Ardent Sentry 16
Cascadia Rising
ARDENT SENTRY EXERCISES
 ARDENT SENTRY is the annual major NORTHCOM
exercise program.
 All agencies that are part of NORTHCOM participate
annually.
 CAP has been an active major participant in ARDENT
SENTRY since 2011.
 ARDENT SENTRY 11 – Earthquake on the New Madrid
Seismic Zone
 ARDENT SENTRY 12 – Hurricane in Florida
 ARDENT SENTRY 13 - Hurricane in south Texas
 ARDENT SENTRY 14 – Earthquake in Alaska
 ARDENT SENTRY 15 – Earthquake in Southern
California (San Andreas)
 ARDENT SENTRY 16 – Cascadia Rising Earthquake
and Tsunami
Ardent Sentry 16
CAP Planning Objectives
Estimate/Quantify Scope of Response
Define C&C external/internal to CAP
Estimate impacts to local resources
Develop Area Command concept to
provide assets from outside impacted
area
Develop a Playbook for CAP portion of the
response – tailored sections for
Anchorage, Cascadia, SF Bay, SoCAL
Pacific Region
Cascadia Subduction Zone
What is it?
Ring of Fire
The Ring of Fire accounts
for 90% of all
earthquakes, and 81% of
the world’s largest
earthquakes
Subduction zones are
shown in red
The CSZ fault line is part of
the Ring of Fire
The CSZ is the only
significant fault line on
the Ring of Fire without a
major quake in the last 50
years (see blue stars)
Cascadia Subduction Zone
The CSZ runs 800 miles from Southern British Columbia
to Northern California, and lies 50 to 80 miles off the
Pacific Coast
The heavy Juan de Fuca plate is sliding under the
lighter North American plate
A magnitude 9.0 CSZ earthquake has occurred every 300
to 500 years (USGS – 400-600 years). The last CSZ
earthquake occurred in the year 1700 (January 26).
FEMA Modeling
• FEMA commissioned a multi year *HITRAC & scientific study and
produced the Region X Response Plan (Published December 2013)
• Modeling Factors
• February 6, 9:41am PST, weekday
• Complete rupture of the CSZ fault line
• Epicenter 60 miles off Oregon coast, 120 miles West of Eugene
• M9.0 earthquake, with ground shaking up to 5 minutes
• Tsunami wave heights 20 to 80 feet
• Aftershocks of M7.0 or greater
• Additional tsunamis caused by aftershocks
Note: Damage caused by aftershocks, follow on tsunamis, and
secondary effects is not included in damage estimates
*HITRAC – Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Infrastructure-intelligence fusion center.
Schools
There are approximately 2,286 schools in the
affected area.
Nearly 100% of schools West of the I-5
corridor suffer complete or severe damage,
and are likely unusable.
Schools along the I-5 corridor suffer a wide
range of damage from complete to slight.
Schools nearest the epicenter generally suffer
the most significant damage resulting in
limited capacity West of the I-5 corridor.
Notable data: All of these schools are part of
the National Sheltering System. Their loss
indicates a corresponding reduction in
sheltering capacity.
Senior Living Facilities
There are approximately 2,156 senior living
facilities in the affected area.
Nearly 100% of facilities West of the I-5
corridor suffer complete damage, and are
likely unusable.
The vast majority of facilities along the I-5
corridor suffer complete to severe damage
and are likely unusable, or are significantly
degraded.
The facilities nearest the epicenter suffer most
significant damage resulting in virtually no
senior living facility capacity West of the
I-5 corridor.
Hospitals
These are general locations and forecast status of the
known Hospitals.
There are 112 Hospitals in the affected area.
36% suffer severe damage, are unusable, and will
likely be completely offline.
17% suffer moderate damage and are only assumed
capable of 50% normal capacity.
Total reduction is assumed to be 45% of total
hospital capacity.
47% suffer slight damage and are able to continue to
operate at capacity.
The facilities nearer to the epicenter suffer most
significant damage resulting in virtually no Hospital
capacity west of the I5 corridor.
Fire Stations
These are general locations and forecast status
of the known Fire Stations.
There are 971 Fire Stations in the affected
area.
30% suffer severe damage, are unusable, and
are planned to be completely offline.
6% suffer moderate damage and are only
assumed capable of 50% normal capacity.
Total reduction is assumed to be 33% of Fire
Response capability.
64% suffer slight or no damage and are able to
continue to operate at capacity.
The facilities nearer to the epicenter suffer
most significant damage resulting in
significantly reduced capability west of
Shelton.
Police Stations
These are general locations and forecast status
of the known Police Stations.
There are 178 Police Stations in the affected
area.
41% are completely destroyed, 7% suffer
severe damage, are unusable, and are planned
to be completely offline.
5% suffer moderate damage and are only
assumed capable of 50% normal capacity.
Total reduction is assumed to be 51% of
Police Response capability.
48% suffer slight or no damage and are able to
continue to operate at capacity.
