Office of Radiological Security
Organization of Agreement States Annual
Meeting Boston, MA
Kristina Hatcher
August 25, 2015
Office of Radiological Security
MISSION: The Office of Radiological Security enhances global security by preventing
high activity radioactive materials from use in acts of terrorism.
PROTECT
REMOVE
REDUCE
PROTECT radioactive
sources used for vital
medical, research, and
commercial
purposes
REMOVE and dispose of
disused radioactive sources
REDUCE the global reliance
on radioactive sources
through replacement with
viable non-isotopic
alternative technologies
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Holistic Approach to Source Security
Site security
enhancements for
radiological and
nuclear materials
in storage/use
Collaborate with
manufacturer to install
security by device design
REACTOR
Transportation
security addressed
throughout entire
lifecycle.
SOURCE/
DEVICE
PRODUCER
TRANSPORT
SOURCE LIFE
CYCLE
FINAL
DISPOSITION
Site security
enhancements for
radiological sources
in long term
storage
Site security
enhancements
for radiological
sources in use
SOURCE/
DEVICE
USER
STORAGE
Site security
enhancements
for radiological
sources in
storage
A LT E R N AT I V E
NON-ISOTOPIC TECHNOLOGIES
The use of non-isotopic technologies negates the
need for security and disposal requirements and
eliminates the risk that radioactive sources will
become orphaned
DEVICE
MANUFACTURER
DEVICE USER
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NSS Radiological Security Gift Basket
• As of January 1, 2015 ORS had secured ~300 Cat 1 Buildings and ~200 buildings
remained
• In FY2015 Omnibus, NNSA received ~$18M plus up to secure all remaining
Category 1 facilities
• “…the agreement provides $67,987,000 for domestic material protection to help
meet the goal of securing all buildings in the U.S. with Category 1 source materials by
the end of 2016.”
• ORS currently working on a targeted outreach campaign to elicit the remaining
volunteers
• Emails, Phone Calls, Website, Webinar, Brochures, Thank You Postcards and
Certificates
• Check out our new webpage at: www.nnsa.energy.gov/RSP
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Protect: Security Enhancements
DETECT
DELAY
RESPOND
TRAIN
Prompt Detection and
Reliable Notification
Extended Adversary
Task Time
Timely, Aware, Equipped
and Trained Response
Security and Response
Training
Centralized Monitoring Stations
Alarm Response Training .
Response Planning
PRD Training, Tabletop Exercises
Next Generation
Integrated
Remote
Monitoring System
(iRMS):
Critical alarms
trigger notification
and assessment at
monitoring stations
Multi-Factor
Access Control:
Requires
combination of
card, pin, or
biometric scan
for entry
Hardened Doors
Facility Hardening
Personal Radiation
Detectors (PRDs)
Security Planning,
Performance Testing, Regulatory
Development
RSP Containment Strategy
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Protect: Sustainability Elements
END GOAL: SUSTAINABLE THREAT REDUCTION
RSP assists to address and develop elements of
overall security culture that will ensure
sustainability in the out years
RSP security enhancements include three years
of warranty and maintenance support
RSP considers existing site security when defining
recommendations; RSP security experts focus on a
defense-in-depth approach that starts at the target
and adds one or more layers of protection
RSP assumes partner sites are in compliance with
NRC regulations; RSP recommended security
enhancements complement, but do not replace
existing regulatory requirements
SITE
TRANSITION
SITE
SUSTAINABILITY
WARRENTY &
MAINTENANCE
SECURITY
ENHANCEMENTS
NRC/AGREEMENT STATE
REGULATIONS
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Protect: Remote Monitoring System
Next Generation Enhancement
• More Sustainable
• Cost Effective
• Integrated
• Additional Alarm Notification Capability
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Protect: Industrial Irradiators
Goal: Enhance security against the Insider Threat.
