DRC Education Business Case: Improving access, quality and
governance in education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
1. Strategic Case
A. Context and Need
Educational Need
1.
DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world and is off track to meet the
Education Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In 2013 it was the lowest
ranked country 186 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index1. There
has been progress in relation to the education MDG in DRC but this remains
limited and is further weakened by inequities. For example the overall completion
rate in 2013 was 63.8% but in Katanga it was just 47% for girls.
Table 1: The Education MDGs in DRC2
MDG 2. Ensure that, by
2015, children everywhere,
boys and girls alike will be
able to complete a full
course of primary schooling
MDG 3. Target: Eliminate
gender disparity in primary
and secondary education
preferably by 2005, and in
all levels of education no
later than 2015
Completion
rate (%)
Gender
Parity Index
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Overall
n/a
53.9
56.3
56.7
58.8
62.4
63.8
Boys
n/a
63.5
66.5
64.9
68.5
70.2
70.6
Girls
n/a
44.2
46.0
48.6
49.1
54.6
57.1
Primary
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.90
Second
ary
Tertiary
0.53
0.56
0.56
0.58
0.59
0.59
0.62
0.35
0.36
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.45
0.46
2.
3.5 million (27%) primary school age girls and boys are out of school, with
20% of these being in one province, Katanga. The majority of these children have
never been to school. In addition, many children enter school late. 75% of children
out of school are aged between 6 to 8 years. In Sub-Saharan Africa only Nigeria
has more children out of school (8.7m, 37% of the school age population).3
3.
DRC suffers from low completion rates, high repetition rates and high
dropout rates. Only 63.8% of girls and boys complete primary schooling4 and only
14% achieve their school-leaving certificate without repeating a year.5 In 2012, the
drop out rages was 11.5% for primary school. Late entry and high repetition rates
means that almost 90% of children are one or more years older than they should
be by the final year of primary.
4.
Inequity of access to basic education is one of the defining characteristics of
the education system in the DRC.6 Almost 80% (2.8m) of all primary school age
children out of school live in rural areas and two thirds are from poor households. 7
There are almost equal numbers of primary school age boys and girls out of school
however differences become starker as girls become older. Girls make up 60% of
out of school children of lower secondary school age (12 to 13) and 75% of these
are girls living in rural areas8.
1
5.
Quality of education remains low and learning outcomes poor9. The results of
a learning assessment carried out by the Program on the Analysis of Education
Systems (PASEC) indicate that at the end of the 5th year of primary education,
only 47% of pupils reached the level of “minimal” knowledge in French and 59% in
maths10.
6.
Socio-economic norms and systemic sexual violence in school underpin
gender inequity in education. Key obstacles to girls’ education have been
identified as parental attitudes, lack of financial means, significant domestic
burdens on girls, the tendency to prioritise boys, adolescent pregnancy and the
poor social and physical environment for girls in schools11.
Education delivery and financing
7.
Whilst the state oversees the education system, almost 75% of all primary
school pupils attend the ‘écoles conventionnées.’ These are ‘écoles
conventionneés’ managed by church networks but recognised as public schools
under the 1977 Convention. The religious networks are powerful and influential,
and maintain their own administrative structures, that are linked to the government
at national, provincial and sub-provincial level. The state pays teachers and
administrative staff but relationships are ambiguous.12 This dual nature of
education management of the écoles conventionneés and non-conventionneés
impedes efficiency and accountability in the system.
8.
Non-state actors play the leading role in the delivery of education services
and the state must ally itself with these in order to maintain its limited
presence and authority. As such a concept of ‘negotiated statehood’ has arisen
between the state and non-state actors which is dynamic, locality-specific, and can
be cooperative or competitive13. In the context of weak state capacity, the
relationship is often one of ‘brokered autonomy’, where the state gains cooperation
from non-state actors, who in return are granted significant autonomy within their
own domains.
9.
The fee free education policy (gratuité) was launched in 2010 and
government financing of education has been increasing, but remains low,
rising from just 1% in 200214 of the budget to 11.8% (education as part of domestic
resources) in 2013. The government has committed to increasing education to
13.4% in 2014, well below the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 22%. The increase
in government spending on the sector has been matched by reasonable
performance in budget execution but this is mainly due to payment of teacher
salaries that account for 91% of domestically funded spending.15 As a result of the
increased resources teachers’ salaries have increased (to approx. $90 per month)
and they are paid more regularly. However, there is little budget left to tackle
access and quality and budget allocation and execution are not well aligned with
major policy priorities such as gratuité.
10.
Past poor financing has resulted in a reliance on school fees, which still
exists. Whilst the government has been taking action to address this with the
gratuité policy, the system remains under-financed. As such households continue
to finance more than half of the education budget. Since the launch of the gratuité
policy, school fees continue to be levied in primary schools; in secondary schools
they have almost doubled. In addition the practice of ‘ventilation’ still exists. This
2
entails the use of fees collected at school level to meet the operating costs of
higher levels in the administration.16 The system has become institutionalised and
has effectively turned schools into tax units with an estimated 90% of all operating
costs of the education sector being funded this way17.
11.
The complex nature of financing the system and a deep-rooted authoritarian
culture has resulted in poor accountability within the system. Despite paying
significant costs for education households have not been able to hold schools and
authorities to account or drive better quality education. Parents fear retaliation
against children and as parent organizations are financed by school fees their
bargaining position is weak.
Potential for Change
12.
There are clear signs the current government and Minister of Education are
committed to improving education. This has been signalled by the increasing
education budget, the production of the Interim Education Plan (IEP), a 10 year
Education Sector Strategy and the identification of a special fund of $100m to
support school construction. DRC has also engaged positively in the Global
Partnership for Education (GPE) and the Ministerial for All Learning Events in
Washington in April 2013, where the Government of DRC set out 4 priorities (i)
implement free primary education; (ii) rehabilitation of infrastructure and equipment
destroyed due to conflict; (iii) reform of initial training of primary school teachers;
and (iv) monitoring and assessing learning outcomes.18 This commitment to
education is expected to continue even if there was a change in Minister but, as
always, this is not guaranteed.
13.
The Interim Education Plan (2012) provides for more effective use of public
resources and better coordinated donor engagement. It sets out ways of
addressing access, quality and governance issues which allow for improved
planning and encourage convergence of key government and donor priorities.
Positive developments include (i) DRC membership to the GPE and the $100m
GPE investment; (ii) donor and government commitments to better coordination
and dialogue amongst donors, and between government and donors; 19 and (iii)
agreement of a 3 year roadmap for policy reforms required under the IEP20.
14.
The $100m GPE funded Programme PROSEB21 is the first major intervention
to support the IEP and includes (i) increasing access and equity through school
rehabilitation; (ii) improving teaching quality and learning outcomes through
school-based teachers’ skills development; (iii) country-wide provision of
textbooks; (iv) performance-based financing and restructuring of education
administrative offices.
Current donor and civil society context
15.
There are few donors to DRC’s education sector. Weak national policy
formulation capacity means donor interventions are fragmented and in the most
part unsustainable. The donor coordination group, the Partenaires Techniques et
Financiers (PTF), works at a strategic level but is weaker when it comes to
programmatic or technical issues. Work is required, as partners scale up to avoid
duplication of activities and stretching the already limited government capacity.
3
However, conversely, there is also the opportunity for donors to work more closely
together and align activities and approaches to support government plans and
priorities and potentially contribute to transforming the aid landscape for the
education sector and moving closer to the first sector wide approach in DRC.
16.
Most programmes are coming to an end, with a few starting up resulting in
an opportunity for DFID to partner with another significant donor (USAID):

USAID provides support for quality improvement programmes (OPEQ and
PAQUED) in targeted provinces22, which will end in 2014. Its 5-year EAGLE
programme targeting adolescent girls in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi ends in
2018. Its new $112m programme, with which DFID would like to partner, is in
design and will start in early 2015.

The World Bank PARSE programme, with countrywide coverage, focuses
on school infrastructure, textbooks and institutional and financial support for
the payment of schools’ operating costs and teacher salaries. PARSE will
end in late 2014. The Bank also has a small system strengthening project
focusing on improving data management systems in the sector and a larger
secondary/vocational education programme ($150m) to start in 2015.

AFD has a new $40m project using debt relief money, which will support
construction and teacher training in Bandundu, Bas Congo and Kinshasa as
well as support 26,000 teachers to be taken onto the payroll.

Government of Belgium is currently the sole significant partner in the
technical and vocational sub-sector. They are contributing to DFID’s Public
Financial Management and Accountability programme (PFMA) and are
interested in supporting improvements in sector governance and
accountability, possibly through DFID’s education programme.

UNICEF supports a broad portfolio of work related to access and quality as
well as education in emergencies and peacebuilding. With UNESCO they are
supporting improvements to the education management information systems.

The Qatar Foundation through the Educate a Child Initiative is supporting
UNICEF and IRC to improve access and quality of education in several
provinces.
17.
INGOs play an important role in the sector. Those with implementation capacity
and expertise in DRC include IRC, Save the Children, CRS and EDC. They have a
wide reach although funding is limited. A consortium of IRC/Save the
Children/CRS was awarded £21.9m from DFID’s Girls Education Challenge for
‘Vas-y Fille!’. IRC, EDC and CRS are implementing the USAID quality
improvement programmes OPEQ and PAQUED.
18.
Civil Society Organizations have an important role to play but need
strengthening. National umbrella organisations representing civil society
(CONEPT, COASCE) lack coordination and influence but have the potential to play
a significant role in stimulating debate on education and holding the government to
account. The recent formation of education coalitions in Equateur, Katanga and a
national level Education Observatoire (a national level independent civil society
education coalition / watch dog) is a positive step in improving policy dialogue and
province level accountability. 23
4
B. Strategic Fit
19.
Education is fundamental to sustainable development. DFID’s 2013 Education
position paper states ‘Improving Learning, Expanding Opportunities’, education
enables people to live healthier and more productive lives: a path to maximise
individual potential, extend freedoms, build capabilities and open up opportunities.
Evidence highlights that for education to enhance economic growth, girls and boys
must be both in school and learning. Learning propels the transformational
potential of education to contribute to better governance, more peace and
democracy, political stability and the rule of law. Education is also an essential part
of responding to current and future challenges, from demographic and climate
change, to rising inequalities within and between countries24.
20.
Education is also key to addressing the root causes of poverty (see Figure 1):
 Education contributes to social outcomes. Income poverty is strongly
associated with a lack of education and issues of gender inequality can be
exacerbated or ameliorated by the provision of education25.
 Education plays a central role in the formation of knowledge and skills, in the
process of economic development. Foundation and transferable skills can be
gained through formal schooling, and technical and vocational skills 26 through
specific training.
 The strength of the political settlement relies on educated citizens who are
able to engage with state processes.
 State capability means that the state is willing and able to deliver core
functions: this is dependent on personnel having the right skills to plan,
manage, monitor and implement and innovate. This is likely to include higher
level skills that are acquired from secondary and tertiary education.
Figure 1: The routes to poverty reduction
21.
As such, DFID continues to be committed to the MDGs and the Education
For All goals, and is focused on three core priorities: (1) to improve learning;
(2) to reach all children, especially those in fragile states; (3) to keep girls in
school, helping the most marginalised girls stay in school and learning for longer.
DFID’s approach to education combines strengthening national education systems
to ensure better provision for improved learning, improving accountability to
citizens and taxpayers for results, and improving what happens in classrooms.
5
22.
DRC is key to achieving universal quality primary education 27 Only Nigeria
has more children out of school in Sub-Saharan Africa, where DFID has a large
education programme. Progress on education in the DRC will contribute to
achieving DFID’s global targets on girls and women.
23.
Education has a key role in supporting DRC’s wider development and
achieving DFID DRC objectives. As set out in the Country Operational Plan,
DFID aims to address the urgent needs of the most vulnerable and poorest people
in DRC now, while working with the government to enable it to provide and finance
basic services in the long-term. DFID does not channel money through the
government, but aligns programmes to national and provincial priorities and
invests in building state capacity to respond better to the needs of its citizens. To
implement this vision ‘Deliver equitable, inclusive and quality services in the health,
education and WASH sectors’ is one of the 6 principle areas of investment. These
investments save lives and can transform governance structures by empowering
people to participate in decisions that affect their lives and strengthen the statecitizen relationship.28
24.
It will contribute to realising DFID DRC’s commitment to making a significant
improvement to the lives of adolescent girls29 including improving key
development outcomes for adolescent girls (reducing early pregnancy and levels
of violence against girls, and increasing access to secondary schooling). Education
has a key role to play in DFID DRC’s Action Plan on Adolescent Girls at a policy
and programme level supporting the development of a national strategy for girls’
education which will enable more girls to complete primary school and transition to
secondary and there will be close linkages between DFID DRC’s La Pépinière
programme for adolescent girls which is under development.
25.
With respect to the Gender Equality Act 2014, we confirm that this Business
Case will contribute to reducing gender inequality. The programme is
considered as having moderately different outcomes on girls and women and
impact on gender equality. The programme aims to meet the needs of boys and
girls equally, but does not have a specific focus on girls. There are specific barriers
faced by girls in attending, achieving and completing school but further in-depth
analysis during programme design will be needed to identify whether gender will
be a primary equity issue in specific areas of implementation. In which case,
implementation may include specific initiatives for girls. By mid-2015, after the
initial gender analysis, the level of ambition on compliance with the Gender
Equality Act will be reviewed to see if the programme could have a more significant
impact on gender quality. The increased education opportunities and changing
expectations for girls in relation to education could result in changing gender
dynamics. However shifting underpinning deep rooted socio-cultural norms is more
challenging. The DFID DRC Gender Review process has been used to ensure that
gender is considered during the programme preparation.30 As a result
disaggregating data, conducting a gender analysis and developing a gender
strategy are included in the contract documentation. The risks of gender equal
programming are mitigated as ‘approach to women and girls’ is a key operational
principle for the programme (see Management Case).
6
26.
There is an opportunity to address disability issues. The GoDRC is committed
to improving access to education for girls and boys with disabilities and has
recently amended the guidelines for school construction in line with the principles
of Universal Design31 which are a key access strategy for children with
disabilities.32 However there is now a need for the GoDRC to focus on the
implementation of these principles. With over 50% of children and adolescents with
disabilities thought to be out of school in DRC, DFID DRC will promote disabilityinclusive development through its programme including working to support the
GoDRC increase access for girls and boys with disabilities.
27.
Capitalising on synergies with other programmes offers opportunities to
maximise other outcomes and improve overall value for money. For example
situating an education programme alongside health interventions such as
deworming and/or, water and sanitation activities could have a direct impact on
improved participation in education and the potential for improving learning
outcomes.
28.
Focusing on provinces with a high level of DFID engagement (Equateur,
Kasai Occidental, Katanga) will maximise programme synergies33. These
provinces also have some of the highest levels of education need34. Targeted
activities will support access to education for conflict-affected girls and boys in
North and South Kivu, key to conflict prevention and stabilisation efforts in DRC.
29.
DFID currently supports a number of contributions to the education sector
(as below). A new bilateral programme will work to leverage maximum impact from
these interventions and support the Ministère de l’Enseignement Primaire,
Secondaire et Professionnel (MEPSP) in the implementation of the IEP

The GEC programme, Vas-y Fille!, started in 2013 and will contribute to
improved completion and quality for girls in 5 provinces35. It will also inform
MEPSP’s national strategy on girls’ education.