The facilities nearer to the epicenter suffer
most significant damage resulting in
significant degradation of Law Enforcement
Sea, Rail, Air
Most facilities west of the I-5 corridor
suffer complete to severe damage
Most facilities along the I-5 corridor suffer
severe to moderate damage
Most facilities east of the I-5 corridor
suffer slight to no damage
Many of these facilities are located in
liquefaction zones
Airports & Runways
•
Damage projections indicate that many
airports may suffer significant
infrastructure damage, but the runways
may suffer less significant damage.
•
Nearly all infrastructure West of I5 corridor
is destroyed or unusable.
•
Several runways are still useable, but will
not have instrument capability and will
require runway assessments prior to use.
Bridges
Virtually every highway crosses numerous
bridges. Route identification that does not
cross a bridge will not be possible when
attempting to reach any isolated
community. Bridges in the affected are
predominantly old and were built prior to
establishment of significant seismic building
requirements.
The assessment of bridges as early in the
IAA process as possible will be key to the
development of routes into isolated
communities. Identifying bridges that need
the least repairs will speed up recovery
operations.
The lack of suitable bridges will be a factor
in the determination of the recovery efforts
an
d timelines.
O
UO
Utilities
•This slide provides an overview of the
utilities networks across the affected area. In
general the amount of damage decreases
from West to East. Major networks will be
out-of-service until significant repairs can be
made.
•There are approximately 440 major
electrical facilities and a vast network of
electrical power lines, both above and
underground throughout the region.
•There are 68 major Natural Gas facilities and
12 counties contain 22 major sections of NG
pipe network.
•There are 54 petroleum processing
facilities, and 9 counties contain 16 major
sections of petroleum pipeline.
• There are 35 known Potable Water
Facilities.
Tsunami
PNAS article: USGS,, University of Colorado,
California State University.
“The tsunami hazard zones in northern California,
Oregon, and Washington that are associated with a
CSZ earthquake contain 94,872 residents, 42,424
employees, 486 public venues, 440 dependent-care
facilities, and 2,314 businesses with a significant
customer presence.”
CAP Response
 Any potential responders (professional and
volunteer) will also be victims.
 Loss of critical infrastructure - roadways,
bridges, viable runways, and fuel - will severely
impact any response by WAWG and ORWG.
 Loss of aircraft – especially hangared.
 Airspace restrictions?
 Communications ? Repeaters?
Any substantive CAP response will likely have to
come from neighboring Wings-Regions.
Capstone Project for PCR Operations: Plan or
Playbook
Aircraft Locations (FEMA Regions)
Hurricane/Super
Storm Sandy
After Action/Lessons Learned
Highlights
CAP Response Highlights
 Tasked to collect airborne imagery, provide
light air transportation, and assist in shelter
management, and other general assistance in
FEMA Regions I, II and III
 250+ CAP members from 21 Wings supported
ops
 73 aircraft flew 1,407 hours on 696 sorties
 Provided 158,012 geo-tagged images
 Provided CAP liaison support to the NRCC as
well as numerous states throughout the
impacted area
 CAP’s response cost $181,771.75
Hurricane Sandy Resources
Wing ICPs
CAP Aircraft
22
Create Hot or Not Maps
Area Comparison Maps
Quote from New Yorker article
4,722 square miles
Lane County Oregon
Comparable to Connecticut in area
~ 1,500 square miles
“In the Pacific Northwest, everything west of Interstate 5
covers some hundred and forty thousand square miles,
including Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, Eugene, Salem (the
capital city of Oregon), Olympia (the capital of
Washington), and some seven million people”
Critical Highways
CAP Regions
Rocky Mt.
Region
North Central
Region
Great Lakes
Region
Northeast
Region
Pacific
Region
Middle East
Region
Southwest
Region
Southeast
Region
HQ CAP
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.)
