Designing Online Advertising Markets

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Data-Driven Market Design
Susan Athey, The Economics of Technology Professor, Stanford GSB
Consulting researcher, Microsoft Research
Based in part on joint work with:
Denis Nekipelov (UVa, MSR)
Guido Imbens (Stanford GSB)
Stefan Wager (Stanford)
Dean Eckles (MIT)
Introduction
Marketplaces
• Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, Rover, Zeel, Urbansitter
• Two groups of customers
– Cross-side network effects
Auction-based platforms
• Online advertising
• Used cars
• eBay
Market design matters
Market Design Examples: Short Run v. Long Run
eBay examples
• Eliminate listing fees
• Make pictures free
• Change search algorithm
–
–
Emphasize price
Force sellers into more uniform categories
• Shipping costs
Search advertising examples
• Change broad match criteria for looser matching
• Change pricing
See, e.g.:
“Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors,” Lewis, 2014
“Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce,” Dinerstein, Einav, Levin, Sundaresan, 2014
“A Structural Model of Sponsored Search Auctions,” Athey & Nekipelov, 2012
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Influencing Market Design
Theoretical framework is key
• Makes arguments coherent and precise
• Identifies equilibrium/long-term effects
• Advertiser/sellers and consumer choices incorporated
Complement with data
Data, Experimentation, and Counterfactuals
Data can inform what kinds of designs will work better or worse in
range of environments similar to existing one
Advocacy for design issues is much more effective with theory
and data combined
Experimentation crucial but also has limitations
• Short-term experiments can’t show long-term outcomes, feedback effects
• Can help gain insight by analyzing heterogeneity of effects
One part of empirical economics focuses structure on empirical
analysis in order to learn model “primitives” and perform
“counterfactuals”
• Learn bidder values, predict equilibrium responses
• Map between short-run user experience and long-term willingness to click
A/B Testing
100% users
50%
50%
User interactions
instrumented, analyzed, and
compared
Control:
existing
system
Treatment:
Modified
system
Control
average
outcome
Treatment
average
outcome
Results analysis and future
design decisions
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Short Term A/B Tests Have Limitations:
Search Advertising Case Study
Standard industry
practice
– Run A/B tests on users or
page views to test new
algorithms
– Make ship decision based
on revenue & user impact
Multiple errors
– Unit of experimentation is not unit
of analysis
• Each advertiser only sees change
on 1% of traffic
– Interaction effects ignored, fixing
bids & budgets
• When released to market, other
advertisers might hit budget
constraints, causing a given
advertiser to hit their own
– Reactions of bids and budgets
ignored
– Long term participation ignored
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Short Term A/B Tests Have Limitations:
Search Advertising Case Study
Cheaper fixes (motivated by theory)
- Modify evaluation criteria (short term metrics)
- Instead of measuring actual short-term performance, focus on
part that is correlated with long-term
- E.g. only count good clicks
- Theory: advertisers won’t pay for bad clicks in equilibrium
- Do a small number of long term studies to relate short term
metrics to long term
- Up-front study only captures responsiveness to types of changes
observed in study—can’t answer all questions
- Add in constraints that “protect” advertisers
- E.g. constrain price increases at the advertiser level
- But advertisers very heterogeneous in preferences and
responsiveness
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Short Term A/B Tests Have Limitations:
Search Advertising Case Study
Expensive solution I:
Long-term advertiser-based A/B test
- Apply treatments to randomly selected advertisers (stratify)
- Watch for a long time
- Problems:
• Ignores advertiser interactions!!
• Unclear whether conclusions will generalize once other
advertisers respond
• Expensive and disruptive to advertisers under
experimentation
• Takes a long time (advertisers respond slowly), interferes
with ongoing innovation
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eCommerce Markets as Bipartite Graphs
Query A
Query B
Sellers
Query C
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Testing Interactions:
Athey, Eckles, Imbens (2015)
• How to do inference properly for various hypotheses?
– Method for exact p-values for a class of non-sharp null hypotheses.
