INSOL International Global Insolvency Practice Course Module A Virginia Woolf Room Hotel Russell Monday 7th SeptemberWednesday 9th September 2015 Day One Welcome G. Ray Warner, Course Leader St. John's University School of Law Of Counsel, Greenberg Traurig LLP, USA Core Committee Course Leader: G. Ray Warner, St. John's University School of Law Of Counsel, Greenberg Traurig LLP, USA Jan Adriaanse, Leiden University, The Netherlands Scott Atkins, Henry Davis York, Australia (Board Director INSOL International) Ian F. Fletcher, University College London Rosalind Mason, Queensland University of Technology, Australia Paul Omar, Nottingham Trent University, UK Michael Veder, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands Group of Thirty-Six AlixPartners LLP Allen & Overy LLP Alvarez & Marsal LLC Baker & McKenzie LLP BDO LLP BTG Global Network Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP Chadbourne & Parke LLP Clayton Utz Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP Clifford Chance Davis Polk & Wardwell De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek Deloitte Dentons DLA Piper EY Ferrier Hodgson Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Goodmans LLP Grant Thornton Greenberg Traurig LLP Hogan Lovells Huron Consulting Group Jones Day Kaye Scholer LLP King & Wood Mallesons Kirkland & Ellis LLP KPMG LLP Linklaters LLP Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Norton Rose Fulbright Pepper Hamilton LLP PPB Advisory PwC Rajah & Tann Asia RBS RSM Shearman & Sterling LLP Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP South Square Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP White & Case LLP Housekeeping • Coffee Breaks and Lunch – timing • Mobile telephone & Blackberry switched off • Assessment forms – completion & return Session One A Framework for, and Concepts and Instruments of International Insolvency Lecturer: André Boraine University of Pretoria, South Africa Framework for discussions • Section A: General Background • Section B: Sources and nature of international insolvency • Section C: Harmonization of National insolvency laws A. GENERAL BACKGROUND • • • • • • Framework: 1. A - M Core terminology: 2 History: 3.1 Comparative aspects: 3.2 Classification of insolvency systems Different classes of creditors A.1. Framework – A. Essence/ nature – B.Policy considerations – C.Sources – D.Similarities/ differences Corporate v Consumer – E.Gateways and commencement A.1. Framework – F.Effects • • • • • • F.1.Automatic stay (moratorium) F.2.Estate assets (local & foreign) F.3. Personal effects and liability F.4.Executory contracts F.5.Set-off and netting F.6.Avoidable dispositions – A.2. Terminology A.3.2 Some global developments • America – – – – Review commission 1973 1978 Bankruptcy Code (Unified Act) Fresh start Reform late 1990’s – • 2005 Amendments: chapter 15 –CBIL (adopted version of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency) • England – – – – Cork report of the 1980’s Insolvency Act of 1986 (Unified At) Insolvency Act 2000 and Enterprise Act 2002 CBIL: s 426, Ins R 2006(Model Law), EU Ins R • EU A.2. Some global developments • The Netherlands – Faillissementswet of 1897 – Fresh start – Shuldsaneringsregeling – Insolvency Reform • Africa • South Africa – – – – Insolvency Act of 1936 Not unified Act and Mixed legal system Reform Dual CBI law system (CBIL) • Western Africa: OHADA A.2.Some global developments • Australia – Harmer Report – Not single unified Act – CBI: 2008 Model CBIL • ASIA – China: 2006 PRC Bankruptcy Law – Asian Development Bank (ADB) – Hong Kong: English insolvency laws: • Personal: amended in 1996 • Companies: under review A.2.Some global developments • Former Eastern European countries: – Russia : 2002 Insolvency Act – Some even adopted Model CBIL, i.e. Poland – ERDB • South – America – Brazil: Bankruptcy and Restructuring law of 2005 – Mexico: Model CBIL – Cross-border treaties: Montevideo A.1.2.B. Policy -Classification of insolvency systems • Wood: – Pro-creditor – Pro-debtor – Not interested • Advantage of creditors • Rescue culture A.1.2.A. Essentials of insolvency systems • Wood: – Pooling of assets (universal concept) – Creditors are paid pari passu (?) • • • • • • Initiation process Administrator Publication (notification) Powers of administrator Creditors participation Supervision A.1.2.A. Essentials of insolvency systems • Sealy and Hoolley: – Individuals – protect, fresh start/ discharge – Corporations – preserve business or viable parts – Pari passu – except priorities • Fletcher: – Common denominator - collectivity A.1.2.A. and H. Essentials of insolvency systems • Distribution rules: Wood: – Super-priority – Priority creditors – Pari passu creditors – Deferred creditors – Expropriated creditors Section B: THE SOURCES AND NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: B4 & 5: INTRODUCTION • What is Int Ins law/ CBIL ?: – No universal set of laws – National legal systems differ• Bankruptcy/ insolvency and • The general law (rights) • Wessels: insolvency rules which cannot be fully enforced… • Fletcher: …insolvency that transcends a national legal system… regard to other systems than domestic • Quest: predictability Section B4 & 5: Context of international insolvency: Introduction • General: – – – – – – – Economic affairs with foreigners Interests in property in more than one country Contractual obligations in various countries Free markets/ different national laws Absence global - court, parliament, law Territorial: jurisdiction, local laws Approaches: • Insular • Cooperate B.5.Context of international insolvency – Sources for cooperation • • • • Comity (reciprocity) Court’s discretion Legislation Treaty – Risk of multiple insolvencies: • Weaker creditors may loose out • Risk of fraud, asset dissipation across borders – Thus: dealings various jurisdictions, assets different jurisdictions, companies, groups B.5.Context of international insolvency • Scenario 1: • ABC Co. Incorporated in USA • Branches in England and SA – (business operations) – Treatment of branches? • Order in USA? – England, SA? B.5.Context of international insolvency • Scenario 2: • ABC Co. holding company of X Co. in England and Y Co. in SA. – Difference? • Structure for dealing with crossborder matter B.5. Context of international insolvency: Terminology • Main proceeding: domicile; principal office? (COMI) – universalilty – What law will regulate? • Non main proceeding: (secondary proceeding) – modified universality – Local law will apply • Concurrent proceeding – Different bankruptcy proceedings running concurrently B.5. Some general difficulties in cross-border context • Recognition of foreign judgments • Technical meaning of insolvency – Balance sheet/ cash flow • • • • • • • Priorities/ preferential claims Avoidance law Labour dispensation Estate representative and structure Prior-acquired rights: securities Rescue v liquidation Funding/ contributions B.5. Some general difficulties in cross-border context: early thoughts • Lex mercatoria • Jabez argued in 1825 for uniform system of insolvency in Europe • Henry 1827 – stumble block absence of general consent • Jitta end 19th century: • World law and federal parliament (unattainable) • Assimilation of national laws based on set of rules B.5. Some general difficulties in cross-border context: early thoughts • Jitta - treaty with minimum requirements: – Jurisdiction – Publicity – Avoidance law rules – Equality of creditors – Jurisdiction – domicile • secondary places of interest B.5. The essence of a crossborder insolvency case • Fletcher poses 3 questions: – In which jurisdiction must procedure be opened? – Which system must rule elements of diversity? – International effects to proceedings in a particular forum? • Two aspects: – Comity: recognition B.5.The essence of a crossborder insolvency case – Choice of law (Private international law ‘PIL’) • PIL gives direction amidst diversity’ • PIL principles universal? • But not even uniform PIL principles – jurisdiction – choice of law – international recognition B.5.Different approaches/ theories • Universality (Fletcher, Omar & Friman) – One procedure (unitary), co-ordination – Covers all the assets – Problems: administer worldwide scale, [lex concursus v lex loci] • Territoriality (‘grab rule’) – Procedure in each jurisdiction (plurality) • Unitary: one procedure • Plurality of proceedings B.5.Different approaches/ theories • Shades of theories: • Modified universality (Westbrook) • Cooperative territorialism (LoPucki) – Conventions – Problem: Local asset protection • Contractualism (Rasmussen) – Company, articles of incorporation, nor real contract B.5.Different approaches/ theories • Internationalist principle (Fletcher) • Pragmatic approach to achieve – Treaty etc or in absence PIL – Universality must complement Territoriality – Cooperation between courts • Internationalist principle aspires to realise: • Ideals of collectivity maximum dividend on equal basis universally (equality of creditors) • Respect for pre-required rights in CB matters • Evolutionary process to attain global common pool B.5.Different approaches/ theories • Universality effects: – ‘Rough wash’ (swings and roundabouts) – Net gain – indirect advantages commerce, lowers costs, increase trade B.5. Some further directions and difficulties • Omar: – Multiplicity of Proceedings-take more funds – Exercise control by limited number of courts desirable – Security over assets based on location of assets – Priorities – Rescue – one court best B.5.Some further directions and difficulties • Nadelmann: – Discriminatory rules regarding the treatment of foreign creditors – Lack of proper notice proceedings – Race of diligence – rush to enforce and execute • Omar: also lack of knowledge of foreign procedures, language time distance and cost B.5. Point of departure with cross-border case • Case (PIL) determinants: – Type of assets – Location – The court first issuing the order • Adhere: universalism or territorialism B.5. Important terms • Main proceeding (COMI) – Main place of business • Non main proceeding – Establishment • Presumption registered office or habitual address in case of individual. • An “establishment” is “a place of operations where the debtor carries out non-transitory economic activity with human means or goods” • Westbrook Modified universalism. – Two primary factors: • Predictability • Optimal..substantive law. • Big four bankruptcy policies that should be governed by the law of the main proceeding: control; priority; avoidance and reorganisation. B.5. Important terms • COMI: Other than place of incorporation, either headquarters (real seat) or its operations (like business, main assets.) • DUAL COMI: Maxwell case: headquarters England but assets in USA (but prefer headquarters.) • • • • • • Ancillary or secondary proceedings Concurrent jurisdiction and cooperation Foreign representative Recognition Lex concursus Lex loci rei sitae B.5.4. Operation of some CB systems: RSA • Dual system in theory: – Common law: comity, convenience – Adopted model law (not operable yet) – No treaties (SADC ?) Boraine & Olivier • Common law: • Outward bound request: – Letter of request but? – Foreign jurisdiction will dictate B.5.4. Operation of some CB systems: RSA • Inward bound request for recognition • Movable/ immovable assets – – – – – – Approach local high court Discretionary (comity) grant recognition Except for precedents no predictability Powers determined by court order Surplus go to foreign proceeding Foreign tax claims (no basis) • Opening of local insolvency proceeding: must comply SA law B.5.4. England and Wales • England and Wales: s 426 IA Act – S 426(4) Courts in UK or any ‘relevant’ country, shall assist. – Relevant countries: 20 (not USA!) – Courts assist outside s 426 (common law) – Adopted Uncitral Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency – EU Regulation B.5.4. USA • Former s 304 of the USA BR Code – Universal effect, modified