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Neg vs. HO Bahls Connolly
T – Reduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
Security (1/5) .......................................................................................................................................................... 3
Security (2/5) .......................................................................................................................................................... 4
Security (3/5) .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
Security (4/5) .......................................................................................................................................................... 6
Security (5/5) ...........................................................................................................................................................7
Bunker Busters (1/3)............................................................................................................................................... 8
Bunker Busters (2/3) .............................................................................................................................................. 9
Bunker Busters (3/3) .............................................................................................................................................10
Conditions-on-the-Ground CP .............................................................................................................................. 11
Stability (1/4) ......................................................................................................................................................... 12
Stability (2/4)......................................................................................................................................................... 13
Stability (3/4)......................................................................................................................................................... 14
Stability (4/4)......................................................................................................................................................... 15
Heg (1/3) ................................................................................................................................................................ 16
Heg (2/3) ............................................................................................................................................................... 17
Heg (3/3) ...............................................................................................................................................................18
Democracy (1/2) .................................................................................................................................................... 19
Democracy (2/2) ................................................................................................................................................... 20
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A. A reduction must be a quantifiable decrease of at least 25% from the President’s Funding baseline.
DOD 5/12/2003, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction SUBJECT: Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System, N UMBER 5000.2 cp
E9.4.3. Additional Funding Considerations. The DoD Components shall not terminate or substantially reduce
participation in international cooperative ACAT ID programs under signed international agreements without USD(AT&L)
approval; or in international cooperative ACAT IAM programs without ASD(C3I) approval. A DoD Component may not
terminate or substantially reduce U.S. participation in an international cooperative program until after providing notification
to the USD(AT&L) or the ASD(C3I). As a result of that notification, the USD(AT&L) or the ASD(C3I) may require the
DoD Component to continue to provide some or all of the funding for that program in order to minimize the impact on the
international cooperative program. Substantial reduction is defined as a funding or quantity decrease of 25
percent or more in the total funding or quantities in the latest President's Budget for that portion of the
international cooperative program funded by the DoD Component seeking the termination or reduced participation.
B. The plan only guarantees that the status quo will continue – it does not produce a reduction from the
funding baseline.
C. This is best for debate –
1. Ground. No unique disads or links – even if there are reason’s the plans bad, they’re already occurring
because the plan is already occurring so we can’t garner offense.
2. Education. Kills policymaking education – the point is to learn how to craft new policy changes to fix
status quo problems, rather than just researching why existing governmental policies are good.
3. Mixes Burdens. The plan text dosen't add a decrease from a baseline – we'd have to research the case
to know whether it's topical in the first place – it's unfair to make us beat their inherency to prove they're
not topical.
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A. The 1ac is grounded in an orientalist discourse of middle eastern security defined according to U.S.
imperial interests.
Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of
Security,” p. 28]
What I call the ‘Middle East’ perspective is usually associated with the United States and its regional allies. It derives
from a ‘western’ conception of security which could be summed up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the
cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon while holding Islamism in check, and
the maintenance of ‘friendly’ regimes that are sensitive to these concerns. This was (and still is) a top- down conception of
security that privileged the security of states and military stability. It is top-down because threats to security have been
defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and
US defence planners, Communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threat to security in the ‘Middle East’
during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West.
Two security umbrella schemes, the ill-born Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed
for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the 1978–9 revolution) and Turkey
that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ.22 Traces of this top-down
thinking were prevalent in the US approach to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the 1990s. In following a policy of dual
containment,23 US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely due to their military
capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that are not subservient to US interests. However, these top-down
perspectives, while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity, at the same time hinder others. For example the lives of
women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours’ military capabilities,
but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict women’s rights under the cloak of religious
tradition.24 For it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the channelling of valuable resources into
defence budgets instead of education and health. Their concerns rarely make it into security analyses. This top-down approach to
regional security in the ‘Middle East’ was com- pounded by a conception of security that was directed outwards –
that is threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the state whereas inside is viewed as a realm of peace. Although it could
be argued – following R.B.J. Walker – that what makes it possible for ‘inside’ to remain peaceful is the presentation of ‘outside’ as a
realm of danger,25the practices of Middle Eastern states indicate that this does not always work as prescribed in theory. For many
regional policy-makers justify certain domestic security measures by way of presenting the international arena as anarchical and
stressing the need to strengthen the state to cope with external threats. While doing this, however, they at the same time cause
insecurity for some individuals and social groups at home – the very peoples whose security they purport to maintain. The practices
of regional actors that do not match up to the theoretical prescriptions include the Baath regime in Iraq that infringed their own
citizens’ rights often for the purposes of state security. Those who dare to challenge their states’ security practices may be
marginalized at best, and accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst.
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B. Orientalist forms of security guarantee genocidal conflicts -- their perspective consolidates the racist
hierarchies responsible for global exploitation.
Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, ‘7 [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in
Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]
At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward
the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa . Perpetuation of this
imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame
of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—
Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental”
Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest
threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption.
Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable
right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist
vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context,
orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege
and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated
the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and
annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of
the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior
other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and
reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the
President of the United States.Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in
Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in
September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what
Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword
the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said,
“violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and
religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against
the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope
was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations
and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it
came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my
address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other
words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort
to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim”
violence had proved his point.Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and
exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for
Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic
calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing
and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic
ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr.
Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues
that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see
the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington
pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis,
like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions
such as his actually prove the validity of his position.
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Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed,
“This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation”
(TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and
he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time
been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States
it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the
American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with
“crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “ . .
.we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN
2006).
Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an
internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the
terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection.
Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial
ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate
domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with
dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.
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C. Rejecting their demand for immediate yes/no policy response is the only way to raise critical ethical
questions about the discourse and practice of ir in the middle east.
Shampa BISWAS Politics @ Whitman ‘7 “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International
Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125
The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long
premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute
force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing
after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This
hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to
overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign
authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US
invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms
of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with
which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly
opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to
account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too
deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order.
Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and
deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as
postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such
varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own
participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with
International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’
and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make
any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in
particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced,
resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to
examine the contours of global power.
Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual
and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have,
ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think
globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but
sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose
globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by
travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of
public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith
Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as
an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are
underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as
it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I
turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask
what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism
and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and
carefully.IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’One of the profound
effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public
sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of
national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site
with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated
neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and
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reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen
groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and
policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has
been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing
concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the
ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the
consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing,
minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a
relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing
their claims to public space and authority.13
While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and
exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for
concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for
scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy
as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals
immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public
space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world
today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said
also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged
(intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a
pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas
of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and
willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which
came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as
IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic
intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and
among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US
intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual
articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of
intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its
relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment
of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more
resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of
the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain
kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply
not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of
‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps
unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the
most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21
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1. Israel will get scared from withdrawal – fears loss of deterrence against Iran
Leslie Susser – Staff Writer - 04
(Israel Worried About U.S. Iraq Withdrawl, April 15 2004)
http://www.jewishjournal.com/world/article/israel_worried_about_us_iraq_withdrawl_20040416/ ty)
Israel's defense establishment is
worried that a U.S. withdrawal under fire could have devastating consequences for the battles against
weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism. And Israel could be one of the big losers: Israeli
officials believe a loss of American deterrence would encourage Iran to continue its nuclear weapons
program, and its support for terrorism could lead to a hardening of Syrian and Palestinian attitudes against
accommodation with Israel and could spark more Palestinian and other terrorism directed against Israeli targets. Without
American deterrence and a pro-Western Iraq, the officials say, Israel might have to rethink its attitude
on key issues like the concessions it can afford to make to the Palestinians, its readiness for a land war
on its eastern front and the size of its defense budget. But there is an opposing, minority view in Israeli academic
As Shiite and Sunni resistance to the American presence in Iraq intensifies,
and intelligence circles: The quicker the Americans leave, this view holds, the quicker the Iraqis will have to get their act
together. And once they do, they will not necessarily pose a threat to Israel or the West.
2. The US will buy off foreign and domestic Israeli opposition by increasing sales to Israel of advanced
US military technology
Petras - Professor of Sociology at Binghamton - 5/14/07 (http://www.dissidentvoice.org/2007/05/the-pro-israel-lobby-and-usmiddle-east-policy/)
With the US trade deficit exceeding $500 billion dollars, one of its few competitive export sectors is its arms industry,
which is number one in world arms sales, followed by Israel. The Bush Administration’s planned arms sale to Saudi Arabia
and other Persian Gulf allies has been blocked by Israeli action through its Zionist Lobby (NY Times, April 5, 2007). The
Administration officials twice scheduled and canceled briefings for members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
because of AIPAC’s influence over the Committee and the likelihood that the arms deal would be rejected. As a result the
Administration is hoping that Israel will call off its Lobby attack dogs in exchange for a 20% increase in
US military aid and grants to Israel — upping the total of military aid from $2.4 billion dollars to $3 billion annually.
Secretary of Defense Gates, who was unable to shake the Lobby’s influence over Congress, had to fly
to Israel to plead with Israel to allow the sales to go through in exchange for receiving advanced US
military technology. US grants to Israel of advanced military research, design and technology has increased Israel’s
competitive position in the world’s military high-tech market and increased its share at the expense of the US, as seen in its
recent $1.5 billion dollar military sales to India. In brief, the Israel Lobby runs circles around the US militaryindustrial complex in terms of influencing the US Congress, blocking lucrative deals and advancing Israel’s
sales in the world market.
