Assessing and Developing Your
Safety Culture
Steve Roberts, Ph.D.
Senior Partner
Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
Tel: 540.951.3993 / 7233
sroberts@safetyperformance.com
www.safetyperformance.com
© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2012. The materials in this presentation are proprietary and contain limited reproduction rights.
People-Based Safety:
Assessing Attitudes and Behaviors for Safety Leadership
Defining Safety Culture
There Are Numerous Definitions
of Organizational Culture.
 The assumptions, shared beliefs, and values people live by.
 Organizational climate, attitudes toward work, degree of
personal responsibility for work.
 Patterns of interactions, values, and attitudes from traditions
and
past practices.
 The nature of interpersonal and intrapersonal conversations.
 The “rules of the game” for getting along in an organization.
3
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Exercise:
Define An Ideal Safety Culture.
List characteristics of an ideal safety culture. Remember, a culture has to do with the
shared beliefs, values, assumptions, or expectations that form the “acceptable” practices
and attitudes within a work environment. Therefore, be sure to consider specific behaviors
and attitudes of people, as well as the environment.
4
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
Common Themes
in a Total Safety Culture.
 All employees comply with safety rules and regulations at all times.
 Employees continuously search for safety hazards.
 Employees take initiative themselves to correct safety hazards
when they can.
 Employees are eager to participate in safety-related activities.
 Participation in safety-related activities is promoted and encouraged
through respect and positive recognition.
 All safety-related issues are openly communicated. Fear of
reprimand or discipline does not inhibit discussions.
5
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
Common Themes Continued...
 Safety incidents are viewed as an opportunity to identify system
failures and therefore improve the system. Individuals are not
assumed to be, and are rarely found to be, at fault.
 Training systems result in all employees having the needed
knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform their jobs safely.
 All business activities are managed with a constant focus on
accident prevention and occupational health.
 All employees fully understand and appreciate the potential hazards
of the operations performed…
6
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
A Total Safety Culture Has Several
Dimensions.
LEADERSHIP
CONDITIONS
Are Senior Leaders committed to improving the
culture and do they demonstrate safety as a value
Does the physical environment (the
interaction of equipment, facilities,
procedures, and people) allow safe
performance
PEOPLE
SYSTEMS
Total Safety
Culture
Do people have positive perceptions
of themselves, their coworkers, and
the organization. Are they willing to
go “above the call of duty”
Do organizational systems support
the “right” behaviors and are they
consistent with organizational values.
BEHAVIOR
Do people perform the
‘right’ behaviors.
EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT
Are Employees Actively Involved in
Making Valuable Contributions
© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2011
www.safetyperformance.com
7
People-Based Safety:
Assessing Attitudes and Behaviors for Safety Leadership
Perceptions, How We Feel,
and How We Act
Why Should We
Measure Perceptions?
- Behaviors are based on perceptions.
- Therefore, whether correct or incorrect, perceptions
are each person’s “reality”.
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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How We Feel, Influences How We Act.
“Want-to”
Self-Directed
Excellent
Engagement
Good
Discretionary
Effort
“Have-to”
Other-Directed
Average
Participation
Time
10
© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2009
How We Feel, Influences How We Act.
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© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2009
Actively Caring Is
Influenced by Several Person States.
Self-Effectiveness
“I can do it”
Personal Control
“I am in control”
Optimism
Actively
Caring
Belonging
Self-Esteem
“I care about myself”
“I care about my team”
12
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
“I expect the best”
Measuring Perceptions Can Be Difficult and
Imprecise, But…
It is Better to Have an Imprecise Measure of
the Right Thing Than a Perfect Measure of
the Wrong Thing.
W. E. Deming
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Optimal Performance Requires Certain
Feelings and Expectations

Feelings of personal control
 Appropriate knowledge of the job/situation
 Understanding of not just “what” works, but how & why
 Confidence in skills/abilities/training
 Feelings of support from co-workers/organization/others
14
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2010
www.safetyperformance.com
Video
Optimal Performance Requires Certain
Feelings and Expectations

Feelings of personal control
 Appropriate knowledge of the job/situation
 Understanding of not just “what” works, but how & why
 Confidence in skills/abilities/training
 Feelings of support from co-workers/organization/others
16
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2010
www.safetyperformance.com
Take Home Exercise: Identifying and
Improving Safety Expectations.
List tasks or situations where you OR those you supervise
lack control, knowledge, skills or support for safety.
List actions you could take to increase control, knowledge,
skills or support for yourself OR those you supervise.