universality – Inward and outward requests – Factors for relief: • Comity: international duty and convenience (Hilton v Guyot) but sometimes not granted: – Public policy: Cost order English court – Where recognition inimical to US interests – Since 2005, Chapter 15 adopted Model Law 43 B.5.4. Pragmatic solutions: judicial and legislative: Applications to Court • Discretion of courts – See SA, (UK) – Comity – Forum conveniens/ non conveniens • Discretionary powers derived from legislation – unilateral statutory regulation – USA and Germany • Direct application without court’s discretion ? B.5.4. Pragmatic solutions: judicial and legislative: Applications to Court • Protocol approach: coordination and cooperation – Maxwell example – IBA, Committee J: Concordat Guide • Principle 1: Single forum, primary responsible • Principle 2: Main forum to coordinate collection and distribution of assets, no discrimination, discharge • Principle 3: Multi forums, notification and participation B.5.4. Pragmatic solutions: judicial and legislative: Applications to Court • England and Wales: s 426 of the Insolvency Act of 1986 – S 426(4) Courts in UK or any ‘relevant’ country, shall assist. – Relevant countries: 20 (not USA!) – Courts assist outside s 426 (common law) – Adopted Uncitral Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency B.5.4. Management by treaty • Treaty – Conventional way to set uniform approach – Even out procedure and minimise exceptions re: • • • • • Priorities Avoidance rules Revenue claims Classes of creditors Asset recovery B.5.4. Management by treaty • Types of initiatives – Limited: bilateral and multinational – Regional • Bilateral initiatives • Europe – Many like • Treaty of Verona of 1204 • Franco Swiss of 1869 (modern bilateral) B.5.4. Management by treaty • Bilateral initiatives • Europe – Superseded or abrogated: Brussels Convention of 1968 and EU Reg of 2000 • Regional or wider multilateral initiatives resulting from conferences: – Montevideo – Havana (Bustamante) – Nordic • Use of treaties? Lack of data, Fletcher B.5.4. Global initiatives • • • • • • • World Bank IMF (International Monetary Fund) Asian Development Bank (ADB) OECD (Org for Economic Development) UNCITRAL(UN Com on Int Trade law) IBA, committee J of IBA More regional: – EU, American Law Institute (ALI, NAFTA), OHADA -Stability of international financial systems- B.6.Various international instruments: General • Wessels para 1 - 35 • These instruments cover: – Cross-border aspects – Establishing international guidelines for local insolvency reform (harmonisation) – Related topics, like securities (general law) B.6. Various international instruments: General Omar: Cross-border insolvency issues will not be resolved by leaving it to individual States. We need coordination on an international level. B.6. Various international instruments: General, Wessels para 1 - 35 1. World Bank and IMF • After 1997-1998 Asian Financial crisis, measures to improve stability • IMF 1999 policies to design insolvency system • World Bank Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor right Systems, 2001(2005) – Legal framework for creditor rights (principles 1-5) – Legal framework for insolvency (p 6-16) B.6. Various international instruments:CBI, EU Reg Wessels para 1 - 35 22. EU Regulation • Uniform jurisdictional rules to be applied by all MS (except Denmark) • Choice of law provisions • Recognition of the proceedings and the liquidator • Addressing concerns of creditors (exceptions) B.6. Various international instruments:CBI, ALI Guidelines Wessels para 1 - 35 18. Note also ALI’s Guidelines Court to Court Communications • 18A. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: the judicial perspective [pre-release] (2011) • 18.B. UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation (2009) • 18.C. CoCo guidelines SECTION C: THE HARMONISATION OF NATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAWS How far will we come with cross border rules if we don’t harmonise national insolvency and related laws? C.7. The harmonisation of national insolvency laws • Some problems re CBI – No global parliament or court – National laws differ: both insolvency and general – Terminology • Initiatives to harmonise – World Bank Principles – IMF principles – OECD C.7. The harmonisation of national insolvency laws – Various regional initiatives: EU, ABD, IBA, ERBD, OHADA – UNCITRAL Guidelines 2004 • Comprehensive addressing basically all core aspects • Related initiatives: securities – Regional: EU, ADB – UNCITRAL: Securities C.9. The harmonisation of national insolvency laws Regulation of insolvency representatives • EBRD Principles: – – – – P 1 – Qualifications & licensing generally P 2 – Appointment in an insolvency case P 3 – Review of office holder appointment P 4 – Removal, resignation & death office holder C.9. The harmonisation of national insolvency laws – P 5 – Replacement of office holder – P 6 – Standards professional conduct – P 7 – Reporting and supervision – P 8 – Regulatory and disciplinary – P 9 – Remuneration and expenses – P 10 – Release of office holder – P 11 – Insurance and bonding – P 12 – Code of ethics Coffee Benjamin Suite Session Two Introduction: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Law Lecturer : Prof. G. Ray Warner St. John's University School of Law, Of Counsel, Greenberg Traurig LLP, USA Lots of Variety Around the Globe • What types of Systems? – Typically liquidation systems – Modern trend • Rescue or reorganization systems – Many are modeled on U.S. Chapter 11 The World is Small • Assets can be moved easily – For legitimate or illegitimate reasons • Cross-border fraud is common – Recovery is difficult – Creditors may not want to fund uncertain efforts The World is Small II • Business is global – Creditors, suppliers, investors & customers are global • Businesses are global – – – – – Example – U.S. Corporation NY headquarters & U.S. patents Korean parts manufacturing plant Mexican & Greek