MAKING CLAIMS, NEGOTIATING SPACE
Chris van der Borgh & Carolijn Terwindt
1
Making Claims,
Negotiating Space
Image: picture of a painting in the office of human rights organization Imparsial, dedicated to
its former director Munir, Indonesian human rights activists, who died of poisoning in 2004.
2
Table of Contents
Making Claims, Negotiating Space ......................................................................................... 2
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 4
1. Operational space in partial democracies: analytical framework ........................................ 6
2. Guatemala – Operational space under pressure ............................................................... 19
3. Honduras – Operational space in times of political turbulence ......................................... 41
4. The Philippines – Strategic manoeuvring in the available space ........................................ 63
5. Indonesia – Specific spots of limited operational space .................................................. 101
6. Conclusions and recommendations ................................................................................ 136
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 146
Appendix: methodology and questionnaire ....................................................................... 155
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Introduction
In this report we present the findings of the second phase of our research into shrinking
operational space of NGOs.1 This research was commissioned by ICCO Alliance, Netherlands.
Below we briefly summarize the findings of the first phase of this study and move on with a
description of the objectives, focus of this second phase.
The reasons for ICCO to commission this research project were the widespread feeling
among partners of ICCO that their possibilities to operate freely are increasingly thwarted as a
result of government policies and actions. It was, however, not clear what the magnitude of the
problem is and to what extent partners of ICCO in different countries experience the same
kinds of problems. More particularly, it was not clear whether and to what extent this is the
result of specific (new) policies, like Counter Terrorism Measures (CTMs) or NGO-laws.
The first report (van der Borgh & Terwindt, 2009) presented the findings based on our
first round of interviews at ICCO HQ Utrecht in June – July 2009 as well as study of relevant
literature. In order to achieve a better understanding of the nature of the problems of partners
in different countries, and of the possible differences between the cases we assumed that the
operational space of NGOs is influenced by three factors:
(1) The political context (the nature of the state and the political regime) that influences
to a large extent the room of manoeuvre of NGOs;
(2) The particular combinations of restrictive actions and polices that restrict NGOs in
their operations. We make a distinction between different sorts of restrictive
policies and actions of different state and non-state actors, ranging from repression
and intimidation, to criminalisation, administrative measures, stigmatisation, and
particular pressures or limitations in existing spaces of dialogue;
(3) The particular nature, antecedents, and characteristics of NGOs, e.g. the thematic
field of NGOs, their political profile and their (historical) relations with the state, and
the geographical areas where they work.
The main finding of the first phase was that there exists a variety of ways in which
operational space is restricted. Therefore we concluded that there is not one trend of shrinking
space. Instead, in each country or region there are rather unique threats and opportunity
structures for NGOs. Moreover, even within the same country there are marked differences in
the space experienced and perceived by NGOs. For analytical purposes we made a distinction
between three ideal types of political contexts where the problem of shrinking space has
particular characteristics:
(1) Authoritarian states claiming the responsibility to regulate the (expanding) and (foreign)
funded NGO-sector;
1
As will be explained in the next chapter, throughout the text we will discuss the operational space of NGOs.
Generally, this includes the operational space of the grassroots organizations (GROs) with whom NGOs often work
together. Where there exist important differences in terms of the restrictions of operational space of NGOs or
GROs we will make this distinction explicit, otherwise we will use “NGOs” as shorthand for professional nongovernmental organization and the grassroots membership organizations with whom they tend to work together.
4
(2) Partial and relatively developed democracies that are not necessarily stable states, or
‘full’ democracies where NGOs can experience obstacles in particular fields, in
particular in issues related to accountability and the exploitation of resources;
(3) War zones and crisis areas, where NGOs struggle for safety and neutrality since state
power is either fundamentally contested or virtually absent.
These ideal types are discussed in more detail in the first report.2 It is important to
emphasise that the three types are not mutually exclusive, but rather describe sets of
interrelated problems. Countries therefore can possibly suffer from the problems described in
more than one ideal type. For instance, in partial democracies forms of authoritarianism can
reappear and pose restrictions to NGOs, or a specific geographic area in a partial democracy
can be qualified as a war zone. Also, in partial democracies there can be marked differences in
operational space, for instance between urban areas and countryside, or within cities between
marginalized and more affluent neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, we argued that research in
phase 2 should take these ideal types as a starting point and that further research should take
into account how different combinations of policy initiatives play out with a focus on these
different contexts as well as what has been done both by local and international actors to deal
with these restricting actions and policies. We also assumed that lobby agendas from European
and regional NGOs will be more effective when they focus on the set of problems in one of
these ideal types.
ICCO showed a keen interest to focus in the second phase on the category of partial
democracies, focussing on two sub-regions: South-East Asia and Central America. The objective
of the second phase is to explore and understand better the phenomenon at hand: the actions
and policies that restrict space of NGOs in partial democracies, as well as the response
strategies of these organisations. Therefore we selected two case studies in each sub-region:
Guatemala and Honduras in Central America, and Philippines and Indonesia in South-east Asia.
In these cases we looked into detail at the pressures on operational space of local NGOs as well
as the response strategies of these organisations. Differences and similarities between
countries will enable us to discuss the forms and variations of these problems. By doing so the
research seeks to contribute to the discussion on how to strengthen and protect civil society,
and how to deal with the various limitations to the operational and political space of NGOs.
The structure of this report is as follows. In the next chapter we discuss our analytical
framework. This is followed by four chapters in which we present the findings of our country
studies, Guatemala, Honduras, Philippines and Indonesia respectively. As will be explained in
the next section, each of these chapters will present: (a) the main characteristics of the political
context and the political space in each of the countries, (b) the characteristics and evolution of
civil society and the local NGO sector, (c) the restrictive actions and policies experienced by
NGOs, (d) the troubles experienced by NGOs, in particular ICCO partners, as a result of this, (e)
the response strategies to these problems, (f) conclusions and recommendations per country.
Finally we present our overall conclusions and recommendations in chapter 6.
2
See for a more concise version Van der Borgh & Terwindt (2010).
5
1. Operational space in partial democracies: analytical framework
In this chapter we present our analytical framework that we use to assess the limitations on
operational space of NGOs. We start with a brief discussion about the notion of operational
space and present the three questions that we will discuss in each of the case studies. We will
than further elaborate on each of these questions.
With the operational space of NGOs we mean the possibilities to function as an
organisation and to perform the key tasks of the organisation. Restrictions on operational space
can take different forms. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) makes a
distinction between different areas in which problems can be experienced. These are (1) the
entry of an organisation; (2) its operational activities; (3) its right of speech and advocacy; (4) its
efforts to contact and communicate with others; (5) its capacity and right to mobilise resources
in order to survive; and (6) its right of protection of the state.3 NGOs can experience limitations
in one or several of these areas.
In this study we are not just interested in the ‘restrictions by themselves’ of NGOs, but
in the restrictions experienced in their respective political contexts. We assume that within a
political context, the operational space of NGOs is not static or ‘given’, but rather the product
of interactions between NGOs and other actors. Cornwall (2002:2) argues, that space is not
something that is simply ‘taken up, assumed or filled’, but space of NGOs is also made by these
organizations and can be claimed or reshaped by NGOs themselves. Thus, operational space of
NGOs is not static and is the result of actions of different actors – state actors, private actors,
civil society actors (and even international actors) that together form a ‘public sphere’. This is
not to say that NGOs should be held responsible for the restrictions that they experience, but
we want to emphasize that NGOs are no ‘passive’ agents using space or undergoing restrictions
in this space. NGOs have agency, they develop (implicit or explicit) strategies to avoid, or to
address restrictions and influence the public sphere at large. As we will discuss below, this
interaction is particularly important in hybrid democracies.
In our case studies we focus on restrictions and response strategies of NGOs, taking into
account the political context in which the operational space is formed and/or restricted. Three
sets of questions guide our field work. These are:
(1) What are the main characteristics of the national civil societies, the NGO sector and
their relationship to the state?
(2) Which restrictive policies and actions affect the work of NGOs?
(3) In what ways do ICCO partners experience these actions and policies and what are their
response strategies to these restrictions?
Operational space in partial democracies
In our first report we used two proxies to indicate the difference in political context; the
strength of the state on the one hand, and the levels of civil and political freedoms on the other
(see Figure 1). Figure 1 depicts four ideal typical categories: strong democratic states, weak
3
See the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and the World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
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democratic states, strong authoritarian states and weak authoritarian states. Obviously, there
are different gradations of state capacity and freedom and countries can for instance have a
limited state capacity and a more hybrid political regime. Moreover, states can be weak in
different sectors, some being strong on military capacity and weak on service delivery, while
others are weak on both (Rice and Patrick, 2008). Thus, the two axes should be seen as
continua and states can be positioned anywhere in the field that is formed, their position in this
field is always subject to change. As we will discuss below there are also marked differences
within in countries and there can be different realities of state power and political and civil
freedoms.
Political regime
More Authoritarian
More Democratic
State capacity
Stronger States
Strong authoritarian state
Strong democratic state
Weaker States
Weak authoritarian state
Weak democratic state
Figure 1: State strength and political & civil liberties4
State capacity and regime type influence the room for manoeuvre of NGOs. In more free and
strong states there are clearly defined civil and political rights, based on the rule of law and a
capacity of the state to defend these rights. In this context there is an effective legal framework
as well as state protection for these organisations forming civil society. Civil society is the
‘intermediate realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate
from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members
of society to protect or extend their interests or values’ (White in Biekart, 1999:32-3). A key
characteristic of more democracy countries is that civil society organizations (CSOs) have
established working relations with state agencies in order to reach consensus on particular
topics or to make claims vis-à-vis the government or other societal actors. They thus also play a
political role and operate in the public sphere. The public sphere can be defined as ‘the nonlegislative, extra-judicial, public space in which societal differences, social problems, public
4
Adapted from Tilly (2007)
7
policy, government action and matters of community and cultural identity are developed and
debated’ (McCain and Fleming in Edwards, 2004:55). Edwards argues that these spaces are
crucial to the health of democracies, because it enables the representation and inclusion of
different viewpoints in decision-making processes (ibid). Therefore, international donors have
come to see civil society as very important in processes of democratic consolidation (Howell &
Pearce, 2006).
The political reality in most developing countries differs from this ideal-typical situation
depicted in the right-upper corner of figure 1. In relatively strong and authoritarian states, like
China, Belarus or Iran, governments have a clear willingness and capacity to control the public
sphere and to restrict NGOs in their work – using different measures. However, in weak states
(both authoritarian and democratising ones), the state capacity to make rules, to control the
public sphere or to defend NGOs is limited. In these cases, other actors like traditional
authorities, warlords, social or religious movements and (international) corporations can be
important factors in the ‘de facto’ local political orders and thus influence the room for
manoeuvre of NGOs. Joel Migdal (2001: 12) has argued that in this regard ‘states are no
different from any other formal organizations or informal social groupings. Their laws and
regulations must contend with other, very different types of sanctioned behaviour, often with
utterly unexpected results for the societies that states purport to govern – and for the states
themselves.’5 These non-state actors can also be of importance in ‘grey zones’ of partial
democracies where the state is virtually absent, or where it has lost influence. Thus, it is
important to also pay attention to the uncivil and criminal practices of state actors and
restrictive actions of non-state actors.
It is important to note, that in many societies the realm of civil society itself is also
fractionalized, fragmented, and not in all cases ‘civil’. In this regard Belloni (2008) argues that a
distinction can be made between civil society groups that explicitly recognize the importance of
respecting human rights and promoting compromise, dialogue and economic and social
integration, and groups that do not adhere to these rules, like mafias and paramilitary groups.
More interestingly, however, is the existence of a range of groups that do ‘partially’ and in
different gradations adhere to ‘civic’ norms. Criminal and paramilitary groups thrive in the
context of an ethnic, national or religious divide, in particular when the state has a limited
ability to make and enforce binding decisions (Belloni 2008, 7-8). In the absence of an effective
state, local organizations can also organize their own protection and security.6 Thus, civil
society itself can be as polarized as society itself, and organizations or groups in the (not
necessarily ‘civil’) society can be responsible for limitations in space of NGOs.
Partial democracies, that are the focus of this study, are countries were democratization has
made a start, but has not led to ‘full democracies’, rather to ‘partial democracies’ or ‘hybrid
democracies’ (Carothers, 2002; Morlino, 2008:2). In a process of democratization the
operational space of civil society is changing, as the consequence of both the efforts of internal
changes in the state and the political regime, as well as the adaptations made by organizations
5
See for instance Auyero, year, Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina: The Gray Zone of State Power, City,
Publisher.
6
Examples are the lyncings in Guatema, and the civil militias in Indonesia.
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in civil society to use (new) space, or to claim spaces on the basis of human rights legislation
(i.e. civil and political rights). That process has both instances of (new) consensus as well as
continuing struggle (Morlino, 2008:2; Hicky, 2009:42). More recently, the destabilizing potential
of democratization has received increasing attention in the academic literature and the cases in
this study all show different instances of these kinds of instability.
NGOs have to deal with a number of weaknesses and uncertainties of partial
democracies that are still poorly understood (Morlino, 2008). A distinction should be made
between the de jure space of NGOs, that is the space that they should have according to the
constitutions of young democracies on the one hand, and the de facto space, or the actual
existing space of NGOs on the other. In many partial democracies there exists a gap between
the de jure rights of citizens and the actual rights and in much of the transition literature this
‘duality of democratic regimes and constitutions’ is seen as one of the main characteristics or
results of (stalled) transitions towards democracy (Blinder and Obando (2004) in Pearce
2006:15; Pansters 2009).
In fact, democratization involves the creation of and claims for new spaces of
participation by some, as well as resistance against these changes by others. Many NGOs in
young democracies try to use, find and create new spaces of interaction with governments and
other social or economic actors. In these cases they are engaged in policy reform and claim
making and in that process creating political space. Writing about South East Asia, Randolf
David (2007:14) conceptualizes political space as the space that citizens use and demand
particularly after an authoritarian regime has been changed and the struggle for
democratization has begun. It is the space that is needed to ‘do politics’and people struggle for
political space as the precursor towards a more institutionally established democratic space.
Citizens need that political space precisely because of the absence of politics, defined as the
“process by which a society produces collectively binding decisions” (2007:14).7 In our project
we have looked at operational space as a more basic and broader concept, which includes
political space (as conceptualized by David) but also social space (which is not related to explicit
negotiation with state actors or the elaboration of state policy and legislation).
In that regard it is important to make a distinction between the political dimension of
operational space of NGOs, and the political space that NGOs may try to create. The
operational space of NGOs always has a political dimension, in the sense that the activities of
NGOs are influenced by national politics defined as ‘the ensemble of practices, discourses and
institutions that seek to establish a sense of social order and organization’ (Mouffe in Hickey,
2009: 142).NGOs operate within these orders and partly constitute them. This is for instance
the case when NGOs become important service providers and substitute the state in tasks that
it also can (and according to some should) fulfill. NGOs can, however, also play a more explicitly
political role and enter into antagonistic relationships with other actors in society that struggle
for power and resources (ibid). This happens for instance when NGOs make claims vis-à-vis the
state to implement or improve particular legislation, or when they enter into conflict with local
corporations about land use or land rights. For NGOs assuming this political role, their capacity
to make claims can be restricted and affect their own operational space. As we will see in this
7
In the case studies it appeared that in developing democracies it remains an important questions for actors in
civil society how they should relate to the electoral arena and ‘official’ politics.
9
study these problems are of particular importance in the category of partial democracies and in
many cases operational space of NGOs is restricted with a view to limit their political role.
Webster & Engberg-Pedersen identified three ways in which the political role of NGOs
can be restricted, that are all relevant to this study (in Hicky, 2009:147). Firstly, the institutional
channels through which policies and actions of governments or other societal actors can be
accessed, controlled or contested, can close (Hicky 2009:147). At a national level this can be the
result of hard measures such as states of emergency, or administrative measures, but it can
also mean that newly created ‘spaces’ (dialogues, round tables, formal participatory
mechanism, etc) are no longer taken seriously by one the participating actors (e.g. incoming
government officials, or disillusioned social partners) or simply close.
Secondly, the power of labelling and framing is of great importance. A case in point is
the resource conflicts where the agendas and motivations of NGOs are portrayed in different
ways. NGOs that are protesting against a logging concession can be portrayed as backward and
opposing ‘progress’, while they would themselves claim to support sustainable development.
The space of NGOs is also the product of this ‘verbal conflict’ where different interpretations
and claims about the (true) agendas of the ‘own’ and the ‘other’ group are heavily debated. The
power to influence these frames is partly dependent on media coverage, which makes the
structure, ownership and loyalties of media enterprises an important factor in these strategies.
Thirdly, there is always a capacity to create new spaces.8 The social and political
practices of individuals, associations and organizations can create, maintain or challenge formal
and informal political spaces. E.g. local organizations protesting against a mining company or a
logging concession can create a new local political space of conflict, or dialogue. This capacity
can, however, also take a negative turn, as is the case with the activities of criminal networks,
or violent street gangs can challenge formal and informal political spaces. The assumption of
this study is that the pressures on NGOs will be different in each and every country (even within
the subcategory of partial democracies) and therefore have to be located and understood in
their particular context.
Restrictive policies and actions
In figure 2 we provide a table to organize the variety of policies, laws and measures that can
have a restricting influence on operational space. We make a distinction between five sets of
actions and policies.9 In many cases these measures are linked and one can identify specific
instances where they occur in a certain order or a certain cycle of escalation. Each of the
actions and restrictions can be viewed on a continuum where they can either enable and
facilitate NGOs or (at the other end of the continuum) pose obstacles. For example, a state can
give protection to civil society actors and thus provide a safe and secure operational space or it
can fail to protect its citizens and allow crimes to go unpunished, thus putting obstacles for
social mobilization. Enabling administrative legislation can be juxtaposed to restrictive NGO
8
Cornwall (2002) makes a distinction between spaces that are created by participants themselves, and those that
are created by others.
9
We have made this distinction on the basis of the findings of interviews with ICCO staff in the period June – July
2009, as well as information of human rights organisations.See for instance the website of Amnesty International,
which mentions Challenges of Human Rights Defenders, online available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/humanrights-defenders/issues/challenges
10
legislation. Similarly, in the field of labelling, a government can actively give voice to groups
and individuals by for example recognizes them in the constitution or by giving them
respectable labels, on the other hand it can discredit their positions and silence their voices by
stigmatizing them as criminals, terrorists, or unpatriotic.
Firstly, we make a distinction between two forms of repression and intimidation:
impunity and lack of protection on the one hand and threats, injuries and killings on the other.
With regard to the first one, this is frequently related to problems of state weakness. When the
state is weak (and in particular when the law enforcement sector is weak), this has
consequences on actual protection of NGOs. However, this can be both the result of a lack of
capacity or unwillingness of the state, while the line between the two can be blurred. Powerful
groups with vested interests within and outside the state can block the rule of law or judicial
reform and thus contribute to a sphere of vulnerability and impunity. These problems are
particularly important in cases of democratic openings after long periods of violent conflict,
where societies are still deeply divided. Transitional justice and truth commissions are often
highly controversial and ‘well-connected’, powerful perpetrators can seek to obstruct these
processes.
There obviously is a link between problems of impunity on the one hand and threats,
injuries and killings on the other. When a state is unable or unwilling to maintain the rule of
law, perpetrators run fewer risks to be arrested or prosecuted. The cases discussed in this
study indicate that sectors of the government themselves can be involved in these actions,
while in many cases they cooperate in different ways with non-state actors with particular
interests (like corporations, paramilitary, gangs). More generally, this weak or corrupted state
capacity enlarges the capacity of ‘uncivil’ groups in society and thus contributes (again) to a
sphere of intimidation and insecurity.
Secondly, criminalisation is the act of isolating a generally defined conduct and labelling
this conduct as criminal which opens up the possibility of public (and sometimes private)
prosecution. This enables the use of coercive mechanisms under state authority against
individuals for the purpose of finding this person guilty of the specified conduct and imposing a
sentence, such as a monetary fine or time in prison. Criminalization involves a range of coercive
measures that can restrict individuals and organizations, ranging from criminal investigation,
such as the search of an office and the seizure of computers to pre-trial detention, to high bails,
travel restrictions, costly lawyers, and time in prison. We distinguish between two ways in
which the concept of criminalization is used: (1) the technical act of criminalization, which
means the defining of conduct as criminal and the application of the criminal law apparatus in
order to enforce that definition; (2) the political strategy of using technical criminalization to
define political opponents and their actions or projects as criminal and applying the criminal
law apparatus to enforce this definition. The first one applies for instance to any of the
provisions in the criminal law, such as the criminalization of sexual intercourse without consent
as rape. The second one applies to the systematic efforts of state agents or political actors to
use the criminal law apparatus vis-à-vis particular groups that are seen as threats to order and
security, such as the criminalisation of being a member of the communist party as was the case
in the Philippines until 1992. While the latter is not (necessarily) illegal, it oftentimes involves
processes of labelling and stereotyping of certain groups that are thus depicted as particular
threats. In this regard the connection between criminalisation and stigmatisation (that we will
11
discuss separately below) is of particular importance. Stigmatisation of opponents in speeches,
documents, and the media is often preceding the actual criminalization. This can also legitimise
acts of criminalisation. On the other hand, detentions and criminal trials can have a stigmatizing
effect.
Although criminalisation never is a ‘neutral’ process, since it always involves
interpretations of threats, but we are particularly interested in these examples where powerful
interest groups (within or outside the state) use the judicial apparatus to neutralize protestors
or activists that are threatening their particular (private) interests. The past decade the
discussions about these ‘perverse’ forms of criminalisation have particularly been focused on
the topic of the negative (intended and unintended) consequences of counter terrorism
measures. Counter-terrorism measures are laws and practices by governments and supranational institutions intended to prohibit, prevent, investigate, and punish specific acts of
terrorism. In the absence of international consensus about one definition of terrorism, many
countries have terrorism statutes that define acts of terrorism in broad terms and thus provide
them with leeway to criminalise particular actors. This is particularly the case with broad
provisions for collaborating with, glorifying or inciting terrorism as well as where merely
material destruction can constitute a terrorist offence. Anecdotal evidence reports that
particularly human rights activists may face these kinds of charges (see for example Cortright
2008 and ICCO/CORDAID 2008). Without clarity about what exactly constitutes terrorism, a
wide variety of conduct could possibly be placed under these derivative charges, such as the
well-known case of journalist Jeyaprakash Tissainayagam in Sri Lanka who was convicted to
twenty years imprisonment for having written articles in support of the Tamil Tigers as well as
collecting money for a pro-Tamil magazine. On 3rd of May 2010 he was given a presidential
pardon.10
There are numerous examples of CTMs having affected the room of manoeuvre of social
movements and NGOs.11 However, it is fair to say that CTMs generally are one of the possible
measures in a wider ensemble of actions and policies and that there is not one trend of
shrinking space due to shared influences of counter terrorism measures. What’s more, although
‘bad CTMs’ can come in handy for governments that want to criminalise certain movements or
to restrict the space of NGOs, this can and is also be done by applying ‘regular’ criminal law. Our
case studies provide evidence of the use of ‘regular’ criminal law provisions against NGOs, but
emphasise at the same time that it is extremely difficult to prove that there exist patterns of
perverse criminalisation and to discern the (possible) interests and strategies behind these
trends.12 [Add: Methodology on problem of attribution.]
Third in our model of restrictive actions and policies come the administrative
restrictions. The most important one in this regard is ‘bad’ NGO legislation, that is legislation on
NGOs and civil society that restricts fundamental rights. The International Center for Not-forprofit Law (ICNL) in Washington has conducted research into the NGO legislation in 150
countries. It produced a “checklist for civil society organisations (CSO) Laws” which describes
10
‘Sri Lankan president pardons convicted Tamil editor’, 3 May 2010, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8657805.stm [accessed 1 June 2010] and Cordaid 2009
11
See for instance Kathrin Buhl y Claudia Korol eds. (2009)
12
See for instance the comparison made by Hudson of Human Rights First between criminalisation in Colombia
and Guatemala.
12
“provisions that should be included in legislation governing civil society organizations” and
which “is useful for assessing whether CSO legislation currently on the books or in draft form
meets generally accepted international practices.” Whereas this checklist counts several pages,
the Open Institute has published in cooperation with ICNL a 120-page book “Guidelines for
Laws Affecting Civic Organizations.” The book outlines all the relevant treaty provisions and the
relevant court cases interpreting these provisions in order to ensure that NGO legislation does
not violate the right to association and other protections of fundamental freedoms. They
discuss why and how several government rules and practices (such as delayed response to
application for NGO status) violate these principles. In this way civil society can use that as a
norm to hold their government to when they try to introduce excessive controls on the NGO
sector.
The problems of governments trying to increase their control over the NGO sector are
mostly prominent in authoritarian countries. But there also have been efforts to introduce
restrictive NGO-bills in more open countries. In these cases, the response capacity of NGOs
sector and civil society organizations is a key factor. For instance, in India the NGO-sector was
able to stall new legislation on NGOs that was inspired by CTM policies (Chandra Pandey, in:
Cordaid 2008:29). In the case of Uganda, NGOs also were able to raise their concerns about a
new NGO Bill. The government however decided to ignore their protests and introduced the
law in 2006. Thus, a key issue is whether local NGOs and civil society organizations can enter
into negotiations with their governments to negotiate their operational space, and how
responsive governments are.
Apart from the topic of legislation, there are numerous examples of government
agencies that use their power to control NGOs in an ad-hoc manner.13 This was confirmed in
our case studies. We encountered examples of government agencies and (local departments of)
ministries that took relatively much time to approve the new statutes of some NGOs, or that
controlled their administration on a much more frequent basis than was considered usual.
Thus, restrictive administrative measures are not necessarily the product of ‘bad’ legislation,
but can also be the product of the willingness and ability to use bureaucratic power to obstruct
NGOs in their operations. Again, it can be extremely difficult to discern the (possible) interests
and strategies behind these practices and the objective of this study is therefore firstly to
collect the evidence of these practices and possibly to analyse how these ad-hoc measures
work.
Stigmatisation and negative labelling is the fourth element of our model. Stigmatization
is the process in which a stigma comes into existence. A stigma is the phenomenon whereby an
individual with an attribute, which is deeply discredited by his or her society, is rejected as a
result of the attribute (such as the attributes criminal, terrorist, non-believer). We talk about
stigmatization in cases where groups are portrayed as untrustworthy, or (stronger) as criminals
or dangerous subjects, and thus forming a threat to security or social order of society, without
giving major substance for these claims. When government agents or other actors use criminal
labels to discredit certain activity or certain actors, we can call this “criminal” stigmatization
(this can also be the case when no judicial action is undertaken). Stigmatization can be an
extremely important strategy when a group or category is constantly depicted as
13
Interviews with ICCO staff in June – July 2009.
13
untrustworthy, or dangerous. However, the labelling of certain groups as untrustworthy or
dangerous is not the exclusive domain of government agents. In fact, other social actors can
play important roles in these activities, such as corporations, religious groups or media. We use
the term social stigmatization to point at the rejection of particular influences, values or ideas
that are seen as contrary to the dominant social norms and values. As is for instance the case
with the demonization of Western NGOs and liberal ideas.
The fifth element of our model is the category of existing spaces under pressure.
Dialogue can take the form of a negotiation, where different actors with opposing interests aim
to come to a deal. A specific characteristic of the negotiations in ‘unfinished’ democracies is
that they are often highly asymmetrical. In the absence of good laws and clear governmental
protection of rights to counterbalance this asymmetry, the space of dialogue where the
negotiation takes place can be full of unequal pressures for the NGO or (often) GRO or even
entirely hijacked by the powerful party. This can for example be the case in negotiations
between corporations and indigenous communities about land rights. Alternatively the
dialogue can take the form of collaboration, where for example an NGO is asked to write a draft
law for the government. A specific characteristic of collaboration between civil society and
government in partial democracies is the danger that NGOs take over what are essentially
governmental tasks.
As to restrictions on each of these spaces of dialogue, we make a distinction between
co-optation on the one hand and closure of newly created spaces on the other. Both are about
the limits or reversal of interactions between state agencies and civil society. In partial
democracies many NGOs and GROs are in the process of adapting to and creation of a new
political ‘playing ground’, where the space of NGOs to interact with state agencies generally
increases, while in that very process the limitations can be reached of the kind of state - society
interaction that is seen as important to democratic politics. Co-optation is an oftentimes deeply
embedded practice that has strong links to clientalism. In this practice persons or several
persons are persuaded or lured to join the agency, party, or system of an opponent and in
these processes offers of material gain for the ‘co-opted person or the group’ play an important
role in these moves. It can, obviously, be extremely difficult to see where cooperation ends,
and where the move of a person is a ‘cross-over’ that is rather a proof of the ability of people to
switch roles (instead of political positions). In extreme cases, NGOs report outright bribing as a
practice in these spaces of dialogue, at times alternated with threats and intimidation.14
Threats and co-optation are forms of ‘coercive’ and ‘reward’ power (Lawler 1983:89), where
threats are based on the prospect of punishment, whereas co-optation aims to forestall
opposition by giving rewards.
Apart from the problem of co-optation, newly created spaces where government
agencies and civil society meet (such as social fora, round tables, seminars, etcetera) can close
or disappear, or simply be disappointment participants. The latter is not uncommon to (all kinds
of) democracies, where invited spaces created by governments can serve to sell or legitimize
existing policies, instead of opening up debate with society at large. These spaces can certainly
have a role to both governments and participants when there is broad consensus about chosen
14
This was reported for example by an anti-corruption NGO in Indonesia after they accused someone of corruption
(this was reported by ICCO-partner Gerak Aceh, see chapter 5).
14
policies or measures, but can be experienced as form of ‘fake space’, when no follow up is
given. This is particularly problematic where the law or donors require “consultation” of target
groups. Such consultation can be perceived or used as ‘legitimising’ practice, instead of an
actual possibility to give voice or to exert influence. There is also a ‘come and go’ of social and
political spaces in partial democracies. In itself this is not a negative feature, since forms of
interaction have to be developed and can be subject to change. However, closure of space as a
result of incompatibility of views, a lack of confidence, or as a result of a change of government,
can be highly frustrating to parties involved.
Actions and
policies that
restrict
operational
space
1
2
Physical
harassment and
intimidation
Criminalization:
Prosecution and
investigation
Threats, injuries,
and killings
Impunity and
lack of
protection
Preventive
measures such
as terrorism lists
and terrorism
task forces
Investigation
and prosecution
for punitive
purposes
3
Administrative
restrictions
Restrictive NGObills on
registration and
operation
4
5
Stigmatisation
and negative
labelling
Space under
pressure
Criminal
stigmatization of
specific actors
Cooptation
Closure of newly
created space
Ad-hoc measures by
different
government
agencies
Social
stigmatization of
specific actors
Figure 2: Actions and policies that restrict operational space
15
On the job trouble and responses of NGOs and GROs
The focus of this study is primarily on counterparts of ICCO in the selected countries. These
organizations are often conveniently termed ‘non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs). This is a
general and therefore rather vague concept, as many authors have argued, and further
clarification of the particular characteristics (what they are, instead of what they are not…) is
therefore needed.
The relationship with external agencies that provide knowledge, contacts, and financial
resources is of fundamental importance for the partners of ICCO in these countries and
distinguishes them from those actors that don’t have such relationships. The partners of ICCO
thus have in common that they are supported by external development agencies (or
International NGOs), and oftentimes also funded (either partly or entirely) by these agencies.
We call these local counterparts non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, there are
many differences between these organizations, among others in terms of size, political links,
constituency, functions, and geographical reach. For the purpose of this study we make a
distinction between the characteristics and functions of partners of ICCO. Both are of particular
importance in order to understand the degree to which organizations experience restrictions,
as well as their capacities to respond.
Function Service delivery
Characteristics
Professional NGOs
Grassroot NGOs
Policy oriented
Family planning agency,
international relief agency
Human rights group,
public policy think tank
Water users’ association,
forestry users’ group
Anti-mining association,
environmental group
Figure 3 - Organizations in Civil Society Defined by Characteristics (What They Are) and by
Function (What They Do)15
In figure 3 we make a distinction in characteristics of ICCO partners between professional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots NGOs. Professional NGOs are professionally
run organizations with a specific expertise that aim to support particular target groups (either
directly or indirectly). These organizations are largely funded by external donors. Examples of
NGOs are organizations lobbying for judicial or security sector reform, or providing technical
support for farmer organizations. Grassroots NGOs are membership organizations, or
organizations with a clearly defined constituency (e.g. a women’s organization, or farmers’
organization) that is generally active at the local level and that have established direct
relationships with international development agencies. Local organizations that do not have
15
Adapted from Harry Blair, 2000: 66.
16
these direct relationships are in our definition grassroots organizations (GROs). This distinction
is not unproblematic, because there are many mix-forms. Over time GROs can professionalize,
and establish direct relations with funders and in that process obtain characteristics of
Grassroots NGOs. And while professional NGOs are not necessarily membership organizations
and oftentimes aim to serve specific target groups in general (e.g. homeless children, or
landless farmers), they can also be membership based (members can be individuals or
grassroots organizations) or have a strong ‘local’ profile. Thus, the variables of expertise,
membership and foreign funding can be present in different combinations, which can have
consequences on the experienced space of organizations. Thus, the distinction serves as a first
effort to classify counterparts of ICCO. Obviously, in these definitions counterparts of ICCO are
always NGOs that can maintain contacts with GROs. Our research is therefore mainly concerned
with professional NGOs and grassroots NGOs, but indirectly addresses the problems of GROs as
well.
A second distinction that we make for both NGOs is whether they are service oriented
or claim making / policy oriented. Organizations that primarily work in the field of socioeconomic services focus on the delivery of services to target groups. Claim-making and policy
oriented groups make claims vis-à-vis other actors, which easily leads to struggles for power
and resources and antagonistic relationships between groups. It is more likely that these
groups will experience tensions or confrontations with the actors they challenge. This is even
more so when these NGOs challenge government policies or structures, for instance in anticorruption campaigns, human rights abuses or security reform. Whereas in authoritarian
regimes the very existence and ‘right to entry’ of this type of organisation can easily be blocked,
in partial democracies these organisations can also experience serious problems of state or
non-state actors that infringe on the operational space of particular NGOs.
This also implies that within the category of partial democracies, policies and actions of
governments and state institutions can be experienced differently by NGOs and GROs in the
same country. Particular organizations and persons can experience restrictions, while the great
majority of NGOs and GROs is not affected by them. Also, particular regions or sectors can be
more affected than others. This is not to say that organizations focusing on service delivery do
not face problems. Although these trends are generally more present in authoritarian regimes,
this can for instance become an issue in more hybrid democracies where governments
introduce strict versions of NGO-legislation.
Individual
Coordinated
Reactive
Coping strategies to avoid the
direct negative effects of the
limiting measures as much as
possible
Incidental coordinated public
declarations in response to
significant events
Proactive
Systematically speaking out
against the measures in an
attempt to have them
withdrawn or changed
Forming (national or regional)
working groups addressing
measures before and while they
are executed and systematically
reach out to the national or
international community to
increase pressure
17
Figure 4: Response strategies of NGOs/GROs to restrictive policies and actions
With regard to the answers to experienced restrictions of NGOs/GROs we make a distinction
between reactive and proactive answers that can both be implemented either at the individual
or ‘organisational’ level, or in a more coordinated fashion. The last decade international
organizations, like the UN, the EU, and many international NGOs have shown an increased
interest in the defense and protection of groups and individuals that wan to organize and
operate freely. The UN Assembly adopted UN General Assembly adopted UN A/RES/53/144
with a view guarantee the rights of individuals and groups to defend human rights (social,
economic and political). These groups are today increasingly called human rights defenders,
which includes a wide range of organizations. The EU writes that ‘all organisations that promote
and protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms (and that do not
commit or propagate violence) are human rights defenders’. The term is, however, in particular
used for groups that experience restrictions. The organizations that are subject of this study can
all be seen as being part of a much broader and diverse group of human rights defenders (HRD).
We do not ourselves employ the notion of HRD, but it is increasingly used by others in the field.
18
2. Guatemala – Operational space under pressure
Introduction
After two decades of democratisation and almost fifteen years of post-settlement transition the
operational space for civil society organisations in Guatemala has both increased, but is at the
same time ‘under pressure’. In principle, many groups can operate relatively freely, but
impunity, corruption, insecurity and high indices of violence have an extremely negative impact
on the operational space of all NGOs and GROs and hamper their work. Groups touching topics
that are related to vested interests can experience severe problems on top of this. The most
vulnerable sectors that were discussed in this chapter are groups working with human rights,
justice and security on the one hand, and groups that enter into conflicts about resources at
local level on the other hand. The security situation of these groups has deteriorated over the
past decade.
Political context
On 29 December 1996 the Guatemalan peace process, which had lasted almost six years,
culminated into the signing of an Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace (Azpuru, 1999:115;
Conciliation Resources, 1997). The peace accords brought an end one of the longest and
bloodiest armed conflicts in Latin America, that was known for its extremely high death toll and
extreme human rights violations that particularly had affected the marginalized indigenous
population (Azpura, 1999:97; CEH, 1999).16 The accord had been brokered by the United
Nations and was signed by a severely weakened guerrilla movement (UNRG) and the
government of Guatemala. The process ran parallel to a fragile process of democratisation, that
had already started in the 1980s, which included the introduction of electoral democracy, but
only partly affected the power of the military (Azpuru, 1999: 97). Civil society organisations
played an important role in the peace process.
The peace agreement – in particular the Acuerdo sobre Fortalicimiento del Poder Civico
(AFPC) – aimed to put an end to the military influence over political life (Pearce, 2006: 18;
Gavigan, 2009: 65). This proved to be an extremely difficult process, since the military had
come to play an increasingly important role in political life in the 20 th century – in particular in
the period after 1954, when the army (with support of the CIA) toppled the democratically
elected and reform-oriented government of president Alvaro Arbenz. Alliances between
civilians and military became the modus operandi, with the head of state being – with a single
exception – a military officer (Kruijt, 2008:20). Thus, the military institutions acquired
‘disproportionate power in relation to the public sector, political parties and social movements,
a dynamic that gradually led to a hybrid civilian-military regime of violence and repression’
(ibid, 20) . The military also extended its powers into the administration of public enterprises,
and even set up its own economic businesses (Pearce, 2006: 16).
16
The report of the CEH registered 626 massacres – the majority in the departments that are populated by
indigenous peoples, such as Quiché, Alta y Baja Verapaz, Chimaltenango.
19
The post-settlement transition in Guatemala is extremely problematic. Economic growth
rates have been rather low over the past decades (average of 1% per annum), and although the
percentage of Guatemalans that live in poverty has dropped in this period, in 2006 50% of the
population was still living in poverty (UNDP, 2008b:10). A key challenge in post-settlement
Guatemala is the continuing socio-economic inequalities and the question of how to address
these (UNDP 2008). This is related to the problematic implementation of the security and
political reforms, which did lead to a downsizing of the army, as well as the regular organisation
of elections. However, Guatemalan society suffers of high levels of violence, while the state
itself is challenged by criminal interests. A major problem is the continuing influence and
control of former military that – increasingly from ‘without’ the state - control the arms trade,
criminal enterprises and security companies (Briscoe, 2009: 8). These groups are variously
called illicit power structures, clandestine groups (Human Rights Watch 2009:184), or parallel
structures and political-criminal networks (Gavigan, 2009:62). This heritage of the (growing)
economic interests of military during the civil war, has gained new momentum now that
Guatemala has become the centre of a drugs trans-shipment belt from the Andes to North
America (Gavigan, 2009: 72). This ‘accident of geography’ has led to extremely high levels of
organised crime and crime-related violence (ibid).
Criminal networks, both within and outside the realm of the state, lead to a further
weakening of the state apparatus. There are long-existing rackets in state offices which are
extremely difficult to clean up since it would ‘put a lot of people’s lives in danger’ (Briscoe,
2009: 5). The weakness of the state also explains why criminal networks are gaining effective
control over the state. In 2007, Minister Eduardo Stein claimed that in six out of 22
departments ‘crime cartels had gained effective control’, while in three others they had a share
of power (Gavigan, 2009:70). Organised crime is also said to finance political campaigns and
political parties, both at national and local levels (ibid). While much of the violence and
repression is orchestrated by actors that are outside of the realm of the state, some of these
actors have gained influence over state agencies. A case in point is the murder in Guatemala of
three Salvadoran members of the Central American parliament and their driver in 2007. They
were presumably killed by senior members of Guatemala’s police, including the head of the
organised crime unit. After their arrest these police officers were themselves killed inside a
maximum security prison (Hudson & Taylor, 2010: 57, Wola, 2007). The Freedom House Report
of 2009 mentions corruption and impunity as important problems in Guatemala. Although it
argues that some progress has been made in terms of anti-corruption activities, it states that
the judiciary is still plagued by corruption and is extremely ineffective. Less then 3% of the
murder cases is resolved (Human Rights Watch, 2009-183). The widespread insecurity and
impunity – both signs of a weak state – has also led to waning confidence in the state and
groups organising their own security among others by lynching.
While the influence, infiltration and pressure of criminal groups on the state and
political parties is considerable, the political establishment itself is extremely fragmented.
According to Briscoe (2009:9) there is ‘an astonishing series of fractures within the elites’ in
Guatemala. The deep divisions between these powerful economic elites itself is one of the main
problems for political reform in Guatemala (ibid, 2009: 18). Historically, powerful economic
elites have blocked social and economic reform and sought to maintain the status quo. This
opposition continued during the peace negations and in the post-settlement period. A case in
20
point is the opposition against tax reforms that would raise Guatemala’s tax-rate which is one
lowest in Latin America (Briscoe, 2009: 7-8; Paris, 2004: 131-2).
The fragmentation is also reflected in the landscape of political parties in Guatemala.
Sánchez (2008:123) claims that with respect to basic facets of internal party organisation
Guatemalan political parties ‘exhibit a feebleness so pronounced that their very status as
parties is questionable’. Although changes of government in Guatemala have taken place after
elections in the past decades, the presidential candidates were generally well-known persons
around which a number of political factions coalesced (Briscoe, 2009: 5). These coalitions are
generally unstable and characterised by infighting. For instance, Pearce (2006: 18-9) describes
how during the governance period of the FRG government –led by Portillo – this instability
manifested itself. Initially, the government was open to new dialogues with civil society, among
others in the field of security. This reversed, however, when a change of military authorities
took place that dissociated themselves from the outcomes of the earlier dialogues (ibid). This
period became the ‘watershed years for the emergence of illicit power structures’ (Gavigan,
2009: 67).17
While the political space in Guatemala has increased over the past decades, and the
counter-insurgency and repressive regime of the late 1970s and early 1980s has been
reformed, Guatemala is still one of the most violent countries in Latin America with over 6.200
homicides in 2008 (Freedom House, 2008). The repression of state agents of the war years has
made place for a broader variety of repressive and restrictive policies and violent actions of
both state and non-state actors. An important part of this violence is related to criminal
activities and drug trafficking, as well as to violence of youth gangs. This affects the human
rights situation in Guatemala and has led to further escalation of repressive action against
Human Rights Defenders in the past ten years, most notably after the Portillo government
(Pearce, 2006:20).
Civil society and NGOs
In the 1960s and 1970s the number of social organisations increased both in urban and rural
areas (Garcia, 2010:3). In the countryside indigenous communities started to organise, with a
marked influence of liberation theology (Biekart, 1999: 254). This led, among others, to the
formation of a national Indian peasant organisation, the Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC).
However, in the period after the earthquake of 1976 there was a steady increase in the number
of conservative US fundamentalist and Pentacostal sects that started to work in indigenous
communities. It was, however, the popular organisations of civil society that were heavily
repressed during the late 1970s and early 1980s, by government forces that established a
‘machinery of control, repression and murder’ (Kruijt, 2008: 21).
New spaces for participation emerged in the second half of the 1980s. In this period, the
political space for progressive groups increased and a number of NGOs were created by former
militants of the guerrilla organisations – such as CDHG18and CERIGUA19 (both created in
17
It is telling that the growing influence of these structures was according to Gavigan (2009:67) the result of
Portillo’s efforts to counter the power of the traditional oligarcy.
18
Comision de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala
19
Centro de Reportes Informativos sobre Guatemala
21
Mexico) (Garcia, 2010:4). In Guatemala NGOs like GAM, CONAVIGUA and FAMDEGUA were
founded (ibid).20 Apart from these organisations, there was also an increase in the number of
independent Mayan organisations, or ‘radical-cultural’ groups (Peace & Howell, 2001: 148-9). In
the second half of the 1980s new indigenous organisations were founded, such as CONAVIGUA,
CERJ and CONDEG (Biekart, 1999: 256). In the early 1990s two coalitions of Indian organisations
were set up: Majawil Q’il (or New Dawn in 1990) and COMG21 in 1991 (Sieder, 1997: 67-8).
Together with other organisations they formed the Mesa Maya in 1992 and the Coalition of
Organisations of the Maya People of Guatemala (COPMAGUA) in 1994 (Siedel, 1997: 68;
Biekart, 1999:257-8). Of particular importance to civil society was the installation of a special
Assembly for Civil Society (ASC) in 1994 which was chaired by Bishop Quezada (Biekart, 1999:
169). This assembly was boycotted by the business sector, but stimulated the involvement of
women’s organisations and coalitions of Indian organisations. COPMAGUA played a key role in
the Assembly for Civil Society and contributed to the Indigenous Rights Accord. According to
Siedel (1997:68) this process showed that ‘non-indigenous intermediaries were no longer
necessary’.
However, most of these newly established organisations that played a role in the ASC
had relations with external donors. In the period until the signing of the peace agreements, the
relations were mostly with international NGOs, that had been involved in solidarity work and
played an important role in supporting these organisations in their struggle for an ‘equitable
peace’ (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 152). After the peace agreements, bilateral and multilateral
donors - that in the post-war years increased their budgets for Guatemala - also became
interested in funding Guatemalan civil society. These international agencies sought to support
civil society in different ways, but Howell and Pearce (2001) argue that they shared an agenda
of ‘institutional strengthening’ that was informed by a particular vision on civil society. They
emphasised consensual approaches to civil society and ignored the importance of underlying
conflicts and power inequalities (p.148). This donor support – although not only negative in the
view of Howell and Pearce – shifted attention away from important questions about the
strategy to follow in the post-settlement years, which weakened the strategic capacity of many
NGOs. Howell and Peace quote a director of a regional NGO that warned in 1995 that ‘financing
must aim to strengthen civil society, not to alter the fundamental nature of its organizations,
converting them into appendices of the state or into private initiatives dominated by the
market’ (2001: 163). This concern was also expressed in several of the interviews conducted for
this study. It shows that the relationship of external donors with NGOs and GROs not only
influences the way NGOs and GROs function internally, but also the ways in which they make
use of new political space.
With an estimated number of 2.500 NGOs and some 23.000 GROs Falisse and SaenzCorella (2009:11) call Guatemalan civil society ‘vibrant and complex’. At the same time,
however, they argue that civil society is fragile in terms of their capacity to influence policy, as
well as the values they promote. The authors mention a number of problems. An important one
is the disappointment about the results of the new spaces of dialogue with government
20
Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (CONAVIGUA), Asociación de
Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos de Guatemala(FAMDEGUA)
21
Council of Mayan Organisations of Guatemala
22
agencies that were created over the past decades (see also the next section). Other problems
are leadership problems, dependency of external donors (both in terms of recourses and ideas),
the transformation of popular movements into NGOs (‘ngo-ization’), cross-over of NGO staff to
government agencies, and a lack of cooperation between NGOs, and insecurity and threats
(Falisse & Saenz-Corella, 2009:12-3. 36-7; Civicus). Also, it seems that the amount of foreign
assistance available for NGOs has past its peak and organisations will need to find alternative
resources or otherwise simply disappear.22
Civil society is broad and diverse and it is fair to say that a number of sectors of civil
society – such as the syndicates and peasant movements – are rather weak, while other sectors
have shown a remarkable strength and resilience. The indigenous movements have grown over
the past decades, but it seems that after the successful mobilisation of the indigenous
movement in the 1990s, the movement has lost some cohesion and force. This is not to say that
their self organisation and struggles – such as the struggle for land, a key issue for indigenous
communities – has ceased. Land issues have become more important and the struggle for
indigenous rights is in many places linked to a struggle for territory. With the new ascendancy
of companies exploiting resources (like mining companies, hydroelectric firms, palm oil
plantations) this has led in a number of regions to severe polarisation and escalation, including
the persecution and criminalisation of indigenous leaders (see the case of San Marcos
elsewhere in this text).
NGOs that are working in the field of human rights, security sector reform and justice
are generally seen as rather successful and proactive (Garcia, 2010:5; Falisse and Saenz-Corella,
2009:11). These organisations are involved in activities like research, lobby, and policy debates,
while others have become actively involved in processes of formulation and implementation of
government policies. Most of these organisations have long-standing relationships with
international NGOs and many of them have participated in dialogues with government
agencies. NGOs working in these fields are, however, not a cohesive group that agree on
objectives and strategies, and there are serious discussions about for instance how far one
should go in the relations with the government (see next paragraph of this chapter).
The above-mentioned sector of NGOs is thus a particular branch of the Guatemalan
NGO-sector. It is mostly urban-based, and while some organisations have a (historical)
constituency, their representation of non-ladino groups is not very strong. Although, it is fair to
say that not all NGOs necessarily need to be membership-based or to have a clearly defined
constituency, this issue of representation of NGOs is important and linked to the historical
ethnical divisions in Guatemalan society, which are also reflected in the NGO-sector. During the
peace negotiations this was already an issue for some Indian organisations that feared to be
dominated by ‘ladino’ organisations (Biekart, 1999:256). But tensions are also reported
between urban-based NGOs and local GROs (Falisse & Saenz-Coreralla, 2009:11).
22
According to Civicus (2005:7) the temporary character of civil society organizations (like NGOs) is one of the
characteristics of the structure of Guatemalan civil society: ‘Many organizations appear only temporarily, absorb
funds and resources, and then disappear. This phenomenon is not unique to Guatemala, but an often heard
critique about the consequences of some providers of foreign assistances that foster ‘opportunistic NGOs’.
23
Restrictive policies and actions
This section discusses the five types of restrictive policies and actions that were identified in
chapter 1. A separate discussion of each field can show the relative importance of each in the
case of Guatemala, but it is important to reiterate that in many cases there are links between
different kinds of restrictions. In the following discussion we focus on two sectors that are most
affected; the groups working in the ‘urban’ based human rights and justice sector and groups
working at the local-level with issues like land, mining and labor rights.
