Terrorism – definitions, characterisations and representations Peter Beaney Faculty of Arts Media and Design Introduction 2 Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; although it could be argued that what we regard as ‘terrorism’ has shifted in meaning over time. This is particularly the case with regard to the difference between state and non-state terror (see below). Regardless, however, of the origin of the terroristic behaviour terrorism can be seen as a specific strategy, amongst others, used in order to influence, dominate or repress the government, powerful organisations or the general population. In this respect, it is one amongst a number of different strategies – including direct action, guerrilla warfare, political protest, and social mobilization – which may be used in isolation or in combination. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to decide where ‘terrorism’ begins and other forms of social and political action begins. Definitions 3 Practically every discussion of terrorism includes some mention of the difficulties of defining it in any way which is likely to achieve even a basic consensus. As noted above, although terrorism has come to be associated in the contemporary period with ‘terror’ which is directed at the state or the ruling groups in society, in the past it was more frequently associated with the terror directed by the state against the civilian population. This usage dates from at least the ‘reign of terror’, directed by Robespierre, which followed the French revolution and has been used in relation to historical examples such as the Stalinist regime in the former USSR and the fascist regime in Germany as well as the more recent examples of Idi Amin in Uganda and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. (NB/ we will deal with this to some extent in the section on genocide). Definitions 4 Such activities are not unconnected with the assassinations, mass killings and genocide which are frequently either the accompaniments or components of state terror. Here, however, we will be focusing on the more familiar phenomenon of non-state terror involving smaller groups and organisations that occupy a subordinate or marginal position in relation to the state or a number of related states. Definitions 5 We will also be looking at the international and transnational aspects of these ‘terrorist’ activities. Non-state terrorism is in itself a large and complex topic and not one therefore that can be dealt with easily. We will, however, touch on aspects of state terror in the section on genocide and it relates to some extent to the earlier work which we did on state crime. Problems of Definition 6 In addition to the distinction between state and nonstate terror a number of initial points can be made about the problem of defining terrorism. Firstly, it is invariably pointed out that the label ‘terrorist’ tends to be applied as a pejorative term to groups which are seen as a threat to the state applying the term. Thus, groups carrying out similar activities might be termed ‘terrorist’, ‘freedom fighter’ or ‘national resistance’ groups depending upon the political stance of the labeller. In the same vein, a number of contemporary states have come into existence through struggles which at the time were considered terrorist but which subsequently came to be seen as revolutionary or nationalist – the state of Israel being a prominent example. Problems of Definition 7 Similarly, activities which are labelled ‘terrorist’ by a state domestically may be seen as ‘liberation struggles’ by other states or by world opinion more generally. The struggle against apartheid in South Africa illustrates this issue perfectly. Many notorious ‘terrorists’ have been rehabilitated as respectable political leaders when their struggles have been successful and this illustrates, perhaps, the relativity of the criminalisation process. Problems of Definition 8 Secondly, this introduces a more general point which has been prominent in the sociology of deviance (see Sage Dictionary of Criminology), which is that there are no acts which are inherently or essentially deviant but only acts which are labelled as such. Labelling is, in fact, a very powerful social process which is part of and can seriously affect, power relationships. Clearly, those who have the power to apply and have generally accepted their particular labels are in a position to influence the way in which the (deviant) groups are treated. Problems of Definition 9 One example of this is the way in which both feminists and Fenians in C19 and C20 struggled to have themselves treated as political rather than common criminals. The latter meant that not only could they be treated differently in penal terms but that they were also seen differently in terms of how the ‘public’, government and other states perceived their struggles. This could be more than ideological in that it affected – and still affects – how groups are treated in terms of the law and diplomacy. What is crime and what is criminal justice? “[In the 19th century there] … was the possibility that those who defined themselves as political prisoners could, through their resistance to the process of criminalisation and representation of themselves as victims and