CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, 2002 –
2013
ANTONY MBURU
R67/42741/2011
A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
OF BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE IN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES (SECURITY STUDIES) TO THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS), UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
SEPTEMBER 2014
DECLARATION
This project is my original work and has not been submitted for examination to any other
University.
Signed……………………………………… Date …………………………..
Antony Mburu
This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;
Signed…………………………………….. Date …………………………….
Dr. Ibrahim Farah
ii
DEDICATION
To my mother Elizabeth Wanjiku and brother Francis Kamau for their patience, encouragement
and understanding. And to my sponsor‟s, SOS Children‟s Home Village Nairobi for their
financial support in sponsoring my education for the four‟s that I have been in campus.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The completion of this work has been possible due to the continued support and encouragement
that I have received from my friends and my classmates. I would also like to express my
appreciation to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies for giving me an opportunity
to acquire new skills and broadening my understanding.
I would like to thank Dr. Farah my supervisor for his patience and personal assistance in
providing direction and guidance throughout the course of the study.
iv
ABSTRACT
The study seeks to contribute to the debate concerning conflict webs in the Horn of Africa from
2002-2013. The Horn of Africa sub-region region has been prone to continues violent conflicts
which have their roots in the colonial era and the cold war period. The overall objective of the
study is to access the impact of conflicts webs in the Horn of Africa, the causes of the conflict,
the actors, issues and process of mitigating the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The study
identified the regional security complex theory as the suitable theory in explaining the conflict
dynamic in the Horn of Africa security complex. The theory asserts that regions are structurally
open to intervention from global and regional hegemons. According to new regionalist scholar‟s
regional subsystems are not closed as the global system, therefore they suffer from an overlay.
Furthermore they argue that geographic proximity causes security dilemma because state are
more concerned or threatened by their neighbors than countries that are far away. On the
contrary the theory asserts that local intense security issues create an intense environment
between member states which has in turn led to spillover of conflict. The theory also asserts that
Regional organizations facilitate joint repression rather than integration which has been the case
in the Horn of Africa region where member states have used Intergovernmental Authority on
Development to further their interest. Furthermore the study discusses the key issue and actors
who are involved in the Horn of Africa region conflict webs. Correspondingly the study
discusses that the intergovernmental Authority on Trade and Development seeks to attain
favorable regional political environment in which regional security can thrive. In addition the
study observes that the shared interests and problems among member states continue to
exacerbate conflict in the region, therefore undermining efforts put in place by
Intergovernmental Authority on Trade and Development. In the same way the study therefore
establishes that any solution or efforts to promote peace and security in the region must
incorporate all the key actors that seek to benefit from the conflict and those who will benefit
after the conflict.
v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AU
Africa Union
CEWARN
CPA
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
Comprehensive peace agreement
HOA Horn of Africa
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
PSC
Africa Union Peace and Security Council
RSC
Regional security complex
TFG
Transitional federal government
UIC
Union of Islamic Courts
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION
ii
DEDICATION
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
iv
ABSTRACT v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Introduction
1
1.1 Background
3
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
1.3 Objective of the Study
6
1.4 Literature Review 6
1.5 Literature Gap
10
1.6 Justification of the Study 11
1.8 Hypotheses
14
1.9 Research Methodology
1.10 Chapter Outline 15
14
5
CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW
2.0 Introduction
16
2.1Colonial Legacy
16
2.2 Arming the Horn of Africa during the Cold War 19
2.3 The Horn of Africa and Cold War Politics as Source of Insecurity
21
2.4 Proxy Wars in the Horn of Africa 22
2.5 Conclusion
23
CHAPTER THREE: CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: ACTORS,
CAUSES AND PROCESSES OF MANAGEMENT
3.0 Introduction
25
3.1 An Over View of Conflict in the Horn of Africa 25
vii
3.2 Actors
27
3.2.1 Member States 27
3.2.2 International Community
28
3.3 Causes of Conflict 29
3.3.1 Frontiers and Borderland Disputes
29
3.4 IGAD and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa
30
3.5 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism of the IGAD
3.6 The IGAD – AU Relations in Conflict Resolution
3.7 Cooperation and Interference
3.8 Conclusion
31
33
33
34
CHAPTER FOUR: CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
4.0 Introduction
36
4.1Emerging Issues
37
4.2 Multidimensionality of Conflict in Horn of Africa
4.3 War Economy in the Horn of Africa
37
39
4.4 Complexity of Regional Security in the Horn of Africa 41
4.5 The Effectiveness of IGAD‟s Contribution to Peace and Security
42
4.6 Conclusion
44
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
5.0 Summary 46
5.1. Key Findings
47
5.2. Recommendations
BIBLIOGRAPHY
48
49
viii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Introduction
The Horn of Africa is a region of geographic strategic importance, with interest coming from
both surrounding and external entities.1 Correspondingly Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan,
border two crucial sea routes that is the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These waterways are
currently regaining importance in international maritime trade now that number of Middle
Eastern, Asian countries and the Russian Federation are trying to open new markets in Africa in
the aftermath of the Cold War.2
In addition the Horn of Africa region is also emerging as a potentially lucrative market for Asian
electronic technology; member states continue to discover oil and globalization has boosted
international trade. These factors have combined to make the Horn of Africa an important region
in the international economic arena of the twenty-first century. Furthermore South Sudan is
promising to be potential major producer of oil, at the same time the country has significant
water reserves and agricultural capacity that could make it a meaningful contributor to regional
development once it attains internal stability.3 Ethiopia on the other hand has enormous water
reserves and human resource which can be utilize to contributor to regional prosperity, should its
internal problems be resolved.
The study asserts that most comparative analysis of the Horn of Africa conflict system have
majorly focused on the importance of the geography and territorial boundaries in understanding
1
Lionel Cliffe , Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Published by: Taylor & Francis, Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, Complex Political Emergencies Ltd. Feb 1999 pg. 89-111
2
John g Nyuot Yoh, peace processes and conflict resolution in the horn of Africa, African Security Review
2009, 12:3, 83-93,
3
ibid
1
the conflict the Horn of Africa of the region.4 On the contrary the region has experienced
complex conflicts stretching decades and involving numerous parties aiming to advance and
eventually achieve own national interest.
Furthermore the study attempts to examine the dynamics of the present and past situation in the
Horn of Africa, therefore the study will look at role played by global actors such as the USA and
USSR in their quest for global domination during the cold war and post cold war era, and their
role in exacerbating the violence.5 In addition the study notes that issues such as oil, pastoral
wars, and support of insurgent armed groups by regional states, terrorism and irredentist actions
of Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to destabilize the region.
As a result the purpose of the study is to sketch out the main features of regional security
relations that characterized the cold war and post cold war era. After setting out the analytical
framework the study will identify the major emerging security threats that face the region as well
as their consequences to regional security. The study will also shed light to the fact that IGAD
member states continue to fuel conflict in the region despite ceasefire talks being in progress, the
study also notes that regional security has been achieved in situations where regional powers
have combined their effort to come up with a collective measures or rather solutions to address
the insecurities.
4
Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers, the Structure of International Security. Published by
Cambridge University Press 2003 pg 40-65.
5
Fred Halliday, US policy in the Horn of Africa: aboulia or proxy intervention?, Review of African Political
Economy 1977 pg 8-32
2
1.1 Background
The Horn of Africa region consist of eight States, which constitute of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan,
South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Uganda and Somalia. The region has been prone to violent
conflicts which have in turn undermined peace and security in the region. The prolonged
conflicts in the region have created pessimism among the citizens as they have witnessed
undemocratic leaders turn promising peace opportunities into another protracted conflict.6
According to Fukuki and Markakis the Horn of Africa conflict are intertwined into three types of
conflicts. They assert that the number of domestic conflict that exists within the internal
boundaries of the member States has indeed increased; furthermore they note that the intrastate
conflicts have political connotations. Secondly they note that interstate conflicts are rooted to the
colonial period have been the major catalyst that has exacerbated the conflict. And thirdly is that
regional clashes have been fuelled by international actors due to lack of good governance or
member states supporting various proxy wars in the region.7
The eight geographically located states are members of Inter Governmental Authority on Trade
and Development (IGAD), which is mandated to deal with issues of promoting peace and
security. However if Somaliland which has declared autonomy from the rest of Somalia,
achieves international recognition as an independent state the number of countries in the region
will increase to nine.8 Additionally kidane notes that the Horn of Africa region has experienced
four major inter-state wars with not less than three violent conflicts in the post-independence era
which have undermined peace and security.
6
Iyob R. Re-configuring identities: clash of Visions in the horn of Africa 1991-1999. Bern: the Swiss Peace
Foundation.
7
Fukui,K, Markakis J. Ethnicity and conflict in the Horn of Africa, Athens Ohio University Press 1994
8
Kidane Mengisteab, critical factors in the horn of Africa‟s raging conflicts, published by nordiskaafrikainstitutet,
Uppsala discussion paper no 67 2011.
3
Moreover Samatar notes that the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia, the EthiopiaEritrea war and the Sudan Civil war are classical examples of wars which have completely
undermined and characterized regional security dynamics in the Horn of Africa.9 He further
notes that occurrence of these wars cannot be fully explained in terms of their contextual factors
alone, since effective domestic and regional governance by the postcolonial state could have
managed them without resort to violence.
