Trident Replacement:
the practical implications
Presentation to British Pugwash AGM
8 April 2008
John Ainslie
Coordinator, Scottish CND
Trident Replacement
Submarine
Missile
Warhead
Targeting
“Successor” Submarine
New submarine Timeline
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Concept
Design
Initial Design
Detail Design
Outputs
Initial
Gate
Build
Main Gate
Nuclear-Powered Submarines
10
12
14
Astute
16
18
20
22
24
Successor
26
28
MUFC
Reactor for “Successor”
Rolls
Royce
Royal
Navy
P
P
PWR2
New Design
New Generation Nuclear
Propulsion Plant (NGNPP)
“avoid pumped flow systems”
Steve Ludham RR
“a modern & much simpler plant”
Rear Admiral Matthews
USS Narwhal (1969 – 1999)
When built - quietest submarine
Continuous Patrols
One armed submarine on patrol at all times
Alert – “measured in days”
non-verifiable
“our planned future programme should take
us up to 750 [patrols]” Rear Admiral Matthews
Patrols
1968-2007
300
2008-2060 ?
450
Total
750
Infrastructure - Devonport
Refit Dockyard
Infrastructure - Derby
Fuel Rod Fabrication
Infrastructure - Faslane
Submarine Base and Shiplift
Infrastructure - Coulport
Explosives Handling Jetty
Infrastructure - Dounreay
Submarine Reactor Prototype
& overhaul of coolant pumps
The Scottish Question
“the Parliament … calls on the UK
Government not to go ahead at this time
with the proposal in the White Paper, The
Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear
Deterrent”
14 June 2007
71 for
16 against
39 abstained
2 did not vote
If not Scotland where ?
1963 Polaris option - Falmouth
Trident Replacement
Submarine
Missile
Warhead
Targeting
Missile System
Underwater Launched Missile System
(ULMS)
New US missile to replace
Trident D5
In service by 2029
Initial concept studies
started in 2007
Considered by Strategic
Advisory Group November
2007
Missile options
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
48
50
52
54
56
58
British “successor” submarine in-service 2024 – 2060
Trident D5 in service
with US Navy until 2042
ULMS & SSBN(X) in service with US Navy from 2029
60
Underwater Launched Missile System
“any successor to the D5 system should be
compatible with, or be capable or being made
compatible with, the launch system for the D5
missile” Bush to Blair Dec 2006
“concepts for future submarines may have
missile tubes larger than 87 inches in diameter”
ULMS Test Bed Request for Information
7 Nov 2007
Future RV system ?
Manoeuvrable Reentry
Vehicle (MaRV)
Developed for nuclear
Trident (E2 RV)
Revived for
Conventional Trident
Option for ULMS ?
Operational independence ?
“without United States
cooperation … Polaris
would become
ineffective after only a
few months”
Sir Charles Ellworthy, CDS,
March 1971
Trident Replacement
Submarine
Missile
Warhead
Targeting
Nuclear Warhead
The special nuclear relationship
1958 Mutual Defence
Agreement
Solly Zuckerman – no
interest beyond Polaris
Polaris upgrade – to revive
relationship
Peter Jones – “whether the
UK had done it themselves”
The first UK thermonuclear bomb
Red Snow warhead
Not based on Grapple design
Anglicised version of
US Mk 28 warhead
The Polaris family
Polaris
Chevaline
WE 177
Primary
Primary
Secondary
US or UK
UK design
US design
US design
Origin
Cleo test
W 58
W 59
Polaris
Jennie
Reggie
WE 177B
Katie
Simon
WE 177A
Katie A
Chevaline
WE 177C
Harriet
Katie A
Reggie
Reggie
source: www.nuclear-weapons.info
Origin of the UK Trident design
UK design
Anglicised
US design
“The warhead was designed
in the UK”
Bob Ainsworth Mar 08
“The warheads were
anglicised by the AWE”
National Archives
1978 – 1980
4 tests of UK lightweight
warhead; 50 kiloton yield
opened door to details
of US designs;
6 further tests 1980-87
Primary uses British
High Explosive
Secondary probably derived
from US design
(as with Polaris family)
US components in UK Trident warhead
… it was decided on cost-effectiveness grounds to procure
certain non-nuclear warhead components from the United
States. (Bob Ainsworth)
Arming, Fusing
& Firing System
Neutron Generator
Gas Transfer System ?