martyrs, gain considerable public sympathy with demands for clemency or outright amnesty. By demanding that their acts be considered in terms of intention rather than in terms of the acts themselves, political offenders tested to the limits the questions: what is crime? and what is criminal justice?” (McLaughlin, E., 2001, 2nd edn., ‘Political violence, terrorism and states of fear’, in Muncie, J. and McLaughlin, E., eds., The Problem of Crime. Page 243) 10 Problems of Definition 11 Thirdly, there is a broad division between those – both academics and state agencies – who see terrorism as essentially ‘political’, and therefore not an issue for criminology and criminal justice, and those (more radical) criminologists who regard terrorism as part of a broader movement to include state crimes and crimes against humanity within the remit of criminology (an issue we addressed in the section on ‘State Crime’). Again this has practical as well as theoretical implications since political prisoners can be granted amnesty at the end of an armed struggle whereas this is unlikely to be applied to ‘common crimes’. Problems of Definition 12 Thus, the IRA in Northern Ireland have in the main managed to achieve rehabilitation, although there are still those who believe the IRA guilty of violent crimes – as well as common crimes that were perhaps not related to their political activities – which they ought to be prosecuted for. Fourthly, there is a difficulty with regard to which acts ought to be treated as ‘terrorist’. Terrorists typically employ a very wide range of actions in order to achieve their aims – everything from kidnappings and assassinations to mass killings – but some of these actions are sometimes employed by social and political groups engaged in, for example, direct action. Problems of Definition 13 It is possible, therefore, that groups such as Greenpeace could be prosecuted under terrorist legislation which wasn’t put on the statute book for this purpose. The latter would not generally be treated in the same way as terrorism but there have been moves in recent years to criminalise actions which lead to or promote terrorism – particularly in relation to terrorist financing - and this has been controversial because of the wider net that it casts and the potential for the legislation to be misused. Fifthly, terrorism has a complex relationship with conventional crime and with organised crime in particular, such that it can be difficult to decide where one begins and another ends. Problems of Definition 14 Terrorists, in pursuit of their social and political aims, may commit a very wide range of different crimes – i.e. those which are illegal under domestic or international criminal law – in order, for example, to support terrorist actions or provide funding (e.g. robbing banks; something which Stalin, incidentally, specialised in before becoming leader of the USSR). When in court, however, those arraigned as terrorists will typically argue that these actions are not criminal at all but are pursuant to their overall social and political aims. Problems of Definition 15 On the other hand, the problem of funding in particular may result in terrorist organisations either engaging in crimes normally committed by organised criminal groups or collaborating with the latter to achieve the same objective. It is well known, for example, that groups such as the ‘Shining Path’ (Peru) in Latin America and the Taliban in Afghanistan have actively used the illegal drugs trade to finance their operations. Characterisation and Representation 16 Beyond the issue of definition, which we will come back to, are broader issues of what we might term characterisation and representation. Both academics and members of the public and security communities may not employ formal definitions but rather they will (i) embed implicit definitions in their analysis and/or (ii) directly or indirectly characterise the phenomenon they are dealing with through their choice of descriptive and analytic language. At the same time, the media, popular culture and public and political debate – as well as socialisation and education – all employ particular ways of representing terrorism. Typically, this might involve, for example, a characterisation of ‘terrorists’ as pathologically deranged, fanatical and clandestine groups which are revolutionary, radical or extremist in nature and target innocent and defenceless civilians. Characterisation and Representation 17 Recently, such characterisations have been augmented by reference to rogue or criminal states which support, promote or provide a refuge for terrorism. Such characterisations, however, rarely go uncontested and it is perhaps best to understand the process of representation as one where various forms of representation vie with each other for acceptance and legitimacy. This isn’t, however, an undifferentiated process as some participants have more power than others to influence the process of representation whilst yet others may be partially or wholly marginalised. This is a commonplace of sociological analysis of the media and of the news media in particular; and, moreover, relates strongly to the point made earlier about labelling. George Bush: terrorists and freedom fighters 18 Consider, for