The Third Sector entering The First.
Cooperation and Competition of Civil Society, State and Oligarchs after Euromaidan
Mykhailo Minakov
Driven by the forms of self-organization created on Maidan Ukrainian civil society has taken
over spheres of the state’s emergency responsibilities in responding to war, political crisis and
separatism in 2014. By doing that civil society organizations have saved Ukrainian state from
collapse in a short-run, but created critical obstacles for the states development in the medium
perspective.
In the comprehensive state model, the state is described as a set of institutes fulfilling a set of
exclusive functions [Ghani & Lockhart, 124ff]. Two out of them lie at the state’s core: a
monopoly of the legitimate means of violence and administrative control. The first function
includes three processes:
“The first is the establishment of a monopoly over the means of destruction and the use
of force. The second is the establishment of the legitimacy needed to subordinate
violence to decision making. The third is the use of force, according to certain rules,
against those citizens of the state who challenge its legitimacy.” [Ghani & Lockhart,
128]
In addition to defense from external danger and law enforcement, in information era the
legitimate violence includes information defense policies critical to political order, i.e.,
counter-propaganda in times of war. Government strictly preserves this monopoly as its core
function.
The second function, administrative control relies on “government professionals who are
accountable to the citizenry and recruited through an open process” [Ghani & Lockhart, 131].
In other words this function is fundamentally connected with the rules-adhered and
transparent transition of power between elite groups, including controlled ways of elites’
rotation (public officials’ careers) and non-controlled ones (elections). This function is also an
un-alienable from the responsible government, but it could be shared with local self-governing
bodies.
In cases of failure of government to preserve its monopoly over those functions, the state is in
danger of getting into the ‘sovereignty gap’, i.e. a gap ‘between the de jure sovereignty … and
their de facto capabilities to serve their populations’ [Ghani & Lockhart, 3]. The bigger is the
gap, the more ground is to acknowledge a state to be failed. As summarized by Chiara
Giorgetti, the fully failed state, which is a rare case, results with ‘the incapability of
governmental authorities to perform their functions, including providing security, respecting
the rule of law, exercising control, supplying education and health services, and maintaining
economic and structural infrastructures’ [GIorgetti, 43]. Less rare though are situations of
government’s temporary inability to implement some of its major functions. This
malfunctioning may lead to a situation when political system isn’t able to serve their citizenry;
but there are also cases when this temporary inefficiency is covered by non-governmental
actors, e.g. by civil society organizations (hereinafter, CSOs).
The latter situation has actually taken place in Ukraine in 2014. Since the flight of President
Yanukovych and his administration from Kiev on February 22, 2014 and the transition of power
into the political leaders of Maidan, the undisputable attributes of government – a monopoly
of the legitimate means of violence and administrative control – have been functioning with
1
the considerable support and sometimes even with the leadership of post-Maidan CSOs.1
Partially in the quest for governmental efficiency, partially in the quest for governmental
legitimacy, the Ukrainian temporary cabinet (February – November 2014) has allowed civil
society to participate in execution of the two functions. There is evidence that CSOs were
implementing the following five functions last year in Ukraine:

Defense sector: volunteer battalions fighting Russian intervention and separatists’
upraising in the Eastern oblasts;

Internal security: self-defense groups policing cities and towns of Ukraine;

Counter-propaganda: activists groups fighting Russian propaganda during the Russian
intervention in Crimea and pro-Russian resistance in Donbas;

Elections: sporadic attempts to create alternative activist networks controlling honest
count of votes;

Lustration: promoting the idea of the necessity of changing elites in power, mainly in
the public service.
By intervening into these five areas, CSOs have assisted to the smooth change of groups in
centers of Ukraine’s power and saved nation from failure in February – May 2014.
However, in all five functional areas of government’s responsibility, civil society organizations
have played an ambivalent role. On the one hand, they enforced society’s chance at surviving
the crisis of post-revolutionary fragmentation and war. Ukrainian civil society was therefore
fulfilling its ‘raison d’être’: civil society advocated in the public interest and made public
institutions act more efficiently in addressing this interest. On the other hand, civil society
transcended the limits of advocacy, and began to act directly; civil society resolved issues
instead of the government. This direct action and civil society organizations’ unprecedented
political role have created a paradoxical situation: civil society lessened certain challenges for
the nation, but created new challenges for Ukraine’s political order.
The ambivalence in question is being produced by situation of crossing the limits of political,
economic and civil societies. For analysis of the current situation in Ukraine I apply a model
proposed by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato. Their model reviews cooperation and
competition of groups, movements and institutions constituting political, economic and civil
societies [Cohen & Arato, 15ff]. Thus each society has its legitimate limits, aims and institutes
participating in the state building. This model was specially designed for description of postcommunist nations’ transition; it is useful to show how developments in each of the ‘societies’
add to democratic transformation of a polity at large. Authors have also proved that each of
‘societies’ add to democratization if they self-limit themselves to their legitimate areas of
responsibility. For example, they review cases when civil movements may make an antidemocratic effect in situations of civil disobedience [Cohen & Arato, 566]. In these cases, CSOs
enter in the areas of government’s or private sectors’ responsibilities.
