Issues for Future Nuclear Arms Control
Jay Davis
President
The Hertz Foundation
APS Anaheim
April 30th, 2011
Events have reenergized nuclear arms control
• The momentum created by the “Gang of Four” in their vision
of a world with zero nuclear weapons -- Nunn, Kissinger,
Perry and Schultz
• The Obama Administration's reengagement of the arms
control process
• Cancellation of the Bush II European ABM concept and
substitution of a version less threatening to the Russians
• The Senate Ratification of the New START Treaty
• The recently concluded review conference on the NonProliferation Treaty
I spent 2009 chairing an APS panel on technical and policy
recommendations for reducing weapons numbers
However, what follows are my opinions
My credibility to speak on this subject rests in
my past
• I’ve been involved in development and assessment of
treaty verification technologies since the mid-80s
• After the First Gulf War, I played both operational and
technical roles in finding, assessing ,and destroying
the covert Iraqi nuclear weapons program
• From 1998 to 2001, I was the founding Director of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, having executive
and operational responsibility for all US arms control
inspections
• In semi-retirement, I study policy and operations
options for this subject for various organizations
My perspective is that of an operator,
not a policy wonk
I was recently amused to hear myself described
as a POLICY person
Does that look like policy work?
UNSCOM
Iraq, June-August 1991
Or this?
Conventional Forces Europe Inspection
Poland, 1998
Arms Control, like Country Music, is
pretty much a hat act…
In 2009, I chaired an American Physical Society study on
technologies needed for future arms reduction treaties
• We made nine
recommendations,
two of which were
acted on as the
report was finished
– Establishing a multinational training site
– Declassifying the size
of the US Stockpile
All of these studies were briefed to Congressional
Staff and were appreciated
There are benefits and risks as numbers go down
• Smaller numbers reduce the scope for accidents,
theft, misuse or mistakes
– We once had about 36,000 weapons, the Soviets, 45,000
– We each now have about 1500 strategic weapons deployed,
several thousand in reserve
– We have a few hundred tactical weapons, the Russians
several thousand
• Smaller numbers unfortunately make each weapon
more important in counting and can destabilize
present understandings
– The risk incurred if one misses a few in counting is larger
– Non-nuclear but weapons capable states may doubt their
guarantees
Dealing realistically with this issue is emotionally
charged
• For the Loony Left
– If only the US would get rid of its weapons, everything
would be wonderful and there would be school
lunches, bunnies, trees, healthcare and jobs for all.
• For the Wingnut Right
– We are the Good Guys and so should have all of every
type weapon we can imagine because if we sign a
treaty we are all dead. By the way, did I tell you we are
the good guys?
And those are just the Congressional reactions!
Let me start with some observations
• As the number of weapons goes down, each successive treaty will
involve more participants, requiring much greater efforts to create trust
and understanding
– There will be long and difficult negotiations, think decades
• We must deal with the reasons for having (and not having) nuclear
weapons
– These are widely varying and often ignored
– And I’m going to come back to this
• The cost and intrusiveness of each successive treaty will increase
– The US resources alone to support R&D, fielding, and operations could easily rival
those of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, i.e., $6B-$8B annually
– Think of a Peace Surcharge, not a Peace Dividend
• The end game requires dealing with states like Iran, Israel and North
Korea who choose at present to remain outside community norms
– This problem is not amenable to technological solution and becomes larger with time
as numbers are reduced
Let’s begin with the New START Treaty with the Russians
• This essentially extends START I at slightly lower
numbers
• It is verifiable with present techniques and authorities
• The issue of tactical weapons (of which we have
100s, they have 1000s) has been ignored
• There is international pressure to ratify the CTBT as
part of the package
• This treaty leaves the present force structure
(bombers, land based missiles, submarine based
missiles) unchallenged
• The Record of Ratification requires that the present
Triad be maintained and that negotiations on tactical
weapons controls be started promptly---and the
Russians have offered to talk about this latter point
To go to 1000 weapons
• Admit that this will be the last exclusively US-Russian
treaty
• The treaty will require baselining materials, declaring
weapons reserves, both strategic and non-strategic
• Technologies for explicit counting of weapons deployed
on launchers will be required, not just counting rules
• Technologies and protocols for weapons verification and
dismantlement will be needed
• One may want the China, the UK and France involved in
transparency and inventory measures
Think ten years to get to this agreement
To get to 500 weapons…
• We and the Russians need to bring in the other weapons states, the
UK, France and China
• We must have a strategy for the US umbrella (Extended deterrence
for Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Germany, etc.)
• Explicit techniques for counting deployed and reserve weapons will
be needed – strategic and non-strategic
• At this point, do we begin counting by groups?