On the other hand Negash and Tronvoll argue that the Ethiopian-Eritrea war and the endless civil
war in Somalia continue to undermine and complicate issues of peace and security in the Horn of
Africa region.10 As a result the wars in these countries have led to spill-over effects to relatively
stable States like Kenya and Djibouti, both in terms of influx of refugees and proliferations of
small arms light weapons. Correspondingly Cliffe notes that the formation of tribal and clan
militia in Somalia has indeed exacerbated insecurity situation in most of the Horn of Africa
states, which in turn forced Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia.11
9
Samatar, A.I. and W. Machaka, “Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Regional Approach”, inIn Quest for a
Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region. Heinrich Boll Foundation Nairobi 2006, pg 26–55.
10
Negash,TTronvoll K. Brothers at War: Making sense of the Ethiopian Eritrean war, published by Lawrenceville:
red sea press 2000.
11
Cliffe, L.andP.While, “Conflict Management and Resolution in the Horn of Africa”, in Mwaura, C. and S.
Schmeidl (eds), Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press 2002.
4
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
The Horn of Africa has been Prone to violent conflicts since the colonial and post-colonial
period. The continuous reoccurrence of violence and the inter-links of the conflicts in the region
is the major focus of this study. The study also notes that the problem on insecurity in the Horn
of Africa has not been given the attention it deserves and that the major efforts which have been
taken have not resolved the issue if conflict. Furthermore the study notes older unresolved
conflicts in the region have been reinvested into the emerging security threats in the region.
However in addressing the problems of protracted conflict in the Horn of Africa, regional actors
as well as the international community have failed to address the main root causes which are
embedded in colonial legacy and the structural deficiencies in governance.
When compared to other regional security complexes in African regions the Horn of Africa
conflict system is considered to be the most volatile region. Furthermore the region continues to
deteriorate with different actors fighting for their interest to be secured. Consequently an all
inclusive premeditated intervention by IGAD and regional member has not had any success in
resolving the continuous violence in the region because of the diversity and complexity of the
nature of conflicts in the region. In this regard the study seeks to analyze the Horn of Africa as a
conflict prone region, and also seeks to explore the protracted conflict situation despite the
diverse conflict management efforts in this relatively volatile region. The study seeks to assess
the reason why no bidding solution is yet to be reached becomes the premier concern of this
study, considering the enormous efforts and measures put in place by IGAD and member states
to resolving the violence.
5
1.3 Objective of the Study
The overall objective of the study is to critically assess the webs of conflict in the Horn of Africa
sub-region. More specifically, the study aims to:
i)
Provide an overview of conflict webs in the Horn of Africa sub-region;
ii)
Analyze the actors, issues and processes of managing conflict in the Horn of Africa sub
region;
iii)
Explore measures taken to promote peace and security in the Horn of Africa sub-region.
1.4 Literature Review
A lot has been written about the conflict in Horn of Africa sub-region. This section focuses on
the various debates by different scholars regarding the conflict in the Horn of Africa. In this
review the study will explore the literature on protracted conflict in the Horn of Africa.
The African continent has been depicted as a dark continent which continues to suffer from
security dilemmas. Three main schools of thought are utilized in this study. A focus through the
realist school of thought provides a view or rather an understanding of interstate suspicion,
which is identified by military buildup as the main cause of war and interstate rivalry in the Horn
of Africa; this was the case during the Ogaden war of 1976.12 A focus through the liberal school
of thought provides a synopsis of a continent with minimal success in regional and sub-regional
cooperation in the sphere of peace security. Lastly, a focus through the human security school of
12
John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, the Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relations: published by Oxford University Press 2005, 5 th edition
6
thought identifies a region that is characterized by poverty, unemployment, violation of human
rights, famine displacement of people, poor health facilities and a region faced with
environmental degradation.13 The three schools of thought establish an entry point into
understanding the conflict and level of insecurity in the Horn of Africa.
A historical context of the existing conflict is used to explain the complex conflict within the
region. Ali Mazrui states that one of the root causes of war in Africa lies in the white man‟s
legacy comparison of pre-colonial and post-colonial wars. A seed of post-colonial war lies in the
sociological and political mess created by colonial rulers in Africa.14 The colonial rulers
destroyed old methods of conflict resolution instilled in the African traditional institutions,
without creating subsystems that would work for the indigenous people. Looking at Somali as a
casing point, Said Barre replaced the council of elders with his own handpicked chiefs who were
only answerable to him. Consequently any conflict within the community ended up in the police
post or chiefs camp. As a result this made clans resort to the use of force as a result of the
deprivation of avenues of dispute resolution.15
In a position paper entitled conflict and peace management in the Horn of Africa, Makumi
Mwagiru highlights the meaning of Horn of Africa Conflict system. He argues that the
internationalized character of the conflict system in the Horn of Africa has led to a far reaching
implication of the entire geographical landscape of the Horn of Africa. According to Mwagiru,
the notion that numbers of conflict in the region are purely internal is a sound beginning point for
analysis and managing conflict. He goes further to argue that any particular conflict should be
13
14
Ibid
Mazrui Ali, conflict in Africa: an overview, edited by Pumphery and Schwartz- Barcott, armed conflict in Africa,
published by Baltimore Maryland Scare crow press 2003
15
Mohammed A, Humanitarian intervention in Africa: A retrospective study of Somalia,, In contemporary Security
in Africa Vol 1, No 1, published in April 2012 pp: 44-62
7
analyzed and managed in the context of the conflict system to which they belong. This approach
gives useful pointer to the wider cause of conflict and eventually to a suitable management
approach that can be adopted.16
The study therefore notes that core conflict systems have been between Sudan and Somalia,
Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. However the current
epicenter is in South Sudan and Somali conflict systems, therefore the management and
transformation of the conflict system in the Horn of Africa need to be centered on both Somali
and South Sudan Conflict. According to Alan, the conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia have
reached unprecedented levels. For instance, the Somali crisis has fragmented the country into
unconventional political units, each under the control of a warlord.17
Kidame argues that the prospect of peace between peace and security Ethiopia and Eritrea is
difficult to assess but its potential impact on the overall stability of the Horn of Africa region is
very significant. The Eritrean- Ethiopian conflict that lasted from 1969 to 1991 completely
destabilized the region, which led to a relapse into conflict between the two states in 1998 to
2000. He also argues that at the center of the recent conflict is the question of Eritrea identity
which has been a contested issue between the two states. He goes further to note that according
to the Ethiopian historians, Eritrea was part of Ethiopia years before the Italian colonization and
therefore it ought to remain as part of the country‟s territory. On the other hand, contrary to what
Ethiopian historians claim, the Eritreans claim that it developed a unified and separate political
16
MakumiMwagiru, conflict and peace management in the Horn of Africa: theoretical and practical perspectives,
international resource group conference, Mombassa Kenya from November 6-9, 1996 (revised in 1998) pg 4
17
Mohammed A, Humanitarian intervention in Africa: A retrospective study of Somalia, In contemporary Security
in Africa Vol 1, No 1, published in April 2012 pp: 44-62
8
entity during the Italian colonial period; therefore the bone of contention between the states is
what has led to increased animosity between the two neighbors.18
According to Vasquez, neighboring states fight because of their territorial proximity and high
interaction. He further acknowledges that the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute of 1998-2000 is a
practical example of why states go to war. He reiterates that the two countries that share common
borders are bound to wage war against each other; hence this was the case between Ethiopia and
Eritrea when they collided over the issue of who owns the Badame village. Among other things,
border dispute of 1998 demonstrated that Eritrean claims of nationhood remained unacceptable
to Ethiopian nationalist who still consider Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopia.19
Gamst argues that Ethiopia has been an imperialist state that has periodically expand its territory.
He argues that from 1855 to 1990 Ethiopia has pursued an expansionist policy which enabled it
to increase in size. He goes on further to note that in the Horn of Africa disputes are likely to
escalate into wars as compared to other regions. Kornprobst concurs with Gamst argument as he
argues that during the 1988 border dispute, Eritrea claimed that Ethiopia wanted to re- occupy
Eritrea, and therefore it justified its military engagement with Ethiopia as an act of defending its
sovereignty. Ethiopia on the other hand argued that Eritrea invaded its sovereign territory and
justified its military confrontation as self defense and as an issue of preserving its territorial
integrity.20
18
19
Falola Toying and Raphael ChijiokeNjoku, war and peace in Africa, Carolina academic press 2009.
John Vasquez, why do neighbors fight? Proximity, interaction and territoriality, journal of peace research isuue no
33August 1995
20
Fredrick Gamst, conflict in the Horn of Africa in peace and war, cultural perspectivesed Foster Mary, Roberts A.
Rubinstein, new Brunswick and oxford transaction books 1986, pp 137.