The GPE PROSEB programme ($100m) supports increased access and
quality in Equateur and Kasai Occidental. DFID is the biggest donor to the
GPE internationally.36

The DFID DRC PFMA programme will support central and provincial level
PFM reforms and support the MEPSP to engage with central level reforms. In
addition the ODI Budget Strengthening Initiative programme has supported
budget preparation and monitoring in the education sector and may provide
support in the future.

Other interventions which impact on the education sector include: the
Tuungane Community Driven Reconstruction programme - classroom
rehabilitation and construction; Village et Ecole Assainie - improvements in
water and sanitation at village and school level; education in emergencies 37;
and strengthening civil society through the Civil Society Fund (Katanga and
Equateur coalitions and the Education Observatoire).
30.
DFID has a comparative advantage in policy dialogue and its breadth of
current investments and education work. The UK is an active member of the
donor coordination group (PTF) and played a lead role in in supporting the
development of the Interim Education Plan (IEP), the proposal for GPE, and
improving analysis and understanding of exclusion through the Education
Exclusion Study. Direct DFID investment would boost this further and working
7
strategically with others, for example USAID, could capitalise on DFID’s
comparative advantage as well as the comparative advantages of others.
C. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
31.
The overall vision is that the programme will contribute to improved education
outcomes for girls and boys in the DRC and as such contribute to improved human
development outcomes and improved economic growth situation in the DRC.
32.
The expected impact is that the Government of DRC is better able to deliver
universal primary education in DRC.
33.
The programme will be closely aligned with the Government of DRC’s Interim
Education Plan (IEP) to support a minimum of 161,000 girls and 161,000 boys
in primary school and to deliver four outcomes: 38
(1) Improved enrolment and completion rates for girls and boys through
improved access and equity for girls and boys of primary school age by
supporting the implementation of a National Strategy for Education for All
Children in partnership with Government of DRC and others; programmes to
increase access through reducing financial barriers to education; piloting
innovative models for education in marginalised communities and supporting
Alternative Learning Programmes (ALP) for out-of-school girls and boys.
(2) Improved levels of reading and numeracy for girls and boys through
improved quality and learning by supporting in-service teacher training to
improve the teaching and learning of reading and mathematics and the
development of improved teaching and learning resources including those in
national languages; development and implementation of an assessment
framework to improve monitoring of learning outcomes; training and support to
improve school leadership and management skills.
(3) Improved quality of public service for education through strengthened
governance and accountability by strengthening financial systems and
capacity at local, provincial and national levels; supporting improved statistical
collection, data use and dissemination at provincial level; capacity building and
resourcing for COPAs and support to an independent civil society Education
Observatoire.
(4) Improved donor coordination and harmonisation by collaborating with
USAID to implement a joint DFID/USAID programme, developing and investing
in a programme to improve governance and accountability in collaboration with
other donors, and supporting the development of a SWAp or joint programme
approach.
8
2. Appraisal Case
34.
During the options appraisal the following questions were considered:
a) Should DFID DRC have an education programme?
b) Which level of education should the programme target?
c) Which geographical areas should the programme focus on?
d) What outcomes should the programme deliver?
e) How should the programme engage with other stakeholders in programme
delivery?
f) What outputs should be delivered to achieve the programme outcomes?
g) What is the preferred option and approach for the programme?
Options Appraisal
(a) Should DFID DRC have an education programme?
35.
Yes. The high level of need and the central role of education in the future
development of DRC create a pressing case for DFID intervention in the education
sector. Although other donors are scaling up, the education sector remains
significantly underfunded and poorly coordinated. DFID resources will contribute
both to improved outcomes and better donor coordination in the education sector.
(b) Which level of education should the programme target?
36.
Primary education at this stage rather than secondary, vocational or tertiary
education. DRC has a high level of need in all levels of education however the
decision to invest in primary was made based on the high numbers of primary
children out of school and the importance of improving learning outcomes,
particularly the basic skills of reading and numeracy, to provide the foundations for
girls and boys to enter higher levels of learning. In addition the Government of
Belgium and the World Bank are planning to increase their investments in
vocational and secondary education respectively.
(c) Which geographical areas should the programme focus on?
37.
Nationally at a strategic level, focus in three provinces and engage at a local
level. There is a need to support change at national, provincial, district and school
level to address systemic, institutional changes as well as direct improvements in
access and learning for girls and boys. As the need is large, and this would be
DFID’s first intervention of significance, the programme would work in selected
provinces and complement other major donor interventions and leverage the
impact of investments already being made in the education sector particularly
through the GPE resources and other DFID programmes (as above). The
programme will therefore focus on Equateur, Kasai Occidental and Katanga as
well as national level. (Note: Due to working with USAID (see below) the
programme will also work in North Kivu and South Kivu, focus provinces of USAID,
supporting specific targeted interventions for conflict-affected girls and boys.)
9
(d) What outcomes should the programme deliver?
38.
A cross-section of areas of need identified in order to achieve desired
programme impact: an improvement in access and equity; quality and learning;
governance and accountability; and donor coordination as these areas cannot be
effectively addressed in isolation. For instance improving access without improving
quality and learning would be ineffective. It is also important that the delivery of
results is combined with systems strengthening – an ICAI report in three East
African countries supported an approach that addresses learning outcomes within
a systems approach context.39
(e) How should the programme engage with other stakeholders in programme
delivery?
39.
Align with Government of DRC’s IEP in line with DFID’s commitment to GPE.
Current evidence points to the Government of DRC being committed to the GPE
approach and to the IEP. No significant reason for non-alignment has been
identified. Working completely within and through the government system has
been rejected DFID DRC’s policy does not support aid to be channelled directly
through government systems on fiduciary risk grounds40. The programme will be
aligned to national priorities and policies, and where possible, with the Government
of DRC’s plans at an operational level41 supporting the principles of the ‘New Deal
for Engagement in Fragile States’.42 Dialogue with other donors will move
progressively towards a SWAp approach while fully taking account of fiduciary risk
issues.
40.
Collaborate with other donors but not yet through a pooled fund approach.
DFID engages regularly with other donors and this will continue. USAID, the World
Bank and Belgium are interested in jointly funding systems strengthening and
governance work. There is some limited, early, evidence of good progress with a
World Bank-managed trust fund for PFM in DRC. But this is not yet the right time
for pooled funding in education. Firstly, the institutional arrangements are likely to
be difficult for USAID. Secondly, we lack a capable in-country management
partner. The World Bank is already the Supervising Entity for the GPE but they do
not have in-country Task Team Leader. However we remain open to considering a
pooled fund if these challenges can be overcome. The jointly funded programme
with USAID should provide a demonstration opportunity that joint / pooled working
is effective.
41.
Undertake a joint programme with USAID which will enable us to leverage
significant resources to support a system strengthening approach whilst
also delivering on results. Work to develop the Business Case found that
USAID’s new programme contains many of the same ambitions as DFID’s, and
that a joint programme would achieve a greater number of outcomes than two
individual programmes as well as offering greater VFM (see table 2 below).
Additional benefits come from the influence DFID would have over USAID’s policy,
programming and use of funds, including bringing a strong systems strengthening
approach to the programme. DFID would also benefit from USAID’s policy and
technical capability. There are nevertheless operational challenges in a joint
approach (for example branding and results’ attribution) which are being resolved
in advance of contracting. A joint programme would also extend the focus to North
and South Kivu to support specific targeted interventions as well as Kasai
10
Occidental, Katanga and Equateur for the main programme outcomes. The
assessment is the benefits of cooperating outweigh the challenges, and that a
joint DFID / USAID programme has the potential to transform the aid
landscape for DRC’s education sector, moving DFID and other donors closer
to DRC’s first sector wide approach.
Table 2: Summary opportunities and challenges of a joint DFID/USAID programme
Opportunity/challenge
1.
2.
3.
4.
Increased results and potential for
a more significant change in access
and improved learning opportunities
for more girls and boys
Increased potential for addressing
institutional challenges and
improvements in sector
management alongside a change in
donor behaviour/support
Potential to leverage systems
change due to extent of
intervention and size of investment.
Improved sector dialogue and
communication and enhanced
potential to move towards a Sector
Wide approach
5.
Combines a USAID strong
technical approach with DFID
systems strengthening
approach.
6.
High operational risks including
risks related to corruption and
misuse of funds
Explanation/rationale
Two donors would deliver an increased number of results to contribute to the
IEP as well as provide increased support to the education system. Reduced
admin costs through one approach rather than two donors contracting similar
programmes enables more resources to be spent on outcomes.
A coordinated approach across donors (USAID, DFID and potentially others)
will lead to a more coherent plan for supporting capacity development in the
education sector, improving sector governance and management and a more
coordinated complimentary approach across donors.
The increased leverage of two donors working with significant resources is
also likely to be able to increase accountability and leverage change in
education sector governance.
The agreement of a common framework between DFID, USAID and the
government would facilitate a move towards more transparent and open ways
of working across donors; the potential of a more coherent sector approach;
to working with donors in a less fragmented/project type approach. Whilst an
individual DFID programme could support a move to a SWAp the combination
of two large donors working together would be a significant step forward.
USAID has developed a strong technical approach to improving learning
outcomes through early grade reading whereas DFID’s approach has been to
work with governments and build systems. The combination of these two
approaches could bring significant benefits in DRC and would build on the
comparative advantage of two donors with strong international expertise.
The possibilities of delays in contracting or programme delivery are increased
however these could be mitigated by clear programme management and
governance structures beforehand. The risks associated with, for example
tied aid, different spending cycles, how we deal with fraud, branding issues
would need to be discussed and steps taken to mitigate the risks.
(f) What outputs should be delivered to achieve the programme outcomes?
42.
Alternative approaches were considered and dismissed:
 Large scale construction to increase access and equity: 65% of classrooms are
not made from durable material and distance to schools is the most significant
reason girls and boys are out of school in rural areas 43. However, a large scale
construction programme was ruled out as the GPE will invest almost $40m in
construction over the next 3 years alongside the $100m special fund created by
the government. The World Bank are also working with the government to
undertake a large scale school mapping exercise in the next 3 years and after
this would be the time to reconsider additional investment in construction.
 Contributing to paying teachers’ salaries to improve access and equity: This is
key to addressing financial barriers in school as incentives for teachers
represent the largest school fee. However, the government is committed to
increasing teachers’ salaries and is receiving some support from the World
Bank. AFD is also supporting additional teachers to be taken onto the payroll.
Rather than paying teachers’ salaries the programme will focus on supporting
improving the systems associated with paying salaries44.
11



Reform of pre-service teacher training to improve quality and learning: Preservice training for primary teachers in DRC is part of the secondary curriculum
and organized in the humanités pédagogiques (HP). It is estimated that there
are more than 10,000 HPs and restructuring would be a complex undertaking
and at this time the commitment of government to the reform is unclear.
Curriculum reform to improve quality and learning: The primary curriculum has
been reviewed many times and there are clear objectives on reading, writing
and math skills per grade available or currently being developed. The current
challenge is related to weak capacity to implement it correctly (poor teaching
skills etc.) rather than the curriculum itself.
Additional nationwide investments in textbooks to improve quality and learning:
The World Bank programme PARSE has distributed textbooks nationwide for
reading and maths in Grades 1/2 and the GPE programme, PROSEB, will
provide textbooks in all schools for Grades 3/4 and 5/6 (French and Maths) and
science books for Grades 5/6. Given the current significant investment in
textbooks, the focus needs to be on supporting teachers use these resources
effectively.
(g) What is the preferred option and approach for the programme?
43.
The preferred option is a combination of activities, aligned with the IEP, and
designed to achieve four main outcomes (1) access and equity; (2) quality
and learning; (3) governance and accountability; and (4) donor coordination
for the reasons noted above. The core activities and the hypotheses by which
these activities will lead to the programme outcomes are illustrated in Table 3.
Figure 2 illustrates the Theory of Change for the programme. DFID will work in
partnership with USAID and support a primary education programme focused on
Equateur, Kasai Occidental, and Katanga with specific targeted interventions in
North and South Kivu. This approach will meet the needs identified in the Strategic
Case and through working to improve donor and government coordination will
improve the institutional environment for primary education.
12
Table 3: Activities by programme outcome
4. Donor
coordination
Hypothesis
1.1. Implementation of National Strategy for Education
for All Children
1.2. Increasing access through addressing financial
barriers e.g. activities to remove indirect costs of
education (e.g. free uniforms, basic school supplies);
incentives to enrol the poorest boys and girls at the
correct age; implementation of local, community based
social protection mechanisms.
1.3. Innovative education programmes to remove supply
side barriers for children in marginalised communities
e.g. pygmy populations, river and mining communities
1.4. Support ALP programmes for out-of-school girls
and boys particularly in conflict-affected areas
1.5. Activities to improve learning environments to make
them more equitable and supportive for boys and girls
1.6. Increasing parental and community awareness and
engagement to address local level barriers to access,
particularly for girls.
2.1. District/ Provincial level in-service teacher training
(including teachers, school inspectors and headteachers)
2.2. Support for development and use of
improved learning and training materials (including for
reading and mathematics)
2.3. Support for development, production and use of
materials in national languages
2.4. Implementation of a framework to assess learning
2.5. Training and support to improve school leadership
and management skills
3.1. Strengthen financial systems and capacity at all
levels through: assistance to improve MEPSP budget
execution; improve PFM capacity in provincial education
ministries; strengthen PFM practice at school and
Bureaux Gestionnaire level
3.2. Support statistical collection, data use and
dissemination at provincial level
3.3. Support steps towards decentralisation in the
education sector
3.4. Support to independent Observatoire at national,
provincial and school level45
3.5. Capacity building and resourcing for COPAs and
other activities to increase in demand side accountability
at school level
4.1. Implement a joint education programme with USAID
in 3 main provinces
4.2. Implement a joint programme to improve
governance and accountability with USAID and in
collaboration with other donors
4.3. Implement joint annual donor sector reviews,
4.4. Work towards a SWAP or joint programme approach
for the education sector by 2018
13
Removal of key financial
barriers and supply side
constraints will increase
enrolment and equity in
education
A school and distance based
model of teacher training
increases teacher quality
and improves learning
outcomes
Improved assessment
improves learning outcomes
More effective school
leadership and school
improvement plans have a
positive impact on learning
Better management of
resources at all levels of the
system and improved
transparency of the budget
process will lead to more
accountability and
subsequently improve the
quality of the education
services
Stronger involvement of civil
society in education leads to
increased accountability and
better quality of the
education service
Increased donor coordination
and programming improves
sector dialogue and
communication and
enhances the potential to
leverage systems change in
the education sector and
move towards a sector wide
approach
Programme
Outcomes
Overall
Outcome
1. Improved equity
and access for all
girls and boys
indistinctively
2. Improved
learning for all
girls and boys
indistinctively
3. Better quality of
public service
4. Improved donor
coordination and
harmonisation
Increased access to education and improved learning outcomes for girls and boys, and
a more responsive and accountable education system
3. Governance and
accountability
2. Quality and learning
1. Access and equity
Activities/Inputs
(DFID resources)
44.
The Theory of Change is based on a number of hypotheses and the evidence
base for each hypothesis has been explored (see Table 3 and Annex 1).