• Exact: no large sample approximations
• Sharp: outcome for each unit known under the null for different treatment assignments
– Test hypotheses of the form
• “Treating units j related to unit i in way Z has no effect on i”
• “Only fraction of neighbors treated matters, not identity or their network position”
– Novel insight
• Can turn non-sharp null into a sharp one by defining an artificial experiment and
analyzing only a subset of the units as “focal” units
• Best ways to analyze existing experiments
– Most powerful test statistics
• Develop model-based test statistics that perform better than commonly used heuristics.
• Insight: write down a structural model and use score-based test
– How to use exogenous variation that is in the data most effectively
Testing Hypotheses About Friends of Friends
A
Focal unit
A
C
Auxiliary to
Focal unit
A
Buffer for
Focal unit
A
F
Auxiliary
to Focal
units A
and B
D
I
Unit
Buffer for
Focal units
A and B
E
Auxiliary to
Focal units
A and B
G
Yi(0
FOF*)
Yi(>1
FOF*)
Aux
Unit
Aux
Wi
A
3
3
C
B
2
2
*Holding fixed
own treatment
and friends’ treat
B
Focal unit
H
B
Buffer for
Focal unit
B
Auxiliary to
Focal unit
BAlt. assignments of FOF Wi
Aux FOF
treat v.
control:
A has C,F v.
D
B has F v.
D,G
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
D
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
F
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
G
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
8/37/3
=1/3
7/3-8/3
=-1/3
5/2-5/2
=0
5/2-5/2
=0
7/3-8/3
=-1/3
8/3-7/3
=1/3
Probabilities
Test statistic:
Edge Level Contrast for FOF links
between Focal and Auxiliary units
1/3
Short Term A/B Tests Have Limitations:
Search Advertising Case Study
Expensive solution II:
Long-term market-based A/B test
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Community Detection
Modularity-based algorithm
identifies clusters:
๏ฝ
Modularity =
๐ถ
2
๐‘–=1(๐‘’๐‘–๐‘– − ๐‘Ž๐‘– )
๏ฝ
Newman 2006
๏ฝ
๐‘’๐‘–๐‘– : fraction of links with
both nodes inside the
community ๐‘–
๏ฝ
๐‘Ž๐‘– : number of links with
at least one node in
community ๐‘–
Clustered Randomization and Community-Level Analysis
Treated
Ugander et al (2013) proposal:
• Define “treatment” as having high
share of friends treated
Control
• Use propensity score weighting to
adjust for non-random assignment
to this condition
This is open research area
Treated
Short Term A/B Tests Have Limitations:
Search Advertising Case Study
Expensive solution II:
Long-term market-based A/B test
- Cluster advertisers
- Bipartite graph weighting links between advertisers and
queries
- Weights are clicks or revenue
- Issue: spillovers large
- Experiment at cluster level
- Watch for a long time
- Problems:
•
•
Expensive and disruptive to advertisers under experimentation
Takes a long time (advertisers respond slowly), interferes with
ongoing innovation
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Further Approaches
1. Gain insight from A/B
tests by studying
heterogeneity of effects
– Understand how innovation
affects different advertisers and
queries
– Relate to other work showing
which types of advertisers are
most responsive
2. Build a structural
econometric model and do
counterfactual predictions
– Requires investment in model
development and validation
– Relies on assumptions, may not
be accepted even if validated
– Can also explore variety of
scenarios interacted with
advertiser characteristics
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Experiments and Data-Mining
• Concerns about ex-post “data-mining”
– In medicine, scholars required to pre-specify analysis plan
– In economics, calls for similar protocols
• But how is researcher to predict all forms of heterogeneity
in an environment with many covariates?
• Goal of Athey & Imbens 2015, Wager & Athey 2015:
– Allow researcher to specify set of potential covariates
– Data-driven search for heterogeneity in causal effects with valid
standard errors
– See also Langford et al, Multi-World Testing
Segments versus Personalized Predictions
Segments with similar treatment effects
• Data-driven search for subgroups
• Pro: Interpretability, communicability, policy, inference with moderate
sample sizes
• Con: Not the best predictor for any individual; segments unstable
Fully personalized predictions
• Non-parametric estimator of treatment effect as function of covariates
• Pro: Best possible prediction for each individual, and can do inference
as per Wager-Athey 2015
• Con: Confidence intervals have poor coverage with too many
covariates; hard to interpret and communicate
Our contributions:
• Optimize existing ML methods for each of these goals
• Deal with issue: no observed ground truth
• Methods provide valid confidence intervals without sparsity
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Regression Trees for Prediction
Using Trees to Estimate Causal Effects
Model:
๐‘Œ๐‘– = ๐‘Œ๐‘– ๐‘Š๐‘–
๐‘Œ๐‘– (1)
=
๐‘Œ๐‘– (0)
๐‘–๐‘“ ๐‘Š๐‘– = 1,
๐‘œ๐‘กโ„Ž๐‘’๐‘Ÿ๐‘ค๐‘–๐‘ ๐‘’.