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3. Israel asks for American bunker buster bombs to feel safer
UPI 6/9/10
(“Israel asks U.S. for more precision bombs” http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/06/09/Israel-asks-US-for-more-precisionbombs/UPI-58021276096834/ ty)
Amid growing fears of a new Middle Eastern war, Israel's defense ministry has asked Washington for
more JDAM precision-guided bombs for its air force, the Haaretz daily reports.
The ministry has also asked the Pentagon to expand the U.S. arsenal pre-positioned in the Jewish state
in December 2009 so that Israeli forces can access the weapons in an emergency, the liberal newspaper
reported Tuesday.
Israel first used the Joint Direct Attack Munitions in combat against Hezbollah forces in its 34-day war in July-August
2006. They were used again in Operation Cast Lead, the 22-day invasion of the Gaza Strip launched Dec. 27, 2008, against
fighters of the Hamas fundamentalist Palestinian group.
JDAM systems provide precision guidance for "dumb bombs," making them immensely more
accurate.
There was nothing to indicate that the request pointed to any imminent operations by the Israeli air force against the Jewish
state's main foes, Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah.
4. Israeli bunker busters causes Iran strikes and war with Iran
Institute for Research Middle Eastern Policy 05
(5/1/2005“Arming an Israeli Attack on Iran: Why the US should cancel "Bunker Buster" Bombs for Israel”
http://www.irmep.org/GBU.htm ty)
There are many factors motivating Israel to strike Iran immediately upon receipt of GBU-28's. Its
current status as a nation under pressure to conform with the quartet's road-map for to peace is causing an internal situation
close to civil war and leave Israel's Likud leadership looking for a way to solidify its hold on occupied territories. The US
presence in Iraq will at some point wind down, leading to troop withdrawal and a diminished possibility of drawing the US
into a costly "regime change" exercise in Iran. The Israeli option of disrupting the road map for peace while
drawing the US into a conflict with Iran by conventional means is more likely with bunker busters.
Israel has many motivations to immediately use the GBU-28. Tactically, it is not in the US interest to
enable any catalyst of a three way conventional war with Iran. Strategically, the US will have to deal with
Israeli nuclear weapons if it hopes to encourage regional players to enter the NPT and disavow nuclear weapons.
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5. Israel – Iran War causes extinction
Jorge Hirsch, a professor of physics at the University of California San Diego. He is one of the originators of the physicists' petition
on nuclear weapons policies started at the UCSD, 1/3/2006, America's nuclear ticking bomb,
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060103/news_mz1e3hirsch.html
If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked U.S. or Israeli aerial attack against Iran's facilities , Iran is likely
to retaliate with missiles against coalition forces in Iraq and against Israel, as well as possibly a ground invasion of
southern Iraq, that the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would not be able to withstand. Iranian missiles could potentially
contain chemical warheads, and it certainly would be impossible to rule out such possibility. Iran has signed and
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in 1993 and 1997 respectively), however it is still likely to have supplies, as
determined by the U.S. State Department in August 2005. Early use by the United States of low-yield nuclear
bombs with better bunker-busting ability than conventional bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile
installations would be consistent with the new U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and could be argued to be
necessary to protect the lives of 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq and of Israeli citizens. It would also send a clear message to
Iran that any response would be answered by a far more devastating nuclear attack, thus potentially saving both American
and Iranian lives. However, the nuclear threshold is a line of no return. Once the United States uses a nuclear
weapon against a nonnuclear adversary, the 182 countries that are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty
will rightly feel at risk, and many of them will rush to develop their own nuclear deterrent while they
can. A new world with many more nuclear countries, and a high risk of any regional conflict exploding
into all-out nuclear war, will be the consequence. The scientific community (which created nuclear weapons) is
alarmed over the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies. A petition to reverse these policies launched by physicists at the
University of California San Diego has gathered over 1,500 physicists' signatures including eight Nobel laureates and many
prominent members of the U.S. scientific establishment (http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/). Scientists object strongly to the
concept of WMD, that lumps together nuclear weapons with other "weapons of mass destruction" and blurs the sharp line
that separates immensely more destructive nuclear weapons from all other weapons . An escalating nuclear war
could lead to the destruction of civilization. There is no fundamental difference between small nuclear bombs and
large ones, nor between nuclear bombs targeting underground installations versus those targeting cities or armies.
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Text: The United States federal government should maintain military troop levels in Iraq until
conditions-on-the-ground improve.
