The Limits of Mediation
for Emerging Powers
Turkey and its Role as Regional Mediator
By Raghda Karajah
December 12, 2012
Professor Ellis
IR 550
SFSU International Relations Fall 2012
Karajah 2
1. INTRODUCTION
“The United States government’s National Intelligence Council projects that American
dominance will be “much diminished” by 2025 and that the one key area of continued
American superiority – military power – will be less significant in the increasingly
competitive world of the future.”1 Power is the “ability to do things and control others to
get others to do what they otherwise would not,”2 and while this was once defined by
military might, today’s definition based on the global power shift 3 emphasizes the use of
soft power. “Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants
through attraction…”4 The United States’ power immensely relies on military capability
and financial resources, which are both useful tools of power, but other instruments that do
not rely on force or coercion are proving also essential in the 21st century. The change in
the diffusion of power5 has added a new element to the process of effective foreign policy,
which the National Intelligence Council’s projection implies that America is yet to adapt
to.
On an international scale, major powers are scrambling to manage issues that are
rising from the Middle East. The situation in Syria, the dying peace process between Israel
and Palestine, and Iran’s rising influence and nuclear program are among issues that fester
with little effective mediation. The United States approached Iraq and Afghanistan with a
Joseph Nye. 2009. “American Power in the 21st Century.” Project Syndicate. Accessed 9/20/12.
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/american-power-in-the-twenty-first-century
2
Joseph Nye. 1990. “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy. No. 80, Pg. 153-171. Accessed 9/19/2012.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580
3
Joseph Nye. 2010 (July). “Global Power Shifts.” Ted Talks. (video) Accessed 9/11/2012.
http://www.ted.com/talks/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html
4
Joseph Nye. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science. Vol 616. Pg. 94.
5
Nye. 2010.
1
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method based on security discourse, which intended to target international insecurities at
the source. This approach proved to be disastrous in many respects, indicating that soft
power may have been the better alternative to maintaining international order. The US’s
hard power has delegitimized it as not only a neutral mediator but also as a capable
mediator. Filling the void, emerging powers have attempted to step in.
Among regional powers, Turkey has the opportunity to become more involved in
resolving regional conflicts. Coinciding with this opportunity, the rise of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and their eagerness to take on the role of a neutral facilitator
shifted the Turkish government to the position of a prominent facilitative mediator within
the region.6 Turkey brought hope to the longstanding Israel/Palestine conflict when the
government began negotiations with Israel and Hamas, cheered on by the US and many
Middle East nations, setting the stage for Turkey as a mediator. However, so far, Turkey
has not been successful in reaching resolutions as a mediator.
What factors limit the ability of emerging powers to mediate regional conflicts?
This question links us directly back to the debate of soft power. While the change in the
diffusion of power set the stage for emerging powers to become mediators, the other aspect
of the global power shift, the power transition between states, explicates the limitations of
soft power. The power transition between states shifts with the rise and decline of major
powers. When examining power transition under a soft power lens, a nation’s legitimate
soft power doesn’t depend on “which army conquests but on whose story does.”7 This
contends that soft power is only one dimension of power. “In such a diverse world, all
Aylin G. Gurzel and Eyup Ersoy. 2012. “Turkeys and Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Middle East
Policy. Vol. 19. Pg. 38-39.
7
Nye. 2010.
6
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three sources of power—military, economic, and soft—remain relevant…”8 Therefore, the
other aspects of power may limit mediation processes even when the country in question
has considerable soft power. Emerging powers like Turkey have the ability to mediate but
are limited in ways that major powers are not. Their mediating efforts are limited because
major powers do not give their efforts recognition, nor take them seriously.9 While
neutrality is expected from mediators, the interests that the regional mediator has in the
conflict also constrain the mediation efforts. The lack of effective mediation by emerging
powers is due to these two limiting factors, among others like the lack of hard power to
pressure parties to make concessions. Turkey’s regional mediation capabilities are limited
by external and internal factors; first, externally, the conflicts rising out of the Middle East
ultimately require a manipulative/power mediator, with resources and influence beyond
Turkey's capacity to execute. Second, while its "insider" status proves to be an asset at
times, Turkey's overriding national interests limit its neutrality and credibility in certain
conflicts. Due to these caps on capabilities, the actual outcomes of Turkish mediation
efforts remain incongruent with their larger aspirations for soft power in the region.
Structure
The global power shift concept introduces the opening for emerging powers and
their use of soft powers. Next, looking back at Turkey’s history as a ‘bridge between
civilizations’ offers why it has the position it does today. Reviewing the literature, the
notion of soft power will be examined and how mediation arises from it, moving on to the
process of mediation and its limits as well. Using a process of evaluation based on the
8
Joseph Nye. 2004. Soft Power. New York. Public Affairs. First Edition. Pg. 30.
Ted Galen Carpenter. 2010. “Estrangement: The United States and Turkey in a Multi-polar Era.”
Mediterranean Quarterly. Pg. 26-37.
9
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contingency approach, the factors of Turkey’s mediation efforts regarding Nuclear Iran
will be evaluated to determine how mediation failed and succeeded to find Turkey’s limits
as a mediator. The same method will be used to examine Turkey’s efforts to alleviate
tensions in the Israel/Palestine conflict. Using these two cases a comparative analysis will
be done discussing how these factors limited/prevailed mediation efforts, concluding with
an answer to the limits of mediation for emerging powers and how those limitations stand
with my argument.
Soft Power and Mediation Theory Debates
Soft Power
The global power shift explains why soft power is imperative today but the soft
power vs. hard power debate is not a new discussion. Those who are skeptical of the
significance of soft power argue that since countries’ cooperation is based on self-interest,
losing soft power as a tool of foreign policy hardly matters. 10 It could be assumed that this
statement leads back to the realist premise that denotes that states act within their own selfinterest but realist do not deny the existence or significance of soft power since it is a form
of power. The term ‘soft power,’ however, is a relatively new term, yet a revitalization of
the concept existed before. Classical realist “E.H. Carr described international power in
three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.”11 Neo-realists,
however, only accepted power as measurable, physical resources, therefore, denying soft
power as a legitimate source of power.12 Contrary to popular belief, soft power is not only
an aspect of liberal ideas but also fits into constructivist and realist perspectives. Modern
10
Joseph Nye. 2004. Soft Power. New York. Public Affairs. First Edition. Pg. 29.
Joseph Nye. 2011. The Future of Power. New York. Public Affairs. First Edition. Pg. 82.
12
Nye. 2011. Pg. 82.
11
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forms of realism may not accept the significance of soft power as a tool of foreign policy
but classical realists do as it is a form of power.
Hard power is an easier tool to use because it can be controlled by the government
and implemented whenever states see fit. Unlike hard power, soft power is much more
difficult for states to use because it is difficult to control and use directly.13 In order to be
able to use soft power as a tool, states compete for attractiveness, legitimacy, and
credibility through values, culture, policies, and institutions and apply soft power through
government policies of public diplomacy and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.14
Nevertheless, a state must appear credible for its diplomacy to be seen as legitimate; a way
credibility can be earned is by meditating conflicts between other states.
While soft power differs greatly from hard power in ways that sometimes places
them on opposite sides of the spectrum, there are also instances when the different forms
of power reinforce each other. The source of soft power is co-optive behavior while
command behavior is the source of hard power but both are used to affect the behaviors of
others to reach desired outcomes.15 The intertwined use of both is known as smart power,
which combines the use of coercion and attraction to create successful strategies.16
Negotiation vs. Mediation
13
Chester Crocker and Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall. 2007. Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict
Management in a Divided World. Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press. First
Edition. Pg. 397.
14
Nye. 2004. Pg.31.
15
Carnes Lord. 2006. Losing Hearts and Minds? Westport. Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
First Edition. Pg. 19.
16
Joseph Nye. 2010. “The Future of Soft Power in US foreign Policy.” In. Parmar and Cox. 2010.
Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. New
York. Routledge. First Edition. Pg. 9.
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Diplomacy’s role in settling conflicts between states has proved to be successful at
times but third-party interventions can improve prospects of reaching settlements.
