G OVERNANCE I NNOVATION FOR S ECURITY AND
D EVELOPMENT I NTERIM P ROGRESS R EPORT :
G OVERNANCE S ECTOR
Dr. Karen Guttieri
Naval Postgraduate School1
Guttieri@nps.edu
Although the civil dimension of military operations is well-known to be vital to mission
success in locales as diverse as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa, it
remains little understood. Military support to governance and dedicated civil affairs
elements in particular have suffered neglect due to several factors: the policy and
military communities – despite specific responsibilities under international law and US
DoD policy - are skittish about the appearance of “occupation” and wary of “military
government” responsibilities that stem from it; the literature on governance is largely
crafted by civilians with little attention to, or understanding of, military norms and rules;
the literature on military operations is generally focused on kinetic missions with little
attention to, or understanding of, civil domain factors. In short, the literatures that are
available do not effectively speak to one another. Moreover, the subject area is
extremely complex, as state-society relations and expectations vary from place to place,
and technological developments including new roles for social media in civic
participation and empowerment, and new ways of monitoring political governance are
constantly being developed and/or refined.
1. P R E LI MI N A RY L I T E R AT UR E R EV I EW / B I B LI O GR AP HY
The US military has with few exceptions failed to prepare effectively for civilian
obligations in war. Once boots are on the ground, two themes characterize the
military’s approach to transition. The first is civilianization – military efforts to handoff
civilian responsibilities to civilian agencies. The second is indirect rule - a local authority
that will enable US troops to depart, ideally leaving a reformed state with legitimate
authority to govern. Today indirect rule is remade in the form of host nation or partner
capacity building. These themes persist into the recent era, when US policy-makers
naively believed that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq would not require
occupations, federal policy put the Department of State in the lead for stability
operations, and diplomats and commanders sought reliable host-nation partners to
assume the mantle of governance. The history of American civil affairs and military
government shows that while many of the patterns, such as debates about military or
civilian roles, are recurring, there has also been change over time. New agencies, new
1
This is a draft work in progress. The author thanks Herman Semes and Charles
Palmares for research assistance.
1
norms emerged. The civil affairs function shifted from keeping civilians out of the way to
providing for their relief, to addressing the civilian population as the center of gravity.
Another, much larger body of literature addresses governance more broadly, and a
subset of this literature addresses challenges of governance in fragile states or
transitional societies.
C IVIL A FFAIRS
AND
M ILITARY G OVERNMENT
Civil affairs -- “the vanguard of DoD’s support to U.S. government efforts to assist
partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public
health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information” (2010
Quadrennial Defense Review Report) -- has historically played critical roles in conflict
prevention and post-conflict transformation. However, the civil affairs capability has not
lived up to its potential and has often been perceived as maneuver support elements
rather than as strategic assets.
Civil affairs as an historical term of art describes the United States military relationship
with the civilian realm. General George Washington at Valley Forge conducted civil
affairs to secure civilian supply, labor and loyalty.2 Since then, civil affairs has been
prominent during engagements ranging from humanitarian assistance to stability
operations, to counterinsurgency campaigns and its fullest expression in military
government. Military government may seem an anachronism, but it was once a
common form of temporary rule, and the roots of current US military doctrine on
stability operations can be seen in doctrine set forth as early as 1898 and formally
issued in World War II.3 Significant chapters in American military history – the expansion
west, the reconstruction of the South, the liberation of Europe, the formation of
partnerships abroad – are civil affairs stories.4
The US military as an institution has had difficulty embracing the civil affairs mission.
Although the US has conducted more stability operations than conventional wars, 5 the
2
Sandler, Stanley. Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S.
Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991. Fort Bragg, NC: US Special
Operations Command, 1998.
3
Birkhimer, William E. Military Government and Martial Law, 2nd Revised ed. (Kansas
City, MO: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1898; 1904). United States Army, F.M.
27-5 Military Government (1940). The 1940 manual is the first so titled, although an
earlier manual on international law addressed the issues of military government, and
earlier texts informed the army. General Winfield Scott’s General Orders 20 in the
Mexican-American War and the Lieber Code or General Orders 100 in the Civil War
predate the Birkhimer study.
4
Guttieri, Karen Military Government and Civil Affairs: Lost Lessons in the American Way
of War and Peace Draft m.s.
5
Yates, Lawrence A. The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
2
mobilization of overwhelming force remained the mantra of “the American way of war” 6
and the myth of stability operations as exceptional missions persisted.
C I V I L A F FAI R S
IN
H I ST O RI C A L P ER SP E CT I V E
The history of civil affairs is intimately related to that of stability operations, small or
guerrilla wars and counterinsurgency. Keith Bickel’s study of the Marine Corps
development of its small wars doctrine, Mars Learning, although it focuses on tactics
such as ground patrols, provides insight into the rationale for “civil measures,” for
example, in Haiti between 1915-1920.7 A commander was to be “fully posted as to
irrigation, roads, bridges, topography, postal service, telegraphs and telephones,
sanitation, and concessions, and he must also report on all work being performed by the
judiciary, municipal and government officials.” 8 Public works projects such as roads
served dual purpose of providing means to bring goods to market and to bring troops to
trouble spots. It was hoped that works projects would help secure the loyalty of the
population, given low troop to population ratios, and that reform of the civil
government would address the core grievances behind insurgency.
The most comprehensive history of civil affairs to date, Stanley Sandler’s Glad to See