example, this attempt to distinguish between ‘terrorists’ and ‘freedom fighters’. “In seeking to destroy freedom and democracy, terrorists deliberately target non-combatants for their own cynical purposes. They kill and maim defenceless men, women and children. They murder judges, newspaper reporters, elected officials, government administrators, labour leaders, policemen, priests and others who defend the values of civilized society. Freedom fighters, in contrast, seek to adhere to international law and civilized standards of conduct. They attack military targets, not defenceless citizens. Non-combatant casualties in this context are an aberration or attributable to the fortunes of war. They are not the result of deliberate policy designed to terrorize the opposition. The difference between the terrorists and the freedom fighters is as profound as it is obvious. To permit the distinction to become blurred is to play into the terrorists’ hands”. (George Bush, Introduction to Vice President’s Taskforce report; full text available at: http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/reading_room/48.pdf, accessed: 6 Nov 09) Characterisation and Representation 19 In this respect there is a constant struggle for what Green and Ward (2004) – following Gramsci – refer to as ‘hegemony’. This is in many respects a cultural process but it is culture informed by power relations. Those in power- whether political or economic – have the resources and influence to try to establish their own representations as the ‘common sense’ of that particular era. Against this alternative or opposing representations have to struggle to be heard let alone accepted. In a similar vein, the contestation that takes place may encourage all parties, but in particular those in power who have the most to gain or hide, to consciously manipulate the process of representation in order to ensure that the truth which is printed, broadcast or televised is the truth which they want the public to hear. Characterisation and Representation 20 Hence the common saying that ‘truth is the first casualty of war’ and this has particular applicability to those recent conflict situations – Iraq, Afghanistan – where the military have become involved in complex manoeuvres to ensure that the official version of the truth is the accepted one. Journalists now have real time access to global communications networks almost anywhere in the world and this makes them a formidable group to control. On the other hand, strategies to control, delude and exclude them have also become more sophisticated. The question of how terrorism (and counter-terrorism) is represented, however, is far more complex than such a brief discussion would indicate. Definitions Again 21 Returning to questions of definition again there are a number of ways of dealing with this beyond simply articulating yet another formal definition (one source refers to “the 200 or so extant definitions of terrorism”, Whittaker, D.J., ed., 2007, The Terrorism Reader. Page 10). The first is to extract from the main definitions some of their key shared characteristics as a way of identifying, at least, the broad field or discourse within which we are operating. Definitions Again 1. 2. 3. 22 Drawing upon various sources we can suggest the following as some of the main ingredients of common definitions of terrorism, i.e. that terrorism involves: The premeditated and calculated use or threat of serious violence The use of violence against non-combatants, innocent civilians and symbolic or infrastructural targets The intention to (i) intimidate or coerce the government and civilian population (ii) instil terror, fear and anxiety in the public at large and (iii) influence an audience wider than that which is immediately affected by the terrorist action Definitions Again 23 The above incorporates some of – but by no means all – the elements of some of the standard official and academic definitions of ‘terrorism’. It draws, for example, on definitions articulated by the US State and Defense Departments, FBI and UK government. It is, however, common practice now for even official organisations to start by suggesting that “there is no commonly accepted definition of terrorism”. Clearly in the case of global – or the more controversial ‘transnational’ – terrorism there is (i) an element of not only influencing a wider community but a world community and (ii) the issue of to what extent actions and activities transcend national borders (Whittaker, op cit, p.4). Definitions Again 24 Even so there are those that would argue that definitions of terrorism and terrorists are so ideologically loaded that it is virtually impossible to arrive at any definition which will be widely accepted or anything more than a fiction or a loaded legislative tool. The second main approach is to employ a typology in place of or in addition to a formal definition. Thus Dekmejian (R.H. Dekmejian, 2007, Spectrum of Terror: p. 10), for example, suggests the following typology which identifies a spectrum of different forms of terrorism. Typology of Terrorism 25 Individual (assassins, bombers) Subnational (ethnic nationalists, religious militants) Transnational (transnational terrorist organisations) State (secret police, special forces, military