I agree with Cohen and Arato model since it also provides with an argument to explain the
legitimacy of CSOs as public agent. In absence of formal legitimation mechanisms such as
elections, representation or career in public institute, civic group’s gets its legitimacy from a
very tacit matter: public interest. There are public interests – i.e. honest elections leading to
proper representation in parliament, or responsible and responsive governance – which need
to be permanently addressed in addition to usual state’s mechanisms (law, institutional set up
1
Hereinafter I call ‘post-Maidan CSOs’ those civic groups that were created during Euromaidan in winter of 20132014 and remained functional after the change of power in February 2014.
2
etc). Effective advocacy of these interests is at the core of CSO’s existence. Ideally, efficiency
and legitimacy of CSO are proved by resources it gets from society. The ‘watch dog’ function
constitutes the guiding idea and a limitation for civil society. Whence the ‘dog’ unleashes itself,
and enters the political area, it leads to a very ambivalent situation of questioned sovereignty
of government.
In 2014 we had just the same situation but with the ambivalent results in Ukraine. The Maidan
upraise had articulate democratic and liberation aims. The outburst of civil activism has led to
the downfall of authoritarian regime. Nonetheless, in a longer term, entrance of civil society in
lands of power and money constitutes a risk not only for democratization but also for survival
of Ukrainian polity and competitiveness of Ukrainian economy.
This ambivalence has been manifested in behavioral change in two groups that were defining
Ukraine’s development, i.e. the political groups in charge of government and major oligarchic
groups.
Traditionally, the Ukrainian political class has treated civil society organizations as either
‘agents of the West’ or counter-elites undermining its rule. At the same time, civil society
leaders and activists trusted neither government nor politicians. But with the inability of the
political class to adequately respond to the critical situation in Ukraine last year, this mutual
enmity has become a competitive cooperation. Ruling groups and some civil society
organizations have established certain forms of cooperation to solve problems critical for
collective survival.
Oligarchic groups have long detested the third sector as their dysfunctional rivals in dealing
with public issues. After the ‘Orange Revolution’, the rent-seekers created ‘private
philanthropic organizations’ that successfully competed with major civic NGOs in their impact
on government, local communities and international donors. In 2014, however, oligarchic
groups recognized the functionality of civil society organizations and attempted to coerce and
use them either for increasing rent-gain, or defending existing power-property.
In my analysis, I review cases of both encounters: ruling groups vs. civil society organizations,
and rent-seeking groups vs. CSOs. I will show that the political development of Ukrainian
society in 2014 has made civil society critical to state survival but a risk for state-(re)building.
The success or failure of political, judicial and economic reforms is now far more dependent on
Ukraine’s civil society then ever before.
1. Civil society and Government: Competitors and Collaborators
In post-Maidan Ukraine there are five functional domains where civil society has gained a deep
impact on political order: defense sector, internal security, propaganda, elections, and
lustration. In each of the domains, there is a rationale for change, a short-term result, a risk for
mid-term stability of political order, and ruling groups’ strategy towards civil society.
1.1. Defense and national security
Separatist uprisings in Crimea, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, and
Kharkiv, as well as un-declared Russian intervention into Crimea and Donbass have challenged
Ukraine’s very existence as a political entity. Responding to the legitimate public interest of
self-preservation, as well as to a deficit of adequate response from the government’s defense
agencies, the ‘volunteer battalions’ were created. These groups were organized based on the
Maidan self-defense networks.
3
As it is described in the Table 1., today, there are approximately over 30 volunteer battalions
with about 13,500 personnel fighting Russian troops and separatists groups in southeastern
Ukraine. The data and figures in the Table 1 I collected from official sources, mass media and
interviews with participants of Ukrainian ‘anti-terrorist operation’ (ATO, the official name of
military operation against separatists). The table is not full and covers only those volunteer
battalions that existed at least two months and were participants in mediated events.
4
Table 1. Ukrainian volunteer battalions in 2014
№
Name of battalion, nominal
leader, first mentioned in
press
1.
Aydar, 24th Regional defense
battalion, Serhii Melnychuk,
May 2014
2.
Kryvbas, Mykola Kolesnyk,
May 2014
3.
Kyivska Rus’ 25th battalion,
Andrii Yanchenko, April 2014
Approx.
staff
number
Region
Affiliation with
gov. agency
Political affiliation/ideology
Web-site
400-500
Luhans’k
region
Ministry of
Defense
Radical party of Oleh Lyashko
https://www.facebook.com/pag
es/%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%82
%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D
0%BE%D0%BD%D0%90%D0%99%D0%94%D
0%90%D0%A0/1430526587216
353
400-450
Dnipropetr
ovsk region
Ministry of
Defense
na, some sources report on
cooperation with
I.Kolomoyskii
na
na
https://www.facebook.com/pag
es/25%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%82%D
0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%
B9%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%A2%D0%B5%D1%80%D
0%B8%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%
80%D1%96%D0%B0%D0%BB
%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%BE%
D1%97%D0%9E%D0%B1%D0%BE%D
1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%
B8-
400-500
Kyiv region
Ministry of
Defense
5
%D0%9A%D0%B8%D1%97%D
0%B2%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%
BA%D0%B0%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D1
%8C/596157110491960
4.
Kyivska Rus’ 11th battalion,
Oleksandr Humenyuk, May
2014
5.
Dnipropetrovsk, Oleksandr
Rashevskyi, May 2014
6.
Dnipro-2, unanimous leader,
May 2014
7.
Azov, Andrii Biletskyi, May
2014
8.