9
According to Abdoulaye, the secessionist and irredentist threats that the African continent has
faced since independence continue to destabilize the continent, for example one could highlight
the impact in the region of the 1993 Eritrean secession from Ethiopia. He argues that the external
powers can also be blamed for their interference in African politics. The ideological war between
the West and the East bloc has exacerbated tensions within the region, as political elites who
refused to comply were either suppressed directly or support for opposition and rebel movements
became rampart after independence of the African states.21
1.5 Literature Gap
All these literature documents have discussed and analyzed the critical causes and issues that
exacerbate conflict in the Horn of Africa, and the impact of conflict on peace and security in the
Horn of Africa region. However most of the scholars have focused their debate on the
importance of geographic proximity, on amity and enmity in understanding the Horn of Africa
security complex. Therefore proximity has been their central pillar of the argument for analysis
on the distinct Horn of Africa region which is prone to continuous insecurities. As a result they
have failed to recognize that in the 21st century, advancement in technology has reduced the
proximity or distance between to state, that is distance is longer an issue. For these reason, the
study affirms that geographic location as noted by Buzan and Ole weaver fails to give an
explanation as to whether states which are not geographically proximate can be part of a certain
regional security complex and conflicts continue to reemerge in the region.
Moreover in order to understand the dynamism and multiplicity of players in the Horn of Africa,
the study identifies that the gap lies between looking at the diversity of issues that characterize
the region and the inclusion of other states which are not geographically located as part of the
21
Markus Kornpobst, the management of border disputes in Africa sub-system. Comparing west Africa and Horn of
Africa. Journal of the mider African studies 40, number 3 (2002) 369-394.
10
Horn of Africa security complex. The multidimensionality of issue has indeed expanded the
region in terms of the actors and the issue that continue to threaten regional security.
1.6 Justification of the Study
The study and explanation of the web of conflicts in the Horn of Africa has mainly focused on
the governance of geographically located states within the region seems to represent significant
gaps in the study. Issues such ethnic violence, fight over scarce resources, tribal wars have been
the main issues that have characterized the regional insecurity dilemmas. However the study
focuses on the importance of issues that inform the regional security dynamics. According to
Lake, a region is defined in terms of the security threats it faces and the issues that characterize
the security dynamics in the region. He further argues that due to advancement in technology,
geography is no longer the main issue that defines a complex. The phenomenon of regional
openness invites both global and continental powers to be part of the increasingly insecurity in
the Horn of Africa.22 The study appreciate the fact that to imagine a peaceful and stable Horn of
Africa is to think of a different political order, perhaps in the form of a loose confederation that
transcends the inherited colonial borders that separated communities a long border lines.
The study notes that the security gaps are not only occasioned by the lack of a comprehensive
regional security defense policy, rather by the diverse issues which characterize the region which
has an international implication.
The study further seeks to contribute to the existing theory of knowledge by bringing forth the
idea that IGAD as regional institutions needs to adopt a more comprehensive regional security
framework such as the one adopted the European Union (EU). The study also notes that there is
22
Robert E. Kell, Security Theory in the "New Regionalism"': International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 2,
published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
11
need for the Horn of Africa States to adopt a common foreign policy and security framework that
will go well with their interest in order to reduce interference from global powers and other
regional hegemons.
1.7
Theoretical Framework
Regional security complex theory enabled the study to analyze and explain occurrence of
conflict webs in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore the Regional security complex theory centers
on patterns of amity and enmity among member states in the Horn of Africa sub system, which
in turn results to the region been dependent on the actions and interpretations of the intentions of
the member states. Buzan notes that most states in a regional security complex worry more about
their immediate neighbors than distance states, in the case of the Horn of Africa region this has
been the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Ethiopia and Somalia. The intertwined
conflicts in the Horn of Africa region demonstrate characteristics of a regional security complex
(RSC) that is a collection of states whose main security concerns are tied together that their
national securities objectives cannot be practically considered apart from one another.
The main element in a RSC is its security relationships and the elements of interdependence that
concern security. According to Buzan, a region refers to a set of countries connected by
geography and share one of or more common arts such as the level of development, culture and
political institution. Furthermore, Buzan argues that security dilemmas are sharper among
proximate states with shared history of interaction, and that states are more concerned about
threats posed by their neighboring states than distant states.23
23
Buzan Barry, people state and fear: an agenda for international system to international security in the post-cold
war era, 2nd edition, boulder and lynnrienner publishers 1991 pg186-221
12
Since security is a relational phenomenon, one cannot understand the national security of any
given state without understanding the regional pattern of security interdependence in which it is
embedded; hence the Horn of Africa region can be defined as a region of interlocking pattern of
securitization.
According to Lake and Morgan they disregard geographical proximity and historical linkage as
the main contributors of insecurity in the region. Lake argues that states form regional security
complexes around the Africa continent share security externalities between member states.24 He
defines a regional system as a collection of states influenced by at least more than one transborder or a series of local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area. If the local
externality presents a genuine or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or
governments in other states, then a regional security complex is established in that location.25
His definition of what constitute a regional security complex, Lake explains that the use of proxy
wars by member states in the Horn of Africa especially by Eritrea and Ethiopia has completely
undermined the peace and security in the region.
While geographical location is not necessarily a contributing factor to membership of a country
into a certain regional security complex. Lake argues that the location of a particular security
complex is where the security relationships or consequence exist of states action take center
stage. He further argues that the membership into the security complex is determined by the level
and frequency with which States participate in a particular security complex. Therefore any
conflict that takes place within a particular regional security complex and pose a threat, or is
viewed by members as having considerable relevance and significant externality qualifies to be
24
David A. Lake, „Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach‟, in Patrick Morgan and David A. Lake
(eds), Regional Orders – Building Security in a New World, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997, p.31.
25
ibid
13
part of that security complex. Therefore the regional security theories illustrate the difference
between intra-state conflict and regional conflict. Furthermore the porous borders in the region
make this approach especially relevant in understanding hostilities in the Horn of Africa sub
region.26
1.8
Hypotheses
The study will test the following hypotheses:
The increased overlay of the region has impacted negatively on peace and security in the
Horn of Africa region
Member states security initiatives can impact positively on the peace and security in the
region
Building resilience mechanism in the Horn of Africa will enhance member states capacity
to mitigate conflict.
1.9
Research Methodology
The study utilized both primary and secondary data collection as the main methods of data
analysis. The study concerning webs of conflict in the Horn of Africa is a challenge because of
the diversity and multiplicity of actors. Therefore the study combined different sources and
methods of data collection. Indeed, the methodology used a combination of primary and
secondary sources due to the lack of varied sources, consequently focusing on the history of
conflict in the Horn of Africa and the forty five (45) plus years of war as well as the current
situation of insecurity in the region. However due to time and resource constrains the study
26
Ibid lake and Morgan
14
utilized the epistemology of both interpretive and constructivism to guide the qualitative method
of research.
Gathering data through primary sources came from official IGAD documents but also from the
existing literature on the approaches of understanding conflict in the Horn of Africa, the study
also took into consideration the view of regional states, scholars from different institutions, the
press in member state countries and also the views of international Organizations such as the
United Nations and the African Union.
The study also used secondary sources of data, derived from previous interviews done by
scholars and researches on key decision makers. Therefore these in turn broaden the study
explanation to the root cause of conflict in the Horn of Africa. By merging the answers retrieved
from interview and the literature available, it enabled the study to construct a reality and
simultaneously creating an interpretation of the situation. The interview helped in understanding
and challenging the theories of contested Geopolitics, diplomatic relations and peace resolution
led by IGAD.
1.10 Chapter Outline
The study is structured into five (5) chapters as follows;
Chapter One introduces the study.
Chapter Two cover‟s the overview of conflict in the Horn of Africa region.
Chapter Three is the case study.
Chapter Four is the critical analysis of the emerging issues in the Horn of Africa.
Chapter Five outline the conclusion, key findings and recommendations of the study.
15
CHAPTER TWO
CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: OVERVIEW
2.0
Introduction
Chapter one introduced the issues that are discussed in this paper. The chapter provides a
synopsis of the problem statement that the study is discussing, its objectives, and justification of
the study, hypotheses and the theoretical framework that informs the study. The chapter also
gave a comprehensive literature review of various key debates on the conflict in the Horn of
Africa, as well as identifying the literature gap of the study.
The chapter focuses on an overview of historical events in the Horn of Africa by dealing
specifically with the colonial legacy and superpower rivalry during the cold war in causing and
exacerbating conflict in the Horn of Africa region.
2.1
Colonial Legacy
The study observes that colonial legacy has had a major impact in destabilizing the Horn of
Africa region.27 Hansen argues that during colonization the British controlled the Somali
hinterland, which they in turn named it the British Somaliland. He further argues that the French
also had their own area around Djibouti which was under their jurisdiction, which was referred
as the French Somaliland, while the Italians on the other hand controlled the area along the Red
Sea Coast extending to the Tagrayan highlands, which was referred as the Italian Somaliland.28
Hansen further states Ethiopia victory over Italy in 1896 in the battle of Adowa led to the
27
Daniel Kendie, towards north east African cooperation, resolving Ethiopia and Somalia disputes. Northeast
African Studies, Volume 10, Number 2, 3 (New Series), pp. 67-109.Published by Michigan State University Press
2003
28
ibid
16
demarcation of major international boundaries in the Horn, and as a result it led to the separation
of the Somalia territory between the French, the British and the Italian Somaliland.29
Samatar elaborates further that colonialism led to the division of various ethnic groups long State
boundaries which resulted into fragmentation and disruption of social and cultural ties between
communities. He argues that the fragmentation of the Somalia people has led to the EthiopiaSomalia conflict over the Ogaden region.30 He illustrates further by arguing that in the case of
the Horn of Africa colonial boundaries that were not properly demarcated have led to intense
conflicts in the region, such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war which continue to be a thorn in
attainment of peace and security in the region.