Challenge: Applying sufficient detection in conjunction with added delays and response capability
•
•
Virtual Perimeter
Pool cover with detection and delay
o Pilot installation of pool cover at one facility in Fall 2014
o Pool cover tested May 2015 achieved delay time similar to Cs In-Device Delay kits
o Test module at a facility to test wiring and switches for detection shows no degradation to-date 60
days into 90 day testing
o In discussion with other large industrial irradiator facilities
•
•
Scaled attack test pool cover with left multilayer top plates removed for continuity loop clarity
Modular design that can be custom designed to fit irradiator model
Pool Cover
Recommended
Enhancements
at facilities with extremely high radiation, humidity and the need to continuously operate.
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Protect: Industrial Irradiators
• Source Rack Testing Planned for October 2015:
• Determine timelines for adversary to remove a pencil from a source module
and rack
Test Rack
• Brute force attack from the side
• Top down attack on the rack
• Test will use a mock up of a rack in a pool
• Scheduled for early October at PNNL
• Participation from Nordion
Mock of irradiator using a pool
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Protect: In-Device Delay
STATUS
Partner
JL Sheppard
CIS/Pharmalucence
Best Theratronics
Others
TOTAL
Estimated
Total IDD
Eligible Devices
221
131
416
73
841
Total
hardened
128
120
232
17
497
*Working Toward New Devices to Come Factory Hardened
Current Manufacturer Partners
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Best Theratronics (Canada)
JL Sheppard (U.S)
CIS/Pharmalucence (U.S.)
Husman Irradiator (U.S.)
Hopewell (U.S.)
ViewRay Systems (U.S.)
Xcision (U.S.)
Elekta Instrument, AB (Sweden)
Gamma Services Medical, Gmbh (Germany)
CURRENT INITIATIVES
• Elekta Gamma Knife Hardening Field Kit
 One Site Pilot installation April 2015
 Two Additional Sites Planned for Fall of 2015
 Broader Deployment Planned for 2016
• Factory Hardened – currently working with
 Xcision
 Hopewell
 ViewRay Systems
• Planned to start work with MASEP (China) in 2016
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Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security
Mobile Device Theft Examples
Colombia, 1998. Transport trucks
owned by Schlumberger were
ambushed and oil/gas exploration
sources stolen for extortion. One of
the perpetrators was a current
employee.
Ecuador, 2002. Thieves broke
into a storage shed of
Interinspec, and stole five Ir192 radiography cameras for
extortion. One of the thieves
was a former employee.
Argentina, 2009 A former employee
and accomplice broke into an Atlas
Baker storage facility, and stole a Cs137 exploration device for extortion
purposes.
Syria, 2012/13 Radiography and
exploration sources reported stolen
from several facilities. No reports of
recovery or known motive.
China, 2001 Radiation technologist
obtained radiography device from
friend, removed Ir-192 sources, made
a necklace from them, and attempted
to kill girl friend.
Nigeria, 2003 Unknown perpetrators
stole Am-241 exploration sources from
a truck. The sources later turned up in
a scrap yard in Germany nine months
later.
U.S., 2011 Truck broken into and Ir-192
radiography camera stolen. Despite extensive
search, no report of recovery or known motive.
U.S., 2013 Perpetrator attempted to steal an
Ir-192 camera from its storage. He was
thwarted by the layered security systems
the company had in place.