17
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2010
People-Based Safety:
Assessing Attitudes and Behaviors for Safety Leadership
Measuring Safety Culture
Safety Culture Assessments Utilize
Multiple Tools and Strategies.
1. Safety Culture Surveys
2. Structured Group Interviews
3. Safety Management Systems Assessment (e.g.,
Leadership Commitment, Incident Reporting & Analysis,
Discipline Process, Environmental Audits/Inspections)
4. Leadership Behavior Evaluation
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
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1) A Safety Culture Survey (SCS)
Serves Several Purposes.
 Identifies strengths and weaknesses in current safety systems
to help identify and prioritize areas of focus.
 Provides a means to compare performance against a
benchmark.
 External (overall, industry)
 Internal (cross-department, cross-facilities, oneself over time)
 Provides a performance metric of improvement initiatives
(through repeated administration).
 Opens lines of communication and build support for change.
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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A SCS Has Benefits Over Other
Information Gathering Tools.
 Gathers information from all or a representative sample.
 Committees, suggestion systems, and even interviews favor the
vocal minority
 Results in better information, as well as “empowered” workforce.
 Gathers sensitive information from employees in a
confidential manner (thus encouraging more frank, candid
responses).
 Relatively quick, easy, and cost-effective.
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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A SCS Should Measure
A Wide Variety of Issues.
 Management Support for Safety
 Genuine interest in reducing injuries (v. “keeping the numbers low”)
 Willingness to invest resources (i.e., time, money, personnel)
 Ability to balance safety with other KPI’s (e.g., productivity, schedule)
 Peer Support for Safety
 Personal Responsibility for Safety
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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A SCS Should Measure
A Wide Variety of Issues.
 Safety Management Systems, including:









Incident Reporting & Investigation
Discipline
Rewards & Recognition
Communication
Safety Accountability
Training
Behavior-based Observation & Feedback process
Employee Involvement
Facilities Audits & Inspections
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Care Should be Taken When
Administering the Survey.
 What Demographic Information to Collect.
 Position or Level (line worker, supervisor, management)
 Business Unit / Location / Site
 Department
 Shift
 Tenure
 Who to Survey
 Everyone (eliminate sampling error)
 Random sample – who, how many, and how
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Site S-SA 2000
46%
15%
38%
When Interpreting the Data, Consider These
63% Interesting
25% Comparisons.
13%
Particularly
60%
Norm
21%
19%
Plant Maint
Plant Prod
Mining Maint
Mining Prod
54%
16%
30%
X54%Survey Results:12%
2003
64%
13%
34%
23%
"Supervisors sometimes encourage employees to
Engineer Svcs
69%
6%
25%
overlook hazards
to get the job done."
71%
60%
Repair Shop
‘11
2007
Site S-SA
2003
Loading
Mgt
‘08
SiteMaterials
S-SA 2001
2003
HR
Accounting
Site& S-SA
2000
‘06
Unknown
Norm
Senior
Mgt
Wage
Plant
Maint
LineProd
Mgt
Mgt.
Plant
Wage
Mgt Norm
Mining
Maint
Wage
Norm
Unknown
Mining Prod
51%
74%
46%56%
53%
60%
50%63%
54% 71%
54% 69%
57%
64%
Engineer Svcs
Shift 1
© 2007 Safety
Repair ShopPerformance Solutions, Inc.
69%
69%
71%
7%
20%
15%
17%
15%
21%
20%
25%
11%
33% 15%
21%
38% 23%
18% 21%
30%19%
17%
16%
25% 33% 13%
11% 30% 17%
18%
12%
34% 13%
15% 13%
29%
23%
6%
14%
7%
25%
18%
21%
Organization
vs. Time
vs. Norm
Wage vs. Salary
vs. Wage Norm
vs. Mgt. Norm
25
When Interpreting the Data, Consider These
Particularly Interesting Comparisons.
 Look at the patterns shown by ‘sets’ of items:
 Employees should give feedback to peers for at-risk behavior…
 I’m willing to give feedback to peers…
 I do give feedback to peers…
Should
80%
14%
6%
Willing
78%
16%
6%
Do
66%
Favorable
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
24%
Neutral
10%
Unfavorable
26
When Interpreting the Data, Consider These
Particularly Interesting Comparisons.
 Look at the patterns shown by ‘sets’ of items:
 Production demands don’t override Managers’ concern for safety.
Organization
Sunoco Chemicals
Norm
Petrochem Norm
57%
15%
45%
28%
25%
48%
31%
23%
29%
 Production
demands don’t
override
concern for
48%
13% Supervisors’
39%
Maintenance
safety.