Kidane Mengisteab notes that border problem is likely to arise between north and South Sudan.
Although the British kept South Sudan apart from the north for most of the colonial period, the
boundaries between the two remain unclear and are likely to cause insecurity in the region. He
notes that border conflicts are mostly between inter-state or intra- states which have serious
implications for state-identity and inter-identity relations, as they entail various hardships for
border communities, especially when their loyalty to their community is questioned.31
Mutibwa takes the debate further and argues that the uneven development among regions and
ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa have further exacerbated the conflicts in the region. He
argues that one of the key objectives of colonialism was the extraction of resources in regions
rich with mineral, which led to the marginalization of certain regions.32 Mutibwa points out that
in Kenya for instance the British ascertained central region and the Rift Valley region as the
29
Hansen, E.Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development London: Zed Books, 1987
30
Samatar, A.I. and W. Machaka, 2006, “Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: A Regional Approach”, in Quest
for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation: 26–55.
31
KidaneMengisteab, Critical factors in the Horn of Africa ‟Raging conflicts, NordiskaAfrikainstitutet, Uppsala
2011. Discussion paper 67 pg 20-39
32
Mutibwa, P.The Buganda Factor in Ugandan Politics. Kampala: Fountain Publisher 2008.
17
main profitable areas, while the Western and Northeastern regions where marginalized because
they were viewed as unprofitable. Moreover years after decolonization these regions that were
marginalized remained marginalized, and in turn they have become centers for conflict and
insecurity in the Horn of Africa.
For instance the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia has been mainly due to the Ogaden
region. Ethiopia has argued that region is part and parcel of its territory due to the fact that the
region was given to it by the colonial masters and that the region was under Ethiopia jurisdiction
in the first place.33. On the other hand the Somalia Republic was created in 1960 after the
merging of former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Therefore the Somalia government
argues that the region should be part of Somali due to the shared cultural values between the two
nations. Since its independence Somali national policy has aimed at uniting all the lands in the
region that had Somalis in order to form the Greater Somalia.34
The unresolved questions of the Ethiopian-Somali border provided the Somali politicians with
some ground on which to challenge Addis Abba‟s control over the Ogaden35. In fact just six
months after Somali‟s independence, there were military clashes between Somali and Ethiopia
which erupted into a full scale war in 1964. However, Somalia was defeated but not restrained
because the government in Somalia carried on causing instability in Ethiopia. Furthermore
Somalia discovered that it could defeat Ethiopia on its own, therefore the Somalia government
opted to look for allies in order to liberate Ogaden from Ethiopia.36
33
Benjamin Rivlin, The United Nations and the Italian Colonies, United Nations Action, Case Histories, no.
1 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).
34
E. Amos J. Peaslee, ed., “Constitution of the Somali Republic,” in Constitutions of Nations, vol. 1, Africa,
3rd ed., rev. (The Hague, Netherlands: MartinusNijhoff, 1965).
36
ibid
18
2.2 Arming the Horn of Africa during the Cold War
During the cold war conflicts in the HOA were characterized by super power rivalry between the
Soviet Union (East bloc) and the United States (western bloc) who funded and armed various
regimes in order to advance their own interest. According to Caroline and Wilkin the Horn of
Africa depicted the hegemonic stability theory, in which the superpower hegemons deepened or
rather exacerbated political stability.37 They argue that political leaders in the region were able
to the play-off external actors against each other in order to attract huge sums of military and
economic aid for their regime survival. The persistence of internal and inter-state conflicts
increased the dependence of the countries of the Horn of Africa on the superpowers for military
aid, which in turn led to exerted political leverage over them.38 The search for outside resources
to maintain domestic power structures was central to the foreign policy of the great majority
states in the region. Jeffrey argues that the United States under President Roosevelt became the
chief supplier of arms to the Ethiopian regime, whereas Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for
arms in order to counter the Ethiopian arms.39
However Jeffrey points out that both Moscow and Washington were interested in Ethiopia
because of its strategic geographical location, its favorable climatic condition, physical size,
population and its affluent rich history. He further points out that over the past four decades the
USA and the USSR (Soviet Union) played great power arms patrons owing to their vast
capability and willingness to provide vast quantities of sophisticated military hardware to their
respective allies. As a result both Ethiopia and Somalia increased their military hardware
37
Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (ed.) Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience. London.
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1999 38 Ibid
39
Jeffrey Alan Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991. Pittsburgh,
PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1991,pp 80.
19
considerably with the United States increasing it‟s funding to Ethiopia to about $ 185 million
worth of military assistance, with the Soviet Union retaliating by arming Somalia to its core.40
Medane Tadese notes that the end of the cold war ushered in a new era of cooperation in order to
manage and resolve conflicts that were a distinguishing factor during the cold war period. He
notes that there were positive progress towards a peaceful transition to democratic governance in
many Horn of Africa countries, with Kenya and Ethiopia playing a key role in managing the
conflicts in the region.41However in spite of the earlier progress the wars in Sudan, Ethiopia and
Somalia intensified and peace initiatives that were set to take center stage wavered into thin air.
In a nutshell intra state conflicts emerged as a serious problem for the Horn of Africa as at
1990's. It become increasingly evident that the end of the cold war or bipolarity would not
contributed to peace and security in the region because of militarization and availability of arms
that was present during the cold war period. Without a doubt the end of the cold war created a
power vacuum which led to political instability, deconstruction of the State institutions in
Somalia and cessation of Eritrea embedded the region into violent conflicts.42 On the contrary
Cliffe argues that the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime of General Omer El-Bestir came to
power in Sudan through a military coup in 1989, while a civil war broke out in Djibouti between
the Issa and the Afar opposition continued to characterize the region as a conflict infected
region.43
40
ibid
41
MedhaneTadese, Turning conflicts to cooperation in the Horn of Africa, friedrich–ebert-stiftung Addis Ababa,
2004 p9 33-105
42
Ibid
43
Lionel Cliff, Regional dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa, Third World Quarterly1999 pg89-111
20
2.3 The Horn of Africa and Cold War Politics as Source of Insecurity
The Cold War exacerbated the crisis in the region, because the United States and USSR sought
to spread their own ideology and stamp their influence in the region. Regional leaders also took
advantage of the Cold War to shift alliances and entrench their authoritarian rule.44 Furthermore
Adam Curle argued that the cold war planted a seed of violence in the region, hence plaguing the
region into virulent conflicts. According to Jaine coercive political negotiations in the context of
the prevailing superpower rivalry were the main mechanisms and strategies that were used to
manage and resolve conflicts during the cold war.45Leatherman and Väyrynen concur with
Adam and they further suggested that the involvement of collective security organizations and
other third parties was possible only in conflicts in which the great powers did not have a direct
involvement or in which they had shared interests.46
Mark Katz further suggests that the USA and USSR employed their cold war strategies without
considering the implications of their strategies on the local communities.47Touval on the other
hand notes that the core interest of the USA involvement in mediation efforts during the cold war
was mainly aimed at ensuring that the Soviet Union did not utilize conflict situation to further
their influence in the region.48 He points out that this was the scenario in the Horn of Africa, as
both Somalia and Sudan were inclined to one or the other superpower.
44
Tim Murithi. Inter-governmental Authority on Development on the Ground: Comparing Interventions in Sudan
and Somalia, African Security2009, 2:2-3, pp136-157,
45
Adam Curle, “Peacemaking: The Middle Way,” Bridges: Quaker International Affairs Report 92, no. 3 (1992): 2.
46
Jaine Leatherman and RaimoVayrynen, “Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution: Directions of Collaborative
Research Policy,” Cooperation and Conflict 30, no.1 (1995): 55.
47
Mark Katz, “The Future of Superpower Conflict Resolution in the Third World,” in Soviet-American Conflict
Resolution in the Third World, ed. Mark Katz (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991)
48
SaadiaTouval, “The Superpowers As Mediators,” in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to
Conflict Management, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1992), 233.
21
In the case of Somalia which was ruled by Said Barre from independence, Touval noted that Said
Barre shifted his allegiance from the USSR to the United States and then back to the USSR as he
sort which great power best suited in interest.49
Mark Katz suggested that due to the perceived strategic interest of the Horn of Africa to the
United States and the USSR, they played a coercive role behind the scenes either in perpetuating
or attempting to resolve regional conflict without much consideration for the affected
communities. Katz observes that “although the superpowers did not cause the many conflicts in
the region, their involvement however exacerbated them.50 The aftermath of the cold war had
significant effect on in promoting peace and security in the Horn of Africa region. Conflict
become more internal, with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sponsoring of
proxy wars in the region by region by member states and international actors continued to hinder
peace initiatives from materializing.
2.4 Proxy Wars in the Horn of Africa
The border stalemate and the underlying problem of fragile governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea
are intrinsically linked to conflicts in the Horn of Africa and. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have
demonstrated the capacity and willingness to use proxy forces to undermine the other.51 The use
proxy wars in the Horn of Africa region can be traced backed to the cold war era, which resulted
to destabilization of peace in the horn of African. Young concur with John that the border
stalemate, fragility of governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea has enabled the two governments to
49
Touval Ibid
50
Katz, “The Future of Superpower Conflict Resolution in the Third World,” 170.
