Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions
QUALITATIVE DATA BASE
This template is the basis of the qualitative data base on UN targeted sanctions. Please
complete all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner,
but with sufficient background and documentation for controversial points. The core units of
analysis
are
sanctions
episodes.
COUNTRY
Haiti
AUTHOR(S)
Francesco Giumelli
1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
In 1987, a military coup removed Jean Claude Duvalier from power and opened a transitory
phase in Haiti that eventually led to the first democratically elected president in the history of
the country. The elections held in December 1990 were won by Jean Bertrand Aristide with
67.5% of the votes, which brought a new democratic wave of enthusiasm among Haitians in
one of the poorest countries in Central America. However, the rule of Aristide and his Prime
Minister, Réné Préval, antagonized the military and part of the business community who
supported the previous regimes, so that on 30 September 1991 the military, led by Colonel
Raoul Cédras, overthrew Aristide. President Aristide had also been accused of inviting his
supporters to use violence against his political opponents, reasons for which he would not
receive unconditional support by all the actors in the US administration.
Aristide fled from Haiti, but he was encouraged to return and to fight back by President Perez
of Venezuela. “Perez was convinced that by mobilizing the international community, notably
through the OAS and the UN (where Venezuela would on 1 January 1992 assume a seat on
the Security Council), the coup could be reversed. He convinced Aristide to seize these fora to
put forward his legitimate claim to the Haitian Presidency as soon as possible. Aristide
recognizes the key role of Pérez in mobilizing foreign support for him and in galvanizing him
to fight on, and of Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s determination to keep his cause
alive in Washington. He was also influenced by the strong reaction of the Haitian Diaspora in
the USA, Canada and France against the coup.”(Malone 1998:61-62)
The Organization of American States (OAS) was the first to react in order to meet the
principles established by the Santiago commitment to democracy adopted four months before
the coup. After a failed negotiation encouraged by OAS negotiator Ramirez Ocampo the
organization decided to impose sanctions on the military junta, which eventually constituted
the prelude to sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN).
Among the actors in the international system, there were a few more active on the case of
Haiti that were to be known as the Group of Friends. “In order to sustain the momentum, after
this initial burst of international activity to counter the coup, France and Venezuela mooted in
capitals a meeting of Canada, France the USA and Venezuela to see whether a steering group
composed of these countries could be agreed. This grouping was constituted in mid-1992 as
the Quadripartite Group, and late that same year as the ‘Group of Friends of the [UN]
Secretary-General on Haiti”. (Malone 1998:66)
1
In 1993, Dante Caputo was appointed as Special Envoy to Haiti for both the UN and the OAS,
a fact that determined the involvement of the UN in the international community’s efforts to
restore the democratically elected President Aristide and a unique arrangement that helped to
coordinate the actions of the two international organizations. Caputo was able to convince the
military junta to accept an OAS/UN human rights monitoring mission known as the
International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), which was led by Colin Granderson of
Trinidad and Tobago.
After 18 months of OAS voluntary sanctions, Caputo in agreement with Lawrence Pezzullo,
Washington’s advisor on Haiti, proposed to impose UN comprehensive sanctions on the
country. The Security Council agreed on this proposal and decided to threaten the imposition
of sanctions in case the de facto military rulers in Haiti did not accept to negotiate on the
return to a constitutional government (the terms de facto and de factos will be used often and
they refer to the military junta as de facto rulers of Haiti after the ousting of President
Aristide). The request of General Cédras to lift the OAS sanctions before any negotiation
could take place convinced the Security Council on the need to adopt a resolution to make the
OAS sanctions globally mandatory. Sanctions were imposed with Resolution 841 on 16 June,
but the proposal of a naval blockade was dropped due to the opposition of Brazil in the
Security Council, and the imposition of a comprehensive embargo was replaced by a milder
ban on petroleum and petroleum products, an arms embargo and a freeze of assets.
This move by the UN contributed to bring back to the negotiating table the military junta,
which eventually led to the Governors Island Accord (GIA) signed on 3 July. The agreement
set the terms for the return of President Aristide, although it was an object of great
controversy amongst the contracting parties, especially in regards to the terms of the amnesty
granted to the military leaders, and to the timing for Aristide’s return. Part of the Accord was
for Aristide to prepare for his return by appointing a new Prime Minister while UN sanctions
were supposed to be suspended upon the ratification of the new Prime Minister by the
Parliament in Haiti. Robert Malval was ratified on 25 August 1993 and sanctions were
suspended on 27 August 1993. However, the implementation of the agreement proved to be
problematic. The appointment of Malval was accompanied by an increasing number of human
rights violations, including the murder of Antoine Izmery and, finally, by the Harlan County
incident on 11 October. The wider strategic approach to the resolution of the crisis by the
Security Council entailed also the deployment of a UN contingent to assist the parties in the
transition. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNIMH) was approved by the Council on 23
September and its first large deployment was scheduled to arrive with the USS Harlan
County. Nevertheless, the military leaders were already critical of the GIA and instigated a
revolt in Port-au-Prince to derail the agreement. On October 11, the first sizeable deployment
of UN troops, 200 US and 25 Canadian, was expected to arrive by sea with the USS Harlan
County. A mob of Haitians prevented the docking of the ship and in order to avoid further
casualties to those that took place a few days before in Somalia, the US administration
decided to cancel the mission without consulting with the UN. This led to the re-imposition of
sanctions and to their strengthening with resolution 873 and 875.
After these events, the international situation began to change. The US administration fell
under heavy domestic pressures as well as international constituencies, being consistently
urged to stop the flow of refugees towards its shores and to support the democratization
efforts in Haiti. In May, the UN decided to expand further sanctions and on 31 July, the
Security Council passed Resolution 940, which authorized UN members to use all the
necessary means to allow the return of Aristide to Haiti. The Resolution was approved with
the abstentions of Brazil and China.
2
In September, when the US had recruited 19 countries for a total of 2000 troops to join the
multinational force (MNF), a diplomatic mission led by former President Jimmy Carter was
authorized by the Clinton administration. The soldiers were already on their way, when
President Carter was able to negotiate the peaceful departure of the military junta and the reestablishment of democracy. Cédras resigned on 10 October 1994 and departed, with other
leaders of the Army, a few days later. President Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October and
sanctions were lifted upon his arrival. (Malone 1997:130-133)
2. BEGINNING INCIDENT OR EVENT (of what prompted UNSC action in the first
place)
General Raoul Cédras and other military leaders overthrew the elected President of Haiti Jean
Bertrand Aristide in September 1991. This event occurred four months after the OAS’
adoption of the Santiago Commitment to Democracy in May 1991. (Cortright and Lopez
2000:87-89) The Spring 1993 stalemate and the lack of political will of the military leaders to
negotiate with the UN hindered further the return of President Aristide. The UN got involved
in the process in December 1992, after the OAS failed to achieve noticeable results and the
US administration began to suffer for the pressure of the political refugees coming from Haiti.
During the negotiations, Cédras and his supporters showed no intention to leave their posts,
being unwilling to make concessions on the return of Aristide, and not manifesting any
intention to leave. As a consequence of this behavior, the UN decided to resort to sanctions in
order to break the deadlock and to favor the return of Aristide to power.
The lack of implementation of the Governors Island agreement and the deteriorating human
rights conditions in Haiti are the two main causes that bring about the reimposition of
sanctions in the country.
3. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF SANCTIONS (i.e., counter-terrorism (CT), nonproliferation (NP), conflict prevention (CP), human rights (HR), democracy promotion
(DP))
The general of objective of sanctions in the case of Haiti was to promote democracy (DP).
Malone talks about a ‘broad range of activities in support of democracy’ from 1990 to 1997
of the UN in Haiti. (Malone 1998:1)
4. IDENTIFICATION OF EPISODES
First episode: from threat to sanction (13 Dec 1992 – 27 August 1993).
The first episode consists in the first imposition of UN sanctions on Haiti. The Security
Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Haiti was preceded by a few months of sanctions
being ‘in the air’ from December 1992 to June 1993. Sanctions are “in the air” when the lack
of compliance and the lack of impact led to think about making sanctions mandatory and
global. The Security Council passed Resolution 841 on 16 June 1993, imposing sanctions on
Haiti. The suspension of the measures on 27 August 1993 with SCR 861, almost two months
after the signing of the Governors’ Island Agreement, determines the end of the first episode.
Second episode: sanctions suspended (27 August 1993 – 13 October 1993).
The second episode consists in the period of suspension of the measures after the signing of
the GIA, from 27 August 1993 to 13 October 1993.
Third episode: sanctions reimposed (13 October 1993 – 6 May 1994).
3
When the Security Council understood that the Governors Island Accords were not being
implemented, sanctions were reimposed for the third time on 13 October 1993. The incident
of the Harlan County triggered the reimposition. This episode ends with the strengthening of
sanctions in May 1994.
Fourth episode: sanctions strengthened (6 May 1994 – 31 July 1994).
The lack of progress in resolving the crisis combined with a renewed interested of the US to
break the deadlock (due mostly to domestic issues) led to a strengthening of the sanctions
with the imposition of a nearly comprehensive trade embargo. This episodes ends in July with
the authorization of a multinational force (MNF).
Fifth episode: sanctions confirmed along with the authorization of MNF (31 July 1994 –
15 October 1994).
Finally, the fifth episode of sanctions began with the approval of UNSCR 940 of 31 July
1994, which authorized the creation of a multinational force and the use of “all necessary
means” to restore Aristide to power. The episode ends with the lifting of all sanctions on 29
September 1994.
5. SANCTIONS TERMINATION?
Sanctions were terminated on the day of Aristide’s return to Haiti, on 15 October 1994.
6. REFLECTIONS (i.e. distinctive or unique aspects of the sanctions, potential lessons)
There are two distinctive aspects for the case of Haiti that should be kept in mind during the
comparative analysis.
First, the escalation of sanctions led the Security Council to the imposition of quasicomprehensive sanctions. Resolution 917 of 6 May 1994 adopted a series of measures that are
among the most stringent and non-discriminatory among all the sanctions imposed by the
Security Council since the end of the Cold War, with the exception of Iraq in 1991. This
aspect should be kept in strong consideration for two reasons. First, the sanctions on Haiti
because they suffered from all the weaknesses identified by Galtung in his article on Rhodesia
(1967), which eventually strengthened the military junta versus the Haitians. Second, general
measures triggered a series of reactions by nation states not to make the sanctions more
targeted towards the military junta, but to make sure that certain economic actors (i.e. the US
owned assembly factories in the country) were not suffering from the effects of sanctions.
Second, strong and heavy sanctions were requested by the de jure leaders of Haiti, who were
not living in the country and who had all the advantages to claim that Haiti was in economic
disarray because of the poor management of the military junta. The official recounts of the
Haiti case do not give too much space to the conduct of President Aristide both before the
coup and during the era of the military junta. For instance, President Aristide was accused of
instigating violence versus the supporters of the military junta, and he certainly bears part of
the responsibility for the derailment of the GIA. The evaluation of sanctions should take into
account this element.
7. TIMELINE (provide a general timeline for each case, identifying the origins, episodes,
and where relevant, the termination of the sanctions)
1990
4
16 December: Aristide wins the elections
1991
6-7 January: Attempted coup by Roger Lafontant
7 February: Aristide is inaugurated
5 June: the OAS approves the Santiago Declaration
29-30 September: Military coup ousts Aristide from power
8 October: the OAS adopts a sweeping voluntary trade embargo and other measures against
Haiti
11 October: UNGA resolution condemns the coup and ask for support of OAS measures
9 November: OAS mission to Haiti with Ramirez Ocampo
15 November: US Coast Guard repatriates 538 Haitian refugees
17 December: A US federal court forbids the forced repatriation of refugees
1992
1 January: a tanker delivers 22000 tons of diesel fuel to Haiti
8 January: both houses accept the proposal of Théodore as Prime Minister
10 January: another tanker delivers fuel to Haiti, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the OAS
Hemispheric embargo
3 February: the Supreme Court strikes down the decision of the US Federal Court
4 February: the US announces unilateral exemptions to the embargo, favoring US-owned
assembly industries in Haiti, from the OAS embargo
23 February: Washington Protocol (WP)
March: more fuel arrives in Port-au-Prince
7 March: Nérette warns Parliamentarians against approving the Washington Protocol
18 March: after Senate’s approval, the lower house is prevented to vote on the WP
27 March: The Constitutional Court in Haiti declares the WP unconstitutional
9 April: Cédras rejects the Washington Protocol
10 April: The US imposes a visa ban on coup supporters
20 April; The US initiates ‘in-country processing’ of Haitian asylum-seekers
27 April: the negotiations for an agreement between the Army, the Parliament and the de
facto government are open by the Senate
30 April: The ambassador of the Vatican state, the only one to recognize Haiti, presents his
credentials
5
8 May: Tripartite Villa d’Accueuil agreement calls for a Government of Consensus
10 May: pro-Aristide groups reject the agreement
17 May: OAS ministers call for stronger sanctions
24 May: President Bush signs the Kennebunkport Order under which all Haitian refugees
will be sent back to Haiti
29 May: Aristide calls the UN for support
2 June: Marc Bazin becomes Prime Minister under the d’Accueuil agreement
3 June: Aristide asks the UN to adopt the OAS sanctions
15 July: Boutros-Ghali informs UNSC that the UN will participate in OAS mission to Haiti
18-21 August: OAS Mission to Haiti
16 September: 18 members of the OAS mission to Haiti, led by Colin Granderson, arrive in
Haiti
29 September: Aristide calls for a naval blockade before the UNGA
24 November: UNGA votes to support Aristide
11 December: Boutros-Ghali appoints Dante Caputo (Argentina) as his Special Envoy
Episode 1
13 December: OAS ministers call for OAS and UN member states to implement fully the
embargo
17-22 December: Caputo holds consultation with Aristide, Cédras and Bazin
18 December: UNGA is concerned about human rights
29 December: Canadian Prime Minister calls for a naval blockade of Haiti
1993
8 January: Aristide requests the deployment of a UN and OAS civilian mission (ICM) to
Haiti
13 January: Caputo is appointed as Special Envoy for the OAS as well
16-17 January: Cédras and Bazin accept in principle the ICM
18 January: Elections in Haiti, which are deemed unconstitutional
9 February: Caputo and Bazin agree on ICM
14 February: 40 OAS observers land in Haiti
15 February: UN dispatches an advance team to prepare the mission
7 March: the ICM, known as MICIVIH, begins to deploy throughout the country. It will
number 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers
4 June: The USA announces sanctions against individuals and institutions supporting the
6
coup and the de facto regime
6 June: OAS ministers ask for stronger sanctions
7 June: The legitimate government of Haiti asks the UN to make sanctions universal and
mandatory
8 June: Bazin resigns
12 June: Cédras announces that he will participate in negotiations only if the OAS embargo
is lifted and he is allowed to address the UNGA
16 June: The UNSC unanimously adopts sanctions on Haiti
21 June: Cédras accept the dialogue
23 June: Sanctions enter into effect
27 June: Negotiations begin
3 July: The Governors Island Agreement is signed
16 July: New York Pact is done
24 July: The Parliament is advised that Aristide’s selection as Prime Minister is Robert
Malval
28 July: Aristide requests a UN presence of 600 police officers, 50 to 60 military trainers,
and 500 military engineers and experts
August: MICIVIH and others report an upsurge in repression
25 August: Malval is ratified by the Parliament
Episode 2
27 August: the UNSC suspends the sanctions
8-12 September: Caputo lead the UN advance team
11 September: Antoine Izmery is assassinated
17 September: UN deplores increasing violence in Haiti
23 September: UNMIH is created
29 September: Cédras complains that GIA is not respected
4 October: Michel Françoise, the powerful chief of police, declares to be against the GIA
8 October: the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and others
demonstrate to ask Caputo to leave
10 October: US Defense Secretary Aspin fends off critics of US participation in UNMIH
with fear of another Somalia
11 October: the USS Harlan County arrives in Port-au-Prince with the first personnel of
UNMIH, but FRAPH demonstrates against the deployment
7
12 October: the Harlan County leaves Haiti
Episode 3
13 October: UNSC reimposes the oil and arms embargo
14 October: Justice Minister Guy Malary is killed. Canada withdraws from UNIMIH
15-16 October: MICIVIH staff withdraws from Haiti
16 October: SCR 875 imposes a naval blockade against Haiti
10 December: UNMIH is renewed until March 1994
15 December: Malval resigns, but he remains as care-taker
1994
14-16 January: Miami Conference convened by Aristide for democratic forces of Haiti
15 January: PAHO humanitarian fuel-delivery programme comes into effect
24 January: Caputo and the Friends of Haiti meet to reconsider strategy. Fuel (and much
else) continues to flow across the DR border
26 January: MICIVH staff returns to Port-au-Prince
14 February: American sponsored miniplan, Caputo supports it, Aristide does not
4 April: Aristide gives six-month notice of termination of the 1981 Haiti-USA treaty
allowing repatriation of Haitian boat people
21 April: US supports Aristide and drops miniplan
Episode 4
6 May: UNSC imposes additional sanctions
8 May: Randall Robinson ends his twenty-seven-day hunger strike over Washington’s
Haitian refugee policy
11 May: Judge Emile Jonassaint installed as de facto President of Haiti
9 June; OAS ministers support stronger measures on Haiti
30 June: UNMIH is extended until July 31
11 July: De facto government expels MICIVIH, which departs on July 13
Episode 5
31 July: UNSC authorizes a multinational force (MNF) to employ ‘all necessary means’ to
achieve the departure of the military leadership and Aristide’s return.