Plasticizer
42%
Material
Handling
Organization
Sunoco
Chemicals
40%
Laboratory
Norm
50%
45%
Plant Admin
Petrochem
Norm
51%
Other Admin
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
5%
53%
27%
66%
14%
25%
27%
75%
87%
24%
33%21%
25%
28%
13%26% 13%
13%
27
Care Must Be Taken When
Interpreting the Data.
 Look at “Favorable”, “Unfavorable”, and “Neutral” – don’t
focus on just one!
 When comparing scores against the benchmark:
 Understand the benchmark – does it represent “average” or some
other group?
 Remember the benchmark is a relative comparison, also consider
the absolute measure
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Relative vs. Absolute Comparisons.
Management Support for Safety
Overall Management Support for Safety
O7 04 PeN EMN MT Op Lb 1st Ad Mgt TC Ct H 04H PHN S
74 70 53
64
61 52 73 94 95 100 83 83 63 62
42 9
Site management seems genuinely interested
86 83 75
in reducing injuries.
78
81 72 85 90 98 100 83 93 82 79
68 9
Site management is more concerned about
keeping the injury statistics low than with truly 62 64 42
keeping people safe.
48
55
42
54 84 86 100 33 64 51 58
33 8
Work productivity and quality usually have a
higher priority than work safety.
66 64 49
59
63
47
62 94 86 92 67 70 53 54
40 8
Production demands do not override
supervisors' concern for safety.
68 67 51
59
64 51 64 90 84 92 67 67 57 60
42 8
Production demands do not override site
management’s concern for safety.
71 62 48
58
56 54 54 97 93 100 83 83 60 54
38 9
© 2011 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Understand the Potential Problems
with Surveys.
 Perception surveys can be influenced by:
 Mood, recent events, ambience, history, perception of how valuable the results
will be, literacy, language barriers, etc.
 Corrective actions include:
 Address language and literacy problems, provide appropriate ambience,
communicate plan for using the results and connect the results to safety
improvement
 It’s also important to conduct focus group interviews to add
clarification to the survey results.
 Survey tells us “What;” interviews tell us “Why”
 Interview random sample of the population (e.g., 10%)
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Compare Sites Across Corporations.
100
Corporation X Average (72)
Norm (66)
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
CRDA
OP Alumina
Aratu
OP Smelter
ECL
Lochaber
Shawinigan
Alucam
IPSF
ISAL
SJdM
Laterriere
Arvida
Lyne Power
Vlissingen
X
Site
EEQ
Dunkerque
Lyne Smelt
Kitimat
Tomago
Sebree
50
Dubuc
60 62 65 67 68 68
68 69 69 70 70 71 71 72 73 73 75 75 76 77 77 78 80 81
OP Outros
55
31
Compare Site to Same Site From a
Previous Time.
CompanyXX ‘11
Company
Company X ‘09
Company X ‘07
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Compare Sites to a Benchmark
(Norm).
Company X ‘11
Company X ‘09
Company X ‘07
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Also Consider Using A Customized
Survey for Specific Issues.
 BBS Program Assessment – 18 question survey
 Incident Analysis Survey
 Demographics include “have” and “have not” been involved in an ‘investigation’ during
past 5 years.
 Customizing / Adding to the Standard Survey
 Assessing Special Programs (e.g., “The new safety committee structure is an
improvement over the old”.... “The 360 Walk Arounds Help Reduce Vehicle Crashes”)
 Expanding the focus of the standard survey (e.g., Including questions on Health and
Environmental Protection in addition to Safety)
 Assessing the effects of organizational changes (e.g., “We feel we have come
together with a unified corporate culture after the merger”)
 “Home” Safety Survey
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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The Results of the Survey Should be
Used to Drive Change.
 Conduct focus group interviews to further explore problem areas.
 Assemble teams for problem solving
 Develop action plans and timelines
 Publicize survey results and next steps.
 Follow-up on completion of next steps, track progress using
activity measures, and communicate results.
 Repeat survey every 18-24 months.
 Warning: A Safety Culture Survey should not be used unless
management is committed to acting on the results.
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Improper Uses for
Culture/Perception/Personality Surveys.
 Hiring
 Firing
 Final Decisions
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Why? There are Differences Between
Knowledge/Skill Tests and Surveys.
 Right/Wrong Answers
 Ability to “Fake” Positive Answers
 Social Desirability
 Generalizing Results to Different Populations
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Predictive vs. Concurrent Validity.