Dnipro-1 (first battalion, later
regiment), Yurii Bereza, April
2014
350-450
Kyiv region
Ministry of
Defense
na
Same as above
na
350-450
Dnipropetr
ovsk region
Ministry of
Defense
na , some sources associated
this battalion with interests of
Kolomoyskyi group, now
reorganized as formal part of
MoD
350-450
Dnipropetr
ovsk region
Ministry of
Defense
Reorganized as formal part of
MoD
na
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
The battalion’s leader is an MP
in ‘National Fronts’ faction,
leader is also affiliated with
the “Patriot of Ukriane” and
Social-National Assembly,
some groups of the battalion
claimed to share racist and
neo-Nazism views
https://www.facebook.com/azo
v.batalion
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
The battalion’s leader is an MP
in ‘National Fronts’ faction,
leader is also affiliated with
the Congress of Ukrainian
http://vk.com/bat_dnipro_1
400-500
5000
Kyiv region,
SocialNationalist
Assembly
Dnipropetr
ovsk region
6
Nationalists; some sources
associated this battalion with
interests of Kolomoyskyi
group
9.
10.
11.
Kyiv-1, Vitalii Satorenko and
Yevhen Dayday, April 2014
Luhansk-1, Andrii Levko, June
2014
Sicheslav, Vladyslav
Portyanko, May 2014
150-400
City of Kyiv, Ministry of
Odessa
Internal Affairs
na, Vitalii Satorenko was a
candidate from “National
Front” at recent parliamentary
elections, na, some sources
associated this battalion with
interests of Avakov group
50-150
Luhansk
and
Dnipropetr
ovsk
regions
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
na, some sources associated
this battalion with interests of
Kolomoyskyi group
na
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
na, some sources associated
this battalion with interests of
Kolomoyskyi group
http://sicheslav.dp.ua/
na
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%9B%D1%8C%D0%B2%D1%
96%D0%B2_(%D0%B1%D0%B
0%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%
D1%8C%D0%B9%D0%BE%D0
%BD)
na
http://vk.com/new_kharkiv_poli
ce
50-100
Dnipropetr
ovsk region
12.
Lviv, Oleh Zarichnyi, April
2014
200-500
Lviv region
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
13.
Slobozhanshchyna, Andrii
Yanholenko, April 2014
2501000
Kharkiv
region
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
https://www.facebook.com/kiev
1.mvs
7
Svityaz (rota), Oleksandr
14. Fatsevych, June 2014
15.
Bohdan (rota), Oleksandr
Zhymennyk, June 2014
Kremenchuk, later
Poltavshchyna battalion, Oleh
Berkelya and Illia Kyva, May
16. 2014
50-100
50-100
100-420
17.
Kyrovohrad, Vyacheslav
Shevchenko, May 2014
100-200
18.
Svyatyi Mykola (Saint Nikolas)
or Mykolayiv battalion, Vitalii
50-100
Volyn’
region
na, some sources associated
this battalion with interests of
Avakov group
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%A1%D0%B2%D1%96%D1%
82%D1%8F%D0%B7%D1%8C_(
%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D
0%B0)
na
http://ru.warriors.wikia.com/wik
i/%D0%91%D0%BE%D0%B3%
D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD_(%
D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0
%B0)
na, some sources associated
groups of this battalion with
interests of Kolomoyskyi
group
https://www.facebook.com/pag
es/%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%82
%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D
0%B9%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D
1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%
89%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0/
700524460032181
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
na, some sources associated
groups of this battalion with
interests of Kolomoyskyi
group
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%9A%D1%96%D1%80%D0%
BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B3
%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4_(%
D0%B1%D0%B0%D1%82%D0
%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%B
9%D0%BE%D0%BD) ;
http://vk.com/bataillon34
Ministry of
na, some sources associated
this battalion with interests of
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Khmelnytsk Ministry of
region
Internal Affairs
Poltava
region
Kirovohrad
region
Mykolayiv
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
8
Goncharov, May 2014
Vynnytsia battalion, Ruslan
19. Moroz, May 2014
Myrotvorets, Andrii Teteruk,
20. May 2014
21.
Shtorm (storm) battalion,
Serhii Shestakov, May 2014
Kyiv-2, Bohdan Voitsehovskyi,
22. April 2014
region
150-200
Vynnytsia
region
50-100
Kyiv oblast,
later Kyiv
and
Dnipropetr
ovsk
oblasts
50-300
150-200
Odessa
region
City of Kyiv
Internal Affairs
Avakov group
BE%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%97
%D0%B2_(%D0%B1%D0%B0%
D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1
%8C%D0%B9%D0%BE%D0%B
D)
na, some sources associated
this battalion with interests of
Poroshenko group
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%92%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%
BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D1%8F_
(%D0%B1%D0%B0%D1%82%D
0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%
B9%D0%BE%D0%BD)
The battalion’s leader is an MP
in ‘National Fronts’ faction
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%9C%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%
BE%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE
%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%86%D
1%8C_(%D0%B1%D0%B0%D1
%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8
C%D0%B9%D0%BE%D0%BD)
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
na
https://www.facebook.com/batt
alion.storm ;
http://vk.com/batallion_shtorm
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
The core of the battalion
consisted of the С-14 radical
nationalist group and of the
Soviet Afghan war veterans,
during 2014 was coordinating
non-military activities with the
Svoboda party
https://www.facebook.com/BN.