assembly plants German, UK, Canada & U.S. stores How Do You Liquidate a Global Business? • Seven or more separate bankruptcy cases • What if each has different rules? Value Preservation • What if assets are worth more if sold together – E.g., the Korean parts plant with the Mexican & Greek assembly plants and the U.S. patents Worse – How Do You Save It? • Where should you reorganize a global company? • Can you do it? – What if Korea lacks a reorganization system? – What if it has critical differences? • E.g., no Debtor in Possession • Or different rules for patent licenses Problem of Multi-National Companies • Name one that isn’t! • What are the bankruptcy options – Territoriality vs. Universality • Territoriality – • U.S. case deals with U.S. assets, Mexico case deals with Mexico assets, etc. • Universality – • one case deals with all assets and all creditors Which One is Better? • Can you ever get to universality? – Loss of sovereignty – But – effect of convergence • If the law is the same everywhere, how much do you care about choice of law? • Still have problem of enforcement of foreign orders EU Insolvency Regulation • EU faced this problem first – How do you deal with a common market and multiple different insolvency systems? – You need jurisdictional and choice of law rules • UNCITRAL Model Law – Much less ambitious UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency • Why a Model Law? • Why not a treaty? – Too difficult politically – Also easier to make local variations • Trade off - less uniform but wider adoption – Adopted in 23 jurisdictions EU & UNCITRAL Adopt Modified Universality • Which nation’s insolvency proceeding should be the main one? – The main proceeding should be the one pending where the company’s main interests are centered • COMI - “center of main interest” Main vs. Non-Main Proceedings • Proceeding pending in the COMI is a “foreign main proceeding” • Other proceedings are “foreign nonmain proceedings” – But only if pending where the company has an “establishment” • What if no establishment there? – Model Law does not address it Main vs. Non-Main • This matters a lot in the EU since main proceeding orders may be binding in other EU nations • Not as critical under Model Law – Nothing is “binding” What is COMI • COMI - “center of main interest” – Not defined in Model Law – But start with presumption it is the registered office • Interpretation rules – International origin & uniformity • Can look to EU Regulation – EU Test – Nerve center • Plus – “ascertainable by third parties” – Why? Creditor expectations COMI Reconsidered • Nerve center + ascertainable • What is the COMI of a corporate group? • What is the COMI of an Irish subsidiary of Apple? • How easy is it to change COMI? – And get a different bankruptcy outcome – EU “bankruptcy tourism” to the UK What Does the Model Law Do? • Not much – But that is still an astounding development in international bankruptcy law The Major Features • Access to local courts • Recognition • Relief • Communication and Co-Ordination First - Access • For insolvency administrators – Both inbound and outbound • Express authority for local administrator to appear in foreign courts • Procedures for foreign representative to appear in local courts Access to Local Courts • Foreign representative can sue and defend in debtor’s stead • Foreign representative can institute a local insolvency proceeding – Insolvency is presumed • Foreign representative can participate in a pending local insolvency proceeding Access of Foreign Creditors • Insolvency laws often treat local creditors better – May not even permit foreign creditors to participate • Model Law gives foreign creditors notice and “same rights” as local creditors • Right to distribution • Foreign creditors may be treated worse – But not worse than general unsecureds – Option to exclude foreign tax and social security claims Second - Recognition • Simply local court recognition (confirmation) that: – There is a foreign insolvency proceeding involving this entity, and – The Foreign Representative is the right person to represent that estate's interests • This is the first issue in the case – Model Law says it should be quick and easy • But it is where you need to fight hard if you want to block local enforcement of the foreign proceeding What is a “Foreign Proceeding” • • • • Collective Judicial or administrative proceeding Law relating to insolvency Subject to supervision of – Foreign judicial or other authority • Purpose of liquidation or reorganization Effects of Recognition • Portal to appear in local courts • May participate in a local insolvency proceeding • May obtain insolvency-related relief from local courts What Relief is Available? • Main gets more than Non-Main – Lots of focus in literature • Automatic relief if Main – Art. 20 – Stay of proceedings and executions • Subject to local stay exceptions – e.g. secured credit may not be affected – Suspension of debtor’s power to transfer property Discretionary Relief • But the same stay is available in Non-Main – Just not automatic – Art. 21 • So how great is the difference? • Also pre-recognition relief allowed – All Art. 21 relief – Available in Main or Non-Main What Else Can You Get? • Discovery • Entrustment – –Entrust local assets to foreign representative! –Entrust distribution to foreign representative!! • Local court collects assets and send them to foreign court to distribute under a different set of rules! Local Insolvency Powers • Art. 21 - "any appropriate relief“ available to a local insolvency administrator • Art. 23 use of local avoiding powers • Strategy consideration – – (1) file a full local proceeding, or – (2) seek recognition and exercise local powers Limitations in Art. 21 & 22 • Court “may” grant relief • “Appropriate” relief • Local creditors must be “adequately protected” • All parties must be “adequately protected” • May impose “appropriate” conditions • Lots of discretion! Main vs. NonMain • Relief granted should reflect