Current Employees
(Who is typically sampled)
Target Population
(Who we are actually interested in)
Job Candidate
Current Employee
…Thinking: “I must score well
to get this job”.
…Thinking: “They Just want to
know how I feel”.
Findings
Findings
Scores =
Performance
Scores =
Performance
You Scored Like Our High
Functioning Employees – We
Should Hire You!
So, We Should Hire
People Like You!
Flawed Logic
Generalizing From Surrogate (current employees) to Target Population
© 2012 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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Predictive vs. Concurrent Validity.
Predictive Validity: The Way It Should Be Done
Job Candidates
(Not Hired Yet)
…Thinking: I must score well
to get this job
Hire Based on Existing Criteria and
Monitor Performance
Scores =
Performance
Scores =
Performance
Now if There is a Significant Correlation Between Scores
and Performance, You Have a Valid Measure.
© 2007 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc.
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2. Structured Interviews Are Excellent Tools
Alone or Follow-Up to Surveys.
 The survey indicates “what” people feel.
 Structured interviews help indicate “why” people feel the
way they do.
 Use the same demographic categories as the survey.
 Allow at lease 60-minute blocks.
 Interview a cross-section of organization.
 Keep the groups small (4-6 participants).
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
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Structured Interviews May Result in
Hundreds of Comments. But the Key is to
Find Trends.
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
41
Sample Trends: North American Sites for
Company X.
 Just-in-Time Inventory Process Creating a Bottleneck for Parts
 Incident Investigation Process Leads to Blame
 Confusing/Inconsistent SOPs Leads to Inconsistent Rule
Compliance/Consistency
 Insufficient Staffing Leads to Short Cuts
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
42
Sample Trends: South American Sites for
Company X.
 Production over safety attitude leads to risk taking
 Inconsistent Discipline/Favoritism Leads to Fear and Negative Attitudes
 Rosters/Schedules/Fatigue Creates Safety Hazards
 “Anything for the Company” Attitude Leads to Inappropriate Risk Taking
 Safety is Taken Home
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
43
3. Safety Management Systems
Assessment.
All safety management systems should accomplish their
primary objectives in a way that fosters a
Total Safety Culture.
- Employee
Involvement/Accountability
- Safety (facilities) Audits
- Incident Reporting & Analysis
- Leaders’ Commitment
- Safety Policies and Procedures
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
- Safety Committees
- Safety Communication
- Discipline Process
- Reward and Recognition
- Behavior Observation &
Feedback
44
Maturity Path Exercise
Description of the Assessment Tool
The assessment tool has four tiers (i.e., Beginning, Improving, Achieving, Leading), with each tier describing a
stage in the evolution of that particular safety management system. A brief description of each tier is given below:
1) Beginning
Safety management systems at the beginning level may involve several scenarios. The system doesn’t exist or if
existing, the system is woefully inadequate. If the system does not exist, there may be little or no effort to implement
the system, or even acknowledge the need for such a system. If the system exists, the organization has little or no
procedures or documentation for the system at this level and adherence to the system itself is inconsistent or
sporadic. Improvement opportunities are plentiful.
2) Improving
Safety management systems exist at this level, but they are deemed inadequate by a majority of personnel affected
by them. Procedures are in place and documented, but documentation is poor or adherence to documented
procedures is sporadic and inconsistent. Additionally, the system is perceived by employees to generally lack
effectiveness, thereby influencing poor support and participation. There is much room for improvement.
3) Achieving
Safety management systems are well documented and generally used in an effective manner. System problems
are identified and follow-up procedures exist that allow the organization to implement and evaluate improvements.
Adherence to the system is generally consistent and employee perceptions of the system are generally positive.
There is still room for improvement.
4) Leading
Safety management systems are extremely effective in addressing and minimizing variance. Embraced by all,
perception of system effectiveness, as well as participation and support, are quite high. The system is an exemplar
to organizations benchmarking for improvement.
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
45
incidents.
are performed on all incidents.
Path: Incident
and
Analysis
5. Analyses are conducted by Maturity
safety professionals
1 2 3Reporting
4 An incident
analysis
team is composed of members
and/or supervisors only.
representing a cross-section of the organization and
Beginning (1)
Leading (4)
includes individuals involved
in the event.
1. All but the most serious incidents go unreported. 1 2 3 4 All incidents (e.g., near misses, property damage,
injuries) tools,
are reported
a timely
6. No structured processes or techniques are used 1 2 3 4 Analysis
such asinevent
andfashion.
causal factor
. during the analysis.
charting and task analysis, are used as
2.. No formal incident analysis procedure exists or if 1 2 3 4 warranted.