• Random assignment of Wi
• Want to predict individual i’s treatment effect ๐œ๐‘– = ๐‘Œ๐‘– 1 − ๐‘Œ๐‘– (0)
– This is not observed for any individual
• Let
๐œ‡(๐‘ค, ๐‘ฅ) = ๐”ผ[๐‘Œ๐‘– |๐‘Š๐‘– = ๐‘ค, ๐‘‹๐‘– = ๐‘ฅ]
๐œ(๐‘ฅ) = ๐œ‡(1, ๐‘ฅ) − ๐œ‡(0, ๐‘ฅ)
Using Trees to Estimate Causal Effects
๐œ‡(๐‘ค, ๐‘ฅ) = ๐”ผ[๐‘Œ๐‘– |๐‘Š๐‘– = ๐‘ค, ๐‘‹๐‘– = ๐‘ฅ]
๐œ(๐‘ฅ) = ๐œ‡(1, ๐‘ฅ) − ๐œ‡(0, ๐‘ฅ)
๏ฝ
๏ฝ
• Approach 1: Analyze two groups
separately
– Estimate ๐œ‡(1, ๐‘ฅ) using dataset where ๐‘Š๐‘– = 1
– Estimate ๐œ‡(0, ๐‘ฅ) using dataset where ๐‘Š๐‘– = 0
– Do within-group cross-validation to choose
tuning parameters
– Construct prediction using
๐œ‡(1, ๐‘ฅ) − ๐œ‡(0, ๐‘ฅ)
• Approach 2: estimate ๐œ‡(๐‘ค, ๐‘ฅ) using
tree including both covariates
– Choose tuning parameters as usual
– Construct prediction using
๐œ‡(1, ๐‘ฅ) − ๐œ‡(0, ๐‘ฅ)
– Estimate is zero for x where tree does not
split on w
Observations
๏ฝ
๏ฝ
Problem 1
๏ฝ
๏ฝ
Estimation and cross-validation not
optimized for goal
Lots of segments in Approach 1:
combining two distinct ways to
partition the data
What is a candidate estimator for
๐œ๐‘– (๐‘ฅ๐‘– )
Problem 2
๏ฝ
๏ฝ
How do you evaluate goodness of fit
for tree splitting and crossvalidation?
๐œ๐‘– = ๐‘Œ๐‘– 1 − ๐‘Œ๐‘– 0 is not observed
and thus you don’t have ground truth
for any unit
Causal Trees
• Directly estimate treatment effects within each leaf
• Modify splitting criterion to focus on treatment effect heterogeneity
• Cross-validation criterion must estimate ground truth
– Build on statistical theory
• Honest trees: one sample to split, another to estimate effects, yields valid
confidence intervals
– Anticipating honesty changes algorithms
• Result: for any ratio of covariates to observations and without sparsity
assumptions, can discover meaningful heterogeneity and produce valid
confidence intervals
Swapping Positions of Algo Links:
Basic Results
Click-through rate of top link moved to lower position
(US All Non-Navigational)
30.0%
Moving a link from
position 1 to position 3
decreases CTR by 13.6
percentage points
25.4%
CTR
20.0%
11.8%
10.0%
7.5%
3.8%
0.0%
Position 1 (natural)
Position 3
Position 5
Position 10
Search Experiment Tree: Effect of Demoting Top Link
Some data
(Test Sample Effects)
excluded with
prob p(x):
proportions do
not match
population
Highly
navigational
queries
excluded
Test Sample
Training Sample
Treatment Standard
Treatment Standard
Effect
Error Proportion
Effect
Error Proportion
Use Test Sample
for Segment
Means & Std
Errors to Avoid
Bias
Variance of
estimated
treatment effects
in training
sample 2.5 times
that in test
sample
-0.124
-0.134
-0.010
-0.215
-0.145
-0.111
-0.230
-0.058
-0.087
-0.151
-0.174
0.026
-0.030
-0.135
-0.159
-0.014
-0.081
-0.045
-0.169
-0.207
-0.096
-0.096
-0.139
-0.131
0.004
0.010
0.004
0.013
0.003
0.006
0.028
0.010
0.031
0.005
0.024
0.127
0.026
0.014
0.055
0.026
0.012
0.023
0.016
0.030
0.011
0.005
0.013
0.006
0.202
0.025
0.013
0.021
0.305
0.063
0.004
0.017
0.003
0.119
0.005
0.000
0.002
0.011
0.001
0.001
0.013
0.001
0.011
0.003
0.023
0.069
0.013
0.078
-0.124
-0.135
-0.007
-0.247
-0.148
-0.110
-0.268
-0.032
-0.056
-0.169
-0.168
0.286
-0.009
-0.114
-0.143
0.008
-0.050
-0.045
-0.200
-0.279
-0.083
-0.096
-0.159
-0.128
0.004
0.010
0.004
0.013
0.003
0.006
0.028
0.010
0.029
0.005
0.024
0.124
0.025
0.015
0.053
0.050
0.012
0.021
0.016
0.031
0.011
0.005
0.013
0.006
0.202
0.024
0.013
0.022