26 August: Boutros-Ghali informs the UNSC that the situation in Haiti has further
deteriorated
28 August: Aristide associated father Jean-Marie Vincent is murdered
8
30 August: Boutros-Ghali abandons efforts to persuade the Military to step down peacefully
15 September: Clinton indicates that the MNF is imminent
18 September: Carter reaches an agreement for the departure of the de factos
19 September: American troops land in Haiti, Caputo resigns
23 September: Lakhdar Brahimi is UN Secretary-General’s special representative for Haiti
24 September: confrontation in Cap Haitien between MNF and Haitian security forces leaves
ten Haitians dead
29 September: UNSC says that the embargo will end as soon as Aristide returns
3 October: Michel Françoise flees to the Dominican Republic
6 October: Haitian Parliament passes an amnesty law for crimes connected with the 1991
coup
10 October: the military leadership resigns. Cédras departs Haiti for Panama on October 13
15 October: Aristide returns, sanctions are lifted
16 October: Lift for sanctions enter in effect
EPISODES
On the following pages we provide a table for each episode you identified. Please complete
all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner.
HOW MANY EPISODES DID YOU IDENTIFY? 5
EPISODE 1
CONTEXT
First episode: threat phase (13 Dec 1992 – 27 August 1993).
The first episode led to the first imposition of sanctions in June 1993. This episode includes
also the threat phase from December 1992 to June 1993. In December, the OAS decided to
ask the UNSC to make their sanctions ‘global’, which substantiates the understanding that
sanctions are ‘in the air’ at the Security Council. (Malone 1998:79) The UN took the lead in
negotiating with the de facto leadership in Haiti in December 1992 and attempted to negotiate
the return of Aristide to Haiti. When the UN realized that the military junta was not willing to
give up its position of power in Haiti, the UN threatened the use of sanctions. As part of the
larger negotiation framework, amnesty was offered to the military junta, but there was a big
debate on whether to include also normal crimes in the amnesty or whether to limit it to
political behavior. In March, Clinton and Aristide met in Washington and Clinton took a
strong stand in favor of the return of Aristide. Plus, Aristide also pointed out that the military
leaders could remain in the country and would l not go to jail upon his return. He also did not
call for vengeance from his supporters, reason for which he was ousted from power by Raoul
Cédras in September 1991. (Malone 1998:81) Caputo sent a letter to the military junta where
he offered certain terms for negotiations that, if rejected, would have led to the imposition of
9
targeted sanctions. The US had decided to give another chance to Haiti by offering military
assistance in order to guarantee the safety of the negotiations, but when even this failed, the
UN decided to resort to sanctions. (Martin 1999:718-719)
The lack of cooperation of the military junta led the Security Council to adopt the sanctions of
the OAS and to make them global and mandatory. However, humanitarian concerns led the
Security Council to impose lighter measures that were limited only to cut off the sale of fuel
and arms to Haiti and to establish a sanctions committee to monitor implementation of the
sanctions. (Zaidi 1997:195) Sanctions were imposed on 16 June 1993 (entered in force on 23
June) with Resolution 841.
Shortly after the imposition of the sanctions, Cédras declared his intention to meet with
Aristide and the negotiation was convened at Governors Island in New York on 27 June. On 3
July, the Governors Island Accord (GIA) was signed and stipulated that sanctions would have
been lifted upon the ratification of the new Prime Minister indicated by President Aristide.
When the Parliament in Haiti ratified the appointment of Malval on 25 August, the Security
Council passed resolution 861 suspending the sanctions on 27 August 1993.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
The US did not have a clear interest on Haiti’s leadership and the administration itself
appeared ambiguous on what to do with the crisis. Therefore, the United Nations entered the
picture after being called in by the OAS, but with the lack of political will from the US and
the absence of interest of the other Permanent members, the action was not trenchant and it was
mainly due to the need of showing an active role for the United Nations in international crises and that
unconstitutional regime changes could not be tolerated by the international community.
Initially, the Security Council was reluctant to intervene due to the opposition of certain
members. “The UN Security Council was already seized of the crisis by the Ambassador of
Haiti, Fritz Longchamp. The Council President concluded, following bilateral consultations
on 30 September, that a majority of Council members – led by India and China – opposed any
Council action on what was deemed an “internal matter”. (Morris 1995:3; Malone 1997:129)
However, the political stand was taken since the very beginning as “In an unprecedented
gesture towards an overthrown leader, however, the UNSC agreed to receive Aristide in a
formal session on 3 October. Following Aristide’s brief and dignified appeal for international
support, the Council President expressed UNSC support for the OAS resolution and called for
restoring the legitimate government in Haiti”. (Malone 1997:129) Moreover, “One week later
the coup, on 10 October [1991], the General Assembly of the United Nations (whose
resolutions are not legally binding on UN member states) also strongly condemned the violent
overthrow of the elected government and urged UN member states to uphold the measures of
isolation called for by the OAS”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:90)
In 1992, most Member States in the SC deemed the Haitian crisis as an internal matter and
they were decided not to involve the SC in it. China and Brazil were especially eager not to
discuss the matter at the UNSC. The group of Friends established in June/July 1992 attempted
to involve the SC in the crisis based on the destabilizing effect that the Haitian problem could
have had in the area. The USA rejected the idea to discuss and use Chapter VII to deal with
the crisis (Malone 1998:74)
Towards the end of 1992, the Group of Friends and the OAS achieved some results in
bringing the UN on board. The UNGA adopted a resolution on 24 November asking the UN
10
to take a more active role in the Haitian crisis and to participate in the OAS civilian missions.
(Malone 1998:75)
After the failure of the negotiations led by the OAS, the UN took the lead, moving one step
ahead to pressure the de facto government in Haiti. The UN “also saw in the election of Bill
Clinton a possibility that had not existed under President Bush of serious US pressure for a
solution to the Haitian crisis”. (Ian 1999:715) By the end of 1992, the UN had exhausted most
non-Chapter VII measures (Swindells 1996:1916-1917) and in June 1993 the General
Assembly “forwarded the issue of the Haitian crisis to the Security Council […]. Following
the de jure government’s consent to impose sanctions, the Security Council decided to
proceed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and unanimously adopted Resolution 841”.
(Swindells 1996:1918) At that point, “Sanctions were the only tools available to the United
Nations short of the use of force and military intervention to resolve Haiti’s quagmire”.
(Swindells 1996:1880-1881)
An intense diplomatic activity preceded and accompanied the imposition of sanctions. Earlier,
it was the OAS to lead the diplomatic efforts, but they failed and sanctions were imposed.
Subsequently, the UN and the OAS appointed a joint mediator in the person of David Caputo
who, together with US special envoy Lawrence Pezzullo, suggested to impose sanctions in
case of non-compliance from the military junta. Aristide and Lavalas as well were in favor of
the sanctions on the military junta”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:98) Aristide, in a speech to the
United Nations General Assembly in September 1992, had called for a stronger embargo and
a blockade if necessary. (Swindells 1996:1917)
The imposition of sanctions took place with the Security Council Resolution and was
approved unanimously, with more skeptical positions from Brazil, China and Pakistan.
Indeed, Brazil was concerned about setting a precedent for several further engagement of the
Security Council. China moved along similar lines as it considered the regime change in Haiti
an internal matter. Finally, Pakistan was not convinced that the crisis in Haiti represented a
threat to international peace as necessary condition to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII.
(Malone 1997:12; Malone 1998:85)
The involvement of the Security Council was requested also by the legitimate government of
Haiti. “On 7 June 1993, Aristide officially requested that the UNSC decree a mandatory
embargo against Haiti. Although some OAS members – notably Brazil, Colombia and Mexico
– resisted involving the UNSC, their position was undermined by the conspicuous failure of
OAS strategies. Brazil, then a Council member, convinced the Friends to drop plans for a
naval blockade of Haiti. On 16 June, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 841 was
unanimously adopted, imposing an arms and fuel embargo against Haiti. China indicated that
it would accept the decision, given the regional sentiment in favor of UNSC action and the
‘unique and exceptional nature’ of the crisis”. (Malone 1997:130)
The Security Council set up a Sanctions Committee to monitor and facilitate the
implementation of the sanctions called for by the Resolution. The Resolution included a
clause to allow for the delivery of fuel for humanitarian purposes.
“Resolution 841 was scheduled to go into effect on June 23, 1993 unless the military began
negotiations with Dante Caputo. The sanctions imposed pursuant to Resolution 841 came into
effect on June 23, 1993, but by June 27, Raoul Cédras, the nominal head of the de facto
government, and President Aristide agreed to meet in New York. On July 3, 1993, Cédras and
Aristide signed the Governors Island agreement”. (Swindells 1996:1920)
11
POLITICAL WILL
Initially, the Organization of American States led the international community in solving the
crisis in Haiti. When the efforts of the OAS proved to be in vain, the United Nations was
affected by the divergent interests that determined US foreign policy towards Haiti.
However, the UN was restrained at the beginning by the need to limit its involvement in
democratization processes around the globe. When Haiti asked for electoral observers to
monitor the elections in 1990, “There was concern in New York that the Haitian request could
lead to a plethora of similar pleas from countries with troubled democratic records”. (Malone
1997:127)
The political will of the UN in the case of Haiti was strictly connected to the political will of
the United States. Other actors as well can be considered, but the real engine generating
support from the UN in Haiti was in Washington.
During the first phase of sanctions, the United States was ambiguous towards the crisis.
Cortright and Lopez defined US foreign policy as schizophrenic towards Haiti: “the Bush and
Clinton administrations officially expressed support for the return of the elected president, but
many US policymakers were uncomfortable with Aristide’s radicalism and his redistributive
economic policies. The powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Jesse Helms (RN.C.), vilified the deposed president, and CIA officials circulated
reports of Aristide’s supposed mental instability. This ambivalence about Aristide contributed
to Washington’s erratic and inconsistent policies towards Haiti”. (Cortright and Lopez
2000:91) The exemptions granted to US assembly plants “revealed a lack of commitment to
real enforcement”. (Werleigh 1995:164) Malone wrote that “Divisions within the
Administration over Haiti were to bedevil American Foreign policy until mid-1994”. (Malone
1998:67)
The US concern was directed towards the refugee problem. By mid-1992 “Washington’s
principal objective remained the ratification of Théodore by the Haitian Parliament. Having
reached an agreement with the de facto regime to permit repatriation of Haitian boat people
and monitoring of their subsequent fate within Haiti, further to the US Supreme Court’s
January 1992 decision, Washington did not seem eager to pick fights with Cédras and his
colleagues” (Malone 1998:71).
Other states were also interested in Haiti, such as France, Canada and Venezuela due to their
historical ties. Venezuela, for instance provided financial support since the time of Simon
Bolivar, but they had neither the political will nor the capacity to prevent the military junta
from seizing power. (Malone 1997:127)
The imposition of sanctions followed along the lines of the first episode, with the OAS’s
substantial incapacity to act and the little political commitment of the other actors, in primis
the US.
UNSCR 841 was adopted unanimously, but it occurred after a long discussion on the final
text. There was the understanding that making OAS sanctions global and mandatory would
have been too disruptive for Haiti, so the focus went on a ban on petroleum products and
weapons, which were thought to be the weak points of the de factos. Brazil’s opposition on
legal and humanitarian grounds was able to water down the implementation aspect of the text
(the naval blockade was dropped), and the text was approved with skeptical statements from
Pakistan, China and Brazil. (Malone 1998: 85) The discussion in the Council lasted for a few
12
months, and the final decision was both far from the original Haitian request (OAS sanctions
mandatory and global) and did not go much further in terms of implementation. This seems to
be the product of a trade-off between lack of commitment on the US side, fear of violating the
principle of non-intervention, and the need to respond to the unconstitutional change of
government in the post-cold war scenario.
The low degree of implementation did not regard only UN sanctions, but also the US did not intend to
play a major role in Haiti with little implementation of the measures. Furthermore, “US measures to
freeze financial assets and restrict travel were also very limited, leaving key supporters of the
junta, such as the powerful Mev, Brandt, Acra, and Madsen families, exempt from sanctions”.
(New York Times 1994; Cortright and Lopez 2000:99)
Malone also describes the reluctance of the US to participate in the civilian mission agreed
during the GIA negotiations. “Finally, and most importantly, the Pentagon was known not to
be keen on participating in UN peacekeeping in Haiti, in part owing to the negative reviews of
the American military occupation there from 1915 to 1934, but also because a number of its
officials, sympathetic towards the Military in Haiti (many of whom had trained in the USA),
believed Aristide was not worth restoring”. (Malone 1998:90)
Von Hippel wrote that “[…], the US government also acted in a somewhat unpredictable and
bizarre fashion. Historically, the US administration maintained strong ties to the leadership in
Haiti – including both Papa Doc and Baby Doc Duvalier – much as it did with Manuel
Noriega in Panama. Also reminiscent of Panama, press reports revealed that the CIA had
trained many Haitian military officers and kept them on the CIA payroll – even after the 1991
coup – despite documentation that they had been engaged in drug trafficking since the mid1990s. In fact, the major incentive for the junta to cling to power for so long was the huge
return on their illegal activities: they were reportedly earning more than $500 million a year.