Negotiation between protagonists is generally the better method to reaching a resolution to
the conflict than mediation for two reasons. First, negotiations require direct contact
between the disputing parties and secondly, negotiations are initiated by the protagonists,
making efforts more sincere since the parties are open to conflict management.17 Some
forms of mediation do not require contact between the disputing parties, nor between the
mediator and one of the parties in some cases. Algeria’s mediation role within the US-Iran
hostage crisis in 1979-1981 is an example of such a case. The US and Iran had no direct
communication throughout the crisis but communicated through Algeria, resulting in the
Algiers Accord, freeing the hostages.18
Since mediation is conducted by a third party, many times the protagonists only
appear to be open to conflict management in order to avoid appearing stubborn or
uncooperative, making negotiations less sincere and therefore the conflict is much less
likely to come to a resolution. Negotiations are less likely to occur outside of a mediation
setting since there is mutual suspicion and mistrust between disputing parties and it
involves more domestic and political costs and commitment from the protagonists than
allowing mediation to take place.19 Negotiating with the enemy can come at political costs
for leaders where they may be seen as appeasers or traitors by the domestic population
while mediation makes it easier to justify diplomacy and allows parties to walk away with
17
Michael J. Greig and Paul F. Diehl. 2006. "Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to
Diplomacy." International Interactions. Vol. 32, No. 4, pg. 369.
18
Bernard Gwertzman. 2012. “Crisis-Managing US-Iran Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations.
Accessed. 12/6/12: http://www.cfr.org/iran/crisis-managing-us-iran-relations/p27558
19
Brian Mandell. 1996. “The Limits of Mediation: Lessons from the Syria-Israel Experience, 19741994.” Pg. 131. In Bercovitch. 1996. Resolving International Conflicts: Theory and Practice of
Mediation. Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. First Edition; Greig and Diehl. 2006. Pg. 369.
Karajah 8
less domestic and political costs. Mediation is a harder path to resolution because it occurs
at times when the conflict is most difficult: a situation where mediation is least likely to
succeed.20 At this time, the mediator must work to ‘soften up’ the adversaries to the idea of
using conflict management tools to attain their goals.21
Mediation
Mediation and negotiation utilize soft power to solve conflicts between disputing
parties. While negotiations can take place between the disputing parties on their own
accord, mediation refers to third party intervention. Mediation is likely to occur when the
conflict has been present for a long period of time: disputing parties have come to a
deadlock that could lead to the escalation of the conflict, and both parties are open to a
third party intervention and negotiations.22 In this sense, mediators “suggest compromises
and may induce [the disputing parties] to change their stance.”23 Successful mediation
depends on third party mediation activities that include preparing to de-escalate, initiating
negotiations, conducting negotiations, and implementing agreements.24 Mediation rarely
inflicts any harm to the conflict and helps encourage constructive conflict management as
well as maintains the interests of the mediator.25 Individuals, states, and institutions and
organizations are possible mediating actors but for the purpose of this argument, the focus
20
Greig and Diehl. 2006. Pg. 356
Greig and Diehl. 2006. Pg. 357.
22
Jacob Bercovitch. 1996. Resolving International Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Mediation.
Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. First Edition. Pg. 12.
23
Saadia Touval and William Zartman. 1985. “International Mediation in Theory and Practice.”
Conflict Management Studies, SAIS. Boulder. Westview Press. First Edition. Vol. 6. Pg. 7.
24
Louis Kriesberg. 1996. “Varuetues of Mediating Activities and Mediators in International
Relations.” In Bercovitch. 1996. Resolving International Conflicts: Theory and Practice of
Mediation. Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. First Edition. Pg. 219, 224-225.
25
Jacob Bercovich. 1992. “Mediators and Mediation Strategies in International Relations.”
Negotiation Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2, Pg. 99.
21
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will be on states acting as mediators. A state’s mediation is done by its representatives and
leaders, depending on the positions they hold while their actions as mediators depend on
the margin of freedom they are given by their state in determining policies and the
resources, qualifications, and political orientations of their country.26
The disputing parties may or may not accept the mediator’s suggestions or even
their intervention which is a major limitation to mediation practice but they too can benefit
from a third party. The acceptance of a third party is not formally decided or accepted but
is gained over time with the third party’s efforts.27 The parties may accept the mediator in
order to avoid escalation. The costs involved with the conflict may be overwhelming for
one or both parties, causing them to consider accepting a third party intervention. A party
may want to enlist the third party’s support incase mediation efforts fail. In this case,
mediation efforts may improve relations between the mediator and one of the parties. 28 A
third party can have a fresh take on the dispute and may offer more innovative solutions
than the partial parties.29
Reaching a successful resolution through mediation has many political, military,
and psychological challenges as well as domestic and international ideological obstacles
that the mediator attempts to overcome through the use of influence.30 The mediator strives
to influence the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors of the adversaries but in return, the
disputing parties attempt to influence the mediator to work in their favor. Therefore, the
mediator must be able to adapt to shifts in this dynamic, where the power of influence is
26
Bercovich. 1992. Pg. 101.
Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad. 1996. “Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation.” In
Bercovitch. 1996. Resolving International Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Mediation. Boulder.
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. First Edition. Pg. 42.
28
Touval and Zartman. 1985. Pg. 10
29
Touval and Zartman. 1985. Pg. 12.
30
Brian Mandell. 1996. Pg. 131; Kriesberg. 1996. Pg. 219, 224-225.
27
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contingent on various factors, two of which are interest and impartiality. This is
emphasized by the contingency approach, which is a framework that offers a model for
analyzing mediation behavior and effectiveness by focusing on antecedent factors, conflict
management factors (mediation process), and consequent contextual conditions of a
conflict.31
Mediation and Interest
Mediators can be motivated by self-interest, either to protect their own interests or
limit their own damage if the dispute were to escalate or may be attempting to increase
their own influence. Alternatively, mediators may be motivated by humanitarian issues or
their desire to be a peacekeeper.32 They may be after rewards that are intangible: prestige,
gratitude of disputing parties, reputation benefits, or political or economic influence. 33
Regardless of these interests, third parties can still be neutral if within the conflict their
main interest is to reach a solution to the dispute which is known as ‘pure mediation.’34
Biased mediators have interests at stake and are closer to one side than the other. Biased
parties can still be effective because the bias increases the parties need to mediate as well
as their ability, especially if there is a connection to the other party as well, and can carry
concessions and agreements back and forth.35 Adversaries may accept biased mediators
regardless of association with one side because it may be better than letting a costly
conflict continue. An Insider-Partial mediator “emerges from within the conflict and
Bercovitch, Jacob and Allison Houston. 2000. “Why Do They Do It Like This? An Analysis of
the Factors Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution. Vol. 44, No. 2, Pg. 171.
32
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 40.
33
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 40.
34
Touval and Zartman.1985. Pg. 12.
35
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 41.
31
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whose involvement stems from a positive, trust based connection to the parties and to the
future of the relationship between disputant and mediator.”36 This can be seen in Egypt’s
insider-partial mediation role between Israel and Palestine, which spans from their long
standing history with both nations.
Both bias and interested mediators have the capacity to carry on mediation efforts,
however, must remain impartial. Becoming impartial is possible “because biases mediators
who had the potential of future interaction would be especially concerned about appearing
neutral, and would make greater effort to equalize outcomes between the disputants in
order to preserve their acceptability.”37 Also, a biased mediator may be closer to the party
that needs the most convincing or changing, giving the biased mediator the greatest
influence over that party.38 If the mediator is closer to party A, party B will only be able to
see the mediator as impartial if the mediator has a bias of source characteristics and not a
bias of content. A bias of source characteristics refers to the mediator having close
personal, political, or economic ties to party A, which is possible for party B to ignore
under certain circumstances.39 A bias of content is when the mediator favors party A more
than party B in settlement proposals or negotiations.40 The opposing parties must perceive
the mediator as impartial because it is the main source of influence for the mediator.
Consequently, an impartial mediator is more likely to be accepted, more effective at
Paul Wehr and John Laderach. 1991. “Mediating Conflict in Central America.” Journal of Peace
Research. Vol. 28, Pg. 85-86.
37
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 43.
38
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 42.
39
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 45.
40
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 45
36
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extracting information from the adversaries, and their suggestions have a better chance of
being perceived as fair.41
Mediation Methods and Strategies
Third party mediators practice one of three types of mediation: manipulative
mediation (power mediation), principle mediator, or neutral mediator. Power mediation
requires the use of power to influence the parties to an agreement.42 Principle mediation
may bring resources to a dispute by ‘bargaining, striking a side deal, or forming a coalition
with one of the disputants to put leverage on the other party.”43 Neutral mediation refrains
from principle mediation methods, instead using communication and interaction.44
Although any of these three methods can be used, a mediator can be both a power or
principle mediator, and a neutral mediator.
Mediation as a strategy consists of three methods that can be used to reduce or
resolve the conflict, but first, the mediator must enter the dynamic. A dispute is generally
two-sided but when a third party enters, the dispute becomes triangular, known as three
cornered bargaining, and the original parties work to bring the dynamic back to two
sides.45 This is done by attempting to enlist the third party in order to make it easier to
convince the other party to concede or make concessions but the sole party may reject the
41
Carnevale and Arad. 1996. Pg. 41.
