Damien-Lansang-Lueveno-Neg-StMarks

advertisement
1nc
Politics
CIR Will Pass Now – Obama Has the PC and Hes Pushing IT
By: Reid J. Epstein October 17, 2013 Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00B694F1-5D59-4D13-B6D1-FC437A465923
President Barack Obama made his plans for his newly won political capital official — he’s going to
hammer House Republicans on immigration.¶ And it’s evident from his public and private
statements that Obama’s latest immigration push is, in at least one respect, similar to his fiscal
showdown strategy: yet again, the goal is to boost public pressure on House Republican leadership
to call a vote on a Senate-passed measure.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do,” Obama said
Thursday at the White House. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill,
let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can
and should get done by the end of this year.”¶ (WATCH: Assessing the government shutdown's damage)¶ And yet Obama
spent the
bulk of his 20-minute address taking whack after whack at the same House Republicans he’ll
need to pass that agenda, culminating in a jab at the GOP over the results of the 2012 election — and a dare to do better next time.¶
“You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position,” Obama said. “Go out there and win an election. Push to
change it. But don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building. That’s not being faithful to what this country’s
about.Ӧ Before
the shutdown, the White House had planned a major immigration push for the first
week in October. But with the shutdown and looming debt default dominating the discussion during the last month, immigration reform
received little attention on the Hill.¶ (PHOTOS: Immigration reform rally on the National Mall)¶ Immigration reform allies, including Obama’s political
arm, Organizing for Action, conducted a series of events for the weekend of Oct. 5, most of which received little attention in Washington due to the the
shutdown drama. But activists remained engaged, with Dream Act supporters staging a march up Constitution Avenue, past the Capitol to the
Supreme Court Tuesday, to little notice of the Congress inside.¶ Obama
first personally signaled his intention to reemerge in the immigration debate during an interview Tuesday with the Los Angeles Univision
affiliate, conducted four hours before his meeting that day with House Democrats.¶ Speaking of the week’s fiscal landmines, Obama said: “Once
that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.”¶ (Also on POLITICO: GOP blame game: Who
lost the government shutdown?)¶ When
he met that afternoon in the Oval Office with the House Democratic
leadership, Obama said that he planned to be personally engaged in selling the reform
package he first introduced in a Las Vegas speech in January.¶ Still, during that meeting, Obama knew so little about immigration reform’s status
in the House that he had to ask Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) how many members of his own party would back a comprehensive reform bill, according
to a senior Democrat who attended.¶ The White House doesn’t have plans yet for Obama to participate in any new immigration reform events or rallies
— that sort of advance work has been hamstrung by the 16-day government shutdown.¶ But the
president emerged on Thursday to tout a
invited House Republicans to add their input
specifically to the Senate bill — an approach diametrically different than the House GOP’s
announced strategy of breaking the reform into several smaller bills.¶ White House press
secretary Jay Carney echoed Obama’s remarks Thursday, again using for the same language on immigration the White House
used to press Republicans on the budget during the shutdown standoff: the claim that there are enough votes in the
House to pass the Senate’s bill now, if only it could come to a vote.¶ “When it comes to immigration reform …
we’re confident that if that bill that passed the Senate were put on the floor of the House today,
it would win a majority of the House,” Carney said. “And I think that it would win significant
Republican votes.”
“broad coalition across America” that supports immigration reform. He also
Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority
legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for
Rubio – Cuba policy is totally unique – this is the best link card you will
ever read
LeoGrande, 12
William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government
and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America,
Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies,
12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf
Political considerations
played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration
as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised
Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the
price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a
Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government
operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez,
who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like
John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's
stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to
improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the
bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was
not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan
Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the
Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally
approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House
political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman
Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the
upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then
announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered
to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his
hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden
The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie?
unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will
There will still be the temptation,
sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and
Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract
concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the
hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle
presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years.
however, to
would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of
restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team,
especially at the Department
of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and
worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting
Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an
opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed
by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of
importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives
on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital
rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.