Repression and intimidation
In the year 2008, the number of homicides in Guatemala reached a startling 6.292, which
equals an average of 17 killings per day (UN, 2009b:6). The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston indicated five types of particularly problematic
types of killings: social cleansing, lynching, femicide, attacks on human rights defenders, and
violence against prisoners (ibid, 7-10). There are estimates that between 8 and 10 percent of
the killings are the result of social cleansing (of criminals and gang members). The Rapporteur
states that there is evidence that the national police (PNC) and de Division of Criminal
Investigations (DINC) are involved in these killings, and that although this has not reached the
level of ‘officially-sanctioned policy,[..] they are ‘more than just the actions of a few rogue
officers’ (ibid, 7). Over 10 percent of the homicides are women, the majority of them killed in
the age between 16 and 30, and killed by strangulation.23 This phenomenon is, however, still
poorly understood, and the justice system fails to adequately investigate and prosecute these
cases (ibid, 8).
There is a worrisome trend in Guatemala of increasing violations of members of NGOs
and GROs. In 2009, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of
human rights defenders reported her deep concern about ‘the deterioration in the
environment in which human rights defenders operate, characterised by endemic impunity for
crimes and violations committed against them’ (UN, 2009a:2). Information collected by the
NGO Unidad de Proteccion a Defensoras y Defensores de Derechos Humanos – Guatemala
(Udefegua) shows a rise of the reported violations over the past 10 years from 59 in 2000 till
353 in 2009, with a marked 38% rise in 2009 in comparison to 2008 (Udefegua, 2010: 7, 14).
Sectors that were particularly vulnerable in 2009 are trade union members (84 cases),
journalists (43 cases) and persons working in the field of truth finding (96 cases) (ibid, 16).
Although state actors (such as – former – police or military) are involved in repression
and intimidation, these restrictions cannot simply be attributed to the state. Moreover,
different combinations of actors are responsible for the repression and intimidation
experienced by organisations working in different sectors. Restrictions of groups working in the
field of human rights, justice and truth can mainly be attributed to groups with relations to the
(former) military. Restrictions experienced by groups involved in local struggles about the
control and use of resources is related to specific local combinations of local business, criminal
and political interests which can include the involvement of local police, government
representatives (e.g. mayors) as well as local villagers. Both will be discussed below.
23
Guatemala is number one in cases of femicide. El Quetzal 4, September 2009, p.5.
24
All partners of ICCO working in the field of human rights, justice, security and truth
reported restrictions as a result of intimidation and repression.24 All have experiences of
(periods of) anonymous telephone calls, e-mails, interception of telephones, and shadowing by
armoured cars of offices and houses of staff. In many cases, these practices were linked to the
fact that (a member of) an organisation spoke out on a particular issue, and/or periods of
polarisation at a national level. For instance, ICCO’s counterpart ICCPG experienced problems in
2006-2007 when they campaigned against the death penalty. CIIDH, another partner of ICCO
reported increasing control and vigilance in May 2009, a period of rapidly increasing political
tensions in Guatemala after the death of Rosenberg.25 The past seven years Fundación Myrna
Mack has had police protection in its office as a result of threats against its director Helen Mack
Chang. This protection is the result of a resolution of the Inter-American Court for human Rights
in 2002, which was recently prolonged.26 It is interesting to note that the Guatemalan
government representatives themselves argued that this prolongation was still necessary.27
Finally, SEDEM is ICCO’s counterpart that has experienced numerous problems.
Udefegua reported 21 violations of SEDEM over the year 2009, which makes SEDEM one of the
most affected organisations countrywide (Udefegua, 2010: 16). It is not only human rights
NGOs that experience these kinds of restrictions. There are also other urban NGOs, that were
intimidated during certain periods. The premises of the evangelical centre for pastoral studies
in Central America (Cedepca) – an ICCO partner – were ransacked twice in 2001 (taking away
computers and information) when the organisation was involved in the public activities against
violence against women. This was part of wave of intimidation against woman’s organisations
in that period. It was reason for Cedepca to take a lower profile in public events such as
demonstrations (in which they don’t use banners of the organisation anymore) and to build a
fence in front of the office.28
The repression and intimidation experienced by grassroots organisations in the
countryside has different characteristics. In a recent analysis of the situation of human rights
defenders in Guatemala, Udefegua (2010:24) reports an increase in the number of violations of
human rights defenders at local level. It also explores a number of cases that are considered
paradigmatic, like local conflicts about land and palm oil plantations in El Petén, and conflicts
around mining companies in Izabal (ibid, 2010:24-40). Other examples are given in the
publications of the Guatemala Human Rights Commission (USA) in its quarterly publication El
24
ICCO has historical relations with several NGOs working in this sphere: SEDEM, Fundación Myrna Mack, CIIDH,
and ICCPG.
25
This lawyer left a videotaped message saying among others: ‘My name is Rodrigo Rosenberg Marzano.
Unfortunately if you are seeing this message it’s because I was killed by President Álvaro Colom.’ This led to
demonstrations both in favor and against left-centre president Colom. The UN-backed CICIG mission in Guatemala
investigated the case and concluded that Colom was not involved, thus clearing his name and easing the political
crisis. See Murder-Case Finding Shocks Guatemala, in The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2010, and Report on
Lawyer’s Death Eases a Political Crisis in Guatemala, The New York Times, January 14, 2010.
26
See Resolución de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de 16 de Noviembre 2009, Medidas
Provisionales respeto de Guatemala, Caso Mack Chang y otros, online available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/mackchang_se_06.pdf
27
Authors interview, Mayra Alarcon, Fundacion Myrna Mack, 16 March 2010.
28
Kerk in Actie (member of ICCO Alliance) financed these measures. Cedepca chose for an unarmed guard – which
is quite unusual in Guatemala..
25
Quetzal.29 In a report of a recent fact-finding mission to Guatemala the details are given of
twelve cases of local conflict about the use of resources (Fian et al, 2010: 29-53).
Most of the cases discussed have in common that the use of resources (land, raw
materials, water) by large land estates or international corporations cause local tensions.
Repression and intimidation are used by a variety of actors, oftentimes combinations of nonstate actors – such as criminals, drug traffickers, or international corporations with some
support of local government agencies. They use violent means, or employ gunmen, to
safeguard access to resources and to prevent individuals and organisations to mobilise and
make claims. In a number of cases repression has led to murders by gunmen, private security
services, or even police and military. However, local people also become involved in these
conflicts that can turn violent. A case in point is the attack on the leader of a Rural Women’s
Network (RMI) in Nebaj. The leader of this movement was attacked in the town hall by three
local women. According to the leader of the women’s network this was part of the actions of
the local mayor who tries to destroy the network. After this attack she was intimidated by the
very mayor who stopped his car in the street, focused the headlights on her and shot six bullets
into the air.30
Counterparts of ICCO in Central America are obviously also confronted with these
problems. One of them is the Movimiento de Trabajadores/as Campesinos/as San Marcos
(MTC). Members of MTC have been involved in protests against the Marlin Mine and
experienced various kinds of restrictions (see next section). FIAN reports that ‘human rights
defenders, members of the communities, persons attached to the church and researchers who
oppose the Marlin project have been repeatedly threatened, attacked, harassed and
intimidated. Among these victims was Mons. Alvaro Ramazzini, Bishop of San Marcos’ (Fian et
al, 2010:38). Some members of MTC are also involved in the Frente de Resistencia en Defensa
de Recursos Naturales y Derechos de los Pueblos (FRENA), a movement in the department of
San Marcos that protests against the deficient distribution and high prices of electricity
company Union Fenosa.31 The tensions have increased and in December 2009 the government
of Guatemala declared the ‘state of exception’, an emergency measure to restore law and
order.32 Popular protests and the right to bear firearms were temporarily suspended, a curfew
was imposed on the population, and the area was under control of the armed forces. To date,
29
See http://www.ghrc-usa.org/ See among others the following Issues of El Quetzal: Issue 5 on the activism
against a cement min in San Juan Sacatepéquez (p.1-2) and on the murder of a community leader in El Estor, Izabal
(p.3); Issue 4 on the attack on a women’s leader in Nebaj, Quiché |(p.1-2) and the detention, torture and forced
exile of villagers attempting to exhume the remains of their fathers who had been murdered in the 1980s.
30
See El Quetzal, #4, pp. 1-2, September 2009, Rural Women’s Network Leader Attacked and Robbed.
31
See Bart van Bael, David en Goliath in Guatemala. Staat van beleg beschermt Spaanse elektriciteitsleverancier,
MO* Magazine, 28 april 2010 (MO), online available at
http://www.mo.be/index.php?id=348&tx_uwnews_pi2%5Bart_id%5D=28289&cHash=6e4d7d8ae7 And Louisa
Reynolds, Guatemala, Rising Discontent Against Energy Company Union Fenosa, Latin America Database, onilne
available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/GUATEMALA:+RISING+DISCONTENT+AGAINST+ENERGY+COMPANY+UNION+FENO
SA.-a0223389766
32
A state of emergency was also declared in the case of the protests against the cement mine in San Juan
Zacatepéquez, in June 2008 and lasted two weeks (El Quetzal #5:2)
26
San Marcos remains under the state of emergency.33 This has, however, not led to deescalation of the conflict, but rather to the contrary. On 13 January 2010 3 leaders were killed
when travel from Guatemala City to San Marcos.34
Criminalisation
There are many cases of criminalization in Guatemala, in particular of individuals involved in
conflicts around resources. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala received
reports of ‘[..] the arbitrary use of criminal proceedings against defenders upholding collective,
environmental, economic, social and cultural rights’ (UN, 2010:8). Although data about these
cases are not systematized, there are indications that the criminalization of members of GROs
and social movements that struggle against is on the rise (Fian et al, 2010:54).
For instance, in San Juan Sacatepéque a community leader said it had 32 accusations
against him, including of terrorism. Furthermore, two lawyers from the Association of Mayan
Lawyers that provide legal support to anti-mine protestors were accused of being the
masterminds of the murder of a mining worker. After the murder of a local resident that was in
favor of the mine, president Colom declared a two-week State of Emergency. During that
period 43 community members were reportedly arrested for six weeks and released for a fine
of $ 14.500,-.35 This case shows that conflicts about mining can lead to high levels of local
polarization and escalation and create deep fissures in communities. Mining companies become
deeply involved in these local level disputes and struggle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of local
people, using communication strategies (of information and/or misinformation), local projects
and the cooptation of local leaders and residents to gain (sufficient) acceptance. Needless to
say that protestors sometimes do break the law and might even use violence themselves. For
instance, in June 2009 residents from the villages near the Marlin Mine burned won Goldcorp’s
machinery. What is striking, however, is the high number of criminal proceedings against
protestors in a context where the state is not able or willing to stop corruption and violence of
criminal gangs. These charges also severely restrict the possibilities to operate freely and have
forced the accused persons to go into hiding. ICCO’s partner MTC is also confronted with these
kinds of criminal proceedings. Crisanta, a local leader against the Marlin Mine Crisanta was
charged and went into hiding. When police came to arrest her, community members prevented
this from happening.36
Apart from these cases there are also cases of criminalization of NGO-staff, and other
professionals. The New York based NGO Human Rights First (HRF) reported the LGBT activist
Jorge Lopez (director of OASIS) had been charged with involvement in the assault of a sex
worker. This was seen as an attempt to discourage López’s human rights advocacy on behalf of
the LGBT community. Eventually, the charges against Lopez were dismissed.37 Another case of
criminalization was the charge against Raul Figueroa – an editor of human rights publications
33
See Louisa Reynolds, 2010, Rising Discontent.
See declaration of FRENA, online available at http://www.pidhdd.org/content/view/1549/86/
35
See Community Organizers in San Juan, Sacatepéquez Accused of Terrorism for Activism Against Cement Mine,
in El Quetzal # 5, pp.1-2.
36
Authors interview with Juan José Monterosso, advisor of MTC, Quetzaltenango, 18 March 2010.
37
See www.humanrightsfirst.org
34
27
who was charged - for alleged copyright infringement and sentenced to one year in prison. This
charge had political undertones. As WOLA explained in a press release:
‘Figueroa’s press, F & G Editores, is the leading publisher of books that spark political
and social debate in Central America. These include report of the Commission for
Historical Clarification (CEH), as well as a number of books on human rights abuses
during the civil war, and in the present day. These include works by the Myrna Mack
Foundation, the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala, the National
Union of Guatemalan Women, and the Association for the Study and Promotion of
Security in Democracy (SEDEM).’38
After lodging an appeal to this decision, in February 2010 Raul Figueroa was cleared of these
charges.39
Administrative measures
Falisse and Sanz-Corella (2010: 10) note that the general institutional and judicial context
regulating the participation of civil society organizations can be characterized as rather
developed and even progressive. The constitution of 1985 that recognizes basic citizen rights is
called a breach with an (authoritarian) past. In the post-settlement years several political
reforms have taken place that affect the space of civil society organizations; such as the
modernization of the political system, the process of decentralization and the creation of new
spaces of dialogue between state and civil society. Although these reforms have led to tangible
changes for civil society organizations, CIVICUS described this context as theoretically favorable,
but severely limited in practice (Falisse and Sanz Corella, 2010:10).
Falisse and Sanz-Corealla mention that the NGO-law that was adopted in 2003 has
several flaws, because of the dual registration (at municipal level and with the Ministry of
Finance). The organizations included in this study, however, mentioned administrative
problems that were not necessarily related to the NGO-law. Several organisations reported
problems with different government bureaucracies that were perceived as purposive
obstructions. For instance, Ceadel, an NGO based in Chimaltenango and working on labour
rights mentioned that it was visited at least once a month by the local branch of the Ministry of
Labour that controlled their financial accountancy, while Ceadel complained that the same
ministry failed to control the corporations working in the Chimaltenango area. Moreover,
Ceadel argued that the local branche of the Ministry of Labor was biased in conflicts between
workers (supported by Ceadel) and these corporations, favouring the latter. SEDEM, an NGO
based in Guatemala City reported problems to have changes in the board registered, which
created problems to withdraw money from the bank account (for which approval of the board
is necessary).
All in all, we would thus suggest that Guatemalan NGO legislation does not lead to
major problems among the NGOs that we included in our survey. The ones that do experience
problems, experience different types of administrative measures or forms of bureaucratic
38
WOLA Press Release, online available on
http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=976&Itemid=8
39
See blog of Raul Figueroa at http://raulfigueroasarti.blogspot.com/
28
problems that can best be understood in the particular local context of these organisations and
in which particular government agencies and/or officials use or abuse their bureaucratic
power.
Stigmatization
The problem of stigmatization is mentioned by many interviewees for this study, among others
in the media (for instance in newspaper columns) but also in the public sphere (both national
and local level). Most cases of stigmatization were not isolated acts, but related to other forms
of restrictions. It is difficult to draw the line between stigmatisation and critique. For instance,
SEDEM was criticised for exaggerating the number of human rights, which may be a point for
discussion, but when this critique is linked to suggesting that the organisation is working closely
with Hugo Chavez, one can argue that an organisation is in fact being stigmatized. A similar
example is the case of the human rights NGO ICCPG that defends the rights of prisoners and is
accused of ‘defending criminals’.
Another case is the accusation of by President Óscar Berger in 2005 that Bishop
Ramazzini of San Marcos was indirectly responsible for the violence taking place in January of
that year, in which at least one peasant was shot to death while protesting the passage of
mining equipment through Sololá towards San Marcos. Berger stated that the bishop as an
"authentic leader" should have been able to calm the protesting peasants.40 When at a later
stage an assassination plot against the Bishop was discovered, it was suggested that Berger’s
accusation had played a role in this process. It is extremely complex to prove these types of
relationships between accusations and repressive measures. In general, politically motivated
repressive acts do take place in a context where different actors debate with each other about
the causes and dynamics of existing social tensions and about who is responsible for these
tensions. These discussions and accusations can become part of broader processes of
polarisation and escalation. For the staff of local organisations that is accused, these
accusations are often experienced as extremely stressful.
Existing spaces under pressure
Over the past decades there has been a growing interaction between representatives of civil
society and government agencies. These practices received an impulse during the peace
negotiations, and after the peace agreement the ‘spaces’ of dialogue between government and
civil society have multiplied (Calvaruso et al, 2007, in FS37). Many representatives of NGOs that
were interviewed for this study (working in such diverse fields as human rights, healthcare, and
agriculture) mentioned their involvement in one or more dialogues or forums that discussed
problems, policies, or bills. Although in general this has contributed to a capacity to dialogue,
discuss policy options and to (try to) build consensus, there is also critique on at least a number
of these practices. One director of a network of NGOs that participated in a series of dialogues
and forums about agrarian issues argued that on the one hand he found these meetings very
useful and important, while on the other hand he experienced a lack of political will to
implement the plans that were discussed. He related this to the weakness of the state: ‘There is
40
Example taken from Houston Catholic Worker, 2005, ‘Bishop Ramazzini in Danger: Assassination Plot in
Guatemala’ online available at http://www.cjd.org/paper/ramazzi.html
29
not only the problem of corruption, but the state has also sold most of its assets. It has no
means to comply its functions.’41 Another staff member of an NGO who had participated in
numerous dialogues in various sector over the past ten years, reached a similar conclusion: ‘We
have learned a lot from these dialogues. But the frustrating thing is that we are reaching
consensus about things that cannot be implemented. The negotiations with the ‘real powers’
never takes place.’42 Another frustration about these dialogues that was frequently reported
was the lack of continuity as a result of turnover of ministers or staff.
Thus, we noted a certain degree of fatigue with regard to contacts in general with
different government agencies. As a result many representatives of NGOs told they had
become more selective about the kinds of initiatives in which they participated. This may
actually be a sign of a more mature use of the spaces available, and a greater propensity to
think strategically about opportunities in existing spaces. There is also ample discussion
between NGOs about what kind of relationship to build with government agencies, which is
also a sign of the contradictions within this sector. Pearce (2006: 37-8) gives examples of
diverging ideas of organisations working in the field of security and justice. A closer working
relation of some NGOs with government agencies was seen as a weakness by others as it was
seen as weakening their ‘autonomy and willingness to speak out’ (ibid, 38). Thus, there are
clearly different views about the nature and form of the political space that is created. Where
more confrontational organisations emphasise the distance to the government, these
organisations are criticised by others for ‘still living in the past’ and even of cultivating the
image of ‘being persecuted and attacked’. Pearce (2006: 39) gives a related example of two
organisations producing work on the military budget, one organisation being more academic
and wishing to impact on state policies, and the other aiming to mobilise a social and political
constituency. The former positioned itself less politically and was therefore better placed to talk
more directly to the military.
It is fair to say that NGOs working on issues of security and justice have become more
proactive in using their space and where possible creating spaces. Helen Mack Chang, the
director of the Fundación Myrna Mack, was asked the head the Presidential Commission for
Police Reform. This was accepted after internal discussions and a number of conditions were
formulated, like the total financial independence of Mack.43 Another example of an innovative
space that was created by NGOs is the Instancia, a forum where representatives from civil
society and several government agencies meet in order to discuss cases of human rights
violations (see for more details the section on Responses).
The situation at local level is much more complex. Here, the negative experiences with
the state from the past and the present, as well as the weakness of the state and the existence
of perverse networks of power can lead to a continued lack of trust and confidence in the
possibilities to cooperate with the state. MTC, a counterpart of ICCO, decided not to participate
in the national level agrarian platform. According to a facilitator of the movement this was
41
Authors interview, Guatemala City, 19 March 2010.
Authors interview, Guatemala City, 17 March 2010.
43
Authors interview, Mayra Alarcon, Fundacion Myrna Mack, 16 March 2010, Guatemala City.
42
30
understandable, but nevertheless a missed opportunity: ‘MTC should really grasp these
opportunities.’44
The way that organisations deal with government agencies is also linked to their mission
and historical relations to the state. More technical organisations may be more open to
dialogue, while interest groups that feel betrayed will more likely enter into confrontation. In
this regard the style and image of organisations (more or less willing to cooperate with
government agencies; more or less confrontational) also has an impact on the sort of
relationship that is establishes. It is interesting to note that many interviewees emphasised that
some degree of moderation was necessary in the forums in which they participated, and that
criticising the government was still seen as ‘risky’. ASECSA, an ICCO partner working in the field
of healthcare, that plans to do more lobby work in the future, noted that this might create
more problems for the organization. Therefore they emphasized the need to prepare
themselves for this.
On the job trouble
This section discusses the ways restrictive actions and policies were experienced by different
organisations. We first discuss the two sectors that we focused on in the previous sections; the
‘urban’ based human rights and justice sector and groups working at the local-level with issues
like land, mining and labor rights. Furthermore, we discuss the problems of NGOS and GROs
that can be attributed to the generalized sphere of impunity and insecurity.
Truth, human rights, security and justice
A distinction can be made between the need to address the human rights violations that took
place during the years of civil war and the need to address the contemporary problems and
deficient reforms in the fields of justice and security in the period after 1996. Although both
types of problems are related to the same problems of impunity, and a number of NGOs are
dealing with both sets of problems, the restrictions that are experienced are somewhat
different.
With regard to the crimes committed during the war years, Impunity Watch concluded
that the magnitude of the human rights violations of these years is only partially acknowledged
by the state, while the state ‘has yet to fully adopt the appropriate measures so that crimes can
be judged, compensated and prevented from occurring’ (2008:37). A number of obstacles that
contribute to impunity are mentioned, among others the limited availability of resources,
misuse of the law and non-compliance and the lack of political will to combat impunity (ibid,
37-40). This implies that civil groups, such as victim’s organizations, are confronted with serious
limitations in their efforts to know the truth and to claim their rights of justice and reparation.
Apart from this adverse opportunity structure, groups working in this field run the risk
of being harassed, persecuted or killed (2008: 40). Truth finding and justice are extremely
sensitive in Guatemala, both at local and at national level. The murder of Bishop Geraldi, two
days after the publication of REMHI's report, on the 26 of April, 1998, is a dramatic example of
44
Authors interview with Juan José Monterosso, Facilitator of MTC, Quetzaltenango, 18 March 2010.
31
this.45 An example of the problems that truth finding generates at local level is given by the
Guatemalan Human Rights Commission. It reports of a case in the department of El Quiche
where villagers were digging in a mass grave of their fathers who had been killed during the
armed conflict. When the former leaders of the paramilitary Civil Patrol (PAC) that were active
during the war years noticed this, they held them by force, whipped them and doused them
with gasoline, forcing the villagers in exile.46 It can still be very sensitive for people to openly
talk about these issues. The Myrna Mack Foundation gave an example of a man who joined a
group of families of victims. In order to attend the meetings he regularly had to take a day off
from his work. However, he didn’t mention the reasons for his absence, and his employer fired
him for being absent too frequently.
As already mentioned in the previous section, urban based NGOs that address issues of
security, justice and impunity still receives threats and intimidations on a regular basis. The
more these organisations address sensitive issues or speak out against particular groups, the
more troubles these organisations experience with NGOs like Udefegua and SEDEM (an ICCO
partner) being targeted most severely. The threats and intimidation have consequences on the
well-being of staff. The director of ICCPG told that in the period that staff of the organisation
received threats, staff was not prepared and either reacted panicking, or was in denial. She
remembers this period as a very difficult one for the organisations. SEDEM has taken several
measures to deal with possible threats, such as evacuation plans – that include safe transport
home for all staff in periods when the organisation runs particular risks. These risks also cause
psychological problems of staff that have to be dealt with in a professional way, which also
means additional costs for the organisation. These threats come together with stigmatization in
press (for instance columns) and administrative problems (the delays to formalize a change of
the organisational structure of the organisation).
Resource conflicts
In comparison to the problems experienced by urban-based NGOs, local NGOs and GROs that
are involved in conflicts around the use of resources such as land and water, as well as the
fulfilment of labor rights are generally more complex, while the restrictions is of individuals and
organisations are less visible. In the previous chapter the case of ICCO partner MTC in San
Marcos was already mentioned. This movement was founded in 1997 to support the
implementation of the peace agreements and has a presence in several parts of the
department: on the land estates in the lower parts of the department, as well as in the
highlands, where members of this movement are struggling against the Marlin mine. In a recent
lecture Bishop Alvaro Ramazzini called San Marcos ‘the mirror of Guatemala’s situation’.47 Thus,
San Marcos reflects Guatemala’s extremely skewed land tenure, and the absence of any land
reform in Guatemala’s past is dearly felt. San Marcos has large plantations devoted to the
45
The Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REHMI) was initiated by the Catholic Church in Guatemala and
interviewed hundreds of people to create a history of the war based on their testimonies. About the murder of
Geraldi see Francisco Goldman, 2007, The Art of Political Murder. Who Killed the Bishop?, New York, Grove Press.
46
See ‘Detained, Tortured, and Forced Into Exile by their Fathers’ Assassins, in El Quetzal 4, pp. 4-5.
47
A Discussion with Alvaro Ramazzini, Bishop of San Marcos, Antigua Guatemala, January 30, 2009, online
available at http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-alvaro-ramazzini-bishop-of-sanmarcos
32
cultivation of coffee, palm oil and bananas in the coastal areas that make use of temporary
labor force coming from the highlands. On many occasions workers are not paid the minimum
wage of 52 quetzals.48 There are also problems around extractive industries.49 At the same
time, San Marcos is heavily affected by drug trafficking, while in parts of the region poppy is
cultivated.
MTC operates in an extremely complex setting, where different powerful groups (such
as narcos and criminal gangs, as well as corporations and ‘finqueros’) pursue their own interests
in different parts of the department, while the state is weak and the rule of law are almost
absent. Here local conflicts should not just be seen as just a breakdown in a particular system,
but rather as the emergence of other, alternative systems of profit, power and protection
(following Keen, 2008: 15). The problems experienced by MTC are in the first place the
consequence of these structural problems and the resistance and action of different local
groups (such as land labourers or protestors against mines) against these vested interests have
led to the whole range of restrictive policies and actions that we discussed in the previous
paragraph. In most cases, repression and intimidation, criminalisation, and stigmatisation go
hand in hand. In many cases these conflicts lead to divisions at local level between different
(groups in) communities. For instance, conflicts against mining companies or hydro electric
dams generate intense local level conflicts. The experience of Gregoria Crisanta Perez, a local
leader from a hamlet in San Marcos that is very close to the Marlin Mine, is a case in point. She
protested against the activities of the Marlin Mine, arguing that the mine harms the
environment, uses all the water, and that the explosions of the mine damage their houses. 50
Cristanta received many threats, which led to her going into hiding with the help of the Catholic
Church. The community itself is divided about the mine, which has been partly the result of pay
offs of the mine. In the case of Crisanta it were her direct neighbours that were allegedly paid
off by the company that become her greatest enemy (Rodriguez, 2009:16-7).
MTC is also working with labourers of large land estates in the coastal zones of San
Marcos, which proves to be extremely problematic. CEADEL has similar experiences in the
region of Chimaltengo. CEADEL was founded in April 1999 in Chimaltenango, with a mandate to
improve working and living conditions for marginalized groups such as children, adolescents,
youth, and women workers. Over the years, CEADEL has developed a special focus on child
labor, adolescent labor, and women workers in the formal sector – both in non traditional
agricultural sectors and in the maquilas.51 Advocating labor rights is extremely sensitive, since
48
Ibid. And interview with Juan José Monterosso.
.In 2006 Goldcorp acquired the Marlin Mine that is exploited by Empresa Montana Exploradora, and its activities
are heavily opposed by local movements. The law on mining in Guatemala is flawed and exempts companies from
taxes during the first seven years of operation. Obligations to consult the local population and to take in
environmental risks have insufficiently been taken into account For more information on theMarlin Min. See o
PeaceBrigades Internatioal, 2006.
50
See about the damage done to houses a study commissioned by the Diocese of San Marcos together with the
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, online available at http://resistenciamineria.org/espanol/files/Informe_Casas_Rajadas.pdf
51
This summary of CEADELs work is from the website of the Internatinol Labor Rights Forum, online available at
http://www.laborrights.org/rights-for-working-women/partner-spotlight/ceadel-in-guatemala. The organization
also works with youth and addresses problems of youth gangs.
49
33
many businesses do not comply with legal norms about wages, working hours, minimum age of
workers and security payments. CEADEL has established relations with international companies
that use factories in the region of Chimaltenango. When Georg W Bush visited the area in
March 2007, the use of child labor in the area was mentioned in the New York Times. This led
to much attention for US firms working in the region, and since CEADEL was mentioned in the
article this meant a boost for the organisation. It is thus not surprising that CEADEL is
confronted with different kinds of reactions caused by corporations and by different
government agencies. Staff of CEADEL reports that it receives anonymous threats over the
phone (in the office and at home), while telephone lines are intercepted and armoured cars
park in front of the office to follow staff leaving the office. CEADEL also reports a deficient
government control of the corporations in the region. For instance, there are many cases of
corporations that don’t pay the levies for social security and the Ministry of Labor is not putting
any pressure on corporations. However, CEADEL director Gabriel reports that the
administration of CEADEL is controlled on a very regular basis. It is, however, interesting to note
that although there are also instances of stigmatization and insults to CEADEL, the reporting of
some of the national media on labor rights in the region is rather critical. Nevertheless, many
people have warned staff of CEADEL that their work is dangerous.52
Chronic insecurity
Central America is currently one of the most insecure and violent regions in the world, which is
reflected in staggering homicide rates and high levels of crime (UNDP, 2009). This chronic
insecurity creates different kinds of problems and restrictions to NGOs and GROs: (i) criminality
causes material and financial losses of organisations; (ii) insecurity and violence lead to social
and emotional problems of staff; (iii) organised crime impedes or actively prohibits NGOs and
GROs to do your their organising or capacity building work. Below, each of these will be
discussed.
(i) Material and financial losses. There are many examples of the first case of material or
financial loss. For instance the security measures, which organisations take to protect their
premises. Not every organisation can afford itself armed guards (that most international
organisations have), but at least they will invest in fences. Apart from this there is also the risk
for staff to be attacked. Local organisations, working in socio-economic projects experience
particular problems related to crime. An example is OPCION, a partner of ICCO that provides
technical, organisational and commercial support to local producer groups. Although codirector Oscar de Leon says that insecurity has not necessarily increased over the past ten
years, it definitely affects local groups in their efforts to move ahead. For instance, part of the
harvest that was stored of an association of coffee producers was stolen, causing severe
economic problems to this association. Also men and women run risks when collecting money
for a rotating credit scheme. But apart from material and financial losses, the insecurity also
puts the cooperation with German volunteers at risk. Today the German counterparts
responsible for the recruitment of volunteers fear that the risks are becoming too high. Thus,
insecurity and crime also affect a part of the international network of this NGO.
52
Authors interview with Gabriel .., Chimaltenango, 19 March 2010.
34
(ii) Social and emotional problems. The atmosphere of insecurity leads to emotional
problems and stress of many common people that are confronted with violence and crime, or
that hear others talk about incidents or read about it in the newspapers. The director of
CEDEPCA, a Christian organisation that organises trainings, seminars and discussion groups for
men and women says that 95% of the women attending courses of the organisation have
experienced some kind of violence. Apart from the violence that staff of the organisation can
experience itself, when travelling to communities, it is confronted with many of the stories of
negative experiences of the participants. ‘They are confronted on a daily basis with these
stories and in almost every workshop they give,’ the director says. CEDEPCA thus identified a
need to support its staff to process these stories so as to be able to do its work.
(iii) The perverse impact of organised crime. There are many stories of organised crime
affecting the functioning of local organisations and the interventions of NGOs. The growing
influence of drug traffickers catches the eye, because of the huge financial interests involved,
and there are examples of drug traffickers building up local power positions, buying off local
politicians and church leaders so as to establish a form of local control. This kind of local control
is not compatible with initiatives of local GROs or external NGOs that aim to empower local
actors, to stimulate dialogue, or to open up local political space. Most NGOs and GROs say that
it is not possible to deal with these groups. One director of an NGO said: ‘When it’s about
narcos you can’t do anything (hay que callarse)’.
The experience of the Guatemalan branche of the YMCA (the Acción Cristiana de
Jóvenes or ACJ) shows that also when an organisation is not dealing with these groups directly,
there are risks that have to be taken into account. ACJ has worked in Guatemala as of 1964. In
1993 it changed its mission into the formation and training of local leaders. 53 Paul Menchu,
director ACJ Guatemala, says that the changing national context has deeply influenced the work
of ACJ. Young people – the main target group – are less interested in voluntary work. But more
importantly, the increasing violence and insecurity have created problems in the
neighbourhoods where the organisation works. In 2008 three volunteers of ACJ were brutally
assassinated in the Amatitlán area. Although the case was never resolved, it became clear that
one of the victims had had links with a local criminal gang (before) that for unknown reasons
had targeted him, while the two other youngster were no direct targets.54 One and a half
month after the murder two other members of ACJ were harassed by local military. It is,
however, not clear whether this was related to the earlier incidents. Thus, the ‘attribution’ of
violent incidents and threats is a problem in its own right. We heard several examples of attacks
or threats to staff of NGOs that at first were seen as a political attack, but then the case was
investigated (by staff themselves) and it appeared to be ‘just’ a criminal attack. The attacks
against youth are not isolated incidents, and social cleansing of youth (suspected gang
members and criminals) has been a growing problem over the past years. In the same year that
53
See ACJs website http://www.ymcaguatemala.org/
In the region of Amatitlán there is a lot of activity of drug trafficking gangs and involvement of local police is
suspected. A local Guatemalan NGO is currently investigating this case.
54
35
the ACJ members were murdered, eight members of another counterpart of ICCO, Caja Ludica,
eight members of another counterpart of ICCO, Caja Ludica, were killed.55
After this murder ACJ was confronted with different kinds of problems, including threats
(telephone) of staff, stigmatisation of volunteers of the organisation (they were called gang
members), problems with the municipality that wanted to withdraw the license to use a local
building, and requests for help to relocate of the family of one of the young men that was
killed. These problems deeply affected ACJs work; it absorbed lots of time and resources from
the organisation and affected the work on the ground. The murders had taken ACJ by surprise,
but Menchu now realizes that analysis of the local context is fundamental in youth work. This
made clear that NGOs working in tense situations need to have clarity about who are in control
locally.’56 ACJ was supported by several other organisations in dealing with the consequences of
the murder. Particularly Udefegua played an important role in this. ACJ also established a
relationship with ICCOs PSJ programme.57 As of this period, ACJ started to use the term human
rights defenders, arguing that ACJ volunteers are also human rights defenders.
Responses
This section focuses on the responses of NGOs and GROs to restrictions in their operational
space, focusing on the restrictions that are the result of repression, intimidation and
criminalisation. As discussed in the second paragraph of this chapter in the past decades a
number of human rights groups were formed that gradually shifted its attention to the process
of clarification and truth finding of human rights violations committed in the past, as well as the
building and strengthening of a democratic security sector and the rule of law in Guatemala. In
the face of increasing human rights violations against members of NGOs and GROs, there is a
growing attention for measures to protect these groups. In this regard a distinction can be
made between more practical measures of persons and organisations in need for protection or
support, and those measures that aim to address the causes of these restrictions by working
for justice, respect for human rights and strengthening the rule of law.
One of the first groups in Guatemala that started to work with practical advice about
how to deal with restrictions like intimidation, spying, and abduction was SEDEM, an ICCO
partner. In 2002 it developed a manual for human rights defenders, journalists and those
working in the justice branch advising on many topics.58 SEDEM also played an important role in
advising other NGOs and GROs in Guatemala and Central America. For instance, in the period
after de coup d’état in Honduras it was involved in the organisation of workshops for other
ICCO counterparts in Honduras that are part of ICCO’s regional programme PDFED59 to
strengthen democracy and the rule of law. One of the four regional commissions of this
programme deals with the issue of protection of human rights defenders. Over the past years
55
Caja Ludica, an art collective based in Guatemala City that uses performing arts to create alternatives for young
people in the arrios. See
http://news.eltecolote.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=4425c6869429bc8b63631f235bf798fd
56
Authors interview, Guatemala City, 17 March 2010.
57
See for more information on the Programa de Seguridad Juvenil http://centroamericajoven.org
58
See SEDEM, 2002, Guia de Protección para Defensores de Derechos Humanos, Periodistas y Operadores de
Justicia, online available at http://www.sedem.org.gt:8080/sedem/publicaciones/libros/guia.pdf
59
Programa de Democratización y Fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho
36
Udefegua started to play a very important role in this field. Many of the ICCO partners that
experienced restrictions mentioned that Udefegua helped them to deal with these problems.
All in all, there is a growing knowledge and capacity among NGOs to deal with different kinds of
restrictions. However, this response is mostly reactive and organisations that have already
experienced restrictions have drawn up plans or guidelines about how to deal with possible
restrictions in the future.
Most interviewees mentioned, however, that urban-based human rights organisations
and persons are better positioned to protect themselves. Some of the staff of these
organisations receives threats on a very regular basis, but these persons are relatively visible,
both at a national and international level. These international contacts are extremely important
in ‘defence strategies’. For instance, a resolution of the Inter-American Court for Human Rights
imposed the government of Guatemala to protect the Myrna Mack foundation and some of its
staff. Although staff of the organisation puts these provisional measures into perspective saying
‘we don’t know if they are protecting us, spying on us, or both’, the protection would not have
materialised without international pressure.
Persons and organisations working at a local level deal in more pragmatic and ad-hoc
ways with the tensions they experience. The case of ACJ in Amatitlán shows that the problems
emanating from the murder of three of its members took the organisation by surprise. Many of
the measures were taken on an ad-hoc basis. In the case of San Marcos a local leader had to go
into hiding, but she didn’t stay out in this new place and decided to return after a while. Also
the many cases of intimidation and criminalisation in these places are extremely difficult to deal
with. The state is weak and the rule of law almost absent, which makes it particularly difficult
to make claims to the state.
The need to intensify the work in favour of human rights defenders at grassroots level is
increasingly recognized, among others by Udefegua. This has, among others, led to a growing
identification of local organisations, their staff and members, with the label of ‘human rights
defenders’. A case in point is ACJ, whose director noted that the concept of defence of human
rights had become more important after the murder of three of its members, and this led
among others to the decision of this organisation to call themselves grassroots human rights
defenders (defensores de base). While it is certainly true that ACJ works in an adverse context,
where the right to organise and promote youth leadership is not guaranteed and thus requires
a response, the self-labelling as human rights defenders can be problematic and have negative
consequences as well. The human rights discourse is still perceived by certain sectors in society
as a ‘politicised’ or ‘left-wing’ discourse. Moreover, Christian GROs and NGOs noted that some
of their members rejected the idea of human rights from a Christian point of view and
preferred to talk in terms of human dignity. In a similar vein psychological help was rejected,
which was seen as non-Christian and informed by humanism. So while there is no need to
question the human rights discourse and the role of human rights defenders, a discussion on
how and when to use these terms may necessary.60 The use of the notion of human rights and
60
In itself a rights based approach is an important and valid starting point for NGOs, and there are many cases
where human rights are violated and definitely need to be defended. Furthermore there is no doubt ‘all
organisations that promote and protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms (and that
do not commit or propagate violence) are human rights defenders (in the definition of the EU). The question is ,
however, whether local organisations should themselves actively use this label. See EU, Ensuring protection –
37
the label of human rights defender have consequences on the ways that GROs and NGOs
perceive themselves and are perceived by others. A strong identification with human rights
defenders can work counterproductive at local level and may run the risk to further complicate
the work of GROs and NGOs. Especially for these NGOs and GROs that aim to strengthen local
capacities, organisations and leadership, it may be better to emphasise this constructive role.
Apart from the (reactive) responses of individual organisations, there is also a lot of
experience with more proactive responses that aim to change the sources of the restrictive
policies and actions. Many of these proactive responses aim to contribute to a reform of the
Guatemalan state. As mentioned in previous paragraphs this can in itself be risky, since
strengthening democracy and the rule of law almost by definition implies addressing those
forces that mine the state ‘from within and without’. The dialogues and meetings of GROs and
NGOs with government officials, as well as increasing capacity to lobby of NGOs and GROs can
both be seen as proactive strategies. In the face of increasing violence and human rights
violations, four years ago, Jenny Pearce (2006:23)argued that complementary strategies were
required to pressure the state and to deal with the myriad sources of insecurity outside its
control. Over the past years Guatemalan NGOs have pressed for the creation of national level
institutions that deal in a proactive way with the issue of impunity and of human rights
violations. Two of these merit particular attention, because of their innovative character.
The first one is the process leading to the formation of the Commission Internacional
Contra la Impunidad (CICIG).61 This process already started in the beginning of this decade,
when violence in Guatemala increased. Human rights organisations, together with international
organisations and foreign states started to lobby for the creation of a commission that would
investigate the illegal structures and clandestine security apparatuses that were presumably
responsible for the rise in human rights violations (Stanley 2007: 139-140). The Guatemalan
Human Rights Ombudsman and the administration signed an agreement to form CICIACS62. The
agreement envisioned a national/international commission (two members appointed by the UN
and OAS, and one by the government of Guatemala). However, parts of the establishment
opposed its formation, and eventually the Constitutional Court of Guatemala declared that the
commission violated the Guatemalan Constitution. This was a blow to the human rights groups
in Guatemala. However, at a later stage, when the human rights situation deteriorated further
and after the murder of the Salvadoran members of the Central American parliament, the
international community and the state of Guatemala reached agreement about the formation
of CICIG. CICIG is a hybrid institution, operating within the domestic legal system of Guatemala,
and is tasked ‘to support, strengthen and assist Guatemalan institutions in identifying,
prosecuting and ultimately identifying domestic illegal security apparatuses and clandestine
security organisations’ (Hudson & Taylor, 2010: 54). Thus human rights organisations actively
lobbied for and supported the creation of a hybrid body that might be better placed to
European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders. Online available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesDefenders.pdf.
61
The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.
62
The Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Bodies and Clandestine Security Apparatuses. The text of the
document is online available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/guatemala/ciciacs-eng.pdf
38
contribute to the dismantlement of the most aggressive perpetrators of human rights violations
in the post-settlement period.
The second example is the establishment of the ‘Instancia’ in 2007, a ‘space’ where
representatives from civil society and several government agencies meet in order to discuss
cases of human rights violations. The idea to form the Instancia was the result of the increasing
threats of staff of NGOs, as well as the increase in practices of social cleansing. NGOs came
together and here the idea of a space to discuss particular cases of human rights violations with
government officials was born. Many hurdles had to be taken before the Instancia was created.
It proved difficult to reach consensus between different human rights organisations, which was
the result of different ideas about whether and how to deal with the government. Several
workshops were held outside of Guatemala, in the Netherlands and Guatemala. The
responsible minister at the time initially didn’t want to participate and it took some coaxing to
convince her. Eventually, the Instancia started with three participants of the NGO-sector and a
representation from different departments. According to the NGO participants, the Instancia
has proved to be useful. However, it has suffered of several problems, such as the frequent
turn-over of ministers. There have also been doubts about the reliability of some of the
participants, and there is a need to constantly build and rebuild trust. With the growing
popularity of the Instancia foreign donors have also become interested in supporting the
initiative, which has led to some turf wars between government agencies participating in the
initiative.
The foregoing examples show that advances have been made by civil society with regard
to security agenda. It is fair to say that international funding and pressure have been important
for the spaces for these groups. However, there are also restrictions with regard to what
international actors can and want to do. International actors are generally willing to support
groups working against impunity and in favour of human rights. But when it comes to more
sensitive topics like conflicts around mining projects, international actors, such as bilateral
donors and national embassies, are generally rather hesitant to become involved.
Conclusions & Recommendations
After two decades of democratisation and almost fifteen years of post-settlement transition the
operational space for civil society organisations in Guatemala has both increased, but is at the
same time ‘under pressure’. In principle, many groups can operate relatively freely, but
impunity, corruption, insecurity and high indices of violence have an extremely negative impact
on the operational space of all NGOs and GROs and hamper their work. Groups touching topics
that are related to vested interests can experience severe problems on top of this. The most
vulnerable sectors that were discussed in this chapter are groups working with human rights,
justice and security on the one hand, and groups that enter into conflicts about resources at
local level on the other hand. The security situation of these groups has deteriorated over the
past decade.
Although all sorts of restrictive policies and actions are present in the case of Guatemala
while they are oftentimes linked, the main problems are repression, intimidation and
criminalisation. There are some cases of administrative policies that caused problems to NGOs,
and there are many examples of stigmatization, but the core of the problem is the weakness of
the state and of the rule of law. This gives space to a multitude of criminal actors (state and
39
non-state) that are also gaining effective control over parts of the state apparatus and parts of
the national territory. At local level different constellations of interest groups have build power
structures that seriously reduce the space of local NGOs and GROs. These pressures on the
operational space of these organisations vary from case to case, and are extremely difficult to
address. Protests against actors responsible for these restrictions can be extremely dangerous.
At local level, the positions of protestors can easily harden in the face of limited possibilities to
claim rights. This increasingly leads to polarisation and escalation of conflicts about resources
that permeate local communities.
All Guatemalans are affected by the situation of insecurity and impunity. In the year
2009 alone approximately 175 bus drivers were killed, presumably by gangs that were involved
in extortion, although others suspected a strategy of distraction, forcing police to devote
resources into dealing with the murders, and meanwhile allowing drug-traffickers to continue
their work.63 In order to diminish the violence, measures are needed that NGOs and GROs
cannot create themselves, but that they can lobby for. The formation of CICIG is an important
example, and it is fair to say that the lobbying and networking of human rights organisations at
national and international level contributed to its formation. The challenge for urban-based
NGOs working in the field of security sector reform and justice is how to further contribute to a
strengthening of the state and the rule of law in Guatemala. In this regard a discussion is
needed about the ways NGOs might be able to contribute to different reforms.
Of all counterparts of ICCO, the groups working in the countryside that become part of
conflicts around resources face the most serious challenges and often have least possibilities to
counter these. The ways in which these groups are restricted differs from place to place, and a
further systematisation of these local problems, restrictions and conflict dynamics is needed. In
particular, there is a need to systematise the evidence on the growing problem of
criminalisation. The systematisation should not only focus on the restrictions and violations of
human rights, but link this to an analysis of local power relations so as to make assessments
about the possible strategies of how to deal with the legitimate demands of local people. What
is their capacity to both protest and dialogue, how do movements deal with local dissent or
cooptation of corporations? And what are – given the restrictions experienced by local people –
successful strategies to move forward?
A number of organisations in Guatemala are already involved in these activities, most
notably Udefegua and SEDEM, working from Guatemala City. We argued in this chapter that
there is a need to critically assess the use of the term human rights defenders. There is no
doubt that human rights are violated and they definitely need to be defended. There is no
doubt either that local organisations that ‘promote and protect universally recognised human
rights and fundamental freedoms’ fall under the category of human rights defenders (as
defined by among others the EU), independently from the question whether they experience
restrictions or not. The question is, however, whether local organisations should be given this
label vis-à-vis their local members or be encouraged to do so. For these organisations, the
actual protection is of utmost importance, but the active use of this label might create
additional problems and therefore rather choose to keep a lower profile.
63
See David Lee, 6 December 2009, Pay up or Die. Guatemala City Bus Drivers Targeted, BBC, Online available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8386584.stm
40
3. Honduras – Operational space in times of political turbulence
Introduction
While Honduras has had a relative tolerance vis-à-vis the work of NGOs, the coup d’état of 28
June 2009 led to a change in the operational space of a number of NGOs, as well as - and may
be more importantly – increasing polarization in Honduran civil society, which affected the
relations between NGOs themselves. Thus, Honduras is a case of a relatively sudden change of
the national political space, which had severe consequences on the operational space of NGOs.
Also, the case of Honduras shows that organizations confronted with these changes were not
really prepared and developed a diversity of response strategies.
Political context
While in the early 1980s wars raged in the countries surrounding Honduras, Honduras was used
as an important base for US military involvement in the isthmus, while the US-financed Contras
were able to operate from Honduran territory. The Honduran military was according to Mark
Ruhl (1999) ‘a late arrival on the political scene’, but attained political hegemony in the 1960s
and for a long period had high levels of influence on elected officials (Ruhl, 2004: 138). The
Honduran military received massive US-assistance during the 1980s in return for allowing the
Contras to be based in Honduras. Sectors of the Honduran military were involved in dirty wars
against suspected subversives, using ‘extreme violence [which]..constituted a sharp break with
Honduras’ less polarized political traditions’ (Ruhl, 1999).
Although the constitution of 1982 is generally seen as the start of Honduras’ process of
democratisation, the military held a firm grip on power during the 1980s. Demilitarisation of
the Honduran political system received new impetus in the 1990s. A major factor in this process
was the sharply diminishing military assistance of the USA (which dropped from over $40
million in 1989 to $ 2,7 million in 1993). A coalition of a wide range of civil society organisations
(including private enterprise) started to press for demilitarisation and President Rafael Callejas
(1990-1994) and in particular Carlos Roberto Reina (1994-1998) implemented political reforms
that substantially reduced the role of the military (Ruhl, 1999). Thus, by the end of the 1990s,
Honduras had almost completed its transition to ‘procedural’ democracy. However,
consolidation of democracy still seemed far away. It was unclear to what extend the Honduran
political class really believed in the new ‘rules of the game’, while many senior military were
still unreconciled with their loss of power (Ruhl, 1999). This ties in with the comments of many
interviewees for this study that emphasised the lack of a democratic culture in Honduras as one
of the explanations for the coup that took place in June 2009.
The Honduran political party system is dominated by two major centre-right political
parties, the Partido Liberal (PL) and Partido Nacional (PN). This bipartite system is, according to
critics, used by PL and PN to limit electoral competition and ‘exclude any upstart from entering
the country’s democratic space’ (Anonymous, 2009a). Politicians of PL and PN, as well as their
‘appointees’ are widely accused of corruption. Honduras scores 2,5 on the 2009 Corruption
Perception Index (that ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 10), which is one of the lowest scores
41
of Latin America and is similar to the scores of Indonesia, and Philippines, or Nigeria and
Zimbabwe .64 According to Ismael Moreno (2009c) one of the fundamental problems of the
Honduran political system is that ‘law is subordinated to politics’ and that a ‘handful’ of
politicians and big businesspeople have a patrimonial conception of the state. He continues:
‘They acted exactly like they owned the state, using all possible resources, starting with
ensuring that the laws favoured them in order to stop anyone else from managing the state and
all of its goods for their own pleasure and whim’ (ibid).
This rather blunt description of the Honduran political system also reflects the
disenchantment and frustration about years of economic growth without substantive poverty
reduction. Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, with an extremely skewed
distribution of income.65Over 59% of Hondurans remain below the poverty line and 36.2%
below the extreme poverty line.
The Zelaya government (PL) took office in January 2006 and was ousted from office by a
coup d’état on 28 June 2009. The ouster was the result of a deepening conflict between his
government and the opposition about the organisation of a non binding referendum scheduled
on the day of the coup. The referendum was intended to ask the electorate whether they
agreed having a fourth ballot box during the national elections that would be held in November
2009. In case this ‘fourth66 ballot box’ would take place, it would ask Hondurans whether the
country would organize a new national constituent assembly to approve a new constitution
(Meyer, 2010: 2). This referendum was highly contested, because the opposition feared that
president Zelaya would use the changes in the constitution for a second term as president and
thus continue its political reforms.67 This led to extremely high levels of polarisation in
Honduran society, state institutions and even political parties. President Zelaya refused to
accept court rulings that prohibiting the organisation of the referendum (Meyer, 2010: 3).