etc) Politicide/genocide (secret police, special forces, military etc) Definitions Again 26 Although this has the unfortunate disadvantage of focusing exclusively on actors and includes both state and non-state forms it does usefully distinguish, as part of a continuum, some of the main forms which terrorist activity can take. It does, however, make the process of definition more difficult by identifying the extremely different forms, motivations and actors that are involved; which suggests perhaps that the term needs to be abandoned or deconstructed in favour of some more differentiated typology of ‘politically motivated crime’. Definitions Again 27 This chimes well with what has already been said above about how terrorism can also be seen as part of a portfolio of actions taken by dissident groups that are opposed to the state and are willing to engage in any activity which will further their cause. The boundaries between terror, war, armed conflict, civil war and civil disobedience can be very malleable. Counter-terrorism: your reading 28 You are going to read into the subject of counterterrorism as one of the activities for the section on terrorism. The chapter in Global Terrorism (2008) represents a very practical and policy-orientated attempt to cover the whole spectrum of different state strategies dealing with terrorism. It doesn’t question the legitimacy of these strategies in any clear way but assumes that ‘terrorism’ has to be dealt with in one way or another and the main problem is to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods employed. This is indicated by the relatively brief and instrumental treatment it gives to human rights’ considerations. Counter-terrorism: your reading 29 It also very much assumes that states are the key actors involved and international organisations aren’t given a very clear role. It does, however, provide a very useful overview of the approaches that have been taken and a comparative analysis of the success and failure of various states in pursuing their own counter-terrorism strategies. What might be added to this is an awareness of the very complex historical and contextual factors that may be influential in deciding why and when that particular strategy will be successful. The history of terrorism: your reading 30 One of the other readings, which addresses the historical development of terrorism, is ‘The four waves of terrorism’ by David Rapoport. This is a very detailed attempt by a noted international authority on terrorism to map out what he sees as ‘long waves’ of terrorist activity. What he means by this is that there seem, retrospectively, to have been historical periods in which particular types of terrorism dominated. Modern terrorist activity is conventionally dated from the late 19th century when anarchist and other groups began to find notoriety because of their political assassinations and radical politics. This is the first wave. The history of terrorism : your reading 31 The second wave is what Rapport calls the ‘anticolonial wave’ and involved attempts to undermine and remove colonial powers. This he dates from about the 1920s to the 1960s. The latter decade saw the emergence of the third wave which is ‘new left’ terrorism carried out by left wing groups engaging in mainly urban bombings, kidnappings etc but there were also significant nationalist and separatist movements. Finally, and most controversially, Rapoport points to a fourth and more recent wave which he calls, in common with other commentators, a ‘religious’ and international wave. The history of terrorism : your reading 32 Rapoport’s treatments of this subject is sophisticated and he very usefully refers to a very large number of cases, makes comparisons between them, and deals clearly with a vast sweep of history. You may, however, want to think carefully about some of his judgements. In particular, (a) are these long waves quite as coherent as he suggests and (b) is the final wave – in which he sees Islam as playing a central role – wholly defined by religion and internationalism? What about right wing terrorism which has been so important in the USA and recently in Norway? Counter-terrorism: your reading The obvious questions are: (i) to what extent this contravened fundamental human rights (ii) was effective (compare Lutz and Lutz on this) (iii) represented a deepening rather than an aberration in terms of the USA’s policies on counterterrorism (i.e. is this an extension and development of cold war policies) and (iv) to what extent the new administration will make fundamental rather than cosmetic changes in these policies. 