Outcome 1: Access and equity - the evidence rating is strong: The evidence
suggests that large changes in access have come about with national policy
change, usually through fee abolition. Therefore supporting a national strategy on
education for all children with a focus on addressing financial barriers is most
likely to yield the biggest gains in terms of education enrolment, especially given
the majority of girls and boys in the DRC are out of school due to financial
barriers. In addition drop-out rates increase significantly after age 10 in Sub
Saharan Africa46 so on-time enrolment is important for retention and completion.
Strong international evidence also indicates: the provision of free uniforms may
reduce absenteeism47; ‘girl-specific’ factors that impact on retention can be
addressed48; cash transfers49 through community based social protection
mechanisms can support vulnerable children.

Outcome 2: Quality and learning - the evidence rating is medium:
International evidence suggests that in-service teacher professional development
has a positive impact on student learning.50 Assessing levels of learning and
identifying barriers to learning so that policy and practice can be adjusted to
address these is essential to improving learning outcomes and improving school
effectiveness.51 There is also a developing body of evidence that learning
assessments play a role in increasing the accountability of schools and education
authorities to stakeholders.52 There is a medium evidence base that leadership
and management, particularly through a school based management approach, is
critical for effective teaching to take place.53

Outcome 3: Governance and accountability - the evidence rating is medium:
There is mixed evidence in relation to improved governance and accountability
and the impact on education outcomes. However there is sufficient evidence of
the need for support to systems in the DRC context. For example there is medium
evidence that the transfer of responsibilities to the local level, as is proposed in
DRC, can build demand for effective local governance, and improve the delivery
of public services.54 In addition where there has been impact on learning in a
decentralised setting this has been achieved with rigorous standards and
increased public accountability.55 There is also evidence of the importance of
supporting both supply and demand side accountability in in order to improve
government accountability56.There is little evidence about the impact of citizen
engagement available: this includes evidence on how changes occur (or do not
occur), and in what contexts and under what conditions.57