Them Come, focuses on the tactical to operational level of war.9 Harry Coles and Albert
Weinberg volume of World War II documents Soldiers Become Governors and John T.
Fishel’s analysis of late 20th century interventions in Civil Military Operations in the New
World provide a more operational to strategic view. 10 Jeremy Suri’s Liberty’s Surest
Guardian reflects on nation-building as a component of America’s national character.11
Taking an historical perspective helps to show how the military makes sense of its own
practices through changes in context, including transformations in basic constructs such
as military and civilian, war and peace.
6
Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Bloomington: University of Indiana
Press, 1973.
7
Bickel, Keith B. Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine,
1915-1940. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001.
8
Bride, Frank “The Gendarmerie d’Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 3, no. 4 (Dec.
1918), pp. 297-298; cited in Bickel, p. 77.
9
Sandler, Stanley. Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S.
Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991. Fort Bragg, NC: US Special
Operations Command, 1998.
10
Coles, Harry L., and Albert K. Weinberg. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors,
United States Army in World War Ii. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1964. Fishel, John T. Civil Military Operations in the
New World. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997.
11
Suri, Jeremi, Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building From the Founders
to Obama. New York: Free Press, 2011.
3
For example, the concentration of the legitimate use of force in the state is central to
our understanding of civil-military relations, yet few appreciate that monopoly as the
product of social change, namely, the demilitarization of the nobility around 1576 in
England.12 Moreover, while today many nations differentiate between domestic police
and armies oriented against external attack, that distinction is more recent still in
European history.13
M I LI T AR Y D O CT RI N E
AND
O C C UP AT I O N L AW
From the earliest days, civil affairs sought to balance the principles of military necessity
and humanity. Early requirements for civil affairs were driven primarily by military
necessity. Civil affairs were left largely to the commander’s discretion. This worked well
when a commander—such as General Scott during the Mexican-American War—
displayed keen understanding of the relationship between political means and military
ends.14 But the annihilation strategy adopted by the Union Army during the Civil War
made it difficult to reconcile the South with the North at the end of the war, and for that
reason the leadership in Washington commissioned Francis Lieber to develop a code to
define civilian protections.
The April 24, 1863 Lieber Code, General Orders 100, formed the basis of the American
legal doctrine on war known as The Laws of Land Warfare. 15 The Lieber Code served as
a model for European and international regulations, including the Brussels Declaration
in 1874 and ultimately, the 1899 Hague Conference. 16 The 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions (also known as the Hague Regulations), were the first multilateral
12
Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural
Revolution, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 65. This allocation of coercive authority
constitutes a form of relationship between civil and military spheres, and is one of the
defining features of the modern state.
13
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: A.D. 990 - 1990 (Cambridge, MA:
Basil Blackwell, 1990). The police/army distinction is also a civil/military differentiation.
14
Guttieri, ms.
15
In 1892 Major General William E. Birkhimer issued Military Government and Martial
Law, along with a revised edition in 1904 to account for the experiences resulting from
the Spanish-American War. In 1914, the Laws of Land Warfare was revised to take into
consideration international conventions. It was revised again in 1934, 1940, 1956 and
1976, the last revision ostensibly to take into account the breakdown between
combatant and civilian. Donald A. Wells, The Laws of Land Warfare : A Guide to the U.S.
Army Manuals (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992).: 17; full discussion 1-20.
16
Hull, William I. The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contribution to International
Law (Boston; New York: Ginn and Company; Kraus Reprint Company, 1908; 1970).: 467.
Army Service Schools U.S. War Department, Military Aid to the Civil Power (Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas: The General Service Schools Press, 1925).: 32-33.
4
agreements relevant to military occupation.17 The Hague Conventions form the
cornerstone of the international law of armed conflict, and their guidelines regarding
treatment of civilians in conflict are frequently cited in American policy and doctrine – in
this way, coming full-circle.
The primary text of international law addressing military occupation is Article 43 of the
1907 Hague Regulations (IV). In order to balance the needs of the populace with those
of the occupying power, the law of occupation spells out obligations, as well as rights of
the occupying power. It makes clear, for example, that the occupying power should
meet the basic needs of the populace with respect to police and social functions.18 The
critical passage follows:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety [civil life], while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.19
The Hague Regulations established a duty to provide administration, as was widely
practiced at the time.20 However, the conventions of the time were more modest than
those that would arise after the advent of the welfare state.
E V O LV I N G N O R MS
FO R
C I V I L A F FAI RS
Two major normative developments in just the most recent generation have altered the
ground on which the soldier treads: the shift in United Nations non-intervention
doctrine of the 20th century to the Responsibility to Protect (R2) in the 21st, and the
related shift in the locus of sovereignty from regime to population. The growth of
government aid agencies after World War II and the rise of non-governmental
organizations since the 1990s has further complicated the civil-military relationships.
17
See specifically Articles 42-56 of the 1899 Hague II Regulations and the 1907 Hague IV
Regulations. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, October 18, 1907.
18
Davis P. Goodman, "The Need for a Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent
Occupation," p. 1578.
19
Art. 43 of CONVENTION (IV) RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND
Signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907. ENTRY INTO FORCE: 26 January 1910
