Not ‘Pro-Choice’ &
Not ‘Pro-Life’:
On the Morality of Abortion
(& related issues in famine aid and animals and ethics)
Nathan Nobis
www.NathanNobis.com
www.WhyThinkThat.com
aphilosopher@gmail.com
Why did I pick the topic of
abortion?
“It sometimes
appears that the
quality of our
thought on a topic is
inversely proportional
to the intensity of
our emotions
concerning that
topic.”
-- Fred Feldman, Confrontations With
the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the
Nature and Value of Death (Oxford,
1994).
Some common, low quality
‘arguments’ about abortion:
A “pro-choicer”
might say:
A “pro-lifer” might
say:


“A woman has the
right to choose to do
“It’s always wrong to
‘play God.’ Abortion is
‘playing God.’ So
abortion is wrong.”
whatever she wants
with her own body.
Therefore, abortion is
morally permissible.”
These arguments are awful!


Does a woman have
‘the right to choose
to do whatever she
wants with her own
body?’
Obviously not!
Simple, clear
counterexamples
show this.


Is it wrong to ‘play
God’? Depends on
what you mean;
suppose ‘playing
God’ means
‘influencing the size
of the future
population.’
Again, this is
obviously not wrong.
We can do better.
Philosophers – like you – can
help improve how people
reason.
My goal: provide some basic
‘logical skills’ to help us better
think about abortion and help us
help others think more carefully
about the topic.
These skills are helpful in thinking
about other ethical topics also.
Three things to do to think
more carefully about ethics:
1.
Avoid ambiguity.

2.
Words can have more than one meaning, so be
clear on the exact meaning of what is being said.
Ask, “What do you mean by that word (term,
idea)?” (Why is this important?)
Be precise.

Is what is said true (or false) of some things, all
things? (If not all, what are the exceptions?).
“Existential” and “universal” quantifiers are often
missing. (Why is this important?)
Three things to do, from a
logical point of view:
Think in terms of arguments, i.e., sets of
reasons given in defense of various
conclusions.
3.

Ask, “Why think that? What reasons are there?


Often a missing, unstated premise or claim needs to be
added to get from that answer – the offered reason –
to the conclusion. You need to find that and see if
there are any counterexamples to it, i.e., exceptions
which show it to be false.
Are these reasons good reasons?
Suppose you asked, “So what
do you think about abortion?”

Some common responses:
 “I’m pro-choice. I think abortions are
morally ok. It’s not wrong for a woman
to have an abortion.”
 “I’m pro-life; I am against abortion. I
think abortion is wrong. It is not
morally ok for women to have
abortions.”
Logical point: recall ‘precision’



What are these people’s views, exactly? The
quantifiers – all’s and some’s – were missing.
All abortions? Some abortions? Most
abortions? Few abortions? Abortions except
in some special circumstances? (Which?) All
possible abortions?
Always morally wrong (or right)? Never
morally OK (or wrong)? Wrong (or right)
except in special circumstances? Couldn’t be
wrong (or right)?
A response to these common,
imprecise views:


No reason to assume – at the outset –
that all abortions are morally equal or in
the same moral category, i.e., that they
all right or all wrong.
Why’s this? Because abortions affect a
range of beings. Differences in these
beings might make a difference to the
morality of how they should be treated.
E.g., very early embryos & fetuses:
“a fertilized egg, only thirty
hours after conception.
Magnified here, it is no larger
than the head of a pin. Still
rapidly dividing, the
developing embryo, is called a
zygote at this stage”
4- 5 weeks: “Embryo is the size
of a raisin .. embryo's tiny
heart has begun beating. The
neural tube enlarges into three
parts, soon to become a very
complex brain. The placenta
begins functioning. The spine
and spinal cord grows faster
than the rest of the body at
this stage and give the
appearance of a tail.”
And far later fetuses:
“24 weeks - Seen here at six
months, the unborn child is
covered with a fine, downy hair
called lanugo. Its tender skin is
protected by a waxy substance
called vernix. Some of this
substance may still be on the
child's skin at birth at which
time it will be quickly absorbed.
The child practices breathing by
inhaling amniotic fluid into
developing lungs.”
(Pictures from WESTSIDE CRISIS
PREGNANCY CENTER:
http://www.w-cpc.org/ I googled
‘fetal development’ to find it.)
Any morally relevant differences
among the range of fetuses?