Kyiv2 ;
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
9
Zoloti Vorota (Golden Gates),
Mykola Shvalya, later Vitalii
Provolovskyi, May 2014
http://vk.com/public73046998 ;
https://www.facebook.com/BPS
MOPZolotiVorota
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
na
Artemivsk battalion,
Kostyantyn Mateichenko, May
24. 2014
150-200
Dnipropetr
ovsk and
Donetsk
regions
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Leader of the battalion was
connected to ‘Batkyvshchyna’
(Yulia Tymoshenko) and ‘Front
zmin’ (Arsenii Yatsenyuk)
parties; some sources
associated groups of this
battalion with interests of
https://www.facebook.com/Spe
Avakov group
cArtemivsk
Kharkiv 1 battalion, Sergii
25. Yanholenko, April 2014
Kharkiv
oblast
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
na
https://www.facebook.com/kha
rkiv1 ; http://vk.com/kharkiv1
na
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%A1%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%
B1%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%B0
%D0%BD%D1%89%D0%B8%D
0%BD%D0%B0_(%D0%B1%D0
%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B
B%D1%8C%D0%B9%D0%BE%
D0%BD)
na
https://www.facebook.com/pag
es/%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%82
%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D
0%B9%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%A2%D0%B5%D1%80%D
0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%
96%D0%BB%D1%8C/77392488
23.
Slobozhanshchyna battalion,
Andrii Yanholenko, later
26. Mykhailo Katana, June 2014
27.
Ternopil battalion, Volodymyr
Katruk, May 2014
250-300
100- 350
120-250
400-500
City of Kyiv
Kharkiv
oblast
Ternopil
oblast
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
10
9297240
Kherson battalion, Ruslan
28. Storcheus, May 2014
Shakhtarsk (Tornado)
battalion, Andrii Filonenko,
29. June 2014
30.
Donbas, Semen
Semenchenko, April 2014
31.
Battalion named after general
Kulchitsky, Vaktor
Anatoliyovych, March 2014
50-300
50-700
4004500
300-450
Kherson
oblast
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Dnipropetr
ovsk,
Luhansk
and
Donetsk
oblasts
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Radical party of Oleh Lyashko
; for some time the battalion
was financed by I.Kolomoiskii
https://www.facebook.com/pag
es/%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%82
%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D
0%BE%D0%BD%D0%A8%D0%B0%D1%85%D
1%82%D0%B5%D1%80/684383
824950475
Donetsk
region
National Guard,
some parts of
the battalions
are still
unaffiliated
Claimed to be associated with
I.Kolomoiskii; leader of the
battalion is MP from
‘Samopomich’ faction
http://www.battaliondonbass.info/ru/
National Guard
The core of one of the first
battalions was from the
Samooborona of Maidan,
na
Unaffiliated
Military wing of the radical
nationalist ‘Right sector’
network ; their political leader,
Dmitro Yarosh is MP from
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%94%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%
80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE
%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%87%D
0%B8%D0%B9_%D1%83%D0
Kyiv region
Ukrainian Volunteer Corps
32.
(5-th battalion ‘Right Sector’,
ataman ‘Chornyi’), August
2014
50
na
http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D
0%A5%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%
81%D0%BE%D0%BD_(%D0%B
1%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%
D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%B9%D0
%BE%D0%BD)
nonregional
11
(9-th battalion ‘Right Sector’,
anonomous comander, June
2014)
33.
OUN battalion (Organization
of Ukrainian Nationalists),
Mykola Kohanivskyi, July 2014
34. UNA-UNSO battalion
%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%9
7%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%8C%
D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D
0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%
BF%D1%83%D1%81
50-100
50-150
Town of
Nizhyn
Nonregional
Unaffiliated
unaffiliated
Military wing of radical
nationalist party ‘Organization
of Ukrainian Nationalists’
UNA-UNSO, radical
nationalism
https://www.facebook.com/pag
es/%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%82
%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D
0%B9%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%9E%D0%A3%D0%9D/14
34842496805156 ;
http://vk.com/club74346598
http://unso.in.ua/,
https://www.facebook.com/kyri
n.unso
12
Separatist insurrections in Crimea, Odessa, Nikolayev, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Lugansk and
Kharkov as well as Russian intervention could have led Ukraine to the brink of its existence as
of a political subject. Responding to a legitimate public interest in a collective conservation in
view of dearth of an adequate reaction of the Ukrainian state to external and internal threat of
its inhabitants’ security, volunteer squadrons were formed. These groups were organized on
the base of Maydan’s self-defense.
At the moment there are some 40 volunteer squadrons (VS)2 with approximately 15 000
members participating in the struggle against Russian intervention and tactical compositions
of separatists in the South-East of Ukraine.
A short term result of these groups’ activities is defense of territorial integrity of Ukraine. In the
spring of 2014 these squadrons, for the greater part receiving weapons, ammunition and
provisions from donations of ordinary citizens, became a major force to effectively resist
separatists and Russian troops in Donbas. With time, a strategic value of volunteer squadrons
in the Russian-Ukrainian war has dipped, whereas a number of army troops and subdivisions of
Ministry of Interior increased. However, tactical mission of VS remained of significant
importance during the whole period from March till November 2014.
Existence of VS poses a definite risk for a political order of Ukraine. Squadrons are
autonomous groups of armed citizens with low discipline and weak control by authorities.
There is a possibility that these groups will prevent a legal work of authorities and will
undermine the country’s integrity.
