Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics
Clark Wolf
Director of Bioethics
Iowa State University
jwcwolf@iastate.edu
REVIEW:
PLATO ON JUSTICE
Connection to Happiness and WellBeing: A person whose "soul" is out of
harmony will be: internally divided (see
351a-c: This passage, and the analogy
between individual and social divisions
becomes clear now.) subject to
inappropriate and unpleasant emotions
motivated to do what she should not.
“And justice was in truth, it appears, something like this. It does
not lie in a man’s external actions, but in the way he acts within
himself, really concerned with himself and his inner parts. He
does not allow each part of himself to perform the work of
another, or the sections of his soul to meddle with one another.
He orders well what are in the true sense of the word his own
affairs; he is master of himself, puts things in order, is his own
friend, harmonizes the three parts like the limiting notes of a
musical scale, the high, the low, the middls, and any others
there may be in between. He binds them all together, and
himself from a plurality becomes a unity. Being thus moderate
and harmonious, he now performs some public actions or
private contract. In all these fields he thinks the just and
beautiful action, which he names as such, to be that which
preserves this inner harmony, and indeed helps to achieve
it, wisdom to be the knowledge which oversees this action,
an unjust action to be that which always destroys it, and
ignorance the belief which oversees that.”
-Republic, Book IV, [443d]
PLATO ON JUSTICE
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Platonic Vices and Virtues:
Courage- reason supports spirit
Cowardice- desire (to escape harm) and foresight (to
see it coming) take too much precedence over spirit.
Vainglory- spirit overcomes wisdom
Temperance- desire is mediated by wisdom
Gluttony- desire takes over
Insensibility- insufficient (desire and spirit) to care
properly for virtue
Book I Chapter 1:
“Every craft and every line of inquiry, and
likewise every action and decision, seems to
seek some good; that is why some people were
right to describe the good as what everything
seeks. But the ends that are sought appear to
differ; some are activities, and others are
products apart from the activities. Wherever
there are ends apart from the actions, the
products are by nature better than the activities.”
Book I Chapter 1:
“Since there are many actions, crafts, and sciences, the ends turn out
to be many as well; for health is the end of medicine, a boat of boat
building, victory of generalship, and wealth of household
management. But some of these pursuits are subordinate to some
one capacity; for instance, bridle making and every other science
producing equipment for horses are subordinate to horsemanship,
while this and every action of warfare are in turn subordinate to
generalship, and in the same way other pursuits are subordinate to
further ones. In all such cases, then, the ends of the ruling science
are more choiceworthy than all the ends subordinate to them, since
the lower ends are also pursued for the sake of the higher. Here it
does not matter whether the ends of the actions are the activities
themselves, or something apart from them , as in the sciences we
have named.”
Book I Chapter 1:
“Suppose, then, that the things achievable by
action have some end that we wish for because
of itself and because of which we wish for the
other things; and that we do not choose
everything because of something else, for if we
do it will go on without limit, so that desire will
prove empty and futile. Clearly this end will be
the good, that is to say, the best good.”
[NE 1094a]
Aristotle on What Matters
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NE I.1: Heirarchy of Goods
NE I.2: Existence of a Master Good
NE I.3 How to judge an ethical theory
NE I.4: Method: discover what most people think about
happiness, then improve it.
NE I.5: Three conceptions of happiness
NE I.6: Against Plato’s Forms
NE I.7: Characteristics of the Good: Complete, selfsufficient, final end. “Soul’s activity expressing virtue.”
NE I.8: …
What Matters?
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Money
Security
Happiness
Fun
Love
Pleasure
Power
Achievement
Knowledge
Wisdom
Aristotelian Teleology
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Telos- ‘end’ or ‘goal.’
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To find out what something is, find out where it’s
going.
Aristotle assumes that things have a
“characteristic function.” This is the function or
capacity that makes it the kind of thing it is. (Ex:
Acorns function is to become an oak.)
A “good” thing is a thing that fulfills its function
well.
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Aristotle on the Master Good:
The “master good” Aristotle is looking for
is a complete description of the human
function.
 It will include within it all the things we
want non-instrumentally, and its
achievement will constitute our complete
happiness.
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Properties of Aristotle's Master Good:
1) Complete
2) Self-Sufficient
3) Final
4) Attainable
Contrast with Plato:
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Aristotle recommends an “Attainable”
good (proper to us).
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Platonic ‘Good’ is beyond us, beyond our
understanding or comprehension. We can
only grope toward it.
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Test for Completeness of a good: For any
good G, we ask "Is there some other good
F that we could add to G to make G even
better? If so, then G is not complete, and
cannot be the "master good."
Aristotle on What Matters:
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Test for Completeness: Consider something that
might be the master good.
Ask “If I possessed that good, is there
something I could have that would make things
even better?