Eventually he was ousted from office by the president of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, a
member of the PL, with heavy support from the military. Micheletti c.s. argued that this was not
a coup, but a constitutional succession, blaming Zelaya of irresponsible, illegal and dangerous
behaviour. However, internationally the coup was almost immediately rejected (Meyer,
2010:7). At a later stage, reports from international organizations like the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights demonstrated the illegality of the coup: (IACHR, 2009:7).
The conflict about the referendum was the culmination of a more fundamental change
in president Zelaya’s policies and political alliances. Zelaya’s administration had been rather
weak during the first two years, and lacked popular and political support. Although one of the
slogans of president Zelaya from the beginning of his term was ‘popular power’, this promise
started to materialize in a very concrete way in the course of 2008 president. Zelaya increased
64
See Transparancy International http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009. On
various occasions corruption has also endangered aid disbursements. See for instance IPS, 17 August 2007,
Corruption Honduras: International Aid Hanging by a Thread, online available
athttp://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38937
65
Honduras has a Gine coefficient of 53,8, see UN Human Development Index 2007-2008.
66
Fourth baloot because it would be combined with three other ‘ballots’ for presidential, congressional and
municipal elections.
67
While there was in itself political support for the possibility of a second presidential term, it was the leftist
political program of president Zelaya that raised objections.
42
the ‘buying power’ of the poor by raising the minimum wage substantially – without the
consent of employers. Also, during the second half of Zelaya’s term there was a marked change
in the relation of the government with a particular sector of civil society. Zelaya successfully
sought contact with leaders of popular and social movements, such as peasants or women
movements, who were invited to come over to the presidential palace. Members of Cofemun –
a women organization – felt sympathy for president Zelaya who had, among other things,
imposed a veto on a bill prohibiting the use of the morning after pill, authorized since 1992 (and
a highly controversial measure in Honduras). Cofemun members remember president Zelaya’s
administration as the one with ‘mayor apertura’. Also the director of the CNTC, a peasant
union, had direct access to the presidential palace and worked with president Zelaya on a
housing project of 5200 houses.
Furthermore, the government moved towards Hugo Chavez’ political and economic
alliances and joined PetroCaribe and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alba). At the
same time he approached sectors from Honduras civil society, such as women organisations
and peasant organisations that were invited at the presidential palace where their leaders had
face-to-face conversations with the president. Thus, a left-leaning coalition was taking shape
that counted at a national level on the support of popular sectors and at international level of
Hugo Chavez. This led to great unease among the traditional Honduran political and economic
elites and a period of increasing polarisation between those ‘pro’ and those ‘anti’ Zelaya.
In the ‘run-up’ to the coup and especially during the coup Honduran civil society
polarised to the bone, with some groups explicitly supporting the golpistas, and other groups
rejecting the coup.68 A group called the ‘camisas blancas’ actively supported the coup, while a
new broad based movement coalesced in the National Front against the Coup d’État (FNRGE,
also FRNG). This front was renamed after the elections of 29 November 2009 into Popular Front
of National Resistance (FNRP). The FRNP is a broad movement with representatives of different
sectors from Honduran society. Protagonist sectors are syndicates of workers and teachers,
leaders from left-wing political parties, and a number of grass-root organizations.69 A number of
more critical NGOs that have links with popular movements play important roles in the FRNP,
providing guidance, as well as resources to the movement.70 However, the term ‘Resistance’
also refers to the very large numbers of protestors that took the streets in the period during the
coup, and whose massive mobilization and continuing protests surprised both the coup makers
as well as the existing opposition movements in Honduras.
The national media and most of the churches endorsed the new ‘de facto’ government.
National media that are owned by conservative elites had already launched a vehement antiZelaya campaign.71 After the coup, this campaign continued, and the media became almost
entirely polarised. The report of the Human Rights High Commissioner for Human Rights notes
that during the coup ‘most media sided with one or the other side of the political spectrum, and
their reporting was therefore usually partial’ (UN, 2010: art 41). There was also a harsh assault
68
See Ginger Thompson, President’s Ouster Highlights a Divide in Honduras, New York Times, 9 August 2009,
online available at www.nyt.com
69
The political parties UD and PINU aligned with the FRNGE, but withdrew later. The coup led to a split of the UD.
Part of the membership (or ‘bases’) of the PN and PL also sympathise and participate on the FRNP.
70
Information provided by Carlos Del Cid.
71
Add source: Book title
43
on media that were critical of the coup. Several media premises were occupied and private
companies and the State withdrew their advertising from those media supporting the FRNG’
(UN 2010: 42 /44). Even more important was the position of many of the churches in Honduras;
most of them – in particular the Catholic church and the new evangelical churches – were
accused of endorsing or supporting the coup, while some of the church leaders were even
accused of being involved in the organisation of the very coup. 72 For instance, the Cardinal of
the Catholic Church Óscar Andrés Rodríguez Maradiaga defended the coup, stating that "each
and every one of the documents which have come into our hands show that the institutions of
the Honduran democratic state are valid and that what it has executed in juridical-legal matters
has been rooted in law."73 Before and after the coup, large numbers of members of new
evangelical churches demonstrated in Tegucigalpa for the Honduran constitution and against
Zelaya. One of them said about the coup: “We feel that what has happened is a reply to the
fervent prayers of so many Christians. For many of us, it's not a coup, but the rescue of our
country and our democracy".74
However, the polarization was not at all total and there were more progressive groups
from civil society that also raised objections against Zelaya’s policies and style. The most
frequent critique on president Zelaya was that he was a populist, looking for the support of
popular sectors. ‘He shared his project with civil society, but this is not the project of civil
society’, said one NGO representative. Another, more critical, NGO representative accused
president Zelaya of manipulating popular sectors, without having a coherent plan, nor a clear
strategy. The Zelaya government was accused of corruption (just like the preceding
governments) and of the usual political games to control key positions in the state structure. 75
The impact of the policies of the Zelaya administration on the poor (the group that the
government increasingly claimed to support) was also criticized.76 All in all, Zelaya was
successful in linking up with parts of civil society (mainly popular movements), whereas he
entered into conflict with others sectors (among these also a number of NGOs). For instance,
the consultation with civil society in the framework op de national Plan of Poverty Reduction
(ERP) (an entity where NGOs played an important role) came to an end during the Zelaya’s
administration.
The coup d’état led to heavy international disapproval (much more than the coup
makers had expected) and several (internationally led) efforts to negotiate between president
Zelaya and the de facto government. A successful negotiation between Micheletti and Zelaya
never took place, and eventually the elections of 29 November 2009 took place as scheduled
and brought Pepe Lobo (PN) to power. These elections were rejected and boycotted by the
FNRP. Also the FRNP does not recognize the government of Pepe Lobo.77 However, many
72
Mark Tooley, Honduran Church Leaders Sympathetic to “Coup”, The American Speactator 7-10-2009, online
available at http://spectator.org/archives/2009/07/10/honduran-church-leaders-sympat/print
73
Ibid
74
Ibid
75
A case in point was the debate about the Nueva Corte Suprema which led to a hunger strike of the public
prosecutors in Honduras (see Eguigure, 2008).
76
This was among others done by FOSDEH, an NGO that entered in fierce discussions with the Zelaya
administration, among others about the data on poverty alleviation that were manipulated according to this NGO.
77
I n the remainder of this text we will talk about the Resistence Front meaning both FRNG(E) and FRNP.
44
countries recognized the new government and restored the diplomatic relations with
Honduras. The Lobo-administration aims to build a national government and to work towards
reconciliation. This proves extremely complex in Honduras, which is still highly divided. Victor
Meza, director of CEDOH and former minister in Zelaya’s cabinet mentions a number of
challenges in particular:78 Human rights violations have continued in the months after the Lobo
took power, with one of the most worrisome trends the re-emergence of death squads
activities particularly targeting the FNRP. Moreover, a silent re-militarization of the state is
going on. For instance, the former head of the Honduran armed forces, Romeo Vásquez
Velásquez, who ordered the arrest and expulsion of former president Manuel Zelaya, has been
named as the new director of the Honduran telecommunications firm HONDUTEL.79
Furthermore, chronic insecurity, growing influence of narcos in the economy and the political
sphere, as well as the ongoing corruption make the ‘post-coup’ situation in Honduras extremely
volatile.
The NGO sector
The NGO-sector in Honduras has grown in the past two decades and the estimates of the
number of NGOs in Honduras is that it grew from around 4000 in the end of the 1980s, to about
12000 at this moment (Del Cid 2010a). Although the NGO sector is very diverse, the sector
partly reflects the stances of social forces in Honduran society and in the donor community.
Roughly a division can be made between more critical NGOs that are funded by a number of
European NGOs and (Nordic) donors, and a group of NGOs and donors taking a more technical
stance while being less pronounced in political terms. This is a general typology indeed, that
does little justice to all different shades, but the idea that ‘international cooperation’ can be
divided into ‘camps’ that are more or less ‘consequent’ has gained strength after the coup of
June 2009 (see below). INGOs belonging to the more critical group are among others the
Aprodev partners, Oxfam Family and the national coalition of international aid agencies ACI.80
Over the past decades, foreign assistance has played an important role in Honduras, both in
financial and in political terms.81 International donors have emphasized the need for political
reforms and for participation of civil society in the definition of public policies. The country
participated in the HIPC initiative and PRSPS processes that led to the (conditional) cancellation
of debt. Furthermore, hurricane Mitch (1998) caused tremendous destruction in Honduras,
leading to a new wave of (emergency) assistance to the country.
Foreign donors and agencies have played an important role in the creation of new
‘spaces’ where government agencies and representatives from civil society meet and discuss
priorities. This policy dialogue (participation by civil society) was one of the principles of the
PRSP process and led to foundation of the Consejo Consultivo de la Estrategia de la Reducción
de la Pobreza (CC-ERP). The assistance provided after Hurricane Mitch had similar intentions.
The second consultative group meeting for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central
78
Authors interview, 25 March 2010, Tegucigalpa.
La Tribuna 9 March 2010, online available at http://www.latribuna.hn/web2.0/?p=106835
80
Communication with Carlos del Cid.
81
See for data on foreign assistanece WorlBank: http://ddpext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&DIME
NSIONS=100
79
45
America led to the Stockholm Declaration, which emphasized the need for ‘an integrated
approach of transparency and good governance, and the importance of participation of civil
society in the strengthening of democracy’.82
As a result of these and other initiatives, the interactions between civil society and the
state have multiplied, and led to a diversity of formal and informal spaces of dialogue and
cooperation between state and non-state actors. These initiatives take place both at national
level and at local level. Some of the ‘bottom-up’ initiatives have led robust networks, such as
the ICCO supported Espacio Regionial de Occidente in the West of Honduras which brings
together government agencies, grassroots organizations and even MPs with their own ‘mesa’
(table). In a similar vein, throughout the country a network of local groups working in the field
of risk management have organized local groups over the past decade, that also organize at
regional, national and Central America level. Overall, the increased ambition and capacity of
sectors of civil society, and of NGOs in particular to lobby the government (both locally and
nationally) or to discuss proposals with specific government agencies is seen as one of the main
changes of civil society over the past decades (Del Cid I-14).
These changes have led to tangible results, but there is nevertheless discussion about
the wider impact. One of the criticisms is that ‘dialogues’ between civil society and government
form part of a strategy of ‘tolerance’ vis-à-vis NGOs. In this view NGOs are a necessity for a
state that lacks resources to provide for basic services. However, this participation reaches its
limits when key interests (such as access to land, or the mining activities) are touched. The coup
of June 2009 is seen by many representatives of GROs and NGOs as proof of this; the result of
the fear of powerful Honduran elites that their interests were threatened.
The coup had a devastating effect on the relations between state and the NGO-sector
that labelled the coup as a coup (and not as legal succession as the supporters of the coup did).
Although the majority of the Honduran NGOs and GROs were not directly targeted by the de
facto government of Micheletti and were (with practical limitations) able to continue their
work, most organizations reconsidered their relationship with the state, which led to a
postponement of contacts with the government or participation in networks. However, those
NGOs and GROs that publicly declared themselves against the coup and in particular those that
aligned with the Resistance Front, faced great difficulties to do their work (see sections below).
A number of these organizations played an active role in the activities of the Resistance Front,
by providing practical help or shelter for demonstrators. Others took a lower profile and in a
number of cases did not speak out against the coup, since within organizations or network
organizations the legality of the removal of president Zelaya was a point of heavy debate.
This led to an extremely high degree of polarization, where it proved extremely difficult
(though not entirely impossible) to take a position that does not either adhere to the ‘golpistas’
or the ‘resistencia’. The situation after the coup in Honduras can be seen as a ‘text-book case of
polarisation’, which implies according to Mitchell (1981) ‘the widening of political and social
space between groups, and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors
towards one of the extremes’. In such a situation it becomes extremely difficult to take a
‘middle-position’. Taking a middle position (or trying to do so…) can be seen by others that have
82
The Stockholm Declaration was signed on 28 May 1999 in Stockholm. See
http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/declaration.htm
46
made a choice as cowardly or an (implicit) choice for the adversary. This is exactly what
happened between organizations and even within organizations (both NGOs and GROs) in
Honduras. Representatives of NGOs and CSOs that chose to align or to work with the Resistance
Front, expressed that there was no space for shades (‘tintas medias’) and that this was the
moment to be clear about your position: ‘you either with us or against us’. For a number of
those representatives that chose to clearly pronounce against the coup and join the resistance
movement, this coincided with warm support for ‘Mel’ Zelaya. Some explained that ‘Mel
opened our eyes’ or ‘showed us the way’, while combining this with frustration about the
limited results of decades of supposed poverty alleviation arguing that it is time for ‘structural
changes’. This also led to the use of a vocabulary by some NGOs that had not been used over
the past decades. A staff member of an international organization was shocked by the
terminology used by some of the members of the Frente that used ‘all of a sudden used terms,
such as class struggle again’.
The coup and the ensuing violence used by the de facto government not only created a
divided civil society, but also a situation with emotions flaring up. Some people describe a
feeling of powerlessness: ‘There was no reason anymore, it all became very emotional’.
Another person argued that polarization is not real, it is created and imagined, but you can’t
escape from it. It was particularly difficult to pronounce against the coup, while at the same not
being identified with the pro-Zelaya sectors of the Resistance Front. However, a large share of
the representatives of NGO’s that supported or sympathize with the Resistance Front, are not
blindly following Zelaya. One NGO-representative, whose organization had pronounced itself
against the coup, but that did not participate in the activities of the Resistance Front, said that
the organization was seen by some as ‘golpista’ and by others as ‘resistencia’. Another, NGOmember laughed that their resistance to the coup had led to the fact that their NGO was seen
as ‘pro-Zelaya’, while they had always been very critical about his policies. Meanwhile, within
organizations and network organizations the June 2009 events had caused enormous debates
about the legitimacy of the coup (or succession). One representative told that it was impossible
to discuss the issue within the NGO (and it even divided families or could simply not be
discussed), while at a later stage it took a lot of energy to respect each others point of view. In
network organizations this proved even more problematic. When the Foprideh network of
Honduran NGOs met in March 2009 and the chairman of the meeting referred to the ‘coup’,
this immediately led to objections of some of the present organizations that wanted to be
neutral in this regard. The coup also caused a strong dispute about the leadership of the ICCOfunded coalition of peasant organizations of Consejo Coordinador de Organizaciones
Campesinas (COCOCH) between Santos Cornelio Chirinos (representing ACAN, and member of
the Christian Democrat Party that endorsed the ‘sucesion presidencial’) and Rafael Alegría
(representing CNTC and linked to the former Zelaya government as well as the Resistance
Front). 83
Thus, the NGO sector historically experienced a high degree of ‘tolerance’. Even in the
period after the coup, most NGOs were not fundamentally restricted in their activities, but
those organizations that were (suspected of) aligning with or supporting the Resistance Front
were target of intimidation, repression and other restrictive measures. The coup, however, also
83
http://cococh.org/cococh/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41&Itemid=51
47
had severe consequences on the nature of the social and political space that NGOs and GROs
granted each other. Polarization generally leads to an atmosphere where positions become
more radical, with emotions flaring up, and where the space for more moderate positions
diminishes. Although the coup was clearly the onset of this development, civil society groups
themselves became part of these dynamics, and it proved extremely difficult to bridge these
divisions.
Restrictive policies and actions
As mentioned before, most representatives of NGOs and GROs reported a ‘relative tolerance’
(tolerancia relativa) to do their work. The typical pattern for ‘partial democracies’ is thus also
present in Honduras: there’s lots of space for NGOs and GROs, but there are limitations for
groups that (start to) touch more fundamental interests or taboos in society. [What’s more, the
case of Honduras shows that particular interests and taboos can become more sensitive in
particular periods of time. This is clearly the case after the coup.] What Honduras also has in
common with the other cases in this study is that policies and actions cannot only be attributed
to state agents, but are the result of both state and non-state actors, and of combinations of
both (particularly in the cases of repression and stigmatization). Below we assess the
importance of each of the five types of policy and action, making a distinction between the
situation ‘before, during and after’ the coup.84
Physical harassment and intimidation
Before the coup a number of groups and sectors were particularly vulnerable and experienced
different kinds of threats, and harassments. Quantitative data about numbers of incidents and
trends are scarce, but it is fair to say that the groups with most problems are those that were
involved in local disputes about resources such as mining, and land rights. These are mostly
local groups or movements. A number of these cases received or currently receive national and
international attention, such as the cases of the problems with the mining company in Santa
Rosa the Copan and the land problems in Bajo Aguan (see next section). However, there are
many less well known cases, and as far as we can see, there is no systematic documentation in
Honduras of these kinds of local resource-related conflicts and human rights violations. In many
of these cases the responsibility for threats, intimidation and harassment is not entirely clear,
but – just like the case of Guatemala – thereseems to be a pattern of (local) combinations of
non-state and state actors that are involved. Although in some cases, there may also be high
level state agencies involved, the dynamics are primarily local. Local residents and organizations
become parties to these conflicts, and local interests, motivations and disputes (also other than
these related to resources) can become important factors in local conflict dynamics, and
companies can use or strengthen these differences.85
There are other sectors that have been particularly vulnerable over the past years, such
as (a) the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community (LGBT), (b) youth living in
84
Before is until 28 June 2009, during is after the coup, until the inauguration of the new Lobo administration in
January 2010 and after the coup is the period as of the Lobo administration.
85
See for a description of how local and national actors influence local conflict dynamics Kalyvas (2003). See for
examples of how this has influenced local anti-mining struggles in Cabañas, El Salvador El Faro.
48
marginalized neighborhoods, and (c) human rights organisations. Firstly, Ciprodeh has reported
over 170 cases of violence against the LGBT community since 2004. In the period after the coup
nine persons from the LGBT community were killed, among them Walter Trochez, who was also
a member of the Resistance Front.86 There are reports of police officials that are involved in
LGBT-violence.87 Secondly, with regard to youth, Amnesty International (2003) reported an
‘unprecedented increase’ at the end of the 1990s in the number of murders and extrajudicial
executions of children and youths in Honduras, especially those that are seen as gang members
or criminals. As to the perpetrators of this violence, there are strong indications that ‘members
of the security forces and others acting with the implicit consent of the authorities’ play a role
in an alarming number of cases, whilst some of these crimes have taken place within the
context of gang or mara warfare.’88 Interpeace (2009) has reported a steep rise in the number
of extrajudicial killings of youth after the coup.89 Thirdly, the Honduran human rights
movement was very vulnerable in the 1980s, but its space widened considerably in the past two
decades. However, as Bertha Oliva of Cofadeh notes ‘they have always viewed us with
suspicion’, but the troubles with the government were mostly of a different (administrative)
nature. This, however, changed after the coup, when Cofadeh declared itself against the coup
and joined the Resistance Front. In the period after June 2009 until the moment of writing,
Bertha Oliva has received numerous threats. Also the other human rights organizations in
Honduras reported threats, and intimidations of different types.
Clearly, in the period during (and partly also after) the coup, the de facto regime
launched a series of ‘restricting repressive measures’ that placed Honduran society under strict
control. These measures included the patrolling of security forces (army and police), the
implementation of curfews (periodically), the closure of radio and television stations or
intimidation of its staff, as well as the detention or persecution of political and social leaders
(Meyer, 2010: 6). The Inter-American Commision on Human Rights reports that security forces
conducted thousands of illegal and arbitrary detentions without an order from of a competent
authority (IACHR, 2009:9). Furthermore, on September 21st 2010, when displaced president
Zelaya took refuge in the Brazilian embassy, a 45-day state of siege was announced (Meyer,
2010:6). These measures were generally defended by most of the institutions of the Honduran
state, such as the Attorney General’s Office, judges and the Supreme Court of Justice (UN 2010,
art 67). In a number of cases government staff that (openly) opposed the coup reportedly lost
their jobs, such as 12 women and 7 men at the National Women’s Institute (UN, 2010, art 62).
These restrictive measures were especially used to counter the protests against the
coup. Organizations that supported the coup (such as a large number of church organizations)
or that did not question it openly experienced no or few problems. For many organizations that
experienced restrictions prior to the coup, the problems increased during and after the coup.
This was especially so for organizations and persons that participated actively in the Resistance
Front. For instance, organizations like Cofemun, and Cofadeh joined the Resistance Front and
86
See Gays Honduras: News and Reports, online at http://globalgayz.com/country/Honduras/view/HND/gayhonduras-news-and-reports#article12
87
See for instance the case of Josef Fabio Estrella, leader of the Rainbow Association Transvestite Group, in
Lesbian News Magazine, June 2007, online available at www.TheLNMag.com
88
See Amnesty International (2003), Casa Alianza (2006), Interpeace (2009).
89
Interview with Tomas Andino, Interpeace, Tegucigalpa, 22 March 2010. Preliminary data.
49
reported different kinds of threats. Cofemun reported threats via e-mail and phone, acts of
intimidation such as monitoring and surveillance (UN, 2010, art 58). Organizations that were
relatively free to operate before the coup, but chose to support the FRN entered in serious
problems as well and these problems were in many cases new to these organizations. Red
Comal (see next section) is a case in point. In November 2009 military searched the offices of
the organization in Siguatepeque on the suspicion of obstructing the elections (that took place
a day later).
Apart from the problems that NGOs experienced, the bulk of the repression during and
after the coup is directed at persons that have links with the Resistance Front. Reports of
human rights organizations in Honduras show that by the end of 2009 – in the run-up to the
elections - the use of torture has increased exponentially.90 There is an extremely worrisome
trend of continuation of human rights violations, where particularly ‘mid-level’ leaders that
have links with the Resistence Front are targeted, as well as other critical voices such as
journalists.91 Many observers – including members of the former Zelaya administration – argue
that president Lobo himself is not directly responsible or in favour of this repression, but rather
not able to stop it (which is even more worrisome).
Criminalisation
We heard of no cases of criminalisation of NGOs in the sense that they were legally prosecuted,
although the discussions prior to the coup about new NGO-laws, included elements of
criminalisation (see also next section). However, there is ample evidence that in the period
during and after the coup, members of social movements were increasingly confronted with
criminal charges. These charges were based on decrees that restricted civil and political
liberties, while they were also based on existing legislation.92 For instance, during the coup,
prosecutors initiated a number of proceedings charging “illicit assembly”. More important and
frequent, however, were the charges of the crime of sedition. During the coup at least 100
persons were charged on sedition, among others a group of 52 protestors against the coup that
occupied the premises of the National Agrarian Institute building in Tegucigalpa on the 30 th of
September 2009 (UN, 2010, art 38). Among these protestors were 10 members of the CNTC, a
counterpart of ICCO.93 It is feared that the crime of sedition will be used more frequently in the
90
See Report Situacion de los Derechos Humanos Previo a las Elecciones Presidenciales, Legislativeas y Municipales
en Honduras, published by a coalition of Central American Human Rights NGOs.
91
See the overview of 54 cases of extra-judicial, arbitrary kllings in the period from 28 June 2009 till the end of
March 2010, presented by CODEH of the killings that took place after the coup, online available at
http://codeh.hn/v1/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=100:ejecuciones-extralegales-arbitrarias-osumarias-consecuencia-del-golpe-de-estado-militar&Itemid=36 On the violence against media, see for instance a
call by the Committee to Protect Journalists, at http://cpj.org/2010/03honduras-deadlin-violence-against-newsmedia.php
92
For instance, executive Decree PCM-16-2009 (emitted on September 22nd 2009) imposed the state of siege
again; suspending freedom of movement, prohibiting public meetings not authorized by the police or the
armed forces, impeding freedom of expression, and authorizing the suspension of any radio or television
stations that offended government officials or expressed opposition to government resolutions (Cofadeh,
2009).
93
Authors interview, Agustin Ramos, director CNTC, 24 March 2010, Tegucigalpa. CNTC also reported the
detention of members in Colon and Comayagua .
50
period after the coup. For instance, ten members of the university trade union Sitraunah of the
Nacional Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH) were charges on the crime of sedition
and taken into custody on the 24 of March 2010.94 Another sector that has been targeted is
professionals working in different sectors of the state, in particular those that pronounced
themselves the coup. A case in point is the destitution of judges that are members of the
Asociación de Jueces por la Democracia and that started a hunger strike against this decision.95
It is important to note that there are links between criminalisation and repression. The
human rights organisation Cofadeh (2009) accused the de facto government of ‘a plan to
criminalise public protest’. In a declaration it states that it started ‘on the very day of the coup
d’état with the illegal suspension of Constitutional guarantees and the denial of the right of the
population under Article 3 of the Constitution’. However, as of July 30th, the de facto regime
announced and publicly threatened to take a series of measures to forcibly disperse protestors
and to apply article 331 of the Penal Code to those who attend protests, meetings and public
marches that generate “disorderly brawls” (Cofadeh, 2009). According to Cofadeh this strategy
shifted a month later, when the government started ‘targeting social groups clearly identified
with the resistance and in the last four weeks, the repression has become selective, using death
threats as a form of intimidation. Both the forms and location of the repression has changed in
the last few months, shifting to barrios and neighbourhoods of different cities, municipalities,
and villages where demonstrations against the coup take place. Campaigns to harass and
persecute members of the resistance have been mounted’ (Cofadeh, 2009).
Thus, it is argued by Cofadeh that criminalisation already diminished during the coup
and made place for more targeted repressive actions that continue until the day of writing. This
is not to say that criminalisation of social protest has disappeared. We would rather argue that
there is a need to closely monitor trends in this regard.
Administrative measures96
According to ICNL Honduras lacks a ‘framework’ law that provides the basic conditions for
establishing an NGO or a GRO as a legal person. The key laws affecting NGOs and GROs in
Honduras are the Civil Code, the Administrative Procedures Code, as well as well as Executive
Decrees 024-2002 and 770-A-2003. The 2002 Decree described the responsibilities of the
Registration and Supervision of Civil Associations Unit (URSAC). The 2003 Decree further
elaborated on this (ICNL, 2010). Other key laws include the Law on the National Convergence
Forum (FONAC)97 which created a national space for dialogue between state and authorized
representatives of civil society.
In the absence of a framework the Ministry of Governance and Justice has according to
ICNL ‘unfettered authority over the granting of a legal personality’. ICNL reports the frequent
abuses of this ministry in providing the legal personality (the right to entry), for instance by
94
See http://www.defensoresenlinea.com/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=678:juez-violala-presuncion-de-inocencia-y-envia-a-prision-a-10-sindicalistas&catid=54:den&Itemid=171
95
See http://www.revistazo.biz/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1108:con-despidossilenciaran-a-jueces-y-magistrados-criticos-de-la-corrupcion-del-sistema-judicial&catid=19:proyectos&Itemid=19
96
This section is largely based on the information of ICNL on Honduras, see
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ngolawmonitor/honduras.htm
97
FONAC was founded in 1994, see http://www.fonac.gob.hn/
51
upholding the request for legal personality up to a period of seven years (ICNL, 2010). ICNL also
reports that the lack of a legal framework ‘leaves NGOs vulnerable to multiple and ad-hoc
requests for information from various government entities and/or to charges of a lack of
transparency by the public’ (ICNL, 2010). However, in our interviews with NGO-representatives
we found that most NGOs didn’t experience these kinds of problems and were not restricted by
administrative measures (but rather by other kinds of measures). There is, however,
widespread support among Honduran NGOs for the drafting of a new comprehensive law on
civil society organisations.
In the past years there have been several efforts to draft a comprehensive law
regulating different kinds of civil society organizations, in which NGOs (both national and
international) have been involved. The discussions with the government about this law took a
negative turn, after the publication of critical report of an NGO (Ciprodeh) on the Honduran
assembly in March 2009. As a reaction, the Honduran Assembly issued a highly restrictive draft
NGO law, which according to ICNL included the following significant restrictions on the freedom
of association: “Vaguely worded prohibitions on non-governmental organization (NGO)
activities that "might influence citizens in relation to a particular political party, candidate or
ideological tendency" that give the Government great discretion to limit rights of freedom of
association and expression.”
An extremely high minimum number of members for an NGO to obtain and retain legal
personality; plus restrictions on the freedom of non-Honduran citizens to associate: for every
legal foreign resident member of an NGO, the organization must have a minimum number of
Honduran citizen members. Vast discretion to forcibly dissolve NGOs if the Government
determines that an NGO is unable to fulfill its objective, falls below number of minimum
members, or spends down 80% of its assets.”98
In the month before the coup, a broad based coalition of national and international
NGOs heavily criticized and lobbied against this concept law. Individuals of these NGOs
remember the aggressive tone of a number of MPs in these discussions, among others of
Roberto Micheletti. The law was not accepted before the coup took place, and currently NGOs
consider opening the discussion with the new government about another, less repressive, law.
Stigmatisation
It is fair to say that in the period before the coup, the most vulnerable sectors in Honduras with
regard to stigmatization are those that were discussed under the first subsection of this
paragraph (the GLBS community, human rights groups and women organizations, and youth).
Labeling of others can be part of strategies of both government agents and civil society. We talk
about stigmatization in cases where groups are portrayed as untrustworthy, or (stronger) as
criminals or dangerous subjects, and thus forming a threat to security or social order of society,
without giving major substance for these claims. Stigmatisation can be an extremely important
strategy when a group or category is constantly depicted as untrustworthy, or dangerous.99
Media generally play an important role in these strategies and in that regard the control of
national media in Honduras by a few powerful conservative elites is of utmost importance.
98
99
See ICNL on Honduras at www.icnl.org
See chapter 1 of this study.
52
Stigmatisation takes different forms in Honduras. For those groups that question norms
that are deeply embedded and widely shared in Honduran society – such as the case of the
GLBS community – stigma is already widely present. Particular strategies of stigmatization are
clearly more important in cases where particular groups are portrayed as ‘dangerous others’ –
such as youth (gangs). In the past decade continuous national level media attention for youth
gangs and their alleged responsibility for crime and homicides have created an atmosphere that
legitimized zero tolerance policies and extra-judicial executions of youth. In local level struggles
images of the self and other are of great importance. Reportedly, (local) media increasingly play
a role in forging alliances in local conflicts about mining. The experience of the resistance
against a local mine by the Associacion Civica para la Democracia in Santa Rosa de Copan (see
next paragraph) shows that these companies used local media (broadcasting their own
programmes) to spread their message. More recently, mining companies do not only sponsor
local radio station, but have opened their own stations. These radio stations play important
roles in the promotion of the message that mining creates progress and that those against
mining are against this progress.100
The last years of the Zelaya regime were characterized by a growing division in the
Honduran political establishment and society. President Zelaya contributed to this by a rather
confronting style. In general, the national level media launched constant and fierce attacks on
the government of Zelaya.101 The image was created that president Zelaya’s administration
formed a threat to national security and sovereignty and can be seen as a form of
stigmatization that helped form a coalition of state agencies and part of civil society against his
government. As already mentioned, this led to an almost complete polarization of the media
after the coup (with a number of smaller regional broadcasting stations and newspapers taking
a more critical stance) and the provision of objective information was extremely problematic.
Thus, in a situation of extreme division and polarization, stigmatization increasingly became an
important tactic for all parties. What’s more, labelling and stigmatization also became a
strategy of civil society groups vis-à-vis each other and groups that were not able to position
themselves during and after the coup could also become object of stigmatization.
Existing spaces under pressure
There has been a trend over the past decades to create new spaces of dialogue between civil
society groups and government agencies. These spaces were closed after the coup. Below we
discuss several types of problems with regard to these newly established spaces. We distinguish
between practices of cooptation and the hesitance to engage in new dialogue with the
government after the Lobo Administration took power.
As discussed in chapter 1 we are interested in these acts of co-optation where persons
or several persons are persuaded or lured to join the agency, party, or system of an opponent
and where offers of material gain for the ‘co-opted person or the group’ play an important role
in these moves. It can, however, be difficult to see where cooperation ends, and where cooptation starts. When PL and PN led governments approach members and leaders of trade
100
Authors interview, Trinidad Sanchez, director Red Comal, 23 March 2010, Siguatepeque.
Some interviewees noted that president Zelaya used Canal 8 for his political project and that there was a
‘propaganda war’ going on in the period before the coup.
101
53
unions, social movements, churches and NGOs to side with the government or to take positions
in the cabinets, this should not necessarily be seen as examples of this (and these ‘cross-overs’
can also be seen as an indicator of an ‘healthy’ democracy). But in a context where corruption
flourishes and clientalism is strong, it is not surprising that we heard numerous accusations that
politicians were actually buying (bribing) leaders of trade unions, social movements and NGOs.
Approaching leaders from civil society is, however a normal practice for Honduran governments
that seek to build or to broaden their constituency. This was the case with the former president
Zelaya in his bid to build a ‘left-wing’ constituency as well as the new Lobo administration in its
efforts to build a broad based government.
For instance, Zelaya approached leaders of social movements, which was seen by others
as an effort to co-opt these movements – not necessarily by bribing them. In a similar vein,
president Zelaya approached new protestant groups. This was, however, not successful, since
these churches are generally conservative and were not willing to be associated with Zelaya.
President Lobo, in his turn, appointed Alejandro Ventura, a prominent leader of the teachers'
union that plays a prominent role in the Resistance Front.102 However, other leaders refused to
accept a position in the new government, like for instance, Andres Pavon, director of the
human rights organisation CODEH and one of the first persons to announce plans of a coup. 103
According to Pavon it was still too early to cooperate with the new government. This ties in
with a more fundamental problem of whether, when and how to restore working relations with
the new Lobo administration.
In that regard, a distinction should obviously be made between those in favour of and
against the coup. The organisations that supported or endorsed the coup generally don’t have
any moral dilemmas of working with the new government or not. This is different for the
groups that actively oppose the coup and don’t accept the legitimacy of the new Lobo
administration (they speak of Pepe Lobo, not of president Lobo). Engaging with this new
government is still not an issue. By the end of March 2010 most NGOs still very much had a wait
and see attitude. A representative of a human rights NGO said that president Lobo had invited
members of a new platform of human rights organisations for a conversation, but this was not
accepted. The relations with the government were still ‘cold’, he said and moreover talks with
government officials could be interpreted by others as being in favor of the coup (‘ser golpista’).
This was also expressed by the director of Interpeace, an organisation working with youth, since
the very youth that the organisation is working with would not agree with new dialogue.104
Apart from the problems to engage with the government, as a result of closure of spaces, we
also found that some NGOs had their thoughts about the nature of their relations with the
government. In this regard the more radical NGOs refer to the Honduran democracy as a
‘oligarchic democracy’ that wasn’t able to foster sustainable development, but rather
contributed to ‘sustainable poverty’. The spaces of dialogue that had been created over the
past decades were seen as ‘ritualised’ spaces, that didn’t lead to fundamental choices in favour
of the poor. The resistance of the political and economic classes to meaningful reform in
102
See El Heraldo 28 January 2010, online available at
http://www.elheraldo.hn/Ediciones/2010/01/28/Noticias/Toma-forma-el-gabinete-del-gobierno-de-unidad
103
Authors interview Andres Pavon, Tegucigalpa, 25 March 2010.
104
Authors interview Thomas Andino, Tegucigalpa, 22 March 2010.
54
Honduras was also a key concern of others, who emphasised the weakness of the state, the
high levels of clientalism, impunity and corruption. While for some this was reason to voice a
strong support for president Zelaya who, it was argued, made a clear choice in favour of the
poor, others questioned how to use their political space and wondered whether changes in
their strategies would be necessary. As one NGO-representative said: What effects did our
efforts produce? Didn’t we –through our dialogues - merely legitimize the government policies
that didn’t lead to improvement of the poor in our country?
On the job trouble
In this section we focus on the ways restrictive actions and policies were experienced by
different organisations. We make a distinction between three different kinds of experiences
(that are partly overlapping): (a) those that are typical for conflicts about resources, (b) those
that are a result of insecurity, and (c) those that are the result of the repression of the coup.
First, struggles about access to resources such as land or raw materials can create
enormous problems to GROs and NGOs. ASONOG, a counterpart of ICCO, has been involved in
protests against mining companies since July 1999 with its program Incidencia Gestión de
Riesgos y Minería. It focuses on the protection of the environment and of human rights in the
western part of Honduras and it seeks to strengthen the lobby capacity of local governments
and civil society. The past two years this led to more and more pressure on ASONOG. In Santa
Rosa de Copan, where ASONOGs headquarters are based, staff played an important role in the
protests against the local mining activities. This led to a struggle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of
local inhabitants. The mining company has used broadcasting time of local radio stations with a
view to foster support for its activities. More recently, it opened its own radio station and thus
has a strong influence on public opinion. According to ASONOG staff there is now communities
that are ‘against ASONOG’ and in favour of the mining company. This is not only the case
because the company provides employment, but also because it has linked up with local
governments. Reportedly, mayors receive funds of the company and even police have received
funds to buy petrol. The mining company also has its own security company that follows staff of
ASONOG when at work. There have also been pressures and threats against ASONOG that have
increased to such an extent that the director eventually had to leave the country. It is not clear
who exactly are behind these threats, but it is clear that they haven’t stopped since then.
ASONOG has taken a number of measures to deal with this situation. The director of
ASONOG had to leave the country and was assisted by several international organisations. Also
with the support of external donors, it started to work on plans of institutional safety.
Furthermore, ASONOG has become more careful in its work, preferably taking action in
coordination with other organisations, so as not to be the (sole) target of repressive actions.
The importance of communication is also emphasised, although it is realised that it may be very
difficult to counter the propaganda of mining companies. Therefore, emphasis is placed on the
prevention of mining activities in communities were mining companies consider to start
activities. Stopping a company that has already invested proves to be very complex. Thus
ASONOG has focused more recently on declaring municipalities ‘free of mining activities’.
econdly, with regard to working in a context of chronic insecurity (other than
repression) several counterparts of ICCO have experienced problems, oftentimes leading to
withdrawal of the organisation. Most of these are related to insecurity generated by criminal
55
groups impeding the work of NGOs. NGOs (such as ICCO partner OCDIH ) working in zones were
narco trade has increased, experience acceptance problems of local traders. In some cases the
narco traders have started to offer services or projects themselves. NGOs can generally only
operate in these areas when they keep a very low profile, but more frequently they are simply
not trusted by criminal networks and have been asked or forced to leave the area. A former
youth worker in San Pedro Sula told that he was shot in his leg by a person belonging to a gang
of car traders thus forcing him to stop working in this part of town.
Interestingly, ICCO partner Arte y Acción, working with youth in marginalized areas of
Tegucigalpa with a strong presence of youth gangs, reports that these gangs accepted the
organisation. An important reason for the acceptance is the focus of Arte y Accion on artistic
activities as a way of self-realisation and self-respect. The risks of Arte & Acción (AA) lie outside
the neighbourhood. In March 2010, two young members of AA visiting a market were beaten
up by police officers that assumed that they were criminals. Their AA carnets – that were
introduced by AA because ID cards are extremely expensive - saved them. Furthermore, AA has
experienced problems as a result of advocating against the coup. The office of AA was recently
searched and equipment was stolen. This is generally seen as a warning towards the
organisation and frightens possible landlords. AA has also been accused by the ministry of G&J
for being a fake NGO (‘NGO de maletin’).
Crime creates particular problems for organisations working in the field of
commercialisation, as is the case with Red Comal - an association of small producers working
for the commercialisation of products of its members.105 Red Comal reports problems in several
parts of the country where criminal groups attacked transports of the organisations – such as
the region around Choluteca near Nicaragua. In this case Red Comal chose to stall its activities
in this region. Furthermore, the supermarket of Red Comal in its hometown Siguatepeque was
robbed three times in a row. Although the perpetrators were never arrested, it is suspected
that people jealous of Red Comals economic success may have been behind it. This implies that
economic success of one association can lead to jealousy and restrictive actions of others.
Red Comal also experienced problems as a result of the coup, the third field that we
discuss. Almost immediately after the coup took place Red Comal became part of the
Resistance Front and provided assistance to the movement. For instance, its premises nearby
the town of Siguatepec were used for meetings and protestors against the coup were given
shelter. After the coup, Red Comal experiences some intimidations, like cars passing by while
drivers shouted slogans against the Resistance Front. Also the military from Siguatepeque
trained in front of the premises of Red Comal at 1.00 AM at night – something they never did
before. Red Comal was also suspected of obstructing the elections of 28 November 2009, which
was reasons for 45 military of the local ‘batallon ingenieros’ to occupy the premises of the
organisations, taking away computers, solar panels, and money of the organisation.106 Although
Red Comal was highly upset about this, it decided not to make any claims to the state, since this
might interfere with the working relations it has with different government agencies. As a result
of the raid, Red Comal was also concerned about its reputation in town. But when it organised
105
See Red Comals website http://www.redcomal.org.hn/
According to the director of Red Comal the lawyer of the Fiscalia came 45 minutes later. Authors interview,
Trinidad Sanchez, 23 maart 2010, Siguatepeque.
106
56
its yearly market a week later, the public attended and was positive about Red Comal. And
although Red Comal was against elections of November 2009, the newly elected mayor (PN)
says he wants to establish contact with RC.
Thus, Red Comal paid a price for speaking out against the coup. Red Comal actively
supported the Resistence Front, and took a low profile in its relations with the (local)
government. For instance, the organisation didn’t submit a complaint against the raid in its
premises, because this might backfire on its relation with the government. The coup had led to
a national economic crisis that also affected Red Comal, with an estimated 40% drop in its
turnover. A further deterioration of this relationship might lead to more economic losses, which
made Red Comal more cautious.
Other organizations were more heavily affected by the coup. As to ICCO’s partners this
was particularly the case with CNTC, a peasant union and COFEMUN, a feminist organisation
promoting the rights of women.107 Both organisations are typical claim-making organisations
(claiming land rights and women’s rights respectively) that traditionally have had a rather tense
relationship with (at least a part of) the political establishment. Representatives of both
organisations also mentioned a sea change in the working relations with the administration of
president Zelaya that received them ‘with open arms’. For COFEMUN this was important, since
the topics that it stands for (including the right of abortion, and the morning after pill) are
extremely sensitive issues in Honduran society and have raised strong reactions by conservative
forces in society and in Congress.108 Zelaya’s support for the cause of COFEMUN was seen as a
‘triumph against conservatism’ in Honduras and this led to a strong identification of COFEMUN
with the political project of president Zelaya. So COFEMUN was also involved in the
organisation of the referendum (consulta popular). Also CNTC - an organisation that has been
claiming land rights for the past two decades -maintained a close relationship with president
Zelaya. In the view of the director of CNTC ‘Mel’ was the first president who really took the
concerns of the CTNC serious and tried to help CNTC.
Both CNTC and COFEMUN were actively involved in the protests against the coup. For
the staff of COFEMUN the coup had been unimaginable (‘we had never expected this’) and so
was the repression that followed the coup. COFEMUN had experienced restrictions before.
Since its foundation the organisation had to deal with different kinds of stigmatisation,
criminalisation and staff had experiences of armoured cars following or watching them and of
anonymous threats (telephone and mail). The threats and patrols intensified in the period after
the coup. Staff reported the interception of their telephones while the kindergarten across the
street was apparently evacuated and occupied by two military.109 The de facto government of
Roberto Micheletti was also a direct threat to COFEMUN since the new government strongly
expressed conservative values. The ‘cancilleria de la republica’ under Micheletti, was Martha
Lorena Alvarado, who in May 2009 had charged the director of COFEMUN who had argued that
107
See http://www.cofemun.org/
The close relationship between COFEMUN and president Zelaya was also interesting, because COFEMUN is seen
by many as a principled and radical feminist organisation, and president Zelaya as a womaniser.
109
Authors interview COFEMUN, 25 March 2010, Tegucigalpa. According to staff of COFEMUN the children
returned and the military were removed after the Lobo administration took office.
108
57
the Lorena Alvarado was ‘against human rights.110 Lorena Alvarado had called COFEMUN a
‘dangerous organisation’. The direct threats to staff of COFEMUN in combination with the
absence of the rule of law, led to an extreme feeling of vulnerability and staff felt no longer at
ease in their own office. This led to new measures: staff no longer left the office alone, and
didn’t work until late in the day. The director left the country for a while. In March 2010,
COFEMUN staff still felt extremely vulnerable and absolutely not safe. Staff reported that
telephone lines were still intercepted, that they were still followed by cars and received threats.
Staff of the organisation also reported that it felt rather unprepared to these severe
restrictions. ICCO’s network on PDFED (of which COFEMUN is a member) prepared workshops
in Honduras on human rights defenders, using the expertise of organisations in Guatemala
(notably SEDEM, see next section).
These examples show that NGOs and GROs that spoke out against the coup suffered
different kinds of restrictions. This coincides with the impression that both during and after the
coup repression is focused on these groups and individuals that play an active role in the
Resistance Front. This repression has continued since the Lobo-administration took office and it
is feared that groups within the (military) intelligence services, the police and private security
agencies will not stop these activities. This might lead to the militarisation and escalation of
local conflicts. Of particular concern is the region of Bajo Aguan where protracted conflicts
about land tenure have created an explosive situation.111 There is a complex conflict about land
titles in this region. A law in the early 1990s aiming to modernize agriculture in Honduras led
to the acquisition of a large number of cooperatives planning African palm in the region and a
de facto reversal of the land reform programme of the 1960s.112 The way the new owners – the
powerful businessmen René Morales and Miguel Facussé – acquired the lands of 29
cooperatives in the late 1990s has been highly controversial, and have been contested by
peasant organisations that claim their lands back.113In 2001 the Movimiento Unido Campesino
del Aguan (MUCA) was organised.114CNTC – a partner of ICCO also has a presence in this zone.
In the past ten years these organisations have been confronted with all kinds of restrictions
mentioned in our model, ranging from arrest warrants of local leaders115 and stigmatisation to a
combination of all these restrictions with a clear trend towards more repression. Local leaders
have been harassed or killed (MUCA members, also part of the Resistance Front). In March and
April 2010 militarisation of the region is reported.116 The militarisation of the region was
already ongoing and is a typical example of a mix of public and private efforts (military, police
and private security forces). Several governments have sought to solve the conflicts in the
region, and local leaders had reached an agreement with president Zelaya on June 12, 2009.
The coup made an end to this process and MUCA occupied farms to which they claim to hold
110
See Dina Meza, 3 March 2010, Mujeres de la Resistencia. Las mas amenazadas en los ultimos dias, online
available at http://ellibertador.hn/Nacional/3840.html
111
Authors interview Victor Meza, 25 March 2010, Tegucigalpa.
112
These cooperatives were formed in the early 1970s, and product of a land reform of the early 1960s.
113
See Muriel Soy, 2010, Police Trained to Commit Illegal Acts while Billy Joya Training Paramilitaries in Colon, on
http://hondurashumanrights.wordpress.com
114
See also hondurashumanrights.wordpress.com and MUCA’s site http://movimientomuca.blogspot.com/
115
See Fian, 2005, Honduras: Criminalisation of agrarian reform activists in Bajo Aguan, www.fian.org
116
See WOLA, 13 April 2010, WOLA alarmed at militarization of Bajo Aguan, http://www.wola.org
58
legal rights. This has led to a new and intense campaign of stigmatization (accusations of
presence and links with guerrilla armies) and a wave of repression and human rights
violations.117
Responses
In general, the response capacity in Honduras to the restrictions experienced by different kinds
of organisations is weaker than in Guatemala. Whereas in Guatemala a relatively strong human
rights movement took shape as a result of decades of civil war, genocide and ongoing
repression by both state and non-state actors, the need for these kinds of response strategies
were less clear in the case of Honduras. The coup, however, changed this situation dramatically.
This is not to say that there were no problems with regard to the political space of NGOs and
GROs in Honduras. There were local level conflicts about land titles and mining that on
occasions became extremely polarised – a phenomenon that we see in all the cases in this
study. But the national political context changed in such a way that these local level conflicts
became part of national processes of polarisation. The question for NGOs and GROs in
Honduras, therefore, is not only how to respond to restricting political space, but also of how to
deal with an extremely polarised political situation which sharply contrasts with the practices of
dialogue and consensus building so much promoted and sought by international donors and
local organisations in the past decades.
As mentioned, in general GROs and NGOs in Honduras are seen as relatively free to
undertake their activities. This was even the case in the periods during and after the coup,
although in this period many organisations that were critical of the coup reconsidered their
relationship with the government. However, the groups that actively spoke out against the
coup, experienced serious restrictions. Many of these groups were also taken by surprise by the
new wave of repression and reacted in an ad-hoc manner to the new threats. Different kinds of
measures were taken. Staff developed protocols of how to deal with the situation. For instance,
it was decided to never arrive and leave the offices of their organisations alone, while staff
members phoned each other several times a day to see if they were safe. Directors and also
staff members of the organisations that were most visible in the protest, went into hiding (or
stayed in different places) and a number of them left the country for a period of time. This also
raised some discussion about ‘staying or leaving’, about ‘when to come to back’ and how and to
what extend to support those persons that decide to ask for political asylum elsewhere. There
were, for instance, criticisms that some people that fled could have stayed in the country, by
taking a lower profile or staying in different houses at night. However, as mentioned, the coup
surprised many people and in these volatile situations it is extremely difficult to make
assessments about the security situation. There clearly is a need for local organisations
systematize their experience and have a discussion about the do’s and don’t in these kinds of
crisis situations. In the aftermath of the coup, there are several initiatives of organisations
providing training and advice. Human rights organisations from Guatemala (among them
counterparts of ICCO) have offered training sessions for counterparts in Honduras. Also almost
117
See Muriel Soy, 2010, Police Trained to Commit Illegal Acts while Billy Joya Training Paramilitaries in Colon, on
http://hondurashumanrights.wordpress.com
59
immediately after the coup, a number human rights organisations from Guatemala (Udefegua,
Sedem) decided to organise a fact-finding mission to Honduras.