Increasing green cards generates an effective base of IT experts- solves cybersecurity
McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and
Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 78, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us_immigration_policy.html)
We have seen, when
you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least
15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not
it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in
seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy
attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department
of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there
only manufactured now overseas, but
the United States. We're
any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what
can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the U nited States,
many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often
returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward. MCLARTY: Yes.
And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here
studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really
have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances ,
we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the
green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously,
that's going to strengthen , I think, our system, our security needs .
Cyberterrorism will cause accidental launch that triggers the Dead Hand
and nuclear war
Fritz 9 (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,
July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.doc)
Direct control of launch
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in
agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense;
Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must
agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a
preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code
read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are
issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has
confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out.
These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters
of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency
(Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF
Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into
the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson
2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false
orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern
reception. Some reports have noted a
of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft
Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as
alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This
may attract hackers and narrow the necessary
reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a
direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the
insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking,
valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch.
Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed.
Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to
engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues
to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was
an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation
strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching
on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top
military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and
other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some
Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically.
(Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool
it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could
help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly
worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and
Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect
information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks
completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US
submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three
chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable
amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early
warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are
most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the
internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm
could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This
could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could
appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear
missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology
is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing
Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques
opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be
more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a
laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber
operations through computer network operations.
reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the
internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most
powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding
simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command
and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001,
Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ **[they cut off the paragraph]** “In
June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and
put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning
1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant
harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007
cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007).
This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.
CP
The United States Congress should pass a non-binding “sense of
congress” resolution stating that the United States federal government
should take incremental measures to substantially increase its science and
technology cooperation with Cuba.
Counterplan Solves Signal and Perception Arguments But Avoids Politics
Longley 2010 (Robert, About.com, US Government Info, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/uscongress/a/senseof.htm)
When members of the House, Senate or entire Congress want to "send a message," or state an
opinion, they try to pass a "sense of" resolution. Since such resolutions do not create law, what good are
they? Simple or joint resolutions expressing the "sense of" the Senate, House or Congress merely
express a majority opinion. They do not make law and are not enforceable. Only bills and joint resolutions create laws.
"Sense of" legislation can come in the form of Simple Resolutions (H.Res. or S.Res.), used to express the opinion of the House or
Senate alone, or as Concurrent Resolutions (H.Con.Res. or S.Con.Res.) used to express the opinion of the entire Congress. "Sense
of" resolutions can also be added as amendments to regular House or Senate bills. Even when added to regular bills, "sense of"
amendments have no force law. "Sense of" resolutions are typically used as: For the record: a way for
Congress to go on the record as supporting or opposing a particular policy or
concept; Political persuasion: a simple attempt by a group of members to persuade other members to support their cause or
individual members of
opinion; Appeal to the president: an attempt to get the president to take or not take some specific action (such as S.Con.Res. 2,
considered by Congress in January 2007, condemning President Bush's order sending over 20,000 additional U.S. troops into the
war in Iraq.), On foreign affairs: a way to express the opinion of the people of the United States to the government of a foreign
nation; and Just saying "thanks": a way to send the congratulations or gratitude of Congress to individual citizens or groups. For
example, congratulating U.S. Olympic champions or thanking military troops for their sacrifice. "Sense of" resolutions
require only a simple majority vote to pass and, since they do not create laws, do not
require the signature of the president. Although "sense of" resolutions have no force in
law, foreign governments pay close attention to them as evidence of shifts in U.S. foreign
policy priorities.
Sense of Congress Resolution Solves Via Better Congressional Signal,
Future Expectations and Anticipatory Behavior Changes and Future
Binding Policy – Competes and Avoids Politics Because its Non Binding
and there is No Presidential Involvement
Posner 2008 (Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and
Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. Stanford LR, December)
Soft law refers to statements by
lawmaking authorities that do not have the force of law (most often because they do not comply with
relevant formalities or for other reasons are not regarded as legally binding 12), but nonetheless affect the
behavior of others either (1) because others take the statements as credible expressions of
policy judgments or intentions that, at some later point, might be embodied in formally binding
law and reflected in the coercive actions of executive agents, or (2) because the statements
provide epistemic guidance about how the authorities see the world. 13 Individuals,
governments, states, and other agents use soft law in order to enter commitments and
influence behavior where legal mechanisms are regarded as undesirable. Against this backdrop,
The academic literatures on these topics have different concerns, yet the themes are similar.