If so, then the original good is not complete.
No good that is incomplete can be the master
good.
Is there any such thing…?
The Function Argument:
1) If something has a function, then it’s
‘good’ will involve the exercise of that
function.
2) A things function will be associated with
whatever is highest and best in things of
that type.
3) To find a thing’s function, find out what its
highest and best capacities are.
The Function Argument:
Aristotle on the Soul (I,13)
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Non-rational Part: (1102b)
1) Nutrition and Growth (In common with plants)
2) Appetites (including desires and passions)
(Possessed in common with animals)
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Rational Part: Two Aspects:
1) Regulative -control appetite
2) Good for its own sake -philosophical thought
and pursuit of truth.
ARISTOTLE: The Function Argument
(Start here Mon!)
1) If anything has a function, its happiness (or
good) will lie in performing that function well.
2) If a human being has a function, its
happiness (or good) will lie in performing that
function well.
3) To determine what happiness is for a human
being, we need to discover the human function.
(look to the capacities of the human soul).
4) Four possible functions of the human soul:
(Next slide)
ARISTOTLE: The Function Argument
4) Three Possible Functions Humans Might Have:
a) Nutritional and reproductive- these functions are common to all
living things. Plants are said to be 'living' because they maintain
themselves through nutrition and growth.
b) Appetitive and perceptual function (use of perception and
desire, or the animal soul). Animals have this function and are
said to be 'living' in that they perceive and act on desire. This
part of the 'soul' includes the non=rational appetites, emotions,
pleasure, pain, sense perception, imagination, and the power of
movement.
c) Rational Function- Humans and God have this function. Human
beings, unlike plants and animals, have projects and plans. We
make choices, deliberate, we can calculate and even select a
way of life for ourselves.
ARISTOTLE: The Function Argument
5) Aristotle argues that (c)rationality is what is peculiar to
human life. We have a life in the sense that we have reason, so
our function lies in reason.
6) Happiness therefore lies in using our reasoning capacity
well.
7) Since the virtues are what enable a thing to perform its
function well, the human virtues are what enable us to reason
well.
Happiness, on Aristotle’s view, is a life of activities governed by
reason: rational activities that are performed well (that is,
virtuously or excellently). Aristotle's theory of the virtues shows
how they are qualities that enable us to live a life according to
reason, and to do it well.
Aristotelian Virtues:
The Human Function
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VIRTUES OF CHARACTER:
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DF: A (1) state involving decision, (2) lying in a
mean, (3) a mean that is relative to us, (4) a
mean defined by reason, and (5) by the reason
by which the wise person would define it.
(1106b36-1107a2)
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VIRTUES OF THOUGHT: (For another time)
Virtues and Vices
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Handout on Aristotelian virtues and vices.
(1) a. Virtue is a state (hexis) not simply a capacity or feeling, though it
involves both capacities and feelings. Possession of a virtue requires more
than behavior-- it also requires appropriate motivation and disposition for
both behavior and motivation.
b. Value of virtue is more than just a means to virtuous action. (Compare to
Kant's "action in accordance with and for the sake of law...) Virtuous activity
is not virtuous unless it is done for its own sake.
c. State "involving decision (prohairesis): Certain pattern of desire and
deliberation is characteristic of the virtuous person. Virtuous action is not just
thoughtless "reflex," it involves intelligent decision making.
(2-3) "Mean" does not merely mean 'moderation' in action or feeling. For
example, achievement of 'the mean relative to anger' does not mean that we
will never be more than moderately angry. On the contrary, a virtuous
person will be EXTREMELY angry on occasions when extreme anger is
called for (Irwin). When Aristotle says that the mean is "relative to us," he
does not mean to defend a narrow relativism. The "mean" is the middle
place between vices of excess and vices of deficiency.
(4-5) Mean (4) defined by reason and (5) determined by the wise
(phronimos) person-- refers to the intellectual virtue that is responsible for
good deliberation. This connects the moral virtues (choice) with the
intellectual virtues (belief).
Weakness of Will?
Socratic Paradox:
1) All voluntary action aims at the achievement of some goal that the
actor perceives, in some sense, as good or desirable.
2) To say that an end is 'wicked' or 'bad' is to say that it is neither
properly desirable nor good.
3) Actions that spring from ignorance are involuntary.
4) When actors would not pursue some end but for their false belief
that the end in question is desirable or good, then their actions spring
from ignorance.
5) When actions are aimed at bad or wicked ends, the actor must
perceive or believe these ends to be good or desirable.
6) Such actors would not pursue these ends but for their false beliefs.
7) So such actions spring from ignorance.
8) So such actions are involuntary.
9) So all actions that aim at bad or wicked ends are involuntary.
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Socratic/Platonic View: Plato, The Laws.