A formal incident analysis and reporting procedure
one exists, it is vague.
exists and clearly defines when, by whom, and how
investigations
are to be
conducted.
7. No training is provided for incident reporting and 1 2 3 4 All
employees receive
training
in the philosophy
analysis.
and overall process of investigating incidents.
3. The incident investigation procedure is not
1 2 3 4 Investigation
The incident team
investigation
is consistently
leaders procedure
receive detailed
training
consistently followed.
infollowed.
investigation skills such as interviewing and root
cause analysis.
4. Analyses are conducted only after sizable
1 2 3 4 Appropriate analyses (with varying level of detail)
incidents.
are performed
all incidents.is on finding system8. The
focus of the investigation is on documenting 1 2 3 4 The
focus of theoninvestigation
the event.
level root causes.
5. Analyses are conducted by safety professionals
1 2 3 4 An incident analysis team is composed of members
and/or supervisors
only.
representing
a cross-section
of the organization
and
9. Analyses
often result
in identifying “who’s to
1 2 3 4 Incident
analyses
focus on determining
system-level
includes
individuals
involvedor eliminating them.
blame.” Corrective measures such as discipline
root
causes
and minimizing
in the event.
or “counseling” are common.
Individuals
are not assumed to be at fault.
Appropriate behavior-based corrective actions are
where
warranted.
6. No structured processes or techniques are used 1 2 3 4 introduced
Analysis tools,
such
as event and causal factor
during the analysis.
charting and task analysis, are used as
warranted.
7. No training is provided for incident reporting and
analysis.
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
1 2 3 4 All employees receive training in the philosophy
and overall process of investigating incidents. 46
Investigation team leaders receive detailed training
Here is a Sample SMS Summary Graph.
1 =B e g in n in g
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
2 =Im p r o v in g
3 =A c h ie v in g
4=L e a d in g
47
People-Based Safety:
Assessing Attitudes and Behaviors for Safety Leadership
Case Studies
Case Study 1
Safety Management Systems Assessment:
Incident Investigation Redesign
The Management Team Questioned the
Effectiveness of their Process.
?
?
Root
Causes
?
50
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
?
?
A Systematic Approach Was Used to
Study and Revise the Existing System.
 Assess current system.
 review current process
 survey employees
 benchmark best practices
 Develop revised investigation processes.
 Train potential members of investigation teams.
 Develop incident investigation field manual.
 Train all employees.
 Implement new processes &51evaluate.
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
We Assessed Numerous
Elements of the Current Process.
 Nature of Typical Follow-up
 Degree of Employee Involvement
Actions Recommended
(Analysis, Follow-up)
(“counsel employee or “discipline
employee)
 Background of and/or Training
Provided To Team Members
 Communication of the Incident
 Analysis Tools Used
 Communication of the Analysis
 Nature of Typical Root Causes
Results
Identified
 Completion of Follow-up Actions
 Communication of the Completion
 Generalization of Follow-up
of the Follow-up Activities
Actions
52
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
The Current Process
Revealed Several Weaknesses.
 No Employee Involvement during Analysis or Follow-up
 No Expertise or Training Provided in Psychology or Human Factors
 No Behavior Analysis Tools Used
 Root Causes Identified Often Included “Employee Action”
 “Counsel Employee” or “Discipline Employee” were Common Follow-up Actions.
 Communication of the Incident was Haphazard
 Communication of the Analysis Results was Haphazard
 Completion of Follow-up Actions was Satisfactory
 Generalization of Follow-up Actions was Infrequent.
 Communication of the Completion of the Follow-up Activities was Haphazard
53
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Survey Results
Highlighted A Revealing Pattern.
Blame...
Non-Hourly
who have been involved
in incident investigations
Hourly
who have been involved
in incident investigations
Hourly
who have NOT been involved
in incident investigations
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Very
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Very
Very
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Very
Very
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Very
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
54
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Problem Solving...
Survey Results
Highlighted A Revealing Pattern.
Wrong Findings...
Non-Hourly
who have been involved
in incident investigations
Hourly
who have been involved
in incident investigations
Hourly
who have NOT been involved
in incident investigations
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Correct Findings...
Very
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Very
Very
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Very
Very
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Very
55
Employees Felt Like THEY Were
Seen as the Root Causes of Incidents.
56
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
The Incident Analysis Process Was
Redesigned to Meet Two Goals.