As a result of the coup, local organisations have started to take more proactive action.
This is particularly the case with the six main human rights organisations in the country that
started conversations about a common platform. This is important, since there is a need for a
coordinated and structured monitoring system of human rights violations, that combines the
expertise of different organisations. In the face of a failing judicial system in Honduras and the
politicisation of its tasks to monitor human rights offences, there is a need for a nongovernmental system. The first task of such a system is to monitor and to share information
with national and international actors. It is also important that the tasks of monitoring are
decoupled from political influences and agendas. Thus, those organisations monitoring human
rights offences should make information public and take a stance against all violations of
human rights, but keep a distance from (party) political activities.
International actors have played an important role in the period during the coup. The
strong international pressure surprised the de facto government of Roberto Micheletti, and
although it didn’t lead to a negotiated settlement (and the return of Emanuel Zelaya), it
probably played an important role in the organisation of the elections as scheduled. It is
interesting to note that Honduran organisations (including NGOs) that sympathised and
participated in the Resistance Front were quite critical about the position of the international
response. In their view the position of the US and the OAS was flawed, and so was the position
of a large number of international NGOs.
International NGOs found themselves in a rather difficult situation and had problems to escape
the polarised situation in Honduras. There were several reactions. A number of NGOs reacted
cautiously; they didn’t openly pronounce against the coup, but suspended their work and
waited for what would happen. SNV Netherlands is a case in point. Over the past years, this
organisation looks for new markets for small producers and in that framework it had
established contacts with national businesses that in a number of cases supported the coup.
For SNV this was reason to freeze its activities and wait until the problems were solved, making
clear that in their opinion the rules of the game should be respected. A problem was, of course,
that the very nature of and the application of the rules of the game were at stake, but SNV
noted that it was not up to them to decide whether this was a coup or a presidential
succession. ‘SNV is not a referee’.118
Other international NGOs criticised the coup and the human rights violations. In a
number of cases it was the international headquarters that criticised the coup, as was the case
with DanChurchAid and the Mennonite Church. The fact that the international branches of
organisations responded enabled local organisations to keep a lower profile. For CASM (the
NGO of the Mennonite Church) this was all too necessary, because local members of the NGO
had different viewpoints about the coup. In other cases, the national branches of NGOs were
seen by more radical organisations as not belligerent enough in a period when in their view
there was no other choice than being in favour or against the coup. For ICCO the situation was
particularly complex. On the one hand, ICCO staff at the headquarters in Utrecht played an
important role in lobbying for arrested or disappeared members of their partner organisations.
118
Authors interview, René van der Poel, 24 March 2010, teleconference Tegucigalpa/Managua.
60
ICCO worked closely together with the Dutch Embassy in Costa Rica and with the ministry of
Foreign Affairs in The Hague. These actions were the result of initiatives of ICCO staff and there
were no protocols with regard to these kinds of situations. On the other hand, the newly
established regional office of ICCO in Managua and the Central American board representing
ICCO partners in the isthmus kept a lower profile. This was also due to the fact that the
members of the board did not reach consensus about the developments in Honduras. This
raises questions about the ways ICCO will position itself in these kinds of situations in the
future.
Yet, other international NGOs and organisations were more critical and closer to the
agenda of the Resistance Front. Some international NGOs supported activities of the Resistance
Front. The Copenhagen Initiative for Central America and Mexico (CIFCA) organised a factfinding mission to Central America. It was criticised by some for not talking with representatives
of the government.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the combined international attention for Honduras has
been of great importance in the transition from the de facto government to the newly elected
government of president Lobo. The fact that this government is still not recognised as
legitimate by the Resistance Front shows the deep divisions in Honduras as well as the limited
capacities of the international community (especially those with more power and resources,
like the US) to deal in a more fundamental way with the crisis in Honduras.
For international NGOs, like ICCO, there clearly is a new situation in Honduras that
should have consequences on their strategy. Political space in Honduras has narrowed and the
human rights violations have increased. Apart from the need to support initiatives to monitor
human rights violations, there also is the question of what priorities there are with regard to
civil society strengthening. What kind of civil society do international NGOs want to support?
How do international organisations (want to) relate to the political opposition of the Resistance
Front? Which political spaces do international organisations want to use, safe or create?
Conclusions & Recommendations
In Honduras there has historically been a relative tolerance vis-à-vis the work of NGOs. In the
period until the coup d’état of 28 June 2009, NGOs that experienced most problems in their
operational space were those claiming access to particular resources (such as land) or asking for
a different use of resources (such as mines). Furthermore, women’s groups and the LGBT
community have traditionally experienced problems. Apart from this, like in Guatemala, all
societal groups (NGOs, social movements, grassroots organisations) experience problems that
are the result of the security situation.
The increasing polarisation that took place as of 2008 as a result of the political reforms
and alliances of the Zelaya administration deeply affected the work and operational space of
NGOs. In the ensuing political twists the fragile Honduran democracy was put to the test,
eventually leading to the coup d’état. Nevertheless, despite the turbulence and chaos that
many NGOs and grassroots organisations experienced and the restrictions that this caused with
regard to their operational space, they were still able to work. It was, however, especially those
NGOs that pronounced themselves against the coup that faced repression and intimidation. In
this regard there is an extremely worrisome and ongoing trend of targeted repression and
criminalisation of NGOs and social movements that pronounce themselves against the coup
61
and the new regime, and of which most are organised in or sympathise with the Resistance
Front.
Parallel to the process of growing political polarisation, civil society has become more
divided and polarised as well. Before and after the coup a cleavage became visible between
those ‘supporting’ or rejecting the coup. The possibilities to take in a ‘middle position’ have
diminished and this has also affected the NGO sector. Trust between (and sometimes within)
NGOs has diminished, and many groups are still hesitant as to the possibilities to cooperate
with the new government.
Contrary to Guatemala, where historically the operational of NGOs has been far less
stable than in Honduras, Honduran NGOs were hardly prepared for the problems that they
faced. Interestingly, staff of Guatemalan NGOs was very important in supporting their
Honduran colleagues. International NGOs, like ICCO HQ in the Netherlands, played an
important role in the period after the coup, while the newly established regional office took a
lower profile.
Two topics are particularly important for ICCO and for other international NGOs in the
period after the coup. Firstly, there seems to be a need for further improvement of the capacity
to monitor the human rights situation. As of March 2010 Honduran NGOs were in the process
of discussing the possibilities and options to cooperate. Secondly, there is the question of what
can (and should) be learned from almost two decades of civil society strengthening in
Honduras. Which strategies were successful, which failed? And what are the lessons for the
new situation in Honduras?
62
4. The Philippines – Strategic manoeuvring in the available space
Introduction
Analysts of Philippine society all raise red flags as they contemplate the current state of the
democracy, the freedoms for civil society, and the actual role of civil society in defending its
space and asserting its claims effectively (e.g. Hutchcroft, 2007; Tiwana, 2009). Tiwana for
example wrote that the Philippines currently is “one of the most dangerous places in which to
be civil society activist” (2009) and the Asian Human Rights Commission claimed that “to be an
activist is to be threatened and risk being killed” (2008:8). In this chapter we analyse whether
and how NGOs are affected by the worrisome trends that these analysts observe. Our
assessment is that those trends indeed exist and affect a significant number of NGOs; however,
many NGOs are not affected by the severe threats posed by intimidation, criminalization and
killings. We identify the sectors that are affected and the way in which different restrictions
interact to limit their operational space. We also pay attention to the strategies that NGOs
have developed to open up and use the available space.
This chapter is based on interviews with ICCO-partners and other NGOs in the
Philippines. Most of the organizations have an office in Manila and were interviewed there.
Some organizations, which are operating in Mindanao, were interviewed in Davao City.119
Recent elections in May 2010 brought to power Noynoy Aquino who was a favourite among
many of the NGOs that we interviewed. People are relieved that Gloria Arroyo has stepped
down and maintain hopes for actual changes.
Political context
The Philippines have been a Spanish and American colony retaining many influences from those
periods. It gained independence from the United States in 1946. From 1972 until 1986,
President Marcos ruled the Philippines under a regime of martial law.120 He was toppled in the
People Power Uprising (also known as EDSA I), a concept which still has an important meaning
in the Philippines today and for civil society in particular. Cory Aquino gained power in 1986
immediately issuing a new Constitution along with various other reforms. The military,
however, still challenged Aquino in five coup attempts (Estifania Co & Neama, 2007:179).121
119
In addition to these interviews with NGOs, we also spoke with the Dutch embassy to discuss their activities in
relation to the Philippine NGO sector, as well as with sociology Professor Randy David and founder of the Institute
for Popular Democracy Ed de la Torre as analysts of the current political context. I would like to thank Arsenio
García for his tireless and engaged work on this project as he prepared our visit and the interviews as well as
contributed to this chapter. His own experiences in the Philippine NGO sector proved invaluable throughout the
research. Non-ICCO organizations were chosen to complement the picture of the Philippine NGO sector. The
NGOs that we have spoken with do represent fairly the wide spectrum of the Philippine NGOs. However, due to
time constraints we were not able to achieve interviews with NGOs who are aligned with the extreme left. The
interviews were conducted from 21-27 March, 2010, Philippines. ICCO partners are indicated in bold.
120
Regarding the democratic qualities of the Marcos regime, Ed de la Torre reported Marcos to have said famously
“I already allowed you to vote; now you also want to be counted?”
121
The Mendiola massacre and the assassination of labor leaders (such as attorney Rolando Olalia) and other civil
society leaders (for example Lean Alejandro) in 1987 were the results of the military’s attempt to take back their
share of governance with the civil authorities.
63
Economic policy in this time was dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank favoring an export-oriented development policy and liberalization (Encarnacion
Tadem, 2009:6). Various analysts have commented on the Philippine’s strong commitment to
the neoliberal model (Quinsaat, 2009:68; Encarnacion Tadem, 2009:245; Petras and EastmanAbaya, 2006). Former general Fidel Ramos followed Aquino in 1992 and his regime is
characterized by broad-based coalition-building (Estifania Co & Neame, 2007:180). He was
succeeded in 1998 by former movie-star Joseph Estrada, characterized as a populist, who was
disposed in 2001 in a second People Power uprising (EDSA II) due to corruption scandals. It has
been criticized however, that the shift by the military leadership from one side to the other was
more decisive for the power change than the people’s outrage (ibid, 2007:183).
The Philippines currently have a population of 88.57 million inhabitants (FIAN, 2008).
Poverty is widespread and the distribution of income highly unequal, with fifteen percent of the
population living on less than US$1 a day (UNICEF Report in: OMCT, 2008:5). The Philippines
have a higher proportion of extreme poor than in China or Vietnam.122According to the World
Bank, the Philippines have the highest levels of income inequality in Asia (OMCT, 2008:7). The
Gini-index from the Human Development Report 2009 rates the Philippines at 44.0.123Some
analysts claimed that more than 50% of the private assets are controlled by only fifteen
extended families (Petras and Eastman-Abaya, 2006). Apart from the unequal distribution,
economic growth itself has been faltering. Bello et al point out that between 1990-2005,
economic growth in the Philippines has been the second lowest in Southeast Asia (2009:xvi). In
2005, yearly debt payments exceeded 30% of the governmental budget (Petras and EastmanAbaya, 2006), leading Bello et al to blame the debt as one of the main factors for the stagnating
economy (2009:xxvi). This explains that at this moment, one in ten Filipinos work abroad and
the money they send home constitutes more than 10% of the GDP.124
Gloria Arroyo (2001 – 2010) replaced Estrada in 2001 and has been widely criticized for
her lack of democratic practices. Her presidency has been criticized harshly by some of the
NGOs we interviewed. Corruption and a tendency to ignore the rule of law characterize her
term. She was accused of having rigged the 2004 elections, but an impeachment process failed
(Freedom House, 2009). Estifania Co & Neame observe that this has pushed many civil society
groups from engagement with the government to a more “resistance mode” (2007:183).
Arroyo has used her executive power to issue the controversial Executive Order 464, which
hampers the ability of Congress to oversee the administration by putting up hurdles for its
investigative committees.125 This Executive Order has for example blocked the inquiries about
the alleged rigging of the 2004 elections and the inquiry about the extraordinary number of
extrajudicial killings (Estifania Co & Neame, 2007:187). In February 2006 Arroyo announced a
brief period of “state of emergency” in order to prevent a perceived coup.
Senator René Saguisag expresses his concern for what this means for the current state
of Philippine democracy: “the House is gone. It’s totally under the Executive wings. The
Senate is struggling to check and to assert itself as an institution. Our democratic institutions
122
‘Banyan’ in: Economist 13-19 February 2010, p.60
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html. In comparison, the Netherlands rates 30.9, Indonesia 39.4
and Guatemala 53.7
124
‘Banyan’ in: Economist 13-19 February 2010, p.60
125
This Executive Order was withdrawn again in March 2008 (Freedom House 2009).
123
64
are at stake. EO 464, Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), CPR, Proclamation
1017 are all threatening the democratic institutions” (cited in: Estifania Co & Neame,
2007:189). Other analysts seem to confirm this assessment of the current state of Philippine
democracy. Freedom House has degraded its rating of the Philippine democracy because of the
prevalence of political violence before elections, reports of cheating and intimidation, electoral
fraud, a discredited electoral commission, and coup attempts (Freedom House 2009).
Hutchcroft qualifies the Philippine democracy as “increasingly dysfunctional” (2007:2).
Philippine politics has traditionally been described with reference to a patron-client model
(emphasizing the importance of personal relations), whereas since the fall of Marcos the socalled “elite democracy” has been the dominant analytical framework (claiming that the system
is essentially run by a few elite families) (Quimpo 2008:6). Analysts seem to agree that the
Philippines are a weak state, where elites use the state for their own interests (Miranda and
Rivera in: Quimpo, 2008:37, for similar assertions see also Lopez Wui, 2009:186).126 Quimpo
lists some of the qualifications that analysts have given Philippine democracy during the 90s,
such as “oligarchic democracy” and “low-intensity democracy” (2008:21), while Hutchcroft talks
about “elite dominance and institutional weakness” (2007:1).
The International Crisis Group has qualified the Philippines as the weakest state in the
region (in: Hutchcroft, 2007:15), with the Economist noting in February 2010 that as the state
receives less than 14% of its GDP in taxes, it is set up for being weak.127 Estifania Co & Neame
paint a bleak picture of the Philippine judicial system, with low public confidence in the police, a
very slow pace of judicial proceedings and a climate of impunity (2007:194-195). Similarly,
Freedom House reports of a backlog of more than 800,000 cases in the court system, while
indicating that low pay encourages rampant corruption (2009). The military retains
considerable influence over political life, specifically in its efforts to destroy the communist
insurgency. Still, the military is under civilian control, leading Hutchcroft to characterize the
problem with the military influence as more an issue of “military adventurism rather than
military dominance” (2007:20). Corruption is widespread in the Philippines and is seen as one
of the characteristics of its weak state, due to the low conviction-rate of those accused of
corruption (Lopez Qui, 2009:186). A survey conducted by the Asian Development Bank in 2003
showed that the Philippines came second after Bangladesh as the most corrupt of 102 countries
(Lopez Wui, 2009:185). Transparency International now rates the Philippines at 139 of 180
countries (Corruption Perception Index, 2009).
An important threat to the democratic institutions is the disturbing number of killings of
journalists, combined with libel suits filed by officials who get exposed in the media file
(Hutchcroft 2007:9; ISIS International, 2007:11; Freedom House, 2009).128 32 reporters were
killed between 1991 and 2006; less than 10% of the cases leading to convictions. After Iraq,
the Philippines are the second-most dangerous country for journalists129, especially for those
126
This is echoed by other scholars who blame the elite families for weakening the state as they “privatiz[e] public
resources” (McCoy in: Quimpo 2008:38).
127‘Banyan’ in: Economist 13-19 February 2010, p.60
128
Hutchcroft writes that the media are largely in private ownership and otherwise unburdened by government
intervention (2007:8).
129
Reporters without Borders has declared the Philippines to be the most dangerous country for journalists after
Iraq (Hutchcroft 2007:8). Another source attributes this statement to the Committee to Protect Journalists,
65
reporting on corruption and with anti-government critique. During the brief 2006 state of
emergency, the offices of the Daily Tribune were occupied, while statements were issued that
“the press could only remain free if it acted ‘responsibly’”, which was interpreted as a “call for
self-censorship” (Estifania Co & Neame, 2007:187). Further, the spouse of Arroyo has filed libel
cases against 43 journalists, which constitutes a criminal charge (ibid, 2007:188). The media
and access to information in general are fundamental for democracy and the effective use of
operational space for NGOs. Many NGOs need information to control the government in its
policies of agrarian reform and mining, as well as to hold it accountable for corruption and
human rights abuses.130 In this light, it is important to note that a proposed Freedom of
Information Act is still stalling in Congress (Estifania Co & Neame, 2007:188).131
Two armed conflicts challenge the Philippine government: the communist insurgency
and the Muslim independence claims in Mindanao. The Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) was founded on December 26, 1968. The CPP has an armed group, the New People’s
Army (NPA) and a civil society group, the National Democratic Front (NDF) and claims to
“[a]dvance and complete the national-democratic revolution and pursue the socialist
revolution.”132 After 1986 there has been a split between a “reaffirmist” (currently in control of
the CPP) and “rejectionist” bloc (dispersed over various civil society groups). This split was
characterized among other things by disagreement about the continued primacy of the armed
struggle (Encarnacion Tadem, 2009:7/225). The Anti-subversion Law, that had criminalized
being a member of a communist organization, was repealed during the Ramos administration in
1992133 and on 6 September 2007, Gloria Arroyo signed the Amnesty Proclamation 1377
granting amnesty with respect to specific crimes for communist armed groups.134 At the same
time, the military is engaged in a fierce counterinsurgency battle against the communist rebels.
Currently, there are about 7,160 fighters and a communist presence throughout the entire
Philippines. Government officials consider the CPP/NPA/NDF the “most potent threat” to
national security (Alston, 2008:7).135
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20091126-238554/Maguindanao-massacre-worst-everfor-journalists
130
The Anti-Mining Coalition ATM complained about the lack of transparency in this respect for example with
regards to mining applications by corporations. In order to find this information, they were being sent around or
simply did not receive an answer. In the end, they had to photocopy the documents themselves. Interview with
author, 26 March 2010, Manila
131
In this regard, it should be noted that English is still used for much public debate and also for example in the
entire legal system. Given that a big part of the population does not speak English, this doesn’t contribute to
broad inclusion into democratic institutions.
132
Website National Democratic Front of the Philippines, available at [accessed 22 June 2010]:
http://ndfp.net/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=33
133
Rene V. Sarmiento (2005), ‘Facilitating dialogue with armed insurgents in the Philippines’ at conciliation
resources, athttp://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/engaging-groups/facilitating-dialogue-philippines.phpv
[accessed 1 June 2010]
134
Dalangin-Fernandez, Lira. 2007. ‘Arroyo signs amnesty proclamation for communists’ in: Inquirer.Net, 9 July
2007, available at [accessed 22 June 2010]: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/2007090787233/%28UPDATE%29_Arroyo_signs_amnesty_proclamation_for_communists
135
It should be noted that whereas the NPA is the strongest, there are other left armed groups active, such as the
MLPP/RHB (Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines/Revolutionary People’s Army) and the RPM-P/RPA-ABB
(Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines / Revolutionary Proletarian Army / Alex Boncayao Brigade).
66
Continued marginalization of Muslims in Mindanao under Spanish colonial rule and later
under US domination, have led Mindanao Muslims to demand self-determination. High levels
of poverty in Mindanao and the richness of natural resources are other factors in the conflict
(OMCT, 2008:13-14). Between 1972 and 1976 there was a full blown war between the
government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).136 In 1978, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) split from the MNLF and is currently the biggest secessionist group in
Mindanao (Hutchcroft, 2007:14). In 1996, the government reached a peace agreement with
the MNLF, however, fighting by the MILF continued. In 2008, peace negotiations between the
Arroyo government and the MILF broke down, leading to the worst violence since 2003,
displacing 600,000 people from their homes (Freedom House, 2009). The MILF currently has
about 11,770 fighters (Alston, 2008:7). Earlier agreements have established the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), but one of the topics of the 2008 negotiations was a
possible expansion of this territory. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is another important group,
which has allegedly been responsible for various bombings resulting in many civilian casualties
(HRW, 2007).137 Until 2003, there appeared to have been links between MILF and the radical
Islamic organization Jemaah Islamiyah. Since then, the MILF has denounced violence against
civilians and specifically attacks by the ASG and the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), another
violent Islamist group. The government, however, still holds that there are links between
elements of the MILF and JI/ASG/RSM (HRW, 2007:24-25). The Arroyo administration
developed strong ties with the US government and adopted the ‘War on Terror’ discourse. This
led to an increase of US military assistance and in early 2003 then-Assistant Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz called the Philippines the “second front in the War on Terror” (Petras
and Eastman-Abaya, 2006). Assistance from the United States has helped the Philippines to
capture or kill several ASG and RSM top leaders (HRW, 2007:24-25). It is suggested that the US
government is also assisting in the struggle against the NPA (Petras and Eastman-Abaya, 2006).
It is clear that the Philippine political context is challenged on many fronts at this
moment. Generally, however, NGOs are not in any way disturbed by the state and can operate
freely, maybe even due to state weakness. Because of the above-mentioned challenges, it is,
however, difficult to be effective in their claim-making, and this was reflected in our interviews.
In addition, because of the lack of a strong state, non-state actors can pose restrictions on
NGOs. In the next section we will discuss the specific characteristics of the Philippine civil
society and its NGOs.
Civil society and NGOs
Filipino civil society is known for being one of the most vibrant in the world. Recently, the
Securities and Exchange Commission reported 80,000 non-profit organizations in its registry
(CODE-NGO, 2007:21). Karina David (in: Soledad, no year) cites estimates of more than a
136
In 1976 the Tripoli Agreement was signed by the MNLF and Marcos, ending the war in exchange for autonomy of
13 provinces, however, disagreement about the implementation led to a continuation of the war (Panagtigum,
2008:2/8).
137
Between 2000 and 2007 there have been more than 1,700 casualties in bombings by violent Islamist groups
(HRW, 2007:24-25).
67
hundred thousand, including the not-registered NGOs.138 There is a saying that for every ten
Filipinos, there are eleven organizations. It is estimated that the total income of the NGO
sector is 12.3 billion Pounds, with 38 per cent of that coming from foreign foundations, and
bilateral and multilateral institutions (CODE-NGO, 2008:20). Ed de la Torre, however, points to
the downside of the thriving NGO sector, as people tend to rely on foreign funds and the
attitude of NGOs is that “the government is lousy, so we will do it with foreign funds.”139 He
therefore argues that civil society has expanded at the cost of the meaning of citizenship.
People now just expect NGOs to do things, instead of learning what it means to be citizens and
demand action from the government.
Before the regime of President Marcos, only traditional professional service delivery
NGOs were present, such as organizations providing occasional basic services to the poor like
educational scholarships, medical missions, and soup kitchens. These services were provided
by church related organizations, and secular non-profit organizations like the Rotary Club,
Kiwanis and the Lions’ Club. During martial law, even these secular organizations somewhat
withdrew from public life. There were underground organizations which fought against the
regime, but on the above-ground level, there were only the church-backed institutions that
were able to operate, although with much control and repression. The church traditionally has
had a lot of influence in the Philippines and still retains much of this influence today (Estifania
Co & Neame, 2007:191), not surprising maybe as 85% of the people in the Philippines is
identified as Roman Catholic (Hutchcroft, 2007:14).
Many of today’s civil society formations have their origins in the period of martial law
resistance (Estifania Co & Neame, 2007:178). The period following the assassination of Ninoy
Aquino (1983) saw a resurgence of civil society activity. Resistance by NGOs to the Marcos
regime gave the term “NGO” widespread legitimacy in the Philippines (CODE-NGO, 2007:33).
Since 1986, the Philippine NGO sector has received a legitimate place in the structure of
Philippine politics. In the Constitution, the local government code and various other legislative
acts, NGOs are specifically mentioned to give them an official role in the process of decisionmaking regarding issues at the local level, such as: “The State shall encourage nongovernmental, community-based, or sectorial organizations that promote the welfare of the
nation” (Section 23, Article II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies). Consequently, this
commitment to NGO participation was institutionalized in the Local Government Code, which
was passed in 1991, and provided for an “accreditation” process enabling NGOs to take a seat
in advisory local development councils.140The Local Government Code of 1991 has been
credited with opening up space for civil society engagement with many local governments and
giving credibility or influence to various NGOs and people’s organizations (Estifania Co &
Neame, 2007:180/192).
138
Estimates reported in an assessment of the non-profit sector range between 249,000 -490,000 organizations,
including non-stock non-profit corporations, cooperatives, NGOs, accredited people’s organizations and other
people’s organizations (Code-NGO, 2008:17).
139
Interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
140
Title 6 of the Code, Section 108, states: “Representation of Non-Governmental Organizations. - Within a period
of sixty (60) days from the start of organization of local development councils, the nongovernmental organizations
shall choose from among themselves their representatives to said councils. The local sanggunian concerned shall
accredit nongovernmental organizations subject to such criteria as may be provided by law.”
68
After the Marcos regime was ousted, many new NGOs emerged, such as peasant groups
claiming ownership to lands, indigenous communities claiming their ancestral land ownership,
NGOs pursuing a gender agenda, and NGOs concentrating their advocacy on ecological issues.
In addition, the cooperative sector also grew tremendously during this period, along with many
micro-finance institutions and NGOs assisting communities and target groups with socioeconomic projects and training on entrepreneurship. The mushrooming of NGOs after 1986
had a negative side effect as politicians, entrepreneurs, and even government units set up
NGOs to attract funding (CODE-NGO, 2007:36). Initially, many NGOs cooperated with the new
government, but Estifania Co & Neame note, that the compromises Aquino made in the early
years of her term on the issues of agrarian reform and international debt, made her lose much
civil society support, which closed off opportunities for engagement (2007:179).
Most of the new NGOs were involved in service delivery, as people had the perception
that politically everything was in order and this was the time to help the new government in
delivering basic services. Also the international perception was that the Philippines already had
an organized citizenry and needed more assistance in basic services. This led many
international aid organizations to divert their funds to socio-economic programs, rather than to
political organizing and claim-making as they used to provide funding for. Political advocacy
was no longer viewed as needed, now that the Philippines were a “democracy” (Encarnacion
Tadem, 2009:226). In our interviews, NGOs reported that since 1986, funding for Philippine
NGOs has steadily declined and across the board, NGOs reported their struggle to find funding.
NGO staff also reported a current tendency of international NGOs to set up their own projects
and recruit people from local NGOs, thus creating a competition with local NGOs.141
Professional NGOs in the Philippines generally work in support of what we have called
“grassroots NGOs” and what in the Philippines is called “people’s organizations.” These are
membership organizations usually rooted in local communities in rural areas, where important
key leaders mobilize the community members. Various professional NGOs emphasized the
importance of mobilized and committed communities in the process of claim-making, for
example regarding natural resources. All NGOs working in that sector reported a lack of
funding for “community organizing.” The secretary general of Pakisama even commented that
“only ICCO has maintained support for organizing work for the implementation of agrarian
reform in the country.”142
It is suggested, that during martial law about eighty percent of the social movements
were dominated by the CPP/NPA/NDF (Encarnacion Tadem, 2009:223). This changed
dramatically after the turn to democracy in 1986. Still, a small but significant part of the NGOs
continues to link their work to a political agenda. Three ideological blocs that are still
recognizable today can be identified. The first bloc is aligned with the Reaffirmist National
Democratic Movement which has links with the CPP/NPA/NDF. A second bloc is aligned with
the Rejectionist National Democratic Movement. A third bloc works together around the multiideological center Akbayan or the Citizens’ Action Party. This bloc is composed of the rest of
the rejectionists, the independent socialists, and the progressive wing of the social democrats.
The military suspects many of these ideologically oriented NGOs to be front organizations for
141
142
Interview with PhilNET, 22 March 2010, Manila
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
69
armed groups, most notably, the Communist Party (CPP) and its armed wing, the NPA. CODENGO is a network of NGOs, the majority from the non-ideological side. Among the ICCOsupported NGOs, the majority is involved in service-delivery without any ideological affiliations.
The majority of the NGOs involved in land and other resource reform supported by ICCO belong
to the more ideological section of the NGOs, but not one is aligned with the bloc connected
with the CPP/NPA/NDF.
The Philippine NGO sector thus is very active and has a long tradition. They are a
legitimate player in the political arena and have received plenty of formal possibilities for
exerting their influence. As such, the operational space generally is specifically facilitated, not
restricted. As we will see in the next sections, due to the deficiencies in the democratic
practices and the weakness of the state, in practice, various NGOs find it hard to turn the
available opportunities into effective advocacy; especially where their claims would affect the
interests of the established elites, such as is the case in the field of agrarian reform. In addition,
the armed conflicts and the military counterinsurgency create problems for those NGOs that
operate in affected areas or are perceived to be associated with one of the armed actors.
Restrictive policies and actions
After having described the general political context in the Philippines and the history and
characteristics of the civil society sector and the NGOs, in this section we turn to those policies
and actions that influence the operational space, which NGOs need to manoeuvre. We discuss
(1) repression and intimidation; (2) criminalization; (3) administrative measures; (4)
stigmatization; (5) spaces of dialogue. Three sectors in particular suffer from policies and
actions that restrict their operational space. Firstly, NGOs that are suspected of affiliation with
the communist rebels; secondly, NGOs dedicated to agrarian reform and other resource
struggles; thirdly, NGOs operating in isolated areas afflicted by armed rebellion. The
interaction between restrictive actions and policies in these areas will be further explored in the
next section “On-the-job trouble.”
Repression and intimidation
The most visible and shocking restriction on the operational space of NGOs is the frequent
killing of activists, community leaders and NGO representatives.143 The political killings were so
widespread, that UN Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings Philip Alston devoted his 2008 report
to the Philippines, analysing the nature of these killings and the governmental possibilities for
an adequate response. Apart from these killings, NGOs can also face (death) threats,
intimidating surveillance, and occasional physical harassment. There is no consensus about the
exact number of killings and disappearances, but Estifania Co & Neame note that “the trends
are acknowledged by all, including the administration itself” (2007:184). Dependent on who
does the counting, numbers of killings vary between 116 and 885 between 2001 and 2008
(Alston, 2008:8).144 Even though the number of killings is staggering, the operational space of
143
The UN Rapporteur concludes that the killings of leftist activists and journalists constitute distinct phenomena
(Alston, 2008:29).
144
Estifania Co & Neame provide the following numbers of attacks on activists, church workers, journalists, and
lawyers, given by former Senator Wigberto Tanada in 2006: 752 killed and more than 155 missing (2007:184).
Hutchcroft comments that the “alarming development in recent years has been the killing of hundreds of leftists,
70
most Philippine NGOs is not affected at all by this violence. As will be discussed more in-depth
in the paragraph “On-the-job trouble,” the NGOs affected by this violence are concentrated in
the three areas that are identified as problematic.
During martial law, violence was prevalent. Estifania Co & Neame hold that more
people were tortured, killed, or disappeared than during the regime of Pinochet (2007:178). In
general, vigilantism is a persistent feature of Philippine society.145 During the Arroyo regime,
killings returned at such a large scale that it has led to international inquiries. Most of the
victims of these killings belong to the extreme left and are aligned with the CPP/NPA. Unlike
during martial law, now the perpetrators of the killings are generally unknown actors. The
government supports that definition of the violence, which enables the government to step in
as the protector and restorer of order.146 Several reports suggest, however, strong involvement
of the military in the killings (see for example Alston, 2008 and the findings of the Melo
Commission, 2006). The New People’s Army is also held responsible for killings. Family
members and colleagues of victims of extra-judicial killings are often threatened as well.
Threats are usually sent by SMS, or by an envelope with bullets. Activists are told to stop their
activities, with the warning of a death threat. There is a general state of impunity regarding the
political killings.147 Indeed, the military dismisses any implication and argues that the deaths
are the result of internal purges (Alston, 2008:2). Similarly, Estifania Co & Neame emphasize
the absence of convictions in the cases of extrajudicial killings (2007:184, see also Amnesty
International, 2008b).148
The AHRC reports a sharp drop in 2008 in the number of extrajudicial killings of (mostly
left-leaning) activists and enforced disappearances “following a concerted campaign by local
and international NGOs and other actors at the international level.”149 What has been done to
counter the extra-judicial killings? In 2006, the president installed the Melo Commission
(Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings) to investigate the issue. The UN
activists, and church personnel” (2007:10). The AHRC mentions a number of 800 killings between 2001 and 2008
(AHRC, 2008:2), while reporting that 139 cases of extra-judicial cases between 2003 and 2008 have been
documented and reported to the UN. Ed de la Torre in our interview with him, reported that criticism exists
regarding the counting of killings and human rights violations by human rights organizations on the left. According
to him, the tendency to report only victims who are on the left, leads people to ask: what is your conception of
human rights if you only count as victims, those that are on your political side?
145
Davao City is a particularly well known and extreme site of permitted vigilantism, where the mayor is willing to
turn a blind eye to the outright killing of street children and petty criminals to ensure a reduction of crime
(Estifania Co & Neame, 2007:194 & HRW, 2009).
146
This was pointed out in an interview with Ed de la Torre and author, 22 March 2010, Manila
147
The AHRC reports that in 2008 not a single perpetrator of vigilante killings was charged and prosecuted.
Families don’t receive any remedies. There are no effective laws for prosecution, as there is no good witness
protection program, no clear policies defining command responsibility, and no clear laws criminalizing enforced
disappearances and torture (2008).
148
In torture cases, the burden of proof lies by the victim, making these actions almost always go with impunity
(Hutchcroft, 2007:12). There is a “writ of amparo” which has not led to effective implementation. The problem
with this writ of amparo is that the courts have rejected several petitions by activists on the grounds that the
activists have failed to provide the necessary evidence, thus placing the burden of proof on the activists (AHRC,
2008).
149
In addition, The AHRC reports of a successful case of “concerted efforts on the part of civil society” where five
persons were released after two years in jail as they were charged for rebel activities (the “Tagaytay Five”).
71
Rapporteur on extra-judicial killings wrote a report with recommendations and also the UN
Universal Periodic Review of the Philippines in 2008 led to recommendations. These various
recommendations have led the Supreme Court to appoint 99 special courts to deal with the
cases of extra-judicial killings. However, no cases have been filed, so nothing has happened.
Despite all the evidence pointing to the military as complicit in the extrajudicial killings, no
member of the military has been convicted since Arroyo took office (Freedom House, 2009).
Earlier international pressure led to a shift from extra-judicial killings to disappearances.
Currently, those forced disappearances often turn out to be detentions by the police, thus
turning the problem from direct physical repression to criminalization. The detention practices
by the police often include incommunicado-detention and the lack of an arrest warrant. The
detained is then held on charges that preclude bail. The AHRC claims that it is clear that these
detentions are a means by the government to fight its political opponents. They fear a
resumption of the killings. In addition, there are allegations of maltreatment and torture. 150
The impact of these killings on the affected parties clearly goes beyond the specific
deaths. Estifania Co & Neame emphasize that the killings are just one aspect and that the
general climate “in which administration critics operate has moved from mere hostility to one
of outright intimidation” (2007:185).
Threats in the Philippines
Various NGOs reported that they have been followed by men on motorcycles
without number plates. These men will come to an office or house and ask around
for a specific individual, usually the leader of an organization. Activists also tend to
get text messages with warnings such as “be careful.” The frequency of these
messages varies from a daily warning to just once a year. NGO representatives
reported that at first they may be afraid as a consequence of these messages, but
as one staff member reported, in some instances people get so used to it, that they
actually respond to the texts, saying for example: “o yeah, where am I?” These
threats are sometimes but not always reported to the police as NGO
representatives claimed that the police generally do not act against these threats
(see also AHRC 2008). One instance in which the police did an investigation was
because the NGO had contacts within the police and also put pressure on the
mayor. Threats are most common for the leaders of people’s organizations
(grassroots NGOs). For example, leaders involved in campaigns anti-mining are
said “to eat threats for breakfast.” The actor behind the threat is generally
unknown, but NGOs reported suspicions of private security personnel of
landowners and corporations, as well as the military or armed groups such as the
MILF and the NPA. As the spokesperson of ATM put it, death threats are a general
commodity, also communities may threaten security guards.
150
This was for example mentioned in our interview with human rights organization PAHRA, 27 March 2010,
Manila
72
Criminalization
In the previous section, we saw that a decrease in political killings may have induced a switch to
prolonged detentions. Criminalization as a restriction on NGO activity is not widespread. Local
communities who are involved in a struggle relating to land or natural resources have faced
criminal charges (mainly trespass and qualified theft), and those organizations that are
suspected to be front organizations for the armed struggle. These specific problems will be
discussed below in the section on “on the job trouble.” Above we already mentioned the
particularly problem of libel suits against journalists (Hutchcroft, 2007). Finally, there has been
unease about the potential for abuse of the new anti-terrorism law against civil society
activists. Human rights organizations have reported their concern regarding the Human
Security Act (Republic Act 9372) that took effect on July 15, 2007. The Act is also known as the
Anti-Terrorism Law and is criticized because of the broad definition of terrorism.151 The UN
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism has criticized the law for not being “in accordance with
international human rights standards” (AHRC, 2008:16). The law is said to violate due process
because of warrantless arrests and prolonged detention without charges.152 In addition, the
anti-terrorism council is argued to have too much power as the sole determiners of who is a
terrorist.153
None of our interviewees reported to have experienced any negative consequences
because of this law. Still, some incidents do indicate the potential restrictive effect. As a
consequence of the Human Security Act, NGOs that were considered by the government and
the military to be linked to the extreme left (CPP/NPA/NDF) or the Muslim armed groups (MILF,
MNLF or Abu Sayyaf) were immediately included in the list of terrorist organizations and closely
monitored, while the Philippine government made use of the generalized War on Terror
discourse to justify specific practices in its fight against these armed groups (Karapatan,
2008:25). ICCO partner Isis International reported a case in 2007, where award-winning
Filipino novelist Ninotchka Rosca was included in a terrorism watch list as a consequence of the
Human Security Act. She reportedly suspects that her detention is related to her research
about the killings and disappearances of Filipino women.154 The AHRC claims that at least in
one instance, a terrorism-charge against a labor activist had the effect of legitimating his
subsequent disappearance (AHRC, 2008:17).
Restrictive administrative measures
Hutchcroft is clear in his positive assessment regarding the NGO legislation creating the legal
environment for the Philippine NGO sector: “The state does not subject NGOs and other civic
organizations to onerous registration requirements, nor does it harass donors and funders of
these organizations” (2007:8). NGOs can register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
which is an easy and non-controversial procedure. NGOs can also operate without registration.
151
Freedom House reports that critics have argued that the act’s broad definition of terrorism would allow the
president to use it against her political adversaries (Freedom House 2009).
152
The law “gives security forces the authority to detain suspects without a warrant or charges for up to three days
and sets penalties of up to 40 years in prison for terrorism offenses” (Freedom House 2009).
153
Isis International 2007, #2, p.9
154
“When Security is the Threat,” Isis International 2007, #2, p.4
73
Many NGOs make use of the various arrangements in Philippine law (such as the Local
Government Code 1991) that enable NGOs to gain accreditation with various governmental
bodies.155 NGOs have to apply for a non-profit status for the purpose of tax exemption.156 The
Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) is authorized by the government Department of
Finance and tasked to certify non-profit status to NGOs, and assist them in institutionalizing
professionalism within the sector.157
Restriction of public activities and demonstrations
Permits are required for rallies, and Freedom House comments that most anti-government
rallies are dispersed (Freedom House, 2009). CIVICUS, for example, reported a rally on 28 April
2009, where protestors against the arrival of President Arroyo in Tacloban City, were met by
Philippine's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) police force. CIVICUS also reported that on 22
May 2009, “the Philippine National Police ended the 40 day long protest by farmers and
demonstrators from Kilusang Magbukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), a movement of landless peasants,
small farmers, and farm workers, that were camping out at the south gate of the Philippine
House of Representatives to press for the passage of the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill (GARB)”
(CIVICUS, 2009). Another incident mentions the violent dispersal of a rally outside the US
Embassy, organized by Gabriela, a women’s rights organization (CIVICUS, 2009). In this regard,
it should be noted that both KMP and Gabriela are perceived to be associated with the CPP.158
This will be further discussed below, when we analyze the negative effects for civil society of
the counterinsurgency of the government against the Communist rebels. None of our
interviewees commented on experiencing problems with respect to public demonstrations.
A controversial law was the implementation of the “pre-emptive calibrated response” to
guide police forces in their regulation of rallies and demonstrations, which was later ruled
against by the Supreme Court (Estifania Co & Neame 2007:187). The law created concern
among the public and among members of NGOs as they feared that less people would be
willing to join rallies and demonstrations.
155
NGOs can seek accreditation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), local government units, but
also the Department of Labor and Employment (if the organization is a trade union), the Cooperative Development
Authority, (if the NGO is a cooperative), the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor, (if the NGO is an urban
poor organization), and the Housing and Land and Urban Regulatory Bureau (if the organization is a homeowners’
association).
156
For more information regarding tax exemption, see http://www.wango.org/congress/about.aspx accessed 2
August 2010
157
Arsenio García told that during the 1990s, in order to increase state finances, the Department of Finance
discussed the possible imposition of some restrictions on the NGO community, especially on its non-profit status,
as well as regarding receiving (foreign) funding. But the NGO community mounted a unified objection to it, and
successfully argued for the creation of a self-regulating mechanism, which resulted in the creation of the PCNC.
158
This allegation is for example the subject of contention as reported in this newspaper article. ‘Gabriela hits
forum by 73rd IB in school’ in: Sunstar Daily Newspaper, Davao, Feb. 26, 2008.
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/dav/2008/02/26/news/gabriela.hits.forum.by.73rd.ib.in.school.html [accessed
2 August 2010]. Bello et al provide an overview of the groups working for agrarian reform and their general stance
vis-à-vis the government, ranging from outright opposition (for example KMP), critical engagement (for example
Pakisama), critical collaboration (ICCO-partners PARRDS, UNORKA, Peace, and PhilNET), and outright support
(2009:78).
74
Stigmatization
As has been discussed before in the section on the Philippine NGO sector, NGOs flourish in the
Philippines and are looked upon favourably as a sector. The government welcomes foreign aid
organizations and provides ample room for the founding and operation of NGOs, indeed legally
recognizing the importance of NGO participation in its governance structures. Specific stigmas,
however, play an important role in limiting the operational space of some NGOs. Some NGOs
are accused of sympathizing with communism and working with the extreme left experience
restrictions on their space. Other NGOs are accused of support for terrorist or separatist
groups in Mindanao. These accusations come from the military and also from landowners and
corporations. The military engages in stigmatization and simultaneous intimidation through
their community “dialogues” in both remote areas and in various urban poor areas in the
country. This was part of the military’s counter-insurgency strategy called “Oplan Bantay Laya”
(Karapatan, 2008:25). During these community meetings, the military uses a PowerPoint
presentation where they identify organizations and NGOs whom they regard as “enemies of the
state” (Alston, 2008:9-10). Almost all sectorial organizations identified with the extreme left
were mentioned in this list, as well as some NGOs aligned with them. But the military also
identified as “enemies of the state” some organizations like party-list Akbayan and some NGOs
not belonging to the extreme left, such as the Labor Education and Research Network (LEARN),
an NGO providing labor education and training and working closely with Akbayan; and the
Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL), one of the ten labor centers in the country, which also
works closely with Akbayan.159 Some ICCO partners suspected that they were also included in
the military’s list (for example BalaodMindanao), especially those working in agrarian reform
and land distribution.
Landowners and corporations have also labeled NGOs as communist, thus discrediting
them in the eyes of the communities with which they work. Almost all ICCO-partners involved
in agrarian reform experienced this stigmatization, such as BalaodMindanao, Task Force
Mapalad (TFM), CARET, PhilNet and its local members, as well as UNORKA and its local
members. An organization fighting against aerial spray (Mamamayang ayaw sa Aerial Spray or
MAAS), and the staff of the NGO working closely with them, Interface Development Initiatives
(IDIS), were denounced as communists. Initially, this was also encountered by TRICOM working
in the Caraga region in Mindanao.160
The stigma of being a ‘western’ organization and promoting a western lifestyle is only
used against NGOs working on gender issues, especially those advocating for the rights of
women on fertility management and reproductive health.161 This label is only used by groups
belonging to the Catholic Church, mainly against NGOs who get foreign funding.162 The strong
159
Information from Arsenio García
Interviews with author, 21-27 March 2010, Philippines. TRICOM is an organization working for the rights of the
so-called “tri”-people: the indigenous people, Christian people, and Muslims in Mindanao
161
This was also mentioned in our interview with ISIS International, an international women’s organization.
Because of their international character they were not affected by this stigma, but they reported the use of the
label regarding local women’s groups.
162
For an example of such accusations, see the article on the Philippine Legislators Committee on Population and
Development Foundation, Inc. (PLCPD): ‘PLCPD Cries Foul Over ‘Malicious Attacks’ Vs Repro Health Bill’ in Pinoy
Press1 October 2008,
160
75
Catholic Church restricts the space of local organizations of Philippine women or LGBT
organizations.163 An example of a restriction can be seen when an LGBT group wanted to set up
a party-list for the elections and the election committee COMELEC prohibited this. Now, the
Supreme Court has ruled this prohibition unconstitutional because morality can be no reason
for excluding the party from participation and in May 2010, the LGBT community participated in
the elections with a party-list.164 In general, however, NGOs are perceived very positively in the
Philippines. In some specific areas, stigmatization is a real issue.
Existing spaces of dialogue under pressure
There are many and varying degrees of contact and cooperation between the Philippine
government and NGOs. Encarnacion Tadem for example describes how social movements have
been successful at times to create linkages with agencies and parts of the government. This is
partly explained by the common practice of individuals who switch between positions in the
government and social movements (2009:242).165 Government agencies often work in
collaboration with NGOs on projects and as discussed above, it is a common practice that local
government units have NGO leaders on consultative boards.166 For example, the representative
of IDIS in Davao City reported that she was recently appointed on the Watershed Management
Council to oversee the implementation of the Watershed Code, for which their NGO had
advocated.167 Indeed, ATM said that it is the tradition for the government to consult NGOs as
they know that there is the expertise.168 NGOs often take the lead in creating spaces for
dialogue with the government, by organizing conferences for the revision of policies. This
happened in preparation for the conference on climate change in Copenhagen. NGOs
organized a working group; they studied the draft text and gave it to the government. The
government adopted 80% of the draft text.169
As discussed in the earlier section on the Philippine NGO sector, the legal environment
provides all incentives for a productive collaboration between civil society and the government.
http://www.pinoypress.net/2008/10/01/plcpd-cries-foul-over-malicious-attacks-vs-repro-health-bill/ [accessed 2
August 2010]
163
Women’s groups like Gabriela, Sarilaya, APL-women, and NGOs like LEARN (for its gender program),
WomanHealth, Likhaan, and some other NGOs on gender have experienced being accused of being ‘western’ by
religious groups who consider themselves pro-life. For more information on the women’s movement in the
Philippines, see for example Santos-Maranan et al or http://library.fes.de/fulltext/iez/01109005.htm [accessed 2
August 2010]
164
‘Gay partylist group can join May polls – SC’ at Inquirer.Net 8 April 2010, available at [accessed 25 June 2010]
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20100408-263061/SC-backs-gay-partylist-group-in-Maypollsreport
165
After 1986, members of anti-dictatorship movements gained positions in the government (Encarnacion Tadem,
2009:231).
166
Not all NGOs, however, have sought cooperation with the government. Specifically NGOs affiliated with the
extreme left have rejected these opportunities. Ed de la Torre criticizes the confrontational and non-constructive
stance that some NGOs tend to take. He calls those NGOs ‘anti-governmental organizations’ (AGOs). Whereas an
NGO wants the government to improve and fulfill certain demands, an AGO keeps escalating the demands to show
that the government is bad and should be replaced.
167
Interview with author, 24 March 2010, Davao City
168
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
169
Interview with ATM, 26 March 2010, Manila
76
NGOs unanimously reported that the legislation in place provides a very good environment for
development and the NGO sector. It is, however, the implementation of the legislation which is
reported to be problematic. NGOs in the Philippines are often invited in spaces and allowed to
talking in several platforms. The general experience with governmental cooperation is not
necessarily bad, but NGO representatives have shared with us various experiences in which the
existing spaces of dialogue proved dissatisfying. Many recognized instances of co-optation170
(some even wondering whether some of their personal past experiences could be qualified as
co-optation in hindsight), reported that their contributions were ignored, some NGOs
mentioned as a restriction that the government refuses to give access to public information, or
that there were cases of outright misinformation. Some NGOs that we interviewed for example
uttered their frustration that they are invited to give input, but subsequently ignored when it
comes to actually taking over their suggestions.
Conform the patron-client politics that were so common in the Philippine past, many
NGOs confirmed the notion that personal relations with government agents is more important
than what is written in the laws or contracts (“personalism” is for example mentioned by
Rocamora as a feature of Filipino political culture, in: Lopez Wui, 2009:186). For example
PhilNET lamented the fact that the effort, which they put into building good relations at the
local level, has to be started over again after three years when people are replaced after
elections.171 For example, one NGO reported that they had a Memorandum of Agreement with
the former police commander that they would assist with land reform and provide protection
for the community of ARBs. When the commander was replaced, the Memorandum of
Agreement became just a piece of paper and they had to start again building a good relation
with the new commander.172 This experience was recognized by many NGOs. ATM
commented that because of the importance of personal relations, the genuine space to operate
for NGOs may be greater at the local level, than at the national level.173
Ed Quitoriano criticizes the practice in which NGO leaders are asked to sit on the board
of governmental corporations. This in effect induces a habit of self-censorship of their entire
NGO. Estifania Co & Neame similarly are not certain whether the active engagement of civil
society with local governments because of the LGC 1991 is really giving them the opportunity to
enact changes or whether it should be seen as a form of “system maintenance” (2007:192).
Many NGOs have decided to make use of the opportunity offered, and many of our
interviewees reported their efforts to achieve this “accreditation” to obtain a seat as advisor in
one of the local boards on health or development. Estifania Co & Neame give a mixed
evaluation, where on the one hand successes are achieved, especially when the local governors
or mayors are perceived as “friendly.” On the other hand, they are sometimes forced to stay
170
Within the Philippine NGO community some NGOs accuse others of cooptation by the government. This is for
example the case with regards to environmentalist NGOs who cooperated with the government in an attempt to
insert sustainable development into its programs. These accusations divide the NGO community.