At the same time that these reports were surfacing, there was a growing anti-Aristide
movement among senior conservatives in the United States. Henry Kissinger, Jesse Helms,
Elliott Abrams, Bob Dole, and Dick Cheney all publicly denounced Aristide. The CIA’s
senior Latin America analyst, Brian Latell, testified to Congress that Aristide was mentally
unstable and that he had spent time in a psychiatric hospital in Montreal. The Miami Herald
received permission from Aristide to check his medical records, and no such stay was in
evidence. Other reports revealed that even after the 1991 coup, the CIA had been paying
Aristide’s enemies in the military for information on him. In 1992 Latell, who worked directly
for former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, met with and praised Marc Bazin, prime minister
just after the coup, and Bazin’s team (which included General Cédras), calling them ‘the most
promising group of Haitian leaders to emerge since the Duvalier family dictatorship was
overthrown in 1986’. He also added that, contrary to popular belief, there was no widespread
violence and repression and that ‘Gen. Cédras impressed me as a conscientious military leader
who genuinely wishes to minimize his role in politics… I believe he is relatively moderate
and uncorrupt”. (Von Hippel 2000:99)
A Sanctions committee was created, but annual or any other reports are not available on the
website. However, a monitoring team was not established.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The principal purpose of this first sanction episode is to coerce the military junta to bring
Haiti back within the constitutional boundaries. The initial objective of the UN and the other
parties was to favour the return of Aristide in power, and the sanctions aimed at bringing
Cédras to the negotiating table. The long term purpose of the United Nations’ policy was to
reinstate democracy in Haiti through negotiations. The purpose of the sanctions therefore was
13
to facilitate the negotiation process and give Dante Caputo some leverage with which to force
the military to the negotiating table”. (Swindells 1996:1918-1919)
There are also constraining and signaling elements to be highlighted. The sanctions certainly
aimed at constraining the capacity of the de factos to rule Haiti and to canvass support
among the Haitians. The decision to impose sanctions signaled the commitment of the
Security Council to get involved in the resolution of the problem. The target was also the
international audience, as the United Nations, accepting the OAS request, could not accept a
forceful change of regime in the post Cold War system. Furthermore, the United States was
also intent to placate the pressures of domestic constituencies to act in Haiti.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
There are two main audiences in this first episode: the military junta, the Haitians and the
international community.
Primarily, the Security Council hoped that the threat of UN sanctions would bring the military
junta to negotiate with Aristide and the international community.
Second, the Haitians are relevant in the imposition of sanctions, as the Security Council is
responding to the requests of Aristide in the name of the people. President Aristide’s call for
sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2000:99) and the Security Council’s decision to act along this
line may have sent the signal to the Haitians that the UN was committed to the return of the
democratically elected government and, therefore, to their protection.
Finally, the international audience is also a relevant audience to be considered. The OAS
reacted to the crisis in Haiti on the bases of the Santiago Declaration, which attempted to rule
out unconstitutional change of governments. This, along with the need to prevent human
rights violations, motivated the Security Council to take the lead in negotiating with the
military junta in Haiti in order to show the international community that a norm could have
been established.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
Prevent the sale or supply of:
-
Petroleum or petroleum products
-
Arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military
vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned
Decide to freeze funds in their territories available to:
-
the government of Haiti or to the de facto authorities in Haiti
-
be controlled directly or indirectly by such Government or authorities or by entities,
wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by such Government or
authorities.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
Before the first episode of the threat of sanctions, the OAS was among the first to react to the
military coup in order to implement the newly adopted Santiago declaration on the
14
democratization of Latin America. The forceful seizure of the government in Port-au-Prince
represented a direct violation of those principles and the OAS responded by authorizing its
members to adopt any measures to end the coup. (Benton and Ware 2001:9) After the first
OAS delegation was expelled in October 1991, the OAS imposed an embargo on all
commercial trade with Haiti, except for humanitarian supplies, (Ian 1999:714) and an asset
freeze on the Haitian State. (Malone 1997:129) “Encouraged by the OAS mediator Ramirez
Ocampo, nonstop maneuvering within Haitian political circles throughout 1992 to find a way
out of the impasse between Aristide and the increasingly comfortable de facto regime came to
nothing”. (Malone 1997:129)
In 1991, the understanding was that an immediate return of Aristide would have ended in
blood-shed. Thus, the newly appointed Ocampo, in cooperation with President Pérez from
Venezuela, attempted to force the appointment of a new prime minister named by Aristide.
The agreement was reached on 7 January 1992 to appoint René Théodore, who was also
accepted by Aristide even if he would have preferred Victor Benoit. However, the de facto
leaders of Haiti thwarted this process by intimidating Aristide supporters in Haiti, as they did
when they consented to a military attack on a meeting at Théodore’s house. This led Aristide
to more radical requests of not legitimizing the power position of the military junta. (Malone
1998:68)
Prime Minister Bazin and the OAS together with Aristide agreed to dispatch “an 18-member
International Civilian Mission (ICM), with a mandate defined only in general terms: ‘to help
reduce the violence in general and encourage respect for human rights, cooperate in
distributing humanitarian assistance and assess the progress made toward a political solution
to the Haitian crisis’”. (Ian 1999:715)
The negotiation continued with little results and with the military junta intentioned to gain
time to consolidate its hold on power. On 23 February, the Washington Protocols were agreed
by the President and Parliamentary leaders and it consisted in the ratification of Théodore as
Prime Minister and the restoration of the Constitutional order. On 25 February there was an
agreement between Théodore and Aristide on a new government, but the negotiations
basically ended there. The constitutional Court declared the WP against the constitution and
on 8 May the military junta, the Government and parliament agreed to bypass the WP
entirely. “The May 8 agreement exemplifies what came to be known as the temporizing
tactics (les tactiques dilatoires) of the de factos and their allies throughout much of the
crisis”. (Malone 1998:69) marc Bazin became the new Prime Minister on 2 June 1992.
“The OAS lacked the resources and political will to enforce trade sanctions or to make a
concerted effort to restore Aristide to power”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:90-91) “By nature,
the OAS is a regional organization limited in its geographic and legal scope. As a regional
organization, the OAS cannot resort to enforcement action without the consent of the
UN Security Council, nor can it use coercive means”. (Swindells 1996:1914) “After 18
months of increasingly ineffective OAS voluntary sanctions, the June 1993 OAS Ad Hoc
Meeting adopted a resolution urging OAS and UN member states to strengthen the embargo”.
(Malone 1997:130) “Caputo, in conjunction with Washington’s new adviser on Haiti, the
highly regarded Lawrence Pezzullo, and the other Friends, had concluded early on that only
universal, mandatory sanctions against the de factos were likely to bring them to the
negotiating table”. (Malone 1997:131)
The UN was then called into action and David Caputo was appointed as Special
Representative in the name of the OAS as well. "The UN in effect took over the lead in
negotiations when, in December 1992, its Secretary-General appointed a former Argentine
15
Foreign Minister Dante Caputo as his special envoy: the OAS Secretary General was
persuaded to designate Caputo as his envoy too, so that for the first time the same envoy acted
on behalf of both the UN and the relevant regional organization [OAS]”. ((Ian 1999:715) This
appears to be a good precedent of coordination between the UN and regional actors.
The threat of sanctions was intertwined with the deployment of personnel in the country in
February 1993. “He (David Caputo) convinced the de facto regime to allow the immediate
deployment to Haiti of a joint OAS-UN human rights monitoring mission known as the
International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). MICIVIH, led with distinction by its
Executive Director, Colin Granderson of Trinidad and Tobago, performed with courage and
determination in documenting the human rights situation during the de facto repression of
1993-1994. (Malone 1997:129-130)
It was also Aristide himself who requested a radically enlarged ICM in January 1993. (Ian
1999:715) This call was received by Dante Caputo who announced, after many protests and
resistance by the military junta, that an agreement was reached over the deployment of the
500 monitoring team. (Malone 1998:80) The civilian mission (known as MICIVIH) was a
good sign of cooperation between the OAS and the UN.
Furthermore, intense diplomatic activity preceded and accompanied the imposition of
sanctions. Earlier, it was the OAS to lead the diplomatic efforts, but they failed and sanctions
were imposed. Subsequently, the UN and the OAS appointed a joint mediator in the person of
David Caputo, who suggested together with Lawrence Pezzullo, the US special envoy, to
impose sanctions in case of non-compliance from the military junta. (Malone 1997:130)
The United States had a marginal role during the first phases of sanctions, as different factions
within the administration had conflicting ideas on how to deal with the regime change in
Haiti. The change in administration (from Bush to Clinton) did not contribute to effective,
coherent and decisive action in Haiti.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
The main regimes were the ones imposed by the OAS and the US, but also a series of other
actors complemented the OAS embargo. For instance, “[…] the cutting off of aid by the
European Economic Community, Venezuela and Canada were applauded by the Haitian
masses and the international community.” (Cited in Malone 1998:67). It is important to note
that these measures were imposed before ‘sanctions were in the air’ at the UNSC.
“Washington did suspend most development assistance and arranged for multilateral
assistance to be frozen as well, but it also essentially carried forward its existing policy of
relying on the Military to deliver credible elections” (Malone 1998:50). This suspension
occurred after the failure of the post-electoral events of 29 November 1987. However, “on 4
February 1992, under very strong pressures from business circles (whose views were pressed
within Congress and on the Administration of the Caribbean and Latin American
Association), the State Department announced a unilateral American decision to initiate
exceptions to the OAS embargo, essentially allowing the US-owned assembly industries in
Haiti to continue operation” (Malone 1998:70). “At the same time, the Administration
announced that the embargo would be sharpened by subjecting individuals in Haiti who had
supported the coup to unspecified sanctions (Thought to include seizure of assets in the USA
and suspension of visas for travel to the USA)” (Malone 1998:70).
“The OAS Ad Hoc Meeting, which was reconvened on 8 October in Washington, adopted a
16
resolution urging ‘Member States to proceed immediately to freeze the assets of the Haitian
State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid’. […] At the
request of Aristide, received on 7 October from Caracas, it set up a civilian mission” (From
Laugerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, note 3, p. 9 cited in Malone 1998:65).
The OAS sanctions remains in force. Other actors imposed various sanctions, such as a travel
ban and an assets freeze of the US, and the asset freezes imposed by the European economic
community, Canada and Venezuela already mentioned above.
When the UN imposed sanctions, the US adopted parallel measures and “In early June 1993,
the United States froze the assets of members of the military junta and denied them entry
visas to the United States. The freeze affected the cash accounts, real estate, and other
property of eighty-three individuals and thirty-five institutions”. (Holmes 1993) The US
government decided to impose sanctions that went beyond the ones decided by the Security
Council, but important exceptions were considered and low enforcement undermined the
overall impact.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
In 1990, the United Nations decided to offer electoral assistance to the transition towards
democracy in Haiti. On 26 March 1990, a UN Technical Assistance Mission of Experts,
belonging to the UN Mission in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) arrived in Port-au-Prince. There was
also an OAS Observer Mission for the December 1990 elections (Malone 1998:51-53).
The use of force was contemplated by the USA and the OAS, but it was decided not to
proceed under that line as many Latin American countries were against that option, especially
in order to avoid the tradition of US interventionism in the hemisphere. (Malone 1998:68-71).
In early September 1992, an 18 member OAS civilian mission to Haiti was announced “to
help reduce violence and to encourage respect for human rights” (Malone 1998:74)
In term of the economic carrot, Malone lists the efforts of the OAS and the UN to launch a
multi-million-dollar joint Comprehensive Plan for Humanitarian Action in Haiti, with the
UNDP, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
involved in ensuring that proper funds would be available to the country upon the return of
Aristide (Malone 1998:81-82).
The diplomatic efforts leading to the GIA and to its following implementation should be
mentioned, along with the joint appointment of a UN/OAS special envoy Dante Caputo.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
The level of implementation is mixed. On the one hand, Gibbons laments the dreadful effects
of the embargo with a particular emphasis on the consequences due to the lack of fuel, while
on the other hand, Malone points at the ineffectiveness of the embargo as fuel tankers
continued to arrive at Port-au-Prince when the embargo was in place. The impact is treated in
further details in the following section, but this contrast of opinion underlines that the opinion
on the degree of implementation lies in the eye of the beholder.
The overall assessment of the implementation of the OAS embargo is daunting. “At least a
dozen countries in Europe, South America and Africa have routinely ignored a trade embargo
against Haiti… according to newly released US documents. Ships have delivered steel and
barbed wire from Belgium; beer, brewery machinery and tools from Germany; cognac, wine,
17
perfume and cosmetics from France; steel from Brazil; chemicals from Argentina; tires and
diesel engines from the neighboring Dominican Republic; steam boilers from Barbados; and
consumer goods from the Netherlands, Antilles, Venezuela and Britain. The documents also
detail the shipment of nearly a million barrels of petroleum from France, Colombia, Portugal,
Senegal and the Netherlands Antilles.” (Associated Press dispatch reproduced in the
Washington Post of 31 May 1992, cited in Malone 1998:73).
The OAS embargo “is often belittled as porous and ineffective because the OAS had no
means at its disposal to force member countries, much less nonmembers, to comply”.
(Gibbons 1999:10) Gibbons refers to Domingo E. Acevedo, “The Haitian Crisis and the OAS
Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Promoting Democracy,” in Lori Fisler Damrosch,
Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: Council
on Foreign Relations, 1993) to argue that the results of analysis of General Accounting Office
documents show that ‘at least a dozen countries in Europe, Latin America and Africa
routinely ignored the embargo and shipped nearly a million barrels of petroleum to Haiti.
(Gibbons 1999:113)
There is a discussion that a naval US blockade would increase the level of implementation,
(Malone 1998:70) and there are many tankers reported to deliver fuel to Haiti.
Similarly to OAS measures, the two main measures to ensure the implementation would be a
naval blockade, which was opposed by Brazil, and a UN mission on the border with the
Dominican Republic. Neither of them was taken. However, a Sanctions Committee to oversee
impact and enforcement of sanctions was established.
DIRECT IMPACTS
The UN sanctions lasted for about two months and the direct impact reported in this section
cannot be attributed only to them. There is also evidence that the OAS embargo also impacted
Haiti and it is worth to report on this in order to better assess the impact of the UN sanction.
As abovementioned, the OAS embargo had several impacts on Haiti. “The OAS embargo was
beginning to produce some effects by the end of October 1991, with fuel reserves down to a
one-week supply and electricity supplies less dependable than the previous eight to ten hours
a day” (Malone 1998:56). Malone wrote in note 56 that “by late October, some in the USA
were arguing that labour-intensive assembly industries in Haiti (overwhelmingly US-owned)
should not be completely cut off in view of the employment implications for Haitians. They
also argued that if these assembly industries closed down, they would never reopen. (there
was, as of late 1996, evidence to support this contention, but years ahead may disprove it). A
little-noticed US Executive Order of 29 October 1991 provided considerable leeway for
import to the USA of the products of these industries”.
According to Gibbons, the OAS embargo was largely ineffective in changing the behavior of
the military leaders, but had a ‘significant and immediate impact on the economy that
disproportionately affected its poorer sectors employed as low-wage, unskilled workers in
factories where they assembled component parts for export goods”. (Gibbons 1999:10)
From October 1991 to February 1992, 29,780 jobs had disappeared in Haiti; U.S. Department
of Commerce showed that between 1990 and 1992 exports to the US of Haitian manufactured
shoes plunged 96 percent, clothing 55 percent […]”.(Gibbons 1999:10-11)
The OAS included in the embargo the suspension of aid to the water sector, which led to a
decrease of potable drinking water output of something between 30 and 50 percent in the first
18 months of the crisis (Gibbons 1999:26).