gopher://gopher.law.cornell.edu/00/foreign/fletcher/HA07-IV.txt. As noted by Edmund
Schwenk, "public order and safety is an inaccurate translation of the authoritative
French text, "l'ordre et la vie publics," refers to order and more broadly, to social and
commercial functions of the community. A better translation would be "public order
and civil life." Schwenk, Edmund H. "Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under
Article 43, Hague Regulations," Yale Law Journal (1945) Vol. 54: 93-416.
20
Benvenisti, Eyal. The International Law of Occupation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1993. p. 4.
5
The nature of war itself, including the technology to fight it and the vision of the peace
to follow, shape the conduct of civil affairs. The landmark study Military Aid to the Civil
Power, published in 1925, described three kinds of occupation: in the first, exemplified
in the occupation of Puerto Rico (1898-1900), the US permanently retains the
conquered territory; in the second, exemplified in Cuba (1898), the US does not hold the
occupied territory once its people are able to stand on their own; and in the third,
exemplified in both postwar Germany (1918) and, much earlier, in Mexico (1847), the
US returns the territory to its former possessor.
Policy intention affects the occupation, but commanders are also able to shape facts on
the ground regardless. General Winfield Scott sought but did not receive guidance from
Washington on troop conduct toward civilians. To propose martial law in the era of
Jacksonian democracy was unpopular, and the Polk Administration neither approved
nor denied Scott’s memorandum. At risk to his own career, Scott then proceeded to
take on the duties of military governor, issuing General Orders 20 to declare martial law
and establish military commissions to prosecute crimes that did not fit within the
purview of a court-martial—crimes committed by inhabitants against US forces, their
retainers and followers; or by the latter against the inhabitants or other elements of the
force.
The appropriate role of the military in governance is a longstanding question. Putting
the military in charge of civil affairs seems contrary to the sensibilities of a modern
liberal state, in which civilian control of the military is sacred. In the early phases of
World War II, US President Franklin Roosevelt had insisted that the administration of
occupied territories would be a civilian responsibility, but after civilian agencies proved
unable to handle the situation in North Africa, the duty fell to General Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Those events prompted the War Department to create a Civil Affairs
Division (CAD) in 1943 with Major General John H. Hilldring as its director. CAD became
a joint Army-Navy planning agency for civil affairs and military government.
Looking to the larger occupation duties ahead, Roosevelt shifted to the view that
“occupation, when it occurs, should be wholly military.” 21 In the words of John McCloy,
a civilian “would be lost that quickly after the close of hostilities.” 22 Civilian agencies
were unprepared, the Hague Convention obliged the military to care for civilians under
effective control, and military necessity required stabilization of territorial gains in the
war.
The Second World War introduced the first formal doctrine, set out in two field
manuals written by Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Judge Advocate General and top
legal expert in the US Army. In 1939, Guillion published FM 27-10 The Rules of Land
21
President Roosevelt cable reported in Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New
York: Macmillan, 1948, Vol. 2, p. 1245.
22
John J. McCloy, US Military Governor and High Commissioner for Germany, 1949-1952
in Robert Wolfe (ed.) Americans as Proconsuls, p. 119
6
Warfare, including a section on civil administration; and in 1940, in light of the war in
Europe, he set to work on FM 27-5 Military Government. These two volumes became
known as “the Old and New Testaments of American military government,” 23 and
underscored the connection between civil affairs and international humanitarian law.
CIVIL OPERATIONS
(CORDS)
AN D
R EV O LU T I O N AR Y D E V E LO P M EN T S UP P O RT
The Vietnam War brought a profound shift due to a footprint of civilian agencies prior to
large-scale military escalation. President John F. Kennedy took an unconventional
approach—later known as special warfare—to the escalating conflict in Vietnam. In
1961, he created the US Agency for International Development to assist in the economic
development and stability of Vietnam and other impoverished nations. In National
Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 124, issued in 1962, he characterized insurgency
as a form of politico-military conflict, and called for the development of new doctrine
and better cooperation among agencies to meet the challenges of insurgents. Kennedy
directed US civil-military efforts toward strengthening the South Vietnamese army and
its government.
After Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson shifted the focus to combat missions;
however, in 1967 Johnson also directed the formation of the Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization. A component of the US
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) under military commander General
William C. Westmoreland, CORDS encompassed all US agencies relevant to civilian field
operations and pacification except the Central Intelligence Agency.24 In sum, Vietnam
was characterized by militarization rather than civilianization of the other war.
Since Vietnam, governmental and non-governmental civilian agencies have grown in
number and authority. However, Congress significantly cut budgets for USAID, for
example, so that the Foreign Service and Civil Service staff dropped from 12,000 during
the Vietnam era to about 2000 today.25 The administration of William J. Clinton
expanded outsourcing to non-governmental and private contractors during
peacekeeping missions.
P R O V I N CI AL R E CO N S T R U CT I O N T E A MS
Following the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the US of September 11, 2001, President
George W. Bush directed the military to aid an insurgency against the Taliban in
Afghanistan, given that the Taliban had provided haven to the al Qaeda leaders who
directed the attack. The accompanying humanitarian effort was given to logisticians
23
Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, Army
Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975; 1990).: 3-4.
24
Guttieri, op cit.
25
Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M.
Cronin. 165-94. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009
7
with minimal civil affairs engagement at the outset, never fully utilizing the doctrinal
Joint Civil Military Operations Center (JCMOTF).
As it became apparent that the Afghanistan mission would require a more sustained