it is a puzzle that no parallel literature has emerged in the field of legislation and legislative process. 14 One does not have to look
hard to find a similar form of soft law: the congressional resolution. Congressional resolutions - whether concurrent or
one-house - generally have
no formal legal effect. 15 Periodically, proposals surface to pay more attention to the
the
soft statute has [*578] received little attention in scholarly work on legislation. 18 The conventional
wisdom is that such measures lack importance because they do not create binding legal
obligations. 19 They are cheap and often happy talk by legislatures, commending military officers for
resolution as a mechanism for influencing statutory interpretation, 16 foreign policy, 17 or some other external matter. Yet
In fact, many congressional resolutions are very
serious: they assert controversial foreign policy judgments, urge the President to intervene in humanitarian crises or to avoid a
good service or sports teams for winning championships.
military conflict, criticize allies and enemies, forecast plans for taxation and regulation, send signals to regulatory agencies about
Congress's expectations, criticize the President's interpretations of executive power, advance interpretations of constitutional
provisions and statutes, encourage state and local governments to address policy problems, identify public health threats that need
funding, and much more. 20 Statutory soft law deserves more attention than it has received, especially in light of the large cognate
literatures that examine the workings of soft law in other fields. In the course of analyzing congressional resolutions and other forms
of legislative soft law - including hortatory statutes - we advance a general theory that explains the
attractiveness of soft law, its advantages and disadvantages, and its place in our constitutional order. We show that
soft public law is preferable to hard public law in identifiable cases and contexts. The congressional
resolution is essentially a "soft statute" - a device for communicating the policy views
and intentions of one or both houses of Congress. Legislative soft law communicates
congressional intentions more accurately and cheaply than does a regular statute, which
will usually reflect the views of the President as well. Legislative soft law communicates the
views of a chamber or the Congress more accurately than do statements of individual legislators, whose views will
often diverge from that of the majority. These communications can influence the behavior of the
public and of other political institutions through three main mechanisms. First, a
congressional communication affects people's beliefs about how Congress will
(formally) regulate in the future, to the extent that it credibly reveals the political preferences of
Congress (or its members or a substantial coalition of its members or its leadership, etc.). A soft statute thus
anticipates a hard statute, [*579] but when the target audience reacts appropriately to the
soft statute, the hard statute may become unnecessary. Second, a congressional
communication may have a purely epistemic effect. Information about Congress's views
might cause people to change their beliefs about the state of the world. 21 Third, in some settings other
institutions that generate formal law take legislative views as an input. Agencies, courts,
and the President regularly incorporate legislative views as one of many factors in the construction of
binding policy.
Topicality
A. Interpretation—Plan mandates should be clear, certain and immediate.
Resolved is to make a firm decision about
AHD 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)
Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a
decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.
B. Violation—The plan merely mentions a incrementalization but doesn’t specify questions of
implementation or action. Incramentalism can cause negotiations can last months are years and
their refusal to take a stand on when the plan will actually be implemented makes core disad
links impossible
C. Vote Neg:
1. Predictable Ground. All neg link uniqueness hinges on the question of certainty and
timing of plan passage. They make it impossible for the negative to win any timely links
to disad.
2. Research—no way to research evidence that hasn’t been written in a future they won’t
specify. Impossible to have a predicable and fair debate.
Neolib
The plan attempts to remake the target countries in the image of Northern
development through economic engagement. Challenging the limits of
neoliberalism in public spaces is key to politicize alternative strategies.
Sheppard et al., Minnesota geography professor, 2010
(Eric, “Quo vadis neoliberalism? The remaking of global capitalist governance after the
Washington Consensus”, Geoforum, 41.2, ScienceDirect)
We have shown that there have been marked periodic remakings of global capitalist governance from a Washington to a post-Washington consensus, and beyond, in ways that
disagreements
have been contained within a developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary that has, in effect, repeatedly legitimized
discourses of first world expertise even as the policies based in this expertise repeatedly
fail. In this section, we summarize the elements of this imaginary, and discuss how it has persisted even in the wake of crises that create space for alternative imaginaries.
The developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary has three components that are closely intertwined: A stageist, teleological thinking
that constitutes capitalism, Euro-North American style, as the highest form of development; a
have begun to question some key aspects of global neoliberal governance. Taken together, they hardly represent a consensus. Yet such shifts and
leveling metaphor, according to which a flattening of the world equalizes opportunities for all individuals and places; and an imagining of socio-spatial difference as coexisting
At the center of mainstream policymaking discussed above is the
conception of a single trajectory of development, namely capitalist development, along which all places are imagined as sequenced.
with this leveling through its commodification.
Rostow famously articulated such a trajectory in his modernist “non-communist manifesto”, The Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow, 1960). As dependency, post-colonial and
this has the effect of presenting places with no choices about what
development means, and of ranking places, and their inhabitants, on a scale of development—
post-development theorists have argued,
according to which the prosperous capitalist societies of western Europe and white settler colonies (North America, Australia and New Zealand) occupy the apex, with respect to
This also implies the desirability of erasing or making
over less adequate states of affairs, replacing them with their more efficient and rational
Northern exemplars. Notwithstanding very substantial shifts and disagreements in how the
apex is imagined (as liberal civilization during the colonial era, as Fordist industrialism after 1945, as neoliberal after 1980, and as good governance and poverty
reduction after 1997), the effect is to locate expertise at the apex. If all places are on a common path, then those who have
reached the end seem naturally pre-destined to teach others about how to achieve this—even when the
which other places are imagined as incomplete in their development.
paternalist advice is ‘don’t do as I do, but do as I say’ (cf. Chang, 2002 and Chang, 2008). The new development economics’ supplement of Keynesian strategies, while critical
of and presenting itself as a departure from the Washington Consensus, still endorses a stageist imaginary. Sachs is explicit about his debt to Rostow, framing the specific
diagnostic interventions in any nation in terms of the goal of achieving a healthy (first world capitalist) economic body. Sutured to stageist thinking is an imaginary of flattening, of
globalization and capitalist development as a process that is flattening out the world, creating a level playing field that equalizes opportunities everywhere. It is this flattening that
enables progress along the stages of development—what Blaut has termed a diffusionist conception of development (Blaut, 1993). Some claim that the world is actually
flattening out—that socio-spatial positionality matters less and less, with the implication that it is the conditions in a place, rather than its connectivity to the rest of the world, that
becomes the important differentiating factor (for critiques of such claims, in both the mainstream and political economic literatures, see Sheppard, 2002 and Sheppard, 2006).
The Washington Consensus, in effect, sought to alter the conditions in place; pressing nations
to adopt ‘best practice’ neoliberal governance norms, structural adjustment, which would then
enable them to progress towards prosperity in a flat world. The ‘new’ development economists acknowledge that the world is not
flat. Thus Sachs and Stiglitz argue that certain differences between nations persist in the face of globalization, creating unequal conditions of possibility for development. Sachs
argues that certain biophysical differences can never be erased, making places ‘prisoners’ of their geography (Hausmann, 2001). This barrier can be overcome by directing
more investment toward and/or giving more policy latitude to, ‘backward’ cities, regions, and nations. Stiglitz stresses how institutions of global governance reinforce power
inequalities that disadvantage the global South, arguing for countervailing policies that favor the latter. Both advocate global redistribution and affirmative action for poor nations
in order to redress inequalities resulting from disadvantaged geographical or political positionalities, in the belief that such interventions can level the playing field. Again, a
Yet a flattened world,
within this socio-spatial imaginary, does not mean a homogeneous world. Development economics has long
flattened world, or leveled playing field, is seen as providing all places with the same opportunities to advance toward prosperity.