18
There is a series of negative direct impacts of OAS sanctions. On 31 May 1992, Lee
Hockstader wrote in the Washington Post that “The combined effects of a seven-month US
ban on trade with Haiti, on top of several years of draught, are producing an ecological and
humanitarian disaster. Relief workers are warning of impending mass starvation, infirmaries
that are critically short of medicines are deluged with new cases of acute malnutrition and the
only thriving commercial endeavor recently is the export of boat people”. (Cited in Malone
1998:72)
The OAS embargo also contributes to high inflation. “[…] the complications of evading the
embargo sent the prices of imports soaring, including the price of fuel, without which
agricultural production could not reach the capital where close to 30 percent of Haitians (1.2
to 2 million) reside. In addition, although food imports (which in 1991 provided 27 of the
calories needed by the population) were exempted from the embargo, their delivery was often
delayed owing to the shortage of vessels entering Haitian ports.” (Gibbons 1999:11)
“In just two months, from September to November 1991, the price of a pound of rice
increased 22 percent, from 2.6 to 3.17 gourdes (or approximately 20 percent of the daily
minimum wage), the price of a pound of corn 21 percent to 1.79 gourdes”. (Gibbons 1999:12)
However, by mid-1992, the dilemma was strong. On the one hand, the maintenance of the
embargo as it was could have caused further harm on the civilian population, but on the other
hand, allowing for greater shipment of humanitarian goods in Haiti would have strengthened
the hold on power of the military junta. (Malone 1998:72-73).
Another direct impact was the increased mortality rate for measles epidemic. It was already
high before 1991, but it increased steadily to a 58 percent (from 38) in the first quarter of
1993. (Gibbons 1999:25)
The relatively short timing of the UN sanctions (a bit over one month) does not allow for an
independent evaluation of their direct impact if taken independently from the OAS sanctions.
The shortage of fuel caused the increase in prices of foodstuff and medicines in Haiti, and
especially in rural areas. (Gibbons 1999:24-25)
“In August 1993, almost two years after the embargo’s imposition, the price of basic
medicines remained stubbornly high: on the open market, for those unable to obtain
humanitarian supplies, penicillin and intravenous fluids cost three times as much as they had
in 1991, acetaminophen and antihistamines five times as much”. (Gibbons 1999:24-25)
The short span of time in which sanctions were implemented does not make a counterfactual
exercise on their impact too useful, but an interesting evaluation could be done on the nature
of the measures. Fuel was deemed to be key to the military junta to rule the country, but little
attention was given to the adverse impact that such measure could have had. More targeted
sanctions could have created similar diplomatic problems (i.e. lack of recognition, visa bans
to key supporters and family members, etc) and shed a light on the crisis in Haiti even if
sanctions did not have a wider economic impact. More specific measures targeting certain
financial transactions, the import-export of certain goods, and especially complementary
measures for violators of UNSC resolutions (namely, on the Dominican Republic), would
have isolated more effectively Haiti.
19
INDIRECT IMPACTS
The indirect impact in this first episode could be similar to the ones that will be reported below
for the UN sanctions: higher prices for food stuff and medicines, weaker local institutions and
weaker capacity of the civil society to organize a resistance to the military junta.
As mentioned above, UN sanctions remained in force for too little to have a real impact,
especially since the GIA was signed a few days later the entry into force of the sanctions.
EVASION
Both OAS and UN sanctions were evaded. “Scepticism over the effectiveness of OAS
voluntary sanctions became rife after three tankers docked in Port-au-Prince, one as early as
28 November 1991” (Malone 1998:70). Malone wrote in note 70 how this happened:
“According to a Baena Soares briefing of the OAS Council on 8 January 1992, one of these
vessels, the Caribou, was owned by an Italian company registered in the Bahamas. The oil
was sourced from Colombia but sold to a Panamanian broker with offices in Miami for
destination Freeport (Bahamas) and then allegedly re-sold when on the high seas to a Dutch
broker who re-directed it to Port-au-Prince. The complexity of this transaction underscored
the fact that without a naval blockade, it was extremely difficult to trace the sources of
sanctions-bursting. (Confidential Interviews).”
Other sources confirm that oil shipments continued unabated during the OAS embargo.
(Economic Sanctions Against Haiti; Friedman 1991)
There are two loopholes in this first round of UN sanctions. One is the lack of enforcement of
the embargo since Brazil did not agree on the establishment of a naval blockade, and the
second is the porous border with the Dominican Republic. An article published by the New
York Times in November 1993 raised doubts on whether the Dominican Republic was
implementing the embargo effectively. (Rohter 1993). Especially, trucks have been reported
to cross the Jimani cross point unchecked and only one out of six seen at the border did
actually arrive in Port-au-Prince. Although a confirmation is missing and Dominican officials
denied all the accusations, it is plausible to still consider the border between Haiti and the
Dominican Republic as a weak aspect of the embargo. (French 1994).
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
There are not unintended consequences recorded due solely to UN sanctions, but the
combination of UN and OAS sanctions commenced the process that led to two of them. First,
the capacity of civil society to organize itself was weakened by sanctions. Second, sanctions
imposed on fuel created the incentive to enter the smuggling business, which was obviously
exploited by individuals close to the military junta and by members of the junta as well. The
lack of supply of medicines and food caused higher market prices for inelastic goods, which
increased the incentives for economic actors in Haiti and for potential exporters to Haiti, in
spite of the embargo and potential violations of it.
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Direct impact
Unintended consequences
Decision of Cédras to participate Strengthening the relative power of
military junta in Haiti by weakening
in negotiations with Aristide
civil society
20
Indirect
impact
Higher price for fuel to run Increased price of medicines and
military equipment
foodstuff
EFFECTIVENESS
The first use of sanctions was effective in bringing the military junta back to the negotiating
table. There is evidence showing that the military junta was keen in avoiding the sanctions,
and Cédras was not convinced about the commitment of the US in restoring Aristide in
power, but the threat of sanction itself was not sufficient to signal Cédras about the
seriousness of the international community. The unanimous adoption of UNSCR 841 was
received by the military junta with a positive response to open the negotiation at Governors
Island. “The USA asserted publicly that Malval’s ratification showed that sanctions worked”
(S/PV.3271 of 27 August 1993, cited in Malone 1998:90).
In terms of constraining capability, UN sanctions did not have a noticeable added value to
OAS sanctions, but they contributed to an immediate decrease of capacity in ruling the
country effectively. The military junta was also forced to the negotiating table because it was
not expecting and not prepared for such measures.
In terms of signaling, it could be stated that the norm was articulated, penalties were
communicated, but it is uncertain whether the message was received or comprehended by
target(s). This would make the signaling dimension of sanctions relatively effective.
EPISODE 2
CONTEXT
Second episode (27 August 1993 – 13 October 1993).
The second episode consists in the period of suspension of the measures after the signing of
the GIA, from 27 August 1993 to 13 October 1993.
Sanctions were suspended, and not lifted, as the Security Council wanted to keep the pressure
on the parties to comply with the GIA. “The resolution allowed for immediate reimposition of
sanctions were the Secretary-General to report non-compliance with the GIA.” (Malone 1998:90)
The GIA was also supported by the New York Pact signed on July 16, which provided for a
political truce among the political parties in Haiti and the military junta in order to speed up
the ratification process of a new prime minister indicated by Aristide. The ratification of
Malval in office and the consequent suspension of the UN sanctions were the highest point of
the GIA, which were followed by an increase of human rights violations, by the continuous
intimidation of parliamentarians by the de facto leaders, and by the resistance of Aristide to an
amnesty that would include also non-political acts. Violence increased and led to the killing of
Antoine Izmery, a prominent Aristide supporter, on 11 September. On 17 September, the
UNSC threatened the military junta that continuous violations of human rights could be
classified as violations of the GIA. (Malone 1998:90). On 23 September the UN created
UNMIH, but Cédras began to oppose the GIA. On 29 September, Cédras lamented the lack of
implementation of the New York pact on the bases that the character of the Malval cabinet
was not in line with the provisions of the pact. Also Aristide was not keen in ensuring full
implementation of the GIA, as he authorized the amnesty only on 4 October 1993. (Malone
1998:91) By early October, also Michel Françoise, the powerful chief of police, declared to be
against the GIA. Both Cédras and Françoise decided to use the FRAPH, a paramilitary
21
organization supporting the military junta, to prevent the deployment of the UN mission,
which eventually led to the impossibility for the USS Harlan County to dock in Port-au-Prince
on 12 October.
“On 11 October, the first sizeable deployment of UNMIH troops – 200 US and 25
Canadian – was expected by sea. Upon the arrival of the USS Harlan County in Portau-Prince harbor, ‘attaches’ – the de facto regime’s notorious henchmen – launched
into a noisy dockside demonstration, screaming, ‘We are going to turn this into
another Somalia’ (which had happened a week earlier)”. (Malone 1997:130-131)
This attitude was condemned by the Security Council, so sanctions were reimposed on
October 13 1993.
The campaign of violence against Lavalas’ supporters during the suspension of the sanctions
is another element that contributed to convince the international community about the real
intention of the military junta. The reign of terror was also confirmed by the killing of
relevant people, such as the Justice Minister, Guy Malary, who was gunned down on 14
October. “Buried along with Malary were the last hopes for implementing the Governors
Island agreement”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:94)
On 16 October, resolution 875 was approved by the Security Council strengthening the
measures with the establishment of a naval blockade.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
Sanctions would have been suspended when Aristide and Cédras appointed a new prime
minister. The Haitian parliament accepted the nominee of Robert Malval on 25 August, and
the Security Council suspended sanctions on 27 August with Resolution 861. (Swindells
1996:1920)
“The Governors Island Agreement was signed on 3 July 1993, […] but its implementation
proved problematic. Despite the appointment and ratification of a new Prime Minister, Robert
Malval, in July 1993, leading to the suspension of sanctions through UNSCR 861 of 27
August, neither Aristide nor the de factos showed much enthusiasm for upholding their other
commitments. Aristide was slow to submit a reasonable amnesty decree to parliament.
Meanwhile, the military increased repression, culminating in the assassination of Antoine
Izmery, a prominent Aristide supporter, on 11 September. Nevertheless, the UN pressed on.
On 23 September, the UNSC approved deploying the 700 military and 600 police personnel
of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Fifty Canadians and 30 Americans UNMIH
staff soon arrived in Port-au-Prince. (Malone 1997:130)
The UN decided to send UN personnel to lay the groundwork for UNMIH and to modernize
the Haitian armed forces. “By September of that year, the situation in Haiti deteriorated
rapidly as the violence increased. On September 17, 1993, the President of the Security
Council made a statement condemning the violence and recalling that, should the Secretary
General feel it was necessary to re-impose sanctions because of serious noncompliance with
the Agreement, the SC was prepared to do so”. (Swindells 1996:1920-1921)
POLITICAL WILL
The political consensus in this phase was broad in the international community, as the
suspension of the measure was voted unanimously, but the inter-agency wrangle over the
return of Aristide in Washington undermined the credibility of the implementation process of
22
the GIA.
The sanctions were suspended according to the time table set up in the GIA, namely with the
ratification of the new Prime Minister Malval. On 31 August, the UNSC passed Resolution
862 authorizing the dispatch of a UN mission to Haiti. After the deterioration of the human
rights situation in the country, the US, France and Spain called for a full and immediate
deployment of UNMIH. The arrival of the first soldiers escalated the tension that led to the
reimposition of sanctions.
The inter-agency disagreement in Washington regarded two main points. First, there were
agencies (i.e. the CIA) that were operating to undermine the credibility of Aristide. These
efforts undermined the activity of those in Washington who were working for the return of
Aristide to Port-au-Prince. (Malone 1998: 94-97; Von Hippel 2000: 99) Second, the decision
to avoid further casualties after the events in Mogadishu of 3 October led the US to respond
firmly to the Haitian opposition to the deployment of UNMIH. This underlined the lacking
political will of the US in ensuring the return of Aristide. Finally, the deployment itself (i.e.
timing, size, etc) was the product of discussions among UN members as well as in
Washington. The SC reacted quite quickly to the deteriorating human rights conditions in
Haiti with the deployment of UNMIH, but state members did not succeed in making sure that
the deployment took place properly.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The decision to suspend the sanctions is to be seen in a wider attempt to coerce the military
junta into a negotiated settlement. UNSCR provided for an automatic reimposition of
sanctions in case of non-compliance with the GIA.
In terms of constraining, the suspension (instead of the lifting) kept the military junta ‘under
check’ with a Sword of Damocles on their action. The military junta was limited in what it
could have done in their negotiation with Aristide.
Finally, the suspension signaled the Haitians that the UN was willing to ease the pressure on
the country with a cooperation of the local authorities. The same message went to the
international community, which could see that the UN was active on the return to
constitutional rule in Haiti.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
The main audience for the second episode is the military junta. As part of the carrot and stick
approach, the lifting of the sanctions intended to reward the apparent cooperation of the
military leaders with the signing and the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.
The lack of results and the deterioration of the human rights situation in the country
contributed to the re-imposition of sanctions.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
Sanctions are suspended.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
23
During the suspension of the sanctions, UN member states and other actors cooperated in
order to ensure the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. During the second
episode, the Security Council created the UNMIH and the first contingent arrived in Haiti
composed by 50 Canadians and 30 Americans, which would have waited for the arrival of
other personnel with the Harlan County. (Malone 1997:130)
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
Sanctions are mostly suspended as agreed with the UN.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
The main other policy instrument discussed in this phase is the deployment of a UN mission
to Haiti. “The escalating violence in Port-au-Prince led several UNSC members, including the
USA, France, and Spain, to call for urgent dispatch to Haiti of the full UNMIH” (Malone
1998:90). “On 31 August 1993, the UNSC adopted SCR 862, approving the dispatch of a
small team to assess requirements for the UN Mission in Haiti forseen in the GIA, UNMIH”
(Malone 1998:90).
The advance team recommended to extend the military numbers of the UN Mission from 560
to 700, but confirmed the number of police at 600. The mission was approved on 23
September by SCR 867 to be deployed within 75 days. (Malone 1998:91)
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
Sanctions were suspended by the Security Council.
DIRECT IMPACTS
The suspension of the measure triggered the military junta to rush in the preparation for future
rounds of sanctions. These efforts went in two directions. First, there was an attempt to
accumulate resources likely to be targeted, such as fuel and weapons.
Second, the tension was increased by the military junta to create the best environment to them
upon the return of Aristide. More human rights violations are reported in September than in
the previous months, and targeted assaults led also to the murderer of prominent Aristide
supporters (11 September) and colleagues (14 October Guy Malary was killed).
“Amid nervousness over the return of Aristide, the human rights situation in Haiti deteriorated
sharply. On 17 September, the UNSC issued a strongly worded statement deploring
‘the recent upsurge in violence in Haiti, particularly the events of 11 and 12 September,
when at least a dozen people were assassinated, including a prominent supporter of
President Aristide during a church service… The Council will hold the Haitian military
and security authorities personally responsible for the safety of all United Nations
personnel in Haiti’ (Cited in Malone 1998:90).
Once again, the losers seemed to be the weaker Haitians, which were less prepared to resist
long-term sanctions. This also confirms that the direct impact of sanctions could be due more
to the way in which the military junta was ruling the country rather than to the type of
measures themselves.
24
INDIRECT IMPACTS
The suspension of sanctions had direct impact only.