Leaving combat troops and Advisory Assistance Brigades past 2011 key to solve Iraqi instability
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, and Irena L. Sargsyan, research
analyst at the Saban Center, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government, Georgetown University, April 2010, The
Washington Quarterly, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Proquest [RG]
Having made the political decision to withdraw the vast majority of U.S. troops, Washington is, to a certain
extent, simply stuck with this risk. But it is a risk that can be mitigated, particularly by modulating the
drawdown in accord with Iraq’s political circumstances, and being willing to show the flexibility and
adaptability that Obama insisted on in his February 2009 speech on Iraq.18 Perhaps of greater importance still will
be the president’s plan to leave behind 35,000 —50,000 U.S. troops many of them combat troops rebadged as
advisors in ‘‘Advisory Assistance Brigades’’ (AABs) until at least the end of 2011 to guard against future
instability. Maintaining the AAB force in Iraq will likely be necessary, if the United States is to avoid the
mistakes it made in Latin America and Southeast Asia in the twentieth century. These brigades retain virtually all of
the personnel and much of the equipment of full combat brigades. Indeed, in an emergency, several of the AABs
will be able to rapidly reequip as full-spectrum combat units. Thus, these brigades will perform a dual role: they
will serve as advisors in peacetime but could quickly become combat brigades in a crisis. In many ways, the
formation of the AABs is a clever way to square the circle between the president’s commitments to transition U.S. troops
away from combat missions while still retaining combat capacity in Iraq to guard against crucial problems such as the
propensity of COIN-trained developing armies to overthrow civilian governments. In turn, this arrangement highlights
another critical political-diplomatic hurdle that the United States faces in Iraq: securing a new agreement with the Iraqi
government that would allow U.S. military forces to remain in the country beyond 2011. At present, the security agreement
governing the presence of U.S. military personnel in Iraq expires on December 31, 2011. This means that every last U.S.
soldier, sailor, airman, and marine must be out by that date. Because this subject is politically sensitive in both the United
States and Iraq, no one is willing to discuss it. But Iraqi and U.S. military and civilian leaders alike recognize that a followon agreement to extend the U.S. military presence beyond 2011 would be desirable and probably necessary. It is highly
unlikely that Iraq will have sorted out its political and security problems by the end of 2011, including
finding a solution to the propensity of COIN-trained militaries to move against the civilian leadership.
Consequently, it will be critical for the U nited S tates to retain at least the AABs for at least 3 —5 years after the
expiration of the current security agreement to allow Iraqi civil-military relations to mature, Iraqi
political institutions to strengthen, and a culture of apolitical professionalism to take root within the
Iraqi military before the last U.S. combat troops (even if they are masquerading as advisors) depart.
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1. Iraq stable now, but tensions are rising—only a risk of our impact turns
Kenneth Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, December 21, 2009, Brookings,
“Could We Still Lose Iraq?,” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1221_iraq_pollack.aspx [RG]
The problem we face in Iraq is that while the country has made tremendous progress in both
the security and
political realms, all of those gains are fragile and could evaporate quickly if strained. What Iraq
experienced was a lot like shattering the bones in your arm: with time, the bones can heal and the arm can become strong
again, but if you take off the cast too soon, then any strain on the arm will cause the bones to fracture all over again.
As scholars of civil war have warned, states like Iraq that have undergone a major inter-communal civil
war have a terrifying rate of recidivism—especially if the state has valuable natural resources like
diamonds, gold or oil. So to some extent, we and the Iraqis are fighting an uphill battle. There is no reason that we
can’t succeed, but it isn’t going to be easy and it isn’t going to happen on its own. And since we can’t know for certain
when Iraq’s bones have healed, we need to be very careful about how and when we remove the cast.
2. Iraq is stable now.
AFP 7/29/10 (Biden bets on no explosion of violence in Iraq,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iGM9JsSKvUaFmb4617MjrnDHZD6g)ZDM
WASHINGTON — Vice President Joe Biden
said in an interview aired Thursday he would bet "everything" that there
would be no explosion of sectarian violence when US combat troops leave Iraq next month. Biden, in an
interview recorded Wednesday as he welcomed home one of America's most combat-tested brigades from Baghdad, said he
could not "guarantee" anything but believed that serious violence was unlikely. "I'm willing to bet everything that
there will be no such explosion," Biden said in an interview with the NBC "Today" show. " We'll still have
50,000 battle-tested combat troops in Iraq... going from leading in combat to supporting the Iraqi combat
capability. "I think neither I nor (US commander) General (Ray) Odierno nor the Pentagon nor the people who have been
on the ground so many times think that is likely to happen." The Obama administration is on track to fulfill a campaign
promise to withdraw all US combat troops from Iraq by the end of August. All US troops must be out of the country by the
end of 2011 under an agreement with the Iraq government. Biden has repeatedly called on Iraq's divided factions
to unite and form a government following months of tortuous political negotiations. This week however,
Iraq's political crisis deepened, as parliament indefinitely postponed only its second session since March elections,
extending the deadlock that has prevented the formation of a new government. Earlier Thursday, four Iraqi soldiers and two
civilians were killed and 34 people wounded in bomb attacks in northern and central Iraq. The country has been much
more stable in recent months than was the case during the height of insurgent violence.