51
John g Nyuot Yoh, peace processes and conflict resolution in the horn of Africa, African Security Review 2009,
12:3, 83-93,
22
sponsor proxy wars in order to underestimate each other government.52 He argues that the
Eritrea has funded and armed insurgents such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Ethiopian People‟s Patriotic Front (EPPF) which
operate within Ethiopian territory. On the other hand Ethiopia has responded by supporting
opposition movements in Eritrea.
In addition to supporting each other‟s insurgents and opposition movements, both Ethiopia and
Eritrea have competed against each other by supporting rival parties in neighboring states.
Terrence notes that Ethiopia had been a major ally of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in
Somalia by providing support, while on the other hand Eritrea provided assistance to the Union
of Islamic Courts (UIC).53
As is the case with domestic politics in both Asmara and Addis Ababa, conflict in Somalia has
its own dynamics and is not predominantly a sideshow in the Ethiopia- Eritrea rivalry. Ending
the Ethiopia-Eritrea proxy war is not sufficient to resolve the challenges of instability within
Somalia or the Horn of Africa region. However, the larger regional insecurities are complicated
and made more difficult to settle by the continuous support by Asmara and Addis Ababa to
various factions, motivated in part by the dynamics of their proxy war.
2.5
Conclusion
Decolonization in the Horn of Africa was a prolonged affair. Ethiopia was colonized only briefly
by Italy during the Second World War. It was a rare case of an African state having a long
standing indigenous state tradition as an empire. Sudan gained its independence in 1956 and
Somalia in 1960. Eritrea gained its independence in 1993 after a long civil war with Ethiopia,
52
Young, J. (2006), „Eastern Sudan: caught in a web of external interests‟, Review of African Political Economy
2006, 33, (109), pp. 594–600
53
Terrence Lyons, The Political Economy 2006, 36:120, 167-180
23
and the small territory of Djibouti attained independent in 1977 remains under strong French
influence.
Therefore the historical factor of colonialism has played a major role in exacerbating conflict in
the Horn of Africa. The fragmentation of the Somalia community due to poor demarcation of
borders has a major contributing factor conflict in the region. In addition the cold War
confrontation between the USA and USSR had significant impact on peace and security in the
Horn of Africa, where it precipitated regional crisis, thereby effectively destroying the conditions
necessary for transnational initiatives. On the other hand the removal of the Cold War‟s overlay
on regional affairs did not solve the problem; rather it exacerbated the situation in the region.
Furthermore most of the period leading up to the early 1990s was characterized by the following
security interactions between the member states in the Horn of Africa. They included the linked
civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over
ownership of the Ogaden region. Interwoven with these was a much older tradition of conflict
between sedentary highland Christian agriculturalists and nomadic lowland Muslim pastoralists.
The post cold war insecurities distinguished the Horn of Africa region to exhibit the
characteristics of a pre-security complex by having many elements of strong bilateral security
interdependence, but the member states failed to link the security environment at that time into
an integrated pattern.
24
CHAPTER THREE
CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: ACTORS, CAUSES AND PROCESSES
OF MANAGEMENT
3.0 Introduction
Chapter two gave an overview of the study. The overview indulged in looking at historical
events that have caused conflict in the Horn of Africa. The chapter highlighted that colonial
legacy and super power rivalry during the cold war as the major causes of conflict. Furthermore
the chapter also provided an insight into the effect of arms proliferation and proxy war and their
distinguished role in exacerbating the conflict.
The chapter will look into the case study of the Horn of Africa as a region prone to conflict. The
complexity of the nature of conflict in the Horn of Africa is mainly due to the interplay between
actors involved and issues considered to be the causes of conflict in this region. Issues affecting
the Horn of Africa region remain unresolved due to various actors who take part in the conflict.
Although member states have tried to cooperate with each other in order to address the issues of
insecurity, their efforts have been futile, because rather than resolving the disputes their efforts
have exacerbated the conflicts in the region. The chapter additionally explores into detail the role
of IGAD in initiating, implementing and mitigating conflict in the region.
3.1
An Overview of Conflict in the Horn of Africa
As started in chapter two of this study, the Horn of Africa sub-region has been Africa‟s most
problematic area for a long time. Internal conflicts have been the most chronic and characterizing
phenomena in most of the countries of the Horn. For instance the proxy wars between Ethiopia
25
and Eritrea, the protracted conflict in Sudan, and the total disintegrations of Somalia are some of
the extreme manifestations of the problems that the region has faced.54
Mwaura and Kiplagat argue that Horn of Africa as a region has been embroiled into endless wars
for more than forty years and represents one of the most complicated and difficult conflict
systems in Africa. The region has been the site for several armed conflicts (both intra and intersstate), severe environmental degradation, and general livelihood of insecurity.55 Without a doubt
Cliffe asserts that the Horn of Africa has become a common place for violent conflict which has
in turn resulted into disruption of the member States in Horn of Africa region.56 He further
observes that the Horn has been faced with the same uncertainty of contested territory and
boarders inherited form European colonial rule, which have inevitably resulted into the problems
of State making and nation building.57
In general, Healy contextualizes the common features of conflicts in the Horn of Africa.58 She
argues that the first feature of conflict in the Horn of Africa is its prevalence. To be precise she
argues that there have been consistently high levels of violent conflict throughout the region for
the better part of the last century and before. Healy notes that conflicts in the Horn of Africa
region have occurred at every level, namely within the internal boundaries of the State, between
member States, among proxies and between armies at the center and in the periphery. As a result
the tension has created habits and continues cycles of war, including reliance on the use of force
54
Mesfin Woldemariam. The Horn of Africa: Conflict and Poverty. Commercial Printing Press, 1999 pp 154-155
55
Ciru mwaura, Gunter Baechler andd bethuel kiplagat , Early warning and conflict management in the Horn of
Africa. Asmara the red sea press 2002 pp 32
56
Lionel Cliffe. Regional Dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Third World Quarterly, 1991 pp 32-40 57 ibid
58
Sally Healy. Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa.
London. Inter-Africa Group, 2008
26
to attain political objectives.59 Moreover another common feature according to Healy has been
the issue of poor governance in the region due to lack of democratic accountability. Furthermore
the history of regime change through violent rather than peaceful means has been made possible
by the toughened culture of militarism.60 While conflict takes different forms according to local
circumstances and traditions, armed rebellions are always high among the options for dealing
with political grievances.
3.2 Actors
3.2.1 Member States
Apart from the internal conflicts in the region, the Horn of Africa States are faced by inter-state
conflicts that have had greater impact in the exacerbating violence in the region. Each state in the
Horn of Africa region has played a role either directly or indirectly in exacerbating the conflict in
neighboring states by supporting or funding some of the conflicts. For example Ethiopia has
indeed backed rebel groups in Sudan and Somalia, while Sudan and Somalia have retaliated by
backing the rebels in Ethiopia. Furthermore the attitudes of the neighboring countries as well as
of regional and international organizations towards the emerging and competing political entities
in various parts of Somalia seem to be primarily driven by their need to protect their respective
interests. Moreover it appears that some of the regional actors deliberately want to interfere in
domestic affairs in Somalia by taking specific positions with regard to the recognition or nonrecognition of one or the other political interest.61
Ethiopia has been directly been involved all the major conflicts in the Horn of Africa region due
to the fact that it shares borders with virtually every state in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore
59
ibid
60
ibid
61
Anonymous, Government recognition in Somalia and regional political stability in the Horn of Africa. The
Journal of Modern African Studies2002,, pp 247-272
27
Ethiopia continues to sponsor various proxy wars in Somalia and Eritrea.62 On the other hand
the phenomenon of militarizing peace processes has been part of a regional culture in which
member states regularly use to project their military power beyond their own borders. As a
consequence regional states create a difficult environment in which to build and premise regional
configure mechanism for regional peace and security. Therefore it is clear that unstable
neighbors cause instability in the region and as such more direct measures need to be taken by
regional states to prevent prevalence of conflict.
3.2.2 International Community
The United States and Soviet Union extended their cold war politics to the Horn of Africa
region. The competition for hegemonic rule resulted to militarization and acquisition of weapons
by the member States in the Horn of Africa. The amount of money invested by Horn of Africa
states in militarization and acquisition of weapons during the Cold war surpassed the percentage
of the Gross Domestic Product used for development, health and education of member states.
Other states like France, Germany, Cuba, Israel and Iran supplied weapons to Horn of Africa
states, with Cuba Supporting Somalia with arms during the Ogaden War. On the other hand the
Soviet Union provided Weapons worth $1 billion per year in arming Somalia.63 Similarly Sudan
spent about $1 million a day to finance its war with South Sudan‟s SPLA.64
This negativity in terms of funding and militarization of the region has in turn contributed to the
complexity and worsening of the situation. Currently there is a strong presence of the United
62
Markakis, J. The Somali in Ethiopia, Review of African Political Economy1996, pp. 567- 570. Khalief, M and
Doornbos, M. The Somali Region in Ethiopia: A Neglected Human Rights Tragedy, Review of African
PoliticalEconomy912002, pp. 73-94.