Outcome 4: Donor coordination - the evidence rating is limited: The reasons
for, and benefits of, donors improving coordination are well documented58, and
there is evidence also that the deployment of uncoordinated project aid in many
sectors has contributed to a vicious circle, compounding poor sector
governance59. There is evidence that mechanisms like Common Funds should be
used for Technical Assistance and Capacity Development rather than setting up
parallel service delivery mechanisms. However, the likelihood of reform at the
sector level relies on political support and technical leadership within government
which is difficult for the donor community to influence60. Testing the level of
political commitment before moving to a SWAp approach and identifying how to
work within the existing political economy is recommended.61
14
Figure 2: Theory of Change for Improving access, quality and governance in DRC
15
Climate Change and Environment Assessment
45.
The preferred option is assessed as category B for risks (medium potential
risk /impact) and category B for opportunities (medium)62 (see Table 4).
Table 4: Summary of risks, impact and opportunities on Climate Change and
Environment
Risks and impacts
B
Climate change:
Impact: carbon footprint associated with
the building materials but construction
activities will be limited. Where it does
happen it will be a one off impact.
Risks: could negatively impact on the
sustainability of school construction,–
particularly in areas subject to increasing
seasonal flooding; changes in the
seasonality and timing of rains in
subsistence agriculture communities can
negatively impact attendance rates at
school – particularly for boys during key
seasons.
Environmental degradation: Most
activities are environmentally benign.
However, some, including construction /
rehabilitation and adding missing facilities
(e.g., boundary walls, toilets) could have
potentially negative impacts, which will
need to be monitored and managed
effectively. This may be particularly
important where activities take place in
marginalised communities e.g river
communities, pygmy populations etc
Opportunities
B
Opportunities through education:
 Development of local reading materials to create
awareness of environment and climate issues.
 Improving environmental management, a direct contributor
to improve livelihoods and economic growth, and building
resilience to climate change: “A well educated population is
better equipped to recognize in advance the threats posed
by a changing climate and to make preparation”63
 A World Bank Economic case study concludes: “Educating
young women may be one of the best climate change
disaster prevention investments in addition to high social
rates of return in overall sustainable development goals.”64
 Education particularly of girls has been proven to impact on
fertility65, reducing numerical pressure on natural resources
on which livelihoods and economic growth depends.
 Building water catchment and storage into school build and
renovation can provide students and their communities with
a source of water, if effectively managed.
Opportunities for impact on education
 Aligning curriculum and timing of examinations to fit with
agricultural seasons can improve attendance rates.
 Building renewable energy solutions into school design and
renovation extends periods available for students to study.
 Providing access to renewable energy in teachers’ homes
is a mechanism for attracting teachers into rural areas.
Note: Where A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity;
C, low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
46.
There is expected to be medium environmental impact if construction
activities take place. Construction activities are expected to be minimal in the
overall programme but where there are elements these will be implemented in line
with best practice and principles to mitigate environmental impact or potential
impacts of climate change. This should include consideration of ways to minimise
impacts for example through the use of solar energy and rain-water harvesting. All
rehabilitation activities will follow accepted engineering standards in line with
Government of DRC guidance and environmentally sound construction material
and techniques66. Analysis of reconstruction/rehabilitation sites will take place to
ensure that the location is not hazard prone nor will environmental degradation
take place as a result of activities. Precautions against unnecessary vegetation
clearing will be taken. If appropriate, re-vegetation activities will be encouraged.
47.
Environmental Mitigation and Monitoring Plan (EMMP) plans will be
developed as required. Contractors will be required to conduct an environmental
review prior to any construction activities and ongoing activities will be monitored67.
Mitigation measures on environmental issues will be incorporated in the
16
implementation plan. If appropriate, DFID/USAID will undertake periodic field visits
to assess the implementation and mitigation and monitoring measures, and identify
appropriate areas of improvement where necessary.
48.
Learning about environment and climate change will be explored during the
inception phase and incorporated into the implementation phase of the
programme. This will include considering learning through reading through the
production of local reading materials highlighting environmental issues. As there is
limited discussion in the DRC education sector in relation to the impact on climate
and environment issues and vice versa these will be explored during the lifetime of
the programme. For example as the programme will have a focus on reducing
numbers of girls and boys out of school, climate variability and how this potentially
impacts on school enrolment, attendance and/or drop out may also need to be
explored.
49.
Climate and Environmental considerations and principles have been
discussed and agreed with USAID. Any partnership agreement between USAID
and DFID will recognise the commitment of the donors under multilateral
environment arrangements, and apply environmental due diligence to the use of
Project funds. Any Terms of Reference or engagement with Contractors or
UNICEF will reflect commitments to conducting and environmental review,
mitigating environmental impacts, and developing an Environmental Mitigation and
Monitoring Plan (EMMP).
Sustainability
50.
Government has learnt lessons from donor initiatives to improve its own
education policy and implementation, and continues/complements donor
interventions. For example, in relation to the implementation of fee abolition:
 The government is paying 60% of schools’ operating costs complementing and
gradually replacing donor funding (World Bank PURUS / PARSE programmes);
 The government is paying annually operating costs to administrative offices (on
average $2400) to reduce school fees paid by households;
 The government is putting additional primary teachers on payroll and donors
are reimbursing these teacher salaries following approved procedures and an
agreed timetable.
These examples are the result of: donors working with government on the basis
that the government is responsible for recurrent costs; project design (sliding scale
showing increased government contribution over the time of the project); and the
existence of a framework (IEP) that sets priorities.
51.
There is the potential to improve coherence of policy and practice. The
government has not always take action to address issues that are detrimental to
the education sector. For example (i) the proliferation of schools, teachers and
administrative staff, despite the need for regulation; (ii) decisions that do not
comply with high-profile priorities (such as mandatory purchase of textbooks at the
primary level – despite fee abolition and donors supporting distribution of textbooks
in all grades in recent years). The programme would need to be cognizant of
where the sustainability of any initiatives could be undermined as a result of
political economy factors and engage with these issues to try to improve/influence
the coherence between policy and practice.
17
52.
A joint DFID/USAID education programme would be sustainable due to the
potential of the programme to deliver results alongside strengthening systems
capitalizing on DFID’s comparative advantage and experience in systems change
and USAID’s strong technical approach. Two donors working together will be in a
stronger position to be able to influence the government to deliver on commitments
whilst also strengthening civil society to hold the government to account. This will
include engaging with key stakeholders such as the faith based organisations who
are responsible for much of the delivery of education services (see Annex 2). This
programme will also work with the government and partners to promote a
coordinated policy dialogue to address some of the inconsistencies in policy and
practice (highlighted above) within the political economy constraints. A progressive
approach towards a SWAp during the lifetime of the programme; building capacity
throughout the programme and transitioning activities to the government in the
final years of the programme will also support sustainability.
53.
The programme will contribute to building legitimacy of the state from the
perspective of citizens68 - by contributing to improving equity and quality in
education and so helping to meet citizens expectations of the state; by supporting
citizens and communities to engage more with the state and those delivering
services for example through parent committees and the observatoire and building
demand side accountability as well as by strengthening supply side accountability
through for example improved public financial management .
Feasibility
54.
Fundamental institutional reform that is a precondition for change still needs
to take place, however government commitment to education forms a basis
for potential change. At the moment, there is limited evidence to demonstrate
real systemic change. Education (specifically primary education) has been
repeatedly presented as a major government priority (one of the 5 pillars - 5
chantiers); particularly the fee abolition policy and Education for All objectives69.
DRC’s membership to the GPE further entails alignment of education policy with
identified consensus-based priorities (IEP) and commitment to actively work or
interact with civil society and donors. However, inconsistencies have been
observed such as the continued proliferation of schools and administrative offices
which indicate how political economy factors may be playing a role in the
education sector as the government / government representatives maintain
patronage networks through the potential of salaries or the option to benefit from
the fee structure in the sector. Working together, and with other key partners, DFID
and USAID will seek to support institutional reform to be able to take place as well
to influence the government to enable it to happen.
55.
There are significant weaknesses in government capacity in key institutions
and the programme will provide technical assistance, capacity building and
resources to support MEPSP in improving the quality of services and increasing
accountability in the system (see Annex 2). Technical assistance can help to
enhance the impact of funding provided.70 The ICAI report on education in East
Africa report recommended strengthening capacity-building in ministries of
education to improve the value for money of their education systems. This should
involve enhanced analysis (including tracking funds and comparing in-country unit
costs and learning outcomes), evaluation, forecasting and application of
international good practice.
18
Value for Money
56.
One benefit to the individual receiving more and better quality education is
the prospect of higher expected earnings. There is much literature on the
impact of increased educational attainment on wages and increased prospective
earnings. This literature often takes increased wages as an indicator of enhanced
productivity, though the evidence is not conclusive. It is, however, widely
recognised that by providing children with writing, reading, counting and cognitive
skills, formal education makes children more adaptable to the requirements of the
labour market, and it “enhances the adaptability and efficiency of workers.” 71
57.
In DRC the average present value of total increased life earnings associated
with one year’s additional education is estimated to be £52.90. This is based a
number of assumptions as outlined in Annex 3 and on an estimate that one
additional year of education in DRC leads to a 6% increase in revenue; almost
twice the increase observed in Benin (3.3%). There are also a number of other
economic benefits associated with additional schooling (aside from increased
through-life income) including improved health outcomes and social returns72.
These other benefits have not been quantified in this analysis and the figure
should therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for the economic return
associated with additional schooling.
58.
We will reassess the case for investing in education if the programme cost of
providing one child with one additional year of schooling exceeds £52.90
During the design phase of the programme, when more detailed programmes
costs will be available from the implementing partners, this economic analysis will
be revisited to verify the economic case for the intervention and, in collaboration
with USAID, to make a more detailed cost-benefit analysis when the final results of
the programme have been determined. Examples of Value for Money measures
that might be used for this programme are indicated in Table 5 and will be agreed
with USAID during the design and inception phase.
Table 5: Examples of Value for Money measures for education
Indicator
Cost per child per
year – average
national and
provincial
Proportion of girls
benefitting from the
programme
Number of teachers
trained
Primary enrolment
rates nationally
compared to target
districts
PASEC scores
Definition
Unit cost per child per year
VfM Measure
Economy
Source of Data
National EPSP data
Baseline
Average $22.7
Number of girls compared to Equity
boys that benefit from the
different components of the
programme
Number of teachers trained Efficiency
through the programme
Monitoring data
Baseline to be
established
Monitoring data
Baseline to be
established
Comparison of enrolment
Effectiveness
rates nationally with schools
targeted
National EPSP data
98.4% (gross,
2011/12)
57.8% (net, Grade 1)
Percentage of children
passing PASEC
PASEC data
PASEC Maths 55% /
Reading 55.3% (2010)
Effectiveness
19
3. Commercial Case
59.
DFID DRC will deliver this programme in collaboration with USAID. The
programme will be jointly managed and implemented with USAID to utilize the
comparative advantages of both donors (USAID’s strong education technical
approach and DFID’s systems strengthening approach), maximise the potential to
address institutional challenges in the sector and improve sector dialogue.
60.
The joint programme will be governed by one Delegated Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) specifying both DFID and USAID as co-donors to a joint
programme. Both donors will have oversight of the overall programme and jointly
manage the different components of the programme regardless of whose financing
is supporting the component. The DCA will include the mandatory sections
covering the Scope and Objectives; Contributions of Donors; Cooperation and
Representation; Disbursements; Reporting; Reservations; Durations – Disputes. It
will also incorporate the operational principles for the partnership (as set out in the
Management Case). The Terms of Reference for the different parts of the
programme specified in the DCA will be annexed to the DCA. Both donors will
claim 100% of the results. Work will also be undertaken to disaggregate for any
DFID or USAID attribution purposes.
61.
DFID and USAID will procure and lead on different parts of the programme as
set out in Table 6 and explained in detail below. However each part will be
considered an element of the overall joint programme with a total value of
approximately £104m and funded from the overall contributions of DFID (£36m)
and USAID ($112m or approximately £68m) – this includes any work delivered
through UNICEF as well as work delivered through other implementing
mechanisms as in Table 6. In order to minimise administration costs, financial
transfers between the DFID and USAID will be kept to a minimum and this means
there will only be one overall net payment made from DFID to USAID (£15.5m over
a 4 year period). This also means in practice that DFID will fully finance and
disburse funds to the governance and accountability and donor coordination parts
of the programme. Both will still be part of the joint USAID/DFID programme under
the DCA. The DFID and USAID financial contributions to all of the parts of the
programme have been agreed which has resulted in the £15.5m net payment
figure The DCA will be the mechanism by which DFID will release funds to
USAID (see Financial Case below for more details).
Outcome 1 (Access and equity): Delivery through an MoU with UNICEF (£6.6m DFID
and USAID funding)
62.
UNICEF has a unique and significant coordination role in DRC. They will bring
added value to this investment through their relationship with government at
different levels and their ability to bring other funding partners on board for the
implementation and achievement of the national strategy for education for all
children. UNICEF have been leading access work in DRC in recent years and
have managed the DFID funded Education Exclusion Study.
20
Table 6: Overview of implementing mechanism
Implementing
mechanism
Programme
outcome
included
Delivery through UNICEF
with an MoUs with both
DFID and USAID
Outcome 1: Access
and equity
(focus on activities
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5 )
£6.6m
Direct procurement of a
contracted supplier by
USAID
Outcome 1: Access
and equity
(focus on activities
1.2, 1.4 , 1.5, 1.6)
and
Outcome 2: Quality
and learning
£76.5m
Direct procurement of a
contracted supplier by
DFID
Outcome 3:
Governance and
accountability
and
Outcome 4: Donor
coordination
Evaluation
£16.9m
Direct procurement of a
contracted supplier by
USAID
Overall
funding (DFID
and USAID
contribution*)
Explanation
An MoU with UNICEF will
support specific activities
which build on UNICEF’s
expertise and previous work.
Direct procurement of
services through a
competitive procurement to
work at school, district and
provincial level to improve
education access and
quality.
Direct procurement using an
approach that will enable a
more coherent approach to
technical assistance and
systems strengthening with
government / other donors.
Independent evaluation of
the joint programme
£4.0m
Lead
DFID to lead on policy
and strategy
Both DFID and USAID
to have MoU’s with
UNICEF
USAID lead
USAID to contract
following US
procurement
procedures but with
open procurement
DFID lead
DFID to contract
USAID lead
USAID to contract
*Figures approximate as take into account USAID contributions and allow for fluctuating exchange rates.
63.
UNICEF has demonstrated the ability to deliver effectively in the DRC. This
indirect procurement route will still require UNICEF to adhere to the rigorous
procedures applied to the other partners under a commercial contract. The
outputs specified in the logframe will be clear deliverables for UNICEF and
quarterly performance and financial reporting will provide a clear line of sight on
progress.
64.
Both DFID and USAID would have MoU’s with UNICEF and contribute
resources directly to UNICEF to deliver on the results but DFID would lead on
policy dialogue with UNICEF and manage the institutional relationship on behalf of
the joint programme. Two MoUs are anticipated because both DFID and USAID
have global agreements and DRC relations with UNICEF. A single MoU, with the
consequent net payment adjustment, may be considered as the UNICEF
discussion progress.
Outcome 1 (Access and equity) and Outcome 2 (Quality and learning): Direct
procurement by USAID of a contracted supplier (£76.5m DFID and USAID funding)
65.
USAID has significant experience of procuring and managing large
education programmes in DRC and they will lead on the procurement of
activities to achieve results under Outcome 1 (Access and equity) and Outcome 2:
(Quality and learning). USAID currently has two large operational programmes
OPEQ (approx. $22m) and PAQUED (approx. $42m) which will come to an end in
2014/15. DFID DRC has limited experience of implementing education
programmes at school and provincial level, having chosen to focus at national level
with previous activities. The GEC programme, Vas-y Fille! is the first significant
DFID funded education programme and is managed centrally. In addition USAID
has been operating in two out of the three focus provinces – Katanga (OPEQ) and
21
Equateur (PAQUED) – and therefore have a good operational knowledge of the
current education context in these provinces.
66.
USAID will use a competitive process in order to select the lead supplier
through commercial competition in consultation with DFID. The Contract
Notice for this will be advertised following approval of DFID’s Business Case and
USAID’s Concept Note. Discussions with DFID’s Procurement Group (PrG)
confirm that the USAID procurement process is as robust as that used by DFID.
DFID have, without making a firm commitment, provided input into the first stage of
this process (the Request for Information (RFI)) and will input into the preparation
of the Request for Proposals (RFP) and form part of the Technical Committee
evaluating the proposals.
67.
It is expected that prospective suppliers will bid in conjunction with other
organisations in consortia in order to provide the full range of skills and
capacities required to deliver the different components of the programme.
USAID will contract the lead supplier to take forward implementation. It is
envisaged that the lead would have the capacity to, both deliver activities, manage
their consortium partners and interface with DFID, USAID, Government of DRC,
UNICEF and other donors. There will be an inception phase to the programme to
ensure effectiveness of the main implementation phase.
68.
The market is expected to respond positively to a direct procurement
through a contracted supplier. This is a tried and tested method, with USAID
having previously contracted several education programmes (OPEQ, PAQUED,
EAGLE) through this approach. In addition DFID DRC has built on previous
engagement with potential suppliers and proactively engaged with the market
identifying potential bidders through the PrG run Girls Education Challenge (GEC)
competition, an extensive mapping of potential partners and a meeting on a no
commitment basis with potential partners, both in DRC and in the UK. Following
this meeting 19 organisations submitted capability statements which came from a
range of organisations including commercial, NGOs, consortiums of NGOs and the
UN. At least half of organisations had strong potential to manage and implement
the programme although all the organisations indicated they would need to work
with others. Therefore along with investments such as the GEC programme, this
programme could provide the opportunity to expand the market of service
providers in DRC, increasing competitiveness and driving innovation in delivery.
69.
We are confident USAID’s performance and financial monitoring processes
are in accordance with best business practices. This has been tested against
advice from PrG, and will be further tested as the programme develops.
Implementing partners will also be required to have well-established and effective
systems for strengthening performance and the ability to deliver and maximise
results which will be monitored by DFID and USAID through regular progress
reviews, narrative and financial and audit reports. Both DFID and USAID have 5
point Annual Review systems which are closely aligned.
Outcome 3 (Governance and accountability) and Outcome 4 (Donor coordination):
Direct procurement by DFID of a contracted supplier (£16.9m DFID and USAID
funding)
22
70.
Direct procurement by DFID through the OJEU process will be used to select
a service provider. While the majority of the activities in this component involve
technical assistance with some provision of resources e.g. for data collection, the
key element of strengthening the education system to become more effective,
accountable and responsive requires political buy from the Government of DRC
and some responsibility for these activities, particularly on donor coordination, will
rest with DFID (and USAID). There is also a need to work closely with the
government and other donors whilst implementing activities to strengthen systems
and accountability. A key consideration during the procurement will therefore be a
supplier/approach that is able to achieve the intended outcomes as well as work in
a way that improves donor coordination and engagement with the Government of
DRC, with the objective of moving towards developing a sector wide approach in
the longer term. If any approach other than direct open procurement, e.g through a
framework contract, is used it will be mutually agreed between USAID and DFID.
71.
DFID will lead on delivering the accountability and donor coordination
outcomes drawing on its strong experience internationally of working with
government and donor partners to strengthen systems in education. DFID DRC
has experience of supporting national level activities in education and also has
other governance programmes which will link to this programme, most notably the
PFMA programme. The PFMA programme is working to strengthen PFM systems
in Equateur, one of the focus provinces for this programme.
Programme Evaluation: Direct procurement by USAID through a contracted supplier
(£4.0m DFID and USAID funding)
72.
The overall programme evaluation will be competitively procured by USAID
in consultation with DFID. The Evaluation may involve a consortium approach or
an individual partner. We are confident that the market will respond to the process
given the increase in evaluations in the education sector and in DRC. For example,
USAID have conducted impact evaluations on their OPEQ and PAQUED
programmes.
4. Financial Case
73.
DFID DRC has allocated £36 million for this programme over five years - one
third of the funds for the entire programme, with USAID contributing £68m.
DFID DRC disbursements will be profiled over a 5 year period of implementation
starting in 2015/16 (Year 1) and ending in 2019/20 (see Table 7). Funds are
available in DFID DRC’s programme resource allocation. Approval by the PUSS
and the Secretary of State will be required for the programme.
74.
The DCA allows for joint management and oversight of the whole programme
by both donors and ensures that each organisation shares the same commitment
to every part of the whole programme regardless of who is leading the
procurement and what level of financial transfer take place. In order to minimise
administration costs, transfers between the DFID and USAID will be kept to a
minimum and this means there will only be one overall net payment will be made
from DFID to USAID (£15.5m over a 4 year period). This is clearly specified under
the DCA.
23
Table 7: Disbursement profile for DFID funds in GBP
Programme Outcome
1: Access and Equity
2: Quality and learning
Lead
Year 0
(14/15)*
DFID/USAID
Year 1
(15/16)
0.6
Year 2
(16/17)
1.0
Year 3
(17/18)
1.0
Year 4
(18/19)
1.0
Year 5
(19/20)
Total
3.6
USAID
-
1.0
1.5
1.5
1.0
5.0
USAID
-
2.5
2.5
3.0
1.5
9.5
3: Governance and accountability
DFID
0.9
2.0
6.0
6.0
1.2
16.1
4: Donor Coordination
DFID
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.8
0.5
1.0
4.3
36.0
Evaluation
USAID
0.5
Total
1.6
7.2
11.2
11.7
* 14/15 etc refers to DFID financial years
75.
10% of the DFID DRC funds (£3.6m) will be paid direct to UNICEF to support
activities for Outcomes 1 (Access and equity).
76.
40% of the DFID DRC funds (£14.5m) will be used to support activities for
Outcomes 1 (Access and equity) and Outcome 2 (Quality and learning).
USAID will contract the supplier selected through commercial competition. The
supplier is likely to be a lead organisation which will provide services, but also
manage the programme and the work of other organisations. USAID will lead
negotiations on the budget including the overhead costs. DFID’s financial
contribution and payment schedule to USAID will be specified in the joint DCA as
per Table 8 below.
77.
47% of the DFID DRC funds (£16.9m) will be used to support activities for
Outcomes 3 (Governance and accountability) and 4 (Donor coordination)
(see Table 8). Whilst USAID will not directly contribute financially to activities under
Outcomes 3 and 4, under the joint DCA these activities are part of the joint
programme and USAID will maintain oversight and engagement in the activities.
DFID will lead on identifying a supplier selected through a restricted OJEU
commercial competition. If there is an OJEU, there is likely to be a lead
organisation which will provide services, but also manage the programme and the
work of other organisations. PrG will lead negotiations on the budget including the
overhead costs.
78.
3% of DFID DRC funds (£1.0m) will be used to fund an independent
evaluation of the programme. USAID will lead on procurement of the evaluation
and DFID’s financial contribution and payment schedule are specified in the DCA
(see Table 8). The lead organisation and details of this will be finalised during the
inception phase of the programme however it will include a mid-term and final
evaluation based on baseline data.
24
Table 8: Anticipated Contributions to the Project/ DFID transfers to USAID
Fiscal year
2014/15
2015/16
2016/17
Total USAID
(USD)*
Total DFID
(GBP)
$28,600,000
$22,592,000
£1.6m
£7.2m
DFID
transfers to USAID
Access and
Evaluation
equity/Quality
and learning
£3.5m
£0.5m
DFID direct investment into
programme activities
Governance and
UNICEF
accountability/Donor
coordination
£1.0m
£2.2m
2017/18
$21,462,000
£11.2m
£4.0m
£6.2m
2018/19
$20,388,900
£11.7m
£4.5m
£6.2m
2019/20
$19,369,455
£4.3m
£2.5m
£0.5m
£1.3m
Totals
$112,412,355
£36.0m
£14.5m
£1.0
£16.9m
Total net
£15.5m
transfer
* for USAID year refers to calendar year that is for 2014/15 it is the 2014 calendar year
Note: annual breakdowns are tentative and may change in final negotiations with USAID
79.
£0.6m
£1.0m
£1.0m
£1.0m
£3.6m
There is a high financial and fraud risk in DRC which we will manage by
strictly enforcing the financial controls set out in the MoU and contract
documentation. Only service providers that meet our Due Diligence Assessment
standards would be eligible to receive DFID funds. USAID also has similar
standards. Regular quarterly reporting and annual audits will be used to ensure
that the standards required are maintained or exceeded throughout the
programme. The joint annual performance review process with USAID and regular
(at least 3 times a year) field trips will be the opportunity to ground truth this
reporting. DFID will support these processes by site visits to partner’s Kinshasa
bases to add further rigour into the monitoring systems and processes already in
place. DFID and USAID will also work closely with the government to monitor the
programme and this will include joint monitoring missions for the Annual Reviews.
5. Management Case
80.
A set of agreed operational principles for programme management has been
agreed between DFID DRC and USAID DRC for the lifetime of the joint
education programme (see below), and these will be represented in the DCA.
81.
DFID and USAID will review the operational principles during the inception
and implementation phases and both parties reserve the right to withdraw if
these are seriously breached and resolution cannot be agreed. USAID share
DFID’s zero tolerance to corruption and the DCA provides for either party to
unilaterally halt their funding should a joint position on any matter not be reached
after due consideration and process.
Operational principles for programme management
a) Strategy and decision making: There will be an Annual DFID and USAID Donor
meeting and provision for a joint Government of DRC, USAID, DFID programme
steering committee which will have overall responsibility for the strategy, progress
and management of the programme. The USAID / DFID Delegated Cooperation
Agreement will provide for all programme concerns.
25
b) Procurement processes: Contractual procurement processes will be robust and
will include advertising as widely as possible and not discriminating against any
bidders. Both DFID and USAID will be engaged throughout the procurement
process and form part of the Technical / Commercial team evaluating the proposals.
From the DFID perspective procurement processes managed by USAID will be as
robust as DFID procurement processes. USAID should advertise as widely as
possible and not discriminate against any bidders. Final selection will include an
adequate due diligence assessment of the provider.
c) Financing / disbursements: Funds will be disbursed against an agreed timeline
and achievement of project deliverables against the work-plan and associated
documentation. Based on the annual reviews and a mid-term evaluation of
programme performance in the third year of the programme.
d) Review, monitoring and evaluation: Government of DRC, USAID, and DFID will
agree a programme work-plan and associated documentation. This will be updated
and confirmed targets will be added during the inception phase of the programme.
Contractor and partner narrative and financial reports will be jointly agreed and
along with programme visits form the basis for annual and project completion
reviews against agreed scoring criteria. A logframe will be agreed and used to
monitor progress. DFID and USAID will use a jointly agreed scoring system that will
score programme progress against the programme logframe. There will be a formal
annual review each year. The annual review will assess and score programme
progress, and will also be used to monitor the key assumptions underpinning the
programme, identify and prioritise operational research needs, and review the
programme risk management plan. There will be an independent mid-term
evaluation and final evaluation procured separately in order to ensure impartiality.
To date, DFID DRC has developed a draft logframe for the overall programme
(Annex 5). In partnership with USAID this will be updated and confirmed targets will
be added during the inception phase. USAID, in discussion with DFID have
developed a draft results framework to share with potential contractors (see Annex
4). See Table 9 below for more information on the processes, which reach across
the whole DFID / USAID programme.
e) Managing coordination with the government and other actors: The
implementing partners and DFID and USAID will engage in key coordination groups
with government and other donors such as the Education Thematic Group, EPSP
Coordination Committees and the donor coordination group.
f) Approach to women and girls: The programme will comply with DFID DRC and
USAID priorities in terms of supporting significant improvement and sustainable
transformation of the lives of women and girls through programme activities and by
ensuring linkages with the DFID funded Vas-y Fille! programme and the USAID
funded EAGLE programme. Both of these programmes provide leadership and
support in addressing gender issues in education. An annual gender review73 will be
conducted by USAID and DFID to assess progress on key actions related to gender
in the programme.
26
Table 9: Programme design, implementation and review processes that need to take
place throughout the programme lifecycle
Stage of the programme
Year 0
(14/15)*
Planning and procurement.
Year 1
(15/16)
Start of implementation
(inception phase)
Year 2
(16/17)
Year 3
(17/18)
Implementation
Year 4
(18/19)
Implementation
Year 5
(19/20)
Final year of
implementation
Final evaluation
Implementation, mid-term
evaluation
Programme management processes that should be completed




