Athenian: all wicked men are, in all respects, unwillingly wicked.This being so,
my next argument necessarily follows.
Cleinias: What argument?
Athenian: That the unjust man is doubtless wicked; but that the wicked man is
in that state only against his will. However, to suppose that a voluntary act is
performed involuntarily makes no sense. Therefore, in the eyes of someone
who holds the view that injustice is involuntary, a man who acts unjustly would
seem to be doing so against his will. Here and now, that is the position I have
to accept: I allow that no one acts unjustly except against his will. ...Well then,
how am I to make my own arguments consistent? [860]
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Aristotle's Response: NE VII.ii, 1145b29. [The Socratic view contradicts
appearances. We need to look to the causes of faulty action.]
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Plato, Laws:[Sources of "faults" and wrong choices:] Our first kind is a painful
one, and we call it anger and fear. ... The second kind consists in pleasures
and desires. The third, which is a distinct category, consists of hopes and
opinion- a mere shot at the truth about the supreme good. If we divide this
category twice [according to the various kinds of ignorance discussed earlier in
the section] we get three types; and that makes, according to our present
argument, a total of five in all. We must enact different laws for the five
kinds...[864]
Weakness of Will?
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Aristotle's View: Incontinents make the right decision (1152a17) and then act
against this decision (1148a13-17, 1151a5-7) Their failure to stick to their decision
is the result of strong appetites. Aristotle's Example: We recognize that we should
avoid eating this sweet thing, but our recognition that it is sweet triggers our
appetite for sweet things, which causes us to eat it after all.
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Proviso: Aristotle agrees with Socrates, against the implausible common sense
view, believing that an appeal to ignorance is an important part of the explanation
of incontinence. Though he admits that incontinents have the right decision and
act against it because of appetite, he believes that it is impossible to act against a
correct decision that they fully accept at the very moment of their incontinent
action. (1147b15-17)
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Explanation: Incontinent people's appetite causes them to loose part of the
reasoning that formed their correct decision. They retain the right general
principles but fail to see (at the time of action) just how these principles apply in
their present situation. So even though they say that they know that they are
wrong to do what they are doing, they are just saying the words, without really
meaning them (1147b9-12).
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To this extent, Aristotle thinks that Socrates is right to appeal to ignorance-though he disagrees with Socrates about the kind of ignorance that is relevant.
NE Book X Ch 6-8: The Best Life?
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Happiness is an activity not a state. X.6 (1176b)
Happiness is “activity in accord with virtue.”
X.7(1177a11)
Activities associated with reason and understanding
are the most continuous, pure, self-sufficient, and
complete. Therefore the highest good for humans
must be the employment of reason and
understanding (“study). X.7 (1177a20-24)
“Such a life would be superior to the human level…”
(1177b25-1178a) (?!?!?!)
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Worries about NE X.6-8:
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Worry: Is the view Aristotle defends in NE
X.6-8 over intellectualized? Is it a Platonic
view, inconsistent with his earlier
insistence that the human good must be
achievable within the scope of a human
life?
The Evidence:
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X.7:
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The activity of philosophy seems to be
presented as the final good!
Thought is represented as “superior to the
human level” (1177b25). (Is this Platonism??)
Terence Irwin:
"Though the evidence suggesting that Aristotle holds this purely
contemplative conception of happiness is strong, it is not conclusive.
He does not clearly claim that contemplation fully satisfies the
criteriafor happiness, and therefore he does not infer that by itself it is
sufficient for happiness. (1) If we were pure intellects with no other
desires and no bodies, contemplation would be the whole of our Good
(as it is for an immortal soul, as Plato conceives it in the Phaedo~).
Still, we are not in fact merely intellects (1178b3-7); and Aristotle
recognizes that the good must be the good of the whole human being.
In his considered view, contemplation is the highest and best part of
our good, but not the whole of it. (2) Though contemplation is the
single most self-sufficient activity, in so far as it is the single activity
that comes closest to being self-sufficient, this degree of selfsufficiency does not justify the identification of contemplation with
happiness. For Aristotle has argued that happiness must be complete,
and for this reason he argues that neither virtue nor pleasure alone
can be happiness. He should not, then, agree that contemplation is
happiness just because it is invulnerable and self-contained. For
contemplation is not the complete good; we can think of other goods
(e.g. virtue and honor) that could be added to it to make a better good
than contemplation alone." ["Aristotle," in Becker, ed. Encyclopedia of
Ethics p59-60.]
