Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment
and Prevention and Mitigation
Strategies
June 11, 2004
Teaching Nonproliferation Summer Institute
University of North Carolina, Asheville
Dr. Charles D. Ferguson
Scientist-in-Residence
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
the Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon
 Crude nuclear weapon or
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
 Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear
power plant or other nuclear facility
 Radiological dispersal device (RDD)
or “dirty bomb”

Assumptions
 Unlike Cold War, today the main nuclear
threat comes more from non-state actors,
i.e. terrorists.
 Terrorists could not launch multiple numbers
of nuclear weapons at U.S., but if they had
one, we cannot rule out them having many.
 Most likely terrorists, if nuclear capable,
would only be able to build low-yield device,
but cannot rule out acquisition of intact
nuclear weapon from a state.
Elementary, My
Dear Watson

Motive

Means

Opportunity
Assessing Risk
Risk = Probability X Consequence
Large uncertainties
Lack of data
Alternatively:
Risk = Motivations X Intentions X
Capabilities X Consequence
Need to understand terrorist group
motivations, capabilities, and dynamics
Key Security Principles




Understanding and Reducing Risks
Practicing Defense-in-Depth or Multi-layered
Security Approach
Leveraging Assets Both Nationally and
Internationally
Understanding the Chain of Necessary, but not
Sufficient, Conditions to Terrorist Acquisition
and Use of Nuclear Assets
How to Become a
Nuclear Terrorist?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Highly-Motivated Terrorist Group Desiring
Extreme or Unconventional Levels of
Violence
Technically Skilled or Can Hire Such Skills
Acquire Needed Materials
Smuggle Materials to Safe Haven
Build/Acquire or Hire Other Group to Build
or Acquire
Deliver Weapon to Target
Detonate/Use Weapon at Target
Terrorist Motivations



Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude
nuclear weapon terrorist attacks?
Those who study terrorist motivations are
“underwhelmed by the probability of such
an event [radiological or nuclear
terrorism] for most – but not all – terrorist
groups.” – Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation,
Nov. 2001
Psychological and political constraints are great
for most groups
Terrorist
Motivations (Cont.)


Post identified two groups that might engage in
large scale radiological dispersal:
 Non-traditional religious extremists (closed cults)
 Religious fundamentalists* [politico-religious]
Several groups might be motivated to use limited
radiological attacks or attempt credible hoaxes:
 The above two, and
 Social-revolutionary*
 Nationalist-separatist*
 Right-wing
*Would not want to alienate their constituencies.
Worst-Case Nuclear Threat:
Terrorists with
Nuclear Weapons





Even a crude nuclear
weapon could destroy the
heart of a city.
100,000 or more could die
immediately.
Devastating political and
economic effects.
$2 Trillion or more in
immediate costs.
Global economic depression?
Terrorist-Constructed
Nuclear Weapon
(Improvised Nuclear Device)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Terrorists must be motivated to conduct
extreme violence using nuclear weapons.
They must have or hire the technical
expertise to build an IND.
They must acquire the necessary amounts
of fissile material (HEU or plutonium).
They must be able to transport the
material without being detected and
caught.
They must deliver the IND to a target.
They must be able to detonate it.
Ease of Building Guntype IND?
“With modern weapons-grade uranium, the
background neutron rate is so low that
terrorists, if they have such materials,
would have a good chance of setting off
a high-yield explosion simply by
dropping one half of the material onto
the other half. Most people seem unaware
that if separated HEU is at hand it’s a trivial
job to set off a nuclear explosion … [and]
even a high school kid could make a bomb
in short order.”
-- Luis Alvarez, Adventures of a Physicist
Required Skills to Build
an IND



Schematic drawings – widely available
Detailed drawings – not available  Large number
of man-hours required to prepare
Need team skilled in:







Physical, chemical, and metallurgical properties
Material characteristics affecting fabrication
Neutronics and radiation effects
High explosives and chemical propellants
Hydrodynamics
Electrical circuitry
Unlikely that an individual would possess all
these skills and knowledge even after years of
training
Need a team.