Procurement process complete and contract agreed with
implementing partners.
MoU signed with UNICEF.
Finalisation of approach, work plan, and logframe with USAID,
Government of DRC, and implementing partners.
Agreement on Gender Review tool and status.
Steering committee set up and functioning.
Implementation and review of pilots in one or two districts.
Annual review
Implementation of all programme components underway.
Annual review
Implementation of all programme components underway.
Mid-term evaluation completed
Annual review
Decision made on how to exit from programme.
Implementation of all programme components.
Programme exit strategy planned for Year 5
Annual Review
Implementation of all programme components.
Programme exit strategy implemented
Project Completion Report.
Final evaluation.
* 14/15 etc refers to DFID financial years
g) Programme risks and mitigating actions: A risk matrix will be developed for the
USAID / DFID programme. A combined probability / impact risk rating for the total
programme will be agreed. Triggers will be identified for the risks and assumptions
in order to identify operational and political control limits. The risks along with
assumptions will be incorporated into the logframe. Based on DFID’s current
assessment the probability of risk rating for the total DFID programme is medium
and the impact risk rating is also medium (see Table 10). DFID DRC has also
developed its own country specific Anti-Corruption Strategy. The implementation of
this strategy and sharing it with partners provides a key mitigating action that
addresses fiduciary risk and the misuse of programme funds.
Table 10: Programme risks and mitigating actions
Risk
Mitigating Action
Probability
Impact
Lack of government
support and alignment with
priorities or changing
government priorities
The level of fiduciary risk is
generally high in DRC
Collaboration with government and development partners
throughout programme. This should also include relevant
potential decentralised authorities in discussions in case the
decentralisation process gathers momentum.
The programme will be implemented through multilateral,
commercial organisations and NGO partners, with strong
MAR rating and proven experience in DRC Risk
management will be built into the programme design with all
partners and cost recovery mechanisms included in all MoUs
and contracts
Due Diligence Assessment at Procurement stage
Low (1)
Medium (2)
High (3)
High (3)
Low (1)
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
High (3)
Medium (2)
High (3)
Partner systems lack
robustness
Misuse of funding by
implementing partners
Competing priorities and
capacity constraints of
government counterparts,
Quarterly assurance reports, visits by DFID, funds released
in small tranches with clear accountabilities and conditions of
release for future funds. The implementation of DFID DRC’s
Anti-Corruption Strategy
UNICEF and consortium programmes will strengthen
partnerships by providing support and additional technical
expertise to government counterparts and by engaging with
27
especially shortage of
skilled staff will affect long
term sustainability of the
programme
Capacity of implementing
partners is not good
enough
Activities will not lead to
expected outcomes
The programme does not
engage enough with
communities
The recruitment of
experienced and
appropriate experts
Weak data collection and
consequent inability to
demonstrate results
NGOs at country level to spread risk.
The programme will be implemented through partners that
have a proven track record in DRC, or internationally. USAID
contractual arrangements are sufficiently robust to detect
capacity issues and put in place timely corrective actions.
In general, the programme uses tried and tested approaches
based on DFID evidence and research and draws on a
significant body of international evidence which establishes
our proposed approach’s impact on outcomes. This has
been supplemented by specific studies carried out during the
Business Case preparation phase as well as monitoring of
programme activities and outputs during implementation
which will allow for changes to be made if required.
Lessons have been learnt from the the previous DFID DRC
Education programme where the approach was very top
down, and once underway it was difficult to realign to match
changes on the ground. This programme will have closer
links to stakeholders and be more responsive. There will be a
particular focus on community empowerment and supporting
this both at the local level and also the national level.
Capacity of proposed partners will be assessed and plans
tailored so that they are not motivated to overreach their
ability to recruit and retain.
Programme will support development of information systems
at provincial level to improve collection and use of data.
Programme builds on the findings of a DFID funded
Exclusion Study in 2011 to understand the reasons children
are excluded from school.
28
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
High (3)
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
Annex 1: Evidence related to Theory of Change74
Hypothesis 1: Removal of key financial barriers and supply side constraints will
increase enrolment and equity in education75 (Evidence rating: strong)





As documented by international evidence, school fee abolition policies have
generally improved educational access, equity and retention. Outcome indicators
include increase in primary school enrolment76, equity and student persistence77;
and improved gender parity at primary level78.
In DRC significant costs include teacher salary top-ups (approx. $11 out of a total of
$16 average per annum of fees charged for recurrent costs 79). Whilst the
government is attempting to address this issue, there is evidence that intermediate
options could be used to reduce the practice of salary top-ups and provide nonmonetary incentives to motivate teachers80.
Uniforms and school supplies can represent significant high costs up to 50 % (or
$18.5)81 of the total cost households spend on education in DRC. There is strong
international evidence that the provision of free uniforms may reduce
absenteeism82. There is limited evidence that the distribution of free basic school
supplies (stationery, workbooks etc.) increases enrolment and/or retention.83
Abolishing school fees is not a panacea to extend access to the poorest and most
marginalized groups facing additional barriers84. There is strong evidence on the
potential of using conditional cash transfers (CCTs)85: CCTs can improve
attendance and test scores However there is limited evidence on the use of
community based social protection mechanism to support vulnerable children
across DRC86. There is also evidence that implementing programmes to support
education for children in marginalized communities can impact on enrolment and
attendance however this is not specific to the DRC context.
Specific interventions to increase girls’ attendance at school are needed. There is
mixed evidence on the links between improved water and sanitation/hygiene and
girls’ attendance87, which is positive in Asian/Muslim countries, but is limited for
Sub-Saharan Africa.88 However, there are ‘girl-specific’ factors that can make a
difference; these include (a) the posting and retention of female teachers89; (b)
gender-sensitive teaching90; (c) accessibility of counsellors; (d) a safe school
environment without the threat of violence.91
Hypothesis 2: More effective school leadership and school improvement plans
have a positive impact on learning (Evidence rating: medium)


School leadership (medium evidence): Studies conducted in African countries with
high increases in enrolment rates (e.g. Tanzania, Uganda) show that once in
school, many children fail to learn92. There is strong evidence that leadership,
particularly through a school-based management approach, is critical for effective
teaching to take place93 94. Evidence from Zambia95 and Uganda96 suggest that
investment in school management is one of the most cost-effective methods to
improve the quality of education.
School improvement plans (medium evidence): Recent whole school interventions
in developing countries to improve the teaching and learning quality show that
working at the school level (as the core unit within the education system) can
produce a significant increase in learning outcomes with impressive results.97 These
interventions are indicative of the impact that can be achieved in a short period of
time, albeit from a low baseline with intensive work at classroom and school level. It
is this level of improvement in learning outcomes, sustained over a long period of
29
time, and combined with access for all, that, it has been argued, explain the
dramatic economic growth experienced in East Asia and India towards the end of
the twentieth century98. The impact of improvements in learning outcomes of 0.79
standard deviations achieved in Liberia, if scaled up to a national level in DRC are,
therefore, potentially very significant. However, although the evidence on the impact
of improvements is strong the evidence on what works and how to achieve these
outputs is inconclusive with a variety of different approaches, models and
methodologies being used not all of which are sustainable or appropriate to scale
up to a national level, particularly in a country like DRC.
Hypothesis 3: A proximity (distance and school based) based model of teacher
training increases teacher quality and improves learning outcomes (Evidence
rating: limited)




There is a strong association between high-quality teachers and student outcomes.99
International evidence suggests that in-service teacher professional development has
a positive impact on student learning.100 Studies also show that teacher professional
development plays an important role in changing teachers’ teaching practice, and that
these changes have a positive impact on students’ learning.101 Evidence from
Sudan102 and Botswana103 suggests that well-focused, individualised in-service
teacher training can change teachers’ attitudes, modify their classroom behaviour
and improve students’ learning104.
Most of the extensive literature on teacher quality, education and training focuses on
the extent of the problem, their importance, or how they might be developed or
delivered. There is some literature on programmes that have been conducted 105;
however, the impact of teacher training on student’s learning outcomes that are
measurable is not well-documented.106
Teacher training alone or in combination with other strategies is the most common
approach to improve teacher quality in developing countries 107. However, there is a
lack of data on the impact and effectiveness of different training and development
models. There is some information on the nature of the teacher training108 and factors
that may make it more effective.109 Analysis from francophone countries using
PASEC data found that where the in-service training refers to the number of courses
per year, there is a positive correlation where the scores of fifth graders improve with
each additional year of teacher’s training.110
Different countries have implemented distance teacher training through a variety of
means such as radio, television, recorded material and electronic communication but
few research studies assess the effectiveness of the use of distance education to
support teachers professional development and there is little evidence to support that
teacher education at a distance leads to improved classroom practice or improves
pupils learning111
Hypothesis 4: Stronger involvement of civil society in education leads to increased
accountability and better quality of the education service (Evidence rating: medium)
Despite a decade of increased support to the demand-side of accountability, little evidence
about the impact of citizen engagement is available: this includes evidence on how
changes occur (or do not occur), and in what contexts and under what conditions. 112
Findings show mixed outcomes (see Table 11):
30
Table 11: Positive and negative outcomes of support for citizen engagement
Positive
Negative
Citizen capabilities
Increased civic and political knowledge
Increased dependency on a few intermediary experts
Greater sense of empowerment and agency
Disempowerment and reduced sense of agency
Increased capacities for collective action
New capacities used for ‘negative’ purposes
Effective services and access to development resources
Greater access to state services and resources
Denial of state services and resources
Deepening of networks and solidarities
Lack of accountability and representation in networks
Responsive and accountable states
Enhanced state responsiveness and accountability
Violent or coercive state response
New forms of participation
Tokenistic or ‘captured’ forms of participation
Rights and deeper democracy
Greater realization of rights
Social, economic and political reprisals
Inclusion of new actors and issues in public spaces
Reinforcement of social hierarchies and exclusion
Greater social cohesion across groups
Increased horizontal conflict and violence
Source: The Development Research Centre 2011 (adapted from Gaventa et al 2010)
Local governance
 There is some evidence that effective local governance considerably impacts on
access to education as well as the enrolment, retention and learning experiences of
children in school. School-based management shows positive results on mainly
reducing grade repetition and failure, and improving teacher attendance rates,
contrasted with the mixed results in test scores113. Ensuring that there is community
empowerment and parental involvement can have an impact on service delivery. For
example in Tanzania, there is a medium evidence base from Haki Elimu and UWEZO
to show that citizen empowerment and increased accountability can bring about
parental awareness and demands for better service delivery. 114 On the other hand,
even if a communal voice may well build citizen participation and some measure of
accountability of service providers, there is little measurable evidence that service
quality has improved115.
 However, evidence also indicates the need to ensure that relevant data are available
to enable communities to engage effectively with education service delivery. For
example, evidence from India suggests that simply increasing the participation of
stakeholders in the monitoring of public services has no impact. Community
involvement in schools had no impact on teacher effort or learning outcomes.116
Publically accessible published data are needed on school effectiveness and
performance to overcome asymmetric information and moral hazard associated with
the education production function.117 Therefore, decentralisation, of management
such as the introduction of SMCs needs to be accompanied by effective monitoring
and evaluation of schools and the appropriate dissemination of monitoring and
evaluation data. In DRC the current architecture of the system and the significant
contribution of households to the financing of the sector represent both challenges
and opportunities to develop an effective M&E system.
Hypothesis 5: Improved assessment improves learning outcomes (Evidence
rating: strong)
 Assessing levels of learning and identifying barriers to learning so that policy and
practice can be adjusted to address these is essential to improving learning
outcomes and improving school effectiveness.118 There is a growing body of empirical
research that demonstrates the benefits of specific types of tests, which when
implemented and used correctly, impact positively on students’ learning outcomes. In
particular, effective learning assessment enables achievement gaps between
different groups of students to be addressed and equity improved. 119 Research on
learning assessment has established a link between countries with effective learning
31
assessment policies and high performance levels in international assessments such
as PISA and TIMMS.120 There is also a developing body of evidence that learning
assessments play a role in increasing the accountability of schools and education
authorities to stakeholders.121
Hypothesis 6: Better management of resources at all levels of the system and
improved transparency of the budget process will lead to more accountability and
subsequently improve the quality of the education services (Evidence rating:
medium)