As an example of the squadrons being out of control was an incident on 11 th August 2014
(according to media). On this day, an officer of Armed Forces of Ukraine tried to gain access to
the mayor of Artemovsk, “arrested” the previous day by a combatant of the “Aydar” squadron.
This squadron did not have right to arrest or detain citizens. The practice of «lynch law» quite
often takes place in the near-front zone; still, connection of the squadrons to security bodies
made it possible to partly control the situations. However, on several occasions volunteers did
not allow the law enforcement officers to take the suspicious “arrested” citizens away,
doubting the legitimacy of their actions and officers’ honesty. According to numerous
messages, that day combatants opened fire at an officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine so as
not to allow him to take the arrested mayor with him.
About similar incident was reported on 27th July 2014. On that day, an armed clash occurred
between combatants of a police unit «Alfa» with a group of volunteers of squadron «Aydar»
because of an arrested group of separatists.
Ruling elites of Ukraine don’t take risk of embarking upon drastic measures to restore order in
the armed forces participating in a so-called ATO.3 The government tries to bring volunteer
squadrons under control by gradually taking them over to the units of Ministry of Defense
(MD), National Guard, Ministry of Interior (MI) and Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. For instance,
squadron «Aydar» is officially considered 24th squadron of territorial defense of the Armed
2
Their number is constantly changing, with old squadrons being dissolved or joined to army organizations or
structures of the Ministry of Interior, while new ones are emerging. This number is a result of my own calculations
based on data, which were gathered in media and interviews with volunteers, raising funds for VS, and with
officers of the Ministry of Interior.
3
АТО – anti-terroristic operation – the term being used by Ukrainian authorities for defining a law status of
military operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ministry of Interior on Ukraine’s territory. This very term
was also used for description of operations carried out by MI and The Security Service of Ukraine against civil
protests at Maydan in 2013-14.
13
Forces of Ukraine and reporting to Ministry of Defense, the squadron «Dnepr-1» is a regiment
of MI.
At the same time a process of squadrons’ leaders being converted into political groups is
taking place. For example, in accordance with the lists of the party “People’s Front” which was
formed for participating in parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, such
candidates as Andrey Teteteruk (squadron commander of «Peacemaker»), Yuriy Bereza
(squadron commander of «Dnepr-1»), Konstantin Mateychenko (squadron commander of
«Artemovsk») and Evgeniy Deydey (coordinator of squadron «Kiev-1») received their seats in a
new parliament. Besides, «People’s Front» came up with 11 candidates to the parliament who
had previously served in ATO. Other parties like Petro Poroshenko’s Block, Radical Party of
Liashko and All-Ukrainian Union of “Batkivschyna” also honoured candidates-combatants with
leading positions in their party lists.
To some extent the influence of volunteer squadrons on the defense sector of Ukraine was also
significant in November 2014, whereas state’s control of VS was still feeble.
Internal security
Groups of Self-defense, a badly coordinated network of Maydan’s defenders, were executing
functions of police units in Kiev and in small towns of Ukraine after Victor Janukovitch’s escape
and a long-lasting institutional gridlock of MI.
By the end of February 2014 a majority of MI’s departments had proved inefficient from a point
of view of law enforcement. Some number of MI’s departments took a direct part in limiting
rights and freedoms of citizens in 2013-14. According to public opinion, police was thought of
as a repressive corrupted authority. After shooting of unarmed demonstrators on Institutskaya
Street in Kiev in February 2014, civil groups of self-defense took on the role of law
enforcement units in the capital and other towns of Ukraine.
Maydan’s Self-defense was formed on 1st December 2013. On 7th February 2014 it included
local groups outside Kiev, having transformed Self-defense into all-national network. Divided
into “hundreds”, these groups executed functions of a police unit at Maydan and in the camps
of protestors in other towns of Ukraine. Later on, starting from 22nd February and till 11th
March 2014 42 hundreds of Self-defense were substituting units of street police in Kiev. These
groups are still acting as a local police or groups of militia outside Kiev and in several small
towns.
A long term result of “police” units of Self-defense can be seen in the fact that these groups
have been taking care of security of citizens and local communities. In small towns these
groups have become an integral part of local police or they act as groups for maintaining a
public security.
Without appropriate preparation, institutional control and discipline of the groups of Selfdefense have gradually become a threat. By the middle of the summer 2014 the groups of SelfDefense at Maydan, having lost their most active participants in the ATO, became a source of
risk for welfare and health of the capital’s inhabitants. After long efforts and an attempt of
mutiny on 7th August at Maydan, the rest of the units of Self-defense were resettled to a
separate precinct in Pechersk district, which helped to put off the pressure.
The strategy of ruling elites towards Self-defense came to light during their attempts to use
the groups of active and organized youngsters for self-interested goals. In May and June 2014
some politicians attempted to bring under their control the groups of Self-defense – without
14
informing the authorities thereof. Apart from nominal leader of the Self-defense, Andrey
Parubiy, other politicians showed their desire to control and use the groups of Self-defense to
their own benefit. These were Sergey Pashinskiy and Oleg Liashko to name a few.
On 5th May Self-defense was transformed into a semi-political, semi-police network of right
military groups, acknowledging the authority of Andrey Parubiy’s, who at that time served as a
secretary of the Council for National Security. In the course of summer the network was falling
apart, its fragments were being involved in different local and national political projects. By
October 2014 Self-defense had ceased to exist as an influential united public organization.