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3. Turn—Iraqi CMR strained now, withdrawal allows military coup and destabilization
Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, and Irena L. Sargsyan, research
analyst at the Saban Center, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government, Georgetown University, April 2010, The
Washington Quarterly, “The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Proquest [RG]
One of the least acknowledged problems with the ongoing transition of the
U.S. mission in Iraq is the potential for problems to arise between the Iraqi military and the civilian
government. The increase in the size, capabilities, and political reliability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were
important elements in the turnaround in Iraq in 2007 —2008. Today, the ISF are so large (roughly 650,000 in early
2010) and relatively capable that many Iraqis and Americans believe that the U.S. military presence has
become superfluous. In Baghdad and Washington, there is a growing consensus that the Iraqis can handle their internal
security and the residual insurgency threat by themselves, and as a result, the United States can pull out its troops quickly.
This notion is dangerously mistaken. There are many things that could still tear Iraq apart, and the future of
the Iraqi security forces themselves are among those at the top of the list. Today, the ISF sees itself as a strong,
modern, progressive institution, fully capable of fulfilling its national mission. More critically, most Iraqi generals see
few, if any, other institutions in Iraq that can make the same claim. They view Iraqi politicians as venal and
incompetent, squandering all of the gains won at such a high price by their soldiers. In and of itself, this has been the
textbook recipe for a military coup throughout modern history, especially in the Middle East. Moreover, Iraq’s
civilian leadership is well aware of both the army’s sentiments and the historical pattern they seem to fit, and
has been working hard to ensure the political loyalty of the armed forces. To do so, the government has been
employing equally typical patterns of what noted RAND analyst James Quinlivan has called ‘‘coup-proofing’’: replacing
military professionals with officers personally loyal to the leader; creating multiple chains of command, some of which
skirt established lines of authority to report directly to the leader or his trusted aides; establishing multiple intelligence
services that can watch each other as well as the military; and creating elite military formations directly under the control of
the leader.4 Naturally, the fact that the civilian leadership is showing such growing distrust of the military
further antagonizes many generals, which someday may incline some (perhaps all) to act against the civilian
leadership. As if that isn’t bad enough, there is yet another problem: it is the nature of counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations to politicize the militaries conducting them. The nature of COIN warfare is that the indigenous military fights an
internal enemy. The history of militaries of developing countries conducting COIN campaigns is that in the absence of a
large, foreign military presence with large numbers of combat troops, indigenous political—military
relations often go sour as a result of the counterinsurgency effort, regardless of its effectiveness. Iraq’s current
civil—military relations are fragile and fraught with distrust on both sides. This is a major problem that
must be addressed before the U nited S tates implements the drawdown of U.S. combat forces and shifts the
U.S. mission from combat operations to advising and training. Today, the surest guarantee that the Iraqi military
will not move against the civilian leadership, and that the civilian leadership will be limited in its ability to
emasculate the militaryeither of which could trigger a new civil war is the presence of almost 100,000 U.S. troops.
When that presence is removed in December 2011, that guarantee will depart with them. Since history in similar
circumstances elsewhere warns of the risk of catastrophically bad civil-military relations, unless large numbers of the
departing great power’s combat troops remain behind for years or decades, the U nited S tates may be
committing de´ ja` vu all over again in Iraq.
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4. Withdrawal doesn’t solve—none of their evidence is reverse causal
5. Turn—U.S. troops key to Iraqi stability—post-election period is key
James Phillips, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation, March 5,
2010, The Heritage Foundation, “Charting U.S. Policy After Iraq’s Elections,”
http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Charting-US-Policy-after-Iraqs-Elections [RG]
Iraq’s elected leaders must resolve Iraq’s problems, but in order to do so, they require substantial, continued
support from the U nited S tates. A calming U.S. military presence will be needed to support Iraqi
security services in combating terrorist threats, shoring up the rule of law, and mediating between rival
armed factions, particularly in the north, along the disputed edges of the Kurdish territories. General Raymond Odierno,
the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, has correctly called for a “robust engagement” with Iraqi political and military
leaders to ensure a smooth transition to the next government. In addition, the U nited S tates should:
Slow the timetable for troop drawdowns. The Obama Administration wisely departed from the President’s
campaign pledge to withdraw one combat brigade from Iraq every month after entering office. Another adjustment in the
drawdown timetable is necessary due to the fact that current plans to pull out approximately 10,000 troops every month,
beginning in late spring, were based on the assumption that the Iraqi elections would be held by the end of 2009. The
delay in the election timetable also requires a delay in the schedule for troop withdrawals so that adequate
forces remain available during the sensitive post-election period.
Maintain adequate U.S. troops in sensitive and insecure areas. General Odierno has reportedly requested to keep
a combat brigade in the disputed northern city of Kirkuk past the Administration’s August 31 deadline for ending combat
operations. This appears to be a necessary and prudent action in light of the continued potential for violence
in that disputed region. U.S. troops in the past have prevented outbreaks of fighting there between the Iraqi army and
Kurdish regional security forces, and a continued U.S. presence could avert a crisis and buy time for political
leaders to settle disputes. Insurgent strongholds, such as the city of Baquba, also need the focused attention
of U.S. military forces to backup Iraq’s increasingly effective security forces.