effort than previously envisioned, Civil Affairs officers on the ground innovated. COL
Michael Stout and others recognized the Afghan government’s interest to expand the
influence of President Hamid Karzai’s government outside Kabul to address challenges
from the provinces. These officers reconceived the JCMOTF as a Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and sold the JCMOTF as a combined civil-military effort
like the CORDS program with an international-host-nation capacity building component.
The PRTs were made up of civilians from the State Department and other agencies as
well as civil affairs - although these were by 2003 already in such seriously short supply
that in November 2008 Robert Bebber described the PRT composition as follows:
American PRTs are approximately 80-90 personnel headed by a commander at
the O-5 level, usually a Navy Commander or Air Force Lieutenant Colonel. PRT
members are drawn from the Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard as well
as respective Reserve components. Typically, members have a variety of
backgrounds and specialties and may or may not be engaged in work related to
their normal military occupation. Co-located with the PRTs are civilian
representatives from the Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of
Agriculture as well as contracted local nationals serving in a variety of
capacities, from linguists and laborers to cultural advisors and specialists in law
and health care. (italics added)26
P L AN N I N G S HO RT F A LL S
Administration planning for the US-led invasion of Iraq seriously omitted civil dimension
considerations for many reasons. Senior leaders in the civil affairs community have
conceded privately that the planning team sent to CENTCOM at Tampa was ineffective.
The policy leaders and war planners expected the humanitarian component to be short.
The Bush Administration hired a contractor - retired General Jay Garner - to lead the
Office of Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to provide basic services in the wake of the
invasion. Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the U.S.-financed Iraqi National Congress, said the
day before Garner’s arrival in Iraq on April 21, 2003, "On the issue of the interim
authority, I think General Garner's work of reconstituting the basic services will finish in
a few weeks...Meanwhile, we must start the process of choosing an Iraqi interim
authority to take over the reins of power in the country and the various departments of
the government."27 Instead, Iraq devolved into chaos. Chalabi failed to consolidate
authority.
26
Bebber, Robert J. "The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Counterinsurgency
Operations: Khost Province, Afghanistan". Small Wars Journal. Retrieved 28 December 2013.
27
Martin, Gail , PBS Newshour Iraq in Transition “Iraq: Key Players” date unknown
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq/keyplayers/garner.
html
8
President Bush replaced Garner with a retired diplomat, L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer, who
transformed ORHA into a more robust proconsular entity, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA). Bremer acted as chief executive in Iraq with power to rule by decree CPA Order 2, disbanding the Iraqi Army, would become the most infamous among them.
C I V I L A F FAI R S S HO R T F AL L S
A system of reserve civil affairs experts was intended to develop and sustain specialized
civilian skills - functional expertise - that could be drawn upon as needed. Problems
with the system of functional specialty concentrations among civil affairs personnel
became apparent in the midst of intense demand for CA forces during the occupation of
Iraq after 2003. The Army shifted the organization of reserve units in teams of
functional specialists (Civil Affairs Team or CAT B) as compared to teams of generalists
(CAT A). The distinction between the two became blurred (Malik, p.6). The “functional
specialists” became associated with unfulfilled promise. Changes to civil affairs doctrine
in 2006 narrowed the number of functional specialties to six general areas -- rule of law,
economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public
education -- that did not align neatly with the then-emerging Department of State and
Army special operations doctrine stability sectors.
A study by the Center for Strategic and International Security in 2009 concluded “it is
not clear that the current system of classifying and managing functional specialists
within the civil affairs community is optimized for accessing specialized skills at the
appropriate level,”(pp. 43-44) and recommended that the Army “require civil affairs
personnel with identified functional specialties to take appropriate civil sector
competency tests to validate and classify the level of functional skills.” and “create a
direct commission authority” to bring individuals with advanced functional skills into the
force structure as needed (Hicks and Wormuth, “Future of Civil Affairs,” p. vi).
C I V I LI AN S UR G E
The Bush Administration and Congressional leaders gave new powers to the
Department of State. In December of 2005 the White House issued National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 declaring the US Department of State the focal point 1)
“to coordinate and strengthen efforts...to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction
and stabilization assistance…” and 2) “to harmonize such efforts with US military plans
and operations.”28 NSPD 44 seemingly empowered the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State (S/CRS), created in 2004.
The Department of Defense developed plans to support the “civilian surge” - a civilian
response capacity.29 The S/CRS planned to hire deployable civilians, and the DoD offered
support to an integrated training strategy and the plan to hire, train, and deploy 250
Active Response Corps (ARC), 2000 Standby Response Corps (SRC), and 500 Civilian
28
United States. "National Security Presidential Directive / Npsd-44." White House,
Washington DC: Reprinted by Federation of American Scientists, December 7, 2005.
29
Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M.
Cronin. 165-94. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009
9
Reserve Corps (CRC). Together various agencies collaborated on the development of an
Interagency Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (ICAPF). The expression
“whole of government” replaced the term “interagency” in policy discourse.
S T A BI LI T Y O P ER AT I O N S
AS
C O RE M I SSI O N
At the same time that these events seemed to shift energy to civilian agencies, they also
put the civil affairs elements in the military at the forefront of major developments in
the mission of the United States military and its relationship to civilian agencies. In
November 2005, a DOD Directive 3000.05 for the first time identified stability