171
Interview with author on 22 March 2010, Manila
172
Interview with PARFUND, 25 March 2010, Davao City. These Memoranda of Agreement are a common form for
NGOs to secure police protection for ARB communities. As ARBs possess the legal titles for their land, the
additional Memorandum should not be necessary, but serve to emphasize the commitment of the police to
protect ARB communities.
173
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
77
quiet in the face of fiscal transgressions in order to get their way on their own programs
(2007:192). ATM mentioned a survey that showed that only in 25% of the local government
units NGO participation had actually been implemented.174 During the Aquino and Ramos
administration, former NGO leaders were in various positions at the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), thus facilitating close cooperation with NGOs working on that issue. UNORKA,
PEACE, PhilNet, and its member-organizations have been beneficiaries of programs and funding
from DAR intended for land transfers and support programs for agrarian reform beneficiaries.
These forms of cooperation blurred the lines between governmental work and nongovernmental work. Of course, it has been doubted whether NGOs involved in these types of
cooperation can maintain a healthy level of criticism of the government. It has also been
problematic for some of these NGOs to maintain their work once the governmental funds dried
up.
An example of a dysfunctional space is the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC),
set up by the Ramos administration, composed of representatives of the government’s national
agencies and sectoral representatives of the poor. The office is being headed by a cabinet rank
officer. NGOs across the entire spectrum except the extreme left participated in the
commission. The office still exists but not many NGOs dispute the fact that it hasn’t been
particularly successful in alleviating poverty. The competition over money and inclusion as a
sectoral representative dominate the proceedings of the commission, and as the president each
year nominates the council’s representative, the representatives tend to be less critical of the
government. The lack of effectiveness of this commission in actually being a meaningful venue
for anti-poverty measures converts it into what can be called a fake space. On top of this, the
space has now become legally restricted as organizations that want to participate now have to
register previously with the Office of the President. Women, indigenous peoples and a majority
of the famers have therefore decided to boycott the Commission.175 Some NGOs commented
that the nature of the relationship between government and NGOs had changed over the past
years as a consequence of the different distribution of official development aid (ODA). In the
90s, the government and NGOs had equal access to foreign funding thus creating an equal
relationship when they worked together on projects. Now, NGOs reported, the government
receives the majority of ODA-budgets, which brings NGOs in a subordinate position when they
work on joint projects. Their position as subcontractors diminishes their ability to have a role in
that space. Butch Olano of PARFUND argues that this subordination effectively transforms
NGOs into service providers for the government, because as soon as they become critical, they
will be subjected to audits and their funding will be retracted.176
In the Philippines, there exist many spaces for dialogue between the government, NGOs
and other actors. Despite this close interaction and the multiple possibilities for providing input
and advice, NGOs often are not satisfied with the net result of their cooperation. In this
section, we have identified some of the reasons why cooperation between the government and
NGOs does not yield the desired results: (1) the continuing importance of personal relations;
174
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
Interview with ATM, 26 March 2010, Manila
176
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
175
78
(2) the self-censoring effect of advisory positions; (3) the ease with which NGOs and their input
is ignored after legitimating consultations; (4) lack of access to information.
On the job trouble
In the previous section we have identified the different kinds of actions and policies that can be
witnessed in the Philippines to restrict the operational space of NGOs. In this section, we
assess how these actions and policies interact to limit the operational space of NGOs. Overall,
the operational space of NGOs in the Philippines can be characterized as free and broad. Most
NGOs do not suffer from the actions and policies outlined above. However, some qualifications
should be made. Generally, the space of urban NGOs tends to be much freer and open than
the space available to rural NGOs and community organizations. Further, professional NGOs
tend to have more operational space than grassroots organizations. In particular, three
different contexts can be identified in which NGOs experience limitations. (1) NGOs operating
at the extreme left: consequences of a counterinsurgency focus on civil society; (2) NGOs and
community organizers making claims about land and natural resources; (3) NGOs operating in
conflict areas and isolated places.
The majority of the NGOs can operate freely in the Philippines, especially the NGOs
operating in the delivery of basic services (such as educational scholarship, soup kitchens),
ecology issues that do not conflict with major business interests (waste management,
alternative sources of power), gender issues, housing for the homeless and the urban poor, and
labour unions. This is not to claim that they never face resistance to the issues that they bring
up. It means that their space to operate as such is not fundamentally contested or restricted.
Research institutes equally operate in a relatively free environment. However, NGOs that are
perceived to be linked with the extreme left experience limitations in their work, regardless the
kind of issues they are working with. Further, the work of NGOs in areas of agrarian reform and
environmental issues in opposition to companies (anti-mining, ancestral domain, anti-genetic
modification) can become very risky, depending on the tactics and strategies employed by the
NGOs. Finally, those organizations that are operating in areas of armed conflict, where state
power is contested, as well as isolated places far from effective state power and protection,
face problems with basic safety, especially if they are suspected to support rebel groups.
NGOs operating at the extreme left: consequences of a counterinsurgency focus on civil
society
In contrast to the cases of Honduras and Guatemala, the Philippines still is characterized by
continued armed communist rebellion. NGOs in the Philippines that are (perceived to be)
aligned with the ideological bloc on the extreme left suffer from severe restrictions on their
operations as the military perceives them to be front organizations for the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its armed group, the New People’s Army (NPA). A recent example is
the detention of 43 health workers in February 2010, who attended a training seminar
organized by an NGO, the Council for Health and Development (CHD) (the “Morong 43”). The
military claims that the workshop participants were rebels and being trained to make bombs.
Criticisms have been raised not only about the raid itself and the argument that the health
workers were from the NPA, but also about the violations of due process as the health workers
were not allowed to see anyone during the weekend after their arrest and later on health
79
workers claimed they had been maltreated.177 This incident is not an exception. The UN
Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions wrote in 2008 that the significant number of
extrajudicial executions of leftists activists were “the result of deliberate targeting by the
military as part of counterinsurgency operations against the communist rebels” (Freedom
House 2009). He further writes: “One important aspect of this counterinsurgency strategy
should be noted. Specific barangays [village or district, CT] are targeted because they have
active civil society organizations, not because such organizations are thought to be proxies for
NPA presence. [...] The civil society organizations are the targets, because the AFP178 considers
them the political infrastructure of the revolution and the NPA’s intelligence network.
Attacking them is designed to blind the NPA and undermine the CPP’s political progress”
(Alston, 2008:12).
Estifania Co & Neame suggest that Arroyo’s dependency on the military for her survival
has allowed the military to push for a military solution to the left-wing insurgency that is still
ongoing (2007:184). They describe this as a way to keep the military busy and prevent them
from mounting coups against Arroyo, provide them with a legitimate reason to scoop up more
financial resources, have them remove potential troublemakers, and distract the public from
underlying issues of political, social, and economic reform. In June 2006, the government
declared “all-out war” against the Communist rebels (Hutchcroft, 2007:10). The government
has labeled the CPP/NPA/NDF as the “Communist Terrorist Movement” thus turning from
negotiation to counterinsurgency as the legitimate response (Alston, 2008:7). Government
officials believe that the CPP controls various civil society groups for support and recruitment.
Alston writes that the CPP itself has publicly stated that its members who occupy positions of
leadership in civil society fall ultimately under the direction of the Central Committee of the
CPP. However, those organizations are not necessarily puppets of the CPP and many members
may be unaware of linkages to the CPP. Indeed, the actual influence of the CPP in those
organizations is unknown. While there thus may be some front organizations, this does not
justify the assertions of the military about the particular organizations that are identified as
such (Alston, 2008:8). Though many NGOs are not affected by these intimidating effects of the
military counterinsurgency, several of our interviewees have reported that they were also
branded as a front organization at some point.179 The military’s suspicions can affect NGOs
severely in their operations, also those NGOs that don’t have any links with the NPA or are even
disliked by the NPA because of their reform-oriented activities that may lessen the population’s
revolutionary potential. Whereas it is legal since 1992 to be a member of the CPP, it is still
publicly announced that supporting their work or candidates amounts to supporting the enemy
(Alston, 2008:9). This is not just rhetoric, but also expressed in actual measures, most notably
the “order of battle.” The order of battle consists of a list with names of suspected enemies.
The UN Rapporteur describes a copy of this document from 2006 which consists of “hundreds
of prominent civil society groups and individuals who have been classified, on the basis of
intelligence, as members of organizations which the military deems ‘illegitimate’” (2008:9).
177
Tan, Michael. 2010. ‘Raid!’ in: Philippine Daily Inquirer 9 February 2010, available at [accessed 17 June 2010]:
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20100209-252278/Raid
178
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
179
This generally affects those NGOs that are involved in agrarian reform, and will thus be discussed more
elaborately in the next section.
80
As already discussed in the paragraph on “repression and intimidation,” the war against
communist rebels has led to many killings of leftists activists during Arroyo’s presidency. The
Melo Commission has concluded that at least in some of these killings the military was involved
(Hutchcroft, 2007:11). The killings of leftist activists are thus the consequence of their branding
as supporters of armed rebels. Killings are generally preceded by threats and surveillance. The
Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) reports, that specific targets of threats are activists
investigating cases of disappearance and labor leaders, who are fighting for workers to obtain
adequate compensation and benefits (AHRC 2008:3). These threats are justified by the military
by claiming that the targets of threats are supporting communist insurgents. Families of these
activists also receive threats. These threats are often accompanied by overt surveillance by the
military. The AHRC claims that these threats and surveillance, which are usually followed by
killings or disappearances, have led to a curtailing of the discussion on human rights or labour
rights. The AHRC describes that persons working in favour of human rights are easily branded
as sympathizers or supporters of armed communist rebels, and thus constitute a legitimate
target for reprisals (2008:8). In one case, the military has offered reward money for the arrest
of a union leader (Dante Senillo) as they claim that he is a communist sympathizer. Also, some
persons labelled as supporters or sympathizers have been charged in court as a reprisal for
having investigated cases of disappearances. The AHRC claims that the fabrication of charges is
a common practice to keep activists in detention (2008:9).180 Similarly, Human Rights Watch
suggested the political nature of charges against a labour rights lawyer (HRW, 2008). These
allegations are supported by the UN Special Rapporteur, who concluded that “[t]he priorities of
the criminal justice system have also been distorted, and it has increasingly focused on
prosecuting civil society leaders rather than their killers” (Alston, 2008:2).
The space of NGOs who are associated with the extreme left is thus severely restricted
by the counterinsurgency efforts of the military. They can officially or unofficially be labelled as
‘communists’ and ‘enemies of the state’ and consequently face threats, surveillance, criminal
charges, disappearance, and killings. Some examples of NGOs, which are severely affected by
the military counterinsurgency effort, are Karapatan, a human rights organization, Gabriela, a
women’s organization, and KMP, an agrarian reform organization. Karapatan revealed that
during the Arroyo administration the human rights workers of Karapatan and allied
organizations have suffered the following: extra-judicial killing (34); enforced disappearance
(3); frustrated killing (6); torture (7); illegal arrests (18); illegal arrests and detention (16);
physical assault and injury (30); threat, intimidation (72) and harassment (68) (Karapatan,
2008:39). Gabriela and KMP experienced that their rallies were violently dispersed.181 ICCO
180
A case that has become well known in this regard is the “Tagaytay Five” where five activists were held for two
years on the suspicion that they were communist guerillas and wanted to overthrow the government. After two
years the Regional Trial Court ruled that there was a lack of substantive evidence (AHRC, 2008:10). Salaverria, Leila.
2008. ‘2 ‘Tagaytay 5’ members plan to sue cops for damages’ in: Philippine Daily Inquirer. 29 August 2008
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view/20080829-157510/2-Tagaytay-5-members-plan-to-suecops-for-damages
This has also been suggested in the Morong 43 case. Because the military are convinced that the suspects are NPA
operatives, one of the cases filed against the suspects was illegal possession of firearms, which the suspects argue
as planted evidence by the military itself to justify their illegal arrest.
181
See above in the section on administrative restrictions
81
does not fund NGOs that are closely linked to the extreme left; however, some ICCO-partners
that are involved in agrarian reform also face this suspicion of association with the extreme left.
This is discussed in the next section.
NGOs and community organizers making claims about land and natural resources
Private landowners as well as corporations hold large amounts of hectares for banana and
sugar plantations, and corporations increasingly apply for the exploration of mining areas. Land
is distributed highly unequally in the Philippines, and there is a long history of land grabbing,
where the elite usurps land from the poor people, either through coercion, or because of their
better knowledge of (and access to) the law (Hutchcroft, 2007:19-20). The new 1987
Constitution mandated that the State should install an agrarian reform program. 182 The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 instituted the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Project (CARP) which offered landless peasants the possibilities for land redistribution, as it
arranges the transfer of land to the landless farmers with compensation for the current
landowners. FIAN reports that of the 5.16 million hectares of land selected for reform by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), 3.96 million hectares have been distributed. Still around
1203 million hectares of mostly private agricultural land remain to be distributed (FIAN,
2008:13-14).183
As communities organize to assert their rights for land distribution, they face resistance
from various sides. Landowners generally oppose all redistribution programs. Also the
CPP/NPA/NDF views the current program as a “divide and rule scheme” to prevent the
“genuine land reform of the revolutionary movement” (Alston, 2008:15). ICCO-partner PhilNET
reported for example that the NPA told them to move out of a specific area as their work on
land reform was hampering “consolidating activities.”184 Local government officials often show
more interest in protecting the interests of powerful local elites than promoting controversial
land distribution (Alston, 2008:15). In addition, land rights of indigenous groups are not always
respected. Various ICCO-partners are involved in claims about land, agrarian reform, and
natural resources in general.185 These ICCO partners are among those most affected by
restrictions regarding their claim making. We also spoke with several non-ICCO partners
182
Section 4, article 13
Whether or not CARP has been a success as an instrument for land reform is discussed at length by Bello et al
(2009:33-90), as they question the acclaimed success rate of 72% land transfer, pointing out for example that the
award rate of 72% does not mean that beneficiaries have been able to actually possess the land (2009:80). As a
more meaningful measurement of the success of CARP, they claim that of those entitled to benefit from CARP only
35.4 percent are actual farmer beneficiaries (2009:81). OMCT points out that already in 1995, the Committee on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights perceived loopholes in the land reform program that hindered the proper
implementation of the law (2008:27).
184
Interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
185
ICCO-partner PhilNet is a consortium of local organizations that support agrarian reform. Balaod Mindanao is
an alternative law group providing legal assistance to communities that are in the process of claiming land.
Centrosaka Inc. is a research institute with a focus on issues of agrarian reform and advocacy. Taskforce Mapalad
(TFM) is a national federation of farmers and farm workers engaged in advocacy and organizing communities to
claim their rights to land. PARFUND provides funds to communities involved in agrarian reform. TRICOM is
involved, among other things, with the “ancestral domain” of indigenous peoples.
183
82
involved in claims about land and natural resources.186 Each of these organizations reported
one or more of the risks that are involved in this kind of work.
Terminology in the Agrarian Reform in the Philippines
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) regulated the agrarian
reform that the 1987 Constitution had stipulated. However, private agricultural lands, mostly
sugar and coconut plantations, were not immediately distributed (FIAN, 2008:13). Members of
communities identified as eligible for receiving lands are denominated Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries (ARB). Once DAR has acquired the lands, they can issue the Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA). If it’s an indigenous community, it is the Certificate Ancestral
Domain Title (CADTI), emanating from the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) enacted in
1997. In the Philippines, 15-20 % of the population is legally recognized as indigenous
(Hutchcroft, 2007:15). CARP was legislated to expire in June 2008. A fierce battle about a
possible continuation of the agrarian reform emerged, as more than a million of private pieces
of land would not be covered by the program (FIAN, 2008:16). Finally, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Project Extension with Reforms (CARPER) was signed, giving five more years
to execute the agrarian reform. Given the conflicting interests, it can be called remarkable that
the political elite has drafted laws that the NGOs that we interviewed have generally qualified
as ‘good’ for marginalized people. Ed de la Torre provides a cynical view upon this matter:
“Because they don’t intend to implement them…”
There are two ways of land distribution: the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme and the
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT). FIAN reports that the majority of the land transfers under
auspices of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) were performed under the VLTframework. They claim that this is problematic, as landowners can choose the beneficiaries of
the land transfer. Landowners have used this framework to transfer their lands to ‘dummies’
beneficiaries: their family-members for example who actually live in Metro Manila, as was the
case with the 212 hectares of land owned by Jose de Leon in the village of Tinang, Concepcion
Municipality, Tarlac Province. Thus, in reality there is no land transfer at all (FIAN, 2008:14).
This complaint was echoed by our interviewees.
Other complaints about the deficiencies of the agrarian reform are that DAR has systematically
reduced the total area that is supposed to be re-distributed. Whereas in 1998 a number of
10.3 million hectares was selected for reform, in 2001, the “working scope” was reduced to
3.96 million hectares (FIAN, 2008:15). In addition, for example in Mindanao from 1988-1998,
the law on agrarian reform was deferred on banana, pineapple, palm oil and other cash-crop
plantations, only offering workers the possibility for a lease on the land, keeping real
ownership with the corporation. In order to become eligible for similar exemptions, many
landowners have transformed agricultural land into industrial estates and golf courses (ibid.).
186
ATM is involved in the anti-mining struggle, Pakisama is involved in land rights, IDIS works on an anti-aerialspraying campaign which involves banana plantations owned by Dole or Del Monte, and the Mindanao People’s
Caucus is, among other activities, involved in land rights for indigenous communities.
83
Current landowners attempt to stall or prevent the reform with a variety of tactics, ranging
from lawsuits about CARP, applying for exemptions or CLOA-cancelations, to the use of physical
violence by their private security personnel. The specific cases in which claimants demand the
real occupation of the hacienda are sites of conflict. Also, the campaign to extend the CARP
and the counter-campaign launched by landowners to prevent the extension from happening
has been very contentious, involving many protest actions by claimants. TFM claims: “in this
struggle for land, the fighting farmer has been bribed, intimidated, evicted, detained, harassed,
assaulted and killed. […] Other strategies of landholders to prevent CARP include
assassinations [sic] and murders, threat and harassments, beatings, burning of houses,
confiscation of household belongings, destruction of crops, ejection and eviction” (TFM,
2008:1). Now CARP has been extended until 2013, which makes it likely that also the next
three years will show intense struggle.
The most grievous risk for NGOs engaging in agrarian reform is the threat to be killed.
This mostly happens to local community leaders, not urban professional NGOs. FIAN and
PARRDS claim that between 2001 and 2008 at least forty peasant leaders have been killed as
they asserted their rights to land. In the same period, also 123 leaders of indigenous peoples
have been killed (FIAN, 2008:10). They attribute the killings to the military, local police, and
various non-state actors, most notably hired thugs or (armed) security personnel of
landowners187, and alleged NPA members. According to TFM, the killings are never an accident
or ‘collateral damage’ as always the best community organizers are targeted. Twelve
community leaders of ICCO-partner TFM were killed between 2001 and 2007.188 ATM had two
mining activists killed during the past two years. A leader of Ugnayan ng Nagsasariling Lokal na
Organisasyon sa Kanayunan (UNORKA) was also killed during the past years as well as two
leaders of PhilNET in sugar plantations in Negros.189 Two high ranking leaders of Pakisama
were killed last year.190 While these killings should generally be understood within the local
context of specific land claims, Pakisama staff suggested that the killing of their vicechairperson René Peñas, who had become a national icon of the struggle for agrarian reform,
was not only about local interests, but should be seen in the context of the 2008 struggle for
extension of CARP. Apart from killings, there are also various reports of shootings and beatings
of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries.191PhilNET claimed that all of their 21 local partners have
suffered from harassment and intimidation in varying degrees. It should be noted that ICCO187
For example, on 4 June 2007, Alejandro Garcesa (70 years old) and Ely Tupas (52 years old) were killed by
hacienda security guards on the Hacienda Velez-Malaga. ‘Hacienda killings stress need for full CARP
implementation’ in: Panay News, June 12, 2007, p.9
188
TFM provided us with a detailed list of the date and names of the 12 deaths. One of them is Rico Adeva who
got killed in front of the eyes of his wife. Lopez, Antonieta. 2006. ‘Community organizer slain in Silay’ in: The
Philippine Star April 17, 2006, p.A-28. An AHRC report attributes this killing to members of RPA-ABB, an armed
revolutionary group, http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2006/1956/ [accessed 18 June 2010]
189
Interview with PhilNet, 22 March 2010, Manila
190
Interview with Pakisama, 25 March 2010, Davao City
191
For example listed in the document ‘Summary Info on ARHRV’, received from TFM during the interview on 27
March 2010
84
partner Centrosaka Inc. reported to have experienced much less violent resistance that has
been so prevalent for TFM. This is probably due to their less confrontational tactics, such as
their policy to withdraw voluntarily from a land occupation long before any real trouble may
arise.192 During 2008, there has been a sharp drop in political killings related to agrarian reform
due to the international and national attention to the topic (AHRC, 2008:2). Whereas the bulk
of restrictions are suffered by the rural communities and their leaders, professional NGOs do at
times experience restrictions as well. IDIS has reported close surveillance by “men on
motorcycles” and threats received by SMS.193 Also Balaod Mindanao and ATM reported to
receive death threats from the military and corporations, as well as signals of
surveillance.194TRICOM, in their assistance to indigenous people to recover ancestral domain,
received threats from private individuals from poor communities that were occupying those
lands. In response they organized a dialogue together with the local government to ensure that
their removal would not affect their economic rights. In addition, they receive threats from
corporations who perceive TRICOM as biased in favour of indigenous people.195
Less violent but equally obstructing their land claims, some NGOs pointed out that
landowners and corporations often provide false information to claimants and workers about
agrarian reform and the rights of the claimants. This is aggravated by the fact that the
Department of Agrarian Reform also fails to give clear information. This makes it important for
NGOs to provide trainings in which they fully inform the claimants of their rights. This
informational work is made difficult when corporations call their workers together and warn
them not to work together with NGOs. IDIS recalled a situation where a corporation called the
workers together in a weekly meeting, saying that IDIS was only interested in the money, and
threatening the workers not to work with them.196 Also combinations of threats and bribes
occur, as NGOs reported that some leaders were offered money or scholarships in exchange for
dropping land claims and on the other hand peasant leaders were fired.197 According to TFM,
all of their members had lost their jobs and IDIS reported that in 2006 the brother of Marcelino
Villaganes had been fired by the banana corporation because of his active organizing. As
192
Asked why TFM has had so many killings whereas other organizations such as Centrosaka have avoided them,
the TFM interlocutor said, that the killings were not inevitable. Apart from the fact that the regions where they
were active are particularly difficult, it may also be that they pushed too hard, and their form of action was new.
But he thinks the killings were not in vain: now there are monthly meetings with municipal DAR, monthly meetings
with provincial monitor assistance, and there is support from bishops. In addition, TFM has earned respect. Now,
if TFM is involved, some landowners may choose to negotiate, because they have established credibility. Also, the
TFM spokesperson is sure that the injuries in deaths most often have the effect that the claimants become more
determined in their struggle. Once someone has died for the cause, the death cannot be in vain. He suggests that
over the years the landowners may have realized that it also isn’t in their interest the killings.
193
Interview with author 24 March 2010, Davao City
194
For example, ATM reported to receive an SMS saying “you won’t get out of there alive,” interview with author,
26 March 2010, Manila.
195
Interview with author, 24 March 2010, Davao City
196
Interview with author with the NGO representative of IDIS, engaged in the anti-aerial spraying campaign
197
For example Balaod Mindanao reported these offers of scholarships, interview with author, 22 March 2010,
Manila. In some cases the farmers did accept these offers as they had lost hope and didn’t see their chances for a
real victory, or they were afraid. Balaod Mindanao perceived a tendency that corporations tend to choose more
for offering money or jobs to dissuade land claimants from pursuing their campaign, whereas private landowners
tended to have threats as a first reaction.
85
communities can be highly dependent on the corporations for their daily livelihood, this creates
tensions and fear in the community as some members say that it is more important to have
food on the table now, than to care about the (for example health) issues of tomorrow. Job
losses were also documented by FIAN who in addition noted that the protest record of these
leaders also prevented their employment by other landowners (2008:28). Balaod Mindanao
reported that corporations often offer them money to have them drop their cases, for example
San Miguel offered them money in 2007. MPC reported that indigenous leaders sometimes
are more interested in the direct money offered by corporations. To circumvent the authority
of the local leaders, MPC tries to discuss the issue with the women of the community under the
guise of discussing spirituality and their relation to spirits and nature, as the men are busy
fighting for the money.198 Landowners have also deliberately engaged in divide and rule tactics
when they organized some loyal farmers to be on their side to nominate them as the
beneficiaries of the reform, leading to fighting between two groups of farmers.199
Restrictions in the form of harassment, criminal or civil cases, are most likely once land
claims look likely to be granted. Once communities receive their CLOA, this often does not
translate directly in the actual possession of land. Farmers may then decide to enter the land.
PhilNET explained how then the landowners with the help of the police, military or armed
personnel will come in, which can lead to skirmishes.200 Both TFM and PhilNET argued that,
whether or not the resistance by landowners escalates into the use of violence seems to
depend partially on the attitude of the local government units, whether they support the
landowners or the claimant farmers.201 It is thus not surprising that NGOs invariably reported
that one of their major strategies is to build good contacts with local government units.
Local community leaders can face criminal charges when they resort to the tactic of land
occupation. TFM has made a comprehensive list of the criminal charges suffered by its
members, providing an overview of cases that have been initiated against CLOA holders or
agrarian reform beneficiaries who are affiliated with TFM, listing offenses such as occupation of
property or usurpation of property rights and trespass. PhilNET equally reported that many of
its community activists are facing criminal charges such as trespassing and qualified theft. The
PhilNET staff member estimates that between 1996 and 2010 a little more than hundred
people of their communities have passed through jail. In one case, a CLOA holder is charged
with qualified theft as he was harvesting his coconuts. A typical incident is an example from
Davao Oriental, where sixteen CLOA holders (awarded to them on December 29, 1998) were
arrested on January 23, 2007, after a criminal complaint of grave coercion was filed against
them by security personnel of ARCAL Development, Inc. after their entry into their awarded
land on September 11, 2006. After a week of incarceration, they were released after the
198
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
Interview with PARFUND, 25 March 2010, Davao City
200
Interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
201
For example, according to TFM the region of Mindjola is especially repressive and the law does not have much
meaning there. To illustrate, the TFM spokesperson told that whereas in general you are free to organize rallies,
without encountering repression, this is not the case for Mindjola, saying: “there is no rule there; there they can
disperse you whenever they want.” Interview with author, 27 March 2010, Manila
199
86
payment of bail. In 2009 their case was dismissed for lack of merit.202 These cases take away
time and financial resources from communities, also when in the end they are dismissed.
Legal cases are particularly problematic, as analysts have suggested that without money,
access to the judicial system and a good defence become increasingly compromised. In
addition, due to the enormous backlog, cases can take a very long time to proceed (Hutchcroft,
2007:19). NGOs claim that landowners like to keep the cases on-going, because it is a means of
pressure of the landowner to the claimant.203 According to the director of MPC, in the area
where banana plantation Dole is active, all of the lawyers are on the payroll of Dole and
communities will find it difficult to get lawyers to represent them.204Centrosaka said that
landowners are “forum shopping:” filing cases in various courts in order to postpone the actual
installation of ARB’s.205 Because the landowners used to file so many criminal cases and
restraining orders, finally the Supreme Court confirmed that all these cases that are related to
the agrarian reform have to be dealt with by the Department of Agrarian Reform. This was a
victory for TFM.206 Not only community members face criminal charges in the struggle for land
reform. Also lawyers collective BalaodMindanao reported to have been accused of oral
defamation by a plantation company after speaking in a rally, as well as accused by a landowner
for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer with the threat of disbarment. The cases were later
dismissed. The spokesperson was concerned that these criminal cases scare lawyers away from
choosing this field to work in as it has led lawyers to change to another field and complicated
their recruitment of new lawyers. In addition, defending their own lawyers in court, takes their
time and resources from traveling to villages.207
NGOs working on agrarian reform often face the negative label of association with the
communist rebels, which can severely impede their work. PhilNET for example reported that
their partner organization PRDCI (a former ICCO partner) was branded as a communist
organization, because of their work at the local level. The military told them to stop working in
that area. Centrosaka has a partner that was on the ‘order of battle,’ Elvira Baladad of the
Macabud Farmers, which affects her mobility in the area. She cannot organize there anymore
as she fears for her life. Centrosaka maintains that she was very successful and thus may have
developed enemies. They reported her case to the media in press statements. According to
PhilNET, this branding happens to anyone who works on agrarian reform or is demanding
202
Document received during interview with TFM, ‘Agrarian Reform-Related Violence and Human Rights Violations
in TFM Areas in Davao Oriental’
203
ICCO partner the Agrarian Justice Foundation, Inc. (AJFI) pays for the bails of poor people in the legal system as
they claim that many large landowners use the Philippine legal system, which costs a lot of money and can take a
long time, as an opportunity to be obstructive towards the government and poor people who don't own land. “It
is the policy of the Agrarian Justice Foundation, Inc. (AJFI) to grant financial assistance for legal expenses to
deserving agrarian reform beneficiaries who have been unjustly charged in court by landowners for various
offenses, for the purpose of delaying or hampering the implementation of the agrarian reform program.”
http://agrarianjusticefoundation.org/programs.htm
204
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
205
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila. A similar remark was made by Butch Olano from PARFUND who
reported that corporations can easily send twenty lawyers who are challenging titles, the agrarian reform as such
and look for exemptions, interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City.
206
Interview with author, 27 March 2010, Manila
207
Interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
87
higher wages, claiming that “in the Philippines, if you raise issues of the marginalized
population, you are branded as a communist front.”208Balaod Mindanao reported that their
organization had been branded by the military as belonging to the NPA. This forced one of
their board members to step down from the board when she was applying to become a
regional trial judge.209TRICOM found out that they are qualified as front organizations in the
military’s PowerPoint presentation and the military requested access to their seminars. 210 One
of the members of ATM (Friends of the Earth Philippines, LRC) was also said to be on the order
of battle. As a consequence they were being followed and their cell phones intercepted. 211
IDIS informed that in Compostela the military put up banners saying that MAAS = NPA (MAAS =
movement against aerial spraying). Apart from the label to be associated with the extreme left,
NGOs can face other attempts to discredit their work. For example, IDIS told that the military
had sent around a petition in favour of aerial spraying. According to IDIS, the community
members had signed it because they didn’t dare not to. Another negative label that is
sometimes used against NGOs is that they are just interested in receiving money from foreign
donors. IDIS reported that corporations tell their workers, that the NGOs want to close down
the plantations and that then there won’t be any jobs.212
NGOs also criticized the spaces of dialogue for solving claims regarding land and natural
resources. Specific criticisms exist with regards to the requirement of free, prior, and informed
consent of indigenous people.213 Citing the report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Hutchcroft notes that in the
face of economic activities such as logging, mining, multi-purpose dams, commercial
plantations, and other development projects “entire areas are reported to have been
devastated without regard to the wishes and rights of indigenous communities” (2007:15). For
example, the World Organization Against Torture describes the 1995 Mining Code as “one of
the most favourable to foreign mining companies anywhere in the world” allowing 100%
foreign ownership of mining projects, including the possibility to repatriate all profits and the
guarantee against expropriation by the State (OMCT 2008:21-22). Last but not least, the
government commits itself to ensure the removal of all obstacles to mining, including
settlements and farms (ibid). The Mining Code is thus used to sidestep the protections of the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) as many minerals are in indigenous territories. ATM
reported that twice they experienced that a local mayor who refused to consent to a mining
project was suspended for six months. Another mayor was then installed who would give the
needed consent. This led Haribon, a member of ATM, to withdraw from that area.214
208
Interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
Interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
210
Previously TRICOM was aligned with extreme leftist organizations. There was a split and TRICOM continued as
a more neutral organization. Still, this stigma was still sticking to them. Thus, when they organized a meeting in
local communities, members of the police or military would be present to monitor. In order to avoid this
suspicion, TRICOM decided to participate in the so-called “accreditation-process.” Interview with author, 24
March 2010, Davao City
211
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
212
Interview with author, 24 March 2010, Davao City
213
This was for example noted by TRICOM and ATM
214
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
209
88
Impact on operational space and response capacity
It is difficult to assess the effects of the political killings on the operational space of NGOs. On
the one hand, NGOs reported that the killings do scare some communities into less
confrontational tactics. On the other hand, NGOs also reported that killings tend to make
people more determined to obtain what they had been fighting for, at times even convincing a
broader audience of the justness of the cause. For Pakisama, the death of René Peñas inspired
not only his co-leaders and members of their own organization, but even their sympathizers
from the middle class. Although the community of the murdered president of Pakisama
stopped their work for a while, they returned to organizing and picked it up from where they
were before the killing.215
Surveillance and threats affect the mobility of NGO workers. Several NGOs have
reported that there were cases where they had to withdraw (temporarily) from an area due to
security concerns.216 IDIS even asked for professional help (training on security and safety).
They set up a buddy system and changed meeting venues. Our interviewee reported that she
cut her hair to change her appearance. Furthermore, they went to the police to report the
incidents, and they went to the mayor. Also BalaodMindanao reported to have put a lot of
emphasis on security plans and trainings on how to secure themselves when they go to the
communities and travel from one place to another. TFM and PARFUND staff began travelling in
teams, and one of them even decided to hide for a time to lessen possibilities of getting hurt.
NGOs sometimes have resorted to tactics that draw a lot of media-attention to their
campaigns and demands. An example of such a tactic has been the long march organized by
TFM. The participation of various people from the clergy gave the march more status. Other
highly publicized actions have been hunger strikes, where again bishops have joined the
farmers.217 These actions are generally judged as successful, however, NGOs point out that it
shouldn’t be the case that citizens go to such lengths to enforce their legal rights. In one of the
hunger strikes, there was the real possibility of dying for two farmers. This specific action has
led to a response by the president herself. She ordered the police and armed forces to enter in
hacienda Velez Malaga to protect the farmers. PARFUND indicated that this incident has
provided more space, as it has set a precedent. Landowners now know that this can happen
and the Department of Agrarian Reform has an incentive that it should be avoided to happen
again. According to Butch Olano from PARFUND, the number of harassment cases has
decreased now and the tactic of landowners has shifted to the “lease-back” approach where
ARBs lease their land back to the landowner.218
The response to violent incidents has been largely reactive. All NGOs issue press
releases in reaction to violent incidents. For example, PhilNET wanted to clear their names of
killed leaders who had been called “trespassers” and argued that they were “claimants” and
215
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
For example Centrosaka, CARET and Mindanao People’s Caucus
217
Manalastas, Jester P. 2008. ‘Bishops join farmers on hunger strike’ in: People’s Journal December 16, 2008. I
received this press clipping from the impressive news archive of TFM. This hunger strike was held in front of the
House of Representatives to call for the extension of CARP. Another important hunger strike was held in demand
of distribution of hacienda Bacan, in Negros Occidental, which is owned by Mike Arroyo, the husband of President
Gloria Arroyo.
218
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
216
89
that they were on the lands as part of the process of engagement in land reform. Beyond this,
there has not been much institutionalized or coordinated effort to respond to the killings. TFM
has reported that in several instances it has filed criminal complaints against (former)
landowners or guards for offenses like attempted murder, arson, or threats.219 These
proceedings tend to be prolonged, for example because landowners strategically don’t show up
the first two times that a hearing is scheduled and only show up the third time.
In order to counter the negative label of association with the NPA, many NGOs reported
that they pro-actively approach local governments and military in the area to introduce
themselves and explain their objectives and take time to prove that they were not linked to any
rebel group. This was done by TFM, PARFUND, PhilNet, TRICOM, and Centrosaka Inc. Some
NGOs also dedicated part of their budget to explain their goals in the media. TFM even secured
a regular radio program to counter negative propaganda of the landowners (this program now
is one of the highest rating-programs in the area). Some NGOs also invited renowned and nonideological personalities to serve as board members of their organizations. When their partner
PRDCI was branded as a communist front, PhilNET immediately reacted. They made
representations at the local level with their legal documents, went to the department of
agricultural reform to ask for their endorsement, and they issued a press statement. They
invited the military to come to the trainings to witness what they are doing, and witness to see
whether it was on agriculture or not. Now the military is working with PRDCI. Their immediate
reaction put the military on the defensive.
It is clear that NGOs and communities working for agrarian reform operate in a risky and
constricted space. They have to deal with strong repression and intimidation, criminalization
and stigmatization. The most important and successful response strategies have been to build
good relations with local governments and visible mobilizations at the national level.
Basic safety in conflict areas and isolated places
The Philippines are a weak state and the government lacks factual control in various areas.
According to International Crisis Group, in parts of the south, the Philippines is in fact a failed
state, therefore making it a sanctuary for Jemaah Islamiyah fugitives (Hutchcroft 2007:15).
This lack of government control affects NGOs that operate in zones of conflict and very isolated
places. There are two ongoing armed conflicts in the Philippines. In the entire territory of the
archipelago, the government is combating the NPA, the armed group of the communist party.
The NPA has a “presence” in several areas, which means that the government cannot enter the
area without paying money and/or asking permission. In other areas, both the NPA and the
military have camps and checkpoints with fighting taking place irregularly. Again in other areas,
the NPA is attempting to recruit and mobilize communities. In these areas, the military makes a
strong effort to counter the recruitment.
In Mindanao, there is an armed conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) and the government. Despite negotiations, and the creation of an Autonomous Region
(ARMM), fighting still continues. To complicate matters, some Islamic terrorist groups such as
the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group are also active in this area, as well as various paramilitary and
219
Interview with author, 27 March 2010, TFM provided me with an overview listing all the current legal cases in
which they are involved
90
criminal armed groups (Estifania Co & Neame, 2007:186). The on-going fighting in these armed
conflicts creates a situation of basic insecurity. In addition, communities, people’s
organizations and NGOs have to be careful not to raise suspicions from any of the armed actors.
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous people, has in this regard commented on the militarization of
indigenous areas and how indigenous communities get caught up in the fighting or are accused
of rebellion, being members or sympathizers of the NPA, or being engaged in ‘terrorist’ activity
because of protests in defence of their economic, social, and cultural rights (OMCT, 2008:44).
Various NGOs have reported that they were branded to be sympathizers of the NPA (in one
case the MILF) and thus encountered harassment from the military. NGOs also reported
threats from the NPA either because their NGO activity would lessen the revolutionary base
from the community220, or because of suspicion to belong to the military.
In conflict zones and isolated areas NGOs thus face potential threats from armed rebel
groups, ordinary bandits and criminals, and the military. This mainly affects their mobility, as
they risk theft, robbery, ambush, kidnapping, and killing when they travel through or work in
these areas. For example, Pakisama reported that during the past five years, in some of their
areas in Southern Luzon, their organizations have experienced heavy militarization like overpresence of check points in highways, intrusion of military personnel in their education
activities, and ransacking of their offices, thus affecting their operational space. Widespread
daily violence is the result of a weak government, no control over army and police force, and
the presence of many other armed actors on the stage. This in turn is reinforced by the
absence of the rule of law and a lack of protection of civilians and total impunity of crimes. This
limits severely the operational space of NGOs as they operate in daily insecurity. TRICOM, for
example, experienced threats from bandits during their work with indigenous people in
Mindanao. The government offered guards, but TRICOM prefers to maintain a neutral position.
In addition, they argue that it heightens their chance to become a target of bandits for the
firearms and money.221
The “Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao” (ARMM) actually displays problems as
described in the ideal type on conflict zones, such as basic insecurity and humanitarian
problems such as refugees and road blockades (see also Amnesty International 2009, for
example detailing the mortar shelling of an IDP camp). The director of the Mindanao People’s
Caucus (MPC) told about an incident where the military labelled internally displaced persons
(IDPs) as “enemy reserve force” which led to a prohibition for the World Food Program to get
through their checkpoint. Donors will have to deal with these military strategies.222 Ed
Quitoriano signals the tendency of securitization of aid, diminishing the attention for poverty
220
Estifania Co & Neame note that the space in areas that are under control of non-state armed actors is highly
constricted as “perceived challenges to the political and military programs of those actors face lethal responses”
(2007:185).
221
Interview with author, 24 March 2010, Davao City
222
ICCO-partner Kalimudan Foundation, Inc. is an organization that has been working with victims of the conflict
and organized the Multi-Sectoral Volunteer for the Disaster Assistance (MSVDA) that addressed the needs of the
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the two provinces of Lanao. http://www.afrim.org.ph/mpp/mppprofiles2.php; http://kalimudan.org/about.html
91
reduction.223 Francisco Lara from the LSE Crisis States Research Center in London claims that
foreign aid that was sent to the ARMM has largely landed in the hands of warlords, as
politicians are forced to negotiate with them. USAID, the Asian Development Bank and the
World Bank have suspended their financial aid to Mindanao because of that reason. He also
claims involvement of drug traders with warlords and political killings in Mindanao as the
Philippines has turned into a transit port.224 On November 23, 2009, in the province of
Maguindanao in Mindanao 57 civilians were killed, of which 34 were journalists.225 The origins
of the massacre are generally attributed to the rivalry between the Ampatuan and
Mangudadatu clans.226 In addition, there are reports of increased communal violence and
vigilantism in Mindanao while the government is handing out weapons for citizens to protect
themselves (AHRC, 2008:1)227, and in Davao City there is already a Death Squad active targeting
petty criminals, which is tolerated by the mayor (HRW, 2009). A colleague of the director of the
Mindanao People’s Caucus was very vocal about his opposition to the Davao Death Squad and
got killed.228
Impact on operational space and response
The operational space of NGOs is clearly affected by the abovementioned restrictions.
Organizations affected by these restrictions have been research institutions who work on
agrarian issues and indigenous peoples (Centrosaka Inc. and AFRIM) who tend to travel to
remote areas and areas where the conflict is ongoing. Centrosaka reported that they could not
send their researchers to Davao del Norte where major banana plantations are as they could
not guarantee the security of their interviewers.229 Security precautions are an integral part of
the training of their researchers.230 ATM informed us that in 2008, two students were doing
research for ATM on access for lands for Indigenous People. They were abducted by the
military after they had been labeled as sympathizers for the NPA. Good offices by the church
led to their release.231 NGOs thus are limited in the geographical area in which they can
operate and they constantly have to negotiate their neutrality and follow security protocols to
ensure their safety.
223
Interview with author, 21 March 2010, Manila
Francisco J. Lara Jr. “Remember Maguindanao”, available at the Weblog of Edicio de la Torre,
http://edicio.wordpress.com/, 4 March 2010 [accessed 20 March 2010].
225
Papa, Alcuin. 2009. ‘Maguindanao massacre worst ever for journalists’ in: Philippine Daily Inquirer 26 November
2009, available at [accessed 17 June 2010]: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20091126238554/Maguindanao-massacre-worst-ever-for-journalists
226
Francisco J. Lara Jr. 2010. ‘The ruthless political entrepreneurs of Muslim Mindanao’ available at [accessed on
17 June 2010]: http://planetphilippines.com/politics/the-ruthless-political-entrepreneurs-of-muslim-mindanao/ ;
Sison, Jose Maria, ‘The structure of reactionary violence and human rights violations in the Philippines’, Press
Statement, 27 November 2009, by Prof. Jose Maria Sison, Chairperson, International League of Peoples' Struggle
227
The military has created self-defense groups called Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAGFU), and the
Philippine National Police has created similar units called the Police Auxiliaries (PAX).
228
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Manila
229
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
230
In the cases where travels are undertaken, the researchers have to be careful not to travel at night, to take nonstop buses, listen to the advice of regional liaison officers, when visiting indigenous peoples coordinate it
beforehand with the chiefs, and follow strict security protocols.
231
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
224
92
Also organizations that are involved with the peace processes are affected, such as the
Mindanao People’s Caucus (MPC) which was active as a ceasefire monitoring organization. The
director of the Mindanao Peace Caucus (MPC) was accused of being a supporter of the MILF
due to their organization’s support for the peace agreement forged by the rebel group and the
government peace panel.232 On the other hand, the MILF in its turn is also suspicious of the
MPC as they are sometimes seen together with the general of the military. Between 2007 and
2009, the director received death threats on a daily basis. During the fighting in 2008, MPC
volunteers were targeted as well. One team leader of a ceasefire monitoring group decided to
stop with the work. MPC has had to transfer their office because of the threats, as in the last
office the staff didn’t feel safe anymore. The director was almost kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf
Group, when she was travelling to a military camp in Sulu. Instead, her colleague got
kidnapped. After this incident, they decided to pull out of Sulu, which was a very heavy
decision for them, as many human rights violations take place in Sulu and they perceive that
after their withdrawal the number of violations has increased. MPC also reported about severe
problems with the military after they had filed cases on behalf of community members about
more than 3,000 houses that were burnt down during a military operation. According to the
director of MPC the arson was planned and deliberate. The military responded to the cases by
threatening to pull out their forces from the area. This led the mayor of the area to promise to
halt the cases.233
Specific mention deserve the loan officers of Micro-Finance-Institutions (MFIs), such as
ICCO-partners Mindanao Microfinance Council (MMC) and the Microfinance Council of the
Philippines Inc. (MCPI). In past years the popularity of microfinance has led to their expansion
into areas farther away from what they called “centers of protection.” The increased popularity
has also led to criminals knowing when the money is collected. In several instances,
microfinance loan officers have been robbed as they came to collect money in isolated places,
although this was not a regular occurrence, which is the reason there is no documenting of the
incidents of harassment. For MCC, in four cases such a robbery led to the death of the
microfinance officer and it is recognized as an increasing problem. There is no police protection
for the microfinance loan officers. As a strategy to protect the loan officers, community
members often accompany the loan officer on the way back. The policy has been implemented
that the money is only considered paid once it has gotten to the bank, providing a clear
incentive for community care.234 The revolutionary tax demanded by the NPA poses another
problem. In at least one instance, one of the partner MFIs of MCPI decided to retreat from an
area because they were extorted to pay “revolutionary tax” to the NPA. MMC told that one of
their partner organizations in Nagusa has negotiated relations with the NPA and thus avoids
paying the revolutionary tax. They explained that the program tries to help the poor people
and thus by paying revolutionary tax, it would be robbing from the people. They threatened
the NPA to leave the area and the people would be angry with the NPA. However, in Davao
232
She told us that governor Piñol mentioned her in every speech as a sympathizer of the MILF, as he was against
the peace agreement, and he portrayed support for the agreement as being pro-MILF. Governor Piñol fought
against the peace agreement and eventually got it declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, interview with
author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
233
Interview with author, 25 March 2010, Davao City
234
Interview with author, 24 March 2010, Manila
93
Oriental, the NPA commanders are strict and there they have to pay revolutionary tax. One
partner of MMC had to leave the area of Davao Oriental after they had taken away their
motorcycle. In correspondence with their vision to work in “frontier areas, as that is where
poor people are,” MMC is now considering expanding into the ARMM, where at this moment,
because of the armed conflict, very few microfinance institutions are active. And regular
lending institutions do not go there either, as it clearly poses the challenges listed before.
Therefore they are now investigating the possibilities how to penetrate the area.235
Unlike the situation in the topic discussed previously where leaders are
disproportionately targeted for harassment, the risk is here more general. Indeed, for example
mining companies also have to pay revolutionary taxes to avoid being bombed.236 Instability
also affects investment. ICCO partner SCARBIDC is a cooperative that due to the agrarian
reform in 1989 received ownership over a plantation on the island Basilan (located mainly
within the ARMM). They lack the means to maintain the plantation for which they need loans,
which are risky because of the instability. ICCO provides a guarantee to a loan provided by
Oikocredit.237 In another instance, the truck of an Alter Trade Corporation (ATC) in favor of fair
trade was burned down after refusing to pay “revolutionary tax” to the NPA (Encarnacion
Tadem, 2009:233). The response to these dangers has been mainly reactive. The Mindanao
People’s Council reported to have conducted security trainings and various NGOs reported to
have engaged in dialogues with various parties to explain their objectives and presence.238
Responses
In the previous section, we have analysed three specific areas in which NGOs face severe
restrictions on their operational space. It is clear that different restrictive actions and policies
by multiple actors often play together to set boundaries as to what NGOs can do or pose risks
when they make certain claims or enter certain territories. In this section, we analyse the
response strategies that NGOs have developed to counter, prevent or avoid these restrictions.
We specifically have looked whether NGOs tend to be reactive or whether they have developed
pro-active responses, and whether NGOs act on their own or in alliance with other
organizations. Generally, responses to the restrictions faced by NGOs have been confronted on
a case by case basis (reactive) and by individual NGOs. A proactive, coordinated response by
the NGO community has been rare. Whereas there are various networks (all NGOs reported to
be part of many networks, such as environmental networks, the political partylist Akbayan, or
the organization that was set up to bring NGOs together: CODE-NGO), there is no single forum
for the NGO community. Several NGOs pointed out that it is a weakness of the Philippine NGOs
235
They consider whether they could (1) somehow support MFIs from other regions to go there; (2) look for
existing MFIs there and provide capacity building; (3) build a new MFI and operate it. MMC specifically requested
if it were possible that ICCO provide a guarantee fund to encourage MFIs to go to these conflicted areas.
Perceived risk is the main reason that MFIs stay away and they need the resources to protect them as there is no
protection from the government.
236
Interview with ATM, 26 March 2010, Manila
237
http://www.icco.nl/delivery/main/en/project.phtml?p=en-project&project=268;
oikocredit.com/documents/pdf/projects//scarbidc%20philipines-uk.pdf
238
For example, Haribon explained to make courtesy calls to both the military and the NPA when they want to
work in a specific area, indeed, they know that the NPA actually attend their meetings and activities in some cases,
interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
94
that despite the existence of many networks and alliances they tend to work in isolation, not
sharing much information or not following up on initial efforts of coordination. Partly, this can
be explained by the fact that NGOs tend to view these restrictions, including the killings, as part
of the risks of organizing. Partly, the lack of a coordinated response can be attributed to the
ideological polarization of the NGO-sector. On a positive note, NGOs tend to interpret many of
the threats to their work as the proof of their effectiveness.239 In addition, we have looked at
available structures for effective responses to restrictions. The Human Rights Commission is
such an available organ, which has been described to work effectively.240
Generally NGOs respond reactively to incidents. Various NGOs have reported to have
stopped their activities in a specific area, because of security concerns. Other NGOs have
attempted to counter the restriction by going to the mayor, the local government unit, and the
police or by issuing press statements. Sometimes, NGOs coordinate this response in their
networks and with other NGOs in order to issue joined press statements to increase the
legitimacy. Often also the Human Rights Commission is contacted. In reaction to the political
killings, NGOs campaigned for intervention and contributed to the various investigations that
have been conducted. For example TFM have cooperated with the Melo Commission
presenting evidence of killings of their community organizers.241 NGOs have also contributed
information to the UN Rapporteur on Extrajudicial killings as he visited the Philippines (Alston,
2008).242 The international community has put pressure on the Philippines after the situation
with political killings became more publicized. For example, Food First International
Switzerland once sent out a fact finding team after killings in Davao. Unfortunately, there is a
lack of good documentation of the restrictions that NGOs face, particularly the killings, injuries,
and criminal charges. TFM was the only organization that kept record of these numbers. Some
data is available, for example recorded by the AHRC, the CIVICUS updates, or lists produced by
Karapatan, but this tends to be anecdotic or partial, instead of comprehensive and complete.