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Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security
Peculiarities of Mobile Source Vulnerabilities
• For radiography sources, lots of material in motion worldwide all the time
• Short source material half lives require constant device replenishment
• Material providers represent a diverse set of research reactors across the globe
• Device manufacturers AND device users often international companies
• For both radiography cameras and well logging sources, storage locations
are different than use locations
• Requires movement from storage locations to field application
• Field site security highly likely to be less stringent than storage facility security
• Often used in parts of the world where overall security is an issue and terror
groups are potentially present
• Designed to be mobile – once lost, hard to find
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Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security
Well Logging
Radiography
•
PM –Tag (Built into Camera)
• Rad Detection - Monitors
source presence, alarms if
removed
• Tamper Detection – Alarm
if camera is tampered with
• Location – alerts/alarms if
out of range
PM-Box (Replaces Current
Transport Box, Installed on
Truck and Stores Camera)
• Tamper Detection – Alert
when device is removed
without check-out
• Worker provides
administrative notification of
check out
• Charging station
R –Tag & Master Control Unit
E –Tag (On Container)
(In Truck Storage)
• Tamper Detection –
• Rad Detection – Monitors
Alarm when source is
source presence, alarms if
removed from container
removed
• Location – alarms if out
• Communication from E-Tag
of range without
to the R-Tag and MCU is via
checkout
Bluetooth
•
•
•
Project Status
Partnering with major radiography and oil service companies
to design and pilot systems, field studies completed in early
2015
Con ops to be developed with partners
Plan to pilot in Fall 2015 and start broad deployment in U.S.
in 2016
Developing plans to deploy with international partners
Telematics (Cellular/Satellite
Communications used by Many
U.S. Companies)
• Transmits GPS location and
security alarms/alerts
Base Station
• Application software
• Receives alarms, alerts,
notifications, location
Source Storage
System will be integrated into site storage, providing persistent
monitoring of sources and increased detection and delay.
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Remove
U.S. OFF-SITE SOURCE RECOVERY PROGRAM (OSRP) & SOURCE
COLLECTION & THREAT REDUCTION (SCATR)
• OSRP - recover disused and unwanted radioactive sealed sources that cannot be
disposed of commercially and pose a threat to national security
• SCATR – recover and disposition commercially disposable radioactive sealed sources
• SCATR & OSRP registration located at: http://osrp.lanl.gov/PickUpSources.aspx
COORDINATION WITH CONFERENCE OF RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM DIRECTORS
(CRCPD):
• Developing Device Packaging Training at Southwest Research Institute (SWRI). Material to be complete in September.
• Participating on the CRCPD working group to develop regulatory guidance for packaging Cat 1 and 2 sources.
STATUS of TYPE B CONTAINER DEVELOPMENT
• 435-B Unshielded Overpack can ship 5 different irradiators and the IAEA Long-Term Storage Shield
 Fabrication in process. Anticipate ready for use in early 2016.
• 380-B Shielded Container can ship problematic devices
 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) being prepared for submission to NRC
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Reduce: Alternative Technologies
Initiative seeks to convert and replace radiological devices with non-isotopic devices and achieve
permanent threat reduction by reducing or eliminating risk-significant radioactive materials
Cesium Irradiator Replacement
Project
A pilot project to offer incentives to
replace Cesium irradiators with
alternative technologies
Non-radioactive x-ray device poses no
RDD risk; no federally funded security
enhancements are required. Does not
need to be disposed of as low level or
Greater Than Class C (GTCC) waste
Cobalt Teletherapy Replacements
NNSA, in coordination with the State
Department, funded the shipment of a
used medical LINAC to Ukraine. We are
working with global partners to develop
options for expansion of Cobalt
teletherapy replacements
Research and Development
Collaboration with the Office of
Nonproliferation Research and
Development (NA-22) to analyze
and prioritize R&D requirements
for improvement or development
of non-isotopic replacements to
make alternative technologies
more attractive to industry.
Linear Accelerator is an alternative
to Cobalt Teletherapy
Consultations available to sites interested in replacing their existing
high-activity source with non-isotopic alternatives
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National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Alternative Technology Working Group
Background
• The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) (Public Law 109-58) emphasized the
importance of non-isotopic replacement technology development and
implementation to reduce the risks posed by radioactive sealed sources in
wide use domestically in the areas of research, industry, and medicine.
• As progress in the technical, operational, and economic feasibility of these
replacements continues, policy options to facilitate their implementation
have become increasingly important.
• At the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States introduced
the U.S. Government commitment to “establish an international research
effort on the feasibility of replacing high-activity [radioactive] sources with
non-isotopic … technologies, with the goal of producing a global alternative
by 2016.”