Meliha Altunisik and Esra Cuhadar. 2010. “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in ArabIsraeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principle Power Mediator?” Mediterranean Politics.
Vol. 15, No. 3, pg. 378.
43
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 378.
44
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 378.
45
Saadia Touval. 1992. “The Superpowers as Mediators.” In. Bercovitch and Rubin, Mediation in
International Realtions; Multiple Approaches to Conflict Managment. London. Palgrave
Macmillan. First Edition.
42
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third party as a mediator, claiming the mediator is not being a neutral mediator.46 The
mediator must avoid forming partnerships with either party and maintain neutrality. Within
this dynamic, the mediator acts according to “the communication, experience, and
expectations set by the disputing parties and by the resources and interests of the
mediator.”47 Once the mediator enters the conflict, a method of mediation is applied.
The first method is one where the mediator is the communication between the
disputing parties because the parties do not have direct contact. In this case, the mediator is
a facilitator who may carry messages between the parties as well as carry the proposed
concessions/agreements.48 This type of mediation is exercised by pure mediators, such as
Norway, whose interests is based on peacekeeping but may also be used by other types of
mediators. A facilitator may take on the responsibility to:
…make contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of
the parties, arrange for interactions between the parties,
identify issues and interests, clarify situation, avoid taking
sides, develop a rapport with parties, supply missing
information, develop a framework for understanding,
encourage meaningful communication, offer positive
evaluations, [and/or] allow the interests of all parties to be
discussed.49
The second method is a more active role where the mediator is known as the
formulator. Formulators take on a role that is more involved in contributing proposals for
solutions than one of a facilitator. A formulator attempts to create a blueprint for a
negotiation solution that both parties find acceptable.50 This is also known as integration
46
Touval and Zartman. 1985. Pg. 10-11.
Bercovitch. 1992. Pg. 102.
48
Touval and Zartman. 1985. Pg. 11.
49
Bercovitch. 1992. Pg. 104.
50
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 378.
47
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strategy since the mediator is involved in direct negotiations working towards a successful
outcome.51 These are the tactics a formulator may use:
choose a meeting site, control pace and formality of
meetings, control physical environment, establish protocol,
suggest procedures, highlight common interests, reduce
tensions, control timing, deal with simple issues first,
structure agenda, keep parties at the table, help parties save
face, [and/or] keep process focused on issues.52
The manipulation method, the third strategy, is involved in contributions like a
formulator would be but in a more aggressive way. A manipulative mediator aims to create
a formula that is acceptable but uses its position and leverage to influence the parties into
reaching an agreement.53 Major Powers who possess enough power to impose leverage on
disputing parties or resources they may find attractive are the ideal mediators for
manipulative mediation. Manipulative mediators work to:
change parties’ expectations, take responsibility for
concessions, make substantive suggestions and proposals,
make parties aware of costs of non-agreement, supply and
filter information, suggest concessions parties can make,
help negotiators to undo a commitment, reward party
concessions, help devise a framework for acceptable
outcome, change expectations, press the parties to show
flexibility, promise resources or threaten withdrawal,
[and/or] offer to verify compliance with agreement.54
Mediators cannot simply choose which strategy they want to use since it is
dependent on the context of the conflict. The strategy taken on by the mediator is decided
by factors concerning the condition of the conflict, the context of the dispute, the nature of
issues, the different characteristics of the parties, and the nature of the protagonist’s
51
Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Johnathan Wilkenfeld. 2006.
“Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 50, No. 1, Pg. 63.
52
Bercovitch. 1992. Pg. 104-105.
53
Beardsley et al. 2006. Pg. 64.
54
Bercovitch. 1992. Pg. 105.
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relationship.55 After evaluating these factors, mediators can then decide which strategy fits
the situation best and uses it to influence the parties in attempt to reach a resolution.
Evaluating Mediation Success
Evaluating whether a third party was successful or effective in mediating a conflict
requires looking at criteria in two different ways. First, considering the subjective criteria,
if the disputing parties or the mediator have the perception that the goals were achieved or
when parties express they are satisfied with the outcome and the mediation was fair,
efficient or effective, then the mediation is considered successful.56 The second is the
objective criteria which examines outcomes from the perspective of an observer or those
who participated in the mediation, based on evidence that points to changes in the
conflict.57 If the disputing parties are acting in the antagonistic way they were before or
worse, then the mediation effort failed but if the mediation led to an end of aggressive
behavior or opened dialogue between the parties or if the dispute has been settled then
mediation is considered successful from an objective criteria. When assessing the success
of mediation efforts, both the subjective and objective criteria must be examined since
different mediators and different parties have different achievements in mind and one’s
success may be the failure of another party.
Looking back at the contingency approach, which offers a model for examining
effectiveness, an analysis can be made that best determines the success of mediation. (See
Figure 1)
55
Bercovitch. 1992. Pg. 105-107.
Bercovitch. 1992. Pg. 109.
57
Bercovitch. 1992. Pg. 109-110.
56
Karajah 16
Figure 1.58
While many states are capable of assuming mediation roles for conflict resolution
on an international scale, Turkey’s role is significant in regard to the conflicts within the
Middle East today. Its geographical location causes its national interest to include desired
stability and order within the region, sparking Turkey’s interest in conflict resolution. As a
democratic nation with close ties to the west, as well as its relationships with its
58
Created by R.Karajah based on factors provided by the contingency approach; Bercovitch. 2000.
Pg. 171.
Karajah 17
neighboring countries, Turkey’s unique position ‘between civilizations’ gives it the
opportunity to ‘bridge’ them together through conflict resolution.
2. TURKEY: A BRIDGE BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS
Considering the conflicts in the Middle East, Turkey’s soft power currently has
potential, but that was not always the case. Post WWI, Turkey’s war of independence lead
to reforms that put Turkey on a path of modernization, inspiring Iran, Tunisia, and
Afghanistan in regards to their own modernization.59 Post WWII, Turkey’s positive image
within the region began to diminish. First, Turkey became a member of NATO and joined
the Western Bloc during the Cold War while the countries in the Middle East stayed out of
both the Western and Soviet Bloc but developed relationships with the parties.60 This,
along with rising Arab nationalism, caused Turkey to be viewed as a puppet of the west
within the region: a sentiment that deepened when Turkey recognized Israel as a state in
1949.61 Furthermore, Turkey kept its distance from the region, attempting to not get drawn
into a region it saw as unstable and conflictive, identifying itself with the west.62 Turkey’s
involvement in the region was lacking until the 1973 oil crisis led it to develop economic
ties with its neighbors.
This perception began to change with its estrangement from the US and the
evolution of a political Islamist movement within Turkey but Turkey’s ties with the west
continued through economic modernization and the improvement of relations with the
Meliha Altunisik. 2008. “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle
East.” Insight Turkey. Vol. 10, No. 2, Pg. 42.
60
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 42.
61
Dietrich Jung. 2005. "Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political
Realities." Mediterranean Politics. Vol. 10, No. 1, Pg. 3.
62
Jung. 2005. Pg. 4.
59
Karajah 18
European Union.63 In 2010, regarding the case of Nuclear Iran, struggling relations
between Turkey and the US became more apparent but disagreements started much earlier.
In 2003, Turkey refused to let the US operate on Turkish territory for the invasion of Iraq.
In regards to Iran, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the US’s
policy towards Iran and the additional economic sanctions the US was trying to impose on
its own and through the United Nations.64 The uneasy tensions between the US and Turkey
prove to the region that Turkey is willing to stand for its own choices and may not be a
‘puppet’ of the US.
The AKP’s election to power in 2002 was the major factor behind Turkey’s more
positive regional image. First, despite the regions problems with implementing democracy,
Turkey proved to both the west and Middle East that democracy and Islam can come hand
in hand, making Turkey appear legitimate in the eyes of its neighbors.65 Second, due to the
many domestic reforms, especially those regarding human rights, at a time when many
Middle East countries were facing governmental crisis and delegitimization, caused the
region to see Turkey’s success as an inspiration.66 While in the past Turkish leaders have
insisted that Turkey does not want to be a model for the region, now, the AKP government
and its leaders desire Turkey’s position as a role model.67
The AKP government’s Muslim identity is also democratic and secular in terms of
how it governs which increasingly makes Turkey’s democracy appear genuine.
63
Altunisik. 2008. Pg.43.
Mauricio Rabuffetti. 2010 (May 28). “Brazil, Turkey Sharpen Tone with U.S. over Iran.”
Associated
Foreign
Press.Accessed10/3/12.http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j1rNsWtHDIhv08
VVV9nhqkgerjfw
65
Hakan M. Yavuz. 2006. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti. Salt
Lake City. University of Utah Press. First Edition. Pg. 291- 293.