operations as “a core U.S. military mission,” that the military should be prepared to
conduct “throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations,
including in combat and non-combat environments.” This message, affirmed in a 2009
DOD Instruction, presented a policy-level determination on the American way of war
debate that had simmered at least since Vietnam.
Despite the obvious importance of civil affairs, the CA force structure was partitioned. In
2006 the Army - home to the largest number of CA forces, mostly residing in the
reserves - split its force structure between special and conventional elements, under US
Special Operations Command and US Army Reserve Command, respectively. This split
roughly aligned with a division between active and reserve components, until
complicated by the addition of a conventionally-oriented active component brigade in
2010. Proponency and doctrine remained with Special Operations Command, home to a
small percentage of the total force structure. Disparities in training and education
between the active and reserve - where resides the preponderance of the force
structure - became more pronounced. In particular, it is difficult for reserve personnel
to access education that is the hallmark of a professional force.
Unfortunately, the hoped-for panacea of a surge of civilian experts failed to materialize.
Career incentives were just not there to induce government workers to leave their
home departments for expeditionary deployments. Unlike military personnel, civilians
could not be compelled to work in dangerous environments. Meanwhile, although the
State Department’s S/CRS had many champions at DoD, there were too few at the State
Department. S/CRS was underfunded and understaffed, and operating in an institutional
culture unwelcoming to its mission. After struggling for several years, the S/CRS was
transformed into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations following the 2010
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). One commentator noted at
the time, “State’s competence in S&R [Stabilization and Reconstruction] is hanging on by
a thread.”30 The “civilian surge” and plans for a cadre of expeditionary civilians as part of
S/CRS have now been largely set aside. In light of these events, the authorities of NSPD
44 ring hollow.
30
The Future of S/CRS – What’s in a Name? Journal of International Peace Operations
30
Volume 6, Number 5 – March-April, 2011. Posted by Heather Price.
30
The Future of S/CRS – What’s in a Name? Journal of International Peace Operations
10
For its part, the US military leadership by the turn of the decade included larger
numbers of veterans familiar with the civil dimension of conflict and interagency
cooperation. In 2010, the DoD reinforced at the policy level the reality of military
obligations. DoD Directive 5100.01 required the Army to be prepared to, when
necessary and directed, “occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial
establishment of a military government, pending transfer of responsibility to other
authority.”
Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations in September 2011 identified the following
stability operations functions: security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization
and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation, and the need for
military contributions to operations design and planning. Civil Affairs perform key roles
in stability operations, as JP 3-07 notes “A civil-military operations staff element (cell,
branch, or directorate) and appropriate employment of civil affairs (CA) forces provides
connectivity and understanding that enables unity of effort within the headquarters and
among stakeholders.” (xi)
In January 2013, the US National Defense Strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, called for the ability to “secure territory and
populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited
period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized
forces” as part of a primary mission to deter and defeat aggression (p. 4). The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council in December 2011 recommended development of joint
civil affairs education “with the overarching goal of equipping and transitioning a CA
officer from a tactical focus in support of Brigade to Corps level formations to a strategic
and operational focus.”
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Reserve and Manpower Affairs (ASA-R&MA) Thomas
R. Lamont addressed structural Civil Affairs deficits in June 2011 with a memorandum
stating his intention to establish a new “… branch proponent that supports the Army’s
total force, with common standards for active and reserve CA forces” (Lamont, 2011).
One important response to ASA Lamont’s concerns was the 2013 establishment of the
Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) to guide the professionalization of
the Civil Affairs force structure. In particular, the IMSG is leading the development of a
new military occupational specialty (MOS) titled 38G - military support to governance
specialists.
The need to clarify military support to governance is particularly acute today, given the
number of missions and organizations now concerned with civil-military planning and
execution. The information domain has become much more diverse with the advent of
new technologies – hardware and software – that enable people to communicate,
organize, and share information. Understanding of the socio-cultural-political dynamics
is critical to success in “the human domain,” defined as “the totality of the physical,
cultural, social, and psychological environments that influence human behavior. The
success of unified action depends upon the application of capabilities that influence the
perceptions, understanding, and actions of relevant populations and decision makers.”
11
(7 August, 2012 Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, ARCIC and USASOC meeting of
General Officers).
12
S UPPORTING S TABLE G OVERN ANCE
US joint doctrine clearly assigns responsibility to military commanders for civil military
operations (CMO), including “directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to
the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (HN).”31
In this context, civil affairs forces supporting commanders “specialize in indirect
approaches in support of traditional warfare (e.g., stability operations) and irregular
warfare. CA forces conduct military engagement, humanitarian and civic assistance, and
nation assistance to influence HN and FN populations.”32 In sum, a major civil-military
mission for military commanders and civil affairs assets supporting them is partner
capacity building.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Roadmap defined partner capacity building as
follows:
“Partnership capacity includes, but is not limited to, the capability to:

Defeat terrorist networks

Defend the US homeland in depth

Shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads

Prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD

Conduct irregular warfare (IW) and stabilization, security, transition and

reconstruction (SSTR) operations

Conduct “military diplomacy”

Enable host countries to provide good governance

Enable the success of integrated foreign assistance”33
Stable governance, as described in the USIP and PKSOI Guiding Principles, is a condition
characterized by “ability of the people to share, access, or compete for power through
nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the
state.”34 Because governance includes delivery of core services such as security, rule of
31
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. "JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations." Washington DC,
11 September 2013. p. ix.
32
JP 3-57 p. xii. “CA forces assess impacts of the population and culture on military
operations; assess impact of military operations on the population and culture; and
facilitate interorganizational coordination. CA Responsibilities CA joint responsibilities
include plan, coordinate, conduct, and assess CAO, and support building partnership
capability. Civil Affairs Operations CAO are actions to coordinate with HN military and
civilian agencies, other government departments and agencies, NGOs, or IGOs, to
support US policy or the commander’s assigned mission.”
33
United States Department of Defense. "QDR Execution Roadmap Building Partnership
Capacity." 22 May 2006. p.4
34
Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. United States Institute of
Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009.
13
law, economic governance and basic needs, this sector is in many ways an umbrella for
the others. Delivery of services enhances legitimacy - the right to rule, or the rightness
of a regime.
Legitimacy implies acceptance of political order: “any political regime, in order to
endure and govern, requires that people believe that those who rule have a right to do
so, that they are not governing in their own selfish interest, and that they are entitled to
use force to sustain order.”35 This definition implies a positive persuasive component of
an attraction to justice as well as the darker influence of coercion in attaining
compliance with rules.36 Voluntary acquiescence is obviously desired. If based not on
the legitimacy of rulers but adherence to accepted processes, a constitution or rule of
law as in Max Weber’s legal-rational authority provides a more stable foundation.
However, in transitional states, not only are rulers often problematic but these
processes are themselves liable to be contested by self-interested actors seeking to
shape that larger structure.
Kal Holsti’s analysis in The State, War, and the State of War describes legitimacy as
twofold: vertical legitimacy pertains to the hierarchical authoritative relationships in
governance, and horizontal legitimacy pertains to the communities that make up the
polity.37 Exclusionary categories of community such as ethnicity create a weak basis for
legitimacy and often, grounds for war. Expanding on Weber’s sociological types of
authority, Holsti offers eight types of authority claims, including consent as already
discussed, religion, ethnicity and task performance. Military victory, according to Holsti,
created legitimate occupation regimes in Germany and Japan following World War II.
Seymour Martin Lipset had years before also cited Germany and Japan as examples, but
his argument rested not on the military victory but the ability of the new democracies to
overcome a legitimacy deficit by means of effective performance of basic governance
functions over time.38 Must military occupiers meet some criteria of effectiveness if they
are to legitimize and thereby stabilize the order they seek to shape?
Two tests - effectiveness and consent - vie for prominence as markers for recognition of
state sovereignty in international law. The de facto or effective control test for
recognition refers explicitly to the regime’s ability to secure habitual compliance of all
within its influence without necessarily being concerned for the means by which that
35
Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz, Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic
Transitions Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 8.
36
Karen Guttieri, “Making Might Right: The Legitimation of Occupation,” 45th
International Studies Association Convention, Montreal Quebec 2004.
37
Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge University Press,
1996.
38
S.M. Lipset, Political Man, The Social Basis of Politics New York: Doubleday, 1959.
14
compliance is attained.39 The Reagan Doctrine in the 1980s rejected the notion that
effective control was sufficient to recognition of government standing, preferring
instead a test of consent of the governed and respect for rights of citizens. Although this
ideological legitimism was rejected at the time, it made a comeback after the victory of
liberalism in the cold war ideological contest. The triumph of liberalism included a
globalization of its democracy and human rights agenda that would become a basis for
“humanitarian interventions” in the 1990s.
The international system, absent a global leviathan, is characterized by anarchy, yet
hierarchy characterizes relations within state structures. The rules of the game
established in the 20th century were rules about avoidance of interference in the
domestic affairs of other states. As the 21st century approached, failures within states
came to be viewed as the primary threat to security. The al Qaeda terrorist attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001 symbolized for many the consequences of
state failure in Afghanistan and elsewhere, that provided a breeding ground for
resistance to the prevailing international order. The literature on governance in
transitional societies is premised on the notion that a system of states is the most
effective form of political order.
P R O V I SI O N
OF
E SS EN T I AL S E RV I CE S
Francis Fukuyama’s measures of stateness include the scope of governmental activity
and the strength of the state, “the ability to plan and execute policies and to enforce
laws cleanly and transparently.”40 This focus on institutional capacity is one of the
hallmarks of the literature on post-conflict reconstruction. Ashraf Ghani and Clare
Lockhart in Fixing Failed States focus specifically on key functions of the state. 41 Primary
among these functions in both accounts is the provision of a monopoly on the use of
force. For Max Weber, it was the successful claim on a monopoly on legitimate use of
force within a given territory that defines the state. Particularly in the early days of an
intervention, establishing public order and providing basic services are essential to the
success of the mission.
S T EW A R D S HI P
OF
S T AT E R E SO U R C ES
Stewardship of state resources is about public administration. Transitional
administrators, or interim regimes, can form in many different ways, and often go
39
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Anders Wedberg trans. New York:
Russell and Russell, 1961; discussion in Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in
International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
40
Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004 p. 7.
41
Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. Fixing Failed States : A Framework for Rebuilding a
Fractured World. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
15
through several transformations.42 Nonetheless, they make crucial decisions affecting
the fundamental rights of the people.
Security sector and civil service reform are some of the most challenging issues in postconflict states. Development of good practices of custodianship of state resources,
transparency and accountability are required.
C I V I C P A R T I CI P AT I O N
AN D
E MP O W ER M EN T
The International Declaration of Human Rights proclaims:
1.
2.
3.
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures. (Article 21)43
The Declaration does not declare any particular form of taking part in governing - just
that some institutional form of governance will enable the expression of the will of the
people.
As James Fishkin notes, one problem with civic participation is that most people are
“rationally ignorant” - “their vote is only one among millions, so why should they care?”
Fishkin developed a an approach called deliberative democracy that involves sampling,