EVASION
Sanctions were suspended; therefore no evasion technique was necessary.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The military junta used the temporary lifting of the embargo to stockpile resources and to
prepare the resistance for re-imposition.
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Direct impact
Partial
improvement
of Increase human rights violations and
humanitarian conditions due to made easy for the military junta to
discover Aristide’s supporters who
sanctions
came public in the process
Indirect
impact
Partial deployment of UNMIH
Weaken position of civil society
EFFECTIVENESS
Sanctions were suspended, and not lifted, with the explicit clause of being reimposed in case
the GIA was not fulfilled. The objective was to favor the implementation of the GIA
agreement, which derailed in late September. However, this does not set sanctions as
unsuccessful. Indeed, the coercive nature of sanctions was directed mainly at the military
junta, but the GIA was signed also by Aristide and there have been accusation of little
willingness on the parties’ side to implement the GIA. Pezzullo said it openly in 1993, when
he declared that both Aristide and Cédras undermined the agreement. Pezzullo also added that
“in the final analysis, the responsibility for bringing Haiti together is Haitian. All the
international community can do is use economic bludgeons, such as sanctions, to cajole, to be
ready to come in with assistance, with advice, and with help, even to intervene, but it cannot
resolve fundamental internal issues.” (cited in Malone 1998: 95)
This statement classifies sanctions as partially successful in bringing the Haitian parties to the
negotiating table, but the responsibility of the resurgence of military conflict seems to be on
the Haitian parties.
The will of the military junta was under question, as “they [the military leaders] would accept
a return to constitutional forms only if they retained much of their power behind a democratic
façade: their parliamentary allies were skilled at designing such façades, but they could not
conceal the reality of overwhelming popular support for Aristide and repudiation of any who
recognized the coup”. (Ian 1999:731) The actors that pushed for a general amnesty were
considered as ‘realistic’, (Ian 1999:728) as no alternatives were expected by a military junta in
control of Haiti through the wide adoption of brutal force. During the second episode, it
became clearer and clearer that the military leaders were not willing to compromise on their
positions of power.
The Governors Island Agreement was seen by the military junta as an acceptable compromise
25
to them, but “If they were prepared to envisage Aristide’s return at all, it was a far distant
prospect, and their leaders had no intention of leaving – rather than merely sharing – power”.
(Ian 1999:715)
The constraint determined by sanctions was to limit the alternatives available to Cédras, but
the lack or arguable compliance of the GIA by Aristide gave Cédras a strong argument to step
back from the GIA.
Finally, the suspension of the sanctions certainly signaled the military junta as the UN was
willing to negotiate and kept its word. Furthermore, the sanctions signaled the international
community that the UN was active and responsive to the changing environment in Haiti. The
norm was articulated well and the signal was received, which would explain the partial
collaboration with the military junta.
EPISODE 3
CONTEXT
Third episode (13 October 1993 – 6 May 1994).
The third episode began right after the USS Harlan County event of 11 October with SCR 873
on 13 October 1993 and ran until further measures were taken, which determines the
beginning of the last episode. “On 13 October 1993 the Security Council declared the
situation in Haiti a threat to peace and security in the region and adopted Resolution 873 reimposing the oil and arms embargo. This marked the start of the third phase of sanctions.
Three days later the Council passed Resolution 875, calling on member states to enforce the
fuel and arms embargo with a naval blockade”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:94)
Sanctions were re-imposed on 13 October with resolution 873, “reversing the suspension of
841 and allowing funds frozen pursuant to Resolution 841 to be released at the request of
Aristide or Malval. […]. The assassination of Haitian de jure minister of Justice Guy Malary,
in broad daylight on October 14, 1993 prompted Aristide to write a letter on October 15 to the
secretary General requesting that the United Nations strengthen the provisions already in
place under Resolution 873. On October 16, 1993, reaffirming its readiness to consider other
measures, the Security Council adopted Resolution 875, requesting that Member States
strictly enforce the sanctions called for by Resolution 841 and 873”. (Swindells 1996:19201921)
“Under US pressure, but with strong support from the other Friends, the UNSC ‘acting under
Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter’ imposed a naval blockade on Haiti to enforce the
sanctions”. (Malone 1997:131)
UNSC DECISION MAKING
The SC reacted immediately after the derail of the GIA process. The USS Harlan County
accident occurred on 11 October, and sanctions were reimposed two days later, with a further
resolution strengthening the enforcement of the embargo five days later (UNSCR 875).
As illustrated also in the political will section of this episode, further measures were
hypothesized, but they did not take place until the Spring of 1994, following Aristide’s
initiative in Washington. France (who drafted a resolution in January) and the US were in
favor of stronger sanctions, while the OAS and the GRULAC countries were against it.
26
(Malone 1998: 102) The discussion did not lead anywhere; therefore it is plausible to argue
that the SC did not act effectively in this phase of the crisis.
Alternatives were already in place and in the making, including the presence of personnel in
the country, the preparation of a peacekeeping mission only if authorized by the military junta
as well, and diplomatic initiatives to enforce the GIA. The military operation, which was
publicly suggested by Aristide in January 1994 (Malone 1998: 101) was not part of the
discussion yet, and it was probably due to ambiguous feelings within the US administration
towards Aristide and the recent events in Mogadishu.
POLITICAL WILL
The step of re-imposing sanctions was an automatic response to the failure of the Governors
Island Agreement, which was taken unanimously and right after the USS Harlan County
failure to deck in Port-au-Prince. The sanctions on Haiti did not represent a watershed in the
stand of the international community. Given the little compliance from the signatory parties
(indeed, both the military junta and President Aristide showed doubts about the agreement in
regards to the timing for his return and the terms of the amnesty granted to the military
leaders). (Malone 1998:71) However, “the return of Aristide appeared a secondary goal”.
(Malone 1998:102)
Further measures were threatened by the SC, but among the Friends, there were doubts about
the wisdom of further sanctions, particularly a total embargo. The humanitarian toll of
existing sanctions was heavy, with the poorest sectors of society being hardly hit. The US
Administration feared a backlash from the NGO community. Venezuela was not comfortable
with additional sanctions, which would do little to block the porous border between the
Dominican Republic and Haiti. France favoured additional sanctions as a political signal,
while Canada’s new Government assessed its position.” (Malone 1998:94).
“A period of ‘phoney war’ had commenced by mid-November, with the UN’s role seriously
undermined by the Harlan County incident, which led the de factos to believe that they could
defy the international community at a limited cost as the US seemed unwilling to adopt
decisive measures to back up its rhetoric on the need to restore Aristide. In fact, ensuing
months witnessed a significant build-up of US pressure on Aristide to compromise with the
coup leaders”. (Malone 1998:94).
The decision to impose further measures was postponed until President Aristide’s initiatives
in the Spring of 1994, and UNSCR 917 was adopted due to strong pressures from the US
government on other UN members. This is telling on the political will of the international
community in settling the crisis in Haiti, which, as written already, was deemed as an internal
matter by some of the P5 and other SC members.
A monitoring mechanism was also created and started to work in January 1994 in Haiti. It
consisted in a local mechanism to monitor the allocation of fuel for humanitarian purposes. It
was decided with UNSCR 875 and it was known as Programme D’approvisionement en
Combustible our les Activités Humanitaires (PAC-Humanitaire or PAC). (Swindells 1996:
1924-25)
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The third episode is determined by the acknowledgement of the international community
about the little willingness of the military junta to accept any real return to power of President
Aristide, therefore the sanctions, strengthened by the establishment of a naval blockade,
aimed primarily at constraining the capacities of the de facto leaders to rule Haiti and to
27
legitimate their seizing of power.
From this moment on, negotiations were based on a different goal than before: while the
involvement of the military leaders in power was previously considered along with the return
of Aristide, the situation changed and the objective was to remove Cédras and his supporters
from the management of the country. “The heart of the Haitian problem was that the military
could only be induced to relinquish power if they were left no other choice”. (Ian 1999:731)
In other words, while an agreement was possible before, the return of Aristide became
incompatible with the de facto leaders in Haiti. (Swindells 1996:1923)
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
The international community seems to be the main audience, to which the black caucus and
the Haitian minority in the United States could be added as their pressure was mounting and
will become determinant in episode five and six.
The United Nations could not tolerate the lack of cooperation from the military leaders, the
forceful seizing of power and the deteriorating human rights situation in the country, therefore
something had to be done to counter Cédras and his colleagues. The worsening of the crisis
caused an increase of refugee flows from Haiti to the United States that reached the media and
the wider public. The US had to deal with the problem and the American administration
renewed its commitment with the re – imposition of sanctions and the attempt to improve
their implementation.
The UN, and especially the US, had also to react to the loss of face caused by the clash in
Mogadishu that left 18 US soldiers dead. “The Clinton administration, still reeling from the
deaths of eighteen US soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, a week before, wanted to
avoid any further risk to US troops regardless of the diplomatic consequences. The
ignominious departure of the Harlan County was sharply criticized within the United States,
especially by members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who advocated a stronger US role
against the junta and were concerned that the incident would further embolden the military
leaders in their obstruction of the UN-negotiated agreement”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:9394)
The military junta was gradually losing its role of “audience’ as the hopes to negotiate their
departure from power were fading away. In other words, the primary audience of the
measures appears to be the domestic constituencies in the US rather than the military junta
itself. On the contrary, domestic groups in the US gained prominence and were determinant in
the following months to trigger the interest of the US administration on the matter. The two
driving factors were the flow of refugees from Haiti and the legal battle over the possibility
for the US to repatriate Haitians without screening whether they meet the conditions of
refugees. Secondarily, the Black Caucus became sensitive to the human rights violations in
Haiti. The actions of the UN and the activity of the US in this phase should communicate
interest in the problem.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
The original measures imposed by UNSCR 841 were resumed and consisted in:
Prevent the sale or supply of:
-
Petroleum or petroleum products
28
-
Arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military
vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned
Decide to freeze funds in their territories available to:
-
The government of Haiti or of the de fact authorities in Haiti
Controlled directly or indirectly by such Government or authorities or by entities, wherever
located or organized, owned or controlled by such Government or authorities.
In addition to that, UNSCR 875 reinforced its enforcement with the approval of a naval
blockade and a precursor to what we would call today monitoring team.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
The reimposition of sanctions was taken as an automatic response to the violation of the
Governors Island Agreement. The diplomatic initiative was re-launched, and the international
monitoring mission was increased.
“A UNSC statement of 15 November called for intensification of humanitarian assistance and
welcomed the Secretary-General’s decision to reinforce the UN’s humanitarian personnel in
Haiti. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) that month developed a
proposal under which the UN Sanctions Committee charged with enforcing SCR 841 would
exempt shipments of oil tied directly to humanitarian deliveries, with the cost of the fuel met
from an international trust fund. The well-received proposal envisaged coordination and
supervision of the plan by the UN. Ultimately, the Pan-American Health Organization
(PAHO) assumed responsibility for the programme, which became effective on 15 January
1994 when the first shipment of oil was unloaded in Port-au-Prince. PAHO was already
involved in the distribution of medicine within Haiti and carried less political baggage locally
than the UN or the OAS. Contrary to expectations, the de facto authorities interfered only
sporadically with the programme.” (Malone 1998:99)
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
Little attention was given to regional organization measures at this point and only the US is
reported to have a set of unilateral measures on Haiti, but they vary only marginally to the
ones imposed by the US. The OAS did not adopt coercive measures of that kind. (Malone
1997:143-144, note 24)
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
No other tools, with the exception of the diplomatic initiatives of Dante Caputo, were decided
or discussed by the Security Council.
There was little coordination upon the reimposition of sanctions, but the result was the
departure of international personnel from Haiti. “On 14 October, Canada unilaterally
withdrew its police personnel from UNMIH. By 15 October, all UNMIH personnel, including
a final group of forty-six Americans, had left Haiti. MICIVIH followed a day later” (Malone
1998:92). Caputo remained in Port-au-Prince (Malone 1998:92) and “UNMIH’s mandate was
29
renewed by the Council on 23 March 1994” (Malone 1998:103).
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
The naval blockade was initially implemented by 6 US warships, 3 Canadian destroyers, and
by French, Argentina and the Netherlands soon to participate. (Malone 1998:93)
Before resolution 875 was passed, the US ordered “6 warships to blockade Haiti”. (Malone
1998:93). However, “The blockade proved little more effective than the earlier sanctions”.
(Malone 1997:131)
“[…] but the existing embargo was increasingly seen as totally ineffective”. Malone reports in
note 29 that “In an article dated 11 February 1994, Linda Diebel of the Toronto Star quoted
Charles Kernaghan, Director of the New York-based national Labor Committee as saying
‘what embargo? It’s a joke’, adding that goods were being shipped as usual to Haiti’s Military
and elite through the Dominican Republic for sale on the black market”. (Malone 1998:226)
There were also episodes of ‘forced’ cooperation of multinational companies with the regime.
“The humanitarian flash-point by mid-November 1993 was the distribution of Petroleum and
petroleum products within Haiti. On 16 November, the de facto Government ordered the major
fuel supplier to release stocks built up before the blockade. Fearing for the security of their
staff, the suppliers resumed sale of existing stocks. This development was described by Prime
Minister Malval as ‘another Harlan County’. However, existing stocks did not permit the
delivery to rural areas of the food and medicines they so desperately required”. (Malone
1998:98-99)
“In addition, at various time during the crisis, confusion over whether propane gas was or was
not exempted (it was) led shippers, fearful of being fined for sanctions-busting, to refuse to
deliver it to Haiti”. (Gibbons 1999:25)
DIRECT IMPACTS
The real evaluation of sanctions impacts begins with this episode four, but given to the fact
that OAS sanctions had been in force since 1991, it is difficult to distinguish between the
impact had by UN measures and others. Overall, sanctions stroke only marginally the de facto
rulers of Haiti as sanctions offered to them new opportunities to enrich personally, but as
sanctions undermined the institutional capacity and shook the overall cohesion of the Haitian
society, the embargo reduced the capacity of the military junta to constitute a viable
government and a viable alternative to the constitutional path inaugurated by Aristide’s victory
in December 1990. The losers of this decision were the poorer and the ordinary citizens in
Haiti, who shouldered much of the negative impact of the sanctions. In other words, they paid
the cost of sanctions.
The immediate direct impact was the increase in the cost of oil. “Within Haiti, acute petroleum
shortages developed when the international oil companies there (Texaco, Shell and Exxon)
refused to sell fuel at their pumps, worried about their liability under the sanctions regime. By
24 October, roads in Haiti were abandoned, black-market prices for petrol having reached
USD 15 per gallon” (Malone 1998:93).
Higher fuel prices translated immediately in inflation for almost any other goods, and the
increase of foodstuff price had the most serious consequences. “Much of the increase in food
prices, particularly after October 1993 […] was due to the phenomenal increase in
transportation costs. By the summer of 1994, a gallon of gasoline cost USD 10. At the same
30
time, the embargo on agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizer and seeds, accelerated a longterm trend of declining agricultural output; rice was particularly affected, with production 10
percent below normal for both 1993 and 1994.” (Gibbons 1999:12)
INDIRECT IMPACTS
Medicines and vaccines were covered by humanitarian exemptions, but the lack of vessels
entering in the ports of Haiti affected also the supply of these goods. The confusion of delivery
of propane gas led to the collapse of the national cold chain for vaccine refrigeration. “From an
already low 40 percent in 1991, coverage went as low as 12 percent two years later” (Gibbons
1999:25).