For example, PhilNET acknowledged that they don’t keep any records of killings or criminal
cases. Good, reliable and specific documentation is a first step to effective advocacy, as well as
for taking more proactive measures, such as setting up a legal fund. Regarding the lack of a
coordinated response to the physical risk that activists face, the director of MPC remarked
cynically “we attend funerals” but then there is not more action.
Apart from reactive responses, there were also pro-active initiatives. TFM told that
volunteers from the International Peace Observers Network (IPON) stay with farmers for a
period of three months.243 According to the TFM leader this was very effective in keeping
violence away. Centrosaka Inc. reported to contact the Human Rights Commission as a
preventative measure before they conduct land occupations, even before any violent act has
occurred. An important pro-active tool that NGOs use individually is the “accreditation
process” which is laid down in the local government codes. This process means that NGOs
239
For example Balaod Mindanao mentioned this in the interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
For example Centrosaka spoke positively about the response of the Human Rights Commission when called
upon, interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
241
Gomez, Carla P. and Gilbert P. Bayoran. 2006. ‘Melo hearings in Negros start today’ in: The Visayan Daily Star
Vol. 25, No. 167, Bacolod City, November 27, 2006, p.1.
242
For example Balaod Mindanao, interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
243
For more information about the IPON program, see http://www.ipon-philippines.org/
240
95
represent themselves to the mayor and the local government councils to take place on advisory
boards. This process provides an opportunity for NGOs to establish their legitimacy and clearly
distinguish themselves from the rebel groups. Various NGOs reported to invest in creating
good contacts, not only with local government units, but also for example with the military. It
is clear that this can be crucial in countering restrictions. Several cases have indicated that
good connections can secure police protection or a police investigation where otherwise no
action would be undertaken. At key points, several NGOs mentioned that they turned to
‘friends’ within the military or within the church to ask for help to respond to restrictions.
Likewise, public opinion is generally influenced by key people. One strategy, for example by
TFM, is to secure important well placed people in the board of the NGO who have an
impeccable track record and can thus safeguard the image of the NGO as well as can arrange
the connections with high-ranked people when it is necessary, such as when TFM secured a
visit to president Arroyo. As discussed before, several of the NGOs that face physical repression
have invested in security trainings and other security measures.
In order to counter negative labelling, NGOs put a lot of effort in presenting their work
and building their image. A key element in a good media strategy is to “build upon the justness
of the cause” as TFM puts it. This for example also involved a good preparation of actions such
as land occupations (more appropriately called “land entry” as community members tend to
have the CLOA). The message for public opinion has to be that it is clear that the claimants
have legitimate titles in the form of CLOA and that thus the landowners are resisting the
legitimate entry of claimants. The media has proven to be a good ally for NGOs in achieving
this. Even though the media is owned by the same families that hold economic and political
power, there are various progressive people within the media, with various journalists
favouring agrarian reform, and there is a very free press (Hutchcroft, 2007:8). TFM specifically
allots a part of its resources to the media and even advertisements and emphasizes that good
media mobilization is not about writing good press releases but about building relationships,
pointing out that this is often a misconception among NGOs who fail to put resources into the
relation with the media. The church can be a good ally for NGOs when they are successful in
mobilizing the progressive bishops.244 There are various instances of successful actions in which
bishops participated, such as a hunger strike and long march to Manila. Some hunger strikes
became very high profile and made it to the front pages of newspapers. NGOs unanimously
emphasized the political power of the church, even though the Philippines are a secular
state.245 All mentioned that when bishops say something, even president Arroyo cannot just
ignore their opinion, but will act accordingly. For example, asked about how they were able to
counter efforts to label them as terrorists, TFM reports that the statement by bishop Navarra
that he is pro-agrarian reform and that the killings should stop was effective to sway the public
opinion.
An example of a proactive as well as coordinated response is the initiative of Code-NGO.
th
In its 4 national congress, held on March 22, 2007 at the Film Centre of the University of the
244
A well known example of successful support by church leaders is the ‘running priest’ Robeter Reyes who has
participated in a 157 kilometer protest run in support of the extension of CARP. Dizon, Nikko. 2008. ‘‘Running
priest’ backs Arroyo tenants’ in: Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 2, 2008
245
For example, the spokesperson of ATM said: “when bishops talk, the president will do,” interview with author,
26 March 2010, Manila
96
Philippines, Code-NGO adopted six thrusts for 2007-2011. One of them is called “Caring for
development NGO worker”.246 This includes providing support to NGO workers and volunteers
in high risk projects and areas, including, among others, the provision of legal assistance and a
legal assistance fund. Another example of a coordinated and pro-active response was the
petition, signed by 600 journalists and thirty supporting organizations urging the
decriminalization of libel (Hutchcroft 2007:9). Another proactive and coordinated initiative has
been the setting up of the ‘Defend the Defenders’ fund with money from the Dutch embassy
(see box). The IDIS representative comments: “instead of having a Task Force to do fact finding
once a killing has occurred, such as in the case of Ka René, they wanted to do something to
prevent this.”247 Informal contacts made this initiative possible, as a friend from the IDIS
representative who works at the Dutch embassy happened to visit her in Davao City at the
moment that the surveillance and threats were going on.
The concept of “human rights defenders” was not well known among all NGO-staff,
making some of them interested in training on the subject. One human rights NGO (PAHRA), a
legal collective (Balaod Mindanao) and ATM reported to be using the term, and to give
trainings on it. Various NGOs reported their activity in training community members to be
aware of their rights. They usually used the term “paralegal training.” ATM explained that
basic trainings teach on basic human rights, the UN Declaration, the Bill of Rights and socioeconomic rights. Advanced trainings teach how to gather documents, how to write an affidavit,
and how courts work, as well as how to do human rights monitoring and documentation, with a
fact sheet and information on who to contact and when.248 Balaod Mindanao also reported to
give security trainings. Other NGOs have already adopted the Human Rights Defenders
terminology, such as the Task Force Detainees, who have set up a human rights defenders
project in relation to the anti-mining campaign and for communities affected by mining
activities.249
246
http://www.code-ngo.org/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121&Itemid=121
Interview with author, 24 March 2010, Davao City, she refers to René Peñas, the well known peasant leader
who got killed in 2008
248
Interview with author, 26 March 2010, Manila
249
For more information about the launch of this project, see
http://www.tfdp.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=24&Itemid=36
247
97
CASE BOX: Mobilizing the embassies
ICCO-staff twice organized a visit to the involved embassies together with a TFM staff
member. Once, because President Arroyo was going on a tour through Europe, the
ICCO country representative and the TFM leader visited the Dutch embassy in Manila
and once they visited the Philippine embassy in The Hague. The Dutch embassy in the
Philippines is receptive to human rights issues. For example, the embassy website
posted the “European Human Rights Defenders Guidelines” in a prominent place on its
website. The ICCO representative as well as the TFM spokesperson reported that the
response of the Dutch embassy in Manila was positive. They promised to bring the
issue of extrajudicial killings under the attention of the relevant people. Anita van de
Haar-Conijn, Counsellor Political Affairs andDeputy Head of Mission of the Dutch
Embassy recalled the visit of the TFM staff member very well, as his story was
“impressive.” She reported that the visit stimulated the embassy to have funded a
documentary that was made about the organizing by TFM, and they were present
during its launch. Visible presence is one of their main tools. They also at times write
letters for example to request an independent investigation in a specific case, often in
coordination with other EU countries. The embassy recently initiated support for a
project "Defend the Defenders" in cooperation with the law school of Ateneo
University. This fund gives money to people who are threatened as they can apply for
the fund for a financial support for legal assistance or for example a lock on their door.
For the embassy it is difficult to get too much involved with NGOs because they
cannot be partial and often don't lack the means to do research after the exact
background of incidents. For this reason, they only choose to be present during trials,
when the cases are extremely clear, in order not to compromise their credibility.
The ICCO representative suggested that such visits provided the leader of TFM with an
extra layer of security. Attention and backing by important people seems to scare
away the people responsible for the killings. This is deduced from the fact that peasant
leaders in local communities are targeted much more frequently than urban NGO
leaders who receive more media attention.
Van de Haar-Conijn emphasized that the embassy appreciates the contact with Dutch
NGOs as an alternative source of information about the Philippines.
Conclusion & recommendations
It is not an overstatement to say that the Philippines have a more vibrant NGO and civil society
community than its neighbours. Operational space for NGOs in the Philippines is heavily
determined by the weak government. On the one hand, the very weakness of the government
provides NGOs with the possibility to set up their own mechanisms and networks and take on
what needs to be done. This however creates the risk that NGOs simply take over the tasks of
the government instead of improving governance. On the other hand, the weakness of the
government in providing security for its citizens and NGOs turns self-protection into a central
98
issue for defending operational space. The weakness of the government also gives way to nonstate actors who dominate the political and economic scene vis-à-vis NGOs.
In this chapter, we have identified the existing actions and policies that restrict the
operational space of NGOs in the Philippines. Physical repression and intimidation in the form
of political killings and death threats stand out in the Philippines as a severe problem that has
emerged over the past ten years, even though there are signals of a decline since 2008.
Criminalization plays a role for rural communities making land claims, as well as for those
organizations that are identified as front organizations for the communist insurgency. The
administrative context for NGOs is generally good as there are no difficult registration hurdles
or otherwise bureaucratic obstacles to pursue their activities. Public demonstrations, however,
can be (violently) repressed. Negative labelling is strongly related to the military tendency to
view organizations involved in land or labour reform as possible communists. Finally, the
spaces for dialogue are specifically facilitated by the state legislation, however, as we will see,
NGOs have found it difficult to turn their participation in these spaces into real influence on the
development of policy and decision-making. Various groups in the Philippines still operate
underground. In this regard, Ed de la Torre pointed out that the underground is an illegalized
space in which actors attempt to create space, when they view other arenas as too restricted to
work.250
Professional NGOs such as NATCCO and APFT reported that they experience no
restrictions on their operational space. Indeed, they emphasized that their space for operation
expanded. This seems to be the experience for the majority of professional NGOs, specifically
those dedicated to service delivery. Thus, NGOs working on gender issues, labor, or urban poor
have relatively a lot of space for their work. We want to emphasize that this does not mean
that the NGOs operating in these areas never face challenges. In fact, they do. The existence of
an NGO generally indicates that some social problem exists and that work is needed to improve
and deal with fundamental interests that have created the problem in the first place. This
means that the work of these NGOs can be deeply political and controversial. Still, at the same
time, the space for these NGOs to engage in that controversial battle can be relatively free and
without fundamental challenges.
We have identified three areas where NGOs experience the interaction of restrictive
actions and policies that challenge the very space in which they operate: (1) NGOs operating at
the extreme left: consequences of a counterinsurgency focus on civil society; (2) NGOs and
community organizers making claims about land and natural resources; (3) NGOs operating in
conflict areas and isolated places. Furthermore, urban and professional NGOs have a relatively
protected operational space compared to grassroots organizations, community organizers and
individual activists. In contrast to the Latin-American cases in this comparative study, the
Philippines still has armed communist rebellion. This creates the pressures on the operational
space for NGOs operating on issues traditionally associated with the left. Further, whereas
issues of gender and sexuality are contested, NGOs working on these issues have relatively
much operational space in comparison to Indonesia and the Central American countries.
In our interviews, NGOs offered some recommendations for ICCO. All NGOs emphasized
the importance of community organizing to be effective. They regretted the lack of funding for
250
Interview with author, 22 March 2010, Manila
99
that work. Other NGOs suggested that a role that international organizations can play is
toorganize projects in which NGOs from different political orientations are enabled to work
together. The important presence of Dutch mining companies in the Philippines, especially also
in places where the land and mining activities are contested, opens up the possibility for ICCO
to use its Dutch contacts to make these mining companies accountable for their activities in the
Philippines. Specifically, ICCO can emphasize the importance of respecting free, prior, and
informed consent requirement regarding mining exploration, specifically in areas of ancestral
domain.
The new Aquino government will possibly offer new opportunities for cooperation
between government and civil society and thus dramatically affect the operational space NGOs
entertain. It remains to be seen how NGOs and the government are able to use the new
political context.
100
5. Indonesia – Specific spots of limited operational space
Introduction
ICCO supports many NGOs in Jakarta (situated on Java) and is further present in Papua, Aceh,
and Java.251 The historical importance of Java in Indonesia is readily understood by the fact that
Java currently has 120 million inhabitants and the rest of Indonesia 90 million. This report is
based on interviews with NGOs in Jakarta and Banda Aceh.252 Thanks to the conversations with
staff in Jakarta the report reflects some of the experiences of NGOs that are nationally oriented
and based in the capital. In addition, by adding the perspective of NGOs in Aceh we have tried
to include the perspective from a region, where regional politics may be more relevant than
national structures, even though the space is still firmly determined by the (historical) context
of the Indonesian state. Both the vastness of Indonesia and the strong pushes towards
decentralization of power have motivated us to include this regional perspective.
This also means that the current report is limited. Our findings do not necessarily apply
to the other regions in Indonesia that were not explicitly included in this research. If this is true
for regions like Sulawesi or Kalimantan, it is certainly true for Papua which has a very particular
political context, different in many respects from the other regions in Indonesia. Our choice to
include Aceh in our research instead of Papua was based on the assessment that Aceh fits more
properly in the category of partial democracies, whereas the strong military presence in Papua
gives it more authoritarian features, such as for example that foreign press has been banned
from the region since 2003 (Freedom House, 2009; HRW, 2010). It should be noted that with
regards to Aceh, we have focused entirely on the period since the first elections have taken
place in 2006. We are aware of the serious limitations of space that NGOs experienced during
the martial law and the violent conflict until the Helsinki Peace Accords of 2005. However, we
have chosen to focus on the space and the restrictions of space as NGOs experience now in this
newly emerging democracy.
251
ICCO also supported organizations in Sulawesi, but due to internal reorganization, these relations are weak at
the moment. Just as in Jakarta, ICCO supports about ten organizations in Papua, Aceh, and Java (outside of
Jakarta).
252
We would like to thank Maria Louisa Khrisnanti from the Legal Round Table, a lawyer’s collective, and Wahyudi
Djafar from Demos, a research and advocacy association on issues of democracy and human rights, for their
excellent cooperation in preparing our visit, arranging the interviews, and for their contribution to this chapter.
The interviews in Jakarta were all conducted in English. In Banda Aceh we had an interpreter, who interpreted in
all except two of the interviews conducted there. For a detailed overview of our interviews, see the appendix.
Interviews were conducted from 29 March – 8 April 2010 in Indonesia. We interviewed mainly ICCO partners, but
also several other NGOs to complement the picture. ICCO partners are indicated in bold.
We have selected for interviews those ICCO partners as well as other NGOs who have indicated (either to ICCO
staff or in any public statement) to experience pressure on their operational space. Many NGOs that are working
in the area of ‘service delivery’ have therefore been excluded. In addition to the interviews, we have drawn upon
region-specific academic literature as well as country reports provided online by CIVICUS, Freedom House, the
Centre for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies (PSHK), and various human rights organizations such as the Asian
Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the National Human Rights Commission
of Indonesia (Komnas HAM) and the report by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Defenders.
We have not spoken with government officials or other (business, military, religious) actors outside of the NGOsector. Their perspective would probably have yielded different findings than those presented here.
101
Political context
On 17 August 1945, Indonesia gained independence from the Netherlands. Sukarno was the
first president followed in 1967 by Suharto, who came to power and installed the “New Order
regime” until he was replaced in May 1998. This regime change has to be understood in the
context of the Asian monetary crisis of 1997, the subsequent IMF intervention, and internal
discontent about the lack of freedom (Schulte Nordholt, 2008). The years that followed are
known as the “Reformasi.”253 Yusuf Habibie became president and thirty laws with reforms
were enacted such as one creating freedom for the press, the release of political prisoners and
the admission of political parties and trade unions. In addition, Habibie started a process of
decentralization of the state administration creating a high level of regional autonomy.254 Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has been in office since 2004 and was re-elected in 2009. Indonesia
is a secular state and has the world’s largest Muslim population (PRS, 2008:16). Recently, there
have been concerns about an islamization of Indonesia.255 The economy, known as one of the
“newly-industrialized economies” (Baron, 2002) is regarded to have done fairly well despite the
financial crisis and is described as one of the “best global performers in this downturn”
(Mocuta, 2009). Indonesia is a founding member of ASEAN and it has strong relations with the
United States, which intensified since 2002 after the terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta (PRS,
2008:16). It is currently a member of the G-20.
Since 1998, some efforts have been undertaken to change the relation between the
government and the military. Suharto used to give ex-military generals positions in the
government at the national and regional level, as ambassador, governor or mayor. The military
also has been involved in various businesses, for example as recipients of concessions for
natural resource extractions (HRW, 2009:10). The military’s influence on politics has
traditionally been so important that Schulte Nordholt writes that no politician can make
decisions without the consent of the military. Abdurrahman Wahid (1999 – 2001, also known
as ‘Gus Dur’), the successor of Habibie, has attempted to place the military under the control of
the politicians (for example, he appointed a progressive general). However, these attempts
ended in the end of his political career. Megawati (2001 – 2004) has not made much effort to
narrow the power of the military. In 2002, a law was adopted officially ending the military’s
presence in the parliament (Nyman, 2006:2). This has been an important start for creating
civilian control over the military. A challenge for civilian control over the military is the fact that
only 30% of the military budget is provided by the state. The military thus engages in many
253
Although for example Aditjondro (2007:108) criticizes this term.
Decentralization led to the division that the central government would do defense, foreign policy, fiscal and
monetary policy, macro-economic policy, justice, and religion. The regions would take care for infrastructure,
trade, industry, investments, environment, education, and culture (Schulte Nordholt 2008:115). This autonomy
came in the hands of the districts (not the provinces). The central state would keep 75% of the national income.
Regions were allowed to gain their own income with the local resources. The regions could keep 15% of oil profits,
30% of gas and 80% of logging, mining, and fishing (2008:116). According to Schulte Nordholt the differences
between rich and poor regions increased (2008:117). Regional elites thus could control the most important money
flows (2008:118). In the process of decentralization many new districts were created, creating opportunities for
the local elite and access to subsidies from Jakarta (2008:118).
255
For a nuanced discussion of this phenomenon, see for example Schulte Nordholt (2008:160)
254
102
(legal and illegal) businesses to gain extra income.256 In 2004, a law was enacted requiring
military businesses to be transferred to the government (Freedom House, 2006).257 Although
military dominance still is a severe issue, the business transfers and the appointment by SBY of
non-military officials for high-level government positions indicate progress.
The military in Indonesia is thought to be responsible for many human rights violations,
such as in Aceh and East Timor, as well as the instigator of communal violence, such as in
Maluku (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:100).258 Aditjondro even argues that instead of military
reform there is the threat of remilitarization, as the government uses regional conflicts and
terrorist attacks as rationales for expansion of military deployments (2007:113).
Indonesia was among the very most corrupt countries in the world.259Schulte Nordholt
describes Indonesia as a thoroughly corrupt society, where everything and everyone can and is
bought. There have been important efforts such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK),
created in 2003, and the Anticorruption Court. These reforms have led to an improved score in
the Corruption Perception Index as well as a mixed positive evaluation by the Political Risk
Services, which emphasizes the anti-corruption activities by prosecutors, watchdogs and the
media as well as a change in the “atmosphere in the bureaucracy” indicating increased
reluctance to engage in corruption (2008:9). However, corruption is still widespread.260 The
anti-corruption initiatives are continuously under attack, for example the Anticorruption Court
was judged unconstitutional (Freedom House, 2009; Aditjondro, 2007:121). Recently, a scandal
has been reported involving the arrest of three KPK officials after an alleged attempt by the
police and prosecutors to undermine the work of the Anti-Corruption Commission after their
investigation in a case of police bribery (HRW, 2010:3). Schulte Nordholt argues that the
interests involved are too big to counter corruption effectively (2008:102).261Impunity is a
returning issue and the courts are rated as the worst institution in the country.
256
For a detailed report on military financing and specifically the detrimental effects in terms of human rights
violations, see HRW 2006 ‘Too High a Price. The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military’s Economic
Activities’
257
In October 2009, President Yudhoyono did indeed issue a decree confirming this transfer, however, Human
Rights Watch criticizes the fact that control is given to the Ministry of Defense, which is led by a civilian, but largely
staffed by military officers (HRW, 2010:3).
258
Indeed, Aditjondro suspects a “riot industry” meaning that intelligence agents played a role in intensifying
communal violence in order to secure military supremacy (2007:116). There are more analysts who perceive this
perverse role of the military in some of the violent conflicts in Indonesia, see for example the “Counternarrative”
by Drexler as described in Braithwaite (2010:39) where she suggests that the GAM insurgency is a creation of the
Indonesian military in Aceh, as the army viewed a chance to increase their resources both from Jakarta and from
foreign investors who would pay protection money.
259
In 2005, Transparency International rated Indonesia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (at 137 of
159 countries that were surveyed). In 2009, there was some improvement, as Indonesia was rated 111 of 180
surveyed countries, accessed 26 May 2010, http://media.transparency.org/imaps/cpi2009/
260
It has been argued that corruption transferred to the local level because of decentralisation (see for example
World Bank, 2007).
261
Schulte Nordholt criticizes the role of political parties in the electoral democracy. Instead of being accountable
to their constituency, political parties are there to mobilize it. Political parties are thus used by party elites to gain
access to financial sources (2008:249). What is more, only people who possess (access to) capital have a chance to
be elected, as bribes are an intrinsic part of the process of getting in the right place. Schulte Nordholt puts the
paradoxical problem as follows: “while elections give the electorate the opportunity to clear corrupt leaders, the
party system is producing an unstoppable flood of new corrupt politicians” (2008:249).
103
The international community has an interest in a peaceful Indonesia as 40% of the
international shipping transport goes through Indonesia, such as the oil transportation to Japan
(Schulte Nordholt, 2008:101). The assumption by the World Bank and international donors was
that decentralization would lead to better governance, more democracy and a stronger civil
society (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:113).262 This didn’t happen. The regionalization actually led to
more state, which would come in the hands of strong regional elites who did not have much
interest in democracy and good governance (2008:118). The central state would keep 75% of
the national income. Regions were allowed to gain their own income with the local resources.
The regions could keep 15% of oil profits, 30% of gas and 80% of logging, mining, and fishing
(2008:116). Regional elites thus came to control the most important money flows (2008:118).
According to Schulte Nordholt the differences between rich and poor regions increased
(2008:117).
Schulte Nordholt argues that the state did not become necessarily weak. He describes
the emergence of a shadow state where governmental institutions become privatized and
private interest become institutionalized (2008:119). He argues that it was not possible to do
anything without the consent of the main actors of this shadow state: bureaucrats, politicians,
business men, local criminals and preman, the police leaders and the military. Also,
decentralization did not only bring more state, but also more military to the regions. And the
split between the police and the military made that they both have to provide for their income,
what frequently leads to conflicts between these institutions (2008:120).
Schulte Nordholt describes how the initiative to decentralization was taken with the
ideal in mind of a neo-liberal economy with a vibrant civil society and less state. Instead, local
competition between elites led to enormous violence in several cases, such as Kalimantan and
Poso. This is exactly what Gaventer warns for: “Creation of new institutional designs of
participatory governance, in the absence of other participatory spaces which serve to provide
and sustain countervailing power, might simply be captured by the already empowered elite”
(Gaventer, 2006:27). Indonesia thus has a lot of state actors, but not necessarily working for
good governance and accountability. Indeed, Klinken and Barker (2009:1) characterize
Indonesia today as more democratic, but also more chaotic and corrupt than during Suharto’s
regime.
The bureaucracy is fifty times bigger than at the end of the colonial period, but Schulte
Nordholt indicates that the capacity to govern is small. The budget for its 230 million
inhabitants is 70 billion euro, whereas the Netherlands has a budget of 210 billion euro. Only
3.7 million people pay any income taxes, explaining partially the low budget. Investments in
infrastructure, health, and education are thus low (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:251). Schulte
Nordholt thus characterizes Indonesia as a “soft state” where laws are made but hardly
enforced. “The state apparatus functions “weak”, giving the political class – consisting of
bureaucrats, business men, and military – the room to set their own agenda and avoid
democratic control. It is this political class that threatens the functioning of the rule of law the
262
Decentralization led to the division that the central government would do defense, foreign policy, fiscal and
monetary policy, macro-economic policy, justice, and religion. The regions would take care for infrastructure,
trade, industry, investments, environment, education, and culture (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:115). This autonomy
came in the hands of the districts (not the provinces).
104
most. The neoliberal idea that less state would lead to better governance and more democracy
is therefore a fiction, according to Schulte Nordholt (2008:251). The Human Development
Report 2009 rates Indonesia at a Gini-index of 39.4.263
Indonesia is now categorized as a “free” society by Freedom House. In 2006 Indonesia
ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It holds regular elections. The Congress
and the president are elected, as well as governors, mayors, and local parliaments.264 Electoral
democracy is functioning well. This does not mean though that there is good democratic
control over the governmental institutions. Not only the military functions outside most of any
form of control (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:248), also regional elites enjoy considerable autonomy
in their decision-making.
Aceh
The political context in Aceh differs considerably from the rest of Indonesia. After 1998, instead
of the Reformasi and a punishment of the human rights violations committed by the military,
Aceh faced military occupation and martial law as a response to a strong return of the GAM,
the Free Aceh Movement (Braithwaite, 2010:11). During this period the GAM established its
own parallel government (ibid; 2010:13). Peace negotiations mediated by the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue between 2000 and 2003 failed. It took the tsunami in December 2004
to force the different parties to come together again. This led to the Helsinki Peace Agreement,
which gave Aceh more autonomy and considerable control over its natural resources. The lack
of benefit from its natural resources was one of the grievances that led to the founding of the
GAM (Braithwaite, 2010:9). The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was constituted to oversee
the implementation of the various provisions of the Helsinki Accords (ibid; 2010:21). 265 In 2006
elections were held and a former GAM member won the post of governor (Aditjondro,
2007:112). This power for the former GAM was consolidated in the 2009 elections where the
Aceh Party won the majority of seats in the provincial parliament. Still, violence continued in
Aceh with specific conflicts centered on land disputes, unemployment, and construction
projects, in addition to internal struggles in the GAM leadership about the reintegration fund
(Freedom House 2009). Reconstruction of Aceh after the tsunami and the building of a new
democracy are important challenges which are not without criticisms. Aditjondro for example
points out that the fear exists, that non-Acehnese corporations will benefit more from the
reconstruction than the Acehnese people (2007:131). These criticisms were also voiced by
ICCO partners Do Karim and Tikar Pandan.266
Indonesia is widely viewed as a success story of democratization. Enormous progress
such as the organization of free and fair elections and economic growth are rightly emphasized
as huge achievements after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Operational space for NGOs has indeed
increased in these years, especially in comparison to the limited space that was available during
the Suharto era. Indonesia thus offers important insights for our inquiry in the room of
263
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html
In Aceh, the Law 16/2006 introduced an independent candidate for governor election. This practice was
followed by all regions in Indonesia (based on the Judicial Court decree No. 5/PUU-V/2007).
265
Our interpreter in Banda Aceh worked one year with the AMM in 2005-2006.
266
Interview with author, 1 March 2010, Amsterdam
264
105
manoeuvre that NGOs have and the restrictions that they still experience. We specifically ask
how those restrictions are linked to the fact that whereas Indonesia has developed a formal
democracy, various features impede the deepening of this democratic potential (Aspinall 2010).
In this section, we have seen how military influence, widespread corruption, and elite
competition because of decentralization are important elements. In the next section we
describe the history and characteristics of Indonesian civil society.
Civil society and NGOs
Some scholars trace the roots of the current Indonesian civil society to the struggles in the
nineteenth century and the anti-colonial struggle (in: Nyman, 2006:29). Alternatively,
according to Nyman, the majority of scholars emphasize that the concept of ‘civil society’ is
entirely new, and that there still is a lack of awareness about it, as well as a lot of debate about
the meaning of the concept for Indonesian reality (Nyman, 2006:30ev, see also CSI Index,
2006:9). There is also suspicion of the concept of ‘civil society’ as being a Western idea. This is
supposed to be a general tendency in East and Southeast Asia where, as Baron puts it,
“government bureaucrats [...] almost always believe that they alone have the right to define
and protect the ‘public interest’ and usually reject the notion that NGOs or private foundations
have a legitimate right to participate in the making of public policy or the implementation of
public programs” (Baron, 2002).267 In Indonesia, the military traditionally opposed the term as
it could imply civilian control over the military.
The relation between civil society and the state is one of the main issues in the debate
about the meaning of civil society. As in Indonesia the Western conceptualization of civil
society is viewed as an independent force opposing the state, most Indonesian analysts prefer a
less confrontational concept. This is reflected in the tendency by NGOs to avoid the term NGO,
which can be seen as “anti-government” and instead use the term “LSM” which Nyman
translates as “community-self-help organizations” (2006:50-51). Nomura equally states that
the term LSM was chosen to emphasize the collaborative relationship with the government
(2007:501). In this regard it is important that, according to Nyman, the traditional relation
between the state and social organizations was one in which the New Order’s regime and its
corporatist character would co-opt those organizations (2006:40/207). In Indonesia, not only
NGOs are important social organizations. Religious organizations play an important role in
society. The two biggest Islamic organizations play a role in politics and in social life: Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:40). The CSI Index emphasizes the
high level of trust that Indonesians have in religious social organizations (like NU,
Muhammadiyah, church organisations, and other religious organisations) (2006:8).
The NGO-sector has been growing enormously since the 70s from tens of NGOs in the
70s to hundreds in the 80s and thousands in the 90s (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:37). Not only
quantitatively but also qualitatively the NGO sector changed. Early on, NGOs used to focus on
development, but later also social advocacy emerged. Pioneers in this field were LBH for legal
aid and Walhi, the first environmental organization (and ICCO partner in Aceh). In the 90s
attention to employment conflicts and human rights emerged (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:37 & CSI
Index, 2006:19). After 1998 one could witness a multiplication of NGOs; for example, there was
267
The Philippines seem to be an important exception to this tendency.
106
only one labour union during Suharto, now there are 40 at the national level and more at the
regional level. There has also been an emergence of many newspapers and magazines (CSI
Index, 2006:19). Nomura notes that a new trend in the post-Suharto era is the emergence of
‘research-advocacy’ NGOs (2007:509). As an indication of the positive expectations regarding
civil society, Nyman notes that president Habibie in 1998 established a civil society committee,
aiming for a close involvement of civil society (2006:44). This committee was repealed,
however, by his successor Wahid.
The NGO community is dominated by the politically conscious middle class (Schulte
Nordholt, 2008:38). NGO representatives tend to be young university-educated people for
whom advocacy has become a profession (Aditjondro, 2007:126/130). The CSI Index reports
that the relations between civil society and government are considered to be more
confrontational than cooperative. “Although the era of reform has been in swing for the past
eight years, state-civil society relations continue to be marked by mutual suspicion and
confrontation, with little in the way of seeking compromise through lobbying and negotiation,
for example” (CSI Index, 2006:55). This does not stroke with the majority of reports we
received from NGOs or Nyman’s writings (e.g. 2006:208). They tend to emphasize cooperation
with the government, which may be related to the change in donor priorities to involve the
government in democracy assistance programs (Aspinall 2010).
NGOs are mushrooming in Indonesia since 1998 and in Aceh especially since the
tsunami. Several NGO leaders explained to me that many Indonesian NGOs are considered
“red-plate” or “yellow-plate.” Red-plate refers to car number plates which belong to the
government. Red-plate NGOs are those NGOs that are founded by the government and serve
to gain access to donor money. Yellow-plate NGOs are not ‘really’ NGOs either (claim the NGO
leaders we have spoken with), as they are founded by corporations as part of an attempt to
engage in window-dressing or receive funding. Many NGO staff members perceived these
NGOs as abusing the NGO-label. This is related to a variety of acronyms that have emerged to
qualify different kinds of NGOs, such as the GONGO (government organized NGOs), Bingo
(business and industry NGOs), Dongo (donor organized NGOs), and DNGDO (domestic nongovernmental development Organizations).268 It is an interesting paradox that even though the
NGO-sector as such has a bad name in Indonesia and NGOs are generally viewed as western
agents, still the LSM-label can be very attractive for some actors. Indeed, NGO representatives
told us that those NGOs that specifically put “LSM” in front of their name are most likely not to
be authentic NGOs.
A major current issue for NGOs is their own sustainability. They are painfully dependent
on foreign funding (CSI Index, 2006:38; Aspinall, 2010:14). The CSI Index contrasts NGOs269 in
this regard with mass-based/ membership organizations (such as religious organisations, labour
unions, cooperatives, and professional organizations) which receive their funding mostly from
membership fees and business activities (2006:38). Aspinall identifies some of the difficulties
for NGOs to raise money within Indonesia, such as the lack of a philantropical tradition, no tax268
Tim Lindsey. 2002. ‘buku 4. Mencari paradigma baru,’ in: Hamid Basyaib, et al.(eds.) Mencuri uang rakyat16
kajian korupsi di Indonesia Jakarta: Aksara Foundation
269
They talk about “non-membership-based CSOs” such as NGOs, working in the advocacy sector, service delivery,
community development and civic/watchdog organisations.
107
deductability for donations to a non-profit organization, and a small middle class (2010:14).
NGO dependence on donors is becoming a major issue as donors are shifting their priorities and
less funding is available for civil society. Aspinall reports that for example ICW, the major anticorruption NGO, has lost half of its income during the past 3-4 years (2010:13). He writes that
many NGOs told similar stories and we also received similar complaints. As Indonesia has
become a success story of democratization, donors are retreating from Indonesia, and
emphasis is now placed upon governance and strengthening of government institutions instead
of the heavy focus on civil society organizations and advocacy. In addition, the Indonesian
government is given more control over the planning and implementation of democracy
assistance as donors involve the government from the earliest stages in their proposals. This is
all in the spirit of the “Jakarta Commitment,” a set of principles emphasizing country ownership
over development programs, signed in January 2009 by the Indonesian government while
inviting development partners to adopt the commitment: “The Government invites
development partners to join this commitment towards development effectiveness, to adopt
the principles of aid effectiveness as articulated in the Paris Declaration as adapted to
Indonesia's country context, and to adopt the Jakarta Commitment moving forward with the
implementation of this roadmap.”270 Aspinall indicates that fear exists that this emphasis on
partnership with the government will stifle critical voices. These observations were echoed in
our interviews with NGO representatives.
Restrictive policies and actions
In the previous section, we have described the development and main features of Indonesian
civil society and the place of NGOs therein. In this section, we turn to the policies and actions
that we have identified as restricting the space that NGOs have. We discuss (1) repression and
intimidation; (2) criminalization; (3) administrative measures; (4) stigmatization; (5) pressure on
spaces of dialogue. In general, all NGOs that we have spoken with assessed their space to have
increased dramatically compared to the Suharto era.271 Apart from changed donor priorities,
over the past five years NGOs in Jakarta generally do not report any significant changes. The
period just after 1998 is usually referred to as the period in which most space was available, but
this space is generally also described as chaotic. Space is more regulated and structured now
than just after the 1998 regime change, and NGOs emphasize the unique opportunities they
view with respect to collaboration with the government. It should further be pointed out that
many of the restrictions on operational space are not the result of official state actions and
policies but of third parties, such as fundamentalist Islamic groups in society or particular
individuals in government positions.
In contradiction to this general assessment by the NGO representatives that were
interviewed for this study, various reports on human rights signal a trend of shrinking space. In
2003, HRW signals a trend in “regressive policies aimed at curtailing political dissent in
Indonesia” (HRW, 2003:2). More recently, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)
270
The Jakarta Commitment, available at http://www.antarantt.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/jakartacommitment-121208.pdf [accessed 6 August 2010]
271
This corresponds to the conclusion of Nomura who has evaluated the impact of the return to democracy for
environmentalists NGOs (2007:513)
108
observes an increasing threat to the freedom of expression, opinion, and assembly because of
“[a]llegations of criminal defamation against human rights activists, police violence against
protesters and criminal charges of "disobedience" (2009:2). AHRC emphasizes the difference
with the acceptance of dissent a couple of years ago (2009:10). The apparent contradiction
should probably be explained by the fact that whereas restrictive measures are indeed
increasing, not all NGOs are directly affected by these measures, and even if they are affected,
the restrictions still seem minor in comparison to the Suharto regime which is still fresh in
everyone’s memory. Thus, whereas NGOs generally enjoy ample operational space to do their
work, it is important to analyze the nature and kinds of restrictions that they currently face and
be alert to those critical situations where NGOs indeed suffer major restrictions that deserve
specific attention, as well as keep an eye on potential negative developments in the future.
This is particularly so because despite the confidence in the Indonesian democracy expressed
by donors and the Indonesian government, among civil society activists there is concern that
there might be a backlash in the democratization process as the democracy may “face serious
risks of backsliding and erosion” (Aspinall, 2010:1). We have identified three major areas of
NGO-work where operational space is at times severely restricted: firstly, accountability:
corruption and human rights violations; secondly, land conflicts; and thirdly, sensitive issues in
relation to religion: gender, LGBT,272 and pluralism. The interaction between restrictive actions
and policies in these areas will be explored in the next section “On-the-job trouble.”
Repression and intimidation
It is useful to make a distinction between intimidating threats on the one hand and actual
physical violence on the other hand. Threats are quite common and various NGO staff
members reported that they receive intimidating phone calls. Former ICCO-partner Imparsial is
part of a network of 50 HRD-organizations and reported that all of these organizations receive
threats, either by SMS or by post. These threats can even become quite frequent. Threats are
usually received by phone. Imparsial reported that they for example once received a dead
chicken in the mail and people came to the office during the night and threw stones. In 2003,
Imparsial experienced public demonstrations in front of their office.273 ICCO-partner KontraS
reported that their office was destroyed in such a public demonstration.274 NGOs in the urban
areas most affected by threats, are the very vocal human rights NGO (such as Imparsial and
Kontras), and NGOs who work on very sensitive issues such as LGBT. Many NGOs reported to
have filed complaints about threats with the police. Police inaction in the investigation of
threats is common. LBH Aceh reported in one instance that by taking threats to the police, the
threats stopped, even though no investigations or arrests occurred. Most of our interlocutors
reported that these threats are very rarely followed up by actual physical attacks. Notable
exceptions exist, such as the murder in 2004 of human rights activist Munir, the director of then
ICCO-partner IMPARSIAL. His death exemplifies both the real lethal threat to activists, and the
inaction on the part of the government to punish perpetrators of such violence. Courts are
272
LGBT is an acronym that stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, issues or rights.
Interview with author, 1 April 2010, Jakarta
274
Interview with author, 31 March 2010, Jakarta
273
109
highly ineffective in Indonesia. While this is a general problem, in the case of human rights
violations, there might be a specific unwillingness to prosecute.
Even though many NGOs have reported to receive threats, most NGOs argue that the
threats don’t have much impact on their work. For example ICCO-partner Gerak Aceh and LBH
(Legal Aid) Aceh argue that they have never dropped a case because of threats.275 In other
instances, however, threats have caused an NGO to leave an area, or significantly altered the
way an NGO operates. This occurred for example in the cases of ICCO-partners Flower Aceh
and YRBI in Aceh.276 Several NGOs mentioned that they do not receive threats, because they
consciously operate carefully without provoking anyone, thus avoiding those risks (this will be
further discussed below in “responses”).
In general, threats, injuries, and killings are widespread in Indonesian society. Violence
is a method commonly used by the military, politicians, the police, and criminal organizations.
As a background to the use of threats and violence it is important to know that the New Order
was characterized by “premanism.” A “preman” is a small criminal who in exchange for a
payment resolves the dirty business of political leaders (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:44 and 110).
This system has not changed in the Reformasi period. Some NGOs mentioned the role of
“preman” in local land issues but also in relation to labour issues.277 Freedom House similarly
reports of physical attacks by “thugs” against human rights groups who are critical of military
abuses, labor activists, and peasants involved in land disputes (2006). Indicating the severity of
this violence, the UN Special Representative for Human Rights Defenders (HRD) notes that HRD
can suffer from “extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary execution, enforced disappearance,
torture and ill-treatment” (UN Special Representative, 2007:17).278 In October 2010, video
images were released that showed the torture of Papuans by the Indonesian military. 279
The experiences of urban NGOs can be quite different from what communities suffer in
distant regions. Community leaders (of GROs) are more frequently threatened than
professional NGOs in urban areas. As an example of experienced intimidation, the NGO
representative of ICCO-partner Tikar Pandan reported that the military was driving around his
office.280 Activists in rural areas are more likely to suffer from actual violence, specifically in
conflict-ridden and militarized areas such as Papua. For example, the AHRC (2009:3) reports
about West Papua that there is “on-going military violence, most of which is conducted to
intimidate suspected independence activists.” In 2004, a human rights worker for ELSAM, who
tried to photograph a police attack on demonstrators gathered near Jayapura for West Papua’s
Independency day, was reportedly beaten by the police (RFK, 2004:5). AHRC reports that
incidents tend to happen in remote provinces and when the military protects mining activities
and other natural recourse activities (2009:3-4). Violence also occurs in the context of land
275
Interviews with author, respectively 5 and 6 April 2010, Banda Aceh
Interviews with author, respectively 6 and 7 April 2010, Banda Aceh
277
The spokesperson from Demos told that businessmen sometimes contract preman.
278
Surprisingly, torture is not criminalized in Indonesia. (In the Philippines, this was only criminalized in November
2009). Indonesia is under the obligation to criminalize it, as it has ratified the Convention against Torture in
October 1998 (AHRC, 2009:3).
279
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNSj5av8ip4 and
http://www.nrc.nl/buitenland/article2634683.ece/Jakarta_erkent_martelen_Papua_s%2C_straft_militairen
280
Interview with author, 1 March 2010, Amsterdam
276
110
disputes. Various NGO representatives we spoke with reported that physical harassment
generally occurs when the police remove peasants or arrests them. In one violent incident in
2005, the police in Lombok fired into a crowd of 700 unarmed peasants who had come
peacefully together to commemorate National Peasants’ Day and discuss land issues. The UN
Special Representative reports that “the peasants were opposing the planned construction of a
new international airport on 850 hectares of fertile land in Lombok on which the peasants were
living and cultivating the land to sustain their livelihoods” (UN Special Representative, 2007:17).
Indicating the absence of adequate state response, NGO representatives reported that there
are never criminal cases against policemen, when illegitimate violence against peasants occurs,
at the most there are ‘administrative’ cases leading for example to a suspension.
Whereas the police and the military are at times involved in cases of physical violence,
most activists we spoke with were more worried about the impact of non-state actors, such as
preman, but also importantly some mass organizations, such as FPI (Islamic Defenders Front),
FBR (Forum Betawi Rempug), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Muslims Forum (FUI). This
corresponds with what CSI Index (2006:66) reported in 2006: “One of the groups with large
base allegedly practicing violence is an ethnic group called Forum Betawi Rempuk. These
groups have been criticised by civil society for their violence when they beat up NGO activists
from the Urban Poor Consortium during a demonstration outside the offices of the national
commission on human rights.” Such an attack occurred for example during a peaceful protest
in the context of the birth of Pancasila281, dated June 1, 2008 at the National Monument
(Monas) in Jakarta.282 The National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Beliefs (AKBB), which
consists of a number of NGO activists, were attacked by Laskar Islam Defenders (LPI), which
contained members of the FPI, HTI and FUI. Some activists were wounded, and had to be
rushed to the hospital, one of the wounded was Ahmed Suaedi (Executive Director of the
Wahid Institute) (see for example the news report on the website of one of ICCO’s partners
VHR Media283).
Other incidents occurred in the course of legal proceedings. Various NGOs have made
an alliance in the petition for judicial review of a law on blasphemy (PNPS Act 1/1965). 284 Here
we can observe that the protection of space can become a new source of contention. In
interviews, human rights advocates reported of intimidation and harassment shortly after the
proceedings in the Constitutional Court, on Wednesday, March 24, 2010. On the same day, the
police cancelled an LGBT conference in Surabaya due to pressure of Islamist fundamentalist
groups.285 An interviewee who was present at the site reported that a group of
fundamentalists was banging on the outside of the conference hall. No physical violence
occurred but the psychological threat was felt. She described it as “demoralizing.” Many staff
281
Pancasila is the state ideology (Nyman 2006:36).
For a report on the incident and its aftermath, see for example, Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: Reverse Ban on
Ahmadiyah Sect, 10 June 2008, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/484f85702c.html [accessed 24
May 2010]
283
http://www.vhrmedia.com/Religious-Dispute-Is-Longing-to-be-Solved-focus3700.html
284
Desantara, Elsam, Imparsial, PBHI, Equivalent Institute, and the Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) and Demos
285
http://iglhrc.wordpress.com/2010/04/02/lgbt-activism-under-attack-in-surabaya-indonesia/. This incident was
also related in an interview with the author on March 31st in Jakarta with one of the activists, Monica
Tanuhandaru, project coordinator with the IOM. She was present during that conference in Surabaya.
282
111
members of NGOs that were interviewed expressed their worries about this trend of religious
intolerance which will be discussed in the next section “On-the-job trouble.”
Actual violence is not commonly experienced by representatives of professional NGOs,
even though the murder of Munir is a forceful reminder that this violence is not impossible.
Grassroots community leaders are much more likely to experience actual violence in
confrontation with the police, military or non-state actors, such as preman, religious
fundamentalists or unknown opponents. Intimidating threats are common for all NGO
representatives that work in one of the areas identified as sensitive.
Criminalization
A distinction should be made between general laws and measures on the one hand and the
specific use of these laws against certain NGO leaders or activists. The operational space of
NGOs is of course affected by general repressive measures, such as the martial law that gave
the military control over governance in Aceh. More important in the current Indonesian
context, however, are the ways in which specific provisions in the criminal code such as the law
on criminal defamation are used to silence activists who speak out against corruption, demand
justice for past human rights violations, or peasants who claim lands. Some concern existed
that counter terrorism efforts might have counterproductive effects for NGO activists as well.
Recent new anti-terrorism legislation has sparked a lively debate about the broadness of the
definition of terrorism and the possible abuses this might lead to. For example, Caveat (August
2009:5) reports that the first law on counterterrorism applies to “anyone who deliberately uses
violence or the threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or to cause mass
casualties by robbing individuals of freedom or causing the loss of life or property, or damage
or destruction to strategic vital installations or public or international facilities.” This means that
also material destruction without loss of lives can be categorized as terrorism, creating the
possibility that the law is used against a wide variety of protest actions.286 To date however,
there have been hardly any problems for NGO members with this legislation or with other
counter terrorism measures. In one notable exception, former ICCO partner Imparsial reported
an incident in which people working for a foundation on human rights policy in South Sulawesi
were arbitrarily arrested and tortured in 2005 in relation to a bomb in Tentena, Poso, on May
28th (Imparsial, 2009:32). The activists were released, but the case is still on-going.
A more significant hurdle than counter terrorism measures are various provisions from
the Indonesian Penal Code that are used against NGO staff. The provisions on “insulting the
president” and “hate sowing” were used quite frequently in the past (see for example HRW,
2003), until they have been repealed in 2006 and judged unconstitutional in 2007 respectively
(UN Special Representative, 2007:10). Currently, the law on criminal defamation that is still on
the books is used frequently against activists during recent years (AHRC, 2009:18). The charge
of criminal defamation is the consequence of a complaint by a third person to the police,
usually someone who has been identified by the NGO as engaged in corruption or responsible
286
Further criticisms have been voiced about the Special Anti-Terror Detachment of the Police Headquarters which
consists of 400 members and was trained by the CIA and FBI. Their anti-terrorism activities mainly targeting
Muslims have been fuelling communal sentiments and potentially exacerbated the conflicts (Aditjondro, 2007:118;
see also ICG, 2006:5-6).
112
for past human rights abuses. Various NGOs we spoke with mentioned that their staff faces
charges against them for criminal defamation or have been threatened with such charges, such
as ICCO partners KontraS, Gerak Aceh and Imparsial, as well as LBH Aceh and ICW. Few
defamation cases, however, are actually brought to court or lead to a conviction. Often the
organizations receive information that they will be charged with criminal defamation, but
nothing happens as the police start investigations but do not pursue them. Only in a small
number of cases there is actually a trial, and only in two cases were there convictions (Gerak
Aceh and LBH). In 2007, LBH Aceh (Legal Aid Aceh) was assisting farmers in a lawsuit against a
palm oil plantation, the Bumi Flora Corporation in East Aceh. When they assisted by providing
the leaflet for a rally that the farmers were organizing, they were charged with “spreading
hatred” because in the leaflet they printed a summary of the case brief in which they presented
the chronology of the land-issue and the demands of the farmers. Eight members of LBH were
convicted to a conditional sentence.287
The problem of criminalization seems to be more severe in rural areas where peasants
and GRO leaders are affected by criminal charges as they are in the process of claiming land.288
Various professional NGOS, such as ICCO partner PRAXIS and also non-ICCO partner ELSAM
reported that they often assist local peasants when they are facing criminal charges against
them. More information on the use of criminal charges in relation to land disputes can be
found below in the next section “On-the-job trouble.”
In areas where separatist groups are active, NGOs and non-violent activists can face
criminal charges because of an alleged relation with separatist activities. In Papua, activists
have been charged with subversion and treason, receiving sentences of 20 years in prison for
actions such as the raising of the Papuan national flag (AHRC, 2009:10; HRW, 2007; AI, 2008:2).
Particularly troubling were the arrest and convictions of five GAM-negotiators after the
negotiations about Aceh failed. Whereas they had not engaged in violence, it was argued that
being high GAM officials they shared responsibility for the terrorist acts committed by the GAM
(ICG, 2006:4). Apart from the use of criminal charges, the Special Rapporteur for the UN also
mentions surveillance activities of human rights defenders (2007:3) for example in Aceh
(2007:23) and Papua (2007:22, see also AHRC, 2009:8-9).
The operational space of NGOs is hardly affected by general measures such as antiterrorism laws. The specific use of criminal offenses such as ‘criminal defamation’ against
accountability advocates restricts NGOs in their operations. GRO leaders in land disputes often
face criminal charges, such as theft and illegal entrance of a plantation. GRO leaders in Papua
have faced charges of sedition and rebellion.