66
Yavuz. 2006. Pg. 289-291.
67
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 45.
64
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Parliament’s decision to not allow the US to use Turkish territory for the Iraq War in 2003
contradicted Turkey’s image as an instrument of the West and increased its credibility in
the region.68 Turkey is well developed economically and part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), among many other international organizations.69 This unique combination of
religion, democracy, and diplomacy gives Turkey soft power in the region and mediation
potential. Turkey also possesses the will to act, evident from the AKP’s eagerness to help
manage and resolve regional conflicts and Turkey’s Zero-Problem Policy.70
The global power shift provides an explanation to how Turkey has emerged as a
soft power but doesn’t account to why its attempts to mediate have been unsuccessful so
far. Post Cold War, Turkey “not only remained NATO’s southeastern anchor, it was now
also a crucial bridge between Europe and the Middle East and a valuable conduit for
Western, secular influence in much of the Muslim World.”71 With the turmoil in the
Middle East as well as the United States’ position in the region, Turkey is an interesting
player to examine. Iran’s nuclear program has heightened tensions between Israel and Iran,
with the US opposing Iran’s alleged capability to produce nuclear weapons and the threat it
poses on its ally. Turkey’s relationship with the parties involved in different conflicts is its
main asset as a mediator. As an Insider- Partial mediator, Turkey’s position as a US ally
and its credibility and legitimacy in the Middle East has encouraged its involvement in the
conflict as both a facilitator and formulator but has failed at easing tensions. The same
68
Jung. 2005. Pg.13
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 45, 47.
70
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 50; Ahmet Davutoglu. 2010. “Turkey’s Zero-Problem Foreign Policy.”
Foreign Policy. Pg. 1-6.
71
Ted Galen Carpenter. 2010. Pg. 29.
69
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unsuccessful results can be seen in the case of Turkey’s facilitative mediation between
Israel and Palestine, specifically within its handling of Israel’s Gaza operation and its
attempts to open negotiations with Hamas in Palestine.
The case of the failed nuclear swap deal
Antecedent Factors
Nature of the Dispute
The controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program has escalated to an
international issue with major powers, specifically the United States and Israel, considering
the use of hard power to prevent Iran from reaching the capability of building a nuclear
weapon. In 2002, two unaccounted nuclear facilities in Iran were discovered by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The agency stated that Iran was practicing
secret uranium enrichment programs and has violated the Safeguards Agreement of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and has failed its treaty obligations. 72 During the early years of
the dispute the international community was able to make some progress with the Saad
Abaad agreement. Iran accepted to suspend enrichment of uranium in October of 2003
with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany but this too failed due to disagreements
over what the word ‘suspension’ implied. “Iran argued that suspension meant stopping the
injection of UF6 gas to the P-1 centrifuges while the EU said that it should involve turning
off the centrifuges and halting the production of centrifuges components.”73 The failure of
this agreement led to the Brussels Agreement in February 2004, which stated that Iran and
the EU are to abide by the IAEA’s definition of ‘suspension’ that also requires the halt of
72
Gurzel and Ersoy. 2012. Pg. 38.
Rahman G. Bonab. 2009. "Turkey's Emerging Role as a Mediator on Iran's Nuclear Activities."
Insight Turkey. Vol. 11, No. 3, pg. 165-166.
73
Karajah 21
centrifuges components production. Through the Paris Agreement of November 2004, the
EU worked on generating a more trust-based relationship with Iran by working on
economic, political, and security cooperation to persuade Iran to keep its nuclear activity
peaceful.74 Regardless of cooperation, Iran refused to continue suspending uranium
enrichment. The election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2006 only generated
additional conflict as his new administration made the nuclear conflict their top priority.
President Ahmadinejad emphasized Iran’s right to enrich uranium and ridiculed previous
agreements made with the international community on the issue.75
When the UK, France, and Germany came to the accord with Iran in 2003 to
suspend nuclear activities and oblige with IAEA, the US opted out of this agreement and
pursued to pressure Iran through threats and economic sanctions.76 In February 2006, the
issue was brought to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by the US and EU. The
UK, France, and Germany were joined by China, Russia, and the US, known as the P5+1,
and stopped diplomatic efforts and joined the sanctions. The UNSC adopted Resolution
1696 in July 2006, stating that Iran’s nuclear enrichment needed to be stopped and moved
on to pass four rounds of sanctions in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010.77 In February 2011, the
International Institute of Strategic Studies claimed that it would take two years for Iran to
acquire a nuclear weapon.78
The conflict arising from Iran’s nuclear program questions how reliable and
efficient a non-proliferation world system can truly be, specifically the Non-Proliferation
74
Bonab. 2009. Pg.166.
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 166-167.
76
Kadir Ustun. 2010. “Turkey’s Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions.” Insight Turkey.
Vol. 12, No. 3, Pg. 19.
77
Ustun. 2010. Pg. 19-20.
78
Gurzel and Ersoy. 2012. Pg. 37.
75
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Treaty (NPT) which has been signed by 189 states. Iran’s geographical location is what
truly causes the most concern. The Middle East presently has captured the attention of the
world with Islamism on the rise once again, the anti-Americanism within the region, and
the festering terrorism concern; the thought of nuclear weapon capability within the region
garners even more attention and concerns.79 Such concerns span from the threat of nuclear
weapons being attained by terrorist organizations to a complete reversal of the progress
made on nuclear arms reductions and peace treaties. Regional nations are wary of Iran’s
ambitions, a ramification of the historical distrust between Iran and Arab countries, which
may spread the desire to acquire nuclear weapons to counterbalance Iran in effort to
maintain their regional security, further destabilizing the region and threatening
international security.
Nature of Parties/Relationships
Iran’s nuclear power program was established in the 1950s in Tehran, supported by
the US, France, UK, and Germany due to increasing tensions during the Cold War and
Iran’s pro-western foreign policy.80 Once the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran, that
pro-west foreign policy ceased to exist and thus began the decline of the international
community’s confidence in the Iranian government. “The perception of Iran’s threat is
more important that its reality. Iran suffers from an image problem in the international
community.”81 Iran’s lack of soft power keeps it from maintaining credibility within the
international community, causing all and any of its efforts towards declaring its nuclear
program’s peaceful intentions to be regarded with suspicion and mistrust, making conflict
resolution increasingly difficult. Within the US, Iran’s image has been fairly negative since
79
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 161,162,167.
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 162-163.
81
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 169.
80
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the hostage crisis in 1979, further demonized by former President George W. Bush’s “Axis
of Evil” comment. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton are
actively attempting to re-establish the American image abroad, implementing a new vision
that promotes a multilateral approach to international issues. Despite the Obama
Administration’s approach to foreign policy in a more cooperative method than the Bush
Administration, the US will not engage Iran without US preconditions being met first. 82
US support of Israel’s regional security, which the US and Israel believe is threatened by a
nuclear Iran, is another factor behind US reluctance to negotiate with Iran. The Obama
Administration is demonstrating that it is not ‘soft on Iran’ by imposing sanctions. While
Turkey is a US ally, Turkish relations with Israel since the flotilla crisis have been
unsteady, delegitimizing Turkey’s credibility as a mediator from the Israeli perspective.
Israel is not the only regional power that opposes Iran’s nuclear activities; Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia among other Arab powers see Iran’s nuclear program as part of
its ambition to become the regional hegemon. Regardless of these oppositions, it is
unlikely that any of these regional powers will emerge to manage the conflict due to
historical mistrust within the Arab World. Alternatively, Turkey has the ability to be a
conflict mediator due to its new regional foreign policy, even more so on issues concerning
Iran due to “Iran’s relative trust in Turkey, especially its trust in the AKP.”83 Turkish
diplomacy in the region advocates for stability and order and is committed to a ‘nuclearfree zone.’ However, with the US continuing to push economic sanctions on Iran, “the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership has been defending Iran’s right to
82
83
Ustun. 2010. Pg. 24.
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 170.
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develop peaceful nuclear technology.”84 Turkey’s stance for peaceful Iranian nuclear
development is due to energy and trade being indispensible factors of Turkish-Iranian
relations.85 Other economic interests such as commercial activities between the two nations
are also threatened by the escalation of this conflict. Regardless of these interests, Turkey
has been promoting international security, which it attempts to do by establishing good
relations with its neighbors based on economic ties. Turkey’s economy doesn’t depend on
its energy and trade partnership with Iran per say but instead, the Turkish-Iranian
partnership depends on their economic ties. While Turkey entered this conflict with its
own regional interests at stake, the main interest was to reach a resolution before it could
escalate any further.