1. Better determine the immediate causes and root causes
(including those influencing human behavior) which
allowed the incident to occur so effective countermeasures can be taken to reduce future injury risk.
2. Encourage the full and open participation of all
employees by eliminating any fault-finding, adversarial
atmosphere.
57
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
A Systematic Approach Was Used to
Study and Revise the Existing System.
 Assess current system and benchmark best practices.
 Survey employees.
 Develop revised investigation processes.
 Developed guidelines for team composition, roles and
responsibilities, group norms and ground rules, etc.
 Introduced new analysis tools
 Revised the notification/communication system
(pre-investigation and post-investigation)
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Incident Analysis
Team Training Course Outline
 Employee Survey Results
 Goals of the Revised System
 Steps of an Incident Investigation
 Interviewing Strategies and Techniques
 Factors Influencing Human Performance and Human Error
 Human Error
 Risky Behavior
 Analytical Investigation Techniques
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Unsafe Behavior is Often
the Result of System Influences.
At-Risk Behavior
Did operator purposefully perform
a behavior which
s/he knew to be unsafe?
Human Error
System-Induced
Human Error
Individual
Variance
No
Yes
System-Encouraged
Behavior
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Calculated Risk
Willful Negligence
Act of sabotage
Incident Analyses Must Look
For System-Level Root Causes.
 There are system influences on human error.





Task structure
Interface design
Training systems
Work structure and schedules
Communication systems
 There are system influences on risky behavior.




Formal and informal organizational reward systems
Social reinforcement/social influence
Work structure and schedules
Employee empowerment
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
What Risky Behavior Does This
System Reinforce?
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
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© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2009
Case Study 2
Supervisor
Accountability/Feedback System
Employees Perceived Low
Supervisor Support for Safety.
Perceived Supervisor Support for Safety
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Balance
Concerned
Review safetyproductivity and about wellbeing
related info
safety
vs. numbers
regularly
% Favorable
% Neutral
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
% Unfavorable
Privide
feedback
Supervisors Had Poorly-Defined
Responsibilities for Safety.
“Don’t have any injuries in your group”.
 “Give monthly safety meeting talk”.
 “Make sure everybody’s wearing their PPE”.
 “Stop an employee if you see them breaking a safety rule”.
 “Send people to training when required”.
 “Help new employees or transfers learn the safety rules”.
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
A Performance Feedback System
Defines, Measures, and Reinforces
Desired Performance.
 Define Measures (behaviors): Define the specific, measurable activities
which will be measured and rewarded. Participation in the goal setting
activity facilitates buy-in & commitment.
 Establish a Timeline: Identify the time period and/or frequency over
which the activities are to be performed.
 Communicate/Train: Make sure everybody clearly understands what is
expected and has the skills to succeed.
 Measure: Monitor and periodically review performance (formally and informally).
 Reinforce: Acknowledge and reinforce accomplishments and
identify a plan for overcoming barriers67 impeding progress.
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
People Should Be Held Accountable for
Things Within Their Control.
 Plant safety statistics are a function of many variables:





At-risk Behaviors and Conditions
Uncontrollable Events
Reporting Practices
Record-Keeping Practices
Medical Management and Return-to-Work Practices
 When individuals are held accountable for things outside
their
control:
 Motivation is decreased (Consequences are uncertain)
 (Dis)stress is increased
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The Skill Set
Contained Many Categories.
1) Support and reward employee participation in safety activities.
2) Set safety goals and expectations with employees.
3) Provide regular formal and informal safety performance
feedback.
4) Model appropriate safety-related behaviors.
5) Solicit and encourage employee input on safety-related
matters.
6) Demonstrate fact-finding rather than fault-finding for safety-
related concerns.
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The Skill Set
Contained Many Categories (cont.).
7) Communicate safety-related information to employees
regularly.
8) Show visible support for safety policies, rules,
procedures, and regulations (regardless of personal
opinion).
9) Demonstrate appropriate balance between safety and
other
performance measures.
10) Focus on safety processes
70 rather than outcomes.
©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Each Category Contained
Objective, Observable, Behaviors.
A. Support and reward employee participation in safety
activities
 Behavioral Observation and Feedback Process (BOFP)










Work with BOFP committee member(s) to establish goals for your group.
Schedule time for observations every week.
Allow/encourage BOFP meetings.
Participate in (or lead) ABC analyses.
Request BOFP observations for specific operations or jobs and during
outages or turnarounds.
Request BOFP observations be performed on you.