63
Paul D. Williams et al, Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace in The horn of Africa: what role for the United
States? Published Woodrow Wilson international centre for scholars, in December 2011 in Washington Dc 64 Ibid
28
States region, because of its involvement in fighting terrorism, while China continues to sell
arms to the two Sudan‟s therefore exacerbating the conflicts. On the other hand the European
Union continue to fund the early warning efforts of IGAD, at the same time Japan has set a
military base in Djibouti in order to ensure Maritime security. Whilst the Arab league and
Middle East states are heavily involved in the funding and arming of different sate and non-state
actors in the region.65 The study also points out that due to the regional proximity with the
Middle East and its shared cultural background with North African states, countries such as
Yemen, Libya and Egypt have been involved in the conflict, therefore intensifying the conflicts
in the region.
3.3
Causes of the Conflict
3.3.1 Frontiers and Borderland Disputes
The region‟s border line and territory have been and continue to be the source of conflict in the
Horn of Africa region. The principal conflicts with precise focus on territory and border lines
were fought between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-78) and Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000).66
The problem of territoriality was exacerbated by the impact of colonialism, which left the Horn
with several ill-defined political borders that split apart people with shared ethnic identities or
forced different ethnicities and cultural affiliations to live in the same sovereign state. A big part
of the boundary headaches that has faced Ethiopia for example stem from the fact that the Italian
and British colonial masters never clearly demarcated the border lines.
65
Ibid
66
Lionel Cliffe, Roy Love & Kjetil Tronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political
Economy 2009 pg 151-163,
29
Conversely the continuing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea persists to be a major
impediment to peace and security in the Horn of Africa.67 In retrospect it was undoubtedly a
miscalculation not to physically demarcate the border line between the two countries in the
immediate aftermath of Eritrea‟s independence when relations between the two nations were
strong and cordial. As a result of the growing animosity the Algiers Agreement has been put to
the side lines and the conflict has become much more than just an issue of border demarcation; it
has shifted to encompass matters of national pride and personal honor for both regimes and, to a
lesser extent their populations.68 Therefore it has become seemingly difficult to engineer a
settlement while both regimes maintain their current hard line stance.
3.4
IGAD and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa
IGAD and its member states have constituted forums for the civil society, community based
organization, and important Non Governmental organizations to participate in promoting peace
efforts in Somalia and Sudan. In this regard IGAD has created permanent secretaries to both
Sudan and Somalia in order to foster peacemaking initiatives. Furthermore it has also enlisted the
aid of the international community to these efforts including the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)
consisting of twenty countries, the UN, the World Bank, and EU have been to assist and support
the two peace processes.69
On the other hand the main focus of IGAD has been on capacity building and awareness
creation, and on the Early Warning of conflicts. In September 2002, the prominent mission in
67
Cliffe, Love and Tronvoll, Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, pp.153.
68
ibid
69
Bizusew Mersha. Sub-Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case ofIGAD‟s Mediation Role
in the Sudan. Addis Ababa University, 2004.
30
this regard was the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
(CEWARN).70
3.5 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism of the IGAD
The issue of peace and security has been the major priority in the Horn of Africa region, in order
to harmonize and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. IGAD in one of its priority
area has a conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism for the Horn of Africa so
as to ensure that peace and security agendas are adequately addressed.71
In addition peace and security in the Horn of Africa was prioritized after revitalization of IGAD
in 199 in order to have broader mechanism and mandate in dealing with conflict. Since its
revitalization IGAD has authorized and outlined its peace and security strategy in 2003 summit
and consequently launched its implementation in 2010. Additionally the formation of a Conflict
Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWARN) has been identified within the peace and
security as a key institution in dealing with conflict prevention, management and Resolution.72
In this mechanism, only member states which have ratified this protocol are entitled to
participate in the activities.73 The Mechanisms functions include; Promoting the exchange of
information and collaboration among member states of IGAD on conflict early warning and
response, gather, process and analyze information about conflicts; establish network of
cooperation in early warning and response among member states; Create, manage and
70
Apuuli, KP. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development‟s (IGAD) Confl ict Early Warning and Response
Mechanism (CEWARN): a ray of hope in conflict prevention? In AG Nhema (ed), The quest for peace in Africa:
transformations, democracy and public policy. Addis Ababa: International Books with OSSREA, 2004.
71
Francis, D. Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems. UK: Ashgate Publishing 2006. .
72
Howard Adelman. Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. Asmara. The Red Sea Press,
2002.
73
Colin Legum. The Horn of Africa Prospects for Political Transformation. Conflict Studies 254. London : 1992
31
disseminate data bases of information on conflict on early warning within region; Develop close
cooperation among in-state early warning and response mechanism in the member states;
Establish collaborative relationships, including information sharing with similar international and
sub-regional mechanism in Africa; Communicate such information and analysis to decision
makers.74
In regards to the CEWARN protocol Member States are expected to cooperate and collaborate
with one another in terms of information dissemination. Furthermore CEWARN provides
technical assistance to the member states after getting approval from the executive secretary. The
mechanism also promotes between inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations
following the approval of the Council of Ministers of IGAD.75
Furthermore, the resources of the mechanism emanates from the contribution of member states,
grants, donations and contribution from other sources that is approved by the Assembly of Head
of States and Government of IGAD on the advice of the Council of Ministers of IGAD.76 In coordination with the chief executive officer of IGAD, the mechanism has the powers to ask and
receive grants and donations that are related to the performances of its functions. Regarding
disputes settlement of the protocol, it states member states will resolve their disputes peacefully.
However if member states are not able to do so, the dispute shall be referred to the Heads of state
and Government of IGAD.
74
Woodward P. Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: I. B. Tauris 2003.
75
Mwaura, C. and Schmeidl, S. Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa, New York:
Red Sea Press 2002
76
ibid
32
3.6
The IGAD – Africa Union Relations in Conflict Resolution
Relationship between any entities can be defined in terms of co-existence, cooperation,
competition, or conflicts. IGAD has established liaison office to the AU, mainly to work together
with the Departments of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, and Economic Affairs.77 IGAD,
through its liaison office in Addis Ababa attends the meetings of AU Peace and Security
Council. In the meetings, the office gives information about the common positions of IGAD,
subsequently the liaison office services contact between the two organizations. On numerous
occupations the resolutions of IGAD have been adopted by the AU, in order to promote policy
harmonization.78
However, in order to institutionalize the relations between IGAD and AU, IGAD has signed a
memorandum of understanding with the AU and other Regional Economic Communities in order
to coordinate peace and security activities. Additionally, IGAD and the AU had shown
significant level of coordination in dealing with the conflict in Somalia and Sudan.
3.7
Cooperation and Interference
IGAD Member States, in particular Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya have exerted substantial
efforts in dealing with the lengthened conflict in Somalia as well as the rest of the region. 79 The
member states also showed their commitment when they agreed to organize a peace keeping
mission in Somalia in 2005. The member states have also shown the willingness and readiness to
amend the mandate of IGAD in order to permit the sending of troops into member states
77
P. Godfrey Okoth, „Conflict resolution in Africa: the role of the OAU and the AU‟, in Z. Nhema and P.
Tiyambe Zeleza, eds, The resolution of African conflicts: the management of conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction Oxford: James Currey, 2008.
78
ibid
79
Menkhaus, K.. „Somalia: a Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare‟, Enough Strategy Paper 8. Washington
DC: Enough 2008
33
territory. But the main problem for their cooperation has been and continues to be the sensitive
issue of the principle of sovereignty and lack of interference in internal affairs of another state.
Actually the interference by IGAD member states into the internal affairs of another member
state has led to regional instability, in the sense that it has exacerbated hostility and worsened the
rivalry among the competing states.80 In addition the following period of conflict highlights how
regional member states have interfered with internal issues of other member states. The conflict
in Djibouti (1990) between the ethnic community of Afar and Issa over the control of the state
power was exacerbated by the interference of Somalia and Eritrea.81 Furthermore during the
Sudan civil war in 1993-2005, the civil war was characterized interference from member states.
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda were exacerbated the conflict by supporting their perceived allies,
Uganda and Eritrea supported SPLM/A forces while Ethiopia supported the Khartoum
government.82
3.8
Conclusion
All the above factors show point to that the fact the region has a chance of deciding whether to
co-operate or choose not to. Most importantly IGAD member states can decide whether to
pursue a culture of peace by focusing their energy, time, and resources to solve the prolonged
and protracted conflict that has promoted a culture of violence in the region. Furthermore the
member states can embrace the principle of collectivism and deal with sensitive issue such as
border issues and non- interference in internal affairs of other states collectively.
80
Negash T. and Tronvoll, K. Brothers at War: Making sense of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War. Oxford: James
Currey 2000
81
Woodward P. Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: I. B. Tauris 2003
82
Prendergast J. and Mozersky J. „Love Thy Neighbour: Regional Intervention in Sudan‟s Civil War‟, Harvard
International Review 26, 2004 at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1220
34
Member state the rivalry and confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea has further weakened
IGAD. Additionally the absence of any meaningful role by IGAD in dealing with the war
between Eritrea and Ethiopia is indicative of the fact that the organization measures are less
effective when its powerful members are in open conflict. In a situation where there is no
effective lead country, security and military platforms risk being undermined by geopolitical
competition. On other hand member states should support collective security approach in the
region by abandoning the rigid oriented state centric approaches. Through collectivism IGAD
countries would focus on addressing the common vulnerabilities by transforming borderlands
and territory which are currently a contributory cause of conflicts in the region.
35
CHAPTER FOUR
CONFLICT WEBS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
4.0 Introduction
Chapter three discussed the case study. It analyzed the impact of the actors and the key issues
that cause insecurity in the Horn of Africa region, the chapter also sought to assess the role of
IGAD and its effect in promoting peace and security.