the nature of the foreign proceeding – Relief may be more restricted in NonMain – E.g. does it relate to assets that should be administered in the foreign NonMain proceeding? Additional Powers • Finally Art. 7 - may "provide additional assistance" under other local laws – U.S. version includes enforcement of foreign insolvency orders • E.g., enforce foreign reorganization plan against local creditors Manifestly Contrary to Local Public Policy • All relief subject to Art. 6 "manifestly contrary” to local public policy – Should be very narrow • Goal is to facilitate foreign proceeding – Often raised but rarely applies • Real limitation is discretion – Threatens to undermine goals of the Model Law Using Foreign Law • Can I use a more favorable foreign law to reorganize and then use the Model Law to enforce it locally? • How different can the foreign law be? Co-operation • Let's talk – Court to court communication – Representative to representative communication • Authority for court and insolvency representative to communicate with foreign court or foreign insolvency representative Let's Work Together • Courts and representatives are directed to "cooperate to the maximum extent possible" Types of Co-operation • Can a US and Canadian judge hold a joint televised hearing? • Can the courts approve agreements? – Common - called protocols – Usually procedural • But use of concentration account? The Law of Nowhere? • What law governs a cross-border case? – – – – A little US A little Canada A little UK A little protocol that is the law of neither? • Can you predict the outcome for your client? Recap • The big issues – You can use any nation's law to handle a global case if it purports to grant jurisdiction • But enforcement is the problem – You can use the Model Law to: • Coordinate multiple national cases • Collect foreign assets and enforce your nation's bankruptcy orders in some other nations Session Three Overview of US Chapter 11 Lecturer : G. Ray Warner St. John's University School of Law, Of Counsel, Greenberg Traurig LLP, USA Why Use Chapter 11? • Preserves business operations – Can retain management – Can force retention of contracts – Can obtain financing • Can maximize value • Very flexible restructuring tool • Can sell, restructure, renegotiate, etc. Contrary Considerations • Significant court involvement – Very transparent – Disclosure & discovery – Any party can challenge any action • Organized creditors with Committee – Professionals paid by estate – Will sue over improper actions • This makes it expensive • Outcomes may be hard to control Cross-Border Importance • Only two major jurisdictions welcome foreign debtors – United States – England & Wales • Both have rescue and sophisticated professionals and courts Bring Us Your Failing Companies • Entities can file if “any assets” in US – Global Oceans – retainer sent to US bankruptcy lawyers was enough – But – usually only if US case is needed • Dismissed Yukos • Test – best interests of creditors and debtor • Model Law (chapter 15 in the US) may cause US courts to dismiss more foreign cases Worldwide Application • US law applies extraterritorially – Applies to worldwide assets and operations – But can orders be enforced? • Yes – against US counterparties • Yes – against any entity that has or aspires to have valuable US assets or operations! – Entirely local foreign entities? • US courts permit 100% payment Limiting Disruption • Insolvency not relevant – File if need to use the tools • DIP – Management remains in control absent fraud or gross mismanagement – CRO has usually replaced prior management – Examiner or CRO may be used • DIP can operate business Liberal Use of Property • Ordinary course transactions continue without court order • Critical Vendors – • Probably can pay immediately • Secured assets – – Can use in ordinary course – Can sell in ordinary course (inventory) – But “cash collateral” requires order or consent – “first day” orders Secured Creditors Affected • Rights are modified in chapter 11 • But entitled to “adequate protection” – Protects “value,” not the contractual rights • Is value at risk – equity cushion – Court’s error in evaluating risk • Cash payments or additional liens – To cover potential loss in value • Court’s valuation error Broad Stay Prevents Disruption • Automatic stay blocks most creditor action – Major reason for filing – Cash flow – stop paying debts – Secured creditors are stayed • Must have “adequate protection” • Contract counterparties can’t cancel Contract & Lease Powers • Counterparties must continue to perform – Bankruptcy default provisions invalidated • Debtor’s Options – – Reject – “pre-petition” damage claim – Assume – Forces continued performance • This facilitates a rescue – Assume and assign – • Overrides anti-assignment clause • This facilitates a sale • Captures value in below-market agreements Post-Petition Financing • Liberal DIP financing rules – Created a DIP financing market • Ladder of options – Ordinary trade and unsecured – Super-priority – Secured or second lien – Prime lien • Subordinates pre-petition secured creditor • Must have “adequate protection” Many Restructuring Options • Revise the capital structure – Debt for equity swap • De-accellerate secured debt – Rebuild the business – Reduce & re-amortize the debt • Resize the business – Reject failing stores, keep successful ones – Or reject failing units, keep core business • Sell the business – Going concern or piecemeal Chapter 11 • Single point of entry – Pre-insolvent or insolvent – Small company, large company or individual – Can reorganize or liquidate • Goal is a confirmed plan • Debtor controls the process – Exclusive option to propose plan for 180-days • Can extend up to 18 months Plan Process • Classify creditors – Substantially similar to others in class • Negotiate & propose plan – Creditors committee plays important role • Court Approves disclosure statement – Extensive information for creditors • Solicit votes by class