The delivery of food, obviously exempted by the embargo, was slowed down by the
mandatory inspections after October 1993, which led to shortage of food supply. (Gibbons
1999:12)
EVASION
The evasion techniques were based mainly on the exploitation of the border with the
Dominican Republic. Howard French from The New York Times reported on it several times,
but this emerges from the analysis of secondary sources as common knowledge in that time.
“The sanctions and blockade were foiled by roaring trade along Haiti’s land border with the
Dominican Republic” (Malone 1998:98)
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The decision of maintaining and eventually strengthening sanctions was made by Haitian
leaders outside of Haiti. Gibbons documents how this decision was not shared by most of the
democratically elected leaders of Aristide’s party in Haiti, as they feared that they were going
to cause a humanitarian disaster. According to Malval, sanctions “did nothing but worsen the
moral and material situation of the people who were at the end of their rope and also of their
hope”. (Gibbons 1999:43)
It also created confusion in the country, as some thought that the target of the sanctions was
Aristide’s government, and it contributed to triggering the rally-around-the-flag-effect by
radicalizing the right. “The paramilitary organization FRAPH, created to frustrate
implementation of Governors Island Accord, exploited the poor’s struggle with life under the
embargo to gain recruits.” (Gibbons 1999:45)
A further unintended consequence of sanctions was that the military junta felt less constrained
in using force to control the society and to justify further human rights violations. “Violence
continued unabated in Haiti. On 26 December, the burned and mutilated body of Paul Issa,
Treasurer of FRAPH, was discovered in Port-au-Prince. On 27 December, a fire broke out in
Cité Soleil, a Port-au-Prince stronghold of Aristide supporters, destroying 200 homes and
claiming at least 3 lives”. (Malone 1998:100)
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Direct impact
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Reduce availability of gasoline
Increase costs of transports, which
caused higher prices of goods
31
Indirect
impact
Reduced support for the military Reduced capacity to resist and organize
against the military junta of the civil
junta of key groups in Haiti
society
EFFECTIVENESS
The imposition of constraining measures reduced the possibilities for the de facto rulers to
establish their firm and legitimate control on the country. In these terms, sanctions were partially
successful. However, the lack of enforcement of the measures in Haiti contributed to lower the toll
paid by the military leaders leaving the pressure on innocent Haitians untouched. As a matter of fact,
sanctions created a strain on the economy of Haiti, but it also had counterproductive effects
that strengthened the position of the military junta in power. This would lead one to think that
sanctions were not successful, but lighter sanctions would hardly have led to better results, if
not to increase the likelihood of an agreement that would have legitimized a non-democratic
change of government in Haiti.
The coercive expectations of this measure were not met. The military junta was asked to
leave the country and they were not given guarantees that they would not face prosecution and
jail upon the return of Aristide, so why should they have left their post voluntarily?
The signaling dimension can be considered quite successful. The signal was sent and the
norm articulated, even if the signal did not reach the ears of the military junta.
Unconstitutional changes of government could not be easily tolerated. Finally, the UN needed
to react to the killing of 18 marines in Mogadishu and had to re-establish its credibility with a
firm action after the USS Harlan County accident.
Alternatives to sanctions do not seem to have offered better results, sanctions appeared to be a
mandatory step for the credibility of the international community that would have allowed for
the escalation of the diplomatic efforts.
EPISODE 4
CONTEXT
Fourth episode (6 May 1994 – 31 July 1994).
The fourth episode of sanctions began with SCR 917 on 6 May 1994 and ended with the
decision to use force to deal with the democratic crisis in Haiti. The growing pressure coming
from the Black Caucus imposed a pressure on the US administration that could not be
avoided. This mechanism was triggered by President Aristide, when he declared that the
treaty between Haiti and the US that disciplining the repatriation of Haitian refugees would
have been revised unilaterally. This triggered a chain reaction that increased the domestic
political relevance of the resolution of the crisis in Haiti and led to an increased pressure on
the military junta with the adoption of stronger measures on 6 May: “[...] comprehensive
sanctions against Haiti included a flight ban, a freeze on the assets of the military junta and
their supporters and families, and import and export bans”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:94)
The confirmation that this round of sanctions was different from the previous ones comes
from Ian’s article, where he stated that “perhaps this could have been achieved (departure of
the military leaders) by a serious determination to apply the toughest of targeted sanctions
immediately after the coup, instead of belatedly in mid1994”. (Ian 1999:731)
The requests of strengthening the embargo date back to November 1993 and it was Aristide
32
himself who launched the idea. “Whereas the previous Security Council resolutions sought
only to deprive Haiti of select goods, the Security Council changed its strategy in May 1994
and imposed comprehensive sanctions. On May 6, 1994, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 917, imposing comprehensive sanctions targeted primarily at the de facto
government and its supporters”. (Swindells 1996:1922) In reality, the measures imposed by
the Security Council with UNSCR 917 are among the most comprehensive ones decided since
the end of the Cold War, including the ones on Iraq and were not targeted exclusively at the
military junta.
UNSCR 940 contained a fifteen-day last chance clause for the military junta, but Cédras and
his colleagues failed to take it.
The measures remained in force until October, but the decision to authorize a multinational
force may change the role of sanctions in the wider strategy realized by the Security Council.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
The decision to impose further sanctions, and especially a comprehensive trade ban, was quite
controversial. There was a wide discussion on whether to impose further sanctions in January
1994. France suggests further sanctions, but the US argues that exemptions of products
essential to the welfare of the Haitian people should be maintained (on which Malone sees the
attempt to maintain the exemption for US-owned assembly industries). (Malone 1998: 102).
“Caputo believed that new sanctions would not necessarily work, but that doing nothing
would be worse” (Malone 1998:102).
When the pressure in the US from the Black Caucus increased, the Security Council began
informal negotiations on further sanctions. “The Secretary-General’s approach and a new
draft sanctions resolution, both representing additional pressure on Aristide, were first
discussed in UNSC informal consultation on 8 March. The Haitian delegation had meanwhile
built support for Aristide’s position among non-aligned countries. Scepticism over the
miniplan was expressed by Brazil, Oman, and Djibouti because it was supported neither by
the de facts nor, more significantly, by Aristide, and was seen as departing from the GIA.
Brazil objected to any suggestion that the UNSC put pressure on Aristide. Further UNSC
private discussions on 10 March and 14 March focused on GRULAC resistance to the
miniplan and to the draft SCR and revealed such Council disunity that the draft was placed on
hold. Differences among the Friends were now evident, with Canada and Venezuela opposed
to the miniplan, the USA in favour, and France Straddling the two positions.” (Malone
1998:102-103).
“Aristide favoured force to deal with Cédras but was reluctant to call publicly for an invasion
of Haiti. Nevertheless, the Friends insisted that he formally request military intervention.
Eliciting support from GRULAC proved even more difficult. Argentina, since January 1994 a
member of the UNSC, had joined the Friends, and supported the forcible removal of the de
factos. Venezuela, however, was distressed at the prospect of the use of force by a US led
coalition so close to home. Within the UNSC, Brazil pressed for provisions circumscribing
the MNF’s mandate. Nevertheless, following intensive diplomatic lobbying [of the ‘Group of
Friends’] at the UN and in capitals, the Security Council adopted Resolution 940 on 31 July
1994 by 12 votes in favour and two abstentions (Brazil and China) [Rwanda did not vote],
despite formal critical statements from several Latina American countries. The text authorized
the use of ‘all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership”. (Malone 1997:132)
33
POLITICAL WILL
The political will of the UN went hand in hand with the one of the United States, as Haiti was
considered within the sphere of influence of the US and the other permanent members did not
oppose heavier sanctions in May 1994.
“This imposition of stronger sanctions was largely the result of a new get-tough policy by the
Clinton administration, which was under mounting domestic political pressure from African
Americans and other political constituencies. High visibility protests by members of the
Congressional Black Caucus and a strong desire in Florida and other key states to halt the
continuing flow of Haitian refugees into the United States quickened Washington’s resolve to
settle the Haiti crisis”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:94)
According to Malone, it was Aristide’s skillful use of the Black Caucasus that tilted the
balance of the Administration in his favor. (Malone 1998:104-105) In between February and
May 1994, Aristide was able to bring the refugee problem back at the center of the stage and
mobilized the leaders of the Black Caucuses that took a stronger stand towards the policy of
the Administration towards Haiti. On the one hand, the refoulment policy was criticized, and
on the other, stronger support for Haitian legitimate President was requested. Clinton bowed
and “in his showdown with the Administration, Aristide had won”. (Malone 1998:105)
The refugee problem became unsustainable by mid-1994, and the US suffered more pressure
to take a stand. “Hundreds, then thousands of Haitian asylum seekers took to the sea: US
vessels intercepted them, and in clear breach of international law, returned them to Haiti
without any meaningful screening to assess their fears of persecution”. (Ian 1999:713)
“Aristide, ably advised by several US lobbyists, notably Michael Barnes, a former
Congressman, fought back, publicly describing the new Clinton administration’s policy of
forced repatriation of refugees as a ‘floating Berlin Wall’. The Congressional Black Caucus,
long split on support for Aristide, finally united behind its Chair, Kweisi Mfume, in early
1994 to blast the Clinton administration over its refugee and diplomatic policies on Haiti.
Aristide’s cause attracted support in Hollywood and from prominent liberal newspapers.
While the administration was still absorbing the increasingly strident representations by
Mfume and others, on 12 April 1994, Randall Robinson, head of TransAfrica and very
influential with Black Caucus, launched a well-publicized hunger strike against the
administration’s policy of forced repatriation of Haitian boatpeople. He described the policy
as ‘cruel, patently discriminatory and… profoundly racist’”. (Malone 1997:131-132)
Under heavy fire, the balance within the US administration was tilted towards a more resolute
stand against the military junta. “Clinton’s motivation to seek a rapid solution became all the
greater when he reneged on his pledge to end the return without screening of Haitian refugees
fleeing by boat; his embarrassment required him to promise an early return to democracy and
an end to political repression”. (Ian 1999:715)
The decision at the UN was therefore the product of a long negotiation among actors with
different interests. This is proven by the voting record of UNSCR 840, which was approved
by 12 votes in favour and two abstentions (Brazil and China) [Rwanda did not vote], despite
formal critical statements from several Latina American countries. Despite the disagreements,
the text authorized the use of ‘all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the
military leadership”. (Malone 1997:132)
34
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The fifth sanctions episode is mainly of a constraining type. It was clear that the military
leaders did not intend to leave their posts, therefore more stringent sanctions were imposed in
order to increase the economic hardship on the state.
Signals were sent, but it is evident how from the fourth phase on, the main objective became
to change the regime in Haiti, therefore constraining became the main purpose. Moreover,
even if the duties of the Sanctions Committee were expanded to verify Member States’
compliance with the measures, both UNSCR 917 and UNSCR 841 “did not mention the need
to monitor the impact of sanctions on Haiti”. (Swindells 1996:1923)
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
Internal US constituencies were at the origin of the strengthening of the sanctions in May
1994. The pressures by African Americans, other political constituencies, high visibility
protests by Members of the Congressional Black Caucus and a strong desire in Florida to have
the refugee flows halted were enough to push the Administration to “get tough” about Haiti.
(Cortright and Lopez 2000:94) “Other reasons not cited by the Administration but equally
important included Randall Robinsons’ hunger strike, which embarrassed Clinton and
demands by the Congressional Black Caucus, as well as pressure exerted by representatives of
the 1.5 million Haitian-Americans”. (Von Hippel 2000:103)
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
The measures approved with UNSCR 917 resemble very closely what we would call
comprehensive sanctions, namely measures aiming indiscriminately to weaken the economy of
an entire country/society without too much care for their humanitarian consequences.
The measures included:
-
Ban on aircrafts from and to Haiti, with the exception of regularly scheduled
commercial passenger flights;
-
Travel ban on Haitian military officers, including the police and their immediate
families, on the major participant of the coup d’état of 1991 and their immediate
families, and on related individuals;
-
Freeze of the funds of the individuals identified above;
-
Trade embargo on all commodities and products originating in Haiti (several
exceptions are considered for medical purposes and foodstuffs, commodities and
products for essential humanitarian needs; petroleum or petroleum products, including
propane gas for cooking; information materials)
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
In early June, the Friends and the OAS met to suggest further sanctions on Haiti. For instance,
“they evoked the possibility of a ban on commercial flights and financial transactions. […] the
OAS […] affirmed the urgent need to suspend commercial flights, freeze assets belonging to
35
the country’s rulers, and ban financial transactions”. (Malone 1998:106)
In the meantime, “On July 11, 1994, the de facto government, defying the United Nations and
the international community at large, ordered the MICIVIH to leave”. (Swindells 1996:1923)
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
While the UN was strengthening its sanctions on Haiti, the United States Executive Order
12920 imposed a ban on financial transactions and on commercial flights between Haiti and
the United States. Additionally, the US also cancelled visas of individual military officers,
pro-coup parliamentarians, along with members of Haiti’s wealthy and influential families.
The US went a step beyond, when “Washington also banned all financial transactions
between Haiti and the United States, a measure that affected rich Haitians, who could no
longer wire money back home. It was only at this point that the White House cancelled the
Bush administration’s sanctions exemption for US assembly plants”. (Cortright and Lopez
2000:94-95)
The US tightened the screw as well: “on June 10, Clinton issued an Executive Order imposing
additional financial sanctions against Haiti. On 17 June, the US Department of Transportation
prohibited scheduled passenger services to Haiti. On 22 June, the US blocked all US assets of
Haitian citizens resident in Haiti”. (Malone 1998:106)
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
The military option was still not considered seriously by the US and other actors, while it
became an option only in June 1994. (Malone 1998:105)
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
The main problem for the personal benefits of individuals of the de facto Government remains
the border with the Dominican Republic, while the naval blockade, overall, prevented big
shipments via sea. “On 23-24 May, ships participating in the naval blockade fired warning
shots at vessels attempting to run it. However, in Ottawa on 24 May, Canadian Foreign
Minister Ouellet recognized that the ‘total’ embargo of Haiti was, so far, largely ineffective.
‘The Dominican border is one of the best-known sieves’ he stated”. (Malone 1998:106)
There were attempts to improve the monitoring of the Dominican border, so on 25 May Gray
met with President Balaguer and they agreed on a US mission to monitor the border. (Malone
1998:106). Malone wrote that “this 88-person strong mission, set up at the insistence of the
US, was initially opposed by President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic, who did not
support Aristide. He only relented following the 16 May 1994 presidential elections in the
Dominican Republic, which were widely condemned by election observers and the
international media as rigged. The monitoring operation was overtaken soon after its creation
by Aristide’s reinstatement”. (Malone 1997:144, note 25) However, the mission was only
agreed and neither established nor deployed.
DIRECT IMPACTS
The evidence on the impacts should be added to the ones of the previous episodes as they
appear to be cumulative. Consequences are recorded in the number of industries operating in
the country as “[…] by January 1994, only 44 of the 145 garment factories operating in 1990
36
were still in business; and in 1994, only 8000 people were still working in the assembly
industries from the 44000 before the coup. (Gibbons 1999:10-11)
Haitians are still the most affected for the embargo in terms of job losses. “The OAS embargo
thus began a trend of layoffs that by the end of the crisis in1994 would, nationwide, terminate
an estimated 200,000 jobs in the formal employment sector, directly affecting more than a
million people or close to 15 percent of Haiti’s total population”. (Gibbons 1999:11)
INDIRECT IMPACTS
The main indirect impacts were documented in the previous section. The increasing cost of
transportation increased substantially the costs of medicines, foodstuff and charcoal, which
was used by many Haitian for heating and cooking. These effects created incentives to
embark on illegal activities to smuggle these products, a very remunerative activity given the
soaring prices.