Restrictive administrative measures
Baron argues that in general in Asia the laws to regulate the NGO-sector are driven by national
security concerns (2002). In Indonesia, at the end of the 80s, the government started to control
the NGO sector, and NGOs had to give insight in their budgets and justify the source of their
287
Interview with author, 6 April 2010, Banda Aceh. More information on this case can for example be found on
the website of the Asian Human Rights Commission: INDONESIA: Eight people in Aceh convicted of disseminating
pamphlets, 1 September 2008,http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2008/2992/ [accessed 26 May 2010]
288
KPA will send data about the number of cases of criminal defamation that were filed against peasants of their
member organizations.
113
income (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:37). Just like in other countries, in Indonesia, NGOs have set
up mechanisms of self-regulation. CIVICUS reports that in 2002, several NGOs established an
umbrella organization and a code of ethics which was signed by 252 NGOs (CSI Index,
2006:35).289
In the interviews it turned out that there is a general lack of knowledge about the
details of NGO legislation as well as about the tax-regime for NGOs.290 Two laws create the
legal framework for NGOs: a 1985 law on ‘associations’ and a 2004 law on ‘foundations.’ NGOs
can thus obtain legal status as an association (membership-based) or a foundation (nonmembership based). It is also possible to operate without any registration (CSI Index, 2006:4950). NGOs as ‘associations’ are still governed by a law which stems from 1985.291 This law has
very strict provisions, enabling the government to dissolve an NGO when it “conducts any
activities that disrupt security and public order, receives assistance from foreign parties without
Government’s approval, and provides assistance to foreign parties that are damaging to the
interests of the State and the Nation” (PSHK, 2008:14-15).292 Whereas the CSI Index
emphasizes that this law has not been used anymore to stifle NGOs and therefore is “no longer
effective” (2006:50), PSHK is more worried because the law is still on the books and therefore
can be used if that is deemed necessary.293
During Suharto most NGOs registered as ‘foundations’ (yayasan) because of the
potential repression faced by ‘associations.’ Nyman writes that foundations were not perceived
as a threat by Suharto because they lacked mass membership (2006:51). Since the law on
foundations has been enacted in 2004 (PSHK, 2008:5), some NGOs are anticipating trouble and
289
“The code of ethics mainly governs the issues related to the integrity, accountability, transparency,
independence, anti violence, gender equality, financial management (including the responsibility towards
beneficiaries, government, and donor institutions), among NGOs and the general public” (ibid.).
290
This confusion is related to the distinction between tax exemption and the possibility of obtaining taxdeductability for donations. As Baron points out, generally there is tax exemption for NGOs, however to obtain
tax-deductability is more complicated and restrictive (2002). This indeed is also the case in Indonesia. Only some
donations such as for national disasters are considered tax deductible. Donations for NGOs are generally not tax
deductible. In 2008 a law on income tax was enacted (PSHK 2008:8). This law gives incentives in the form of Tax
Exemption and Tax Deduction for activities in the non-profit sectors. In the Law on Tax Income, Tax Exemption is
given to surplus money, donations and or grants received or obtained by non-profit bodies or agencies in the field
of education and/or research and development.
291
Article 14 Law No. 8 Year 1985 on Community Organizations
292
This law also addresses “assistance and receiving foreign funding” (PSHK, 2008:9). PSHK writes that “[t]here is
actually nothing new in the content of this regulation.” There is still an obligation to seek government’s approval
before receiving assistance from foreign parties. PSHK writes that “[i]n order to be able to receive assistance from
foreign parties, CO must be registered with the Department of Home Affairs, other government institutions, or
regional government (Article 7)” and “COs that are to receive foreign assistance directly are obliged to report the
plan to receive such assistance to the Minister of Home Affairs (Article 10).”
293
Also the UN Special Representative reports more critically on the way in which the government currently can
use this law (2007:12): “According to this law, registration of NGOs is compulsory, and criteria for registration
contain ideological elements and adherence to a subjective code of morality that appear to be unjustified and
intrusive. Further, it was alleged that the Government uses the registration regime to allow the creation of
organizations that are more compliant and can be used for countering NGO criticism of any aspects of Government
performance on human rights. The law also places undue restrictions on international funding to NGOs.” It is not
clear though whether this conclusion is entirely correct, as registration for NGOs is not compulsory.
114
therefore changing their status from a ‘foundation’ into an ‘association.’294 No one seems to
know whether that is indeed a good decision, but fear exists that the government may suddenly
use administrative laws to restrict NGOs. Whereas some NGOs have changed their status to
‘association’ because they perceived the new law on foundations as a potential threat, other
NGO representatives argue that the new 2004 law is good and supposed to counter corruption,
money-laundering (as many foundations were founded by Suharto and his family to function as
money laundering covers), and the channelling of charity money to terrorist purposes.295 The
goal of the new law was to make those abusive foundations responsible and accountable to the
public. These analysts emphasize that the possibilities for restriction have not been used
against bona fide NGOs.
ICCO partner Peace Brigades International (PBI) reported severe problems with
registration which may be related to the prohibition on international NGOs to conduct political
activities in Indonesia (see for this prohibition PSHK, 2008:12).296 They changed their legal
status and became a national foundation (instead of an international organization). It is not
clear whether this actually solved their problems or just created other problems.297
Uncertainty about their legal status is currently identified as one of the major challenges;
particularly with respect to their field office is in Papua, as they reported severe problems
regarding their travel permits in Papua and visa for their volunteers. Different government
employees asked them many times to submit information and letters in order to obtain the
necessary permit, but since January 2010 they have failed to obtain the permit at all. They have
experienced delays in permits before, but it was never entirely impossible. PBI reported that
the “western” label was used against them frequently in this context, along with a suspicion
that their work in Papua would not be what they were saying it is. Government officials would
insinuate that PBI would abuse its access to help separatists and expose the government in
international publications. Many international NGOs experience restrictions when they want to
work in Papua. In April 2009 the Indonesian government denied the ICRC access to Papua.298
Freedom House similarly reports that foreign funding agencies and NGOs experienced
difficulties experienced in terms of their legal status in Aceh and Papua (2006). At this moment
PBI is one of the few international organizations still present in Papua.
Administrative regulations of demonstrations and public activities
In general, in Indonesia you are free to organize demonstrations, and you don’t need a permit.
However, you do need to notify the police. Some NGOs in Aceh, however, reported that they
do face restrictions on public activities. ICCO-partners Do Karim and Tikar Pandan reported
that they need prior permission for a variety of events and ceremonies where there will gather
more than thirty people. In addition, they need permission from the Islamic scholars, ensuring
that the event is not dangerous for the Islam.299 LBH Aceh reported that often when the police
294
For example ICW changed its legal status.
Interviews with author, March/April 2010, Jakarta, Banda Aceh
296
Interview with author, 30 March 2010, Jakarta
297
From the PBI Evaluation 2008:25-26
298
See Reuters, 22 April 2009 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSJAK434532._CH_.2400. HRW 2010 reports that
not only the ICRC field office in Papua but also in Banda Aceh had to close.
299
Interview with author, 1 March 2010, Amsterdam
295
115
want to disturb a rally or a meeting, they claim that the demonstration or meeting was not
properly notified with the police. In addition, LBH reported that sometimes the police request
to be present during public meetings.300 These restrictions correspond to the observations of
the UN Special Representative in Aceh regarding the “wrongful application of law on public
meetings by the police who require permission, together with statutes, from NGOs for
organizing workshops and seminars. When permission is not sought, the police reportedly
conduct an investigation to know the content of the meeting” (2007:23).
The main problem with the Indonesian administrative framework for NGOs seems to be
the lack of clarity and the existence two laws on foundations and associations, both of which
are potentially restrictive, even though at least in case of the 2004 law the reasons for those
potential restrictions are genuine. Despite fears to the contrary, the administrative framework
does not seem to cause NGOs any problems. Only one NGO reported actual problems because
of their legal status, which created problems for their operations in Papua. NGOs in Aceh
sometimes are restricted in their ability to organize public meetings.
Stigmatization
In a striking difference with the open and welcoming attitude towards the NGO-sector in the
Philippines, suspicion in Indonesia is directed towards the NGO-sector as a whole. Without
exception, NGO leaders reported this stigma. They are supposed to be western puppets. This
labeling is attributed mostly to the military and some government officials, but also importantly
to religious fundamentalists who for example claim that NGOs are related to Satan. ICCO
partner Do Karim reported that also the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘secular’ have a negative
connotation in Aceh. CSI Index (2006:9) also reported the general stigmatization of the NGO
sector as a whole: “Civil society, particularly NGOs, have for a long time now been built up on
foreign aid, to the extent that their values and goals are inappropriate to their domestic base,
including the people and government. Therefore, it can perhaps be understood why civil
society, especially NGOs, which are known as the pioneers of reform and democracy, are also
frequently branded as tools of foreign propaganda. Due to differences in values, and the urban
nature of NGOs and trade unions, Indonesian people in general are not familiar with these
organizations and as a result, public trust in them is low.”
Most NGOs we interviewed claimed that this general suspicion does not affect them
much, but the ‘western’ stigma does affect those NGOs that work on religious issues, programs
related to pluralism, and NGOs that work closely with Muslim communities. For example,
NGOs in Aceh working with women and on issues of gender reported that they struggle against
the widespread image that “gender” is a western concept. The ‘foreign agenda’ label also
heavily affects international NGOs who are suspected to do something else (such as political
involvement or support for separatists) than what they say they do. As a result of the stigma
NGOs can get questions where their money comes from or communities can refuse to work
with the NGO. ICCO partners Do Karim and Tikar Pandan reported that they are careful not to
emphasize that they receive foreign funding, as this easily can and sometimes is used against
them with the argument that they are executing a hidden foreign agenda. For example, in their
300
LBH’s tactic to deal with this involves making the meeting so boring that the police will leave and only then they
start the real discussion. Interview with author, 6 April 2010, Banda Aceh
116
activities they do not use the ICCO logo.301 Whereas the unaffected NGOs claim not to do
anything about the negative label, the affected NGOs emphasize a good communication
strategy, a low profile of western donors, not publicizing their logo, and the changing of names
of their programs.
Apart from this general stigma against the NGO-sector as such, there are specific
instances where NGOs suffer from negative labels because of their activities. In one specific
case the Head of State Intelligence Agency publicly classified human rights organizations
Imparsial, KontraS and Elsam as “radical.” The UN Special Representative reports that these
organizations were accused of receiving foreign aid and assisting separatist movements
(2007:17). Imparsial filed a civil case against this military officer. They asked for revision of the
statement, but lost this case in the lower court and appeal, now the case is pending before the
Supreme Court. The ‘communist’ label is another stigma still used today against various
activists (Aditjondro, 2007). Aditjondro describes an incident in December 2006 in Surabaya
where the Human Rights Study Center of the Airlangga University that wanted to screen a film
on the killings in 1965 was forced to cancel the screening by persons from the “Front
Antikomunis.” The Front relied upon a new law issued by Habibie which forbids any activity to
disseminate communism (2007:119).302 Also pro-labour activists suffer from the communist
stigma as well as advocates of land reform. KPA reported that as a way to counter this stigma
they decided to talk about “agrarian reform” instead.303
In the (former) conflict areas of Aceh and Papua, there is (was) the specific risk for NGOs
to be associated with the rebels. For example, during martial law in Aceh, people suspected of
relations to the GAM and land rights activists have been found to be labelled as terrorists. Also,
human rights defenders have been stigmatized as insufficiently nationalist. The UN Special
Rapporteur mentions an example where a military commander stated publicly that human
rights defenders are “those who sell their own country” (2007:23). In Papua, there is the
specific danger for activists to be labelled as “separatists.” The UN Special Representative
reports a case of church workers in West Papua who were linked to the separatist Papua Free
Movement after having voiced their concerns regarding human rights violations suffered by the
local population (2007:20; AI, 2008:2). She views this stigma as a deliberate attempt to
undermine the credibility of these allegations of abuse. AHRC (2009:12) reports that there may
have been deliberate stigmatization of Papua activists by staging fake “resistance attacks.”
When one NGO is accused of sympathies for rebels, this puts other NGOs in a difficult spot. PBI
that works in Papua reported of the difficulty to on the one hand work with local NGOs in
Papua and defend their activities in the face of these stigmas and on the other hand maintain a
neutral position vis-à-vis the government in order not to be refused access to Papua.
Stigmatization is an issue for almost all Indonesian NGOs. They all face the negative
label of executing a ‘western’ agenda. For some NGOs this label seriously restricts their
operational space. In Papua, NGOs and GROs face the risk to be labelled as sympathizers of
separatists, which has serious consequences for their space.
301
Interview with author, 1 March 2010, Amsterdam
Law No 27/1999 signed by President Habibie on 19 May 1999, still in force.
303
Agrarian reform means three things: (1) land reform, to return lands to communities that were evicted by
Suharto often without compensation; (2) market reform to change the cheaper incoming products, for example
from China; (3) access reform to seeds and fertilizers. Interview of author on April 8, 2010 in Jakarta
302
117
Existing spaces of dialogue under pressure
Many of the NGOs we interviewed are very positive and hopeful about the possibilities to work
together with the government, especially some of the NGOs in Jakarta. They take full
advantage of the opportunities that are currently offered to NGOs and their leaders. Nyman
similarly notes that both Indonesian scholars and activists “stress the need for increasing
cooperation between the state and civil society” (2006:208). For example one NGO (Demos)
points out that at this moment there even is the possibility to get in touch with the inner circle
of the president. Despite this increased collaboration and participation, sometimes civil society
actors are still excluded from decision-making. For example, as ICCO-partner HuMA pointed
out, in the working group on REDD304 there is no representation of civil society. In another
example, ICCO partners Do Karim and Tikar Pandan in Aceh reported that whereas before the
transition the relation between the GAM and the NGOs was very good, now the GAM looks at
NGOs with more suspicion and can perceive them as a threat. “With the transition, everything
became more complicated,” they say. In one case, advisors from the governor approached
them to stop demonstrations against a cement factory. They were told that their activities
were negative for the investors, and “if you continue your work, you are going to be arrested.”
In this section, we discuss the possibilities of collaboration with the government. We
also identify three limitations on the spaces of dialogue that have opened up. Firstly, spaces of
dialogue can be transformed into ‘fake spaces’ as NGO contributions are received but not used.
For example, because sometimes consultation with civil society actors is only done because of a
requirement by a multilateral donor like the World Bank, it turns out to be only a “formal”
consultation. Secondly, spaces of dialogue can fail to be used adequately as NGOs don’t
manage to sustain their institutional capacity and attract good leaders. Increased cooperation
between donors and the government can effectively enable the government to decrease
funding for critical NGOs. Other mechanisms threaten the institutional capacity of NGOs. This
is also recognized by Aspinall (2010), who cites an NGO representative complaining about
donors: ‘Now they just come to us if they want a report, but it’s very hard for us to do our basic
work of collecting data and monitoring of corruption’ (2010:13). Thirdly, spaces of dialogue can
be abused when counterparts of NGOs use violence or bribes. Various NGOs have expressed
particular concern about the tactics used by companies to win communities over for their
commercial enterprises. In some instances, particularly NGOs working with land rights and anticorruption, have reported efforts of their opponents to negotiate and offer bribes.305
ICCO-partners such as AMAN and HuMA cooperate actively with the government. They
participate for example in the preparation of laws. Indeed, the government itself asks
explicitly for assistance. “They appreciate us,” says the HuMA representative. NGOs reported
that they felt they had a genuine influence because of this cooperation, however, that by doing
this, they were doing the work that the government should do. Whereas in the Philippines
several NGOs reported their frustration with the government as it ignored their proposals that
304
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, for a criticism on the REDD policies and the way in
which they perpetuate benefits from current concession holders such as oil and logging plantations over
indigenous people, see Steni (2010).
305
The CSI Index (2006:55) similarly reports about criticisms regarding aid that mining companies give to local
NGOs at the company site.
118
they offered in dialogues, in Indonesia most NGOs report collaboration with the government
and are thus far optimistic about the process. In this regard, NGOs point to the significant
difference compared to the Suharto time. The HuMA spokesperson mentions, that they want
to take this “government space” that is now offered. It is clearly viewed as an opportunity that
should be grabbed. He thinks it is too soon to tell whether or not this collaboration indeed
yields positive results, but he emphasizes that at this point the collaboration in itself is more
important than the future results. HuMA indicates that for example in their suggestions for a
regulation, several parts were indeed adopted.306 As HuMA has its own source of funding it can
operate independently from the government. This contrasts sharply with the reports from the
Philippines where NGOs work with the government on projects but are paid by and thus
subordinated to the government.
In one instance, we could identify what we have called ‘fake space’: the former director
of LBH (Legal Aid) Aceh reported some frustration about the collaboration with the local
government regarding the law on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). With a
working group, he drafted a law for the TRC, on request by the governor.307 But since they
submitted the draft in November 2008 nothing has happened. He feels that they were asked to
draft the law just so the governor could say he was working on the TRC, but the willingness to
actually create the TRC is lacking. When he asked for clarification about the delays regarding
the TRC in a public meeting, the spokesperson of the government replied that he should not ask
about that, because he had written the law himself, so he knew that they were working on it.
He felt that at that point his cooperation was being used against him, to silence his demands for
action on the TRC.308
The willingness of the government to cooperate with NGOs should partially be
understood as a result of the requirement set by multilateral institutions such as IMF and World
Bank. The positive influence of donors in this regard (by promoting inclusion of civil society) is
offset by criticisms that donors also get to set the priorities.309 For example, the Elsam
representative pointed out that whereas there is money available for the improvement of the
law-making process, there is little money for accountability for past human rights abuses.
These shifts in priorities are especially noteworthy as these decisions are currently often made
in close cooperation and consultation with the Indonesian government (Aspinall, 2010). As
discussed above, donors are shifting their focus from NGOs to governance assistance and
closely cooperating with the Indonesian government from the planning phase. Aspinall’s
assessment in this regard leaves no doubt: “Yet it should come as no surprise that government
officials are more interested in having donors provide assistance to government agencies than
to CSOs, especially ones that might criticise the government, and that their input is having an
306
Interview with author, 8 April 2010, Jakarta
For more information on this working group for the TRC see for example Braithwaite (2010:37).
308
Interview with author, 6 April 2010, Banda Aceh
309
As an illustration of the restrictive influence donors can have, Aditjondro describes that the Ford Foundation
was involved in censoring environmentalist activists regarding US mining companies (2007:123). He describes also
that two US ambassadors put pressure on USAID to cut funding to Walhi and Jatam (Anti Mining Advocacy
Network), because of their criticism of the US mining companies Freeport McMoRan and NewMont (2007:129).
Aspinall (2010:17) writes that Walhi decided not to accept funds as they did not want “to be dictated to.”
307
119
effect on the nature of democracy assistance” (2010:8). NGO representatives reported great
concern for their space in this regard.
The quality of spaces of dialogue depends heavily on the strength and sustainability of
NGOs as well as the capacities of their leaders. Above, we already indicated that NGO
sustainability is a real issue in Indonesia due to donor dependency. NGO representatives
expressed their concern because of the competition that NGOs founded by the government,
corporations, and donors (red-plate or yellow-plate NGOs) pose in terms of the struggle for
foreign funding as well as the maintenance of good leaders and organizers. Many NGO leaders
knew examples where talented activists had been lured away into comfortable positions as a
consultant for donor-driven projects thus disconnecting them from their bases (see for similar
observations also Aspinall, 2010). One NGO asserted that political parties like to recruit from
well-known social movements. This leads to frustration regarding good community leaders
who get a political post, for example in a specific case in South Sumatra where a leader became
senator, which resulted in his village losing all strength. In other instances, NGOs observed that
competing NGOs were receiving money from the local government in order to function as a
broker with communities, but interviewees complained that these competing NGOs barricade
the real issue instead of solving it.
In general, optimism about the benefits of collaboration with the government far
exceeds negative experiences regarding cooperation. Points of concern are the combination of
negotiation, bribery and intimidation, which seems especially prevalent with respect to NGOs
who level accountability accusations and GRO leaders engaged in struggles regarding natural
resources. Other concerns relate to the increasing cooperation between donors and the
Indonesian government to the detriment of (critical) NGOs as well as the luring away of good
NGO leaders into positions of consultants and political positions, thus decreasing the
sustainable capacity of NGOs to be strong actors in spaces of dialogue.
On the job trouble
In the previous section, we discussed the various restrictions that NGOs in Indonesia face in
their work. In this section we turn to those specific contexts in which NGOs those restrictions
occur and come together to hamper NGOs in their work. Whereas most human rights reports
provide a broad overview of the various violations that citizens suffer, it is our aim to indicate
how this context of limitations actually impacts the work that NGOs are doing. In this section,
we have identified three areas of claim-making in which the operational space of NGOs is under
pressure. We look at (1) NGOs demanding accountability for corruption and past human rights
violations; (2) peasants and indigenous people (re-)claiming land; and (3) decreasing space for
NGOs working on issues of gender, LGBT, and pluralism. This analysis enables us to address for
each of these working areas, the actors that are responsible for the restrictions, the interaction
between different restrictions and the way in which these restrictions actually affect the space
of NGOs and in what way it limits or impacts their work as well as the local response capacities.
120
CASE BOX: combinations of negotiation, bribes and intimidation
Many times, NGOs reported that corporations or other actors offered bribes to them or to
GRO leaders. For example, in 2007 in Aceh there was a bridge that was in the process of
construction. However, the contractor didn’t finish the bridge. The surrounding
communities approached ICCO partner Gerak Aceh to discuss the issue. Gerak went to the
media and exposed the fact that the contractor did not finish his job. The contractor
happened to be an ex-combatant of the GAM and approached one of the members of
Gerak individually to talk with them. The Gerak staff told him that if he wanted to talk, he
could come to the office. But the contractor insisted on meeting in private at another
location. He wanted to negotiate and offered a bribe. The staff member refused the bribe.
That is when they started receiving threats. However, the threats never materialized. And
the case regarding the bridge was sent to the police.
When ICCO-partners Do Karim and Tikar Pandanin Aceh organized a demonstration, as
they were critical of the way in which the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRR)
spent its money after the tsunami, the BRR offered them money, supposedly in order to
stop the demonstration. Do Karim and Tikar Pandan rejected and claimed that they didn’t
want money, but demanded the BRR to be building houses instead of wasting it on a
cooking competition.
ICCO-partner Permata argues that this practice, the combination of negotiation and the
offering of benefits to leaders, is very frequent in land conflicts as well. For example in 2007
in Abdya, in South-west Aceh, the BALCompany (palm oil plantation) approached the head
of the district. The company asked him to calm down the people and the company
succeeded to acquire the lands. The farmers were offered 2 ha per household, and the
leader argued that thus the deal was beneficial to the farmers. Permata, however, argues
that the company got more than 1,000 hectares out of the deal, whereas 60 households
got 2 ha each, totaling 120 hectares for the farmers, thus taking advantage of the farmers.
This example indicates that the use of violence is not necessarily prevalent, because the
elite have other means to acquire the land, with the advantage of the guise of legality.
Accountability: corruption and human rights violations
Keeping influential people accountable can be very dangerous as is illustrated by the case of
“Tommy” Suharto. He was tried in 1999 for a case of fraud. He was convicted at first, but
acquitted on appeal. Schulte Nordholt reports that every time that Tommy was interrogated or
had to appear for a judge, there was a bomb attack in Jakarta (2008:76). In 2001, the judge
that convicted Tommy Suharto for corruption and refused to accept a bribe of $200,000 was
killed in broad daylight in Jakarta (2008:108). In this context, it is not surprising that NGO
121
representatives310 frequently mentioned that when they demand accountability from high
government officials or powerful economic actors, it is common that they receive offers of
bribes or negotiation about the charges, sometimes combined with intimidation, threats,
and/or criminal defamation charges. Recently, an anti-corruption activist got severely
injured.311 The opponents of NGOs in this category tend to be military officials or government
officials in the national or local government. NGOs that work in this terrain of accountability
are anti-corruption NGOs, such as ICW and Gerak Aceh, as well as NGOs demanding
accountability regarding past human rights violations (such as ICCO partner KontraS and
Imparsial).
Anti-corruption NGOs Gerak Aceh and ICW have faced criminal charges of criminal
defamation. This is despite the fact that the police regulations state that in cases of corruption
accusations the priority should be placed on the corruption charged, and not on a counterclaim of criminal defamation. When one of the employees of ICW was summoned for
questioning on possible criminal defamation charges (HRW, 2010:4), she wrote a letter to the
police pointing out to them this priority rule.312 It should be noted that the media, both
mainstream and alternative media, such as social networks (Facebook, Twitter) are important
in supporting NGO claims for government accountability.
Case Box: Accountability for human rights violations
Many NGOs are involved in the struggle to create accountability for human rights
violations. The continuing impunity in Indonesia for human rights violations
committed in Aceh, Papua, East-Timor, and other areas, is denounced by international
human rights organizations such as Amnesty International. Efforts like the creation of
a human rights court are deemed insufficient to deal with the violations and deliver
adequate reparations to the victims (AI 2008:2). This judgment is echoed by Linton,
who is highly critical of the state efforts for genuine accountability. She concludes that
“[a]ccountability has too often been hijacked and skillfully used as a platform to
further aims that have nothing to do with the fundamental concepts that underpin the
human rights paradigm, such as justice, fairness, non-discrimination and individual or
State responsibility” (2006:31).
Along similar lines, AHRC (2009:20) reports
“unwillingness of the Attorney General (AG) to conduct investigations on the
recommendation of the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM).” In
cases of involvement of the military, the military court system is responsible, but also
this court is alleged to be “ineffective” (AHRC 2009:25).
The UN Special
Representative indicates that the Witness Protection Act does not give sufficient
safeguards to people giving their testimony (2007:12) and a specific problem with
disappearances is that these are categorized as “past abuses” instead of ongoing
violations (UN Special Representative 2007:13).
310
Imparsial, KontraS, Gerak Aceh, LBH, and ICW
Batus BT Saragih. 2010. ‘Anti-graft activist attacked, severely injured’ in: The Jakarta Post, 8 July 2010
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/08/antigraft-activist-attacked-severely-injured.html [accessed 5
August 2010]
312
Interview with author, 29 March 2010, Jakarta
311
122
Even though most activists reported that threats are not followed by action, and that neither
threats nor charges of criminal defamation will impede them to do their work, Munir’s death
and the events surrounding the criminal case because of his death are strong reminders of the
extremes to which their opponents could be willing and able to go.313 Munir died on a flight
from Jakarta to the Netherlands because of poisoning. As a founder of KontraS and the
executive director of Imparsial, he was at the forefront of the struggle to create accountability
for human rights violations perpetrated by the military in 1965 and more recently in East-Timor,
Aceh, and Papua.314 A fact-finding mission carried out by a commission set up by the
government suggested the involvement of the military. Also, whereas a Garuda pilot has been
sentenced because of the murder315, nothing has occurred regarding the available evidence,
that people involved with the military were implicated in the murder. In December 2008, the
former head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) was acquitted of the charges against him
(Freedom House 2009). After his acquittal he filed a complaint of criminal defamation against
staff member Usman Hamid from KontraS for statement he had made after the acquittal on the
courthouse doorsteps.316 The police however did not continue that case. Hamid was
summoned by the police, but then the case was not pursued.317
NGOs operating in the field of accountability can experience severe limitations on their
space, most importantly due to frequent threats and charges of criminal defamation.
Land conflicts
Indonesia has many valuable resources, such as minerals, forests, land, water, and oil. These
resources are subject to various, often local, conflicts about ownership, distribution, and
exploitation.318 NGOs and community organizations (GROs) play important roles in
representing and assisting communities, making claims, and providing legal, informational,
material or psychological assistance. In this struggle they face various other actors, such as
local elites who want access to government positions and exploitation permits319; military,
313
As a noteworthy exception, none of the NGOs in Aceh who work on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) reported problems in this regard. They offered as explanation that this might be because the TRC has not
been founded yet, and as of now the founding seems actually effectively stalled.
314
For a detailed overview of the campaigns Munir was involved in as well as details on the findings of the fact
finding team and their investigation into his murder can be found in the publication of Imparsial on this matter
(2007).
315
In 2008, he received a sentence of 20 years in prison. In addition, the former chief of Indonesian airline Garuda
was sentenced to one year in prison (Freedom House 2009)
316
HRW 2010; HRW Alert, ‘Jakarta police launch criminal defamation investigation against rights activist’ 16
September 2009, http://www.ifex.org/indonesia/2009/09/16/usman_criminal_defamation/
317
Interview of author with KontraS representative, 31 March 2010, Jakarta
318
Schulte Nordholt writes that the environment was one of the biggest victims of the decentralization process in
Indonesia (2008:120). Regional governments were for example allowed to earn their money by giving out licenses
for logging until 100 hectares. This happened a lot. Every hour 300 soccer fields of rain forest are lost in
Indonesia. 73% of the 192 million hectares forest has been lost (ibid 2008:121).
319
Aditjondro reports that local government has the authority to approve or reject any investment plan in their
regions, which according to him leads local government leaders to act as protectors of national and transnational
business interests (2007:129).
123
police, criminal organizations, preman, militias and private security services who provide
‘protection’ but often participate in the exploitation of resources320; the state as an important
landowner, legislator, and the agency responsible for permits and concessions; and national
and international corporations with plans and projects to exploit resources.321 The experiences
related in this section are very similar for claims regarding natural resources in general. Due to
limited space and because many of our interviewees were involved in land disputes, in this
section we focus exclusively on land disputes and the restrictions that communities face as they
attempt to exert a land claim.
CASE BOX: Land claims and legislation
It goes far beyond the scope of this chapter to go into the details of land tenure and the
complications with land claims, concessions, and the exploitation of lands in Indonesia. It
is however useful to give some insight into the legal challenges that communities face as
they exert land claims. Ardiansyah of the Institute for National and Democratic Studies
reports of more than thousand cases of land grabbing during the Suharto era (2008). In
1998 many communities started to reclaim those lands by entering the land and cultivating
it. In these beginning years of the Reformasi, communities were able to do this in relative
freedom, even though the majority of the communities did not have legal certificates for
the land (the lack or inconsistency of land tenure documentation as well as the uncertainty
about access to forest resources is for example discussed in a report of the International
Development Law Organization (IDLO, 2009:10-11). Customary land rights are a subject in
themselves and have been addressed by various scholars such as McWilliam (2006). A
large proportion of lands have been designated as state forest and is thus automatically
state-owned land, which the Suharto regime interpreted as having exclusive authority,
over the rights of the indigenous people that may be living there (Steni, 2010:4). In
practice, this state control has led to massive exploitation of the forest (Steni, 2010:3).
Whereas in the Philippines the laws are reported to be great but implementation is lacking,
NGOs involved in agrarian reform (HuMA, KPA, and AMAN), report that the problem in
Indonesia is more complicated. Some laws are quite good, but can get very restricting in
the details of the regulations. For example, whereas the general right of indigenous people
to obtain their lands is laid down in laws, it is made very hard to become recognized as an
indigenous group. The regulation requires that the traditional structures of the community
are still intact, but because of interventions such as the removal off the lands, this
structure has often disappeared over time. The communities applying for recognition thus
get often rejected. Another problem with the legislation is that different laws are in
conflict with each other. To solve this issue, AMAN has started the process to draft a law
on Indigenous People.
320
During Suharto, companies paid 20-25% of their profits to the military or local bureaucracy to ensure their
security and access to their land. According to Steni, not much has changed today (2010:4)
321
Steni from HuMA describes that especially the palm oil and pulp and paper industry have been strong in
applying for concessions (2010:4).
124
Because the communities lack legal certificates, they won’t win their cases in a courtroom,
which is the reason they never file a case in court about the land they claim. Facing
communities who actively reclaim their lands through occupations, corporations still want
access to the lands for which they had received the concessions. In March 2007, a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) specified the role that the police can play based on the
provisions in the various laws that illegal entry to forestry lands is a criminal act.322 Previously,
the conflicts between communities and corporations had been defined as private conflicts in
which the police could not intervene. This changed in March 2007 and since then the police has
intervened frequently.323 They charge these communities with the specific provision from the
relevant act which prohibits “illegal entry” to the forestry land, plantation, or mining area
respectively. Police then remove the communities, which in the case of resistance by the
community often leads to violence and arrests.324 The spokesperson of KPA explains that since
2007 they have observed an increase in the response of the government to act against
communities who occupy lands without legal certificates. The physical harassment and criminal
cases have a clear effect on the mobilization of communities, reports the spokesperson of KPA.
There is fear in communities, and he has observed a decrease of the number of communities
who reclaim land by entering it as well as a decrease in KPA’s member organizations because of
various people’s organizations that disappeared as a consequence of the harassment or the
jailing of leaders.325
Urban NGOs working on land issues generally don’t face physical harassment or
criminalization, but they emphasize that the communities they work with suffer from these
restrictions of their space. The interaction with police, military, and corporations in these cases
often involves a combination of threats, bribes, job loss, physical violence, and criminal
cases.326 For example, KPA tells that in 2009 three people were shot dead in Sumatra by the
police, in another incident 12 people were shot (not fatal). The KPA spokesperson says that it
frustrates him that human rights organizations often are only interested in human rights
violations like torture and violence, but that they are never placing it in the context in which
those violations occur. He says almost apologizing “of course torture is also bad” but he wants
to emphasize the unequal distribution of land which is the background for the violations.
Physical harassment generally occurs when the police act upon a supposed illegal or criminal
322
Memorandum of Understanding between National Land Agency (BPN) with Indonesia National Police No
3/SKB/BPN/2007 about Land Dispute Settlement http://racainstitute.wordpress.com/2007/05/24/hello-world/
323
Many communities do not resist removal by the police, the communities that do can face physical harassment
and/ or arrest.
324
For more information on human rights violations in land expropriation, Freedom House (2006) provides the
following reference: Tutup Buku dengan "Transitional Justice"? Menutup Lembaran Hak Asasi Manusia 1999-2004 dan Membuka Lembaran Baru 2005, (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat [ELSAM], 2005), 41-52.
325
Interview with author, 8 April 2010, Jakarta
326
ICCO partners in Aceh YRBI, Permata, and (non-ICCO partner) ELSAM in Jakarta shared some cases with me
which involved these issues. PRAXIS was able to tell about the experiences of its members, as many members of
ICCO partner PRAXIS are communities of peasants and peasant organizations. Many other instances related here
were shared by non-ICCO partner KPA.
125
action on the part of the community. It is therefore directly related to the criminalization of the
actions of peasants who reclaim lands. Often, the mere presence of communities on these
lands without a legal certificate is legislated to be illegal and can lead to the removal by the
police, potentially accompanied by violence. In other instances, the cutting of trees is defined
as “material destruction” leading to arrests of community leaders.327 Also criminal defamation
has been used as a charge. The spokesperson of KPA emphasizes that it is always the leaders of
communities who are the subject of criminal prosecutions.328 The sentences tend to be
between 3 and 6 months, but also longer sentences have been applied, up to 8 years in prison.
Elsam reported to perceive an increase of criminal cases related to land disputes.
It should be noted that not all organizations involved in land rights reported physical
harassment. Just as in the Philippines, often NGOs have a choice in their tactics and can assess
their willingness to face the repressive consequences of more confrontational tactics. For
example, ICCO partner Permata does not experience any physical harassment in the
communities where they work. Instead, they observe the “old pattern” in which the
government and corporations will negotiate with the community and offer benefits to
community leaders, so that the case will be closed.329
In order to assist communities in agrarian reform, a network of organizations has
opened an “agrarian desk” where communities can come with their problems. AMAN, HuMA,
Walhi, Legal Aid Indonesia, and KPA are members of this network. HuMA and KPA explain that
this network is united around the principle of “genuine agrarian reform” as opposed to stateled or market-led agrarian reform. Another good practice is the “conflict desk” that for
example dealt with a conflict in southeast Sulawesi.330 Violence occurred against members of a
community, which during Suharto was removed from the state forestry land where they had
been cultivating for years. Using its ownership rights over all forestry land, the Suharto
government created a teak plantation on the land. After the fall of Suharto, the community
decided to enter the land and start cultivating it again (the teakwood had already been cut).
After 2005 their presence led to violence and the community was facing criminal charges.331 In
response, the conflict desk sent a letter to the local government. The violence stopped as a
result of their intervention. In order to address the community’s demand for access to the
land, the conflict desk continued its intervention by pushing the Ministry to issue a ministerial
decree on the protected area. This is still in on-going procedure.332
The operational space for urban professional NGOs working on land issues is quite free
and broad. Local communities and GROs, however, can face a range of restrictions, most
importantly threats, violence, and criminal charges.
327
Article 47 of the Plantation Act prohibits entering and using a plantation without permission or any action that
results in damage to the plantation or its assets. In practice, police or companies use this article against
communities who enter a plantation and cut off wood for the purpose of cooking or building their house.
328
This was confirmed by ELSAM.
329
Interview with author, 7 April 2010, Banda Aceh
330
Conflict desks are created by National Forestry Council (DKN). Members of DKN consist of communities, NGOs,
government and scholars.
331
The incident and the work of the conflict desk were reported to me by the spokesperson of HuMA. Additional
details about the incident were contributed by local researcher Maria Louisa Khrisnanti looked this information up
in the Kendari Post (a local newspaper).
332
Interview with author, 8 April 2010, Jakarta
126
Sensitive issues in relation to religion: gender, LGBT, and pluralism
NGOs working on issues of gender, freedom of religion, pluralism, LGBT and HIV/AIDS reported
restrictions due to fundamentalist religious organizations and the religious beliefs held by
communities. Different NGOs in Jakarta and Aceh reported the challenges they face in this
regard, such as the TIFA Foundation, a woman involved in the LGBT community, and ICCO
partners Flower Aceh, RPuK, Do Karim, Tikar Pandan, and PRAXIS. Religious intolerance is
perceived to have increased over the past 5 years.333 The affected NGOs emphasize a good
communication strategy, a low profile of western donors, and the changing of names of their
programs as ways of dealing with this restriction. The TIFA Foundation reported that the stigma
as a ‘western’ NGO with a moderate interpretation of the Islam and work on interfaith dialogue
can mean that people refuse to attend meetings or that the community leader asks the NGO to
leave. For example, the word “pluralism” has obtained a negative meaning after the fatwa by
the Islamic council “MUI.”334 Also, the TIFA Foundation reported that the term human rights is
viewed as a western concept and not used in trainings. They use a special Arabic word in their
trainings.335 Thus far, the changing of terminology generally has been sufficient to keep
working where they are. The TIFA Foundation told that for good communication they rely on
local partners who know how to communicate their programs. They also meet with the high
Ulama to explain to them what TIFA does. They emphasize that their activities are not only
about the freedom of religion, and certainly not about conversion from Islam. For example,
they point out that they also focus on migrant workers.336 ICCO partners Do Karim and Tikar
Pandan use art and culture to open up space for discussion in this regard. For example, they
show films in Arabic, to show the different visions on Islam and they issued a journal on Islamic
scholars.
The “western” label also affects some NGOs in Aceh who work on women’s issues in
communities. They sometimes are rejected by communities, for example because the word
“gender” is viewed as western. Flower Aceh reports that they do the following against the
negative stigma: (1) gender education from an Islam perspective: they invite a resource person
on Islam issues, to explain that there is also in Islam a woman perspective; (2) they tell about
the history of Aceh in which there were many women leaders; (3) they also invite men to the
discussions, so they also understand and can practice in their own households.337
333
Aditjondro lists religious intolerance as one of the five major dangers to Indonesian social movement activists
(2007:129).
334
See for example http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/02/10/religious-tv-jeopardizing-pluralism.html
335
This practice has led to a discussion among NGOs: should we introduce new terms with the risk that they are
being “hijacked”? For example, the definition that the MUI adopted of pluralism was that it meant that all
religions are the same, thus rejecting a truth claim. This definition makes that NGOs cannot use the term
“pluralism” anymore without seeming blasphemous.
336
Interview with author, 1 April 2010, Jakarta
337
Interview with author, 6 April 2010, Banda Aceh
127
CASE BOX: dealing with a negative stigma as Westerners and Non-believers
ICCO partner Flower Aceh has to struggle against a negative stigma when they want to
work with women in rural communities. They have to work for acceptance in the
community. The resistance against gender comes from within the community, mainly
from the men, who fear that the intervention of Flower Aceh will lead the women not to
behave like women anymore.
In one community in Northern Aceh, Flower Aceh received the warning that “they should
not ever talk about gender here.” Specifically a traditional Islamic boarding school
resisted, as they even disputed the logo of Flower Aceh which they argued contained a
cross in the logo which meant that they wanted to Christianize. In response to this
Flower Aceh arranged a talk by one of their members (a man whose field is gender in
Islam perspective) about gender and Islam and slowly the women became used to the
term gender.
At the end of 2008 in Greater Aceh, a community forcefully resisted the entry of Flower
Aceh, even after the leader had permitted their access. The community showed their
traditional knives and asked Flower Aceh to leave the area. The leader of the community
could not give promises, acknowledging that the community was close minded. There
was panic in the Flower team. The community threatened that if they wouldn’t leave the
area they would burn the car. As they had come with their children, and as it is a very
rural area, far from any roads, they decided to leave. They reported a trauma from this
incident. It was very risky, and they decided not to go back (interview with author, 6
April 2010, Banda Aceh).
Women experience specific challenges as NGO representatives and community leaders. The
National Human Rights Commission, in cooperation with for example ICCO partner RPuK has
written a report on “Women Human Rights Defenders” as well as guidelines for women,
identifying ten specific vulnerabilities and types of violence that they face because they are
women: “rape; sexual abuse; sexual terror; sexual harassment; sexual stigmatization; attack on
women’s role as mother, wife and children; corrosion of credibility based on marital status;
marginalization and rejection based on morality, religion, custom, culture, and family
reputation; belittlement of women’s capacity and issues; and exploitation of women’s identity”
(UN Special Representative, 2007:18, based on report “Women Human Rights Defenders” by
Komnas Perempuan). Several specific cases are mentioned such as a woman protesting against
a controversial Pornography Law was called “dirty woman” and the house of a female activist
who protested against domestic violence was burned down.
NGOs often work in alliances to tackle these sensitive issues. Several NGOs in Aceh have
worked together to advocate for a human rights perspective on a law enacted in September
2009 which proscribed the death penalty for a woman who committed adultery, even after a
128
rape (AHRC, 2009:14; HRW, 2010:2).338 This network was initiated by the Gender Working
Group (GWG) and involves ICCO partners Tikar Pandan, NU, a Women Solidarity group (SP) and
several others.339 Flower Aceh tells that when they did lobby in the House of Representatives
on this law, they were accused of being “out of Islam.” When the lobby in the legislative failed,
they turned their lobby to the governor. The governor thus far has refused to sign the law. The
representative of Flower Aceh believes this is a result of their lobby.340
In 2006, there was a violent incident in which Ahmadiyah adherents (religious group)
were evicted from their houses. Despite the violence, reports have stated that there was no
state intervention to protect the Ahmadiyah adherents or punish the attackers. 341 In 2008, the
government has issued a decree freezing activities of Ahmadiyah adherents (potentially five
years imprisonment) and some district governments have banned the group (Freedom House,
2009; HRW, 2010:4). This indicates that the challenge here goes beyond the specific groups
that commit the violent acts. In Jakarta, there is a pro-pluralism coalition constituted by
Muslims, Catholics and others, including for example Praxis, Demos342 and Imparsial. They
report to the public, pressure the government, and take legal actions, such as advocating a
judicial review of the law on blasphemy.343 This law is deemed problematic as it limits the
number of state-recognized religions to six and the law further prohibits the interpretation of
338
Aceh has gained autonomy after the peace agreement was signed in 2005. With this autonomy it has become
possible to enact laws. The AHRC reports that the “proposed provincial legislation (Law No. 11/2006) dictates that
a raped women find four witnesses to her attack or face death by stoning for adultery. […] The law would apply to
all Indonesian's in Aceh, including non-Acehnese residents and non-muslims. Journalists and rights activists who
criticize the law are easily stigmatized as anti-islamic” (AHRC, 2009:14). This provision is part of the current efforts
in Aceh to enact laws based on the Sharía. Schulte Nordholt reports that the Sharía law was not one of the
demands of the GAM. It is suggested that it was a conscious strategy by Jakarta to strengthen the position of the
Islamic leaders and make them form a counterweight to the GAM (Schulte Nordholt, 2008:123; Braithwaite,
2010:17, footnote 5 and 23). It should be noted that since 2006 also other districts in Indonesia have enacted laws
based on the Sharía (Freedom House, 2009).
339
The civil society network of those who care about Islamic law: NGO Coalition HAM, Kontras Aceh, RPUK, LBH
Aceh, LBH APIK Aceh, KPI, Flower Aceh, Tikar Pandan, ACSTF, AJMI, KKP, SeIA, GWG, SP Aceh, Radio Suara
Perempuan, Violet Grey, Sikma, Pusham Unsyiah, Sri Ratu Safiatuddin Foundation, Banda Aceh in:
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/letters/your-letters-repeal-the-stoning-law-malaysia-misconceptions/330795
340
Lobbies and legislative efforts from progressive and conservative groups continue to confront each other.
Protests by conservative Islamic groups have also limited progressive legislative efforts. Freedom House (2006)
mentions an initiative of a working group drafting revisions to Islamic civil laws that were supposed to promote
gender equity in marriage, inheritance, and divorce. After protests by Islamic groups, the minister of religion did
not pursue the revisions.
341
“In February and March 2006, the Ahmadiyah adherents in Central Lombok, Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) were
evicted by the local community. This incidents [sic] had caused 141 persons had to fled their homes.
Unfortunately, the Regional Government as well as local police officers did not do anything when and after the
incidents occurred. The adherents of Ahmadiyah also experienced acts of violence during the eviction” (Komnas
Ham, 2006:39). AHRC (2009:15) reported that “[a]s a consequence of discrimination and alleged crimes
committed against the Ahmadiyah the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) established a
monitoring team based on Law No 39 of 1999 regarding human rights. This law was aimed at monitoring and
inquiring in to several alleged violations of human rights against members of the Ahmadiyah. To date there is no
significant progress.”
342
For example, the vision expressed by Demos is “the realization of society and state that respects the values of
justice, pluralism, equality a well as humanism” (pamphlet about Demos).
343
Law No. 1/PNPS/ 1965
129
religious passages. This provision is viewed to create the basis for violence against religious
groups such as Ahmadiyah, which is by far the main victim of incidents of religious
intolerance.344 The pro-pluralism coalition has united to call for judicial review of this law that
seems to justify discrimination of Ahmadiyah adherents. During hearings in court related to
this case, religious groups appeared with banners calling the NGO activists demons and pagans.
The executive director of Imparsial was called a “devil.”345 Even though the police protection in
the court is deemed to be good, the activists as well as the court officials had to enter the court
through a specific door.346 Just recently, on 17 May 2010, President Yudhoyono held a
remarkable televised speech in which he claimed that “to change the country’s constitution in
favour of an avowedly Islamic one […] would be ‘unacceptable to Indonesians.’”347 This is a
clear signal from a president who has otherwise been silent on the issue of political Islam.
Whereas in most cases stigmatization is a problem because it can lead to criminalization
or repression, in the case of religious sensitivity, stigmatization in itself severely restricts
operational space once it forces NGOs to withdraw from a community or change the content of
their programs. NGOs working on issues of gender, LGBT or pluralism can face serious
limitations when they face religious organizations or community leaders who oppose their
work. Professional NGOs are particularly targeted when they receive foreign funding and are
therefore more likely to be seen as western agents, executing a western agenda.
Responses
In the previous section, we have identified three areas where NGOs are active and experience
severe limitations on their operational space as different restricting actions and policies from
different actors (both state and non-state) interact. We have already given some indication of
how the NGOs in these particular areas have dealt with the restrictions, manoeuvred to
operate around the restrictions or defended their space in a more confrontational style. In this
section, we will analyse systematically the various response strategies that we have
encountered. We distinguish between reactive and proactive responses, individual versus
coordinated responses, and confrontational versus accommodating styles of response. In
general, NGO response strategies in Indonesia can be characterized as highly coordinated.
Nomura also points out the tendency to create networks, which Nomura characterizes in the
sector of environmentalist NGOs as participatory and egalitarian (2007:509). Whereas
sometimes proactive campaigns are set up (mostly in relation to legal reform), most responses
are in reaction to immediate physical threats or criminal charges. Specifically interesting is the
distinction between confrontational and accommodating response styles as NGOs very clearly
choose a certain ‘profile.’ This choice is related to a risk assessment. Activists in Aceh
specifically related how they moved from more accommodating styles during martial law to
more confrontational strategies in the current democratic framework.
344
For a detailed overview of incidents, the Setara institute has published a report in which it monitors the
freedom of religion and belief. In 2008 they reported 367 violations, of which 238 were affecting followers of
Ahmadiyah.
345
Interview with author, 1 April 2010, Jakarta
346
From interviews with Imparsial, 1 April 2010 and the Legal Round Table (31 March 2010) in Jakarta
347
‘Dispense with the pieties. Counter-terrorism in Indonesia’ in: Economist, May 22-28th 2010, p.59.
130
Regarding individual reactive responses, we have encountered some accommodating
instances where NGOs practice forms of self-censorship to avoid trouble and be able to
continue doing their work. Such is the case with NGOs who work with issues that are sensitive
for some religious groups and in some cases where people struggle for land rights. In general,
however, many activists speak out against what they perceive as restrictions on their work and
are more confrontational. The press freedom and informational freedom has led to good
websites and reporting, even though the law on criminal defamation has also led to convictions
of journalists (Freedom House, 2009).348
Coordinated proactive responses occur as NGOs collaborate on specific issues in various
networks. For example, there is a “Security Sector Reform Network” that works on police
reform. This network provided a policy paper on police reform and a draft for the internal
regulation for the police after the police asked input from the civil society. In this work they
often collaborate with academics.349 Thus, in many instances NGOs can be observed to unite
their forces and make common demands on the government, for example regarding laws that
are about to be implemented or to repeal undesired laws. There was for example successful
opposition to the proposed reinstatement of the Internal Security Act in 2003 and at this
moment there is collective action for judicial review on legislation on blasphemy. In addition
there is collective action (by the same coalition) for judicial review on the law on criminal
defamation. Other successful collective campaigns are the mass demonstrations by workers
who succeeded in postponing debate of the Employment Bill which they feared would have
negative consequences for workers (CSI Index, 2006:27) and the joint advocacy about tax
exemption (CSI Index, 2006:52). Unfortunately, we have seen that proactive efforts to protect
space by initiating procedures for judicial review can become subject to contestation and limit
the available space for NGOs as they undertake this legal action. This happened for example
when NGOs applied for judicial review of the law on blasphemy.
