Decisions Under Uncertainty explicitly consider probability again contrast normative (economic theory) and descriptive models examine expected value and expected utility models represent our own utility functions try some numerical examples $ Decisions Under Uncertainty Suppose I flip a coin. If it is heads, you win $15. Tails, you lose $10. Play? What if you believe there is a 10% chance that the coin is “fixed”? How should we choose? How would we know whether or not to play the Massachusetts lottery? Expected Value Principle 18th c. court mathematicians EV = p*V play any gamble if EV > 0 choose so EV is maximized Matrices and Trees Payoff Matrix Events Heads Tails Play 15 -10 Don’t Play 0 0 Acts Events = mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of “States of Nature”, e.g., snow/none Outcomes = consequences (money, pleasure?) Acts = choices, decisions taken Independence Assumption: acts affect outcomes but not events Matrices and Trees, continued * Tree Choice Play Acts Events Outcomes Don't Play Heads Tails Heads Tails +15 -10 0 0 Behavior Doesn’t Match EV People find “gambles” attractive even if the EV < 0, e.g., Mass Lottery People find gambles unattractive even if the EV > 0, e.g., subsidized insurance St. Petersburg Paradox: Flip a coin until heads comes up. Payoff outcome is $2n (n= # flips). What would you pay to play once? Expected Utility People act as if gaining more money has diminishing returns as wealth increases Bernouilli (1738): EU = p*U U(W) = b * log(W) U(gain X) = U(W+X) - U(W) = b*log(W+X) - b*log(W) = b*log[(W+X)/W)] people reject fair gambles (risk aversion), since U(W) > .5*U(W+X) + .5*U(W-X) Diminishing Returns U(W+X) U(W) U(W-X) 0 0 W-X W W+X Psychophysics of Wealth Suppose your current level of total monetary and non-monetary wealth (your “life situation score”) is 1000 points. If I give you $10,000, what would your life situation score be? What if I give you $20,000? What if I took away $10,000? Psychophysics of Wealth 1000 0 0 W-X W W+X W+2X Psychophysics of Wealth, cont. U(W+2X) U(W+X) 1000 U(W-X) 0 0 W-X W W+X W+2X Von Neumann - Morgenstern Axioms Completeness either X > Y, Y > X, or X ~ Y Transitivity if X >~ Y and Y >~ Z, then X >~Z Probability Mix I if X > Y, then X > (p,X; 1-p,Y) > Y More VNM Axioms Substitutability if X ~ Y, then (p,X; 1-p,Z) ~ (p,Y; 1-p,Z) Probability Mix II if X > Y > Z, there must be p such that Y ~ (p,X; 1-p,Z) Solvability of Complex Gambles [p(q,X; 1-q,Y); 1-p,Z] ~ (pq,X; p-pq,Y; 1-p,Z) Why Axioms? If the axioms are satisfied, then there exists a utility function U(X) such that the ordering of lotteries by utilities is equivalent to the ordering of preferences, and U(X) is interval. It can have any monotonic shape. Then we can measure U(X) - Certainty equivalent method - Probability equivalent method Certainty Equivalent Method What is X: X ~ (.5,$0; .5,$10,000) ? i.e., what is your minimum selling price for a ticket worth a 50% chance at $10,000? This procedure identifies U(X) = .5 * U(0) + .5 * U(10,000) We are free to choose a scale for U, usually U(0) = 0 and U(10,000) = 100, thus U(X) must be 50 (we are really looking at a segment of your utility curve above W) Certainty Equivalent, continued What is Y such that: Y ~ (.5, $0; .5, X) ? this defines U(Y) = 25 What is Z: Z ~ (.5,X; .5,$10,000) ? by the axioms, U(Z) = 75 Now, plot a utility function with dollars on the X-axis and utility on the Y-axis Concave is diminishing marginal utility or risk-aversion; convex is risk-seeking Your Utility Curve 100 75 50 25 0 $0 $5,000 $10,000 Probability Equivalent What is the p at which (1-p,$0; p,$10,000) ~ (.5,$0; .5,$5,000) ? this equates the two utilities, so (1-p)*U(0)+p*U(10,000)=.5*U(0)+.5*U(5,000) or, 0 + 100*p = 0 + .5*U(5,000) therefore, U($5,000) = 200*p Try $2,000 and $8,000, etc. This plots another utility curve Numerical Examples assume U(X) = 30+X what is the certainty equivalent or minimum selling price X for (.33,$6; .67,$19) ? U(X) = .33*U(6) + .67*U(19) = .33 * 36 + .67* 49 = 2 + 4.67 = 6.67 utiles; but X in $ ? U(X) = 6.67 = 30+X X = $14.44 (note, EV is $14.67) Numerical Examples, continued What is the certainty equivalent of playing the same lottery twice? $28.88 ? Outcomes are: (.11,$12; .44,$25; .44,$38) U(XX)= .11*U(12) + .44*U(25) + .44*U(38) = .11 42 + .44 55 + .44 68 = 7.68 utiles = 30+X XX = 7.68*7.68 - 30 = $29.02 Numerical Examples, continued What’s the minimum bid for the simple lottery? Is it the certainty equivalent (X)? If you play, you get $6 or $19, but you have already paid your bid $b; not play = U(0) U(not play) = .33*U(6-b) + .67*U(19-b) 30 = .33 36-b + .67 49-b 9b*b + 1740b - 26,780 = 0 Summary Normative economic model has changed over time (from EV to EU) to better represent decision makers’ preferences As we will see, EU is still not a complete descriptive theory The EU model does provide a structure and benchmark for analyzing decisions More on Job Choice Exercise Most (but not all) trust the intuitive model, and try to adjust the linear models to agree Does using intuition first bias the model? Weight ranges varied greatly Weights may be hidden in attribute ratings What would you do if this really