Nevertheless, on a local scale its influence was still significant. For instance, in October 2014 a
Self-defense group from Zaporozhe declared its intention to control ecological situation in the
city. Right after this some activists tried to enter the territory of Zaporozhstal plant belonging
to the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. In a series of interviews with the activists from Zaporozhe one
could sense a firm conviction, that these active actions of the Self-defense represented the
interest of Igor Kolomoysky, an oligarch and governor of the neighbouring Dnepropetrovskaya
region.
Propaganda
With a view to deepening “the Ukrainian crisis”, Russian government deployed not only its
troops and networks for sabotage formed after “the Orange revolution”, but also propagandist
media, formed in 2013-14. Propagandist channels, working for the West, Ukraine and Russia,
have contributed to effectivity of Russian special operations against revolutionary Kiev. At the
same time retaliatory measures (of propagandist and counter-propagandistic nature) were not
taken by Ukrainian authorities till June 2014. Ukrainian government still does not exert an
effective policy, capable of coping with the impact of propagandist media of Kremlin in
Ukraine.
Public interest in freedom of speech and in citizens having access to different points of view is
undisputed. At the moment of insurrection and intervention, Ukrainian citizens had
legitimate public interest in lessening moral and psychological damage done by Kremlin’s
media to disoriented Ukrainian population. Not the government but civil society responded to
the complex of these interests. Ukrainian Maydan’s and post-Maydan’s OCSs managed, even
though to a slight extent), to come up with extremely effective projects as a counterweight to
Russian propaganda, exposing to light Kremlin’s false messages.
A beautiful case in point is a project «Inforesist», an informational resistance [inforesist.org].
Revelations published on the website of this group showed absurdity of propagandistic “news”
of RT or LifeNews, or indicated the sources, from which videos and photos from Egypt, Syria or
Livia were being used for falsifications of information on Ukraine. This group predominantly
worked for a Russian-speaking community of Ukraine, simultaneously leading its modest
English version.
For informing people about the events at Maydan several public TV-channels were launched, a
good example of this is «Hromadske TV». The channel was financed with help of donations of
its audience. The signal was broadcast via internet. Anyone having their smartphones or
cameras and being interested in the life of the channel could become one of its reporters. This
channel has also been able to keep its influence and audience after Maydan events and to
compete with oligarchic channels “Inter” and “1+1”.
There were also groups of pro-Maydan intellectuals, translating articles and news from Ukraine
for West-European countries. A page of the “Critics” journal in English, the group
15
“Euromaydan-press” with a website and Facebook page [euromaidanpress.com] to name a
few.
A short-term result of the activities of these groups is limitation of the influence of Putin’s
propaganda and the emergence of the distrust effect or low trust in materials provided by RT
or LifeNews.
Mid-term risks for a political order in this respect are vague. To my mind, the only risk could
occur due to the fact that the major part of activists’ projects have lost its influence and the
government has formed no effective institute ready to lead an information war in future.
English- and Russian-speaking programs, just like counter-propaganda in March 2014, are still
a matter of a few public groups.
The strategy of ruling elites in view of control of public information projects was about
attracting a number of the most popular journalists and reporters into their own party lists, as
well as in creating “public television”, where the share of state’s control would be significant. In
the first part, the necessary measures have already led to emergence of sundry pro-Maydan
journalists in a newly elected parliament. «Public television» is still being developed. However,
it is already obvious, that the share of bureaucrats and politicians in Directorial Board of the
channel will be quite significant, though not a decisive one.
Defense of voting rights
In a post-Maydan period deputies couldn’t adopt an Electoral Code or at least change the rules
for elections to the parliament despite strong pressure exerted by the public. During the
campaign, voters witnessed the unchanged behavior of the deputies and financial-politic
groups in majority constituencies. Neither ways of agitation, bordering on bribery, nor peculiar
procedures for vote counting and publishing of the results by the Central Election Committee
changed. The impact of oligarchic TV channels on the outcome of all-national campaign was of
decisive importance. In this respect, it was naturally to expect post-Maydan’s OCSs, units of
Self-defense and volunteer organizations to try to make the elites stick to at least some
decorum while competing with one another.
An important public interest constitutes the functioning of an uncontrolled channel of elites’
turnover, first of all, elections. By violating this process a state usually gets into zone of
inconsistence because of the processes caused by “electoral revolutions”- civil insurrections as
a reaction against elites’ efforts to falsify elections. Ukrainian “orange revolution” is an
example of such a reaction of society to blatant manipulations during presidential elections of
2004.
In 2014 Ukraine underwent presidential and parliamentary elections. If in the first case
registration, information campaign, voting and vote counting took place in accordance with
law, during parliamentary elections many a process was far away from being competitive, legal
and transparent. In spite of a high level of trust in old specialized public monitoring
organizations, such as “Pora”, some groups of activists undertook attempts of “direct action”
in some regions in order to provide “legitimacy”, according just to their understanding of the
word.
As an example of such an initiative was a formation of “Electoral self-defense” (in other words
“An electoral hundred”) in Cherkassy region. On 10th October 2014 a patriotic OCS of
Cherkassy established a unit of “self-defense” pursuing three goals:
1) «to protect people’s votes»,
16
2) «to not let oligarchs buy up votes»,
3) To control abidance by law during the “night of counting”. 4 At the same time,
implementation of the initiative was connected with support of patriotic candidates in the
region and it did next to nothing in terms of transparence of elections.