The Horn of Africa region has been prone to violent that have completely destabilized the region
into webs of conflict which continue to fed off each other. This means that resolving conflict in
the region is impossible due to the complex nature of the issues and multiplicity of actors
involved in the web of conflict. However management efforts have been prescribed accordingly,
drawing their rationale to from the effect of multidimensional nature of the conflict.
Moreover most of the peace initiatives that have been enforced by regional member states in
conjunction with outside interaction and IGAD‟S peace and security framework have partly
resolved the issues of insecurity. Hence older conflicts which were left unresolved have been
reintegrated with the new emerging issue, which has in turn increased the complexity of
diffusing or rather transforming the region into a peaceful region.
This chapter therefore seeks to assess the effectiveness of IGAD in promoting peace and security
in the Horn of Africa and also asses the multidimensionality and complex nature of the conflicts
in the Horn of Africa. The chapter also analyzes whether the emergence of war economies and
its effect on exacerbating conflict in the Horn of Africa region.
36
4.1
Emerging Issues
4.2
Multidimensionality of Conflict in Horn of Africa
Lionel Cliffe argues that the older conflicts in the Horn of Africa that were left unresolved
continue to cause insecurity. Furthermore the older conflicts have been integrated together with
the new patterns and dimension of conflict in the region.83 He further notes that the relations
between Eritrea and Ethiopia is becoming more laden but not yet violent, in turn impacting
negatively on most of their neighbors. Somalia on the other hand is marked by more polarized
confrontation than the multiplicity of clan and other militia fighting suggests, and has been the
scene of direct intervention from Ethiopia with the assistance of the USA.
According to Tadese Eritrea on its part has been involved in skirmishes with Djibouti since
2008.84 In one of the three major cleavages in Sudan, Darfur continues to be involved in open
fighting with rebel groups. As a result of fighting too many wars in different fronts, Tadese notes
that it is therefore difficult to predict how Eritrea‟s ongoing conflict with Djibouti and Ethiopia‟s
pull-out from Somalia will influence the dynamics of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict as well as
the regional security. On the other hand the war Darfur between the government and rebel forces
has been overshadowed by the on going conflict in South Sudan, which has in turn led the two
conflicts feeding of each other.
Roy Love argues that the impact of Eritrea-Ethiopia confrontation has signaled the foundation of
new emerging security threats, which are influenced by older threats which have been left
resolved or the ones that were overtaken my new threats. He argues that the future of peace and
83
Lionel Cliffe , Roy Love &KjetilTronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political
Economy 2009, 36:120, 151-163
84
Tadesse, M. The Djibouti- Eritrea conflict. IAG Briefing, October, Addis Ababa: Inter Africa Group 2008.
37
security in Somaliland and has been affected by the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. 85 In
addition he argues that the repercussion of the confrontation between the UIC, the Ethiopia
forces and the Transitional Federal Government led to the spread of bombings in the latter part of
2008 into Puntland in the north-east and Somaliland to the north-west.86 These normally
peaceful areas now faced the threat of wider expansion of the escalating violence in Somalia,
fuelled by outside intervention. On the other hand Bradbury argues that the accomplishment of
Somaliland can offer a casing point as to how the Horn of Africa region conflicts can the
transformed.87 He notes that the region constitutes an exemplar of the other dimension of
conflict in the Horn and search for peace that is indigenous in order to counter the dismissive
pessimism about the inevitability of violent conflict in the Horn.88
According to Tronvoll many relations that can be traced through the meshed conflict system in
the Horn of African region have their roots in the Sudan conflict. The country has been faced
with multiplicity of vicious conflicts ever since it attained its independence. He further notes that
these conflicts ought to have been given close attention in order to stop them from reoccurring in
the future. However tronvoll notes that the CPA agreement of 2005 between North and South
Sudan led to a dramatic culmination of the conflict which was conducted under the auspice of
Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Similarly Tronvoll and Cliffe note that even
thought the peace has been held, unresolved issues such as border demarcation and allocation of
oil revenues have led to regression into conflict between the two Sudan. There have also been
controversies about the border line between the two states, revenue allocation from the oil-rich
85
Lionel Cliffe , Roy Love &KjetilTronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political
Economy 2009, 36:120, 151-163 86 ibid
87
Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey 2008.
88
Ibid
38
area of Abyei and future status of three territories technically in the North have led to new
conflicts in the region.89
In general peace remains unrealized because some of the contentious issues that were highlighted
in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have not been addressed adequately. On the other due to
the emerging conflict in South Sudan and the divisions in Darfur the older conflict issues will
reemerge thus causing the region to relapse into conflict.
4.3 War Economy in the Horn of Africa
Another major issue that complicates peace initiatives in the Horn of Africa is the issues of war
economy in Somalia and Sudan. In Somalia for instance the imposition of arms embargo could
not stop the distribution of arms by combatants in Somalia. Furthermore the existence of shadow
and combative war economies has turned Somalia into breeding ground where money
laundering, proliferation of small arms and light weapon, and all sorts of illegal trade continue to
sustain the warlords in the country. All this can only thrive in a chaotic state not where there is
law and order and because of the lots of money involved the kingpins would do all that is within
their means to maintain the status quo. This war economy most likely go beyond Somalia
borders and that‟s why no one has ever been arrested for the illegal business that may be funding
the internal war.
War economy equally applies to protracted conflict Sudan. Before the signing of the CPA, oil
revenues where used to fund the war in the country. Berouk further notes that Uganda proximity
to oil fields in the upper Nile states has caused tension with Sudan regarding Uganda‟s intention
89
Lionel Cliffe , Roy Love &KjetilTronvoll. Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political
Economy 2009, 36:120, 151-163
39
in the region. The Khartoum government has been concerned with the possibility that Uganda
might arm the Sudan Revolutionary Front, an armed group opposing the Sudan government.
Therefore Omar Al- Bashir support of Kiir‟s government is a symbol that Sudan might has
reverted its long standing tactic of supporting the opposition forces.90
In addition Solomon Dersso notes that the escalation of tension between Sudan and South Sudan
in 2012 was a result of the oil resources in the oil province of Abyei.91 He notes that the
escalation of violence commenced when South Sudan occupying Heglig begun to shut down the
pipeline which supplied the Khartoum government with oil. Therefore oil was used as catalyst
that resulted to a relapse into conflict between the two Sudan countries.92
Pantuliano adds to the debate by arguing that the war economy constituted an important part of
the Misseriyya livelihood system for nearly two decades. Although it is difficult to assess the
number of Misseriyya youth in the Popular Defense Force (PDF) and the economic gains they
attained from the oil fields. She points that the majority of the youths from the region that
controlled the oil fields in the region participated in illegal trade such as trade in weapons,
smuggling and looting of animals and goods. However with the signing of the CPA agreement in
2005 led to the dismantlement of the PDF although militiamen were not disarmed or helped to
re-enter civilian life. As a result she notes that PDF youth can reenter the conflict because of the
gains they were receiving from the informal economy.93
90
BeroukMesfin,The crisis in South Sudan: a game of regional chess Institute of Security Studies, published on the
26 May 2014
91
Dr Solomon A. Dersso, H.E Mohamed Fathi Edress and Dr. Jide Okeke. Annual Review of the Peace and Security
Council 2012/1013.published by the Institute for Security Studies Pretoria, South Africa 2013 92Ibid
93
Sara Pantuliano. Oil, land and conflict: the decline of Misseriyya pastoralism in Sudan , Review of African
Political Economy2010, 37:123, 7-23,
40
4.4
Complexity of Regional Security in the Horn of Africa
Healy argues that conflicts in the Horn are characterized by several inter-related issues: identity
politics; religion; state formation and disintegration; intervention and use of proxies; alignment
with global agendas; and resource issues.94 Support for dissident groups from neighboring states
is a typical characteristic of inter-state relations in the Horn: Sudan and Chad support rebels on
either side of their borders; Eritrea supports groups in Darfur, Ethiopia, Somalia and eastern
Sudan; Ethiopia supports groups in Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. These links exemplify the
mutual mistrust that characterizes inter-state relations. Questions of identity, ethnic or otherwise,
feature prominently in most conflicts in the region. Ethnic linkages have been crucial in
determining alliances in the Horn, as rebel groups have often invoked these sentiments to gain
support from neighboring governments.
Sarjoh Bah further notes that the current state of interaction emerges from complex interrelations
between the global hegemons, the Africa union mission in the Horn of Africa region. The level
of influence varies depending on the situation. Bah notes that the United States, China, Nigeria,
South Africa and Egypt have played critical key roles in exacerbating as well as resolving the
conflict in Sudan, furthermore he notes that the United States and South Africa have influenced
the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia.95 Similarly he notes that the larger
security framework in the Horn of Africa region has been shaped the USA strategy. For instance
USA political engagement was a key factor during the singing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA).
In addition Bah notes that the mix of US policy perspectives and motivations in the region are
broad ranging from concern of stability and fragility of the states in the region, to role played by
94
Ibid Healy
95
A. Sarjoh Bah. The Broader Horn of Africa: Peacekeeping in a Strategic Vacuum, International
Peacekeeping 2009, pp16:4,
41
religious and human rights groups. For instance, USA based Christian groups provided crucial
material and political support to the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement (SPLM) during its
two-decade battle with the northern Islamist government.96 Therefore in a broader
conceptualization, the conflict in the Horn of Africa are complex in such a way that conflict in
one state poses grave danger to the security and stability of other states. No state in the area can
expect to isolate itself from the political crisis in another state.