Class Acceptance • Majority required for acceptance • > 2/3 in $ amount of voting holders • Majority in number of voting holders – Vote binds dissenting class members • “Best interest of creditors” test • Plan can be partial – May leave classes “unimpaired” • Rights not altered by plan • No right to vote • Deemed to have accepted plan Class Cramdown • Can bind dissenting class if – At least one class accepts and – Plan is: • “Fair & equitable” and • Does not “discriminate unfairly” • Unfair discrimination – Look side to side – 100% frequent flyers v. 10% others Fair and Equitable I • For unsecured and equity classes – “Absolute priority” rule • PV = 100% or • Look up/look down –Unsecureds can force equity out »Creates negotiating leverage Fair and Equitable II • For secured classes – Return collateral or – Sell collateral • Get bid in rights • Lien attaches to sale proceeds or – Write-down - PV > value of collateral • Rewrite face amount • Rewrite interest rate • Rewrite payment schedule – Can stretch out many years Valuation is the Key • Court determines value – What is the business worth? • Risk of erroneous valuation • This encourages negotiation Modern Chapter 11 Process I • Sale under §363 replaces plan – Quicker and cheaper – Business is preserved but entity may not be – Contract assignment power allows going concern value to be sold – “Free & clear” power allows purchaser to take assets free of claims • Compare to English “pre-pack” Sale Process • Potential buyer is arranged before filing – Buyer may also be DIP lender • Court approves sale process – Generally buyer’s offer is subject to competing bids – Can be sold free and clear of• Liens • Claims – including successor liability Creative Use of Sale Power • General Motors – Created NewCo to purchase retained product lines • Assumed desired dealership agreements • Assumed other desired agreements • Took assets free of liabilities • How is this different from a reorganization? Modern Chapter 11 Process II • US “pre-pack” – US securities law does not permit collective action clauses in bonds – Can’t bind dissenting holders outside bankruptcy • Votes are solicited before bankruptcy – Usually part of an “exchange offer” • May be enough acceptances to avoid filing Quick Chapter 11 Confirmation • If enough votes for plan – File chapter 11 – Use pre-petition votes for confirmation • Confirmation binds all members of class • Partial pre-pack – – Only certain classes restructured – Others left “unimpaired” – Compare to English “scheme” Corporate Groups • Procedural consolidation – All cases before same judge • Global Oceans – even foreign entities – Single plan involving multiple entities • Substantive Consolidation – Combines assets and debts • Rarely forced by court decision – But consensual “deemed” substantive consolidation is common in large cases Lunch Hotel Russell Restaurant Session Four Workout Clinic Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Jan Adriaanse, University of Leiden, The Netherlands Jan Adriaanse Professor of turnaround management at Leiden Law School Department of Business Studies TRI Leiden – “Turnaround, Rescue, Insolvency” research team www.tri-leiden.eu Founder of global think tank Turnaround PowerHouse® Training programs and advisory including turnaround games for turnaround professionals, bankers and management teams www.turnaroundpowerhouse.com Teaching philosophy Harvard Business School approach • Preaching versus teaching • Participant centered learning • Learning by sharing knowledge and experiences in discussion • Learning by doing things together (e.g. cases, serious gaming) • Based on conceptual framework “Crisis. What crisis?” Conceptual Framework: Crisis. What Crisis? Healthy company Assumption Crisis Small Structural underperformance Large Earnings crisis 54% Examples strategic crisis Focus on shrinking markets Underestimating new competitors Uncontested assumptions about market/industry Neglect of real and/or changing consumer preferences Liquidity crisis 17% Scope for action Need for action 29% Governance crisis Time Large Cause Effect On average companies start restructuring 16 months too late Source: Blatz e.a. 2005 [amended by Jan Adriaanse 2005-2014] Small Program 13.45 Introduction 13.55 Workout Discussion Preparation in groups [20 minutes] Plenary presentations and discussion 14.45 The Trump Casino Workout Game What is serious gaming? Introducing the Workout Game Playing the Workout Game… 17.15 Group analysis on Workout Game process and results 17.50 End of session Workout discussion • • • Preparation in groups Input based on your own practical workout experience Report group conclusions on a flipchart paper + short presentation/explanation 1. What is a successful (out-of-court) “workout” according to your definition? 2. What are advantages and disadvantages of workouts compared to judicial bankruptcy/reorganization procedures? How do you deal with that in practice? 3. What are cross-cultural differences and (potential) conflicts in international workout situations? – Your experiences? Characteristic examples/anecdotes? – How to deal with it? Informal workouts versus judicial reorganizations Advantages [not limited] • • • • • • • Confidentiality Control Flexibility Wide range of solutions possible Less reliance on legislation or judiciary Encourage commitment ‘Selffulfilling prophecy’ can be avoided due to relative silence and ‘controlled’ process Disadvantages [not limited] • • Holdout problem / free-rider risk No instruments to force stakeholders to participate in solution Source [amended] Chatterji & Hedges, Loan workouts and debt for equity swaps. A framework for successful corporate rescues, Wiley Finance, 2001 Cross-cultural differences and potential conflicts in workouts Examples • Settling of priorities • Local habits and behavior • Times of the day people work and hours in workweek • Acceptable pay wage/fees • Motivation of people • Ehtical standards practiced in business • “Rescue culture” in