The naval blockade only increased the scarcity of products, which was a multiplier effect on
goods prices.
EVASION
The Haitian border with the Dominican Republic remained the main source of sanctioned
goods.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The unintended consequences as well were documented in the previous episodes, and they
regarded mainly the decreasing capacity to organize against the military junta, further
incentives to embark on illegal activities for personal returns, and the structural decrease of
Haitian rate of alphabetization, which could have a tremendous negative impact on the growth
of the country.
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Direct impact
Lowering availability of military High humanitarian toll as sanctions
equipment and fuel due to became non-discriminatory and almost
monitoring of Dom Rep. border
fully comprehensive
Indirect
impact
The military junta became less Reduce the social capital of Haiti in the
prepared to resist a forceful medium-term
deployment of UNMIH
EFFECTIVENESS
Sanctions were constraining the capabilities of the military junta to operate in normal
conditions. As if it is true that the people in power were profiting from the black market
activities, it is also evident that the viability of the state authorities would not have been
sustainable in the long run. Sanctions did not prevent the military junta to function in the short
term, but constraining measures need longer time to eventually cause the collapse of entire
economic systems. Seen in this light, sanctions were partially successful in reducing the
options available to the military junta, more dedicated to find alternative sources of gas and
other supplies, rather than spending their time in ruling the country.
On the signaling effects, the result appears to be less effective as the military junta still does
37
not believe that anything substantial would change. “The de factos seemed determined to
thumb their noses at the new Clinton policy. In light of past swings in US policy on Haiti,
they seem to have believed that nothing fundamental had changed in Washington”. (Malone
1998:106). The signal was sent, but it was not received. However, the imposition of further
sanctions was a clear signal that the international community was willing to pay an economic
cost to solve the crisis in Haiti, and the short-term gain of the military leaders does not seem
to balance the advantage of the diplomatic options available to the international community.
Indeed, the military option entered the public debate in June, shortly after the imposition of
the measures, and it also became the option of last resort only after the strengthening of the
sanctions.
EPISODE 5
CONTEXT
Fifth episode (31 July 1994 – 15 October 1994).
Finally, the fifth episode of sanctions began with the approval of UNSCR 940 of 31 July
1994, which authorized the creation of a multinational force and the use of “all necessary
means” to restore Aristide to power. Sanctions did not change in this episode compared to the
previous one, but sanctions played a more marginal role in the overall UN strategy. Doubts
were mounting over the utility of a total embargo. The human costs were increasing “with the
poorest hard hit while the military and the elite were cushioned by stockpiles of supplies.
NGOs were going to complain for this, so that “Caputo and Pezzullo increasingly pressured
Aristide to compromise with his opponents”. (Malone 1997:131)
The military way was taken seriously only in June 1994 (Malone 1998:105) and it was
officially authorized by the Security Council with resolution 940. However, “At the time of
SCR 940’s adoption, the US signaled that no invasion was imminent. It still hoped that, under
the threat of US-led intervention, the de factos might depart”. (Malone 1998:110)
The de facto government may have understood this as a sign of weakness, so the situation in
Haiti was not improving. “On 26 August, the UN Secretary-General noted continuing serious
human rights violations and new pressures against foreign and Haitian journalists by the de
facto regime. On 28 August, Father Jean-Marie Vincent was assassinated outside the
Montfortain residence in Port-au-Prince by attachés. Vicent, a vocal supporter and close
friend of Aristide, was the first priest killed in Haiti since 1985”. (Malone 1998:110-111)
After that further diplomatic attempts from the Rio group and the UN emissary, Rolf
Knutsson, were turned down in August by the military junta (Malone 1998:110), it was
crystal clear by then that “There was no way the military would have gone peacefully unless
they feared that they would be removed by force, which in the case of Haiti could only mean
international force”. (Ian 1999:731)
The departure of the mission was announced to be imminent on 15 September by President
Clinton, and former President Carter left to Haiti on 16 September in a final attempt to
convince the military rulers to leave their posts in order to avoid an unnecessary resistance to
the arrival of the MNF. After the initial intention of the military junta to resist the
deployment, the information that the 82nd Airborne Regiment was preparing to take off
convinced them to negotiate their departure. (Malone 1998 :112) The mission was successful,
Cédras resigned on 10 October and departed with other military officers on 13 October to
Panama (while others, such as Francoise, went to the Dominican Republic).
The end of this episode as well as of the sanctions case of Haiti is determined by UNSCR 944
on 29 September 1994 and by UNSCR 948 on 15 October 1994, when Aristide returned to
38
Haiti. “Resolution 944 effectively ended the UN Security Council’s sanctions policy toward
Haiti”. (Swindells 1996:1924) This phase is characterized by the use of sanctions as a prelude
to the use of force, and regardless from the type of sanctions or their implementation, the
uncertainty of the future plays a crucial role in understanding the functioning of sanctions and
assessing their effectiveness.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
The use of force was “an option increasingly mentioned. The UN Secretary-General, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, with the UN still reeling from setbacks in Somalia and Rwanda, favoured a
US-led coalition, on the model of the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, rather than a
UN peacekeeping operation. The US government was initially not keen, believing the UN flag
to be essential for wide participation in multilateral action and also because Aristide was wary
of a US-dominated mission. Boutros Boutros-Ghali forced the issue in a report to the Security
Council, proposing a two-phase operation: a sizeable UNSC-authorized non-UN multinational
force (MNF) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, followed once a ‘secure and stable
environment’ had been established, by a Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operation”. (Malone
1997:132)
The crisis gained importance also in regards to the deterioration of human rights conditions
caused by both the de facto government and by the negative consequences of sanctions.
“Violence continued unabated in Haiti throughout the summer. The military may have believed
that Aristide’s enemies in Washington would scupper any effective action against them. Opposition
to the proposed invasion was growing daily in Congress, much of it centering on the
administration’s refusal to seek Congressional approval for military action. The clamor generated
pressure within the White House to act before it was overwhelmed by domestic criticism. The US
had recruited 19 countries, with a total of 2,000 troops, to join the MNF. The MNF did not include
Canada, France, or Venezuela, but it did feature Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Israel,
Jordan, the Netherlands, several Caribbean and Central American countries and the UK.”(Malone
1997: 136) The political will to solve the crisis materialized with the authorization of “all
necessary means” to restore the democratically elected government.
Before the arrival of the troops, the negotiation of President Carter was authorized by
Clinton and led eventually to the peaceful departure of Raoul Cédras and the other military
leaders.
“The US administration was pleased with the results of Carter’s mediation, which surely
spared many US and Haitian lives, but there was some resentment that Carter chose to act as a
free agent. At one point he admitted to being ashamed of US policy in order to reassert his
authority after rumors were circulating that the intervention had already begun before the
negotiation terminated. There was also controversy over Carter and Powell labeling Cédras “a
man of honour’, just after Clinton had publicly described him as a murderer. Aristide was not
pleased either because the deal signed did not stipulate that the junta had to leave the country,
as Clinton had earlier promised, and because it allowed Cédras to stay in office for another
month. Aristide was eventually arm-twisted into a public display of gratitude to the United
States a few days later. Meanwhile, the UN Special Envoy to Haiti, Dante Caputo, resigned
over the lack of consultation with him and the UN during the Carter negotiations”. (Von
Hippel 2000:104)
POLITICAL WILL
39
The pressure of domestic constituencies and the increasing problem of the refugees
convinced the US administration, which played a crucial role in the sanction case, to
pressure the Security Council to adopt harsher measures to reinstate the government in
Haiti.
The decision had alternatives as the use of force could have been postponed further.
However, the combination of US pressure plus the uniqueness of the case were enough to
convince Security Council members to authorize the use of “all necessary means” to allow
the return of President Aristide.
In this regards, Clinton was reported saying that: “In Haiti, we have a case in which the right
is clear, in which the country in question is nearby, in which our own interests are plain, in
which the mission is achievable and limited, and in which the nations of the world stand with
us”. (Von Hippel 2000:103) The use of military force was decided in July and this sets the last
episode for the case of UN sanctions in Haiti. Once again, the main motivator for this decision
was the US, and to the question “Why military force?”, Von Hippel lists seven reasons:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Haiti is in the US sphere of influence
Democracy was denied to a country in the western hemisphere
The refugee problem was threatening to overwhelm the United States
The US administration had suffered continual humiliation by the ruling junta since the
1991 coup
5. Human rights abuses were severe
6. Concern for US citizens living in Haiti, albeit a small number
7. The sustainability of the world order, as Clinton ‘claimed that the situation in Haiti
caused the total fracturing of the ability of the world community to conduct business in
the post-Cold War era’. (Von Hippel 2000:101-103)
The importance of the US in this phase is confirmed by the diplomatic mission dispatched
by the Clinton Administration only a few days before the arrival of the soldiers. Former
US President Jimmy Carter opened a negotiation in order to prevent fighting conflict
between the parties, which led to a peaceful departure of Cédras and his colleagues in
exchange for amnesty in other countries. For instance, Cédras went to Panama and he was
reported to run a computer graphic shop. While President Aristide was not fully satisfied
about this solution, it seemed a good compromise to limit the bloodshed and the
humanitarian consequences of a forceful removal of the military junta.
Sanctions play a less central role in the UN strategy in this episode. The discussion since
June is to refine the military option and to ensure that a renewed UNMIH will have the
possibility to remove the military junta with the consent of President Aristide. The first
problem is based on who has to participate in this mission. The US was keen in having a
UN led mission, while the UN Secretary-General wanted to avoid the problem of
miscommunication that took place in the former deployment of UNMIH (The Harlan
County incident). The agreement was reached by having a US led mission authorized by
the Security Council. However, Aristide was still reluctant in agreeing publicly with such
an option as countering the Constitution in Haiti. Plus, a second element for Aristide
consisted in whether the three years of his mandate spent abroad would have gained him an
extension of his mandate upon his return (on which the length of the UN mission depended
on). (Malone 1998:107-109) Once Aristide agreed with the drafted text, Resolution 940
was adopted by the Council (co-sponsored by the USA, Argentina, Canada and France –
but not Venezuela) on 31 July 1994”. (Malone 1998:109)
40
“In the debate marking the resolution’s adoption, Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Uruguay
criticized the text, making clear that there were no circumstances under which they could
support resort to Chapter VII of the Charter in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela indicated
that it was uncomfortable with Chapter VII action at this juncture. Brazil, in explaining its
abstention, noted that Haiti’s situation was unique and that action to restore Aristide could be
seen as strengthening democracy throughout the Hemisphere, but state that Brazil’s
Constitution and political traditions precluded support for military intervention now. China
harped on its attachment to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to the principle of nonintervention but did state that, once adopted, UNSC resolutions had to be respected. Canada
emphasized the lack of progress over three years towards a dénounement of the crisis, the
particularly distasteful nature of the de facto regime, the growing hardships imposed on the
civilian population of Haiti, and continued de facto non-compliance with earlier Council
resolutions”. (Malone 1998:109)
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The main purpose of this last episode remains the one to constrain the capacity of the
military rulers to establish a functioning state under their control and to force a return of
Aristide on them. While the process established with the GIA sought the support and the
agreement of the military junta in bringing Haiti back to its Constitution, the purpose of
sanctions is now to make sure that the military junta cannot rule Haiti anymore without their
consent. With the military operation being prepared, the purpose of the sanctions was to
support the threat of the military operation in order to send a clear signal to the junta about the
seriousness of the threat.
The signaling dimension follows the previous episode and it focuses on the international
community, primarily on those in the P5 as they are usually the highest contributors to
international missions.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
The audience in the last episode of sanctions was once more the military junta. As the military
mission became the preferred instrument of the Security Council to solve the crisis, the little
interest left to sanctions sent a message to the junta about the credibility of the option to use
force in Haiti. Especially the US had to do something to stop the flow of refugees, (Malone
1997:132) and the combined use of sanctions and military force intended to reassure both
domestic audiences and the Haitians on their resolve.
The Haitians supporting Aristide and Aristide himself were also the target of sanctions in both
episode 5 and 6. The threat made by Aristide to annul the treaty disciplining the matter of
Haitians repatriation and his commitment to lobby the Black Caucus convinced the US
administration that the time to restore the constitutionally elected government had arrived.
The ambiguity over the objective of the US was dropped and restoring Aristide became a
priority. Sanctions (and the MNF) were functional to this goal.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
Same as Episode 5, but accompanied with the authorization of a Multinational Force (MNF)
to restore Aristide to power.
41
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable
and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
The added value of this episode is the creation of a MNF to be deployed in Haiti. The
preparation started in August and gained momentum in September. “On 9 September, two US
aircraft flew over Port-au-Prince dropping pro-Aristide leaflets, and four days later, two
American warships hove into clear view of Port-au-Prince”. (Malone 1998:111). However,
the threat was still questionable as there is a fervent debate in the US on whether President
Clinton should seek the authorization from Congress to invade Haiti. (Malone 1998:110-111)
The military operation was announced by President Clinton on September 15, when “the
Pentagon called up 1,600 specialist member of the Reserve to support the MNDF operation in
Haiti. Asked when this military operation would be launched, Defense Secretary responded
‘soon’. By now, the USA had recruited nineteen countries with a total of 2,000 troops to join
American forces within the MNF. The MNF did not include Canada, Venezuela, or France.
However, it did include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Israel, Jordan, the
Netherlands, many Caribbean and Central American countries, and the UK.”(Malone 1998:
111) The peak of the mission (21,000) was reached within three weeks from the initial
deployment. (Malone 1998:113)
It is also worth noticing that Dante Caputo resigned from his post after this agreement was
negotiated as the UN and the OAS were kept out of the Carter mission. (Malone 1998:112)
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures,
Regional organization measures)
Expressing satisfaction on the operation Uphold democracy, Clinton announces the lifting of
US sanctions on Haiti on 26 September 1994. (Malone 1998:114)
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions,
tribunals, referral to ICC)
The coexistence of sanctions and preparation of military action was characterized by the
diplomatic mission of former President Jimmy Carter to Haiti days before the operation
started. “On 17 September, two days after warning Haiti’s military leaders to step down,
President Clinton dispatched a last minute diplomatic mission to Haiti, including former
president Jimmy Carter, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and
Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA.). With US military planes already in the air on their way to Haiti,
Carter announced an agreement with the de facto authorities”. (Cortright and Lopez 2000:99)
The terms of the negotiations provided for an early and honorable retirement, but “the
agreement proved controversial. Aristide was not pleased, particularly over Carter’s
kowtowing to the Haitian Military: Carter had described Cédras to the media on 18 September
as ‘honourable’and even invited him to teach his Sunday school class in Georgia. Aristide
resented that its leadership would now escape abroad rather than being called to account by
force. An Aristide press release, 19 September, did not even mention US efforts to secure his
return peacefully. Some NGOs also complained that the agreement contained no reference to
human rights. US officials did not defend Carter’s signature of the agreement with Jonassaint
and did little to hide their irritation with Carter’s repeated statements that Cédras’s dignity
needed to be respected”. (Malone 1998:112)
42
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
Efforts were made to improve the control of the border with the Dominican Republic. A
multilateral monitoring mission on the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti is
established in August 1994 (Malone 1998:131), but its implementation is halted by the
shifting priority of the military action coordinated by the United States.