33 Counterterrorism 34 It is worth concluding with some further thoughts about counterterrorism. This embraces a very wide range of governmental and inter-governmental strategies and practices. Terrorism can to some extent be defined in terms of the aims and means it deploys. Thus as Rapoport (above) makes clear different groups have very different rationales for their activities and may have quite sophisticated social, ideological and political justifications for their actions. They also employ a very wide range of methods, take advantage of technological change (from gunpowder to chemical weapons) and can have a range of transnational links. Eve in the 19th century anarchist revolutionaries formed a very tight nit group across Russia, Europe and North America. Counterterrorism 35 Measures to deal with terrorism internationally, however, also date back to the 19th century with the League of Nations introducing an international convention to deal with the threat of terrorism and coordinate international efforts in this respect. During the 20th century this activity – which had sometimes been more nominal than actual – was extended to cover specific terrorist activities such as hijackings and hostage taking as these achieved a higher international profile. After 9/11 greater surveillance of terrorists and possible terrorist became a much greater priority and this was aided by the ICT revolution that leads towards very high level surveillance of communications at all levels from mobile phones to satellites. Counterterrorism 36 With the declaration of the ‘war on terror’ this became a coordinated strategy on the part of the USA and its allies to deal with terrorism at a global level. New legislation was introduced domestically, such as the US PATRIOT Act, and new bodies were deployed to deal with terrorist threats at the domestic level. International activity, however, was most dramatic and this, as is well known, embraced a range of actions from direct military intervention in states which were seen as harbouring terrorists to attempts to control, terrorist financing and the use of a range of practices, such as extraordinary rendition, which were highly controversial if not illegal in terms of both national and international law. Human rights abuses became common place but were justified in terms of the need to pursue an extraordinary war. Counterterrorism 37 The Bush government sought to change some of the fundamental rules of international law in order to carry out its ‘war on terrorism’. The use of ‘extraordinary rendition’, detention centres in third party countries and practices tantamount to torture (‘waterboarding’) raised severe human rights issues as well as threatening to undermine the , admittedly limited, legitimacy that international law might hold. The context for this was the conflicts which the USA had been drawn into as a result of its war on terror (although you could argue that these conflicts have much deeper roots). As we have seen in the section on war crimes some have argued that the war on Iraq, unsupported as it was by the UN, was a crime of aggression by the UK and USA. Counterterrorism 38 It has also been argued that other crimes have been committed in terms of, for example, the seizure of Iraqi assets, the killing of civilians, the destruction of essential infrastructure, and the failure to protect Iraq’s cultural heritage. Similar accusations have been made with respect to the Afghanistan war. Jamieson and McEvoy in an article entitled ‘State crime by proxy and by juridical othering’ (British Jl. Of Criminology, vol 45, no 4) also usefully highlight how transnational the ‘war on terror’ has been. With the advent of the Obama administration there was widespread expectation that the war on terror would disappear. Critics however would suggest that this is far from being the case and that the ‘war’ has rather taken a different course. At the same time, aspects of the Bush period remain – e.g. Guantanamo Bay – despite Obama’s resolution to expunge them. Counterterrorism 39 The Bush government took full advantage of all of the USA’s formidable international resources and alliances in order to avoid having to obey the letter of domestic law and international humanitarian law. This involved not only extraordinary rendition and ‘offshore prisons’ such as Guantanamo Bay but also the use of prisons in friendly third party countries which are notorious in human rights terms. The Obama administration, despite its firmer commitment to liberal principles and international law, has been heavily criticised for the way that it carried out its assassination of bin Laden and there are real questions about the extent to which its prepared to ignore nation state territoriality. Counterterrorism The obvious questions are: (1) to what extent US policies have (a) contravened fundamental human rights (b) have been effective (compare Lutz and Lutz with Jamieson and McEvoy on this) and (c) have represented a deepening rather than an aberration in terms of the USA’s policies on counter-terrorism (i.e. is this an extension and development of cold war policies rather than a complete break) and (2) to what extent the new Obama administration has made fundamental rather than cosmetic changes in counterterrorism policies. 40 Final Words: the Omagh Bombing “I can only say to the people who committed that act of appalling violence that those children did not deserve what they went through and to those who let off that sort of bomb in that area is the most cruel and inhumane thing I have seen in my life. I only hope the people who did it will now stop. I don’t want them punished for what they did. I just want them to say now that they will finish it, they will stop it and they won’t do it to anybody else’s children.” (Victor Barker, father of 12 year-old James Barker, who died in the Omagh Bombing by the Real IRA in August 1998. Quoted in McLaughlin, op cit: 295) 41