Slide 2
Learning Objectives
Summarize the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor.
 Explain US and Japanese strategy at
the opening of WWII.
 Be familiar with the timeline of key
events in the Pacific Theater.
 Summarize the battles for Guadalcanal,
Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.
 Describe the decisions that led to the
employment of the atomic bomb.

Slide 3
The Road to War

Japan sought to control of “East Asia” for
additional markets and sources of raw
materials
– Invades China in 1931.
– Invades French Indochina in 1940.
“Colonial” governments begin imposing
embargoes to put brakes on Japanese
expansion.
 Japanese armed forces argue that they must
strike to relieve pressure of embargoes.

– Expect conflict, but buy time and surprise through
negotiations.

US and UK focused on war in Europe.
Slide 4
Japanese Strategy

Three Phases
– Phase I: Surprise attacks, then strategic
defense.
• Knock out US fleet; seize vital areas; establish
defensive perimeter.
– Phase II: Strengthen perimeter; make any
offensive action by the US prohibitively
costly.
– Phase III: Defeat and destroy any forces
that attempt to penetrate the perimeter.

Long US LOC and natural strength of
defense should almost guarantee
success.
Slide 7
Pearl Harbor

Surprise

Critical Vulnerability??
– Deception operations
– First significant use of carriers.
– Tactical home run, but strategic foul ball…or
strikeout?
– US Pacific Fleet
• Destruction of battleships proved
counterproductive.
– US carriers proved to be “surface” that cost Japanese
the war.

Fog and friction?
Slide 9
Who’s in charge?

General MacArthur
– SWPA
• Southwestern Pacific
• Many large land masses
– Maneuver
– Retake PI
– Island Hop, but larger
land masses.

Admiral Nimitz
– POA
• North, Central, Southern
Pacific
• Primarily open ocean
– Carrier Air
– Island Hop
Slide 12
Island Hopping Campaign

LtCol (then Maj) “Pete” Ellis develops OPLAN 712
“Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia” (aka
“the Orange Plan”) in 1921.
– Predicts that Japan will strike first.
– " . . . it will be necessary for us to project our fleet
and landing forces across the Pacific and wage war in
Japanese waters. To effect this requires that we have
sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during its
projection and afterwards. To effect [an amphibious
landing] in the face of enemy resistance requires
careful training and preparation to say the least; and
this along Marine lines. It is not enough that the troops
be skilled infantrymen or artillery men of high morale;
they must be skilled watermen and jungle-men who
know it can be done--Marines with Marine training."
Slide 13
MajGen Lejeune circa 1923

"... on both flanks of a fleet crossing the Pacific
are numerous islands suitable for utilization by
an enemy for radio stations, aviation,
submarine, or destroyer bases. All should be
mopped up as progress is made. . . The
presence of an expeditionary force with the
fleet would add greatly to the striking power of
the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. . . . The
maintenance, equipping, and training of its
expeditionary force so that it will be in instant
readiness to support the fleet in the event of
war, I deem to be the most important Marine
Corps duty in time of peace."
Slide 15
Logistics

Logistics plays a crucial role in the Pacific.

Japanese have qualitative edge in military
hardware at the beginning of war.
– Island Hopping to seize advanced (primarily air)
bases and cut Japanese LOC.
– Choose quality over quantity (Zero, Yamato).
– Unable to replace assets quickly.

US is master of mass production.

US subs operate independently and sink
Japanese ships faster than Japan can
produce them.
– Average quality, tremendous quantity.
– Implement ideas from captured equipment.
Slide 16
1941

December 7 Pearl Harbor

Dec 8
US & GB declare war on Japan

Dec 9
China declares war on Japan

Dec 10 Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk

Japan invades Burma, Hong Kong,
Philippines, Guam, Wake, & Borneo
Slide 17
1942
The Empire Expands

February
Singapore falls

March
New Guinea

April
Bataan

May
Corregidor
Slide 18
1942

April Doolittle Raid on Tokyo

May Coral Sea
– Tactical evolution with strategic impact.
– Shifts morale in both countries
– Adapt and overcome…
– “Stop the enemy”
– Tactical victory for Japan
– Strategic victory for US
June Midway
 July-November Guadalcanal

– Island not officially “secured” until Feb ’43.
Slide 20
Battle of Midway June 1942

Original perimeter not sufficient.
– Doolittle raid concerns Japanese.
– Want base to bomb Hawaii.
– Deliver killing blow to US fleet.
Security
 Simplicity
 Yamamoto uses “operational push”
tactics.

– Attacks island before locating US fleet.

First naval battle fought entirely with
airplanes.
Slide 21
Midway: The Tide Turns

Patrol planes spot Japanese main body just as
they are about to RTB.
 Midway-based A/C strike Japanese TF
 Japanese A/C attack Midway with little impact.
– Rearm w/ bombs or torpedoes?

US carrier-based torpedo attack has same
outcome as land-based attack, but distract
fighters and allow dive bombers to hit TF while
planes rearm/refuel.
– Aviation “combined arms”?

Japanese lose four heavy carriers, all planes,
and many of their best pilots; US loses
Yorktown.
Slide 23
Guadalcanal

7 August 1942
 First offensive action of the war.
 Critical airfield.
– First plane makes emergency landing on 12 Aug.
– 2 USMC squadrons arrive on 20 Aug.
– Only one “healthy” carrier left by end of battle.

