Developing a New System Safety Standard
for U.S. Army Aviation
Presented at the
International Helicopter
Safety Symposium 2005
Montréal, Québec, Canada
September 28, 2005
David B. West, PE, CSP, CHMM
SAIC
6725 Odyssey Drive
Huntsville, AL 35806
(256) 313-2091
david.b.west@saic.com
Developing a New System Safety Standard
for U.S. Army Aviation
OVERVIEW OF PRESENTATION
Introduction – the domain of U.S. Army Aviation
What it is, who’s involved, and what they do
Existing Standards and Regulations
From DoD Instruction 5000.2 on down
The Current Situation and Its Challenges
Similarities and differences among the various Army Aviation
system safety programs
Opportunities to Benefit from Standardization
Recommendations
Introduction
U.S. Army Aviation
Over 5000 Aircraft – the largest fleet in the world
Helicopters, Fixed Wing Aircraft, UAVs
Majority of helicopters:
CH/MH-47 Chinook
UH/MH-60 Black Hawk
AH-64 Apache/Longbow
OH-58 Kiowa/Kiowa Warrior
Fixed wing aircraft – a variety, managed under a single Army PM
UAVs – increasing in importance; managed by a separate PM
Special Ops Aircraft; managed by TAPO
Introduction (cont.)
Who’s Who of U.S. Army Aviation


Aircraft Manufacturer (OEM) or Prime Contractor

“Foundation” of each Army aviation program

Provides the aircraft and after-market services
PEO Aviation; owns and manages all Army aircraft

Program Managers (PMs) to manage each major program
(e.g., Cargo Helicopters, Utility Helicopters, etc.)


In some cases, Product Manager reports to PM (e.g.,
Fixed Wing Product Manager reports to PM Aviation
Systems)
RD&E Command / AMRDEC / Aviation Engineering Directorate
(AED)

Matrix engineering support to programs
Introduction (cont.)
Who’s Who of U.S. Army Aviation (cont.)


Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM)

Airworthiness (per AR 70-62); delegated to AED

“Gatekeeper” of System Safety Processes

Issues Safety of Flight (SOF) / Aviation Safety Action
Messages (ASAM)

Coordinates and tracks all system safety risk
assessments (SSRAs)

Reviews and coordinates on AWRs, ECPs, MWOs,
RFD/RFWs, SARs, test plans, etc.
Developmental Test Command (DTC)

Operates Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC)
Introduction (cont.)
Who’s Who of U.S. Army Aviation (cont.)


Combat Readiness Center (CRC)

Formerly the U.S. Army Safety Center

Conducts accident investigations; maintains accident data

Director of Army Safety is also CRC Commander
Army Safety Action Team (ASAT)


Senior Army leadership; reviews Army-wide safety issues
Developmental Test Command (DTC)

Operates Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC)
Existing Standards and Regulations

DoD Instruction 5000.2

Single paragraph on ESOH in Enclosure 7 (HSI):
“[PM must] prevent ESOH hazards where possible, and ...
manage ESOH hazards where they cannot be avoided.”



Four risk levels and their acceptance authorities
MIL-STD-882

“Tailorable” – selected application of requirements

First published 1969; Rev. E to be published 2005
AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy

Specifies Army’s risk management process
Existing Standards and Regulations
(cont.)

AR 70-1 provides “risk decision authority matrix”
Existing Standards and Regulations
(cont.)

AR 385-16, System Safety Engineering and Management

Requires major Army programs to establish SSWGs

Standardizes the system safety risk assessment (SSRA)
process
Existing Standards and Regulations
(cont.)

PEO Aviation Policy Memo 05-14
Existing Standards and Regulations
(cont.)

PEO Aviation Policy Memo 05-14 (cont.)

Outlines responsibilities of PMs, AED, SSWGs for all
programs under PEO Aviation

Requires source-mechanism-outcome description of
hazards

Requires use of common risk matrix:
The Current Situation and Its Challenges
Similarities / Differences in Application of
System Safety to Army Aviation Programs

Similarities – the good news:

Some due to deliberate attempts (e.g., PEO Policy Memo),
such as common risk matrix, SSRAs, ASAM/SOF

Some safety issues common due to general nature of Army
Aviation and helicopter design

Short duration, low altitude flight

Engine failure; autorotation

Similar flight control and rotor system mechanisms

Identical or similar weapon systems or auxiliary
systems on different platforms
The Current Situation and Its Challenges
(cont.)
Similarities / Differences (cont.)

Differences in safety considerations:

Kiowa autorotation vs. Chinook or Black Hawk autorotation

Single engine vs. multi-engine

No. of crew/passengers: 0 (UAVs) to 2 (Kiowa, Apache) to
30+ (Chinook)

Helicopter hazards vs. fixed wing hazards

Common risk matrix, but different interpretations

Considerable variations in SSPPs, Hazard Tracking
Systems

See Table 1 in paper
Frequency of
Practice
Opportunities to Benefit from
Standardization
Minimum
Acceptable
Exemplary
“State-of-theArt”
Consensus
Cutting
Edge
Level of Detail and Accuracy
Goals:
(A) Improve mean practice
(B) Decrease spread in
practices
(B)
(A)
Source: APT Research,
“Revising Draft MIL-STD882E; Strawman
Improvements and
Rationale.” Presentation
by Pat Clemens at the
110th meeting of the GEIA
G-48 System Safety
Committee. 2005.
Opportunities to Benefit from
Standardization (cont.)

Make life easier for Army leadership (e.g., ASAT) that deal with
all Army Aviation programs

Enhanced agility of work force

Shared resources – e.g., Hazard Tracking Systems
I-C Hazard
=
I-C Hazard
Opportunities to Benefit from
Standardization (cont.)
Hazard Frequency (Mishaps per 100,000 Hrs (11.4 years))
Severity
End of Life on
Planet Earth
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
N
M
L
K
J
1E-11
13
$2Q 1B Fatal
Cataclysmic2
$200T 100M Fatal
TBD 11
$20T 10M Fatal
TBD 10
$2T 1M Fatal
TBD
9
$200B 100K Fatal
Disastrous 8
$20B 10K Fatal
Catastrophic 7
$2B 1K Fatal
Catastrophic 6
$200M 100 Fatal
Catastrophic 5
$20M 10 Fatal
Catastrophic 4
$2M 1 Fatal
Critical 3
$200K
Marginal 2
$20K
Negligible$2K
1
1E-10
1E-9
1E-8
Super Incredibly Extremely Very
Improbable Remote OccasionalProbable Frequent
Improbable
Improbable
Improbable
Improbable
I
1E-7
H
1E-6
G
E
F
0.00001 0.0001
0.001
D
0.01
C
0.1
B
1
A
10
Earth encounter with an asteroid
High
Serious
Medium
B-2
Low
F-22, C-17
AH-64, CH-47, UH-60
C-12, OH-58D
Small Unmanned Air Vehicles
Opportunities to Benefit from
Standardization (cont.)

Specific Areas of Opportunities:

Risk Summation

Risk Matrix Modernization

Definitions

Boilerplate SSMPs

Minimum Requirements for Hazard Tracking Systems

List of Generic Hazards

Lessons Learned

Online Access
Recommendations

Develop and publish a new standard for application of System
Safety to U.S. Army Aviation

All affected organizations should be involved

Incorporate specific opportunities cited herein