Open to Conflict Management?
In order to maintain stability in the region and protect its own interest, Turkey
assumed a third-party role and began working towards a multilateral settlement with the
aid of Brazil. Abdullah Gul, Foreign Minister of Turkey at the time, and now president,
visited Iran in 2006 to discuss the possibility of Turkey as a mediator. 86 Ali Larijani,
Secretary of the Supreme National Council of Iran, accepted Turkey’s proposal on behalf
of Iran. Iran has also stated that withdrawal from the NPT was not an option they are
willing to explore. Along with their acceptance of Turkey and their engagement in some
negotiations, it can be implied that Iran is open to conflict management in regard to its
nuclear program.87
84
Gurzel and Ersoy. 2012. Pg. 38.
Gurzel and Ersoy. 2012. Pg. 39.
86
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 169-170.
87
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 164.
85
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In 2008, Turkish Prime Minster Tayyip Erdogan visited the US and expressed
Turkey’s desire to mediate between the US and Iran. “Secretary of State Hilary Clinton
embraced Turkey’s bid for the mediator position and announced that the Obama
Administration would request Turkey’s assistance.”88 In May of 2010, President Obama
wrote a letter to Brazilian President Luna da Silva encouraging his negotiation efforts with
Iran but also expressed his doubts of the negotiation having a positive outcome.89
Reasoning behind the invasion of Iraq was based on the premise that Iraq was in
possession of weapons of mass destruction, which proved to be false. The current
administration must be cautious of making the same mistake again in Iran, possibly
causing them to consider mediation options before military strike. The Obama
Administration’s disregard of the Bush doctrine, improvement of foreign relations, and its
commitment to reducing their own nuclear stockpiles demonstrates its commitment to nonproliferation, increasing their credibility in making decisions regarding international
nuclear issues.
Israeli security plays a significant role in regard to Iran’s nuclear program, for
Israel believes that it poses a threat. “Israel argued that Iran could make its first nuclear
bomb by 2007-2008 and demanded that the international community stop Iran’s nuclear
ambitions by any means possible, including sanctions or military strikes.”90 That
estimation proved to be false, with the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)
claiming in 2011 that it would take Iran two more years to be able to produce a single
weapon. Israel’s solution to the conflict appears to be one based on security discourse
rather than conflict resolution.
88
Gurzel and Ersoy. 2012. Pg. 40.
Ustun. 2010. Pg 21.
90
Bonab. 2009. Pg. 164.
89
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With the US and other western parties displaying their approval of Turkey and
Brazil’s efforts, they perceived that the international community was in support of their
mediation efforts.
Factors of Conflict Management Process
In an attempt to diffuse some of the tension regarding the program at a time when
the UNSC was discussing a new round of sanctions and Israel was contemplating using
military action, Turkey began negotiations with Iran to try to come to a solution that the
international community and Iran would concede to. The mediation began as facilitative
approach by exchanging messages with Iran and with Turkish diplomats visiting Tehran
before shifting to a formulator role. As Turkey attempted to formulate a solution all parties
would find acceptable, the P5+1 countries took on a duel-track approach where they
supported negotiation efforts but still implemented sanctions on Iran.91
Turkey’s entrance into the conflict came at a time when the parties had reached a
deadlock and negotiations were no longer taking place between the parties; an appropriate
time for mediation. As to why an emerging power is able to mediate a conflict that
involves all great powers of the world: simply, because the major powers are failing to
solve the issues because of their security discourse, leaving room for Turkey and its soft
power. Communication between Iran and the US has been minimal since the deadlock but
Turkey did not necessarily carry messages between the parties but instead carried its
suggested protocol between the parties and discussed the issue with the parties separately.
Similar to the Fuel-Swap plan presented to Iran in Vienna, Turkey and Brazil proposed a
Howard LaFranchi. 2010. “America’s New ‘Duel-Track’ Approach to Iran Nuclear Program.”
Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0520/America-snew-dual-track-approach-to-Iran-nuclear-program
91
Karajah 27
nuclear swap deal.92 The plan required Iran to agree to deposit 1,200kg low enriched
uranium (LEU) in Turkey that both Iran and the IAEA could monitor by stationing their
own observers in Turkey.93 Once Iran notified the IAEA of its agreement, the IAEA and
other nuclear powers that were present at the Vienna deal (Russia, US, and France) would
also have to agree, proceeding to elaborate the details of the exchange in writing. 94 Iran
would deposit 1,200kg of three to five percent enriched rods in Turkey within a month of
the agreement and in return the US, Russia, and/or France would be required to deliver
twenty percent enriched fuel-rods to Iran within a year.95 To guarantee Iran that it was not
going to be deceived, the agreement also stated that if the rules of the swap deal were not
respected, Turkey would be required to return the LEU to Iran quickly and without
conditions if Iran requested.
As a mediator, Turkey not only used an integrated strategy to formulate a plan that
could be potentially accepted by all parties involved but integrated itself in the proposed
plan as well. As an insider-partial mediator, Turkey’s trust based connections with the
western countries and Iran served it well in terms of being accepted as a mediator by the
parties of the conflict. Building on that, Turkey planned on using its trust based role within
the swap deal to increase the plan’s acceptability. Thus, ensuring the Vienna Group and the
IAEA that the LEU would be in good hands in Turkey and ensuring Iran that the LEU
would remain being Iranian property which they could have back if the process was
violated in any way.
92
Gurzel and Ersoy. 2012. Pg. 38.
Julian Borger. 2010. “Iran-Turkey nuclear swap deal means new sanctions are unnecessary.” The
Guardian UK. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swap-turkey
94
Borger. 2010.
95
Borger. 2010.
93
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During 2009-2010, Iran was reluctant to sign the Nuclear Swap deal but signed in
2010 with the looming possibility of China and Russia joining Turkey and Brazil in voting
against more sanctions in the UNSC.96 Iran was not only facing a new round of sanctions
but was being secluded from UN talks on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which
Iran is a signatory. Iran’s agreement to the Nuclear Swap deal illustrates their openness to
conflict resolution, which clearly expands from the high costs of the sanctions being
imposed on them. Turkey and Brazil’s nuclear swap deal was the only agreement Iran had
signed regarding its nuclear program.97
Consequent Factors
Subjective Outcomes
Reactions to the proposed swap deal were cautious at best. Within the UNSC,
Turkey argued that since Iran has agreed to the swap deal there was no need for new
sanctions to be passed. The UNSC members did not believe that was the case, claiming
that the swap deal fails to prove that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are not threatening to the
international community. Turkey was looking for international recognition for its efforts
with Iran, but instead was humiliated.98 Turkey entered this conflict as a credible and
legitimate mediator aiming for intangible rewards such as prestige and gratitude in order to
further increase its credibility and legitimacy. The consequences of this mediation instead
caused the reverse effect, proving to be detrimental for Turkey’s soft power method from
the perception of those promoting sanctions against Iran.
96
Gurzel and Ersoy. 2012. Pg. 41.
Ustun. 2010. Pg. 22
98
Carpenter. 2010. Pg. 29.
97
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While Iran may have been willing to agree, the US did not take the swap deal
seriously, contradicting its pervious support of Turkey’s diplomatic method. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton commented on the matter, criticizing Turkey and Brazil for even
engaging in such negotiations.99 The US continued to delegitimize the agreement for not
addressing Iran’s previous NPT violations and continued to push for a new round of
sanctions. British foreign minister Alistair Burt stressed Iran’s obligation to ensure that it is
not a threat. “The IAEA has said it is unable to verify this. That is why we have been
working with our partners on a sanctions resolution in the Security Council. Until Iran
takes concrete actions to meet those obligations, that work must continue.”100
When the UNSC came together to vote on a new round of sanctions towards Iran
under Resolution 1929, both Turkey and Brazil voted against the proposal. Turkey has
reaffirmed its compliance with the UN sanctions and that it would act in accordance with
Resolution 1929, taking the duel-track approach and continuing negotiations with Iran as
well.101 The Swap deal failed to solve the conflict but Turkey’s strategic way of handling
this failure may have saved its credibility as a mediator. By continuing to comply with
UNSC decisions, Turkey was able to maintain its insider partial position with the West.
Nonetheless, by voting against the new sanctions, Turkey stood behind the swap deal,
emphasizing its commitment to that solution and giving Iran the message that it is still
open to negotiations. Turkey’s actions allowed it to maintain its insider partial role with
Iran and its credibility from Iran’s perspective without alienating the west.
These negative subjective outcomes clarify that the parties were not satisfied with
the resolution. Therefore, according the method of evaluating mediation success, Turkey’s
99
Carpenter. 2012. Pg. 28.