Review (or ask BOFP participant to review) BOFP progress reports at
monthly safety meetings.
Recognize individual contributions toward BOFP (privately and publicly).
Recognize overall BOFP process accomplishments.
Keep up-to-date on pertinent BOFP data, including:
71
Group members
who
trained observers.
©Safety Performance
Solutions,
Inc.are(1.08)
Employees Complete the
“Safety Leadership Feedback” Form.
Safety Leadership Feedback
Behavior
1 2 3 Comments
1. Encourage, support, and reinforce employee participation in safety activities.
A. Safety Audits:
- Regularly conduct audits yourself.
- Allow / schedule time for employees to conduct audits.
Help remove any barriers to conducting audits (e.g., time pressure).
- Keep up-to-date on important audit data, including:
~ Group members who are trained as auditors (total number and their names).
~ Group members who are actively participating in conducting audits.
~ Results from audits in your area.
~ Status of follow-up items.
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Individual and
Collective Results Are Reviewed.
Employees (Anonymously) Complete
“Safety Leadership Feedback” Form
Copies Are
Forwarded to
Safety Dept. for
Compilation
Originals Are
Collected
and Forwarded to
Supervisor
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
The Summarized Information Leads to
Group-level Improvements.
Each Department’s Summarized Data Is Forwarded
to and Reviewed by All Department Members.
Department XYZ:
Supervisor Feedback Results
10 0%
80 %
% Un favorab le
60 %
% Ne utral
40 %
% Favorab le
20 %
0%
Encoura ges
em ployee
pa rticipation
Sets sa fety
go als
Provid es
fe edba ck
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (1.08)
Mode ls s afe
be haviors
4. LEADS: Leadership Behavior
Evaluations.
Assessments of How Effectively Leaders Promote:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Vision for Safety
Engagement In Safety
Rewards & Recognition for Safety
Trust in Ability and Intent for Safety
Communication for Safety
Teamwork and Empowerment for Safety
The assessment tool should target various levels of the
organization (supervisors, plant-level leadership, executive
leadership).
© 2002 Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (EVIT 8.00)
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Case Study 3
LEADS: Executive Behavior
Evaluation and Development
Sample LEADS Results
Engagement In Safety
1.00
2.00
3.00
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
VPs
Directors
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© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2007
PMs
4.00
Sample LEADS Results
Engagement In Safety
9. Leader actively participates in safety activities within the
sites they oversee.
- The role of the VP is not supposed to work at the plant level. VP’s may animate plant level plans but it is
the plant managers’ role.
- I (VP) participate in discussions, reward people, ask for examples and suggestions. I give best
idea awards, and attend workshops focusing on safety.
12. Leader participates in HSE celebrations at the site level.
-When plants win HSE awards they are extremely proud because of their commitment to the community
and company. However, the VP is never present and rarely offers a letter of recognition. …there should
be more attention given by the VP to safety celebrations and recognition.
- He does recognize sites for safety – it is strong leadership behavior and very welcome from the
people – Thus is a good/important thing he does.
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© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2007
Sample LEADS Results
Accountability/Rewards/Recognition
1.00
2.00
3.00
Q46
Q47
Q48
Q49
Q50
Q51
Q52
VPs
Directors
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© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2007
PMs
4.00
Sample LEADS Results
Accountability/Rewards/Recognition
47. Always include a discussion of HS&E performance, praising good
and challenging plant managers with poor performance in Operations
Reviews.
- We should start the operations review with HSE. Instead we are not seeing any discussion of HSE
unless there is an incident.
- We have sites with the goal of acting like a business unit; …. Now environmental issues and safety
are much more emphasized. The downside is much higher when mistakes are made…Thus, HS&E
should be higher on the agendas of operations. Leaders should “animate” safety with good processes
beyond just one slide during the Operations Reviews.
- I’m surprised this is even a question. I don’t do this and I don’t plan to do this. I should start
with quality, safety should not be key unless there is a problem. My boss puts HSE at the end.
Quality and production are our main issues now. I know some are trying to increase focus on
safety and I appreciate this – But we all have goals and we all want our goals on top.
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© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2007
Exercise:
Safety Leadership Mini Self-Assessment
Evaluate your own safety leadership performance :.
1=Rarely
2= Occasionally
3= Of
4= Almost Always
_
I maintain focus on safety even when safety performance is good.
_
I actively participate in safety activities (e.g., safety meetings, safety training/hiring,
safety committees, incident reviews, etc.).