business community / stigma on failure (yes/no) • • • • • • (direct) Involvement of governments Influence of local labor laws and role of unions Bankruptcy and tax laws (debtor - creditor friendliness) Level of experience with workouts and bankruptcy (”Kosovo” example) Sophistication of banking sector (“London Approach”) Etc… Source [amended] DiNapoli (ed.) Workouts & Turnarounds II, Wiley/PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 1999 The Trump Casino Workout Game What is serious gaming? Simulation of real life situation – in a safe environment Role change to better understand other actors in workout situations In the end: what can we learn from the game to use in daily practice? Challenging your own assumptions… Recent games: Zambia, Uganda, Tunisia, UK, South Africa, Suriname, Italy, Rwanda Introducing the Trump Casino Workout Game Five teams (“roles”) at the “Workout Game Table” 1.The Trump Casino Management Team 2.The Informal Equity Committee 3.The Informal Lenders Committee 4.The Workout Firm 5.Team Trump Instructions • Every team receives a sheet with specific instructions Fair play • No team is being manipulated – no boobytraps • Just remember: the more serious you play, the higher the gain… How we play the game: three rounds to come to a workout solution • Round 1: 30 minutes to prepare with your subgroup – State/define your position – Initiative for 1st meeting taken by Workout Firm • Round 2: maximum of 30 minutes to come to a standstill agreement • Round 3: 90 minutes to come to a written workout agreement Your position in the game… Be cooperative and act in good faith yet keep close eye on your legal and financial position at all times and bear in mind the instructions What if no agreement at 17.15…? Atlantic gaming authority will then terminate the gaming license which will immediately lead to an uncontrolled shutdown of the company So, there seems to be quite a good reason for an informal workout solution… Plenty of time… Welcome at the Workout Game Table Game analysis 1. Did you come to a solution? 2. What were the hurdles to overcome? 3. What are your lessons learned? Success and failure factors of corporate turnarounds/workouts Success factors (Adriaanse, 2005) • • • • • • Active attitude by management and shareholders Seeking help from professional advisors Adequate operational turnaround measures [fixing the business] Transparency with regard to financial situation Injection of risk-bearing capital Involvement of financiers (major financial and trade creditors) Confirmed by (among others): R3 research (UK), Slatter & Lovett (London Business School) and Franks/Sussman (UK) Characteristics of successful turnarounds according to Slatter & Lovett Some management changes are almost always necessary Use of multiple cash generating strategies (and in particular divestment) Improved financial control systems An understanding that cost reduction strategies are important but insufficient by themselves Nearly all successful strategies involve focusing resources on selected business units and selected product-market segments Improved operational marketing Significant organisational change in terms of organisational structure, processes and improved communications [based upon Slatter & Lovett 1999] Some examples of conflicts/bottlenecks in turnaround/workout routes [Adriaanse, 2005] – Principal banks putting pressure on management [tension] – Unsecured creditors cannot be convinced and yet refuse to take “haircut” [holdout problem] – Investors only interested under unfavorable conditions – Shareholders and potential investors not agreeing on sales price – Principal bank canceling financing – Uncontrolled “race to collect” started by creditors [frustrations among creditors] – Problems becoming publicly known leading to “self-fulfilling prophecy” – Conflicts with service providers and suppliers on payment terms – Emergency loans necessary yet shareholders and banks refusing – “Signaling” of shareholders by not injecting additional finance [no trust anymore] – “Skeletons in the cupboard” leading to pressure of potential investors towards liquidation Among others leading to… Failure factors [Adriaanse, 2005] Passive attitude management and shareholders – Started too late; “too little, too late” – Need for strategic redirection not seen No speedy and adequate operational restructuring – Lack of turnaround planning based on vision, strategy, operational and financial planning – Too much focus on costs instead of sales – No indications of methodical approaches towards turnaround Important stakeholders not involved – Banks badly informed – Important suppliers/vendors ignored Insufficient transparency regarding financial situation and proposed reorganization – MIS is disaster – Lack of attention with regard to steering on financial key performing indicators Not enough efforts towards bringing in risk-bearing capital (equity) – Too much focus on additional debt and/or workout agreements with (unsecured) creditors – Need for additional equity not seen by management Summary of failure factors Frustrations and loss of trust Not enough attention on negotiation and communication No improvement in operational (financial) results Dealing with loss of trust Why is communication needed? With whom? What is good communication? How to achieve trust, communication and results in daily workout practice? Harvard negotiation framework 1. 2. 3. 