Standard “pro-choicer” seems to say ‘no,’ that any
abortion affecting any fetus, at any stage, is morally
permissible. No restrictions are morally justified.
Standard “pro-lifer” seems to say ‘no’ too: any
abortion affecting (almost?) any fetus, at any stage,
is seriously morally wrong. Permitting (almost?) any
abortions would be wrong.
However, you might think that the issues are more
subtle; you might think that (empirical, scientific)
facts about fetuses (and women and girls, too)
makes a difference to the morality of an abortion.
(An aside: a poor objection from
anti-‘extremist’ motivations.


What’s wrong with those two positions – as
they were just characterized – is that they are
‘extreme.’ More ‘moderate’ positions tend to
be correct, when it comes to moral issues.
Response: No, ‘extreme’ positions are
sometimes right. You are an ‘extremist’
about many things: child abuse, rape, torture
for fun, etc. You are against it all the time
and you think any ‘moderates’ are mistaken.)
Despite their differences, fetuses
are human, so abortion is wrong!

Are all fetuses ‘human’? What do you mean?

Recall ‘precision’ & ‘meaning’:


But, as a matter of logic, how to you get from that
true premise to either of these conclusions?:



All biologically human fetuses are biologically human,
that’s for sure! Who would disagree?!
All abortions are morally wrong, or even
Some abortions are morally wrong.
Need to add the missing premise(s)!
Is the missing premise (2)
true or not?
1.
2.
3.
All biologically human fetuses are
biologically human. [True]
Anything that is biologically human is
wrong to kill. (or, if X is biologically
human, then it is wrong to kill X).
Therefore, it is wrong to kill human
fetuses.
Actually, we need to make (2)
more precise. Is it true now?:
1.
2.
3.
All biologically human fetuses are
biologically human. [True]
Anything that is biologically human is
always wrong to kill. (or, if X is
biologically human, then it is always
wrong to kill X).
Therefore, it is always wrong to kill
human fetuses.
Schema for arguments that
premise (2) is false:
If it is true that ‘anything that is
biologically human is always wrong
to kill,’ then ___X___ is also true.
2.
But ___X___ is not true.
3.
Therefore, it is not true that it’s always
wrong to kill anything that is
biologically human. (modus tollens)
What are good candidates for X?
1.
Since (2) is false, this argument
against abortion is not sound.


If the premise was ‘if X is biologically
human, then it’s sometimes wrong to
kill X’ then we’d need more information
to determine whether this was one of
those cases.
New argument: “Fetuses are alive. It’s
always wrong to kill anything living, so
it’s wrong to kill fetuses.” Any better?
Maybe ‘human’ means
something else, like ‘persons.’
People say, “Fetuses are ‘persons’ from
the moment of conception.”
1. All fetuses are persons.
2. All (innocent) persons are always
wrong to kill. [Are there exceptions,
e.g. self-defense?]
3. Therefore, all fetuses are always wrong
to kill, so abortion is wrong.
Premise (2) is questionable. But
are any or all fetuses ‘persons?



Is there a way to rationally answer this
question, i.e., decide what persons are?
I think there is. I think there is a way to
make progress in deciding what terms, words
mean or what their correct definitions are.
The methodology: make lists of things that
are clearly an X, clearly not an X and
things that we’re not clear about. We then
develop a hypothesis that best explains the
patterns in the list.
Building a definition of a person
& getting clear on the concept:
Clearly a person Not Clear Either Way Clearly not a person
Individuals
like us here.
• who else?
•
• Fetuses (or
else we’re just
assuming that
they are, or are
not, “persons”)
• Some (or all?)
non-human
animals
• what / who
else?
• Rocks
• Old cars
• Livers, hearts
• cells, tissues
• Tables, chairs
• Plants
• decomposed
human corpses
• what else?
Does it make sense to say that the concept of
“person” applies to these fictional beings? Were
they to exist, would they be persons?
If God(s), angels, &/or devils
exist, are they persons?
The (traditional, Western monotheistic) concept of God is
an immaterial person who has some exceptional abilities
and attributes, to say the least. Same w/ Eastern religions
Might any of these beings be ‘persons’?
Or are they more like non-persons?
A rough, vague hypothesis: all beings
with a personality, who are conscious,
feeling, with beliefs, desires, memories, a
sense of the future, ability to
communicate, etc. are “persons.”

If this is definition is true, then:




Being biologically human is not logically necessary
for personhood; it is not logically sufficient either.
If God exists, there is a person without a physical
body. So it appears that having a body is not
conceptually necessary to being a person.
Personhood is a consequence of one’s psychology
or mental make-up.
If this definition is false, then what are
persons?! What other definition might work?
Are any fetuses “persons,” on
this characterization?