Borger. 2012.
101
Ustun. 2010. Pg. 23.
100
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mediation process was a failure. Major powers’ opposition to the swap deal could have
easily shifted the ‘three cornered bargaining’ dynamic back to the original antagonistic
dynamic with Turkey on either one side or the other, but Turkey’s decision to continue
with the dual track approach and continue negotiations with Iran preserved its neutrality.
When examining Turkey’s credibility and legitimacy as a mediator, there may have been
losses with some of the western nation’s faith in Turkey’s capability but Turkey’s strategic
decisions were able to maintain its insider-partial positions with both the western parties
and Iran, leaving room for continued third-party involvement.
Objective Outcomes
The deadlock between the parties and lack of negotiations served as an ideal time
for third party intervention and Turkey was able to re-open dialogue between the nations as
it served as communicator between the US and Iran. Although the proposed solution failed,
from an objective perspective looking for evidence of change, the ability to open dialogue
is considered a success. The failure of the swap deal highlights the lack of change within
the conflict in regard to sanctions still being imposed on Iran, harming its population and
the inability to reach a resolution. Yet, it was the only deal signed by Iran that provided a
concrete method to solving the conflict, also implying the success of Turkey’s mediation.
Post Turkey’s mediation, the antagonism between the parties increased. The US
and other European countries went beyond Resolution 1929, building and expanding on
the resolution’s measures; Russia’s President Medvedev criticized these actions and after
French President Sarkozy’s visit to Russia, he declared France was prepared to negotiate
with Iran on Turkey and Brazil’s nuclear swap deal.102 While the increased antagonism is
102
Ustun. 2010. Pg. 22
Karajah 31
considered a factor of failure through the objective lens, it also led Russia and France to
consider alternative methods regarding Nuclear Iran, purely a positive instance of change.
President Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric has been criticizing the UNSC members for
imposing sanctions on Iran that are detrimental to its population but continues to insist on
Iran’s right to enrichment, further increasing antagonism. However, Iran has continued to
reaffirm its commitment to the swap deal,103 thus providing evidence of both negative and
positive change.
The conflict has not escalated to military strikes but technology is being used to
wage cyber warfare on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Stuxnet worm, a computer virus, is
understood to have been created by Israeli and US intelligence agencies to undermine
Iran’s nuclear progress. The components of the virus achieve two things: the first
component attacks Iran’s nuclear centrifuges causing them to lose control while the second
secretly records what operations at the nuclear plant look like.104 While the virus is said to
have stopped some of Iran’s nuclear operations by destroying a fifth of their centrifuges,
some operations were able to survive. Currently, Israel and US intelligence are testing the
worm on centrifuges identical to the ones Iran, which were recreated using the information
the virus collected, to improve Stuxnet’s effectiveness.105 The US and Israel’s cyber
attacks on Iran obviously heighten tensions, supplying further evidence of negative
evidence of change since post-mediation antagonism only appears to have escalated.
Since March 2012, the conflict has escalated immensely close to military strike
with Israel pushing for US to harden its policy towards Iran, specifically, draw a ‘red line’
103
Ustun. 2010. Pg. 22.
William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger. 2011. “Israeli Test on Worm Called
Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay.” New York Times. Accessed 11/6/12.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
105
Broad, Markoff, and Sanger. 2011.
104
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on what circumstances an attack on Iran would be necessary. President Obama has rejected
Israel’s demand, claiming that such actions would put the fate of possible future
negotiations at risk and until force is necessary, a US strike against Iran was off the
table.106 The possibility of a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran is still substantial. As recently
as November 2012, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that he is ready to
order strike on Iran: “I am, of course, ready to press the button if necessary.” 107 Netanyahu
ordered the military to prepare to strike Iran within hours in 2010 but these orders were
withdrawn due to objections from Chief of Staff Lt Gen Gabi Ashkenazi and Head of the
Mossad Intelligence Agency Meir Dagan, who have both retired since.108 Regardless of the
opposition, Netanyahu claims, “the responsibility lies with the Prime Minister and as long
as I am Prime Minster, Iran will not have the atomic bomb.”109
The Failure of Mediation
As previously stated, the evaluation of mediation success must be done through the
analysis of both subjective and objective outcomes. Subjective outcomes from the
perspectives of the parties involved assert that mediation failed. The international
community did not take Turkey’s proposal seriously nor were they satisfied with Turkey’s
progress with Iran on the issue. Objective outcomes searching for evidence of change,
affirm the failure of Turkey’s mediation attempt with the increase of antagonism, the lack
Mark Lander. 2012. “Us Backers of Israel Pressure Obama Over Policy on Iran.” New York
Times. Accessed 11/7/12. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/world/middleeast/israels-backersin-aipac-press-obama-to-harden-iran-policy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
107
Yolande Knell. 2012. “Israeli PM Netanyahu ‘Ready’ to Order Strike on Iran.” BBC News.
Accessed 11/8/12. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20220566
108
Knell. 2012.
109
Knell. 2012.
106
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of change in regard to sanctions imposed on Iran, the escalation of tensions, increased
cyber warfare strikes on Iran, and Israel’s push for military strike. However, objective
outcomes also emphasize Turkey’s mediation accomplishments. The swap deal was the
only agreement Iran has signed and dialogue between the parties was opened again through
Turkey’s efforts. Turkey’s mediation strategy appropriated a method based on formulation,
which is the real limit to its efforts. Antecedent factors present the nature of the dispute as
one that involves all major powers of the international community and had already
escalated to great heights. The factors of such a dispute require a mediation strategy with a
manipulative approach. As presented earlier, major powers have yet to adapt to the
diffusion of power, consequently, their solutions to international issues rely on hard power,
economic sanctions being an example of that. Therefore, the conflict requires a mediator
that is capable of exercising smart power: a manipulative mediator that can formulate
proposals but also supply incentives to persuade parties to concede. Turkey, a nation that
has established prodigious soft power, does not acquire resources that major powers would
be interested enough in to concede on the nuclear issue. While Turkey’s efforts have failed
in many respects, their soft power strategy still has potential in regard to conflicts that have
not reached such an international stage, as it was able to maintain its respected positions
with both the west and Iran. Turkey’s soft power may be better suited to solve regional
issues; however, their efforts in that regard have failed as well.
3. MEDIATING THE ISRAEL- PALESTINE CONFLICT
Numerous parties, with different capabilities, have conducted third-party
intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for over a century. All the developed
Karajah 34
countries have attempted to mediate this conflict, as well as most regional powers, and
many major international organizations, yet the conflict continues to escalate. The US
appeared to have the most potential to mediate due to their close relations with Israel but
neutrality was lost under the Bush Administration and the US’s focus shifted from that
conflict to Iraq and Afghanistan.110 During the early years of Bush’s presidency, he refused
to communicate with the first president of the Palestinian National Authority, Yasser
Arafat and in 2006 the US’s impartiality grew even stronger with Hamas’ increasing role
in Palestine, limiting the US’s role. Once again major powers were failing to successfully
mediate, leaving room for emerging powers. Turkey expressed their desire to mediate
between Israel and Palestine because their close relations with both parties had the
potential to make progress, once again placing Turkey in an insider-partial mediation role
that began with a facilitative strategy.
Antecedent Factors
Israeli-Turkish relations developed post-cold war with Turkey’s search for a
regional partner. At the time, Israel proved to be a fitting partner due to shared regional
threats and their pro-west ideologies.111 Relations between the two nations increased
exponentially in regard to economy, military, and diplomacy but changes within the
regional environment in the late 1980s due to the second Palestinian Intifada caused the
Esra Cuhadar Gurkaynak. 2007. “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
Assessment and Reflections.” Perceptions. Pg. 95-99.
111
Cengiz Candar. 2009. “Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World.”
SETA Policy Brief. Brief No. 38. Pg. 7.
110
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withdrawal of Turkish diplomats from Israel and relations to deteriorate. 112 Once the
Intifada came to an end and the Oslo Accords began, relations once again improved in
terms of military, economy, culture, education, and science. From the Arab perspective,
Turkey’s position regarding Israel was seen as an “alliance against all Arabs,” and Turkey
became known as a nation serving US and Israeli interests.113 Returning from the brink of
war, Turkey’s relations with Syria began to improve after the Syrian-Turkish Crisis in
1998, which proved useful after the collapse of Israeli-Turkish relations in 2000. Turkey
began to work on re-establishing negotiations between Israel and Syria using a facilitative
strategy of conveying messages between the nations that led to indirect peace talks in
Turkey in 2008.114
Although relations with Israel damped relations with Arab nations, Turkey’s
position on Palestine and its conflict resolution role between Israel and Palestine softened
up negative Arab narratives of Turkey. In 1975, official relations were established with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and in 1988, Turkey recognized Palestine as a
state.115 Turkey is also a provider of development and humanitarian aid to Palestine.116
Turkey’s main asset as a third party to the conflict is its good relationships with both
nations.