Another example is the vote counting in the 59th single member constituency in Donezk
region. Here were competing candidates of two biggest oligarchic groups, neither of which
was going to recognize its defeat. In the course of several days and nights police, controlled by
one financial-political group, and a well-armed volunteer unit were pointing their guns at one
another and members of the committee, without providing any opportunity to type the data
on votes into electronic system of Central Election Committee. “Volunteers” claimed that their
participation in the conflict was needed to assure the true results of will expression of voters.
However, actions from both sides did not make it possible.
Participation of OCSs resorting to activities of “direct action” during electoral processes had a
certain negative effect on quality of elections in some majority constituencies. Manipulation
of volunteer groups and groups of Self-defense to the benefit of some candidates contributed
to the emergence of conditions for serious violations during the process of will expression of
Ukrainians. Effectively, these OCSs were used with a view to radicalizing competition amongst
the candidates.
There is no strategy of the ruling elites when it comes to attracting OCSs. Political groups
maintain distance from initiatives of Hromadske ТV.
For the time being the reaction of the ruling elites to the participation of the post-Maydan
OCSs in election processes has been not clear. Law enforcement bodies have not reacted on
these initiatives, shunning public scandals before and during the day of election. There remains
a possibility that new experience will influence deputies of the new Verkhovna Rada and
motivate them to adopt Electoral Code of Laws and to launch an electoral reform.
Lustration
Renewal of ruling elites takes also place through a controlled channel of turnover which is
career growth at civil service. There exists a legitimate public interest in those people holding
high offices who have proven their adherence to laws and interests of the country. Lustration
is a way to provide such a positive selection in the situations when the development of a
political system has led to remarkable number of people in government bodies with the skills
and habits endangering the law and order and decreasing the efficiency of public
administration. In Ukrainian public opinion lustration is seen as a way to drive the people linked
with crimes of Victor Yanukovych’s and his circle out of civil service.
On 24th February 2014 Ukrainian parliament made a decision to prepare the lustration process.
In spite of this decision having been made in the first workdays of a new parliament, further
steps towards lustration by political groups which came to power after Janukovitch’s escape
were put off for seven weeks. On 9th April 2014 Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law on lustration
of judges, who have been making up the least influential branch op power in the post-Maydan
Ukraine. The rest of the measures in regard to lustrations were postponed till 9th October 2014
when networks of activists carried out several “show actions of lustration” by throwing
politicians and officials into dumpsters. By the moment of adoption of a new lustration law in
4
Quotations were written down by me during the press-conference of the organizers of “Electoral self-defense”
on10th October 2014.
17
Ukraine, criteria for lustration were limited due to formal presence of an official for fixed term
at civil service during Victor Yanukovych’s rule.
On the part of Maydan’s OCSs, Public committee on lustration was observing the preparation
process of lustration as well as lustration itself. It was established at Maydan on 28th February
2014 with the aim to control government’s activities and law-making bodies in this respect.
Egor Sobolev, a former journalist and Maydan’s activist, became its chairman. The work of the
Committee based on participation of activists, willing to cooperate with parliamentary
committee and department of President Administration which were supervising the
preparation of lustration laws.
In the course of a difficult battle and of no less difficult cooperation, two laws on lustration
were created and adopted (concerning judges and civil servants). Several changes were made
in regard to the personnel in the Cabinet of Ministers, MI and judicial system. At the same
time, due to extremely unclear lustration criteria, this process does not provide quality control
of those holding high offices.
With all respect in regard to lustration outcome in Ukraine it is necessary to point out the fact
that competing ruling elites use practices of lustration law appliance in order to hold sway over
new posts in judicial and executive branch of power. This poses a risk to a political order
caused by lustration laws and is simultaneously a strategy of elites to subdue ideas of Maydan
to their own benefit.
An example of its strategy realization is participation of a leader of a Public Committee Egor
Sobolev in parliamentary elections as a candidate in the party list comprising many
representatives of oligarchic groups. Participation of authoritative activists along with
questionable businessmen has led to many ideas of Maydan being discredited, while the
parliament received the members who should have been deprived of taking part in executing
of state’s authority.
Above mentioned cases show how deep the post-Maydan public initiatives have penetrated
the field of exceptional responsibility of the state. After a political system recovered from a
shock caused by Maydan’s victory, ruling elites cheated on their usual removal from a public
sector and now try to restore state’s monopoly on violence and other functions either by
integrating public groups into government’s bodies or by involving leaders of OCSs into groups
controlling centres of authority in Ukraine.
2. Rent recipients and post-Maydan’s organizations of civil society: unexpected allies.
In 2014 oligarchic groups recognized the efficiency of organizations of civil society in a struggle
for gaining control of centres of authority. This recognition has led to restructuring of
oligarchic groups. The absence of formal structures in these groups leads to their
organizational flexibility. Traditionally, oligarchic groups, whose interest lies in gaining control
of public posts opening up an access to public finances to their own benefit and providing
protection of their own property-power, comprise:
1) several key-owners,
2) loyal public politicians (to some extent the actors of the first two groups might coincide),
3) official in central or local government’s bodies,
4) heads of law enforcement bodies,
5) influential actors in judicial branch of power,
18
5) directors of key enterprises,
6) leaders of criminal groups at times.
During the past year these groups integrated public activists and leaders of significant OCSs.