In DRC, while there have been recent improvements, PFM analysis122 notes that 'the
education expenditure chain continues to suffer from serious shortcomings with
leakages and embezzlement detected at every level of the expenditure chain'123. As a
result, fiduciary risk in the education sector has been assessed as 'high' 124 due to weak
legal, information, resourcing, payment and control procedures. Weaknesses reported
in sector analysis include: weak budgeting and inappropriate budget coding, with
divisional budget requests only weakly connected to plans; a lack of ability to execute
and monitor granted budgets ('suivi budgétaire'), leading to unspent investment funds;
outdated sector management and reporting procedures which are incomplete and hard
to enforce, resulting in a lack of accountability at all levels; audit functions are generally
weak or inexistent, and control mechanisms are frequently captured by vested
interests125.
There is some, but not strong, evidence supporting a broad approach to improving
learning outcomes through interventions at a systems and management level.126 There
is medium evidence that the transfer of responsibilities to the local level, as is proposed
in DRC, can build demand for effective local governance, and improve the delivery of
public services.127 However, the evidence on the impact of decentralisation in
education on learning is mixed. Systems with both decentralised and centralised
systems have achieved rapid improvements. However, where there is decentralisation
and there has been impact on learning this has been achieved with rigorous standards
and increased public accountability.128 There is some evidence from IDA-financed
projects (PURUS) that school grants are managed more effectively than resources
from school fees for the simple reason that school grants can be audited. 129
There is evidence that to support improved government accountability there is a need
to support both the supply side (government transparency, financial management, data
systems etc) and the demand side (observatoire, PTAs, etc) and the dialogue /
convening / brokering between the two130.
Hypothesis 7: Increased donor coordination and programming improves sector
dialogue and communication and enhances the potential to leverage systems
change in the education sector and move towards a sector wide approach
(Evidence rating: limited)

Uncoordinated projects delivered in parallel with government systems duplicate
activities, attract valuable skilled staff from the public sector, and create a mismatch
between needs and resources by perpetuating geographical or thematic inequities131.
Donors’ coordination can help to overcame challenges such as: duplication of
activities, small scale of activities, administrative burden and unclear leadership 132.
There is evidence also that the deployment of uncoordinated project aid in many
sectors has contributed and continues to contribute towards a vicious circle,
compounding poor sector governance133.
32