Future of the US nuclear stockplie
Life Extension
Reliable Replacement Warhead
US Life Extension Programmes (LEP)
B61-7/11
LEP underway
W80
LEP cancelled
W76
Major LEP
US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
More reliable ?
Safer
More secure
Increased weight and size
US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
Livermore design chosen
No funding FY 2008
Advanced Certification
Funding request FY 2009
US Nuclear Weapon Reviews
Report date
Congress Commission
2008
Policy Review
2009
Posture Review
2010
Options for British warheads
Life Extension
or
High Surety Warhead
Life Extension underway since 2000
Britain will probably follow US lead
New UK High Surety Warhead
Features – IHE, FRP, No Be
Design Options
Design
Modified UK Trident
Previous tests
None
Modified UK TD-127
??
Anglicised US WR1
US W89
Warhead components
Reentry Vehicle (RV) case
Life Extension
Mk 4 RV
Replace some fittings
New Warhead
Larger Mk 5 RV
New production
Plutonium pit
Life Extension
No replacement
Lifespan 60 years plus
New Warhead
New Pit
Fire Resistant
Pit Tube
Life Extension
Replace pit tube
Tamper
Life Extension
Beryllium
No replacement
New Warhead
Substitute for Beryllium
High Explosives
Life Extension
US – replace after 30 yrs
UK - EDC 37 High Explosive
- replace after 16 ? years
New Warhead
Insensitive High Explosives
Safer, Larger & Heavier
Detonation System
Life Extension
Replace detonators
New Warhead
Optical initiated firing system
Secondary HEU
Life Extension
No replacement
Lifespan 60 years plus
New Warhead
New HEU secondary
Interstage
Life Extension
Remanufacture Fogbank
New Warhead
Substitute for Fogbank
Substitute for Beryllium
Radiation Case
Life Extension
No replacement
New Warhead
New simpler design
Arming, Fuzing & Firing System
Arming, Fuzing & Firing System
AWE vacancy
Warhead Electrical Engineer
Support the approval programme for the
introduction of the system into UK Trident
AWE website
Support the approval programme for the
introduction of the Mk4A AF&F system
into UK Trident
Beechgrove Recruiting
Arming, Fuzing & Firing System
MK4A AF&F
key part of US W76-1 warhead upgrade / LEP
advanced fuzing options
increased targeting flexibility and effectiveness
increase the warfighting effectiveness of the
D5 system
introduced in UK Trident system by 2017
Arming, Fuzing & Firing System
Life Extension
upgrade to Mk4A
New Warhead
New design
Neutron Generator
Life Extension
MC4380 introduced 2003
New Warhead
New design
Gas Transfer System
Life Extension
Acorn
(UK 2005)
Acorn II (LEP)
New Warhead
New design
Warhead Timeline
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
40
44
48
W76-0
W76-1
and
Reliable Replacement Warhead
Initial lifespan
New AF&F
Refurbished Warhead
or
High Surety Warhead
52 56
Modernisation of AWE
Aldermaston
Orion
Laser
Modernisation of AWE
Aldermaston
Hydrus
Hydrodynamic
Facility
Modernisation of AWE
Aldermaston
High Explosives
Fabrication
Facility
Modernisation of AWE
Aldermaston
Uranium
Production
Facility
Modernisation of AWE
Aldermaston
Refurbish A90
Modernisation of AWE
Aldermaston
Refurbish A45
Modernisation of AWE
Aldermaston
New
Supercomputers
Modernisation of AWE
New Warhead
Assembly &
Dissassembly
Facility
Burghfield
Current
Gravel
Gerties
AWE budget 2005 - 2011
£ million
1000
900
800
700
600
Development
500
400
300
200
Running costs
100
0
05/06
06/07
07/08
08/09
09/10
10/11
Tritium supply
2006
2054
Tritium decays with half-life of 12 years
No current source of UK tritium
New facility ? – linked to civil nuclear
Lower yield warhead
the continued availability of a lower yield from our
warhead
Future of UK Nuclear Deterrent December 2006
UK Trident warhead
– yield fixed at time of manufacture.