4.5
The Effectiveness of IGAD’s Contribution to Peace and Security
According to Francis the signing of the Sudan and Somali peace agreements in quick progression
in 2004 snd 2005 formed an impression that IGAD was proving to upto the task in deaaling with
issues of conflict resolution.97 The sighnig of the two IGAD settlements within three months
was a remarkable accomplishment especially when taking into consideration that both addressed
the long and prolonged conflicts that had undermined previous attempts in resloving the two
conflicts.98
Khadiagala notes that the origin of the two led IGAD peace intiatives in Somalia and Sudan were
political initiatives conceived and executed by IGAD member States.99 He futher points out that
the lead regional mediators were interested parties which did no trust IGAD capability in leading
the mediation talks. Indeed, at the point when the Sudan process began in 1993 the organisation
had no remit to work on peace and security issues and had yet to develop its conflict resolution
mandate.100
96
97
98
99
ibid
D. J. Francis, Uniting Africa: building regional peace and security systems. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006
ibid
G. L. Khadiagala, Meddlers or mediators? African intervention in civil conflict in Eastern Africa Leiden: Brill,
2007
100
ibid
42
He further notes that when the peace talks commerced, the talks required organisational and
logistical effort which were beyong IGAD‟S capacity. On the other hand Healy points out that
the Kenya had to take the lead and the focal point in handling the Sudan Somalia peace process.
She motes that Kenya provided the two chief mediators, with General Sumbeiwyo leading the
Sudan mediation team and on the other hand Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat led the Somali
process.101 The importance of Kenya to the success of the two peace processes was not confined
to its provision of diplomatic and organisational capacity, rather it was confined on its ability to
maintain political neutrality.
Notwithstanding its institutional weakness and lack of authority over member States, IGAD
Secretariat was able successfully institutionalised donor support through the IPF. The willingness
of external donors to carry the financial burden of the peace process was both a blessing as well
as a burden.102 The extent of their involvement generated frictions over the ownership of the
process and the imposition of the condition that the on deadline for the parties to agree were to
tied to willingness of the external donors in financing the agreements. Sumbeiywo observes that
this especially the case in the Sudan peace negotiations.103 Young adds that the strong
involvement of the US, UK and Norway was also been blamed for maintaining an exclusionary
top-down process approach to the Sudanese peace process. In the Somali case, US involvement
was much less apparent and there was less demands over what the Western donors expected
from the process even though they were willing to finace the peace agreement.104
101
S. Healy, Lost opportunities in the Horn of Africa: how conflicts connect and peace agreements unravel, Chatham
House report London: Chatham House, 2008
102
IGAD, „Lessons learnt from the Sudan and Somalia peace processes‟, brief report of the Mombasa workshop, 9–
11 July 2007.
103
Gen. L. Sumbeiywo, „The mediator‟s perspective in peace by piece‟, in M. Simmons and P. Dixon, eds, Conciliation
Resources, Accord 18 (London: Conciliation Resources, 2006).
104
Ibid young
43
As well as drawing in support from the West, IGAD‟s nominal ownership of the peace process
helped to secure the exclusion of secondary actors from outside the region, principally Egypt,
Libya and Yemen organized a few rounds of negotiations when the parties were in a stalemate.
All of these countries have clearly identified and acknowledged their interests in the Horn of
Africa, but IGAD‟s collective intent was to establish a monopoly over the peace process in the
region. However Francis emphasizes that it is noteworthy that new initiatives invariably arose in
the Arab world whenever IGAD peace processes stalled.105 IGAD‟s peace-making activities
helped to secure legitimacy for the organisation and build a wider international acceptance of
IGAD as the only appropriate forum for tackling conflict in the Horn. In order to maintain this
primacy, IGAD needs to secure one of two things: either actual success in conflict resolution (as
in Sudan); or the ability to align its peacemaking activity with the interests of powerful external
actors (as it was the case in the Somalia peace process).
Consequently IGADs inability to prevent or resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 or to
deal with violent conflict in Darfur and rumbling conflicts in Northern Uganda and Eastern
Ethiopia demonstrates that a lot needs to be done in order to make the organization is more
effective.
4.6 Conclusion
In the eigtheen years since IGAD added peace and security to its mandate there has been no
significant reduction in the level of conflict in the Horn of Africa. The region still lacks the most
basic regional security framework.106 IGAD member states continue to defy the old fashioned
inter-state rules of respect for territorial sovereignty and non-interference in each other‟s affairs,
and continue to a pose as a threat to their neighbours. At the present there are few signs of
105
Ibid Francis, Uniting Africa.
106
Khadiagala, Eastern Africa.
44
moving towards a collective security arrangements or genuinely endorsing institutional processes
of regional consultation and decision making. All this could point to the conclusion that IGAD is
paralysed.
However eighteen years is a relatively short time in which to judge the efficacy of new
approaches to peace and security, more so after a century of regional conflict. IGAD‟S peace
processes in Sudan and Somalia have proved that member states can come up with measure to
resolve the insecurity dielema.107 The two agreements are important achievements and
milestones in the era of IGAD‟s expanded mandate, and provide relatively rare examples of
regional mediation in internal conflicts within the region.
The existence of IGAD nonetheless brings a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management
in the Horn of Africa. This is a forum that tresses on the importance of regional collectivity
between members but also looks at the role other interested parties beyond the region play in
promoting or exacerbating the situation. The new ingredient is the internationally conferred
legitimacy that IGAD possesses to address conflict within the region. The acknowledgment that
national security interests are intimately connected across the region implies that however
imperfect and compromised, IGAD‟s regional peace and security activities will remain in place
and gain incrementally in importance. If IGAD is to consolidate its role, its institutions including
the Secretariat, will eventually need to be strengthened so that it can assert some autonomy.
107
Ibid Sally Healy
45
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
5.0 Summary
Chapter one was an introduction to the study which provide a synopsis of the subject matter. It
gave an historical overview of the conflict webs in the horn of Africa, the problem statement and
the objectives that inform the study. It also gave a literature review of the previous debates about
the conflict in the Horn of Africa, which covered three types of theories as the major entry points
into understanding the Horn of Africa conflict system. The realism school of thought argued that
the conflict in the horn of Africa is due to interstate suspicion which led to security dilemma. The
liberal school of thoughts assumed that the lack of co-operation between the region member
states is the major cause of conflict. Furthermore the theory acknowledges the role of IGAD in
mitigating conflicts in the region. The justification of the study, theoretical framework,
hypotheses, research methodology and chapter outline were also covered in the chapter. The
chapter provides a framework for the study to establish the link between the two variables and
identify how they affect each other.
Chapter was an overview of the study which sought to look at the effect of colonization and
superpower rivalry during the cold war period. The chapter highlighted the effect of territory
borders that were drawn the colonial governments in exacerbating conflict in the Horn of Africa
region. Chapter three was the case study and it dwelt on the issues and actors that cause
intensified conflict in the Horn of Africa. The chapter also looked at the processes that were
employed by IGAD in mitigating conflict in the region.
46
Chapter four provide a critical analysis into the emerging issues in the Horn of Africa. The main
issues that were discussed were the multidimensionality nature of conflict and effectiveness of
IGAD in promoting peace and security.
5.1. Key finding
From the findings and key debate, the study asserts that the Horn will continue to be prone to
conflict because of member states interference and lack of proper peace mechanism. The
multiplicity of actors and issues in the Horn of Africa will continue to significant influence on
how the region moves forward in terms of dealing with conflicts. Furthermore the study
established that the political fate of each state in the Horn of Africa region will continue to be
inextricably intertwined with that of their neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of
Africa has been able to completely or partially insulate itself from the problems of the other
states no matter how distant, the complexity of the issues and finally no matter how strong or
weak they can be able to project their power.
On the other hand the overlay in the system will continue to allow global hegemons and regional
powers from other region to intervene and advance their foreign policy in region. These
reaffirms that the USA in particular will continue to be a dominate player in the Horn of Africa
conflict system due to its strategy of fighting terrorism. Similarly china will continue to advance
its interest in securing oil resources in the region; therefore it will continue to be part of the
problem rather than the solution. Furthermore the study also found out that the unresolved
conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia over the ogaden region will carry on
causing insecurity unless member states with the help of IGAD cab come up with lasting
solution to the never ending conflicts in the region
47
5.2. Recommendations
Unfortunately, there has not been much effort towards structural and institutional transformation
in the region. Therefore the region continues to be prone to violent conflicts, the study therefore
recommends that for the foreseeable future more research needs to focus on the structural
conflicts that continue to prevalent in the region. On the other hand there is also need to carryout
in depth research on the role of external support in strengthening or weakening IGAD‟S
institutional capacity in mitigating conflicts in the region.
The study notes that there has also not been much research undertaken into how the state can
reconcile the fragmented communities in the region and incoherent institutional system within
the member state countries. Another area where research needs to be done, it‟s on the effect of
war economies in the Horn of Africa region. That is how the interests of various parties can be
addressed in order to adopt formal economies.
48
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