PRELIMINARY ESIMATES
Aircraft Availability
Aircraft Available
Pre CSZ
Aircraft Utilized
Post CSZ
Oregon
7
2
Washington
14
6
California
31
20
Nevada
14
7
Idaho
9
5
Utah
14
7
Montana
7
3
Wyoming
7
3
Colorado
16
8
Arizona
15
7
New Mexico
15
7
Total
149
75
Ardent Sentry 16 has Two Parts
 Day 0-4 Initial Response (June 7-10)
 Similar to AS 15
 Day 10-14 Sustained Response (June 13-16)
 Expanded participation of other western wings
 7 outside of Pacific Region
 Idaho
 Montana
 Wyoming
 Colorado
 Utah
 Arizona
 New Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved Exercise
Objectives
Defense of our Homelands
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Homelands Partnerships
Regional Partnerships
Arctic
Professionalism and Excellence
Warfighters and Families
1. Exercise USNORTHCOM Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) Catastrophic Earthquake
& Tsunami Response Playbook
2. Exercise the command, control, and coordination (C3) structures required for a
synchronized DOD response to a CSZ event
3. Exercise the rapid identification, approval, sourcing, and in-transit visibility of DOD
capabilities in accordance with the USNORTHCOM CSZ Catastrophic Earthquake &
Tsunami Response Playbook and in response to additional Lead Federal Agency
requests
4. Exercise the sustainment of critical asset/supply requirements after the initial 5-7
days of the incident, and synchronize logistics support to the Federal response, as
requested, and between Title 10 and National Guard forces (Title 32 and State
Active Duty (SAD))
5. Exercise DOD mission assurance for support of NORAD and USNORTHCOM
missions
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
AS 16 Exercise Execution Concept
• AS 16 exercise execution: 7-16 June 2016
• 7-10 Jun: Part A - initial earthquake and tsunami “response” with DoD, Regional partners
and FEMA HQ in ‘real time’ EQ event (E0) through event +3 days (E0 thru E+3)
• 11-12 Jun: Time-bridge / scenario reset (E+4 thru E+9)*
• 13-16 Jun: Part B - starts ten days post event; DoD is the primary training audience for
theater sustainment planning and operations; State, Federal play is simulated (E+10 to E+13)
Part A
Key Storylines
7 Jun
Tue
E+0
8 Jun
Wed
E+1
Stand Down
9 Jun
Thu
E+2
• Immediate Response, SAR,
Mission Assignments
• Five day time-bridge and Scenario Reset
• Command, Control and Coordination
(C3), Sustainment, Logistics
* VIGILANT GUARD; will not break or reset but play continually through 12 JUN 2015
UNCLASSIFIED
10 Jun
Fri
E+3
11 Jun
Sat
E+4
Part B
12 Jun
Sun
E+9
13 Jun
Mon
E+10
14 Jun
Tue
E+11
15 Jun
Wed
E+12
16 Jun
Thu
E+13
AS 16 Storylines
Aerospace WG
Storyline
• Provide or arrange for timely DoD SAR
and SAR services through Immediate
Response, SAR coordinator, and DSCA
methods
OPR
NC/J3
• State, Federal, DOD Incident Awareness N-NC/J2
and Assessment (IAA)
• Evaluate WADS, CADS, and Northwest
ACA bases’ C3
• Evaluate Northwest ACA bases
infrastructure and its impact to
supporting NORAD’s 3310/ONE
mission requirement
• Evaluate EADS’ ability to assume
mission essential functions (MEFs)
from WADS and the NFOC
N/J3
N/J3
N/J3
• Patient movement (SAR/Medical WG)
N-NC/SG
• CAP Damage assessments, SAR
assistance, Communication Support,
and Sustainment.
CAP
7 Jun
Tue
D+0
8 Jun
Wed
D+1
9 Jun
Thu
D+2
10 Jun
Fri
D+3
CSZ Playbook
C3 structures
Sourcing and ITV
Sustainment
Mission
Assurance
Stand Down
11 Jun
12 Jun
Sat thru Sun
D+4
D+9
13 Jun
Mon
D+10
14 Jun
Tue
D+11
15 Jun
Wed
D+12
16 Jun
Thu
D+13
What is a CAP Area Command?
 Name chosen to be consistent with NIMS concepts.
 Is not a command center over the Wing Incident
Command Posts.
 Utilized when more than one wing is involved in
responding to a disaster situation or when more than one
wing is involved in responding to a major disaster within
one wing.
 Provides coordination to assist in providing additional
resources or personnel when a wing has exhausted its
resources or personnel.
Who authorizes a CAP Area Command?
 Authorized by the Region Commander whose Region is
most affected by the disaster.
 If more than one Region is involved, the lead Region
Commander will be the one whose Region is most
affected by the disaster.
 Region Commander should not serve as the Area
Commander.
 Region Commanders serve as the Agency Liaisons to be
in a position to commit resources from their respective
regions.
 Established with the concurrence of the NOC and 1AF.
 Should be funded by Mission Assignment (MA) from
FEMA.
What is a CAP Area Command Staff?
 Area Commander
 Preferably someone rated as an IC1.
 Should have experience dealing with a large disaster
 Deputy Area Commander
 Situation Awareness Specialists
 One for each three wings involved, depending on wing
size
 Primary person on staff for dealing with the Wing ICPs
 Logistics Section Chiefs
 Finance-Admin Section Chief
What are CAP Area Command
responsibilities?
 Coordinate provision of additional resources and
personnel as needed.
 Consolidate daily SITREPs from the Wing ICPs.
 Provide consolidated daily SITREP to FEMA NRCC CAP
Desk, 1AF and NOC.
 Provide daily bed down report to 1AF.
Where are they located?
 Far enough away from the disaster affected area to
maintain the critical infrastructure.
 Phone service.
 Internet service.
 Cell phone service.
 Electric power.
 Prime location in each of the eight CAP Regions.
 Southeast Region – Dobbins Air Reserve Base,
Atlanta, GA.
 Preferably at a military facility with lodging facilities.
 Locations should be established ahead of the need to
respond to a disaster.
AS 16 Summary




AS 16 largest AS Exercise yet for CAP
Part A and Part B
Major role for wings east of Pacific Region
Employ Area Command to Deploy western wing
assets
 Establish inter-wing/inter-region working group
to plan CAP response
 Actual event capacity
 Level of exercise participation
 Northcom developing plan for execution of
SAR/CISAR - Working Group Meeting in Washington
mid-October