_
I include safety activities and efforts of employees in their performance reviews, thus
letting employees know safety activities are a critical part of the job (as opposed to
simply whether or not they’ve been injured).
_
I routinely recognize employees for working safely.
_
I ask employees what they need to do their jobs safely.
_
I create opportunities for employees to discuss safety-related issues with each other.
_
I ensure employees have adequate time to participate in safety activities (e.g.,
committees, safety suggestions, near miss reporting, safety training).
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
So What Would Others Think?
Average LEADS Rating
(on a scale from 1-4)
Self-Evaluation
x = 3.4
Evaluation by Others
x = 2.1
Individuals Are Usually Poor At Assessing
Their Own Leadership Skills.
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
LEADS (Leadership Evaluation & Development
for Safety)
o
Usually Employs a 360 Format.
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. (5.06)
Case Study 3
Behavioral Observation Process
Assessment
An Observation and Feedback Process
is More than Just Filling Out Checklists.
Ge ne ric Obse rva tion Che c klist
Depart: ____________
Observer's Name: ______________________ Month/Yr: ____ / ____
Safe
At-Risk
Comments:
PPE:
- Eyes / Face
- Hearing
- Hand
- Foot
- Protective Clothing
Housekeeping:
- Slip / Trip
- Storage
- Egress
Body Position:
- Cramped / Extended
- Ergonomics
- Lifting / Lowering
- Line of Fire
- Pinch Points
Visual Focus:
- Eyes on Task
- Eyes on Path
Other:
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©Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2010
www.safetyperformance.com
An Observation and Feedback Process
Reduces Injuries In Two Ways.
Behavior Observation and
Feedback Process
Informal Process
Formal Process
Goal: Increase quality and
quantity of interpersonal safety
communication.
Goal: Target, analyze, intervene to
increase safe and decrease atrisk behaviors.
Purpose:
Injury Reduction
86
© SafetyPerformance
©Safety
PerformanceSolutions,
Solutions,Inc.
Inc.2010
2010 www.safetyperformance.com
An Observation and Feedback Process is
More than Just Filling Out Checklists.
Employees Observe
Critical Behaviors
Safety improvements are
communicated to workforce
providing motivation to
continue collecting data.
Checklists are completed and
collected. The most critical
behaviors are targeted for
follow-up.
Interventions developed (may
include environmental or system
changes) to increase safe and
decrease at-risk behavior.
Target behaviors are
analyzed to determine why
they are occurring.
A breakdown at any step can STOP the cycle.
87
© SafetyPerformance
©Safety
PerformanceSolutions,
Solutions,Inc.
Inc.2010
2009 www.safetyperformance.com
Common Barriers to a Successful
Observation Process.
1) Lack of Trust
• People feel true observations will lead to disciplinary action.
• People don’t trust co-worker reaction
• Observations will primarily focus on conditions rather than behaviors
• Reluctance to observe
• “Pencil Whipping” is common
2) Poor Observation/Hazard Recognition Skills
• People do not recognize hazardous behaviors and conditions
• “Low Hanging Fruit” has already been picked
• Little /insufficient training provided for workforce
• Easy/Superficial observations are common “Lack of PPE”
• Reluctance to observe – especially outside own work area
• “Pencil Whipping” is common
88
© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2010
www.safetyperformance.com
Common Barriers to a Successful
Observation Process.
3) Low Risk Perception
• People don’t believe they are at-risk.
• Low motivation to do anything “extra” for safety
• Reluctance to observe
• “Pencil Whipping” is common
4) Low Perceived Value in the Observation Process
• People don’t believe the process targets the true hazards
• People don’t believe the organization is willing to correct the true hazards once identified
• Trending of data and appropriate follow-up intervention is rare
• Employee input/ownership/control is typically low
• Reluctance to observe
• “Pencil Whipping” is common
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© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2010
www.safetyperformance.com
A Total Safety Culture Has Several
Dimensions.
LEADERSHIP
CONDITIONS
Are Senior Leaders committed to improving the
culture and do they demonstrate safety as a value
Does the physical environment (the
interaction of equipment, facilities,
procedures, and people) allow safe
performance
PEOPLE
SYSTEMS
Total Safety
Culture
Do people have positive perceptions
of themselves, their coworkers, and
the organization. Are they willing to
go “above the call of duty”
Do organizational systems support
the “right” behaviors and are they
consistent with organizational values.
BEHAVIOR
Do people perform the
‘right’ behaviors.
EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT
Are Employees Actively Involved in
Making Valuable Contributions
© Safety Performance Solutions, Inc. 2011
www.safetyperformance.com
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