0.304
0.064
0.004
0.017
0.003
0.119
0.005
0.000
0.002
0.010
0.001
0.000
0.013
0.001
0.011
0.003
0.022
0.070
0.013
0.078
What if we want personalized predictions?
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From Trees to Random Forests (Breiman, 2001)
“Adaptive” nearest neighbors algorithm
Causal Forests
Random forest
• Subsampling to create alternative trees
– +Lower bound on probability each feature sampled
• Causal tree: splitting based on treatment effects, estimate treatment
effects in leaves
• Honest: two subsamples, one for tree construction, one for estimating
treatment effects at leaves
– Alternative for observational data: construct tree based on propensity for assignment to
treatment (outcome is W)
• Output: predictions for ๐œ(๐‘ฅ)
Main results (Wager & Athey, 2015)
• First asymptotic normality result for random forests (prediction),
extends to causal inference & observational setting
• Confidence intervals for causal effects
Applying Method to Long-Term Prediction
• Estimate a model relating short-term metrics to long-term behavior,
incorporating advertiser characteristics
• Estimate heterogeneous effects of treatment in short-term test
• Map effects to long-term impact on actors (advertisers)
• Predict long-run responses based on responsiveness of the affected
advertisers
• This method has difficulty with full equilibrium response
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Approach 2: Build A Structural Model
• Athey & Nekipelov (2012):
– Assume profit maximization, estimate values
• Athey & Nekipelov (2014, in progress):
– Specify a set of objectives
– Estimate Bayesian model of objective type and parameters
• Use experiments and algorithmic releases to identify objectives—different
objectives predict different reactions to change
– Model the decision to change bid
• Both: use model to predict how advertisers respond to
short term metrics
– Do short-term experiment
– Calculate new equilibrium based on changes
– Assume small interactions among advertisers are zero to approximate
numerically
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40
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45
46
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Summary: A Structural Model
• Findings
– Substantial set of bidders predictably non-responsive in
medium term (high implied cost of bid changing)
– Exact match advertisers optimize for position, while
broad match optimize for ROI from clicks
– Short-term experiments and long-term counterfactuals
can go in opposite direction
– Examples: switch to Vickrey auction, improving
accuracy of click predictor
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Conclusions
• Power of A/B Testing leads to a culture of relying heavily on
experiments
• Standard experiments are not appropriate for many problems
• Expensive to use correct experimentation approach
• Layering analytics and structural models on top of experiments is
cheaper
• But a culture of short-term experiments leads to resistance to nonexperimental analytics, leading to short term focus for innovation
• Advice:
– Use rules of thumb to trigger when more costly long-term approaches brought to bear
– Take every opportunity to study long-term effects, e.g. use staggered rollouts
– Study heterogeneity and build insight
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