By bypassing weak government systems, project aid undermines the ability of
government organisations to perform their core functions, starting continuing cycles of
weak governance and aid ineffectiveness. However, challenges in implementing joint
programme approaches as donor coordination mechanisms in any sector gravitate
towards the dominant aid modality, and in particular Common Funds (CFs). The
evidence indicates that dialogue remains stuck in operational issues around CFs in
particular, but also around project aid. Despite this, through the establishment of joint
sector reviews, some programmes for example in Mozambique and Uganda have
made real progress towards sector-wide monitoring and review134.
There is some evidence that the vision of CFs as ‘transition mechanisms’ towards
more effective aid to service delivery appears destined to fail. In certain
circumstances, they may do more harm than traditional projects. However this is in
particular in relation to service delivery - modalities that drive the development of
parallel service delivery systems such as CFs should be avoided. Project aid and CFs
are more suited to be used for the provision of TA and capacity development. However
ultimately, the likelihood of reform at the sector level relies on political support and
technical leadership within government and this is very difficult for the donor
community to influence135.
There is a lack of rigorous evidence-based and independent research conducted on
MDTFs as the focus has been primarily on the evaluations of individual projects
financially supported by MDTFs, rather than the effectiveness of the funds as a
financing mechanism. Minimising transaction costs, enhancing coherence in policy
dialogue and programme implementation can support cost savings, promote
government ownership and support more effective programmes. But it can also be
very time consuming, difficult and frustrating for all so they need to be managed very
carefully and cost benefits be assessed carefully136.
Evidence that SWAps can help in scaling up provision in education as needed in many
fragile states eg in relation to salaries, and have played a pivotal role in increasing
access to education although there is less evidence that they have contributed to
improving learning outcomes. Evidence points to the need for SWAps to be welldesigned and take into account the political economy.137
33
Annex 2: Institutional structure and capacity assessment by programme
outcome
The MEPSP is characterized by a hybrid institutional architecture. The majority of the
public schools are managed by faith-based organizations (écoles conventionnées) and
represent about 70% (2012) of the students; 18% attend the secular, state-run schools
(écoles non-conventionnées) and the private sector accounts for the remaining 12%. The
current configuration of the public sector is a legacy of the colonial period; while the state
is in the driver’s seat, religious associations de facto exercise considerable day-to-day
oversight and managerial autonomy over their respective schools. This dual structure
results in a parallel administration; both faith-based and state-run ‘networks’ have
administrative offices at national, provincial and district levels, including a complementary
school inspection system.
The MEPSP is subdivided into 30 ‘educational’ provinces, managed by PROVEDs who
represent the central Minister of EPSP. Partly because of the size of the country and the
dimensions of the sector, deconcentrated provincial and district levels in practice operate
as autonomous entities. This reality is reinforced with the position of provincial ministers as
part of the decentralization process. The far-reaching deconcentration of these local
entities allows for provision of direct institutional and financial support at the service
delivery level.
Figure 3: Deconcentrated architecture of the MEPSP138
34
Table 12: Capacity Assessment of Key Institutions
2. Quality and learning
1. Access
and
equity
Component
Key Institution
DIS (infrastructure) and DEP
(planning).
Capacity Assessment
These directorates already receive support from PARSE
and PROSEB and through other donors.
Programme Action
To collaborate with these institutions.
DIPROMAD and SERNAFOR
(Directorates responsible for
textbooks/curricula and teacher
training)
Weak capacity in developing learning and training modules
(quality / pertinence of the didactic content /
practical/concrete pedagogical responses).
Limited expertise in developing innovative/alternative
education models and in the production of materials in
national languages.
Does not currently exist but capacity on assessment is
weak. The national end of primary school exam (TENAFEP)
is focused on certification and enabling students to move to
the next level rather than assessing levels of learning – the
quality and modalities needs to be improved.
Weak pedagogical skills (e.g., content knowledge, effective
teaching techniques, relevant guidance of teachers,
reporting on key pedagogical challenges, etc.). Current
practices of assessing/measuring children’s progress and
learning achievements are limited.
New, not yet operational unit but EPSP capacity on
budgeting and financial management is weak (as the
majority of control currently rests with the Ministries of
Finance and Budget)
Similar to the DAF at central level such a unit is not yet
operational and PFM capacity related to the provincial
budget process will need to be assessed as a precondition
for targeted support.
Weak PFM skills in order to implement a transparent
budgeting/spending process. Management committees in
administrative offices not yet operational and will require
support.
Civil society actors in the education sector are multiple and
diverse including community-based groups, not officially
registered, operating at the grassroots level and often
connected to faith-based structures (such as parishes) as
well as teacher unions, Parents’ associations and local
NGOs. Some initial support focused on capacity building
has been given to coalitions in Katanga and Equateur and
the national level Education Observatoire.
Improve directorates’ capacity by involving them in the
development of training and learning material
and supporting them to provide leadership in these
activities.
Independent learning assessment unit
that conducts and analyses
standardized assessments of students’
learning achievements
Inspool (inspection at district level),
head teachers and teachers
3. Accountability and governance
The DAF (Administrative and Financial
Unit) at MEPSP
The PFM unit at provincial level that will
involve provincial Ministries (Education,
Budget, Finance, Planning) and
technical advisors e.g PROVEDs.
COGES and COPAs (management and
parent committees in schools) and the
Comités de gestion (management
committees in administrative offices.
Independent Education Observatoire
35
Develop and implement a framework to assess learning in
partnership with Government of DRC. Provide technical
support to the Independent learning assessment unit once
in place.
Training heads teachers and inspectors (along with
teachers) and supporting them to become leaders and
trainers as part of the programme.
Technical support for all phases of the budgeting process
(advocacy and planning, allocation, execution), and for
specific technical issues such as procurement and reporting.
Technical support and training on statistical collection, data
use and dissemination at provincial level.
Institutional support for producing appropriate training
materials, and accountability tools as appropriate and
conduct targeted training.
There is a need (i) to address internal legitimacy issues of
different groups (includes procedures of democracy such as
elections and membership issues, accountability and
service delivery, and questions of financing etc.); and (ii) for
institution building: targeted support to build capacity that
will contribute to credibility and support to enable them to
engage in policy dialogue and engage constructively in
improving accountability in the sector.
Annex 3: Economic appraisal
There is limited evidence of the impact of educational achievement on wages in DRC. In
order to assess the economic impact of schooling, a rate of return analysis for education
was conducted by the World Bank using data from 1-2-3 Survey (2004-2005)139. This
study estimated that one additional year of education in DRC leads to a 6% increase in
revenue; almost twice the increase observed in Benin (3.3%). If the following assumptions
are made, the average present value of increased life earnings associated with one
year’s additional education is estimated to be £52.90 (see Table 13).
 Annual wages can be approximated by GNI per capita (Atlas method), which
amounted to $190 in 2012, or £123 (using an exchange rate of 1.55 $/£).140
 Real GNI per capita grows by 3.4% per year (equal to the average growth of GDP
per capita between 2004 and 2013 – see Table 14 below).
 The average beneficiary begins productive work four years after the intervention
and their income is 6% higher thereafter.
 The average beneficiary remains in productive work for 30 years (life expectancy in
DRC is 48.37 years).
 There is no opportunity cost associated with children attending an additional year of
school (i.e. they would not have been engaged in productive work instead of
attending school that year).
 The economic discount rate is 12% per year.
Table 13: Estimated economic value of one additional year of schooling for one
individual
Year
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
GNI
per
capita
(£)
123.0
127.2
131.5
136.0
140.6
145.4
150.3
155.4
160.7
166.2
171.8
177.7
183.7
190.0
196.4
203.1
210.0
217.1
Additional
income
(£)
Present
value
(£)
Cumulative
present
value (£)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
8.4
8.7
9.0
9.3
9.6
10.0
10.3
10.7
11.0
11.4
11.8
12.2
12.6
13.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.1
4.6
4.2
3.8
3.5
3.2
2.9
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.1
9.7
13.9
17.7
21.1
24.3
27.2
29.8
32.1
34.3
36.3
38.1
39.7
41.2
Year
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
GNI
per
capita
(£)
224.5
232.2
240.1
248.2
256.7
265.4
274.4
283.7
293.4
303.4
313.7
324.3
335.4
346.8
358.6
370.8
Additional
income
(£)
Present
value
(£)
Cumulative
present
value (£)
13.5
13.9
14.4
14.9
15.4
15.9
16.5
17.0
17.6
18.2
18.8
19.5
20.1
20.8
21.5
22.2
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
42.5
43.8
44.9
45.9
46.8
47.7
48.4
49.1
49.8
50.3
50.9
51.3
51.8
52.2
52.5
52.9
Table 14: Real growth of GDP per capita (2004 – 2013)
GDP per capita (FC,
constant prices)
% Change
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
5,753
6,021
6,172
6,367
6,562
6,552
6,817
7,074
7,356
7,735
3.5%
4.7%
2.5%
3.2%
3.1%
-0.2%
4.1%
3.8%
4.0%
5.1%
36
Average
3.4%
Annex 4: Overall USAID DFID Joint Program Results Framework
Joint USAID/DFID Program Objective: Improved educational outcomes
for girls and boys in select districts of the DRC
Result 1: Equitable
enrollments to a quality
education environment
increased
Result 2: Improved
education quality
Result 3: Improved governance
and accountability by
stakeholders
Intermediate Result (IR) 1.1
Barriers to access for primary
education reduced.
IR 1.2 Alternative/accelerated basic
education programs that address
the needs of out-of school children
and youth strengthened.
IR 1.3 Community and school
collaboration and partnerships to
support access to education
strengthened.
IR. 1.4 Quality of education
environments improved.
IR 2.1 Quality of instruction at
the primary level improved.
IR 2.2 Teaching and learning
materials used in the classroom
effectively.
IR 2.3 Community participation
to support school based and
extra-curricular learning
increased.
IR 3.1 Development and
implementation of policies for
improved access and learning
strengthened.
IR 3.2 Community and civil society
oversight and accountability at local
and provincial levels increased.
IR 3.3 School leadership and
management strengthened.
IR. 3.4 Effective resource allocation
and execution in the education
sector strengthened.
IR 3.5 Strengthened systems and
capacity at the national, provincial,
and school levels.
TO BE PROCURED SEPARATELY
37
1
"2014 Human Development Report Summary". United Nations Development Programme. 2014. pp. 21–25. Retrieved
27 July 2014
2 Data from Unesco Institute of Statistics; and MEPSP Annuaire Statistique de L’Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et
Professionnel and from Direction d’Etudes et de Planification de l’EPSP
3 www.uis.unesco.org/FactSheets/Documents/FS12_2011_OOSC_EN.pdf
4 MEPSP ( 2011) Annuaire Statistique de L’Enseignment Primarie, Secondaire et Professionnel
5 Pearson, N. (2011) Case Study : Democratic Republic of Congo, State-building, Peace-building and Service Delivery in
Fragile and Conflict Affected States
6 Diallo and Mans (2011). “Skills and Employment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Review of Recent Trends
in the Labor Market.” Background paper to the DRC Country Economic Memorandum. p. 14
7 Less than $50 per month
8 ISSP/UO and MEPSP (2013) Rapport de l’enquête nationale sur les enfants et adolescents en dehors de l’école.
Kinshasa, UNICEF, UNESCO Institute of Statistics and DFID DRC
9 Learning outcomes in DRC are compromised by very high rates of malnutrition. 43% children under 5 are malnourished
and may have associated cognitive impairment. However the elimination of stunting also requires long-term investments
to improve education, economic status, and empowerment of women. Undernutrition weakens the immune system,
stunts mental and physical growth and development. Effects can be life-long, passed between generations, and can
affect how well children do at school and their capacity to earn later in life. So undernutrition affects the economic
potential not just of individuals but of whole nations (Black et al. 2008, Victoria et al. 2008 in DFID (2012) An update of
‘The Neglected Crisis of Undernutrition: Evidence for Action’).
10 PASEC (2010) Evaluation Diagnostique du Système Educatif de la République Démocratique du Congo
11 DFID DRC and Social Development Direct (2012) Situation analysis of women and girls in DRC and development of a
gender strategy and action plan for DFID DRC
12 World Bank (2008) DRC Public Expenditure Review
13 Titeca, K. and De Herdt, T. (2011) Real Governance beyond the Failed State: Negotiating Education in Democratic
Republic of Congo, African Affairs 110 (439), 213-231
14 Expenditure per pupil was $160 per pupil in 1982, and had dropped to $2.88 by 1987. It was $4.45 per pupil in 2002
and rose to $10.6 and $13.7 per pupil in 2006 and 2008 respectively (all constant US$ 2006 figures) (De Herdt, Titeca
and Wagemakers, 2012). In 2012 the average for per pupil for primary and secondary education was $22.7 ranging from
$58.6 in Kinshasa province to $4.8 in Maniema (UNICEF calculations using MEPSP data)
15 Williams, G. and Ghonda, E. (2012) The Political Economy of Public Financial Management in the Democratic
Republic of Congo
16 Fees are distributed according to previously established rules for redistribution and it is estimated that 20-30% of
school fees pass up through the administration in this way (MEPSP (2010) Stratégie de développement de
l’enseignement primaire, secondaire et professionnel (2010/11 - 2015/16), Ministère de l’Enseignement Primaire,
Secondaire et Professionnel.)
17 De Herdt, T. and Poncelet, M. (2010) Enjeux et acteurs autour de la réduction des frais scolaires en RDC, April 2010,
Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp
18 GoDRC (2013) Accelerating Progress to 2015: Democratic Republic of the Congo, April 2013. A report series to the
UN Special Envoy for Global Education
19 As presented at the meeting between the PTF and Minster and MEPSP, 24 October 2012 Cadre de partenariat et
principes directeurs: (1) Alignement sur le PIE. Le PIE devient dorénavant le cadre de référence pour toutes les
interventions dans le secteur ; (2) Respect de la Charte du PME. En souscrivant au PME, les partenaires sont appelés à
accorder une attention particulière à l’efficacité de la dépense promouvoir la transparence, la clarté et la confiance
(Charte PME, 1.5.)
20 MEPSP (2013) Roadmap of Education Reforms
21 Projet de Soutien à l’Education de Base
22 Katanga, Province Orientale, Bandundu and Equateur provinces
23 These coalitions / Observatoire are supported by DFID’s Civil Society Fund for their inception phase of approximately
8 months.
24 See DFID (2013) Education Position Paper Improving Learning Expanding Opportunities, page 4
25 Lloyd C. B. (2011) Evidence Paper for Girls’ Education Challenge Fund, Consultancy Report to DFID
26 Three types of skills as conceptualised in the Education for All Global Monitoring Report (2012)
27 Based on analysis undertaken by DFID Policy Division in 2012 on education targets such as numbers of out of school
children (especially girls).
28 DFID DRC (2013) Operational Plan 2011-2015 DFID Democratic Republic of Updated June 2013
29 This is in line with DFID’s A New Strategic Vision for Girls and Women, one the pillars of which is getting girls through
secondary school.
30 See Improving access, quality and governance in education in DRC: GENDER REVIEW May 2014
31 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-policy-on-standards-of-accessibility-for-disabled-people-in-dfidfinanced-education-construction
32 WHO and World Bank (2011) World Report on Disability. UNICEF (2013) The State of the World’s Children: Children
with Disabilities. Steinfied, E. (2005) Education for All: The Cost of Accessibility. World Bank. UNESCO (2009) Education
for All. Global Monitoring Report. Paris.
33 DFID DRC has identified that programmes will be concentrated in six of DRC’s 11 provinces, with the aim of achieving
better value for money and reducing risk through more effective monitoring, better provincial relationships and creating
38
synergies between our programmes. DFID DRC (2013) Operational Plan 2011-2015 DFID Democratic Republic of
Congo Updated June 2013
34 See assessment as part of GPE programme, World Bank PAD (2012)
35 Funding of £21.9m to an IRC/Save the Children/CRS consortium to work in Equateur, Kasai Oriental, Province
Oriental, Katanga and Bandundu.
36 Contributing approximately 20 to 25% of the overall global fund, on average £50m per year. The DRC proposal of
$100m was endorsed in November 2012 and implementation started in mid-2013
37 For example through the Humanitarian Pooled Fund - in 2012 the Pooled Fund made a contribution of $8.8m to 15
education cluster projects. Outputs included supporting children to access school, raising awareness of education in
communities, creating child friendly spaces, supporting child soldiers to access education, refurbishing classrooms,
training teachers, and handing out school supplies. In addition education is supported through UNICEF’s RRMP (Rapid
Response to Population Movements) and ARCC II (Alternative Responses to Communities in Crisis) programmes which
DFID fund and recent support was also given to Save the Children for a child protection and education programme.
38 As in DFID DRC (2013) Operational Plan 2011-2015 DFID Democratic Republic of Updated June 2013
39 ICAI 2012 DFID’s Education Programmes in Three East African Countries 2005-15
40 In addition only two programmes, the World Bank’s PARSE 40 and PURUS40 have adopted a government executed
approach however they have experienced severe delays in disbursement. The current support through GPE and AFD
will also be government executed. All of these programmes – although executed by government – use donor
procedures.
41 DFID DRC Country Operational Plan, June 2013
42 Agreed at the 2011 Busan High-Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness.
43 ISSP/UO and MEPSP (2013) Rapport de l’enquete nationale sur les enfants et adolescents en dehors de l’ecole.
Kinshasa, UNICEF, UNESCO Institute of Statistics and DFID DRC
44 See Minford M (2013) Assessing PFM Needs in Education and Health in DRC Draft Report and Dolan, J., Golden, A.,
Ndaruhutse S and Winthrop R (2012) Building effective teacher salary systems in fragile and conflict-affected states
Brookings and CfBT Education Trust
45 This will build on the initial support given to the Education Observatoire through the Civil Society Fund (this funding
was for one year for the initial set up of the Observatoire and will finish mid 2014).
46 UNESCO 2011 School Drop Out: Patterns, Causes, Changes, Policies
47 Kremer et al. (2003) in Kenya: Free uniforms + text book funds and classroom construction- students remained
enrolled 13% longer than comparison; Duflo et al. (2006) in Kenya: Free uniforms: 15% decrease in likelihood of drop-out
; Evans et al. (2009) in Kenya: Free uniforms - reduced school absenteeism by 44% (62% for children who did not
already own a uniform (Source: Morgan et al (2012)
48 For international experience, see: Lloyd, CB. and Young, J. (2009) New Lessons; the Power of Educating Adolescent
Girls. New York: Population Council.
49 DFID (2011). Arnold, C., with T. Conway and M. Greenslade. Cash Transfers: Literature review, Department for
International Development, London.
World Bank (2009). Fiszbein Ariel and Norbert Schady et al. Conditional cash transfers. Reducing present and future
poverty. World Bank: Washington D.C
World Bank (2008). Grosh Margaret, Carlo del Ninno, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi. For Protection & Promotion.
The design and implementation of effective safety nets, Washington D.C.: World Bank
50 Villegas-Reimers, E. (2003) Teacher Professional Development: An International Review of the Literature. Paris:
UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP)
51 Black and Wiliam 2005 Assessment and Classroom Learning
52 Ibid
53 Barrera-Osorio, F. et al., 2009, World Bank Decentralized Decision-Making in Schools, The Theory and Evidence on
School-Based Management; MOEVT/VSO Zanzibar (2011) Leading learning: a Summary report on effective leadership
and quality education in Zanzibar.