Strategic offense; tactical defense
 Navy bugs out, taking majority of supplies
with them.
– Redeem themselves during critical 12 Nov naval
battle when they turn back major Japanese force.
Slide 24
Guadalcanal

Japanese piecemeal counterattacks.
– Maneuver, mass, and surprise all
hampered by jungle.
• 8 day forced march
– USMC conducts vigorous patrols as part of
“active defense”.
• 2d Raider Bn conducts month-long patrol.
– Japanese attempt to reinforce by sea, but
suffer significant losses in the process. (7
of 11 transports)

Jungle causes significant casualties.

Army comes in to mop up in November.
– Over 1k new cases of malaria per week.
Slide 25
Results
Island “secured” in Feb ’43.
 Japan suffers critical losses in all areas.

– 600 a/c, 2300 aircrew
– 25k soldiers (1/2 in combat, ½ to illness)
– 2 BB, 3 CV, 12 Cruisers, 25 destroyers
• Roughly same number as US, but Japan
unable to replace.

Institution of CATF/CLF.
1st Marine Division Staff
23 Generals, 1 Admiral, 3 Commandants;
40 officers with 700 yrs of combined service.
Slide 30

1943

1944
– March Bismark Sea (limited Japanese
reinforcement of Southern Pacific)
– November Tarawa and Makin (Gilberts)
– February
Kwajalein & Eniwetok (Marshalls)
– February-June New Guinea
– June-August Saipan, Tinian, Guam (Marianas)
• B29s now able to be recovered after hitting Japan
– October
Leyte Gulf
• Destroyed much of Japanese Navy
Slide 31
The Low Road

MacAurthur leap-frogs through his AO.

Seizure of New Guinea puts him in a
position to retake Philippines.
– Skips heavily defended islands and areas
and leaves them to “wither on the vine” by
taking less well defended surrounding
islands and cutting off LOC.
– Works around coast of NG to take
advantage of naval superiority, again
bypassing and cutting off strong points.
• Critical vulnerabilities?
Slide 32
1945
February-March Iwo Jima
 March Tokyo raids

• Low level incendiary bombing runs with much
destruction. Designed to force surrender but
didn’t.
April-June Okinawa
 August

• 6th Hiroshima
• 9th Nagasaki
• 14th Japan surrenders.

September 2
VJ Day
Slide 34
Iwo Jima




D-Day 9 Feb 1945
Airfields again the objectives.
450 ships
Pre-invasion bombardment shortened from
12 to 3 days.
– Weather limited effectiveness of even this.

3rd, 4th, 5th MARDIVs

Southern half of island in US hands by D+2.
– 1st wave gets ashore, but when bombardment lifts
for them to move inland, all hell breaks loose.
– Takes 34 more days to secure remainder of island
(8 square miles total).
Slide 35
Iwo Jima

Nothing fancy; simple but costly.

36 days, 26k US casualites including 6k KIA.

– “Throwing human flesh against reinforced concrete.”
– 1 of every 3 US personnel that went ashore was
wounded or killed.
1k of 20k defenders survived
 2400 B-29s w/ 27k crewmen made unscheduled
landings on island by the time the war ended.
 27 Medals of Honor awarded.
"The battle of Iwo Island has
been won. The United States
Marines by their individual and
collective courage have
conquered a base which is as
necessary to us in our
continuing forward movement
toward final victory as it was
vital to the enemy in staving off
off ultimate defeat. By their
victory, the 3d, 4th and 5th
Marine Divisions and other units
of the 5th Amphibious Corps
have made an accounting to
their country which only history
will be able to value fully.
Among the Americans who
served on Iwo Island,
uncommon valor was a
common virtue. "
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
Slide 39
Okinawa





D Day 1 April
Last stop before the mainland.
1200 ships
1, 2, 6 MARDIV + 3 Army divisions
USMC heads north; secures northern ½ of island
by D+4.
 Combined Army/USMC battle determined
Japanese defenders until late June.
– Gen Geiger named to command Tenth Army when
Buckner is KIA.

Better job of using combined-arms, but still ugly.
Slide 41
Desperation
Kamikaze = Divine Wind
 1900 planes launched against US
during Battle for Okinawa.

– 6 April
• 355 launched
– 22 get through defenses
» 3 US ships sunk.
Slide 42
The Costs

US

Japan
– 7k KIA
– 31k WIA
– 130k KIA
– 10k POW
– Lost 700+ aircraft
Victory was never in doubt…What was in doubt, in all our minds,
was whether there would be any of us left to dedicate our cemetery
at the end, or whether the last Marine would die knocking out the
last Japanese gun and gunner. Let the world count our crosses.
MajGen Graves Erskine, CG 3d Marine Division, following the
Battle for Iwo Jima
What platoon are you guys?
Platoon, hell! We’re the 2nd Battalion, 22d Marines, what’s left of
us anyway.
Exchange between Marines following the Battle for Sugarloaf Hill
on Okinawa, May 1945
Slide 45
A New Formula for Mass


Japan warned, but refused to surrender.
Planners estimated invasion would result in 35x as many casualties as at Okinawa.
 Hiroshima
– 6 August 1945
– HQ, Japanese 2nd Army
– 60-70k killed or missing

Nagasaki

Compare

Logical outcome of “Total War”?
– 9 August
– 40k killed
– Dresden 35-135k
– Tokyo 120k KIA/WIA
Slide 48
For Further Study









At Dawn We Slept
Guadalcanal
Goodbye Darkness
Battle Cry
With the Old Breed
Iwo Jima, Legacy of Valor
A Marine Named Mitch
Once a Legend
Hoffman
Once a Marine
Prange
Frank
Manchester
Uris
Sledge
Ross
Paige
Vandergrift
Slide 49
Questions?