While Turkey began expressing its interest to be a mediator to the conflict at the
beginning of the Oslo Accords, its role only became most noticeable internationally after
112
Jung. 2005. Pg. 10.
Jung. 2005. Pg.10-11.
114
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 50.
115
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Turkey’s Political Relations with the
Palestinian National Authority. Accessed: 11/07/12. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-politicalrelations-with-the-palestinian-national-authority.en.mfa
116
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 51.
113
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the second Intifada because the violence stressed the need of conflict resolution.117
Mediation began under Prime Minster Bulent Ecevit of Turkey’s Democratic Left Party
and intensified under following AKP Prime Ministers, Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip
Erdogan. While Israel has called upon Turkey’s assistance to help persuade Palestinians to
renounce terrorism, it was reluctant to accept Turkey as a mediator.118
Factors of Conflict Management Process
Turkey has a history of establishing relations with its neighbors by increasing
economic ties and so attempted to strengthen relations between itself, Palestine, and Israel
economically. TOBB-BIS Industry for Peace Initiative was established, which included the
Turkish Chambers Commodity Exchange and representatives from the Chambers of
Commerce of Israel, Palestine, and Turkey.119 Turkey believed that the initiative, using
private sector discourse, would build confidence between the nations. TOBB-BIS
established the Erez Industrial Zone in Gaza, Palestine, which would benefit the
Palestinian economy, be profitable for Turkish companies, and establish security for
Israel.120 This initiative progressed slowly but failed to generate confidence due to the
deteriorating security situation, the inability to get Israel to sign a security protocol, and
Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, which caused the project to be moved to Tarqumia in the West
117
Gurkaynak. 2007. Pg. 101.
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 380-381.
119
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 51.
120
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 51.
118
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Bank.121 With the exception of TOBB-BIS, Turkey’s mediation relied on a facilitative
method.
As a facilitative mediatory, Turkey succeeded in providing Israel and Palestine a
channel of communication, a safe location to meet (Turkey), and worked to convince other
international parties to participate in helping negotiations move forward. The conflict
required a facilitator as opposed to a formulator because other parties who have worked as
third-parties to the conflict had already establish proposals and brought them to the table.
The issue with the Israel/Palestine conflict was the lack of negotiation between the nations
that prevented them from discussing those proposals.122 Turkey’s mediation efforts reached
a positive step in 2007 when Israeli President Shimon Peres and President of the PLO
Mahmoud Abbas met for negotiations in Ankara.123 While the facilitative path was making
very slow progress, it was undermined by mediation actions beyond the realm of
facilitation.
Manipulative/Power mediation is not a strategy that Turkey can assume because it
does not have enough leverage to pressure the parties into conceding, nor does it have the
ability to punish parties that do not comply.124 Yet, Turkey took actions that were better
suited for a power mediator, risking their facilitative role. Turkey hosted negotiations with
Hamas in 2006 with Khalid Meshal, the Syrian Hamas leader, taking Israel by surprise. By
leaving Israel out of that process, conducting negotiations with, and legitimizing an
unrecognized organization, Turkey lost its credibility. From a mediation strategy
perspective, Turkey attempted to shift its role from facilitator to power mediator yet failed
121
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 381.
Gurkaynak. 2007. Pg. 102-103.
123
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 381.
124
Gurkaynak. 2007. Pg.102-105.
122
Karajah 38
to use the manipulative method properly. The Turkish government claims that Meshal was
invited to Turkey so it could convey the message that since Hamas won in the Palestinian
legislative elections; they should act reasonably and democratically.125 It rewarded Hamas
with recognition as a legitimate actor, yet failed to get any pre-conditional commitment
from Mishal to cease violence.126 Turkey also failed to consider that it does not have
enough power or resources to change the behavior of the Hamas leadership.127 The
problem with Turkish negotiations with Hamas had very little to do with violating the
generally accepted strategy of not negotiating with terrorist organizations. Turkey’s
negotiation execution strategy is the basis of the predicament. In order to maintain its
credibility, Turkey should have first conducted the Hamas negotiations in private and
second, inform Israel of its plans.
Impartiality and credibility are two requirements of mediation, which Turkey did
well to preserve despite ‘the overwhelming sympathy of the Turkish public opinion and
politicians towards the position of Palestinians.”128 However, Turkey began to lose its
impartiality and credibility when it began to publicly criticize Israel’s actions. Critical
discourse towards Israel’s actions in Palestine began in 2002 with Turkish PM Ecevit
referring to Israel’s military operation in Palestinian territories as “genocide.”129 A followup declaration from Ecevit, using less momentous terms was able to save face in this
particular instance but statements and actions during the 2008 Gaza Operation escalated to
a point where Israel-Turkish relations were weakened extensively. Four days after Israeli
PM Ehud Olmert’s visit to Turkey regarding Israeli-Syrian negotiations, Israel launched
Aras Bulent. 2009. “Turkey and the Palestinian Question.” SETA Policy Brief. No.27: Pg.6
Altunisik. 2008. Pg. 52.
127
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 386.
128
Gurkaynak. 2007. Pg. 103.
129
Gurkaynak. 2007. Pg. 103-104.
125
126
Karajah 39
the Gaza Operation without discussing its plans with Turkey, severing their relations.130
Turkey regarded Israel’s actions as a betrayal to its third party role in both Syrian and
Palestinian negotiations; Turkish PM Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ali Babacan
expressed their disappointment to the press multiple times. Erdogan made statements like:
While we were discussing the fifth round of the IsraeliSyrian talks, this operation happened. I consider this
operation an insult to Turkey despite all our efforts. I have to
say this. For me, bombing unprotected civilians and saying
that the operation’s duration is unknown is a crime against
humanity.131
He continued to claim, ‘we’ll not take side with the oppressors’ and described the
operation as ‘massacre.’132 Babacan continued to contribute to this discourse as well:
We stopped telephone diplomacy with Israel. You can’t
conduct peace negotiations on the one hand, while making
war on the other. This is an attitude that damages the process
initiated by Turkey. There is definitely inconsistency in this
behavior. If they had a war plan, why didn’t they consult us?
This in fact damages our trust. When they were in Turkey 34 days ago, we talked about every issue, but they were
preparing a war at the same time without informing us. This
is not honest behavior.133
While Israel’s actions may have offended Turkey, handling it with outrage ruins their
impartiality and credibility and prevents their further involvement in the conflict. Turkey’s
outrage led to its decision to keep Israel out of a NATO exercise that was supposed to take
place on Turkish territory, the US and Italy in return refused to attend as well.134
Stephen Kinzer. 2010. “In Turkey, Rage at Israeli Raid Puts an Ally to the Test.” The Boston
Globe.
Accessed
11/09/12:http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2010/06/02/in_turke
y_rage_at_israeli_raid_puts_an_ally_to_the_test/
131
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 386.
132
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 385-386.
133
Altunisik and Cuhadar. 2010. Pg. 386.
134
Candar. 2009. Pg. 6.
130
Karajah 40
Relations between Turkey and Israel soured even further after the Economic World
Forum in Davos, Switzerland. PM Erdogan insisted on speaking after the debate had come
to a close, in which he reprimanded Israeli President Peres for murder. Erdogan criticized
Israel’s actions in Palestine and was quoted saying, “When it comes to killing, you know
very well how to kill” to Peres.135 Erdogan proceeded to claim he would never return to
Davos and stormed off stage before the forum was over.136
Consequent Factors
Turkey continues to work towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute but
without efforts from Israel. Soon after the Gaza Operation began, Erdogan began touring
the Middle East, making stops in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as well as
meeting with Abbas in search of information regarding what could be done to stop the
violence in Gaza. Perhaps the most significant aspect of his tour is the exclusion of Israel.
Tensions heightened even further with Israel’s raid on the ‘freedom flotilla’ on its way to
supply aid to Gaza, killing nine Turkish activists.137 The loss of Turkey’s position as an
Israeli partner also ruined Turkey’s efforts with Israel’s Syrian issue, consequently Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly declared Israel’s decision to end Syrian talks
with Turkey and desire to rely on France as a mediator. Therefore, the consequent factors
solely present negative instances of change post mediation.
YouTube. “Turkish PM Erdogan Slams Shimon Peres for Israeli Killings and Walks Off Stage”
Youtube video. Accessed 11/30/12: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OrbQsHkVQ_4
136
Ibid.