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National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Alternative Technology Working Group
Background (cont.)
• In August 2014, the U.S. Interagency recommended in the 2014 Report of
the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force, “that the U.S.
Government, as appropriate, investigate options such as voluntary,
prioritized, incentivized, [sic] programs for the replacement of Category 1
and 2 radioactive sources with effective alternatives. The Task Force
further recommends that U.S. Government agencies, where appropriate,
that lead by example in the consideration of and transition to alternative
technologies that meet technical, operational, and cost requirements.”
• Nuclear Government Coordinating Council initiated the formation of an
Alternative Technologies Working Group to look at the
advantages/disadvantages of alternate technologies for replacement of
category 1 and 2 radioactive sources.
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National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Alternative Technology Working Group
Working Group Members
• Total Membership: 100
Academia: 5
Law Enforcement: 1
Private Sector: 45
State/Local Government: 9
Federal Government: 40
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National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Alternative Technology Working Group
Working Group Timeline
• Schedule of Meetings and Discussion Topics
 February 2015 –Kick-off Meeting
 March 2015 –Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation
 April 2015 –Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation
 May 2015 –Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation/Research Irradiation
 July 2015 –Cesium-137/Cobalt-60 Research Irradiation and Phytosanitary
Applications
 August 2015 –Stereotactic Surgery (Co-60 and LINACS)
 September 2015 –Industrial Sterilization (Co-60 panoramic irradiators)
 October 2015 –Industrial Radiography
 November 2015 –Well Logging
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National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Alternative Technology Working Group
Working Group Timeline (cont.)
• Schedule for Report Development
 October 2015 –Roadmap and Message Development
 November 2015 –Finalization of WG Report and Identification of
Stakeholders
 December 2015 –Update on Draft Report
 January 2016 –Issue Final Report at Joint Nuclear CIPAC and recommend
Next Steps
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National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Alternative Technology Working Group
For more information, visit:
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Additional Working Groups
• International Ad Hoc Group on Alternative Technologies – The goal of the group is to
exchange views and ideas that help develop an international roadmap on alternative
technology.
• Health Physics Society Task Force on Alternative Technologies – This group will bring
together users of high activity radiological sources to discuss opportunities and
acceptance of alternative technologies.
• National Science and Technology Council – Working group to look at the issue of
alternative technologies under the Committee on Homeland and National Security. A
primary objective of the NSTC is the establishment of clear national goals for Federal
science and technology investments in a broad array of areas.
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Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program
• Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program (CIRP) - ORS has initiated
a CIRP pilot effort that incentivizes domestic users who choose to
convert from a cesiums-137 irradiator to a non-isotopic alternative
(e.g., X-ray irradiator).
• ORS is in the process of evaluating the CIRP Pilot for broader
applicability for FY16 implementation.
• ORS has received numerous inquiries as well as volunteers to
participate in CIRP.
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Research and Development
ORS is working in collaboration with Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Research and Development (DNNR&D) within NNSA to identify gaps and
fund technology developments for non-isotopic devices that are not yet
commercially available. Research in alternative technologies includes:
• Superconducting LINAC X-ray source (panoramic irradiator)
• Flat panel X-ray sources (blood, sterilization and research irradiation)
• Micro-linacs (radiography and well logging)
• Dense Plasma Focus (well logging)
ORS and DNNR&D are working together to create a research and
development roadmap for alternative technologies. This roadmap will
look at each application (e.g. blood irradiation, research, etc), the
currently available technologies and the identified needs or gaps. Once
the gaps or needs are identified, the roadmap will outline the path
forward for improving, or in some cases developing, the technology.
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Contact
Joy Ferguson
Program Director
Domestic Radiological Security
Joy.Ferguson@nnsa.doe.gov
202-287-6845
Kristina Hatcher
Regional Officer
Domestic Radiological Security
Kristina.Hatcher@nnsa.doe.gov
202-586-7544
Check out our new webpage at: ww.nnsa.energy.gov/RSP
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