54 World Bank (2008a), “What Do We Know About School-Based management? Washington, DC: World Bank. World
Bank (2008b), “Guiding Principles for Implementing School-based Management Program”, Washington, DC: World Bank
(online toolkit).
55 Ibid
56 Wampler, B. (2007). Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability. Pennsylania:
Pennsylvania University Press; Yaron, G. (2011). A report on the field review of the tuungane community scorecard.
October 2011.
57 Development Research Centre 2012.
58 See for example Williamson T et al., (2008) Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks? The Effectiveness of New
Approaches to Aid Delivery at the Sector Level Research Project of the Advisory Board for Irish Aid, 2008
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1526.pdf; Lawson, M, 2010, Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of
Development Assistance. Washington DC: CRS, pp. 2-3.
59 ibid
60 ibid
61 Boak, E., and Ndaruhutse, S. (2011) The impact of sector-wide approaches: where from, where now and where to?
Reading: CfBT Education Trust
62 In accordance with the ‘Technical How to Note Climate Change and Environment’ Dec 2010 p5
63 International Council on Human Rights Policy 2008: 28
64 Adaptation to Climate Extremes in Developing countries: The Role of Education 2010: Blankespoor, B., Dasgupta, S.,
Laplante, B., Wheeler, D. World Bank.
65 Bledsoe et al 1999
39
66
Construction, if any, is likely to take place under the USAID procured activity and under their Initial Environment
Assessment state that any small-scale construction/rehabilitation activities must integrate good-practice design
standards for construction of primary and secondary day schools in Sub-Saharan Africa, as drawn from the USAID
Sector Environmental Guidelines (http://www.usaidgems.org/Sectors/schools.htm), or similar.
67 Whilst not envisaged under this programme, if DFID funding was to be used for larger scale construction e.g. an entire
school – then the Environmental Mitigation and Monitoring and Plan will need to include rationale for whether a full
environmental impact assessment was or wasn’t required.
68 This is based on a Conceptual Framework developed by DFID’s Conflict and Fragile States Team and is informed by
Service delivery’s contribution to state legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected states and based on initial research
(CFBT & ODI http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Output/191925/Default.aspx http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Project/60989/Default.aspx)
commissioned by DFID provides emerging evidence that the way in which health, water, sanitation and education
services are delivered in fragile and conflict-affected states has an impact on their ability to contribute to wider
peacebuilding statebuilding efforts and at the very least ‘do no harm’ to statebuilding processes ( OECD, Do no harm:
International Support for Statebuilding, 2010
http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/donoharminternationalsupportforstatebuilding.htm)
69 For example the written commitment of the Vice-prime minister and Minister of budget to the GPE Secretariat, recent
participation of Education and Finance ministers in Learning for all ministerial meetings.
70 A recent study calculating impact of TA concluded that technical assistance does matter as it has an impact over and
above that of only financing. Given the small dollar value of technical assistance relative to the dollar value of transfers,
not only does technical assistance matter but it is a way of getting more for less”.Ruprah & Marcano 2010 “Does
technical assistance matter? An impact evaluation approach to estimate its value added” Journal of Development
Effectiveness Volume 1, Issue 4, 2009
71 Sackey, 2008
72 such as the wider benefits to society from a more educated population including a lower probability of conflict,
enhanced political stability and accountability of the government, enhanced entrepreneurship that should expand
economic activity and levels of production and improved ability to cope with climate change.
73 See for example DFID DRC Improving access, quality and governance in education programme: GENDER REVIEW
mid 2013
74 Additional information on evidence can be found in DFID (2014) Learning Achievement: Engaging with evidence – A
Working Paper Version 1.
75 A full appraisal of the evidence related to reducing out of school children in DRC is available in Verhage, J. (2013)
Reducing the Number of Out-of-school Children in the DRC. Discussion paper (draft). This paper looks at the situation of
vulnerable and marginalised girls and boys, poputation and the evidence base on potential interventions.This paper
consideres specifically children with disabilities, orphans and vulnerbale children, the poorest, children living in mining
communites, river communities and pygmey.
76 For example: Ethiopia 23% - 29% growth in grade 1; Ghana 14%; Kenya 18%; Malawi; 51% - 59% in grade 1;
Mozambique 12%. (World Bank/UNICEF 2009); Rwanda 20%; Timor Leste 9.5% and Tanzania 33%, (Bentaouet-Kattan
2006); Uganda 68% ( World Bank/UNICEF 2009)
77 Morgan et al. 2012
78 Ethiopia 18 points; Ghana 2 points; Malawi 6 points, Mozambique 2 points but Kenya lost 2 points. Source: World
Bank/UNICEF 2009). Uganda: For girls who benefited from the elimination of school tuition fees before their 9th birthday
the probability of entering school before age 9 is 5 percent higher (Grogan 2009); Malawi: Re-enrolment rate increased
by 2.5 times for treatment girls and dropout rate decreased from 11% to 6% (Baird et al. 2009).
79 Source: Calculated from provincial decrees on school fees
80 For example an alternative way of reducing/eliminating the practice of salary top-ups could be the provision of a bike to
a teacher (estimated cost of USD 150 per teacher). The logic is to provide an income generating/time saving unit that
can eventually lead to economic empowerment and in the end generate benefits that are higher than current salary
supplements. There is some evidence related to benefits from such schemes however limited evidence in relation to
teachers so any such scheme would need to be piloted and evaluated.
81 Ibid;
82 Kremer et al. (2003) in Kenya: Free uniforms + text book funds and classroom construction- students remained
enrolled 13% longer than comparison; Duflo et al. (2006) in Kenya: Free uniforms: 15% decrease in likelihood of drop-out
; Evans et al. (2009) in Kenya: Free uniforms - reduced school absenteeism by 44% (62% for children who did not
already own a uniform (Source: Morgan et al (2012)
83 Swaziland implemented free textbooks and workbooks for all primary students (2003) but this intervention was part of
a broader package that included capitation grants: E100.00 (USD 10) for each pupil plus E225.00 (USD 22) per OVC.
The provision of the above-mentioned items resulted in a 20% enrolment increase but the limited number of primary
students in Swaziland (250,000) makes it difficult to compare with DRC realities (12 million).
84 Bentaouet-Kattan 2006, World Bank /UNICEF 2009
85 DFID (2011). Arnold, C., with T. Conway and M. Greenslade. Cash Transfers: Literature review, Department for
International Development, London.
World Bank (2009). Fiszbein Ariel and Norbert Schady et al. Conditional cash transfers. Reducing present and future
poverty. World Bank: Washington D.C
World Bank (2008). Grosh Margaret, Carlo del Ninno, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi. For Protection & Promotion.
The design and implementation of effective safety nets, Washington D.C.: World Bank
86 In a randomized trial of a cash transfer program to support adolescent girls in Malawi, researchers found
improvements in attendance and test scores were found amongst girls whose grants were conditioned on school
attendance (Baird, McIntosh and Ozler 2010
40
87 Birdthistle et al 2011 What impact does the provision of separate toilets for girls at schools have on their primary and
secondary school enrolment, attendance and completion? A systematic review of the evidence
88 WB 2005: Global monitoring report: Millennium Development Goals from momentum to consensus; Gideon, B., Jules,
A., and Tamsin, M (2004) ‘Water and sanitation; the education drain’ WaterAid; DFID (2011) ‘Water, Sanitation and
Hygiene Evidence Paper’
89 There is strong evidence that having female teachers in the classroom influences girls’ behaviour and improves
learning outcomes, and can improve gender equity as the teachers act as role models for girls and can help create a
safer school environment. Cited in C.B. Lloyd 2009: USA study: Dee, Thomas S. 2007. "Teachers and the gender gaps
in student achievement," Journal of Human Resources, 42(3): 528-554. Bangladesh study: Khandker, Shahidur R. 1996.
Education Achievements and School Efficiency in Rural Bangladesh. Washington, DC: World Bank. Asadullah,
Mohammad N. and Chaudhury, Nazmul. 2008. "Holy alliances: Public subsidies, Islamic high schools, and female
schooling in Bangladesh." in Mercy Tembon and Lucia Fort (eds.) Girls' Education in the 21st Century. Washington, DC:
World Bank: 209-238. Five-country Africa study: Michaelowa, K. 2001. "Primary education quality in Francophone subSaharan Africa: Determinants of learning achievement and efficiency considerations." World Development, 29(10): 16991716. Mozambique study: Handa, Sudhanshu. 2002. "Raising primary school enrolment in development countries: The
relative importance of supply and demand." Journal of Development Economics.69: 103-128.
90 Gender-sensitive teaching practice can help to ensure teachers have equal interactive time with boys and girls,
encourage female students participation in class, address gender discrimination among students and nurture a safe and
positive learning environment for girls as well as boys. Make it Right: Ending the Crisis in Girls’ Education. A report by
the Global Campaign for Education and RESULTS Educational Fund
91 For international experience, see: Lloyd, CB. and Young, J. (2009) New Lessons; the Power of Educating Adolescent
Girls. New York: Population Council.
92 CONFEMEN 2010; SACMEQ 2010
93 Barrera-Osorio, F. et al., 2009, World Bank Decentralized Decision-Making in Schools, The Theory and Evidence on
School-Based Management; MOEVT/VSO Zanzibar (2011) Leading learning: a Summary report on effective leadership
and quality education in Zanzibar.
94 Sammons, P., Hillman, J. & Mortimore, P. (1995) Key Characteristics of Effective Schools. Institute of Education:
International School, Effectiveness and Improvement Centre
95 IOB (2008) Impact Evaluation. Primary Education in Zambia. Policy and Operations Evaluation Department No. 312.
The Hague: OBT
96 IOB (2008) Impact Evaluation. Primary Education in Uganda. Policy and Operations Evaluation Department No. 311.
The Hague: OBT In Uganda schools participating in a project aimed at improving the quality of school management
produced 50% better results than comparable schools
97
Date
20072011
Name of intervention and country
Impact
Whole
School
Development
Programme (WSD) (included WSD
training and school grant) in Gambia
(273 schools in a randomized field
experiment. 3 groups – comparison;
only grant; grant plus WSD training)
Reduced student absence (21%)
Reduced teacher absence (23%)
No significant differences in learning outcomes on average except in
communities with higher levels of adult literacy where there is a positive
impact
(Blimpo, M., Evans, D. (2011) School-Based Management and
Educational Outcomes: Lessons from a Randomized Filed Experiment
(web.worldbank.org)
A high pupil teacher ratio is detrimental to English test scores, and
being a beneficiary of the WSD programme improved them
Participation in WSD positively affects both English and Math scores
(Evidence from World Bank (2004) Improving Primary Education in
Ghana: an impact evaluation, Washington, The World Bank cited in
Akyeampong, K. (2004) Whole School Development, Ghana. Report
commissioned for the 2005 EFA Monitoring Report)
30% gain in learner achievement (literacy and numeracy) between
2000-2002
(US Aid 2006 Integrated Education Program Analysis of the Impact on
Pupil Performance of the District Development Support Programme
(DDSP)
Students in afterschool remedial classes scored 10 percentage points
higher than students in other groups (only evidence is after 10 weeks of
programme)
(Innovations for Poverty Action 2012 An Evaluation of Teacher
Community Assistant Initiative (TCAI) Pilot Programme in Ghana:
Preliminary Impact Results)
The overall EGRA Plus effect size on learning achievement for the full
treatment group was 0.79 standard deviations. This equates to between
1.9 and 8 years of additional schooling in specific aspects of reading
achievement. (USAID 2010 EGRA Plus Liberia Program Evaluation
Report)
WSD in Ghana (National sample of
children aged between 9 and 15
who had recently or currently
attending primary school in locality
of residence)
1998/
92003
2011
– on
going
District
development
Support
Programme (DDSP) South Africa
Teacher
Community
Initiative Ghana
EGRA Plus Liberia
20082010
Assistant
41
20062009
19992005
Pratham Read India Chhatisgarh
State
Primary
Zambia
Reading
Programme
Increase in average ASER score from 60% in 2006 to 73% in 2009
(average in 2008 was 85%) (2011 Introduction to Pratham Power Point
Presentation)
Change in English Reading and Writing Scores 1999-2002:
Grade 2 575%; Grade 3 417%; Grade 4 300%; Grade 5 165%
There was also evidence of increased enrolment and reduced
absenteeism (DFID 2005 Impact of the Zambia Primary Reading
Programme)
98
OECD 2010 The High Economic Cost of Low Educational Performance The Long Run Economic Impact of Improving
PISA Outcomes (fig 6)
99 Teacher quality measure was a composite of teachers’ years of education, courses in pedagogy, and experience, as
well as teachers’ scores on the same literacy test administered to students (School effectiveness in 14 sub-Saharan
African countries: linsk with 6th graders’ reaching achievement Valerie E., Lee, Tia Linda Zuze and Kenneth N. Ross
Studies in Educational Evaluation, 31 (2005) 207-246); Barber , M and Mourshed, M 2007 How the world’s best
performing school systems come out on top
http://www.mckinsey.com/App_Media/Reports/SSO/Worlds_School_Systems_Final.pdf; Hanushek found significant
differences in learning outcomes associated with good and bad teaching: students with very good teachers will learn
twice as much as those with bad. In Hanushek, E. (1992) ‘The tradeoff between child quantity and quality’, in The Journal
of Political Economy pp84-117; Mingat, A. (2005) ‘Options for a cost-effective allocation of resources’ in Verspoor, A. The
Challenge of Learning: Improving the Quality of Basic Education in Sub-Saharan Africa. ADEA. Paris.
100 Villegas-Reimers, E. (2003) Teacher Professional Development: An International Review of the Literature. Paris:
UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP); Alexander, R. (2008) Education For All, The Quality
Imperative and the Problem of Pedagogy. CREATE Research Monograph (20). IoE London; Bennell, P. (2004) Teacher
Motivation and Incentives in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Brighton;.
101 Miti, M. & Herriot, A. (1997) Action to improve English, mathematics and science (AIEMS): a case study in Zambia –
the start-up process. International Journal of Educational Development, 17(2); pp. 163-172
102 Shommo, M.I. (1995) Teaching Home Economics by a problem-solving approach in Sudanese secondary schools
for girls. British Journal of In-Service Education, 21(3); pp. 319-330
103 Duffy, A. (1993) Steps towards new horizons. International Journal of Early Childhood, 25(1); pp. 49-53
104 World Bank (2010) ‘Does linking teacher pay to student performance improve results’. Human Development Group
Policy Brief, Washington DC; Muralidharan, K. and Sundraraman, V. (2006), ‘Teacher Incentives in Developing
Countries: Experimental Evidence in India’. Job Market Paper. World Bank; HakiElimu (2010) Restoring Teacher
Dignity: Volume I: learner outcomes, Teacher Development Management strategy (TDMS) and the 2010/11 budget in
Tanzania.
105 For example Miti, M. and Herriot, A. (1997) Action to improve English, Mathematics and Science (AIMS); A Case
Study in Zambia – The Start-up Process; Hardman, F etc (2009) Changing pedogoical practice in Kenyan Primary
Schools: the impact of school based training
106 HDRC 2011 Impact of teacher training on students learning outcomes
107 Chapman 2000
108 it must be relevant, timely and context-specific. Edge et al (2008) Teacher quality and parental participation: An
exploratory review of research and resources related to influencing student outcomes. ILOPS Literature Review
commissioned by ActionAid
109 Maximum school improvement can be achieved if schools put more emphasis on teachers’ collaboration, in-service
training and classroom observation and less on individual action enquiry (Bangladesh). Greatest classroom impact was
seen in the classrooms of those teachers who had undergone the most systematic in-service teacher training (Kenya:
Hardman, F etc (2009) Changing pedogoical practice in Kenyan Primary Schools: the impact of school based training….)
Enamul et al Impract of teachers’ professional development on school improvement – an analysis at Bangladesh
standpoint, Asia Pacific Education Review, Volume 12, Issue 3, Pages 337-348
110 Fehrler et al (2009) The Effectiveness of Inputs in Primary Education: Insights from Recent Student Surveys for subSaharan Africa, Journal of Development Studies, Vol 45, No 9, 1545-1578, October 2009
111 Villegas-Remiers 2003 Teachers Professional Development; Lynch et al (1996): the literature on the effectiveness of
distance education programmes (DPE) for teachers is sparse mainly because programmes fail to establish the baseline
data. Few studies have evaluate the impact of DEP on teacher’s practices and fewer still (none?) on pupils learning.
(Distance education for primary teacher training in developing countries. Bernadette Robinson. In J. Lynch, C. Modgil,
and S. Modgil (eds). Innovations in Delivering Primary Education, London, Cassell Educational, 1996, Chapter 9.).
112 Development Research Centre 2012.
113 HDRC (2012) Voice and accountability interventions in the education sector
114 Haki Elimu (2010), “How can communities make education better for their children?: A research report on the role of
the communities in improving education in Tanzania”
115 Gaumer, G. & Beswick, J. Voice Interventions and the Quality and Responsiveness of Public Services in Low- and
Middle-income Countries (LMICs) Does Voice Improve Quality and Responsiveness (Draft for Comment)
116 Banerjee et al 2008 Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a randomised Evaluation of Education in India
117 Levacic 2010 Motivation and Agency in Schools
118 Black and Wiliam 2005 Assessment and Classroom Learning
119 World Bank 2011 Framework for Building an Effective Student Assessment System
120 Ibid
121 Ibid
42
122 References
include: Public Expenditure Review, 2008; Pricewaterhouse Coopers report for DFID, 2009; Cour de
Comptes report on SECOPE, 2012.
123 Fiduciary Risk Assessment for the DFID Education Programme in DRC, Final Report, Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP,
2009, done in the context of donors providing financial aid to the government to meet the costs of provincial and district
level operating costs to perform functions such as school inspection as well as overall sector administration and support.
124 Pricewaterhouse Coopers Report, 2009, op.cit
125 Minford (2013) Assessing PFM Needs in Education and Health in DRC Draft Report
126 Institutional issues with educational systems in developing countries such as corruption, lack of transparency, and
inefficient use of resources may severely impair the effectiveness of increased school resources (Glewwe, P., & Kremer,
M. (2006). Schools, teachers and education outcomes in developing countries. In E. Hanushek & F. Welch, eds.
Handbook of the Economics of Education. North Holland.).”
127 World Bank (2008a), “What Do We Know About School-Based management? Washington, DC: World Bank. World
Bank (2008b), “Guiding Principles for Implementing School-based Management Program”, Washington, DC: World Bank
(online toolkit).
128 Ibid
129 Report from LICOCO on use of school grants under the IDA-financed PURUS project (2010)
130 Wampler, B. (2007). Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability. Pennsylania:
Pennsylvania University Press; Yaron, G. (2011). A report on the field review of the tuungane community scorecard.
October 2011.
131 Williamson T et al., (2008) Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks? The Effectiveness of New Approaches to Aid
Delivery at the Sector Level Research Project of the Advisory Board for Irish Aid, 2008
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1526.pdf
132 Lawson, M, 2010, Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of Development Assistance. Washington DC: CRS,
pp. 2-3.
133 Williamson T et al., (2008) Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks? The Effectiveness of New Approaches to Aid
Delivery at the Sector Level Research Project of the Advisory Board for Irish Aid, 2008
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1526.pdf
134 ibid
135 ibid
136 Barakat, S., Rzeszut, K., and Martin, N. (2011) What is the track record of multi donor trust funds in improving aid
effectiveness? An assessment of the available evidence. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute
of Education, University of London.
137 Boak, E., and Ndaruhutse, S. (2011) The impact of sector-wide approaches: where from, where now and where to?
Reading: CfBT Education Trust
138 Source: MEPSP strategy
139 Reference GPE PAD (2012)
140 This does not distinguish between income levels and therefore may overstate the level of income for individuals
without primary education. However, on the other hand it is also widely recognized that the informal economy in DRC is
very large and not reflected in these figures.
43