Most NGOs in Indonesia, especially in Jakarta, are familiar with the concept of “human
rights defenders” but not all of them work actively with the concept or use the available legal
instruments specifically formulated in the defence of HRD. Various NGOs reacted positive to
the suggestion of receiving training on HRD Guidelines. Some NGOs (Imparsial, LBH, and KPA)
actually provide these trainings, which are generally referred to as “paralegal” training. This
training is needed to give peasants for example the capacity to document well their land claims
as well as violent events or criminal cases, as there is a lack of lawyers. Often a clear
chronology is missing and their language is too bombastic. Praxis mentioned that in Jakarta
they often receive a letter from a member organization in a region with the request to pressure
a specific government officer in that region. This indicates the lack of local capacity to deal with
it locally. The NGO community in Jakarta does have the capacity, but lacks the resources to
solve these issues across Indonesia or even to provide enough paralegal training.350
Imparsial told that every year there is a meeting of HRDs. At the yearly meeting they
exchange information about cases and share mechanisms of protection. In a closed session
348
Nyman reports of a short period of liberalization during the Suharto regime specifically for media, from 19891994. This opened up the space and awareness for later demonstrations when these freedoms were curbed again
(2006:53).
349
Interview of author with Praxis, 31 March 2010, Jakarta
350
Interview with author, 31 March 2010, Jakarta
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they provide training on security issues. Imparsial together with some other NGOs proposes an
HRD-protection bill in which the government is requested to provide specific protection as well
as to create a specific desk at the national HR Commission that focuses on HRD protection. At
the moment, Imparsial observes a lack of state protection for HRD as there is no specific
recognition of HRDs, they are accused to be western puppets and they tend to be perceived as
a threat.351 In the same spirit, in 2007 the TIFA Foundation together with KontraS, LBH Jakarta,
the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) and the Pulih Foundation, started an emergency
system for HRD under risk, the Human Right Support Facilities (HRSF) which would for example
enable the evacuation of HRDs within the region, to avoid the need to bring them to Jakarta, as
well as provide legal aid or physical health care to HRDs who really need it.352 The slogan on
the pamphlet advertising this campaign reads “Protecting Human rights defender, Promoting
Human rights.” Another initiative is the legal review that TIFA Foundation published to clarify
for HRDs how the laws (such as the law on the environment) facilitate or impede HRDs. 353
Whereas the examples above indicate some proactive initiatives, other alliances are
more reactive, such as the support group that has taken up the fight in the Munir case. After
the murder of Munir, ICCO allowed Imparsial to change the destination of a part of their
funding to dedicate it to the campaign around Munir.354 Many organizations have reported on
its progress (see for example AHRC, 2009, Caveat, 2009) and it has also gained international
prominence. US Congress for example made a part of “security assistance” to Indonesia
contingent upon a report by the Secretary of State on the investigation into the murder (PRS,
2008:17). In addition to the proactive activity to repeal the provision on criminal defamation,
there has been joint resistance after specific charges of criminal defamation. For example,
there was a successful fight in the case of Prita Mulyasari who was charged with criminal
defamation after she filed a public complaint about hospital treatment. Civil society
organizations successfully defined this as an attack to free speech (Caveat, June 2009:4). She
faced possibly 6 years in jail and 1 billion IDR. Rallies were held across the country and a
famously successful campaign in Facebook was set up. The charged were dropped.
In response to serious threats, Imparsial reported that they often assisted NGO
representatives and activists from Aceh to evacuate to Jakarta to provide protection. One NGO
leader subsequently worked as an intern at Imparsial. During the past years, they conducted at
least 10 evacuations from Aceh, one of them was the former director of Kontras Aceh.355 The
decision to evacuate is taken if the threat becomes specific and violent and/or when the family
351
Interview with author, 1 April 2010, Jakarta
Because HRDs are usually volunteers, now they are working on a fund for HRDs to support them in small things
such as scholarships for their children. The goal is to turn this HRD fund into a community fund, which is funded
not by international donors, not by TIFA, but by local community donors.
353
Interview with author, 1 April 2010, Jakarta
354
The spokespersons for Imparsial we interviewed were not aware of other ways in which ICCO had been
supportive of Imparsial during or after this period. Since last year ICCO does not support Imparsial anymore.
Because of this Imparsial feels that ICCO has left them alone after their director was killed when he was on his way
to the Netherlands to study supported by ICCO. The Munir case is still not closed and they need resources for the
case.
355
The real need for these evacuations is demonstrated for example by the incident of a Kontras volunteer who
was abducted on June 16, 2003, by unknown attackers in North Aceh. He was found dead the following day, tied to
a palm tree, gagged and showing evidence of torture (HRF 2005:14).
352
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is threatened as well. A few other evacuations took place from Papua, Sulawesi, and Ambon.
In these evacuations Imparsial generally cooperated with other organizations. In the case
regarding Sulawesi in 2005 they cooperated with Walhi. Evacuations cost time though,
therefore Imparsial decided to focus on a proposal to demand official protection from the
government for human rights defenders (see more on this below).356 In response to the
criminal charges that peasants in land conflicts suffer, various NGOs offer some form of legal
counsel or representation. ELSAM provides legal representation to peasants who face criminal
charges in the context of land occupations and conflicts about natural resources. 357 Agrarian
Legal Aid Services is another organization of lawyers who offer legal counsel to peasants that
get arrested. When incidents occur, KPA sends reports to the police department, national
parliament, HR Commission358 and the relevant sector council (such as the Forestry Council).
These are all examples of coordinated reactive responses.
Some NGOs are very vocal about restrictions they face. Not all NGOs, however, choose
for a confrontational path to resist potential or actual restrictions. In Aceh, several NGOs
emphasized to be careful about their strategy in order not to create risk in their work. They
talked about “soft power” (as expressed by ICCO partner JKMA) and a strategy not to discuss
illegal logging openly, but instead talk about “caring for the forest” (in the words of ICCO
partner YRBI).359 YRBI consciously uses safe language and warns communities not to use
violence against illegal loggers, but instead to take their tools. YRBI explains they do not want
to seem biased, they do not want to provoke the people, and they do not directly address the
sensitive issue. The NGO leader explains that just like during the conflict in Aceh one could not
talk about “freedom” or “the future of the country”, now one doesn’t talk about illegal logging.
Instead they talk about “strengthening the community, strengthening customary law, and
strengthening welfare” as well as “taking care of the water and the forest.” This is a strategy to
minimize risk of physical harassment. For example, one time in Lamteuta, they received a
direct warning not to talk about illegal logging. The spokesperson of YRBI fears that even if the
risk is not so much about physical harassment, then the illegal loggers may create mistrust
among the community and say negative things about YRBI. He emphasizes that it is their
responsibility to create a safe atmosphere in the community where they work and not create
trouble for them.360
Conclusions & Recommendations
In this research we have selected countries in the category of ‘partial democracies’ emphasizing
that democracy is more than the fulfilment of a formal set of requirements such as regular
elections. Civil society activists emphasize that even though Indonesia does satisfy many of the
formal requirements, still there is a lot to do to achieve real democracy. Aspinall writes that
356
Interview with author, 1 April 2010, Jakarta
Interview with author, 1 April 2010, Jakarta
358
KPA reports that at the local level there is little respect for the National Human Rights Commission Komnas
HAM as they can only give recommendations. However, a visit by a HR Commissioner usually has the effect that
the violence stops, even though it doesn’t solve the land dispute.
359
It is suggested in various reports that illegal logging is a major problem in Indonesia, see for example HRW
2010:3.
360
Interview with author, 7 April 2010, Banda Aceh
357
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many of his informants identified the corrupt and authoritarian practices within the new formal
democracy (2010:11). Civil society actors worry that donors are not sensitive to this. Aspinall
cites a senior human rights advocate who said about donors: ‘Of course, the worst thing at the
moment is their attitude which says that democracy in Indonesia is now okay, that it’s taken for
granted […] [The problem is] the attitude of the donors who give too much credit to democracy
using a narrow and procedural definition’ (2010:11). Aspinall goes to the heart of the matter
when he juxtaposes the different views about how to deepen the Indonesian democracy. He
reports that whereas donors tend to stress “technical deficits,” civil society activists view the
matter as “fundamentally political, pointing to systemic and structural problems with the
character of state power, and continuing needs for a strong civil society as a counterweight to
the government” (2010:12).
Some conclusions can be drawn from this case study. Indonesia is widely viewed as a
success story of democratization. Operational space for NGOs has indeed increased since the
fall of the Suharto regime. Still, military influence, widespread corruption, and elite
competition because of decentralization are important elements limiting operational space for
NGOs. Gaventer (2006:27) specifically warned that the creation of new spaces of governance
could easily be filled by the existing elite if no ways of sustaining “countervailing power” are
created. Non-state actors such as the military, religious groups and business elites play an
important role in determining the operational space of NGOs. Civil society in Indonesia has
grown enormously since 1998, partially because of great donor support. Still, civil society is
looked upon suspiciously in Indonesian society as it tends to be associated with western values.
NGOs have not (yet) gained the widespread support and legitimacy as they enjoy for example in
the Philippines. Civil society is small but cohesive in comparison to the Filipino civil society.
We have identified the most prevalent restrictive policies and actions limiting the space
of NGOs. Regarding repression and intimidation, intimidating threats are common for all NGO
representatives that work in one of the areas identified as sensitive. Actual violence is not
commonly experienced by representatives of professional NGOs, even though the murder of
Munir is a forceful reminder that violence is not impossible. Grassroots community leaders are
much more likely to experience actual violence in confrontation with the police, military or nonstate actors, such as preman, religious fundamentalists or unknown opponents. Regarding
criminalization, the operational space of NGOs is hardly affected by general measures such as
anti-terrorism laws. The specific use of criminal offenses, however, such as ‘criminal
defamation’ against accountability advocates, restricts NGOs in their operations. GRO leaders
in land disputes often face criminal charges, such as theft and illegal entrance of a plantation.
GRO leaders in Papua have faced charges of sedition and rebellion. Regarding administrative
measures, the main problem with the Indonesian administrative framework for NGOs seems to
be the lack of clarity and the existence two laws on foundations and associations, both of which
are potentially restrictive. Despite fears to the contrary, the administrative framework does
not however, seem to cause NGOs any problems. Only one NGO reported actual problems
because of their legal status, which created problems for their operations in Papua. Regarding
stigmatization, all NGOs face the negative label of executing a ‘western’ agenda. For some
NGOs this label seriously restricts their operational space. In Papua, NGOs and GROs face the
risk to be labelled as sympathizers of separatists, which has serious consequences for their
space. Finally, regarding spaces of dialogue, in general, optimism about the benefits of
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collaboration with the government far exceeds negative experiences regarding cooperation.
Points of concern are the combination of negotiation, bribery and intimidation, which seems
especially prevalent with respect to NGOs who level accountability accusations and GRO
leaders engaged in struggles regarding natural resources. Other concerns relate to the
increasing cooperation between donors and the Indonesian government to the detriment of
(critical) NGOs as well as the luring away of good NGO leaders into positions of consultants and
political positions, thus decreasing the sustainable capacity of NGOs to be strong actors in
spaces of dialogue.
We have identified three major areas of NGO-work where operational space is at times
severely restricted as the abovementioned actions and policies interact. Firstly, NGOs
operating in the field of accountability (anti-corruption and human rights violations) can
experience severe limitations on their space, most importantly due to frequent threats and
charges of criminal defamation. Secondly, whereas the operational space for urban
professional NGOs working on land issues is quite free and broad, local communities, peasants
and rural GROs that struggle for land, however, can face a range of restrictions, most
importantly threats, violence, and criminal charges. The third area that we identified where
NGOs face limitations of their operational space are NGOs working on sensitive issues in
relation to religion, such as gender, LGBT, and pluralism. Whereas in most cases stigmatization
is a problem because it can lead to criminalization or repression, in the case of religious
sensitivity, stigmatization in itself severely restricts operational space once it forces NGOs to
withdraw from a community or change the content of their programs. NGOs working on issues
of gender, LGBT or pluralism can face serious limitations when they face religious organizations
or community leaders who oppose their work. Professional NGOs are particularly targeted
when they receive foreign funding and are therefore more likely to be seen as western agents,
executing a western agenda. In general, NGO response strategies in Indonesia can be
characterized as highly coordinated. Whereas sometimes proactive campaigns are set up
(mostly in relation to legal reform), most responses are in reaction to immediate physical
threats or criminal charges.
NGO experiences in Aceh regarding limitations of their space largely coincide with the
experiences from Jakarta based NGOs. Some differences, however, can be noted. Firstly, the
restrictions posed because of religious sensitivity have been felt more and since longer in Aceh
than in Jakarta. Secondly, the relations with the local Acehnese government for some NGOs
have changed radically over the past years, where the current government has become
increasingly suspicious of some of the more critical NGOs. Thirdly, some NGOs experienced
limitations related to the fact that Aceh is a post-conflict territory, thus for example facing the
issue of the proper reintegration of ex-rebels. Fourthly, some of the NGOs experienced specific
stigmatization because of the huge influx of NGOs and funding directly after the tsunami.
It is clear that the process of democratization has opened up new spaces for NGOs for
advocacy and claim-making. The results of this research show that whereas most NGOs benefit
from the expansion of space, some old conflicts have not satisfactorily been solved and new
tensions already challenge the process of democratization.
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6. Conclusions and recommendations
In this chapter we draw conclusions about the restrictions that NGOs experience in the four
countries that were examined in preceding chapters. Firstly, we reflect on the findings of these
cases studies in terms of the existence of trends in restrictions on operational space of NGOs
and about commonalities and differences within and between the countries examined.
Secondly, we discuss the importance of the different types of restrictions, as well as the issue of
attribution. What kinds or combinations of policies are responsible for the most important
restrictions, and who can be held responsible for this? Thirdly, we will reflect on the response
strategies and capacities of local NGOs. We finalize this chapter with recommendations.
General findings and trends
A first conclusion is that, in general terms, in the partial democracies that were under study,
there is lots of operational space. This is the case despite the typical problems or deficits that
these partial democracies suffered from; such as a rather weak rule of law, corruption, and
insecurity. There are important commonalities and differences between the countries included
in this study. All countries embarked on an uncertain process of democratization in the late
1980s or 1990s. In three of these countries (all except for Indonesia) a strong NGO sector
emerged during the authoritarian period and this sector played an important role in the push
for democratization and transition towards democracy. During and after the democratic
openings, the NGO sectors grew and in all cases NGOs have increasingly tried to use and
enlarge the resulting operational and political space. The case of Indonesia is rather different
since NGOs were less present during the authoritarian regime, played a relatively minor role in
the transition towards democracy, while the sector started to boom when the Reformasi
started.
In all four cases, democratization is ‘unfinished business’ and it is fair to say that in at
least two cases (Honduras en Guatemala) the democratization process is under pressure (as a
result of a coup and criminalization of the state respectively). In all countries there is a
fundamental problem of a relatively weak state, with high levels of corruption, while there are
powerful interest groups (often with a presence or contacts in the state) that have no interest
in obeying to democratic rules of the game. In all cases the diminishing role of the military was
a key component of the democratization processes. But (former) military still play a role in
national political life. In Guatemala the role of the military diminished substantially over the
past decades, but (former) military are still a factor to count with, while in Honduras the coup
provided new space to the military. Despite reforms, in Indonesia the military still has strong
vested interests and exerts substantial influence on politics while there is a lack of civilian
control over the military.
While the four countries are clearly examples of ‘partial democracies,’ all countries have
regions that are war zones or crisis areas, since the power of the state is or contested.
Mindanao in the Philippines displays the characteristics of a war zone and until recently Aceh in
Indonesia was a war zone, whereas the presence of an independence movement in Papua has
led the Indonesian state in this region has strong authoritarian characteristics. In Central
America there are regions and urban areas with particularly high indices of violence where the
136
state is weak and not able or willing to restore public order. In these cases, the chronic
insecurity is reflected by high levels of violence and extremely high homicide rates. The
generalized insecurity in these crisis areas restricts almost all NGOs, but this insecurity is
different from the actions and policies that specifically target NGOs which are the subject of our
study.
Despite this unfinished democratization, the operational space of NGOs is substantial
both on paper and in practice. In particular, NGOs that are involved in issues of service delivery
generally experience few problems. However, despite the fact that there is operational space
for many NGOs, in all countries under study, groups that make political claims vis-à-vis the state
and/or other actors (e.g. corporations or the military) are more likely to experience serious
restrictions in their operational space. Hence, we found selective restrictions on operational
space, which affects in particular a number of claim-making NGOs.
In each of the country chapters of this study, we focused on the sectors that experienced most
problems. In Indonesia there were: (1) NGOs demanding accountability for corruption and past
human rights violations; (2) peasants and indigenous people (re-)claiming land; and (3)
decreasing space for NGOs working on issues of gender, LGBT, and pluralism. In the Philippines,
the following specific contexts are described: (1) NGOs operating at the extreme left:
consequences of a counterinsurgency focus on civil society; (2) NGOs and community
organizers making claims about land and natural resources; (3) NGOs operating in conflict areas
and isolated places. In Guatemala we looked at (1) NGOs working in the field of truth, human
rights and justice, (2) resource conflicts, and (3) problems related to chronic insecurity. Finally,
in Honduras we distinguished between (1) resource conflicts, (2) chronic insecurity, and (3) the
specific problems caused by the coup.
Box 6.1: Categorization per country
In general, we found that the kinds of organizations that experienced most restrictions in all
cases are (a) NGOs (mostly those working at grassroots level) and local community
organizations involved in resource conflicts about for instance land rights or mining rights; (b)
NGOs who demand accountability of the state, particularly when they address issues of past
atrocities, corruption and state repression; (c) NGOs or organizations involved in women’s
rights and the rights of the LGBT community, and (d) NGOs operating in areas with chronic
insecurity. Finally, it is important to note that all organizations that participated in dialogues or
consultations with governments reported complaints or doubts about the results of these
processes.
The vulnerability of these groups is not a given. Restrictions come and go, depending on
the general political conjunctures and the tensions that are building up. For instance, election
periods are generally tenser periods. The increasingly tense atmosphere in the period before,
during and after the coup in Honduras is an example of how polarization at national level also
influences local resource conflicts (e.g. in Bajo Aguan) and leads to new cycles of violent
restrictions. In the Philippines, violence against farmers became more frequent as the battle
137
about the extension of land reform intensified. Closer scrutiny by the international community
was a factor that helped reduce the extrajudicial killings of farmers. The restrictions
experienced are also a result of the political profile of the NGOs as well as their ‘(response)
style’ (either more confrontational or accommodating), which will be discussed further on.
Restrictions and attribution
The above mentioned groups experience problems in one or several (and sometimes all) of the
fields that were mentioned in figure two of chapter one. These measures can seriously hamper
the work of these organizations, both in terms of the operational capacity, but also with regard
to the staff of these organizations that can experience serious emotional and mental problems,
if not actual physical injury. Below we discuss our general findings with regard to the five types
of restrictions.
There is no doubt that repression – either in the form of threats, injuries and killings, or
as a lack of protection – plays a role for most of the groups that experience restrictions.
Repression is not necessarily a continuous threat. It can come and go. In many cases – but
particularly in the case of conflicts about resources (such as land and mining) – the attribution
of the repression is not always clear. There is strong evidence that both state and non-state
groups or individuals (or combinations of state and non-state actors) can be held responsible.
This is in our view closely connected to the relatively weak state structures (especially in terms
of rule of law) in the countries studied.
Criminalisation can be a serious problem for NGOs, as is for instance the case with the
law on criminal defamation in Indonesia. Many grassroots organizations suffer from
criminalization in the struggle around resources, for example farmers involved in campaigns for
land reform in the Philippines are prosecuted for trespassing. In the case of Guatemala and
Honduras, there is a growing concern that prosecutions of members of community
organizations and trade unions that claim land right or protest against mining companies are
prioritized by the judicial sector, while many other crimes are not addressed. This leads to
suspicions about alleged political motives of staff within the judicial sector that are generally
very hard to prove. In combination with lengthy trials, long periods of pre-trial detention, and
awkward situations in jail, this causes serious problems. In a few cases, counter terrorism
legislation was used to try NGO staff, but in general the accusations are based on regular
criminal law.
We didn’t find clear patterns of administrative restrictions that all countries share. In
general, the legal framework enables NGOs to do their work and for example in the Philippines,
legislation explicitly promotes NGO involvement in government policy. Nevertheless, efforts to
introduce ‘bad NGO legislation’ can seriously threaten the space of the entire NGO sector. This
was most clearly the case in Honduras. However, NGOs there have been able to counter these
threats. Also in Indonesia, NGOs reported concerns about potential abuse of NGO-legislation.
Apart from NGO-legislation, administrative measures of different sorts can severely restrict
NGOs in their operations. CEADEL in Guatemala reported frequent (monthly) and timeconsuming audits of the staff of the local ministry of Labor, while CEADEL precisely criticizes the
ministry for not controlling the labor conditions in the region where they work. In the
Philippines, the “pre-emptive calibrated response” which aimed to guide police forces in their
regulation of rallies and demonstrations, created resistance among NGOs as they feared it
138
would scare people away from public activities. This leads to the conclusion that government
agencies, or officials can (ab)use their administrative powers. This can cause severe restrictions,
but we would however not talk of a clear trend. Bureaucrats (or their superiors) have the ability
to creatively and on an ‘ad-hoc basis’ hamper the work of NGOs. It is clear that NGOs that touch
upon vested interests are more likely to experience these kinds of pressures or restrictions.
In general, stigmatisation is part and parcel of the first three kinds of restrictions.
Depending on the local and national context, NGOs are singled out and labeled as groups
obstructing progress (mining), communists or terrorists (Philippines, Guatemala). NGOs can also
be criticized for promoting different values, which can easily lead to stigmatization. In
Indonesia, however, the general stigma of the NGO-sector as ‘western’ agents proved an
important hurdle, specifically for NGOs working on issues of pluralism and religious freedom. In
Guatemala and Honduras, religious groups take issue with the idea of human rights and human
rights defense.
Many of the claim-making NGOs have become involved in cooperation or dialogues with
government agencies. As to the use of political space, there are concerns and frustrations about
the quality of dialogue in these spaces. In particular in Guatemala and Honduras the
frustrations about the quality of these spaces are considerable. The coup in Honduras led to
doubts about whether NGOs should deal with the government in the future. While using the
new opportunities is seen as crucial by donors of NGOs, the use of these spaces is often
problematic. In all cases, we found examples of cooptation of NGOs by government officials,
while bribing of NGOs or community leaders was also reported. There are, however, also
concerns about the functionality of these new spaces. A frequent critique is that talking didn’t
lead to any substantive changes. In some cases, it was reported that dialogues alternated with
threats and intimidation. We would argue that the complaint that the spaces don’t work, also
points at weaknesses of civil society actors, since a strong and capable civil society will not so
easily be ‘co-opted’ and be more likely to ‘make spaces work’.
The restrictions experienced by the groups mentioned above mostly entail a changing
‘cocktail’ of several of the measures discussed in figure 2 of chapter 1. Actions and measures
seldom ‘come alone’, but we did not find particular ‘sequences’ of combinations of measures.
For example, repression (intimidation) can come together with stigmatization through the
media (as experienced by human rights organizations in Guatemala). There are, however, also
‘silent’ forms of repression, where local staff members or participants of NGO-activities are
targets of anonymous phone calls or harassment.
As to the attribution an important conclusion of this study is that the experienced
restrictions are not only the result of government actions, but in many cases the combined
actions of corporations, government officials and (un)civil society. As mentioned, in many cases
it is not entirely clear who is behind the measures, and there is a serious problem of attribution.
In this regard it proves very complex to prove ‘what exactly is going on’. This applies particularly
to the repressive actions and criminalization. There is little doubt that restrictive measures of
NGOs can be the result of targeted ‘campaigns’ or initiatives. However, this is not to say that a
particular series of measures (from repression to stigmatisation) is the result of a coordinated
plan or the product of a ‘mastermind’.
Response strategies
139
In figure 4 of chapter 1 we made a distinction between four types of response strategies. Below
we will discuss each of them, adding a variable that – on the basis of our fieldwork - was found
to be of particular importance; the difference between more ‘accommodating’ and more
‘confrontational’ responses. While a response is a calculated reaction to an experienced threat
or challenge to a person or an organization, there are different styles to react in all four
domains. In the accommodating responses the search for a direct solution of the NGO or a
group of NGOs themselves forms the core of the response. In these cases the focus is on the
efforts to tackle the effect of the problem, without necessarily dealing with the cause of the
problem. In case of more confronting styles, the crux of the response is to accuse or protest
against those responsible for the restrictions experienced. Obviously, there can be both more
accommodating and more confrontational reactions, though this is not necessarily the case.
Moreover, responses can change over time and so can the balance between the
accommodating and confrontational responses. Below we discuss the individual and
coordinated responses separately. We will not refer in each section to each of the five
restrictions, but only discuss the responses to the most important restrictions that NGOs
encountered.
What do organizations do individually? Reactive and proactive responses.
Wherever there is a restriction there will always be a reactive ‘response’. The typical response
in cases of experienced restrictions is an accommodating ad-hoc response to find a solution –
such as building a fence, contracting a guard, taking a break after threats, be cautious when
using the telephone, etc. This is generally based on an equally ‘ad hoc’ analysis of these threats.
NGOs that have experienced most problems with threats have become more strategic and
developed scenarios of how to deal with new restrictions.
There is a variety of responses to the various problems encountered. The most basic one is
‘exit’ and the most radical form of exit is to disband an organization. We have not seen a case
like that, but organizations do censor themselves and decide to skip certain topics that are
simply too dangerous to touch upon. For example, in the Philippines, a land reform NGO
reported to avoid confrontation and withdraw from land occupations in advance. In Central
America several organisations emphasised that they were not able to deal with threats from
criminal groups. NGOs are also cautious about the language they used. For example, in
Indonesia, a ‘pluralism NGO’ reported that they do not talk about ‘human rights’ as this is
considered a western concept by some religious groups. In Central America a number of NGOs
were hesitant to openly use a human rights discourse. There is every reason to believe that all
claim-making organizations make these kinds of tactical judgements.
140
Individual
Coordinated
Reactive / Ad hoc
Proactive / Strategic
Accommodating:
Deny or relativize; leave
country; stop work;
change work, selfprotection, such as a
guard or a fence.
Accommodating:
Initiate dialogue with
those responsible for the
restriction. Ask
government for
protection; ask support
from other NGOs.
Confrontational:
Submit a complaint for a
particular case, denounce
the specific problem in the
press
Confrontational:
Protest, accuse, lobby, or
go to trial. Systematically
inform the public and
international partners
Accommodating:
Form a network to deal
with a particular problem
Accommodating:
Form a network to deal
with challenges and
develop self-help
strategies or dialogue with
government agencies
Confrontational:
Form a network to protest
specific problems
collectively, send out a
collective press release
Confrontational:
Protest, in alliance with
other NGOs
Figure 6.1 Response strategies of NGOs
When it comes to threats of staff the typical immediate response is to look for some
form of accommodation. An option is that staff leaves the organization (temporarily). This
happens especially when tensions rise. E.g. in Honduras after the coup staff members left the
country for a while. In the Philippines some staff had to hide for a while. In Guatemala, the
Fundación Myrna Mack receives government protection, which was the product of
international lobbying which resulted in a resolution of the Inter-American Court for Human
Rights. However, in all cases, staff has to deal with the emotional stress of threats. These
reactions vary from denial and relativizing the impact of threats to panic and stress. A number
141
of NGOs reported it had hired counselors to deal with these symptoms. Most NGOs reported
to take security precautions, such as changing the route to their work.
When particular regions are too dangerous or problematic to work, NGOs decide to
leave these particular areas. For instance, in the Philippines and Indonesia, NGOs (a microfinance organization and women’s organization respectively) have reported to leave an area
where they had experienced restrictions. In Honduras and Guatemala NGOs reported to
(consider to) leave areas that were seen as too dangerous (as a result of petty crime or
interests of drugs traders). The latter kind of problem is particularly important in Central
America, where a situation of chronic insecurity not only hampers the work of NGOs but has a
profound impact on the social fabric in general.
Only in a limited number of cases individual NGOs chose for a more confrontational
response to the restrictions. For example, NGOs issue press releases when they are confronted
with criminal cases or killings. Some went to the police when they received death threats. Most
often, however, NGOs choose for a confrontational approach with the support of or in alliance
with other organisations.
What do NGOs do together? Reactive and proactive responses.
In the foregoing it was argued that almost all organizations that face restrictions will try to
resolve these at first by ‘individual accommodation’, while a number of these organizations
looks for coordination with other organizations. In fact, most NGOs do not operate in a vacuum
and have their networks with other NGOs, government officials and others, which are mobilized
once a restriction appears or continues. Thus, even ad hoc individual responses will more often
than not be taken with some kind of advice or help of this network. For example, a director of
an NGO that received anonymous threats told she was in frequent contact with other directors
of NGOs about her situation, while sleeping in different houses.
The move towards more coordinated action seems (not surprisingly) more difficult to
take. In order to coordinate ad hoc actions, there has to be a restriction that several
organizations experience. In these cases a press release denouncing a restrictive action is often
signed by many NGOs in support for the organization that suffers the restriction. In Indonesia,
there is a high level of cooperation between NGOs to respond strategically to restrictions. For
example, an alliance of NGOs has initiated a request for judicial review to change the law on
criminal defamation. Also in the Philippines, there is a high level of coordination, for example in
CODE-NGO, representing more than 2,000 development NGOs. However, the existence of
networks of NGOs does not necessarily lead to coordinated responses.
In order to move to a more proactive response capacity that addresses the restrictions
on operational space in general, is even more complex. In this regard, the experience is in
Guatemala is interesting and can be explained by the problems that NGOs have experienced in
the past 4 to 5 decades. There is already a local infrastructure of organizations that have dealt
with these problems before and where NGOs like Udefegua and Sedem have specialized in
these problems and play a pioneering role in Guatemala as well as Central America. Though
these networks are supported by external donors, they are the product of local initiatives and
processes, which to a large extend explains their strength.
With regard to both the individual and the coordinated efforts, the distinction between
more accommodating and confronting responses is important. Where a proactive
142
accommodating style will look for solutions to a problem by dialoging or negotiating with
government officials, more confronting approaches will protest against the government or
submit a press release. The two approaches can obviously strengthen each other. In Guatemala
the creation of ‘la Instancia’ (a space where representatives of civil society and several
government agencies meet to in order to discuss human rights violations) is an example of a
coordinated strategic response that seeks to accommodate. However, this space itself is the
product of a long series of accusations and lobbying by numerous NGOs.
The style of the response itself is also subject to debates between NGOs. In many cases
these debates are linked to political and strategic differences between these organisations that
have different political stances and histories. In the countries of Central America NGOs
criticized each other for either showing too much willingness to cooperate with government
agencies, or for being too confrontational and ‘negative’. This is indeed related to the general
problems of coordination of NGOs in many parts of the world. Coordination requires both a felt
need to work together as well as a (political) willingness and consensus about style to do so. In
many cases this proves to be extremely problematic.
All in all, the restrictions of operational space are the result of oftentimes targeted and
context-specific processes. In most cases that we found restrictive measures, these were the
result of particular (combinations of) state or non-state actors defending their interests or
values and resisting efforts of NGOs to create new spaces. The exact impact of restrictions on
the operational space of NGOs is determined in interaction with their chosen response.
However, the result is almost always some form of operational restriction. Ad-hoc
accommodation is the most common way to deal with these, but in many cases this leads to
some reduction of operational space. Some accommodating responses like leaving an area
constitute effectively a serious decrease in their operational space. On the other hand, the
NGOs that choose for a more confrontational style often report to suffer more frequently or
intensely from restricting actions and policies like stigmatization as criminals and physical
repression. This indicates one of the main dilemmas that NGOs face as they are challenged by
restrictions: how can they optimally use, defend, and maintain their operational space, without
risking an increase in restrictive measures?
ICCO support for partners
Support from ICCO (as well as other international organizations) has mostly been ‘ad hoc’.
Although ICCO is currently developing new policies with regards to human rights defenders and
problems of shrinking political space, there is no clarity about the ways and the situations in
which ICCO (regional offices or HQ) will be involved. While it is too early to reflect on the roles
of the regional offices, ICCO HQ has, however, a rich experience of supporting partners in
different ways.
ICCO itself has both used accommodating and more confrontational approaches.
Examples of ad hoc accommodating approaches are for instance the assistance of ICCO (with
other international NGOs) provided to an NGO leader to flee the country. ICCO HQ also played
important roles after coup in Honduras, where it used its contacts with the Dutch Embassy in
Costa Rica as well as the ministry of Foreign Affairs in finding out whether and where staff of
partner organizations was imprisoned. It is important to note that this proactive role was not
played by the new regional offices of ICCO. This was not only a result of the fact that the
143
regional office was still starting up, but also due to different views within the regional board
about the coup in Honduras. An example of a more pro-active and strategic action has been the
visit to the Dutch embassy in the Philippines, where a leader from farmer organization TFM
could present the plight of the killings against farmers and request international attention.
At other times ICCO HQ opted for a more confrontational style, for example when it
supported public declarations about the killing of Munir in Indonesia. ICCO’s involvement in the
lobby for a special UN mission to Guatemala (CICIG) is an extremely interesting example of how
a coalition of international NGOs together with Guatemalan NGOs pushed for a UN-mechanism
that critically looks at one of the causes of the restrictions in that country.
Recommendations
With regard to the protection of operational space of its partners, ICCO should primarily
support local mechanisms to deal with (a) direct threats, (b) to work towards proactive action
that might involve international actors when necessary, (c) to use existing political space more
effectively, and (d) pay particular attention to grassroots NGOs and community organizations in
the opening up and defense of operational spaces.
Dealing with direct threats
With regard to the ways ICCO deals with direct threats, ICCO (regional and HQ) should be clear
about what it is able to do and what not. The needs and expectations of partners can exceed
the actual capacity of ICCO to assist. ICCO should be clear about what partners can expect when
they are in trouble. E.g. to what extend is ICCO responsible for staff of partner organizations
that have to flee the country? And how long will ICCO continue support for a partner
organization after it has suffered severe repression, such as the killing of Munir?
Towards proactive action
With regard to proactive action, ICCO should play a supportive role in the creation of local
capacity. However, the development of these mechanisms will have their own rhythm and
problems of coordination can hamper this process. There is a particular need to enhance the
capacity to monitor local violations of human rights as well as to analyse the micro-level
political processes in which these take place.
While the framework of human rights and the discourse and policies on human rights
defenders is valid, ICCO should be aware that this discourse is not accepted or used by all
partners. Furthermore, labeling all NGOs involved in development work as human rights
defenders may make the concept an empty shell. We suggest ICCO uses the term human rights
defense to emphasize the rights of its partners to have their operational space and where
necessary to help NGOs to defend, restore or optimally use their operational space.
International campaigns to counter particular restrictions can be important. However,
campaigns addressing ‘operational’ or ‘shrinking’ space in general will not be helpful, since the
variety of contexts, restrictions and specific problems of NGOs are too diverse. International
campaigns should define a clear focus on particular restrictions that are present in more than
one country – or particular fields where a variety of restrictions are experienced in several
countries (e.g. the problems with regard to mining activities).
144
Creating and using space
Apart from thinking about how to ‘defend’ NGOs, ICCO should also think of the ways it can
contribute more strategically to the widening of operational space of grassroots and
professional NGOs that are working in the most sensitive areas of resources and accountability.
For the NGOs that experience restrictions operational space is not something that can simply be
‘given back’. Their space is rather the result of national and local contexts, as well as the
position, history and style of the NGOs themselves. Creating, defending and/or using
operational space will therefore mean different things for different NGOs. In this regard an
important dilemma is how these NGOs can use their (limited) space to make claims, without
risking an increase in restrictive measures, but instead to reshape their space.
Pay particular attention to the importance of grassroots NGOs and community organizations
Of all counterparts of ICCO, the groups working in the countryside that become part of conflicts
around resources face the most serious challenges and often have least possibilities to counter
these. The ways in which these groups are restricted differs from place to place, and a further
systematisation of these local problems, restrictions and conflict dynamics is needed. In all
cases, there is a need to systematise the evidence on the growing problem of criminalisation of
peasants and indigenous people in these struggles for rights over resources. This
systematisation should not only focus on the restrictions and violations of human rights, but
link this to an analysis of local power relations and claim making so as to make assessments
about the possible strategies of how to deal with the legitimate demands of local people. What
is their capacity to both protest and dialogue, how do movements deal with local dissent or
cooptation of corporations? And what are – given the restrictions experienced by local people –
successful strategies to move forward? NGOs in the field of resource claims almost always work
with grassroots organizations and would not be able to do any of their work without them.
Outside funding for these grassroots organizations hardly exists. In addition to the often severe
restrictions that they face vis-à-vis local power holders, their operational space deserves
specific attention.
As to the research agenda, further research about operational space of NGOs should be
conducted in authoritarian regimes and war zones. Relevant commonalities and differences
between these political contexts will strengthen the general understanding of operational
space and the possibilities for NGOs to defend and strengthen their uses of it.
145
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Appendix: methodology and questionnaire
Based upon our identification of three ideal types (authoritarian regimes, partial democracies,
and war zones) we have chosen to do in-depth case studies focusing on partial democracies.
After our initial exploration we concluded that partial democracies view the NGO-sector as an
obstacle in particular fields. Freely elected governments ruling countries in which huge
inequalities still abound, face a difficult task in the struggle to progress and participation in a
global economy. Big assets of these countries such as land, timber, and minerals are contested
by a variety of parties. NGOs/ CSOs working on these issues often cooperate with groups
emphasizing local community rights and environmentalist values. They are critical of large scale
economic projects (such as dams), vested economic interests of powerful groups in society, and
demand accountability. Governments and corporations can come to view these NGOs/ GROs as
an obstacle on the road to economic progress.
NGOs working on service delivery generally experience less pressure. But the political
space of human rights NGOs or NGOs working on resource issues can become contested in
particular regions of the country, or during certain periods when governments take decisions or
are confronted with protests. In these cases, criminal stigmatization can be an extremely
important means and is widespread. Interested parties such as landowners, corporations and
the government portray their challengers as criminals or terrorists, focusing the attention
exclusively on the illegal or violent incidents that occur, diverting attention from the issue at
hand: the struggle about the rights to and protection of resources. Criminal stigmatization can
lead to actual criminalization when these images of ‘criminals’ or ‘terrorists’ materialize in the
application of the criminal code or terrorist laws to the NGO/GRO protest activity. Newly
adopted legislation, such as CTMs, can be used to try particular groups. Also the use of direct
repression such as torture or extra-judicial killings is not widespread, but its sporadic use is
sufficient to create a chilling effect, a climate of fear, and forms of self-censorship.
Examples of these practices come mainly from Latin America, such as Peru, El Salvador,
Brazil, Honduras, and Guatemala, as well as Asian countries like the Philippines and Indonesia.
Although each of these cases is different, they have in common that political space is (being)
restricted or under pressure. However, not all groups in society experience the same kinds of
limitations, while regional variation can also be considerable. In a number of these countries
there is a local capacity to respond, but in particular in periods of increasing pressures, external
pressure and lobbying can be of great importance.
We decided to focus on two sub-regions, Southeast Asia and Central America, and chose
two country cases in each region. We believe that many of the trends and measures described
in our cases, as well as the various response strategies, are representative of experiences in
other partial democracies that were not included in this study, such as Thailand, Nicaragua,
Peru, and Brazil. On the one hand, by focusing on partial democracies in these specific regions
we aim to discern similar patterns and mechanisms. On the other hand, the choice of cases
provides for sufficient diversity to note important differences within the group of partial
democracies.
In each country, we worked with local researchers who have done much valuable work.
They have written a report describing the civil society and NGO sector, the policies and actions
155
as identified in figure 1, and the recent trends and cases. In addition, they assisted in the
selection of non-ICCO-NGOs for interviews and often accompanied us during our fieldwork.
In our selection of NGOs we worked closely with the ICCO country liaisons and with our
local researchers. Together with the ICC country liaisons we identified 10 to 15 NGOs that had
experienced restrictions of their operational space. In practice, this meant that we mostly
interviewed with NGOs that belong to the ‘Peace building and Reconstruction’ division within
ICCO. In close cooperation with our local researchers we selected additionally 5 to 10 nonICCO-NGOs to make our sample more representative of the NGO sector and civil society in
general. In each of the countries we have also interviewed with various local experts and
outsiders, such as political analysts at the Dutch embassy or sociology professors at local
universities.
Much of our data is based on academic literature and available reports from Freedom
House, Human Rights Watch, or Transparency International. Hardly available in the public
domain, however, is the experience of local NGOs. It was not known how the actions and
policies identified by various human rights organizations and other watch dogs were actually
impacting the room of maneuver of NGOs, how they adapted themselves to the new situation
or how they developed response strategies. Most of our interviews thus dealt with these
questions which we have labelled “on-the-job-trouble” and “responses and best practices” of
NGOs/GROs. Most interviews lasted between one and two hours using a questionnaire as a
flexible guideline instead of a rigid survey. The questionnaire is attached below.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Questions for NGOs
General questions about work and functioning NGO
1. What is the mission and what are the objectives of your organisation?
2. What is the history of your organisation? When was it founded? With which objectives?
3. Which are the main programmes / projects your organisation?
4. What have the most important changes been of / in your organisation in the past 5
years?
5. How big is your organisation in terms of staff and annual budget?
6. What are the financial sources of your organisation? What is the importance of
international donors? Who are the principal donor agencies?
7. In which parts of the country does your organisation work?
8. What is the constituency of your organisation? Is it membership based?
9. Which are the main achievements of your organisation?
10. What have been obstacles in the achievement of your work?
State – civil society – NGO relations
11. How is your relation to the government? Does your organisation have any institutional
links with the government? Which ones? How are the experiences?
12. Is your organisation part of networks of NGOs? Which ones? How are experiences?
13. Which national and international actors influence your operational space?
On the job-trouble: General
14. In general; does your organisation experience limitations in the possibilities to operate
freely as a result of government policies and actions?
a. If yes, could you give us a general overview? See checklist below.
b. If no, how come? Does your organisation take particular measures (in terms of
security measures, public speech, actions and programmes, networking) with a
view to avoid problems?
15. Do your counterparts experience problems?
16. Do you know of other organisations (NGOs / GROs) that experience trouble? Do you
think that there is in general a trend of diminishing space, or not?
Checklist for interviews with NGOs that experience problems.
On the job-trouble: Phases of engagement
ICNL has outlined six different parts of the operational work of civil society organizations which
are protected by the international human rights legislation, such as the right to free speech.
These six different dimensions of CSO-work can be restricted by government actions and
policies. Did you experience in any of the following phases?
1. Entry
157
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Operations
Speech/advocacy
Communication/contact
Resources
State protection
On the job-trouble: Government actions and policies
17. Physical harassment: What kind of repressive (more open, or hidden) practices have you
or your organization over the past five to ten years? Have you experienced threats or
violence? Which actor was responsible for the harassment? How has the government
responded to these incidents? Have perpetrators been punished? Has government
involvement in repressive practices been alleged or proven?
 How have you responded to this harassment? Individual/coordinated or
proactive/reactive? Which response was most successful? How could ICCO have
contributed to the effectiveness of this response?
18. Criminalization: Which repressive legislation (not specifically directed at NGOs), such as
counter-terrorism measures, emergency measures, or other, has affected the
possibilities to work of you or your NGO/GRO? Have there been instances of criminal
prosecution of members of you NGO/GRO? What were the charges? Have there been
efforts of government agents to start civil lawsuits against members of your NGO/GRO?
 How have you responded to this criminalization? Individual/coordinated or
proactive/reactive? Which response was most successful? How could ICCO have
contributed to the effectiveness of this response?
19. Administrative restrictions: How does the (formal) legislation on the founding or
operation or tax-rules of NGOs affect your NGO? Have there been recent changes? Have
there been other administrative restrictions on your work, meetings, demonstrations, or
other operations?
 How have you responded to these restrictions? Individual/coordinated or
proactive/reactive? Which response was most successful? How could ICCO have
contributed to the effectiveness of this response?
20. Negative propaganda: Are there cases of negative labelling and propaganda against your
NGO/GRO? Who are the main actors responsible for this? Is there a clear involvement of
particular government officials or agencies? Are there other actors (political parties,
media, religious organisations, other) involved in this? What are the labels or stigmas
that are most generally used?
 How have you responded to this negative propaganda? Individual/coordinated or
proactive/reactive? Which response was most successful? How could ICCO have
contributed to the effectiveness of this response?
158
21. Cooptation: Have there been efforts to co-opt you or your NGO/GRO, or to influence in
any other way their work or decision-making? Which actor was responsible for these
attempts, e.g. the government (local or national) or business corporations?
 How have you responded to these attempts? Individual/coordinated or
proactive/reactive? Which response was most successful? How could ICCO have
contributed to the effectiveness of this response?
22. Which other (government or other) actions and policies have influenced the work of
your NGO?
23. Which other actions and policies have influenced the work of your counterparts?
24. How do the different policies and actions interact with each other to restrict the political
space of a specific NGO or of the NGO-sector as such? (E.g. is negative propaganda
combined with criminal charges? Or are administrative restrictions on some NGOs
combined with cooptation of other NGOs?)
On-the-job-trouble: Daily operations
25. Which parts of your organization have experienced restrictions and limitations?
a. Specific individuals (e.g. the leaders or directors, the spokespersons)
b. Specific programs, or campaigns (e.g. the campaign about Munir, the
Kalimantan-logging campaign, the campaign on military reform)
c. Specific regions?
d. With specific partners?
e. Specific kinds of actions (e.g. meetings, speech, demonstrations, networking,
fundraising)
f. The existence of the organization as such has been threatened
26. Have responses on your side had counterproductive effects in the sense that other
restrictive measures were applied more frequently or with more intensity? (e.g. the
successful dropping of charges on criminal defamation has led to increased physical
harassment)
On the-job-trouble: Responses and best practices
27. What made you decide to respond in the way you did? What factors did you take into
account?
28. What features of your NGO/GRO or in the context around you have made this response
the most feasible?
29. Have you been able to make use of existing alliances or networks?
30. What has ICCO Netherlands done to assist in defending against restrictions and
limitations? What could ICCO do more or better next time? What kind of reactive
response could ICCO develop? What kind of proactive response could ICCO develop?
159
INTERVIEWS
Interviews Philippines
Manila/ ICCO-partners361
1. Ruel, PhilNET (agrarian reform)
2. Kaka Bag-ao, Balaod Mindanao (legal assistance for agrarian reform)
3. Allan Robert I. Sicat, Deputy Executive Director, Microfinance Council of the Philippines,
Inc. (MCPI)
4. Marion Cabrera, ISIS International (women organization)
5. Eugene L. Tecson, Centro Saka Inc. (CSI) (research on agrarian issues)
6. Armando D. Jarilla, National Coordinator, Task Force Mapalad (TFM), National
federation of farmers, farm workers and advocates
7. Vicente Roaring, Advocate of Philippine Fair Trade, Inc. (APFTI)
8. Sylvia Paraguya, National Confederation of Cooperatives, (NATCCO) (cooperative)
9. Ed Quitoriano, KAISAMPALAD
Manila/ Non-ICCO partners
1. Ed de la Torre, founder of the Institute for Popular Democracy, current board member
for the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Foundation for the Philippine
Environment and the Education for Life Foundation
2. Anita van de Haar-Conijn, Counsellor Political Affairs/ Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
3. Randy David, Professor Sociology at the University of the Philippines and columnist for
the Philippine Daily Inquirer
4. Billy de la Rosa, VSO and current regional coordinator for ICCO in Bali, Indonesia
5. Dennis Murphy, Urban Poor Associates
6. Jesus Vicente C. Garganera, National Coordinator, Alyansa Tigil Mina, ATM (alliance
against mining)
7. Belinda E. de la Paz, OIC Operations Group and Head, Advocacy Division, Haribon
Foundation
8. Max de Mesa, Chairperson, Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA)
Davao/ ICCO-partners
1. Narciso Jover, Vicente Toring and Ester Reluna, TRICOM (tri-people in Mindanao)
2. Jeffrey R. Ordoñez, Executive Director, Mindanao Microfinance Council (MMC)
3. Butch Olano, Philippine Agrarian Reform Foundation for National Development
(PARFUND)
4. Venus Betita, Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc. (AFRIM)
361
It should be noted that we have spoken with NGO representatives where and whenever they were available. It
happened that we spoke with NGO representatives in Manila who are actually based in Mindanao. It also
happened that we interviewed NGO representatives in Davao whose NGO is actually based in Manila, this was due
to a large conference that was held in Davao at the time of our visit.
160
Davao/ Non-ICCO partners
1. Ampon and Soc Banzuela, Pakisama (land rights)
2. Lia Esquillo, IDIS (aerial spraying campaign)
3. Atty. Arnado, Mindanao People Council (MPC) (peace monitoring and land rights)
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Interviews Indonesia
Jakarta/ ICCO-partners
1. Andi K. Yuwono, Executive Director of Praxis, Resource Management and Development
Institute for Social Transformation
2. Raharja Waluya Jati, Executive Director of VHR Media and FX Rudy Gunawan, Editor in
Chief for VHR Media
3. Asep Yunan Firdaus, Executive Coordinator of HuMa, Association for Community and
Ecologically Based Law Reform
4. Sandra Moniaga, founder of HuMa
5. Al Araf and Bhatara Ibnu Reza, Human Rights Research Coordinator of Imparsial, the
Indonesian Human Rights Monitor (previous ICCO-partner)
6. Michael Mori, PBI, Peace Brigades International
7. Indria Fernida A., Deputy 1 Coordinator, Kontras
Jakarta/ Non-ICCO-partners
1. ICW
2. Iwan Nurdin, Deputi Bidang Riset dan Kampanye of KPA, Consortium for Agrarian
Reform
3. Monica Tanuhandaru, project coordinator IOM, active in the LGBT community
4. Donatus K. Marut, Executive Director of Infid, International NGO Forum on Indonesian
Development
5. Herryadi, Program Officer for Civil Society and Democracy for the TIFA Foundation
6. Antonio Pradjasto, Demos, Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
7. Indri, ELSAM
Aceh/ ICCO-partners
1. Abdon Nababan, Secretary General of AMAN, Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the
Archipelago
2. Sanusi M. Syarif, Directur Pelaksana of YRBI, Yaysan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia
3. Azriana, Sekjen and Khairani Arifin for RPuK, Women Volunteer Team for Humanitarian
[sic]
4. Mr. Askhalani for Gerak Aceh
5. Harley and Budi Arianto, JKMA Aceh
6. Evi Zain, Koalisi NGO Ham
7. Desy Setiawaty, Flower Aceh
8. Nazarudin Thaha, Permata Aceh
9. Reza Idria, Do Karim (interview in the Netherlands)
10. Azhari Aiyub, Tikar Pandan (interview in the Netherlands)
Aceh/ non-ICCO partners
1. Afridal Damin, LBH Aceh
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