Early to mid-term fetuses definitely are
not. So the premise ‘All fetuses are
persons’ is false.
Note: don’t get troubled ! Don’t think
that we’ve established this:

if something is not a person, then there
are never any moral constraints on how it
can be treated.
Conclusions on ‘personhood’
argument:
All fetuses are persons. [False]
2.
All (innocent) persons are always
wrong to kill. [False]
3.
Therefore, all (innocent) fetuses are
always wrong to kill, so abortion is
wrong.
The premises are false, so unsound.
1.
Reply: fetuses are ‘potential’
persons!

Reply to reply: “True, some fetuses
could and would become persons.” But,
again, we’d get to the sought
conclusion only if this were true:


If something is a potential X, then X has
the ‘moral rights’ of an actual X now.
X = Parent? President? Tenured
professor? Driver of a car? College
graduate?
Potentiality revisited:

“There are ‘potential people’ “out there” in
the future. Abortion prevents them from
being brought into the world. It is wrong to
prevent people from being brought into the
world, so abortion is wrong.”


But birth control, abstinence and not-doingwhat-you-can-to-reproduce-now do the same
thing. Are those always wrong? 
Another idea: If someone would naturally
develop into something if left alone, then it’s
wrong to prevent that from happening.
Conclusions on some common
anti-abortion arguments:



Arguments from the biological ‘humanity’ and
‘personhood’ of fetuses, as well as various
(simple) arguments from potential all have
false (sometimes unstated) premises. These
arguments are all unsound.
“Self defense” considerations might
sometimes be relevant (if fetuses were
persons). I’ve said little about this.
However, perhaps that there are other, strong
anti-abortion arguments. Ideas?
Why ‘pro-life’ is misleading: the
concern isn’t for all life, or even
all conscious, sentient life.
Indifference to human starvation
and severe poverty:
“The Singer Solution to World
Poverty,” NY Times,
September 5, 1999
Indifference to the deaths, and
suffering, of billions of animals.
A simple argument for
ethical vegetarianism:
1.
2.
3.
4.
It’s wrong to cause, and support, needless
pain, suffering and death, especially when it is
easy to do so.
Buying dairy, meat and eggs supports causing
needless pain, suffering and death.
It is easy to not buy such products (and you &
others can benefit from not doing so)
Therefore, you should not purchase meat, dairy
and eggs.
Back to abortion:
So should you be ‘pro-choice’?



No, not as I’ve characterized it, in terms of
the view that all (possible) abortions are
morally permissible.
Some abortions might have features that
make them morally problematic, perhaps
quite seriously.
Most obvious feature: later fetuses can
experience pain and suffer. Undeniably
relevant. Peter Singer: “If a being is capable
of suffering, there can be no justification for
not taking that suffering into account.”
Fetal Pain:
The Scientific Evidence

Conservative estimates are at 18 weeks,
but the consensus in the medical
literature is that the capacity for a fetus
to feel pain arises at about 28-30
weeks. (David Benetar, “A Pain in the
Fetus: Toward Ending Confusion About
Fetal Pain,” Bioethics, 15, 1, 2001, 5576).
When are most abortions?

Fortunately, nearly all are well before the 18th
week. (4th month!).



CDC data. (See recent article by Ken Himma in
Faith and Philosophy for references).
However, some abortions are, or at least
could be, later. Raise serious moral concern.
“Pro-choicers” seem to want to deny this and
ignore the facts about the possibility of fetal
pain: ignoring something quite important.
Mitigating concerns:
Anesthesia.
 Concerns for the life (quality and
quality) of the fetus or newborn.
 Concerns for the safety and well-being
of the mother.
However, some kind of truly unconditional
“pro-choice” position seems
indefensible.

Is the “most actual abortions are
morally OK, but a few later abortions
might not be” position home free?


Not so easy. The failure of these
arguments against abortion does not
simply establish the permissibility of
abortion.
True, if there’s no reason to think it’s
wrong, then, of course, there’s no
reason to think it’s wrong, but maybe
there are such reasons…
Harder principles to evaluate:



Actions, including abortions (and not having
abortions) affects the future. Which are
permissible and which aren’t? Hard to tell,
esp. in light of “opportunity costs.”
If something is not a person, is not conscious,
and cannot feel pain, then it is never wrong
to kill or destroy it.
Conclusions?? Much more to talk about!