education and small group discussion. His aim is “to show is that these people don’t lack
the competence to make informed decisions. If we give them the right information, in
an institutional design where they become seriously engaged in competing arguments,
they will make informed and thoughtful judgments.” 44
Deliberative democracy, and other civil society building approaches, may offer tools for
civil affairs as facilitators of governance abroad.
P O LI T I C A L M O D ER AT I O N
AN D
A C CO U N T ABI LI T Y
The goal of political moderation is to channel conflict through institutions. Liberal
theory emphasizes the role of civil society and institutions to rein impulses to violence.
At the heart of liberal theory is “a search for principles of political justice that will
command rational assent among persons with different conceptions of the good life and
42
Guttieri, Karen, and Jessica Piombo. Interim Governments : Institutional Bridges to
Peace and Democracy? Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.
43
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
44
http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/783-fishkin-james/784-deliberativedemocracy#
16
different views of the world.” 45 National constituting processes set the rules for
expression, representation and reconciliation of interests. The idea of government by
and for the people begs the question, “who governs and in whose interest should
prevail when there are differences among the people?” Arend Lijphart, in his classic text
Patterns of Democracy provides two alternative answers to that question:
1. the majority of the people (majority rule)
2. as many people as possible (consensus)
Majority rule concentrates power, often in a mere plurality. The consensus approach,
by contrast, uses “rules and institutions [that] aim at broad participation in government
and broad agreement on the policies…” Lijphart’s taxonomy of such systems around the
world identifies ten differences arranged in terms of two dimensions: 1. executive
power related to party systems and 2. federal-unitary distribution of decision making
authority:
1.
2.
executives-party dimension
1.1.
single-party majority cabinets versus executive power sharing
1.2.
executive dominance versus executive-legislative balance of
power
1.3.
two-party versus multi-party systems
1.4.
majoritarian versus proportional representation
1.5.
pluralist interest groups versus coordinated and “corporatists”
interest groups
federal-unitary dimension
2.1.
unitary and centralized versus federal and decentralized
2.2.
unicameral legislature versus two equally strong but differently
constituted houses
2.3.
flexible versus rigid constitutions
2.4.
legislature final word on constitutionality versus judicial review
2.5.
central bank dependence on the executive versus independent
central banks46
45
John Gray in the preface to his volume on liberalism characterizes the perspective as
individualistic, egalitarian, universalist and meliorist. That is, liberal theory tends to
emphasize the rights of individuals, viewed as equals, irrespective of culture or time,
and perhaps most significantly, the possibility of progress for social and political
institutions.
45
John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 91, p. x.
46
Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1999.
17
Some liberals emphasize the potential for international organizations to fill a vacuum of
authority at the international level.47 Another variant of the liberal school relies upon
the character of states themselves for peace, claiming that liberal states are more stable
and peaceful.48An article published by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 fits the second
stream.49 This article was significant, but not only because of its seeming prescience
about the end of the Cold War. Fukuyama’s argument had political consequences,
legitimating the American model of governance and the drive to export democracy. 50
The article was also significant as scholars in the 1990s established empirically that
democracies do not war with one another. As the Soviet empire collapsed, Francis
Fukuyama declared an end of history. However, as Jack Snyder has shown, the
transition to democracy is, on the other hand, typically violent. 51 Snyder’s work is one of
the most important references for anyone participating in a political transition.
2. S TAKEHOLDER A NALYSIS
“Above all, it is important to keep in mind that wars are fought not to be won but to
gain an objective beyond war.”52
In the design meeting on September 18, 2013 the team explored the question “who is
the client”? A humanitarian assistance perspective might name the host nation civilian
as the client; however, the civil affairs are needed because military force has been used
47
This discussion is taken from Guttieri, Toward a Usable Peace Phd Dissertation, 1999.
This approach effectively extends the so-called 'domestic analogy,' or the democratic
procedures for settling disputes within democratic states, to the international realm.
See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to
Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). Idealism of an earlier era
resonates in David Held’s recent advocacy of an international governance system based
upon a model of cosmopolitan democracy.
48
Michael Doyle observes that liberal states create a ‘separate peace.’ Making reference
to Kant’s depiction in an essay on “Perpetual Peace,” written in 1795, the liberal thesis
of democratic peace holds that war is not thinkable between democratic states. Michael
Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 1” Philosophy and Public Affairs
Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983) and “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 2”
Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983); also Bruce Russett, Grasping the
Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
49
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest Vol. 16 (Summer
1989), pp. 3-16.
50
Timothy Dunne notes the political consequences of Fukuyama’s thesis, in particular
the rationale provided therein for humanitarian intervention, the promotion of
democracy by force. Timothy Dunne, “Liberalism” in John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds.)
The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 147-163,
p. 155.
51
Snyder, Jack L. From Voting to Violence : Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. 1st
ed. New York: Norton, 2000.
52
Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War, p. 3
18
in as an expression of foreign policy. This point to the conceptualization of policy and
force set out by Carl von Clausewitz.
Clausewitz described war as a continuation of policy by other means. The decision to
use military force implies a transition in which a mode of policy gives way to a mode of
force. Policy implies a general direction for state action. In war the state takes up arms
and military as opposed to civilian instruments are the locus of movement. Post-conflict
military operations are concerned with a return transition, in which the mode of force
gives way to a mode of policy. The transition from force to policy can be understood in
this light as the natural reciprocal of the transition from policy to force.
Photo 1: GSID PI NPS professor Karen Guttieri depicts policy and force in Clausewitz
with implications for civil affairs. Stakeholder analysis at the Dec 2013 IPR at Stanford
University with research team and sponsors, including BG Van Roosen.
The helix configuration illustrates the ultimate predominance of policy, and the complex
challenge for military commanders who must implement it. As an intervention
progresses, military forces shape and also must adapt to new conditions in the policy
environment. Military intervention to create or support a friendly regime depends upon
non-military processes for the mission to bear fruit. Intervening troops seek to win
19
indigenous, or host-country civilian cooperation to establish order and depart, as quickly
as they are able. Intervening forces hope to establish a friendly regime capable of selfdefense, however, the regime may continue to rely on the intervening military forces for
public order and service provision for some time. In sum, the cyclical nature of war and
peace sets the context for a civil dimension to military operations.
Previously, the GISD design meeting of 18 October grappled with the stakeholders,
political and military, foreign and domestic, with many perspectives: national,
organizational, humanitarian. We recognized the political purposes of the use of force.
We developed the following goals:

sustainable peace

protection/resilience

security and development

consistent with US foreign policy goals
3. K EY P ARTICIPANTS / P OINTS
OF
C ON TACT

BG Cosentino, National War College, National Defense University

James Fishkin, Stanford University

Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University

Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Efffectiveness
4. D ECEMBER I N P ROGRESS R EVIEW (IPR) R EPORT - OUT
Professor Guttieri presented research on the American paradigm of civil affairs through
history, focusing on norms, goals in war, technologies of war, and the relationship
between commanders, policy-makers, and civilians in different historical eras. The topic
of governance was included in nearly all discussion throughout the IPR. A session in
which Stanford Communication Professor James Fishkin spoke on deliberative
democracy started a very thoughtful discussion on what military support to governance
would resemble. Specifically, at length, participants discussed how to transpose the
expert dialogue, as found in deliberative polling, to battlespaces in which Civil Affairs
operates, where experts on any particular subject may be few and far between.
Additionally, from a legal and moral standpoint, we discussed how can Civil Affairs
proffer options to a community without simultaneously imposing cultural standards
foreign to that area. Neither of these issues were unanimously resolved, though the
basic mechanics of truly understanding the human terrain, as in the case of deliberative
polling, can certainly be incorporated into the Assessment phase of Civil Affairs
operations.
5. P RELIMIN ARY P LANNING : S ECTOR I N TERIM P ROGRAM
R EVIEW (IPR) AND P LANNING FOR THE P EACE AND
S TABILIT Y O PERATIONS T RAINING AND E DUCATION
W ORKSHOP (PSOTEW)
The next steps for the governance team involves both desk research and outreach. The
stakeholder analysis identified many organizations relevant to the research effort.
20
During the January IPR we will reach out to stakeholders at NDU and elsewhere in
Washington.
The governance IPR is currently scheduled to take place at NPS in February. That is too
soon. Recognizing that governance is the umbrella competency, this should be the final
topic. following other sector working sessions.
The PSOTEW will include a governance panel. Several governance questions are in the
PSOTEW call for papers, for example, How can governance innovation support
resiliency? What is the role of gender in governance practices?
An example of a certification agency is the American Planning Association. The APA
offers education, and certifies planners: https://www.planning.org/educationcenter/
The jobs descriptions may be useful for the 38G Governance category:
https://www.planning.org/jobs/
Planning for identification of competencies and certifications has begun with the
Department of Labor occupational classifications. Some categories identified include:

11-0000 Management Occupations

11-1000 Top Executives

11-1030 Legislators

11-3000 Operations Specialties Managers

11-3010 Administrative Services Managers

11-3030 Financial Managers

11-3120 Human Resources Managers

11-9000 Other Management Occupations

11-9010 Farmers, Ranchers, and Other Agricultural Managers

11-9020 Construction Managers

11-9030 Education Administrators

11-9040 Architectural and Engineering Managers

11-9050 Food Service Managers

11-9060 Funeral Service Managers

11-9110 Medical and Health Services Managers

11-9120 Natural Sciences Managers

11-9130 Postmasters and Mail Superintendents

11-9140 Property, Real Estate, and Community Association Managers

11-9150 Social and Community Service Managers

11-9160 Emergency Management Directors

43-0000 Office and Administrative Support Occupations

43-1000 Supervisors of Office and Administrative Support Workers

43-1010 First-Line Supervisors of Office and Administrative Support Workers
21
6. E N A B LI N G T E CH N O L O GI ES
Governance is one of the richest areas for enabling technologies. Social media, data
storage, web portals, communications technologies and mapping all provide tools for
administration of governance, mobilization of peace constituencies, and articulation of
interest.
22
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K EY A GENCIES /P OINTS
P R O V I SI O N
OF
OF
C ONTACT : G OVERNANCE
E SS EN T I AL S E RV I CE S

Program on Poverty and Governance, CDDRL (Stanford
University).http://governance.stanford.edu

Center for Effective Global Action (UC Berkeley). http://cega.berkeley.edu

Development Impact Lab (UC Berkeley). http://dil.berkeley.edu

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (Afghanistan).
http://mrrd.gov.af/en
S T EW A R D S HI P
OF
S T AT E R E SO U R C ES

Center for Global Development (Washington, DC). http://www.cgdev.org

Governance Project, CDDRL (Stanford University).
http://governanceproject.stanford.edu
P O LI T I C A L M O D ER AT I O N
AN D
A C CO U N T ABI LI T Y

Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (Stanford University)
http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/stanfordcenter-on-international-conflict-and-negotiation-scicn

Center for Deliberative Democracy (Stanford University).
http://cdd.stanford.edu/

Quality of Government Institute (University of Gothenburg, Sweden).
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se

Department of Social Welfare & Development (Philippines).
http://www.dswd.gov.ph

National Solidarity Programme (Afghanistan). http://www.nspafghanistan.org

Participatory Budgeting Project (Brooklyn).
http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/

Carter Center (Atlanta). http://www.cartercenter.org

Democracy International (Bethesda). http://democracyinternational.com

World Bank Institute: Governance.
http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/topic/governance
C I V I C P A R T I CI P AT I O N

AN D
E MP O W ER M EN T
Freedom House (Washington, DC). http://www.freedomhouse.org
G E N E R AL G O V ERN AN C E
Academic Institutions (US)

Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law (Stanford University).
http://cddrl.stanford.edu

Center for International Security and Cooperation (Stanford University).
http://cisac.stanford.edu

Program in Democracy and Governance (Georgetown University).
http://government.georgetown.edu/cdacs
32
G O V E R N M EN T O R G AN I Z AT I O N S (US)

US Agency for International Development (Washington, DC)
http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-andgovernance

US Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
(Washington, DC). http://www.state.gov/j/drl/index.htm

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (Washington, DC)
http://www.ndi.org
G O V E R N M EN T O R G AN I Z AT I O N S (N O N -US)

Australian Agency for International Development (Australia).
http://aid.dfat.gov.au

Non-Governmental Organizations (US)

Asia Foundation (San Francisco). http://asiafoundation.org

Urban Institute Center on International Development and Governance
(Washington, DC). http://www.urban.org/center/idg
N O N -G O V ER N M EN T A L O R G AN I ZA T I O N S (N O N -US)

Transparency International (Germany). http://www.transparency.org

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (Netherlands).
http://www.nimd.org
I N T E R N AT I O N A L O R G A N I Z AT I O N S

United Nations: Department of Political Affairs.
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
http://www.unrisd.org

United Nations Development Programme: Democratic Governance.
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgoverna
nce/overview.html

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. http://www.osce.org
33