Source: Mark et al. (1986)
Gun-type vs.
Implosion-type IND

Gun-type:
– Simplest design
 Cannot use plutonium; must use HEU

Implosion-type:
– More sophisticated, but still first generation
weapon
 Can use either plutonium or HEU
Gun-type IND
Implosion-type IND
Major Hurdle:
Acquisition of Fissile Material
Material Type
Global Inventory
(metric tons)
Military plutonium (Pu)
250
Civil Pu, unirradiated
205
Civil Pu, irradiated
1,065
Military HEU
1,670
Civil HEU
Ref: David Albright and Mark Gorwitz, ISIS, 1999
20
HEU First Strategy

Large stockpiles of HEU plus relative
ease of construction of gun-type
device 
Need to prioritize securing,
consolidating, and eliminating HEU.
Eliminate by down-blending into a lowenriched (non-weapons usable) form.
HEU Stocks of
Biggest Concern






Russia – about 500 metric tons outside of
weapons
Pakistan – smaller stocks, but turbulent
region
Research facilities – dozens of sites in some
40 countries; about 20 tons of HEU
Naval and maritime use
North Korea and Iran?
United States?
Accumulation of Pu


Some states such as France, Japan,
and Russia continue to separate tons
of plutonium per year
Even reactor-grade Pu can be used in
nuclear bombs
Acquisition of Intact
Nuclear Weapon

Theft

Purchase

Gift?

Coup
Arsenals of
Nuclear-Armed Nations
Ref: NRDC, “Nuclear Notebook,” 2002
Nation
United States
Russia
France
Britain
China
Israel
India
Pakistan
North Korea
Total Active
Weapons
9,650
8,380
288
200
400
75-200
30-35
24-48
1-3?
Total Inactive
Weapons
2,700
8,000-10,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Greatest Risks of
Terrorist Acquisition

Russia –
Large numbers of forward deployed tactical
nuclear weapons

Pakistan –
Presence of al Qaeda
Unstable political system
Parts of government (ISI) sympathetic to
terrorist causes
Nascent nuclear command & control system
Highest Priority Efforts to
Prevent Terrorist Acquisition of
Intact Nuclear Weapons



Press Russia to bring forward deployed TNWs
into central storage – in general the most
portable weapons are the most vulnerable.
U.S.-Russia need to work toward mutual and
transparent nuclear weapons dismantlement
Provide security assistance to Pakistan
contingent on constraints of NPT
Attacks on or Sabotage of
Nuclear Power Plants and
Other Nuclear Facilities

Commercial nuclear power plants

Research reactors

Spent fuel storage pools

Reprocessing facilities
Attacks on Nuclear
Facilities –
Worst consequence

Major consequence of
successful attack: release
of radioactivity off-site
 Soviet-designed plants
without containments, e.g.,
Chernobyl-type plants
(RBMKs)
 13 are still operating.
 Also, many reactors in the
UK do not use containments.
U.S. Nuclear Power
Plants
Good News:
 All U.S. NPPs have reactor
containments.
 All employ defense-in-depth safety
systems.
 NRC responded quickly after 9/11 to
enhance security.
U.S. NPPs (Continued)
Bad News:
 Vulnerability to airplane attack?
 Control rooms and most nuclear spent
fuel pools are outside containment
structures.
 External power supplies and water
intakes could be vulnerable.
Research Reactors
Good News:
 Small inventory of radioactivity compared to
commercial NPPs.
Bad News:
 Spent nuclear fuel here could be portable.
 Many research reactors located in or near
universities.
 Many do not use or have weak containments.
 Many still use HEU for fuel or have it on-site.
 Mainly concern for foreign research facilities.
Priorities for Protecting
Nuclear Facilities




Ensure that design-basis-threat accounts for
9/11-type attack and need to factor in
beyond-design basis threats.
Take quick fix actions to upgrade protections
around control rooms and spent fuel pools.
Make sure that research facilities also are
employing defense-in-depth security
measures.
Need performance-based, not compliancebased security system.
RDDs: A Rising Concern


RDD = Radiological Dispersal Devices such
as “dirty bombs”
Heightened Concern: Are radioactive
materials secure?



Attacks of September 11, 2001
Al Qaeda has expressed
interest in RDDs
Widespread news reporting
Characteristics of RDDs

RDDs are NOT Weapons of Mass Destruction
– Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly
after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD

RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption
Major effects:


Panic (psychological and social effects)
Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)
Components of
Radiological Weapons

Radioactive materials:
 Radioactive sources: Used in medicine, food
irradiation, research, industrial gauging, oilprospecting, etc.
 Spent nuclear fuel
 Nuclear waste

Means of dispersal:
 Conventional explosives
 Fizzle-yield improvised nuclear devices
 Aerosolized particles
 Contamination of water supplies
FAS Study: Cesium Bomb
2 curies Cs-137; 10 lb. TNT X
Location of my
home
Inner ring: 1 cancer death/100 people due to remaining radiation
Middle ring: 1 cancer death/1,000 people
Outer ring: 1 cancer death/10,000 people: EPA recommends
decontamination or destruction
Goiania, Brazil, 1987
Cesium-137 Dispersal
Incident