137
Yigal Scheifer. 2010. “Gaza Flotilla Raid: Will It Change Turkey’s Regional Role?” Christian
Science
Monitor.
Accessed
11/10/12:
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2010/0616/Gaza-flotilla-raid-Will-it-change-Turkey-s-regional-role
135
Karajah 41
The Failure of Mediation
Turkey’s involvement was intended to contribute to an Israeli-Palestinian
resolution but alternatively resulted in an end to Turkish-Israeli relations and added another
party to the conflict. While the mediation began with a three-cornered bargaining dynamic,
Turkey’s position on the conflict transitioned to being impartial, leaning more towards the
Palestinian party, thus transforming the conflict back to its original dynamic. Therefore,
Turkey failed as a mediator due to their inability to maintain a neutral position. By
expressing dissatisfaction with Israel’s actions and acting with outrage, Turkey lost not
only its neutrality but its present role within the conflict as well as its future involvement in
reaching a resolution. As hard as Turkey tries to remain neutral on the Palestinian issue, it
is clearly one too close to the hearts of the Turkish people and administration. While parts
of the international community frowned upon Erdogan’s criticisms of Israel and actions in
Davos, he was welcomed home as hero. Although Turkey’s actions failed in respect to
mediation strategy, it appears to have been within the interest of the nation to speak out
against Israel’s actions and it may have a role in strengthening Arab-Turkish relations even
further.
In regard to the Hamas talks, Turkey was unable to remain within confines of a
facilitative mediator, taking actions better suited for power mediators at the cost of
impartiality and credibility. Negotiations with Hamas call for a power mediation strategy
which Turkey is not capable of executing. Its failed attempt to shift from facilitator to
manipulative mediator cost Turkey its mediation role in the Israel/Palestine conflict as well
as within Israeli/Syrian negotiations.
Karajah 42
While Turkey’s extensive soft power provided it with the ability to take on a
mediator role regarding regional conflicts, its soft power is not enough to reach as
resolution on its own. Mediation also relies on executing appropriate methods and
maintaining dynamics, as well as having appropriate resources that can be used as leverage
in conflicts that require a power approach. In regard to those requirements of mediation,
Turkey has failed to solve regional disputes due to its inability to execute a strictly
facilitative role and maintain a three cornered bargaining dynamic in the Israel/Palestine
conflict, as well as its lack of leverage in both the Israel/Palestine case and the conflict
concerning Iran’s nuclear program.
4. ANALYSIS: COMPARING THE FAILURES OF REGIONAL MEDIATION
The conflicts rising out of the Middle East have escalated to a point where a
manipulative mediator is better suited but other forms of meditation can still contribute to
progress. Both the Iran and Israel/Palestine mediations required manipulative mediators,
which Turkey is incapable of exercising. Nonetheless by maintaining its formulator role
within Iran mediations, Turkey was able to maintain its future involvement in the conflict
and the prospect of resolution. Contest to that, its attempt to shift from facilitator to
manipulator within Israel/Palestine mediation came at the cost of losing its mediator role
within the conflict. As the literature states, the mediation method must be dependent on the
context of the conflict. Accordingly, Turkey’s shift from facilitator to formulator within
the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program was appropriate for the conflict due to the lack of
proposals on the table that both parties could find acceptable. However, in regard to the
Israel/Palestine conflict, where a strictly facilitative approach could have assisted in the
Karajah 43
peace process, Turkey’s attempt to shift from facilitator to manipulative mediator had a
negative impact on the conflict.
In terms of neutrality, regardless of Turkey’s interests, its main interest in both
conflicts was to reach a resolution, which makes it an appropriate candidate for mediation,
particularly in combination with its insider-partial status. Nevertheless, Turkey was also in
search of prestige, the gratitude of disputing parties, reputation benefits, and larger
aspirations for soft power within the region. It failed to accomplish these goals in both
mediation cases due to the lack of international support for the swap deal in Iran
mediations and its inability to maintain its mediator role in the Israel/Palestine dispute.
However, have these aspirations hindered their ability to mediate exclusively on the basis
of the conflict’s context? Turkey’s very public negotiations with Hamas threatened its
mediation position not only from the perspective of Israel but their lack of discretion made
it impossible to save their credibility when the negotiations failed to result in any nonviolence commitment from Hamas. What reason was behind the decision to hold the
negotiations publicly other than to garner prestige? If recognition and prestige were not
present aspirations, perhaps the negotiations would have been conducted privately and
Turkey would have been able to preserve its mediator role when negotiations failed.
While Turkey was able to maintain a partial role in its mediation attempts with
Iran, it failed to do so with efforts concerning Palestine, limiting its credibility and
neutrality. Literature on mediation stresses the magnitude of the mediator’s ability to avoid
forming partnerships with either party in order to maintain neutrality. In regard to the
outcomes of mediation concerning Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey was able to execute this
quiet well. Abiding with UNSC sanctions but also voting against them preserved the three
Karajah 44
cornered bargaining dynamic and maintained Turkey’s partial mediation role. Turkey was
not successful in upholding that dynamic during Israel/Palestine mediation. Their inability
to remain partial on the matter resulted in Turkey siding with Palestine against Israel’s
operations, shifting the dynamic back to its original, pre-meditation, antagonistic form.
While Turkey’s mediation efforts failed to resolve the conflict surrounding Iran’s
nuclear program and the conflict between Israel and Palestine, focusing on its mediation
strategies sheds light on achievements and failures regarding execution as well.
Concerning nuclear Iran, its mediation role and strategy were implemented properly: in
accordance with the mediation literature and the context of the conflict. Such conduct was
not present with mediation efforts concerning the Israel/Palestine conflict. Regardless of
Turkey’s mediation strategy achievements, the external and internal limitations not only
led to its failure to resolve the conflicts but also limit its capacity to inflate its soft power
within the region.
5. CONCLUSION
Turkey’s soft power has proven to be an indispensible asset in its diplomatic
relations, which in return has contributed to larger aspirations for regional soft power. The
mounting conflicts in the Middle East presented Turkey the opportunity to expand that soft
power through mediation. Conversely, emerging powers are limited due to the inability to
exercise manipulative mediator roles in conflicts that demand a power mediator and
incapability of maintaining neutrality and credibility due to national interests. Therefore,
due to these caps on capabilities, the actual outcomes of Turkey’s mediation attempts
remain incongruent with their larger aspirations for soft power in the Middle East.
Karajah 45
While soft power may be vital to diplomatic relations, it is simply one aspect of
power. Military and economic power is just as relevant in securing national interests
abroad. Turkey’s inability to exercise a manipulative role is due to the fact that its military
and economy does not compare to those of major powers, thus limiting its role among
those nations. In order for a nation to assume a manipulative mediation role, it essentially
needs to exercise smart power: combining coercion (leverage) and attraction (soft power),
a role Turkey and other emerging powers are incapable of implementing.
Yet how can emerging powers overcome such limits and effectively mediate
conflicts? As stated in the introduction, the power transition between states shifts with the
constant rise and decline of major powers. Accordingly, with major states’ soft power on
the decline, the diffusion of power presented emerging powers with the ability to increase
their status with their soft power. But, once the major states are able to once again increase
their soft power, emerging powers will not be able to compete due to their lack of other
forms of power. Therefore, emerging powers can effectively mediate by maintaining a
strictly facilitator roles that do not require extensive amounts of the other aspects of
power, thus no longer needing to rely on the decline of major states’ soft power to have the
opportunity to mediate. Mediation solely based on facilitative strategies of communication
can contribute to conflict resolution while leaving the disputing parties with the
responsibility of using their resources for leverage. Norway’s facilitative role has
contributed to peace processes between Israel and Palestine, and in Guatemala, Sudan, Sri
Lanka, and Columbia.138 Algeria was able to also contribute to a resolution to the US/Iran
Rebekka Ovstegard. 2008. “Implications of Norway’s role as Peacemaker in Sri Lanka.”
Norwegian
University
of
Life
Sciences.
Accessed12/2/12:
http://www.umb.no/statisk/noragric/publications/master/2008_rebekka_ovstegard.pdf; Julia S.
138
Karajah 46
Hostage Crisis in 1981 with the Algiers Accord with a strictly facilitative role.139 Turkey’s
‘bridge between civilizations’ characteristic can effectively mediate conflicts between East
and West, as well as within the region by maintaining facilitator status that can be
maintained at any point of international power transition.
Perelstein. 2009. “Norway Leads on Soft Power Diplomacy.” MandagMorgen. Accessed 12/1/12:
http://www.mandagmorgen.no/norway-leads-soft-power-diplomacy
139
Bernard. 2012.
Karajah 47
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