Start thinking about negotiating with the new Iraqi government to postpone the deadline for a final troop
withdrawal. No expert believes that the Iraqi army and police will be ready to stand on their own by the
end of 2011, when all U.S. troops are required to leave Iraq under the 2008 SOFA. Substantial U.S. air support,
logistics, intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, training, and advisory support will still be required long
after that date. After a new Iraqi government is formed, the Obama Administration should quietly work with that
government to reach a new agreement that will enable American trainers and advisors to give Iraqis the tools they need to
defend Iraq’s fragile democratic system.
Prudent Readjustments
These prudent readjustments in U.S. policy can help ensure that a responsible drawdown in U.S. troops brings a
successful transition to stability in Iraq.
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6. Turn—withdrawal increases Al-Qaeda credibility, Iraq becomes a terrorist stronghold
Daniel L. Byman, et al., Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, associate professor in the
School of Foreign Service, Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, Richard
A. Clarke, July, 2008, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618 Annals 55, “Terrorism: What the
Next President Will Face: Iraq’s Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism,” Lexis [RG]
Despite these risks and despite recent gains, a new president may choose to draw down American forces from Iraq in the
belief that the costs are no longer justified by the prospects of success. In addition to the problems withdrawal may
bring Iraq, the United States would face a short-term blow in prestige as al Qaeda and other opponents of
the United States would tout any drawdown as a [*66] victory. Initially, such a perception will be hard to
deny, as images of departing U.S. forces will bolster the picture of defeat.
Even if the United States opts to reduce its forces in Iraq, Washington must recognize that terrorists will continue to
find a home in Iraq and will use it as a base to conduct attacks outside the country. Thus, from a
counterterrorism point of view, it is important to contain the Salafi terrorist problem in Iraq if it cannot be completely
defeated. To do so, a limited number of U.S. forces will have to remain in and/or near Iraq. Many will be
devoted to the problems of assisting refugees, preventing neighboring states from massively intervening, and otherwise
trying to stop the Iraq disaster from metastasizing further. However, one of the most important tasks for the United
States is to limit the ability of terrorists to use Iraq as a haven for attacks outside the country. The best
way to do that will be to retain assets (particularly air power, special operations forces, and a major intelligence and
reconnaissance effort) in the vicinity to identify and strike major terrorist facilities like training camps, bomb factories, and
arms caches before they can pose a danger to other countries. The goal would be to stop parts of Iraq from becoming
terrorist centers on the scale of the Taliban's Afghanistan. Iraq's centrality and oil resources make it an even
more ideal hub than Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet the Salafi extremists in Iraq spend much of their time
fighting Americans, Shia, and other Sunnis and cannot train (and relax) on the same scale as they could when they enjoyed
the Taliban's hospitality.
7. Terrorism causes extinction
Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, political analyst, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further
exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies
would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between
civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms
race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still
more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one
will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be
without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
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1. Perception of U.S. primacy is high.
Drezner, international relations professor at Tufts, in 2009 [Daniel W., Professor of International Politics at Tufts and a senior editor
at The National Interest, 7/15, “The False Hegemon,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21858]
The rest of the world certainly seems to treat America as the hegemonic power, for good or ill. According to the
New York Times, Latin America is waiting for the United States to break the deadlock in Honduras. Vladimir Putin
is incapable of giving a foreign-policy speech in which he does not blast American hegemony as the root of all of
Russia’s ills. While Chinese officials talk tough about ending the dollar’s reign as the world’s reserve currency, its leaders
also want America to solve the current economic crisis and to take the lead on global warming in the process. It’s
not just foreign leaders who are obsessed with American hegemony. Last week, in an example of true hardship duty, I
taught a short course in American foreign policy at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies. The students in my
class represented a true cross section of nationalities: Spaniards, Germans, Brits, Estonian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian,
Thai, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Turkish, Belgian, Mexican, Nicaraguan and, yes, even Americans. I cannot claim that my students
represent a scientific cross section of non-Americans (one of them complained that I did not rely on Marxism as a structural
explanation for American foreign policy). Still, by and large the students were bright, well informed about world affairs and
cautiously optimistic about President Obama. That said, a persistent trend among my students was their conviction that the
U.S. government was the world’s puppeteer, consciously manipulating every single event in world politics. For example,
many of them were convinced that George W. Bush ordered Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to precipitate last
year’s war with Russia. The Ghanaian students wanted to know why Obama visited their country last week. The standard
“promotion of good democratic governance” answer did not satisfy them. They were convinced that there had to be some
deeper, potentially sinister motive to the whole enterprise. Don’t even ask what they thought about the reasons behind the
war in Iraq. To be sure, the United States is a powerful actor; the government is trying to influence global events (and
Americans are not immune to their own misperceptions). And good social scientists should always search for underlying
causes and not take rhetoric at face value. Nevertheless, the belief in an all-powerful America hatching conspiracies left and
right frequently did not jibe with the facts. For many of these students, even apparent policy mistakes were merely
examples of American subterfuge. Ironically, at the moment when many Americans are questioning the future of
U.S. hegemony, many non-Americans continue to believe that the U.S. government is diabolically manipulating
events behind the scenes. Going forward, the persistence of anti-Americanism in the age of Obama might have
nothing to do with the president, or his rhetoric or even U.S. government actions. It might, instead, have to do with
the congealed habits of thought that place the United States at the epicenter of all global movings and shakings.
