India, the World Bank, the Global Economy, and Dams
In any country, who owns the rivers, the fish, the land, the forests? In India, the
question is answered “unambiguously, in bitter, brutal ways” ( 9).
Whenever activists (from the NBA – Narmada Bachao Andolan) challenge the
government’s right to build yet another dam – because doing so displaces yet more
people – they’re described as “holding the nation to ransom”. News media plays to
the government position, reporting on only isolated aspects of the project. Thus,
the “war” to stop dam-building in India is posed as a “war between modern, rational,
progressive forces of ‘Development’” vs. “an irrational, emotional ‘Anti-development’
resistance” (9-10).
At any rate, dam-building has come to be tied to the facade of nation building.
India can now boast that it is the world’s third largest dam builder (13). And while
the “publicity people” pose dam-building as “Local Pain for National Gain, … there
are more drought-prone areas and more flood-prone areas today than there were
in 1947” (15). Curiously, the government has not commissioned a single post-dambuilding evaluation though it has built 3,600 dams; therefore, no one can
realistically assess the achievements or lack thereof (16).
Even if researchers err on the side of caution, though, at least 33 million people
have been displaced by “Big Dams” alone. The Planning Commission Secretary
acknowledged that probably 50 million had been displaced – more than three times
the population of Australia (17). The “victims” (that is, the displaced) are largely
from rural tribes and castes: “[In short], India’s poorest people are subsidizing
the lifestyles of her richest” (19).
The displaced normally have no clear title to their land (they’re peasants) so cannot
claim compensation: “The millions of displaced people don’t exist anymore. When
history is written they won’t be in it. Not even in statistics. Some of them have
subsequently been displaced three or four times – for a dam, an artillery-proof
range, another dam, a uranium mine, a power plant … no resting place … eventually
coalesce into an immense pool of cheap construction labor (that builds more
projects to displace more people) … who are eventually absorbed into slums” (20).
Here’s the irony of the “free market”. In 1950, India produced 51 million tons of
grain while [in 1999] it produced nearly 200 million tons. So that’s progress, right?
On the contrary, most Indians are too poor to purchase that grain; now more than
350 million live below the poverty line (more than the country’s population in 1947).
“So while India has progressed, most of its people haven’t.” The government has
“ruthlessly” appropriated the country’s resources – “its land, its water, its forests,
its fish, its meat, its eggs, its air – and redistributed them to the favored few”
(21-23).
So, how does the World Bank fit into the picture? The World Bank hasn’t refused
funding a single project. Consequently, today India is in the unenviable position
that most debtor nations find themselves in: “[From] 1993 to 1997, India paid the
Bank $1.475 billion more than it received” (29).
The international dam industry is worth $20B a year. If you follow the
trails of Big Dams the world over, wherever you go – China, Japan, Malaysia,
Thailand, Brazil, Guatemala – you’ll encounter the same actors: the Iron
Triangle (dam jargon for the nexus comprising the politicians, bureaucrats,
and dam-construction companies); the racketeers who call themselves the
Int’l Environmental Consultants (usually directly employed by dam-builders or
their subsidiaries); and, more often than not, the World Bank.
You’ll find the same rhetoric; the same noble “People’s Dam” slogans; the
same swift, brutal repression that follows the first sign of civil
insubordination.
It’s a skillful circus and the acrobats know each other well. Occasionally
they’ll swap parts – a bureaucrat will join the Bank, a banker will surface as a
project consultant. At the end of play, a huge percentage of what is called
“Development Aid” is rechanneled back to the countries it came from
masquerading as equipment cost or consultant fees or staff salaries (29-30).
Well, argue the proponents of dam-building: These dams will produce huge amounts
of electricity.
Here’s the conundrum: The purposes of dams (irrigation, power production, and
flood control) actually conflict with each other. For example, if you irrigate, you
use up water needed to produce power. If you want to control the floods, then you
must keep the reservoir empty during the monsoons so you can contain excess
water. And if that excess water doesn’t materialize, you’re left with an empty
dam. And if you have an empty dam, you have no spare water for irrigation (34).
Further, consider the track record of just one dam: the Bargi, near Jabalpur,
completed in 1990. Costing 10 times more than its estimates, it submerged three
times more land than expected, displacing about 140,000 residents in 162 villages
(though engineers said 70,000 residents would be displaced because 101 villages
would be submerged). “Some of the resettlement sites were submerged as well!”
Note: There was NO rehabilitation policy established to assist these residents
(35). “Today, the Bargi dam irrigates only as much land as it submerged in the
first place – and only 5% of the area its planners claimed it would irrigate” (36).
Even based on World Bank figures – not on protestors’ – the story is repeated time
and time again: More land is appropriated – more people are displaced – more costs
are associated with completion (36).
Consequently, opposition to such projects has spread worldwide…which has also led
to more repression. Nonetheless, despite the fact that no one has ever managed
to make the World Bank back down from a project before, opposition to the
Narmada Valley Development Project in India stalled the Project because
thousands of protestors -- beaten and arrested -- bound their hands together in a
face-off covered by international TV crews and filmmakers. Later, an Independent
Review concluded: “The resettlement and rehabilitation of all those displaced by
the Projects is not possible under prevailing conditions…The environmental
impacts…have not been adequately addressed…We think that the wisest course
would be for the Bank to step back from the Projects and consider them afresh”
(45). “Sacking the World Bank was and is a huge moral victory for the people in
the valley” (46).
All these years later, though, the “ragged army” lives in fear of eviction; living in a
community slated for submersion (for the dam-building plans have not been
permanently shelved by either India or the World Bank), the community has had no
development assistance for schools, wells, or medical care. They’re isolated from
the rest of society with no marriage proposals or land transactions. It’s a tiring
struggle.
Roy, Arundhati. The Cost of Living. New York: Random House, 1990.