– Some in the Russian Duma have raised this issue now
• The ability to track weapons and materials through storage,
dismantlement and disposal will be needed
• The declaration and inspection processes of the Conventional
Forces in Europe and Open Skies Treaty may be good precedents
• One would like to have the Israelis, Indians, Pakistanis and the
umbrella nations watching
This looks like another hard decade-long slog
…and before that time
• All of our delivery systems will need replacing
–
–
–
–
The costs will be large – and do or can we keep the full Triad?
Will there be a manned bomber?
What sort of ground launched missile?
How many subs?
• The issue of military careers will arise
– Having excellent officers and enlisted personnel requires an
important mission and the prospect of promotion
• We will know how successful we are in maintaining the
human skills and infrastructure of the design labs
• The size and mission of the weapons complex will need reexamination for reinvestment
To get to 200 weapons…
• The Israelis, Indians and Pakistanis need to be included and to
be willing players
– And the reason they feel nuclear weapons are essential to their security
dealt with
• A tough fissile materials cutoff treaty is necessary
– But all parties need to figure out the naval fuel exemption
• The nuclear fuel cycle needs to be leak free
– And possibly (likely?) internationalized
• There needs to be agreement on dealing with rogues
• Missile defense systems and advanced conventional weapons
become important
• With whom would we or others accept parity?
This looks like another ten years of hard
work…and what happens in the meantime?
To get to 50-100 weapons
• The Iranian and North Korean situations need
resolution
– Perhaps time brings regime change
• There would have to be rigorous multi-national
inspection agreements for declared weapons
• The nuclear fuel cycle would clearly need to be under
international control
• Clandestine programs would have to be very
detectable
• Understand that the weapons now are clearly targeted
at populations
Perhaps another ten years to accomplish? And
again, what happens in the meantime?
Below that number…
• I fail to have a clear vision – or any vision
• I think at about 25 weapons we hit a hard minimum
– But I can explain the reasons to have 100, 20 or 1
• Technical measures will follow only from the increased
confidence that mutual inspections will yield
• It strikes me that mutual development and test of all technical
measures is a necessary step
– A facility for this at the Nevada Test Site is now in the Budget.
– But all the hard problems are in behavior and fear – and not amenable to
technical solution
At the end of the day, scientists can only quantify
risk – acceptance of risk is a political decision.
Bill Perry sees 500 as a realistic point for a
“Long Pause” -- my words, not his
• He postulated this in a talk in Livermore Last
October
• He thinks we can lead to this number without
risk
• He thinks that the other nuclear states can be
brought into concord with conforming
numbers and strategies
• He thinks that to go below that, the World and
societies will have to change
I find myself strongly in agreement
with this assessment
So at 500 weapons…
• At this point, nuclear and conventional weapons
become coupled
– The US has traditionally worked hard to avoid that
• Many binary pairs are unstable because of
conventional asymmetries
– India-Pakistan, Russia-Georgia, Israel-the Arab States,
North Korea-US, etc. – and the fear not need be
realistic
• Most states fear US conventional superiority
– And our hawks are getting fearful of the Chinese
• At low numbers, ABM systems become more
credible and upset deterrence theories
For me to be comfortable with low numbers, I need to
know what you are up to over there
• Eisenhower's 1956 Open Skies Proposal was
for free over flight and photography for just
such a purpose
• The Soviets not unsurprisingly, would not
agree to the idea
• In a more limited form, nearly 30 nations of
NATO and the former Warsaw Pact have
agreed to such a treaty
– It supports the Conventional Forces Europe treaty
– And it is a success
How about a modern version to support general
relaxation of tensions?
• Imagine an internationally operated satellite
constellation that sees everything all the time
• Imagine all the data being downloaded and
stored to give a “look back in time’ ability
– Data storage is the biggest cost
• Assume a resolution of 1m at ground
• Imagine all the data being openly available to
anyone, both governments and NGOs
This is both feasible and
affordable, but is it a good idea?
There are Goods and Bads
• Goods
– Everyone can be reassured
– Everyone has the same data and the ability to
challenge it and any interpretation
– Satellite overflight is accepted and protected at present
• Bads
– Shutter control over Israel, Area 51 and Dick Cheney’s
house is lost
– Everyone can see all of our forces all the time
– It can be useful for targeting
So my story ends about twenty years
down the road
• To go below 500 weapons
–
–
–
–
Transparency in weapons systems is necessary
Transparency in the fuel cycle is needed
The effects of missile defense need to be dealt with
Asymmetries in conventional systems need
understanding -- but is resolution possible?
– The World may need to be transparent
– There must be consensus on how to deal with those
remaining outside all norms -- and action on them
These are difficult problems
that will be long in solution