The tragedy is that such an exaggerated perception of American power and purpose is occurring at precisely the moment
when the United States will need to scale back its global ambitions. Indeed, the external perception of U.S.
omnipresence will make the pursuit of a more modest U.S. foreign policy all the more difficult. The Obama
administration has consciously adopted a more modest posture in the hopes of improving America’s standing
abroad. If the rest of the world genuinely believes that the United States causes everything, however, then the
attempt at modesty will inevitably fail.
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2. Withdrawal creates immediate regional power vacuums that embolden challengers.
Poffenbarger and Schaefer, professors of poli sci, in 2009 [John G., Dept Social Sciences @ Wheeling Jesuit U, and Mark E., Dept
History, Philosophy, Poli. Sci. and Religion @ Marietta College, "Searching for Acceptance: The United States and South America," for presentation
at the 2009 International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, February 17, AllAcademic | VP]
It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we
believe that the depth and breadth of U nited S tates’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies.
The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore
balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken U nited S tates power and interests. Second, the
realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing.
That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an offshore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away
from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The E uropean U nion faces problems of
unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the U nited S tates. Russia,
while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely
wishes to focus on its “near-abroad”. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within U nited S tates’ security and economic
purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain
global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the U nited S tates.
Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a
withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the
U nited S tates would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system , and by simply
taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners.
3. Iraq is at a precipice, continued troop presence is necessary to prevent Iranian takeover.
Dreyfus 7/6/2010( Robert, July 6th, independent journalist in the Washington, D.C, Biden in Iraq, U.S. influence Shrinks, Iran
Gains,
The good news from Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Iraq for the Fourth of July is that the United
States has
reaffirmed its commitment to reducing US forces to 50,000 by next month, ending the US combat role,
and pulling all of its remaining forces out of Iraq by the end of next year.
That's despite pressure from hawks and neoconservatives to slow the drawdown. Of course, there is still
talk about renegotiating the terms of the US withdrawal in 2011 by establishing some kind of longterm US-Iraq military agreement. Such an agreement, however, is not up to the US alone. It will also
depend on what the Iraqis think, and if Iranian influence in Iraq continues to gain strength as the US
departs -- as seems likely -- and if the US and Iran continue to engage in a confrontation over Tehran's
nuclear program and Iran's regional role, then the likelihood of a lasting US-Iraq aliance vanishes. In
fact, Iraq has become a battleground for competing US and Iranian influence, and Iran has the upper hand.
In his visit to Iraq -- his 17th -- Biden seemed not to care who forms a government in Iraq. "He made it very clear that we
have no candidates, we have no preferred outcomes, we have no plan," said an aide to Biden, on background, briefing
reporters in Baghdad. Pressed repeatedly by reporters, the administration officials conducting the briefing refused to say
anything about the kind of government they'd like to see take shape. All things being equal, however, it's clear that the
United States would prefer that Iyad Allawi's secular, nationalist, and anti-Iran bloc, Iraqiya, have a
major role, either leading the next government or in some sort of grand coalition with Prime Minister
Maliki's State of Law/Dawa Party bloc. But the United States has few cards to play, and as the level of US
troops declines, it will have fewer still.
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4. Obama thinks a win in Iraq establishes a new era of American leadership in the Middle East. In order
to regain our dominance, Obama will do whatever necessary to win the war in Afghanistan to make up
for the follies of his predecessor, he’s already made plans to transfer troops to Afghanistan when the
pullout happens
Peter Baker, 2/27/09, NY times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/washington/28troops.html
President Obama declared the beginning of the end of one of the longest and most divisive wars in
American history on Friday as he announced that he would withdraw combat forces from Iraq by
August 2010 and all remaining troops by December 2011. The decision, outlined before thousands of
camouflage-clad Marines here, underscored the transformation in national priorities a month after Mr. Obama took office
as he prepared to shift resources and troops from increasingly stable Iraq to increasingly volatile
Afghanistan. “Every nation and every group must know, whether you wish America good or ill, that the end of the
war in Iraq will enable a new era of American leadership and engagement in the Middle East,” Mr.
Obama said. “And that era has just begun.” The president’s venue underscored the shift in emphasis. About 8,000
Marines stationed here will ship out soon to Afghanistan, part of the 17,000-troop buildup he ordered.