Scavengers broke into abandoned medical facility
Stole 1,375 curie Cs-137 source
Cut into pieces and distributed to friends and family
Junk dealer caused further dispersal of powdered
source
Results:
 Four deaths and one arm amputation
 Some 200 people contaminated
 More than 110,000 monitored (Fear mongering
via news media)
 Massive cleanup that captured most of the
materials (about 1,200 curie)
High-Risk Materials?
HIGH RISK
LOW RISK
High-Risk Materials
(cont’d)

Finding: Only a small fraction of commercial
radioactive sources pose inherently high security
risks
But still large number

High-risk sources are:

Portable
 Dispersible
 More radioactive

High-Risk Radioactive
Source Examples
Radiography Sources
Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators (RTGs)
Mobile Cesium Irradiators
High-Risk Materials
(cont’d)
Only 7 reactor-produced radioisotopes present high
security concern:
• Internal Health Hazards (Mainly):
 americium-241
 californium-252

plutonium-238
• Internal and External Health Hazards:




cesium-137
cobalt-60
iridium-192
strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard)
Radioactive Source
Lifecycle
Illegitimate
Users
Radioisotope
Production
Source
Manufacture
Recycling/
Manufacturer
Disposal
Legitimate
Users
Disused
Sources
Orphan
Sources
Govt.
Disposal
Site
Ref: Greg van Tuyle, Los Alamos National Laboratory; CNS Occasional Paper No. 11
Major Areas of Concern
1. “Disused” Sources
2. “Orphaned” Sources
3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing
Countries
4. U.S. Export and Domestic Licensing Rules
5. Consequence mitigation and public education
1. “Disused” Sources

Bad News:






Large numbers
Vulnerable to theft, diversion
Potential safety hazard
Could become “orphaned”
Inadequate disposal facilities
Good News:
accounted for
”Disused” sources are largely
2. “Orphaned” Sources

Bad News: Many Thousands of High-Risk
Sources
– Result of:


High disposal costs
Lack of adequate depositories
– Most in FSU – terrorist and illicit
trafficking activities cause concern

Good News: Ongoing programs, e.g., IAEA,
U.S., and Russia efforts focused on FSU
3. Regulatory Controls in FSU
and Developing Countries


Bad News: Regulatory controls are weak
or non-existent – about half the world’s
nations
Good News: Number of high-risk sources
outside the FSU is limited
→
Concentrate security efforts on FSU
4. U.S. Export Licensing Rules

Bad News: Rules are currently inadequate
to prevent illicit commerce


Unlimited, unregulated exports of high-risk
sources to most destinations including Syria
Exceptions: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, and Sudan are embargoed but no
measures to prevent transshipments.

Good News: Regulatory measures could
be implemented quickly if given priority
Consequence Mitigation
and Public Education

Bad News: Little apparent effort by the
government to prepare the public for a
radiological attack.
– No apparent stockpiling of decon gear at regional
sites
– Not apparent that credible spokespeople are being
trained

Good News: DHS, NRC, and CDC have
useful info on Web sites.
– R&D is ongoing in decon technologies.
– Also, development of medical
treatments, e.g. Prussian Blue
Strengthening the Radioactive
Source Security System
Recommendations:
1.
Implement Source Controls
2.
Establish Regulatory Measures
3.
Manage Security Risks
4.
Prepare for RDD Attack
Strengthening the Radioactive
Source Security System
1. SOURCE CONTROLS
a)
Safely and securely dispose of disused
sources
• Example: DOE Off-Site Source Recovery
Program needs additional support
b)
Track down and secure orphan sources,
especially those in the NIS, that pose the
highest security risk
Strengthening the Radioactive
Source Security System
2. REGULATORY MEASURES
a)
Assist nations with weak or essentially
nonexistent regulatory controls (buttress
IAEA assistance programs)
b)
Protect against illicit commerce in
radioactive sources
c)
Implement improved U.S. export licensing
rules
Strengthening the Radioactive
Source Security System
3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS
Decrease security risks from future
radioactive sources by:
a)
Encouraging producers to make fewer
high-risk radioactive sources
b)
Promoting use of non-radioactive
alternatives
Strengthening the Radioactive
Source Security System
4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK
a)
Educate the public, the press, and political
leadership
b)
Equip and train first responders
c)
Conduct planning exercises