4. [People] Adopting a problem-solving approach and not allowing personality differences to side-track this [dealing with frustrations] [Interests] Avoiding taking and defending positions but rather concentrating on parties’ respective interests [enlightened selfinterest] [Options] Before making decisions, generating as many options as possible, particularly those creating mutual benefit [tailor made solutions] [Criteria] Establishing objective and fair criteria for a resolution, rather than the judgment of either party [sophisticated turnaround plan – commercially viable future - root causes addressed] Harvard Principle 1: People • Consciousness must be present with regard to “feelings, emotions, frustrations” of stakeholders involved • Resolving financial distress has a great way to do with: – Communication – Frustrations – Dealing with fear of losses at various parties involved Harvard principle 1: deal with human factor first, then move on Harvard Principle 2: Interests • Negotiations often take place one-on-one • Important to focus on common interest of company, individual creditor and other creditors – Interests are related Harvard principle 2: “pull” parties out of positions and show them what is to be gained for all Harvard principle 3: Options • Fact: companies in distress lack money • Yet, various options always available between direct payment and debt write-offs [“workout”] • “Opportunism” to be avoided; specifically with regard to tendency to have unsecured creditors footing the bill Harvard principle 3: always look for various options to choose from by creditors Harvard Principle 4: Objective criteria “Company viability” is a subjective fact Holistic turnaround plan needed as basis for negotiations Harvard principle 4: establish “objectified subjectivity” Consensus in literature: turnaround plan (10 elements) 1. Company profile – business model + causes 2. Analysis of external environment – market analysis 3. Turnaround strategy – sales growth + retrenchments 4. Strategic intent – description of desired end-state 5. Operational analysis – formulated SWOT-issues outlined 6. Operational action plan – detailed operational plan of attack 7. Financial prognostications – profit & loss-, and cash forecasts 8. Time scheme – timetable + milestones 9. Risk analysis – best & worst case scenario, and risk reward ratio 10. Summary – `to the point` outline (e.g. for bankers steering committee) Lessons learned... • • • • • • • • • • First of all, try to create a standstill and with that stabilize the situation (“informal moratorium”) Agree about “fresh money” and how to deal with it in case the company collapses anyway (“loss-sharing agreement”) Try to generate as many options as possible before deciding on solutions Make information transparent for all Be aware of fact that some stakeholders in practice have more power than strictly based on their legal positions Create a negotiation atmosphere based on mutual trust and respect Keep a close eye on legal positions: do not try to put stakeholders in a worse off position as compared to their legal status Use Harvard Negotiation principles and INSOL Statement to help guide negotiations and to create some kind of “informal rules” (framework) Make sure the company works on a turnaround plan (“fixing the business”) Use a little bit of humor… (indeed, research shows it helps in difficult situations) Rotterdam Science Tower Marconistraat 16, 12th floor 3029 AK Rotterdam The Netherlands tel +31 (0) 10 204 56 70 fax +31 (0) 10 204 55 55 jan.adriaanse@turnaroundpowerhouse.com www.turnaroundpowerhouse.com INSOL international statement of principles for a global approach to multi-creditor workouts [appendix] Appendix II: Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts First Principle • Where a debtor is found to be in financial difficulties, all relevant creditors should be prepared to co-operate with each other to give sufficient (though limited) time (“stand still period”) to the debtor for information about the debtor to be obtained and evaluated and for proposals for resolving the debtor´s financial difficulties to be formulated and assessed, unless such a course is inappropriate in a particular case Second Principle • During the standstill period, all relevant creditors should agree to refrain from taking any steps to enforce their claims against or (otherwise than by disposal of their debt to a third party) to reduce their exposure to the debtor but are entitled to expect that during the standstill period their position relative to other creditors and each other will not be prejudiced Third Principle • During the standstill period, the debtor should not take any action which might adversely affect the prospective return to relevant creditors (either collectively or individually) as compared with the position at the standstill commencement date Fourth Principle • The interests of relevant creditors are best served by co-ordinating their response to a debtor in financial difficulty. Such co-ordination will be facilitated by the selection of one or more representative co-ordination committees and by the appointment of professional advisors to advise and assist such committees and, where appropriate, the relevant creditors participating in the process as a whole Fifth Principle • During the standstill period, the debtor should provide, and allow relevant creditors and/or their professional advisers reasonable and timely access to, all relevant information relating to its assets, liabilities, business and prospects, in order to enable proper evaluation to be made of its financial position and any proposals to be made to relevant creditors Sixth principle • Proposals for resolving the financial difficulties of the debtor and, so far as practical, arrangements between relevant creditors relating to any standstill should reflect applicable law and the relative positions of relevant creditors at the standstill commencement date Seventh Principle • Information obtained for the purposes of the process concerning the assets, liabilities and business of the debtor and any proposals for resolving its difficulties should be made available to all relevant creditors and should, unless already publicly available, be treated as confidential Eighth principle • If additional funding is provided during the standstill period or under any rescue or restructuring proposals, the repayment of such additional funding should, so far as practical, be accorded priority status as compared to other indebtedness or claims of relevant creditors Day One Close