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Martha Nussbaum: [Aristotle's other works show that] "ethical
Platonism of some sort exercised a hold over Aristotle's imagination in
one or more periods of his career. We should, then, view the fragment
x.6-8 as a serious working-out of elements of a position to which
Aristotle is in some ways deeply attracted, though he rejects it in the
bulk of his mature ethical and political writing. Surely this is not
disappointing. Frequently Aristotle is rather quick and dismissive of
Platonic positions. It seems far more worthy of him, and of his method,
that he should seriously feel the force of this position and try to
articulate the arguments for it. Perhaps we can say that, like anyone
who has been seriously devoted to the scholarly or contemplative life,
Aristotle wonders whether, thoroughly and properly followed, its
demands are not such as to eclipse all other pursuits. (...) So he
articulates the Platonist view, not attempting to harmonize it with the
other view, but setting it side by side with that one, as the Symposium
stands side by side with the Phaedrus. In a sense there is a decision
for the mixed view; but the other view remains, not fully dismissed,
exerting its claim as a possibility. This seems to me to be a worthy way
for a great philosopher to think about these hard questions; and
therefore worthy of Aristotle." [The Fragility of Goodness, p. 377]
Upshot:
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NE X.6-8 occur within a larger work that focuses on
virtues of action and character, which cannot be
exercised in a purely contemplative life.
The argument of NE X.6-8 is not entirely consistent (?)
with the view expressed in the rest of the book.
The achievement of a complete good requires the
exercise of all the virtues, not only the virtues of thought.
This would have fit Aristotle’s experience of life, since
Athenian citizens mostly did not have the option to
retreat from public life.
Non Aristotelian Conceptions of
the Human Good
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1) Hedonists and Cyrenaics [Epicurus, Aristippus]
(Came after Aristotle) Pleasure, not virtue, honor, or
self-control, is the human good.
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2) Socratic View: Virtue is sufficient for happiness.
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3) Egoist view: (Thrasymachus(?), Hobbes): We
<always do/always should> act in our own self
interest. <psychological/ethical>
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4) Stoic view: (Seneca, Epictetus) Achievement of
the best life requires that we not only restrain our
wants, but that we gain control over what we want.
Non Aristotelian Conceptions of
the Human Good
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1) Hedonists and Cyrenaics [Epicurus, Aristippus]
(Came after Aristotle)
Argued that pleasure is the human good.
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Aristippus: Instant Gratification View
Epicurus: Take the long view.
Aristotle argues that a life of pleasure must be
incomplete, since it allows no essential role to
rational activity. Mere pleasure without rational
activity is not the good for a rational agent.
(1174a1-4). So: A life of pleasure can be Improved
upon.
Non Aristotelian Conceptions of
the Human Good
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2) Socratic View: Virtue is sufficient for happiness.
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Later accepted by the Stoics. [Epictetus, Seneca] Good for
human beings is not happiness or pleasure, but discipline of
the will by the use of reason. If we constrain our desires so
that we want nothing that isn't entirely internal and within the
control of our will, we will always be completely happy
regardless of external circumstances. The virtuous stoic can
be completely happy even while being tortured on the rack.
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Aristotle notes that external misfortunes may impede rational
activity (1100b29-30) and take away happiness (1100a5-6).
Virtue is insufficient for happiness-- one also needs "goods of
fortune." While virtue may help to achieve these, it won't
always work.
Non Aristotelian Conceptions of
the Human Good
3) Egoist view: (Thrasymachus, Aristippus, Hobbes): We <always do/always
should> act in our own self interest.
Aristotle believes that our "end" is not "protection of life and gaining power."
This follows from the fact that a life that was secure and powerful might still
be lacking in some important ways. Thrasymachian view places too little
weight on reason and understanding, and so misses that portion of the good
that is most important for beings like ourselves.
BUT:
1) While virtue is insufficient for happiness, it is nonetheless its dominant
component. That is, no matter what we have to lose as a result of being
virtuous, we still have better reason to choose virtue than to choose any
other combination of other goods that are incompatible with it. (1100b301101a8)
2) From the general conception of happiness, Aristotle infers the general
features of a virtue of character (ˆthikˆ aretˆ = moral virtue). Like Plato, he
argues that the excellent and virtuous condition of the soul will be the one in
which the non-rational elements are guided by reason.
Non Aristotelian Conceptions of
the Human Good
3) Stoic View: (Epictetus, Seneca): Achievement of the best life requires that
we not only restrain our wants, but that we gain control over what we want.
(Note: The Stoics post-date Aristotle) In the strongest case, the Stoics
recommend that we extirpate our wants and desires altogether. Epictetus
allows that we may re-acquire wants that apply to things that are in the
control of our will.
Aristotle aggrees that acquisition of the virtues will enable us control what
we want, and that this is crucial.
Aristotle does not agree with the Stoic claim that self-control can render us
invulnerable. On Aristotle’s view, the good life is always fragile, and never
entirely in our control.
Non Aristotelian Conceptions of
the Human Good
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On to Epicurus (Epicureanism) and
Epictetus (Stoicism)