Many financial-political groups, advocating the interests of big rent recipients, changed their
way of cooperation with organizations of civil society back at the onset of the events at
Maydan. Already in December 2013 representatives of oligarchic groups joined Maydan and
provided activists with resources without any precedent conditions.
In the post-Maydan period such connections were enhanced with some OCSs in view of a
necessity to urgently provide volunteer squadrons with weapons and ammunition. Patriotic
conduct of oligarchs presented them with new legitimacy. Today, a part of a usual behavior of
leaders of financial-political groups makes support of volunteer squadrons and army troops, as
well as of many other Maydan’s initiatives.
A shining example of cooperation between an oligarchic group and post-Maydan’s OCS is a
coalition of group “Privat’s” structures with several volunteer unions. One of the owners of the
“Privat” group is Igor Kolomoysky, presiding at Dnepropetrovsk regional state administration.
By raising funds, partly from business structures of “Privat” group, partly from local budget,
partly from local enterprises which buy the loyalty of the governor for financing post-Maydan’s
volunteers, the governor has managed to build up connections with the strongest volunteer
squadrons.
From media publications and interviews with volunteers and officers from law enforcement
bodies of Ukraine I managed to draw up a quite trustworthy list of squadrons closely linked
with “Privat” group:










«Krivbass» (squadron commander Mykola Kolesnik, more than 400 members, Ministry of
Defense)
«Dneprоpetrovsk» (squadron commander Oleksander Rashevsky, approximately 400
combatants, Ministry of Defense)
«Dnepr-1» (squadron commander Yuriy Bereza, approximately 4000 combatants, Ministry
of Interior)
«Dnepr-2» (approximately 400 volunteers, current squadron commander is not known,
Ministry of Defense)
«Artemovsk» (squadron commander Kostyantin Mateychenko, 200 combatants, Ministry
of Interior)
«Shakhtersk» (squadron commander Andriy Filonenko, approximately 200 volunteers,
Ministry of Defense), is a linchpin between pro-Ukrainian volunteers of Dnepropetrovsk
and Donezk
«Sicheslav» (squadron commander Vladyslasv Portyanko, approximately 150 combatants,
Ministry of Interior)
«Pravy sector», fifth and tenth squadron (squadron commander Chorny, approximately
200 volunteers, official affiliation is currently missing)
«Storm» (squadron commander Сергей Шестаков, according to different sources from
300 to 50 combatants, Ministry of Interior), is a linchpin between pro-Ukrainian volunteers
of Dneprоpetrovsk and Odessa
«Kremenchug» (squadron commander Oleg Berkelya, approximately 120 volunteers,
Ministry of Interior), is a linchpin between pro-Ukrainian volunteers of Dneprоpetrovsk and
Poltava.
19
In such a manner, one of the richest persons of Ukraine and governor of Dnepropetrovsk
region exerts influence on approximately 10 squadrons with 2,500 combatants.
A short term result of such cooperation is nice fighting equipment allowing an effective
struggle against invaders and separatists. Cooperation of volunteers and oligarchs will provide
both groups with more independence of state authorities. Beyond that, leaders of financialpolitical groups will receive an opportunity for a more efficient struggle for the actives of
Yanukovych’s family and his closest circle being now in exile.
Cooperation of volunteer squadrons and oligarchic groups presents quite a number of risks to
stability of a political order. Two of them could possibly have long-lasting consequences: (1)
more independence of volunteer squadrons of central government, which might lead to
concentration of power in the hands of numerous local leaders of the squadrons and (2) more
independence of oligarchs of government, which might enable them to create their own zones
of exceptional influence on Ukraine’s territory. In Kolomoyskiy’s case, activities of his group
have led to the emergence of enterprises, local administrations and volunteer military groups
in a number of regions in the Southern Ukraine.
Systematic cooperation of OCSs and oligarchic groups poses a system risk both to Ukrainian
civil society and to the state. The strategy of rent seekers regarding cooperation and
competition with OCSs might lead to the corruption in the third sector and loss of trust in civil
organizations.
3. Conclusions
During the post-Maydan period Ukrainian public organizations have entered the spheres of
exceptional authorities and powers of the state. To these spheres belong – (1) protection from
an external danger, internal security, law enforcement activities and informational security,
which is critical for a political order, and also (2) control of the staff turnover in groups of elites
holding sway over centres of authority.
There is quite a number of organizations of civil society having emerged during the events at
Maydan in 2013-14 which participate in execution of monopolistic functions of the state.
Political groups are attempting to involve the leaders of these OCSs into their networks along
with organizations trying to take them over into state’s authorities.
At present time, cooperation between a certain part of post-Maydan OCSs and old oligarchic
groups is getting stronger. This increases the authority of oligarchic groups in internal and
external national policy, which leads to a stronger oligarchic rule in Ukraine.
Strengthening of Ukraine’s civil society leads to ambivalent consequences. This makes
government and ruling elites react more sensitively to the needs of citizens. This effort
encourages collective survival of citizens of Ukraine. At the same time this very thing weakens
possibilities of the government to execute monopolistic functions of the state, casting
aspersions on its sovereignty.
Literature
Ghani, Ashraf, Lockhart, Clare. 2008. Fixing Failed States. A Framework for Rebuilding a
Structured World. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
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Giorgetti, Chiara. 2010. A principled approach to state failure: international community actions in
emergency situations. Leiden, Boston. Brill.
Arato, Andrew, Jean L. Cohen. 1997. Civil society and political theory. Boston. MIT Press.
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