The Marines applauded when he promised to bring troops home from Iraq.
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1. No impact—Diamond is empirically denied—democracies hold most of the world nukes and are more
likely to go to war with non-democracies, Iraq proves
2. Turn—democracy promotion causes war in the Middle East, draws in great powers
Edward D. Mansfield, Professor of Political Science and director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics,
University of Pennsylvania, and Jack Snyder, Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department at Columbia
University, December 22, 2005, The National Interest, “Prone to Violence: The Paradox of Democratic Peace,”
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-5456772/Prone-to-violence-the-paradox.html [RG]
THERE IS no reason to believe that the longstanding link between democratization and nationalist war
is diminishing. Many of the countries that are still on the Bush Administration's "to do" list of democracy promotion
lack the institutional infrastructure needed to manage the early stages of a democratic transition. The
"third wave" of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s consolidated democratic regimes primarily in the richer countries
of eastern Europe, Latin America, southern Africa and East Asia. A fourth wave would involve more challenging
cases: countries that are poorer, more ethnically divided, ideologically more resistant to democracy,
with more entrenched authoritarian elites and a much frailer base of governmental institutions and
citizen skills. Many Islamic countries that figure prominently in the Bush Administration's efforts to promote
democracy are particularly hard cases. Although democratization in the Islamic world might contribute to peace in the
very long run, Islamic public opinion in the short run is generally hostile to the United States, ambivalent
about terrorism and unwilling to renounce the use of force to regain disputed territories. Although the
belligerence of the Islamic public is partly fueled by resentment of the U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes under which
many of them live, renouncing these authoritarians and pressing for a quick democratic opening is unlikely to
lead to peaceful democratic consolidations. On the contrary, unleashing Islamic mass opinion through
sudden democratization might raise the likelihood of war. All of the risk factors are there. The media
and civil society groups are inflammatory, as old elites and rising oppositions try to outbid each other for the
mantle of Islamic or nationalist militancy. The rule of law is weak, and existing corrupt bureaucracies cannot
serve a democratic administration properly. The boundaries of states are mismatched with those of
nations, making any push for national self-determination fraught with peril. Per capita incomes,
literacy rates and citizen skills in most Muslim Middle Eastern states are below the levels normally needed to
sustain democracy. The richer states' economies are based on oil exports, which exacerbate corruption and insulate
regimes from accountability to citizens. In the Arab world, every state has at least one risk factor for failed,
violent democratization: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Yemen have annual per
capita national incomes under $2,000. Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab
Emirates and Yemen have rates of illiteracy above 20 percent among adults over the age of 15. The best bet for
democratization by these indicators is Lebanon, a state that does not produce petroleum and where illiteracy stands at 13.5
percent and the average income is $4,040. However, Lebanon is deeply divided among distrustful, armed ethnic and
religious groups. Its electoral power-sharing institutions provide a rigid system for managing these divisions that locks in
ethnic identity as the political trump card and prevents the formation of groups based on non-ethnic platforms.
Iran's experience over the past 25 years should serve as a cautionary tale. The theocratic, illiberal semidemocracy established by the popular Iranian Revolution relentlessly pressed the offensive in a bloody
war of attrition with Iraq after 1981 and supported violent movements abroad. A quarter of a century
later, Iranian electoral politics still bears the imprint of incomplete democratization. With liberal
democratic reformers barred from running for office, in 2005 Iranian voters looking for a more responsive government
elected as president the religiously fundamentalist and populist mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a staunch
proponent of the Iranian nuclear program. When elites manipulate the weak mechanisms of electoral
accountability to rule out liberal alternatives, nationalism is often the only game in town.
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3. No impact—democratic peace theory has no evidence to support it
Christopher Layne, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at
Texas A&M, 2007 AMERICAN EMPIRE: A DEBATE, p. 94 [RG]
Wilsonian ideology drives the American Empire because its proponents posit that the United States
must use its military power to extend democracy abroad. Here, the ideology of Empire rests on
assumptions that are not supported by the facts. One reason the architects of Empire champion
democracy promotion is because they believe in the so-called democratic peace theory, which holds that
democratic states do not fight other democracies. Or as President George W. Bush put it with his customary eloquence,
"democracies don't war; democracies are peaceful."136 The democratic peace theory is the probably the most
overhyped and undersupported "theory" ever to be concocted by American academics. In fact, it is not
a theory at all. Rather it is a theology that suits the conceits of Wilsonian true believers-especially the
neoconservatives who have been advocating American Empire since the early 1990s. As serious
scholars have shown, however, the historical record does not support the democratic peace theory.131
On the contrary, it shows that democracies do not act differently toward other democracies than they do
toward nondemocratic states. When important national interests are at stake, democracies not only
have threatened to use force against other democracies, but, in fact, democracies have gone to war with
other democracies.
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