However, since the international community had shifted the focus towards the use of force to
remove the de facto leadership of Haiti, the efforts of the international community to enhance
the enforcement of the measures decreased. For instance, the border between the Dominican
Republic and Haiti represented a weak spot of the sanctions regime, so the UN was
negotiating with the government in Santo Domingo in order to have the border patrolled and
secured, but the agreement did not enter into force due to the imminent military operation.
Therefore, the purpose of the sanctions in the overall strategy towards Haiti was mainly to
signal the resolve of the UN and to sustain its military operation by limiting the military
junta’s access to resources.
DIRECT IMPACTS
Once again, the impacts recorded overlap with previous sanctions from both the UN as well
as other senders. The effects are often reported cumulatively, as it is the case for the increase
price of foodstuff. “In three years from September 1991 to September 1994, the Port-auPrince prices of these staples would increase 137.4 percent and 184.6 percent respectively”.
(Gibbons 1999:12) “Although price increases were less in rural markets, they were
nonetheless significant for a population increasingly pushed out of the cash economy: in the
final 12 months of the crisis, the price of a pound of red beans, another stable of the Haitian
diet, increased up to 21 percent in the provincial markets, where rice was available, its price
increased between 68 percent and 113 percent.” (Gibbons 1999:12) Finally, “the price of
powdered milk increased 283 percent from November 1991 to September 1994. There is also
evidence that the rate of malnutrition of children increased during the three years of sanctions
and by the end of the crisis even rural areas were as affected as urban ones. “One can infer
that by then the rural population had thoroughly depleted its resources”. (Gibbons 1999:23)
The production of food also decreased by the end of the sanction regimes. “Overall,
production of stable crops fell by more than 20 percent compared with the pre-crisis years. An
epidemic of Newcastle disease that, owing to a lack of animal vaccines, could not be
contained wiped out close to 40 percent of poultry stocks. Another well-documented cause of
lower agricultural production during the crisis was the ferocious repression in certain parts of
the country that forced farmers to abandon their fields. These developments decreased rural
income and further increased food prices.” (Gibbons 1999:12)
The fuel embargo had an impact on every aspect of the life of the Haitians through the
increase of transportation costs. For instance, although Gibbons claims that the health system
was poor before as much as after the sanctions in Haiti, “between 1991 and 1994, many
Haitians seeking health services […] could not obtain them, in part because the fuel
embargo”. (Gibbons 1999:26)
The embargo on specific components obstacle the maintenance of existing infrastructures.
43
The water system was heavily affected by the lack of maintenance, so the rate of water-borne
diseases increased (such as diarrhea) (Gibbons 1999:26) the conditions of the water system
was deteriorating, even if it is difficult to distinguish between the effect of sanctions and the
poor management that, as Gibbon acknowledges, could have started even before sanctions
were imposed. (Gibbons 1999:28)
Gibbons wrote that sanctions, in their entirety, undermined state institutions, local
government and the Parliament as they suspended financial aid to Haiti. Since 40 percent of
the budget of the state depended on foreign support, sanctions affected mainly state workers
and services. “With the cutoff of international aid, the salaries to state officials, technicians
and service providers were delayed for weeks. As the weeks stretched to months and the basic
supplies required to carry out their professional responsibilities dried up (to say nothing of the
transportation needed to get to work), public employees increasingly abandoned their posts in
search of a livelihood”. (Gibbons 1999:29) A similar argument is made about the role of the
Parliament, as Gibbons claim that had the Parliament been stronger, it would have been able
to funnel and institutionalize a protest against Aristide that had started before the military
putsch. (Gibbons 1999:35-37)
Gibbons attempts to evaluate the overall impact on the economy before, during and after the
sanctions, which suggests that sanctions had a detrimental effect on the economy of Haiti
(Gibbons 1999: 96):
The increased monitoring activity, both in international waters and along the Dominican
border, presumably reduced the military capacities of the military junta to present a credible
44
resistance to a forceful deployment of UNMIH, which would open the question of what would
have happened if the USS Harlan Country crew had used force in October 1993.
The counterfactual exercise of this section can be summarized here for the five episodes. Not
imposing sanctions would have very likely reduced the humanitarian toll on Haitians, but it is
unlikely that economic growth would have replaced the economic devastation that Gibbons
has reported from 1991 to 1994. Alternatives to sanctions would not have gathered enough
attention from the international community and exercised strong pressure on the military
junta, and any lighter response to an unconstitutional change of government would have given
the impression that the UN (and the international community) could tolerate potential
recurrences of such events. The norm was announced with the Santiago declaration and
established by the UNSCRs that called for the return of Aristide to Haiti. Furthermore, the
crisis in Haiti had profound internal roots, and it is unlikely that external forces could play a
determinant role in the long term.
INDIRECT IMPACTS
There are a number of indirect consequences that sanctions had on the Haitians, but it is
difficult to discern among the different episodes. For instance, the main cause of malnutrition
was the absence of maternal care. Basically, mothers had to go farther afield in search of
income, which kept them away for longer period from their homes (Gibbons 1999:24). “The
international sanctions further reduced both the outreach and the effectiveness of the state and
its institutions of governance, complicating an already difficult ‘return to democracy’ […]. At
the end of the crisis in 1994, the state infrastructure was even more dilapidated than it had
been in 1991, its human resources depleted and demoralized.” (Gibbons 1999:31)
EVASION
The evasion was documented already in the previous episodes as members of the de facto
government were accused of profiting from the management of the black market for products
that were banned (but also that were lacking) by the sanctions. To this, it can be added that
“For much of August, the de facto authorities sequestered the emergency fuel supplies for the
PAHO programme”. (Malone 1998:111)
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Due to sanctions, the economy of Haiti started to become more independent from the
international environment, which consequently helped the military junta to maintain its hold
on power as they remained the strongest actor in the country.
“Indeed, unwittingly, by creating economic hardship, the international community facilitated
the military’s work: a population forced to be on the move, whether for political or economic
reasons, is not a population that can mount an organized resistance. In more specific terms,
the sanctions, notably the fuel embargo, were designed and implemented without respect for
protecting the right to work, to education, to a decent standard of living, to live with one’s
family, and to freedom from servitude, all included in international treaties the UN itself is
charged with upholding”. (Gibbons 1999:22)
Certainly, among these unintended consequences, the weakening of local and national
institutions controlled or participated by members of the national Front for Change and
democracy (FNCD), the party of President Aristide, is of primary importance. Gibbons
describes how the financial strain imposed on local governments reduced the possibility of
45
FNCD members to play a role and to foster consensus. In fact, sanctions had “the
unintentional effect of marginalizing elected local officials whose legitimacy is as great as
that of the President… These elected officials are thus left to their own devices in
circumstances which, already difficult when President Aristide was in power, have become
even more so since September 1991”. (Gibbons 1999:32 citing Michéle Oriol, Pierre Andre
Guerrier, and Danielle Saint-Lot, Les Collectivités Territoriales entre 1991 et 1993 (Port-auPrince : PIRED, December 1993) p. 73). Oriol added that “the international community, by
cutting off aid to local government, undermined the democratic legitimacy of officials elected
to those offices, at least in the eyes of the voters.” (Gibbons 1999:33) “[…] it seems both
absurd and legally questionable for the United Nations to apply measures that actually help
the party undermining international security, while harming those against whom the worst
human rights violations are being committed. Yet this is the effect of the sanctions regime
imposed against Haiti”. (Gibbons 1999:38)
Gibbons talks about the ‘Increasing opportunities for political control and repression’. As it
had happened in Iraq, the military junta needed only to keep the people on the brink of
starvation in order to keep them busy to look for food and not preoccupied with the political
life of Haiti. Furthermore, “the Haitian army, by seizing control of the black market in
embargoed goods, especially fuel, was also able to realize huge windfall profits, creating a
strong, perverse incentive to continue sanctions”. (Gibbons 1999:38)
Unintended consequences were registered in limiting the capabilities of media to operate due
to shortages of electricity supply. Gibbons claim that radios were allowed to operate and to
lightly criticize the military junta, but the lack of fuel did not allow them to work for 24 hours
per day. (Gibbons 1999:40) “Although Security Council Resolution 917 of May 6, 1994,
specifically exempted informational material from the sanctions, the trade embargo in effect
since October 1991 had reduced the supply and increased the cost of batteries.” (Gibbons
1999:41) Gibbons reports Boutros Gali claiming that sanctions brought forth “a mafia of
racketeers of all sorts, who gained enormous benefits from the situation and sought to have it
last as long as possible”. (Gibbons 1999:42)
The embargo also undermined public morality and social cohesion by forcing “ordinary
people […] into illegal activities like smuggling, black-marketeering, and prostitution.”
(Gibbons 1999:42)
The lack of fuel undermined the freedom of assembly right as traveling in the country became
more difficult, and likewise it became more difficult to organize a resistance movement.
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Intended consequences
Unintended consequences
Direct impact
Lowering availability of military High humanitarian toll as sanctions
equipment and fuel due to became non-discriminatory and almost
monitoring of Dom Rep. border
fully comprehensive
Indirect
impact
The military junta became less Reduce the social capital of Haiti in the
prepared to resist a forceful medium-term
deployment of UNMIH
46
EFFECTIVENESS
Gibbons’ evaluation of sanctions in Haiti is daunting: “Neither they [Haitian people] nor the
international community anticipated that sanctions would set back democracy by reducing
access to education, eliminating the middle class, and weakening the national institutions”.
(Gibbons 1999:29) While the international community assumed that ordinary citizens would
have blamed the government for their decreasing living standards, “it was UNICEF’s
experience that communities were very able to separate the legitimacy of the services they
received, thanks to international assistance, and the illegitimacy of the de facto government.”
(Gibbons 1999:30) Nonetheless, Gibbons to concludes that “the wisdom and effectiveness of
maintaining financial and technical aid to the Haitian Parliament during the crisis, as a means
of sustaining and strengthening a nascent democratic institution, remains an open question”.
(Gibbons 1999:37)
The costs in human rights terms overshadowed any other effects that the embargo and the use
of sanctions might have brought about. “For almost three years, international economic
sanctions against Haiti did tremendous harm to ordinary Haitians while achieving virtually no
political result… The white-knuckled negotiations in September 1994 between the Haitian
military leaders and the U.S. delegation led by former president Jimmy Carter… [ and the
former’s] remarkable intransigence in the face of overwhelming military force highlights the
fact that economic sanctions would almost certainly never have driven them out…” (Thomas
Carothers cited in Gibbons 1999:74)
However, if sanctions are assessed including also the effects that they contributed to reach,
then a different assessment is possible. For instance, sanctions were effective in undermining
the capacity of the military junta to build up a stronger army, which would have represented
an important obstacle to the deployment of the MNF. The peaceful intervention was also
possible thanks to over one year of sanctions, which limited the supply of food, fuel, military
equipment and spare parts. Furthermore, sanctions were part of a larger strategy that aimed at
creating consensus over stronger international commitment in the country.
Sanctions were not sufficient to convince the military junta to negotiate their departure, but it
appears that the de factos began to consider leaving power only when US soldiers were
already on their way to Haiti. While it would be simplistic to assume that sanctions were
ineffective because solely the threat of force would have been enough to remove the junta, it
is plausible to say that the threat of military intervention was possible (and real) only after the
imposition of tough constraining sanctions. As briefly argued above, there were several
discussions on what would have happened if the Canadians and the American soldiers who
were arriving in Port-au-Prince in October 1993 had used force to achieve their mission. It is
difficult to state whether an earlier military intervention would have spared lives and human
sufferance due to one year of sanctions, but it was also difficult to predict that the military
junta would not have opposed resistance to an invasion, that the international community
would have accepted such a move without exhausting all the possible alternatives to it, and,
last but not least, the 3 October killing of 18 US soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu created a
very complicated environment for the US government, who was not willing to account for
further casualties in international missions. In brief, it seems that there were not the conditions
to use force in 1993 or earlier, and sanctions contributed to create these conditions in
September 1994.
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL
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In the following box you may add background or reference material that is too generic for
inclusion elsewhere in the template.
Selected Bibliography
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Benton, Leslie and Ware, Glenn. 2001. "Haiti: A Case Study of the International
Response and the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Crisis". Emory
International Law Center 16.
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Cortright, David and Lopez, George A. 2000. The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN
Strategies in the 1990s. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers.
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Gibbons, Elizabeth D. 1999. Sanctions in Haiti: human rights and democracy under
assault. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
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Ian, Martin. 1999. "Haiti: International Force or National Compromise?" Journal of
Latin American Studies 31, no. 3.
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Malone, David. 1997. "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study".
Survival 39, no. 2.
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Malone, David. 1998. Decision-Making in the Security Council. The Case of Haiti,
1990-1997. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
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Morris, Justice. 1995. "Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti".
International Peacekeeping 3, no. 2.
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Swindells, Felicia. 1996. “U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction Under Articles 41
and 55 of the U.N. Charter”. Fordham Int'l L.J. 20, no. 5. pp. 1878-1958.
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Von Hippel, Karin. 2000. Democracy by Force: U.S. Intervention in the Post-Cold
War World. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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Werleigh, Claudette. 1995. "The Use of Sanctions in Haiti," in Economic Sanctions:
Panacea or Peacebuilding, ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
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Zaidi, Sarah. 1997. "Humanitarian Effects of the Coup and Sanctions in Haiti" in
Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions, ed.
Thomas G. Weiss et al., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Newspapers Articles
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French, Howard W. 1994. “Embargo Creates ' Oil Boom' Near Haitian Border.” The
New York Times, 13 March. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/13/world/embargo-creates-oil-boom-near-haitianborder.html?n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Dominican%20Re
public (Accessed on 02.05.2011).
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French, Howard W. 1994. “Even Wealthy Haitians Starting to Feel Pinched.” The New
York Times, 11 June. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/11/world/evenwealthy-haitians-starting-to-feel-pinched.html (Accessed on 02.05.2011).
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French, Howard W. 1994. “Split Reported in Haiti' s Army, With Chief Urged to
Quit.” The New York Times, 27 June. Available at
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http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/27/world/split-reported-in-haiti-s-army-with-chiefurged-to-quit.html (Accessed on 02.05.2011).
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Friedman, Thomas L. 1991. “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate Chiefs of Haitian Junta”
The New York Times, 3 October. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/03/world/the-oas-agrees-to-isolate-chiefs-of-haitianjunta.html (Accessed on 02.05.2011).
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Holmes, Steven A. 1993. "Haitian Rulers Are Target of New Sanctions by US". The
New York Times, 5 June. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/05/world/haitian-rulers-are-target-of-new-sanctionsby-us.html?src=pm (Accessed on 02.05.2011).
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New York Times. 1994. “Lean on the Dominican Republic”. New York Times, 14
May. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/24/opinion/lean-on-thedominican-republic.html (Accessed on 02.05.2011).
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Rohter, Larry. 1993. “At Haiti-Dominican Border: Barrier or Loophole?” The New
York Times, 10 November. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/10/world/at-haiti-dominican-border-barrier-orloophole.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (Accessed on 02.05.2011).
Documents Cited
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Economic Sanctions Against Haiti (1993-1994). Available at
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_1997/Imposing%20International%20Sanctions
%20-%20March%2097/chapter2.html (Accessed on TBA).
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US Executive Order12920: Available at http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/executiveorders/pdf/12920.pdf (accessed 27 June 2010)
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