Future US & UK submarine warheads
– possible variable yield.
Trident Replacement
Submarine
Missile
Warhead
Targeting
Targeting system
Transfer of US targeting data
UKLO
STRATCOM Omaha
OPLAN
8044
information
STRATCOM
Omaha
SACEUR
Mons Belgium
NOTC
MoD London
sanitised
SWS IPT
Bath / Corsham
Corsham
Corsham
Corsham
Site 3
Cold War
bunker for
PM and Queen
Corsham
DCSA HQ
UK Defence
Communications
Hub
Corsham
Corsham
Computer
Centre
Trident targeting
Targeting system
Magnetic
Tape Cartridge
Target
Planning
(Corsham)
Fire Control
(Submarine)
Target Change
Message
Targeting system upgrades
SLBM Retargeting System (SRS)
operational in 2003
quickly, accurately & reliably
retarget missiles to targets
timely & reliable processing of an
increased number of targets
support adaptive planning
US and UK systems
Targeting system upgrades
SLBM Planning & Operational Flexibility (SPOF)
follow on to SRS
funded 2010 - 2012
improve flexibility & responsiveness
enhance accuracy and effectiveness
application in UK ?
Fire Control hardware upgrades
US
UK
In service
Mod 4
Mod 5
2003
Mod 6
Mod 7
2010
Targeting software for UK Trident
// Assess system response time suitability
F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx);
//Assess Yield Suitabilty
F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld)
//Assess Probability of Kill Suitability
for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++)
[
F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld);
F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k);
F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k];
Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3);
If(Fsum<min_pk)
MIN_PK=Fsum;
If(Fsum>max_pk)
{
max_pk=Fsum;
indx=k;
{
If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001)
Indx=indx_cep;
;
opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx;
return(max_pk
Software for US
target planning &
fire control
Targeting software for UK Trident
// Assess system response time suitability
F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx);
//Assess Yield Suitabilty
F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld)
//Assess Probability of Kill Suitability
for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++)
[
F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld);
F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k);
F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k];
Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3);
If(Fsum<min_pk)
MIN_PK=Fsum;
If(Fsum>max_pk)
{
max_pk=Fsum;
indx=k;
{
If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001)
Indx=indx_cep;
;
opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx;
return(max_pk
US Eyes Only
items removed from
code, tables and
manuals
Targeting software for UK Trident
// Assess system response time suitability
F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx);
//Assess Yield Suitabilty
F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld)
//Assess Probability of Kill Suitability
for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++)
[
F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld);
F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k);
F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k];
Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3);
If(Fsum<min_pk)
MIN_PK=Fsum;
If(Fsum>max_pk)
{
max_pk=Fsum;
indx=k;
{
If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001)
Indx=indx_cep;
;
opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx;
return(max_pk
Sanitised
software supplied to
Corsham
Targeting software for UK Trident
// Assess system response time suitability
F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx);
//Assess Yield Suitabilty
F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld)
//Assess Probability of Kill Suitability
for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++)
[
F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld);
F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k);
F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k];
Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3);
If(Fsum<min_pk)
MIN_PK=Fsum;
If(Fsum>max_pk)
{
max_pk=Fsum;
indx=k;
{
If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001)
Indx=indx_cep;
;
opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx;
return(max_pk
US could cripple
software to restrict
use
Assigned to NATO ?
NATO attack
less likely
independent attack
less likely
bilateral attack
most likely
Closing Points
Dependence on US support
Early stage of long-term plan
Need greater transparency
Endangered species