recognized that places differ in their resource endowments, arguing that such differences need not be sources of inequality. Rather, each place is enjoined to find its
comparative advantage, and trade in global markets on this basis. In doing so, places develop very different economic specializations, each of which is an equal basis for
advancing along the developmental trajectory. More recently, both the World Bank and the new development economics have increasingly come to recognize and value
such
cultural differences are recognized and valorized in terms of how they can be utilized in the
market. As in the case of comparative advantage, the value of such socio-spatial differences is assessed in terms of their commodifiability. For example, Bergeron (2003)
persistent differences in cultural norms and practices across the globe, explicitly distancing themselves from previous quasi-orientalist rankings of cultures. Yet
analyzes how the World Bank incorporates difference into its attempts to create subjects for the market. Taking the case of microfinance, she notes how the Bank, utilizing
Putnam’s conception of social capital, takes the position that “developing social capital is best achieved by tapping into the communities’ own ‘premodern’ modes of
collaboration and social life” (p. 403). Where such non-capitalist practices are seen as functional to incorporating subjects into microfinance, they are valued. However, social
and cultural differences and practices that are not regarded as commodifiable are dismissed as barriers to development, in need of modernization. By the same token, Sachs’
concerns about geographical disadvantage can be regarded as identifying place-based characteristics that cannot be commodified in terms of comparative advantage, e.g.,
tropical or inland locations, thus requiring intervention. A variety of forces has contributed to the persistence of this imaginary, for at least the last century. First, its power
geometry—its rootedness in hegemonic regions of the global system—has given the imaginary particular power to shape not only thinking in the global North, whose self-image
it reinforces, but also the global South, whose residents often have been convinced that their own local knowledge and indigenous practices are inadequate. Second, the
imaginary gains traction from its optimism and resonance with the notions of progress, equality, and acknowledgement of difference. While each is defined in a particular,
commodified way, their capacity to connect with deep human desires for a better life is enticing. Notwithstanding the power and attractiveness of this imaginary, the failure of
globalizing capitalism to bring about the prosperity that it promises, combined with the persistence of contestation, has periodically created moments of both material and
cognitive crisis. Capitalism’s ability to reinvent itself through such moments of crisis, thereby reinvigorating this imaginary, can be understood through Derrida’s concept of the
supplement. [T]he concept of the supplement…harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself…, a
plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence… But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace…; if it fills, it is as one fills a void… As
substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence…, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. (Derrida, 1976, pp. 144–5) Both Keynesian
and Hayekian governance discourses play this supplementary role for capitalism as, arguably, does any global governance discourse. Crises signal the incompleteness of
capitalism—marks of an emptiness that require a supplement. Supplements fill capitalism’s emptiness and enrich it, promising a fuller measure of presence. Keynesianism
provided exactly this supplement during the Great Depression, filling a gap in capitalism and reinvigorating the socio-spatial imaginary. Hayekian neoliberalism worked similarly
when first world Fordism entered its crisis in the later 1970s, only to run into its own difficulties, described above, for which a new supplement is currently being sought. While
We have argued that the
shifting global governance discourses directed toward the third world since the 1970s can be
conceptualized as capitalism’s supplements. As supplements, they have reaffirmed a persistent developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary.
there is no guarantee that a supplement must emerge to alleviate any crisis, to date this has been the case. 4. Conclusion
Recent discussions of such shifts (e.g., Evans, 2008 and Wade, 2008) invoke Karl Polanyi’s double movement: struggles within nation-states of North Atlantic capitalism, dating
back to the 18th century, between those propagating free markets and those seeking to protect society through “powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market
relative to labor, land and money” (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 79). The Washington Consensus entailed a shift from the latter to the former pole, albeit at a global scale, generating
some nostalgia for national Keynesianism among critical scholars (cf. Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 38). Yet, while new development economics discourses resonate with
Keynesian imaginaries, it is doubtful that we are experiencing a return to Polanyi’s institutions, even at a supra-national scale. The decommodification of land, labor and money
is not evident, and emergent governance discourses in the US and the UK stress a paternalistic ‘nudging’ of individuals to make the right choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003).
Nevertheless neoliberalism, as we know it, is in question. The current crisis has made Hayekian nostrums unpopular, but faith in the market runs deep, and it will probably take
a decade before it becomes clear what supplement emerges to manage this crisis. There is no shortage of candidates for post-neoliberal governance regimes—both
progressive and regressive (Brand and Sekler, 2009)—and in a moment of crisis, when supplements are in question, contestations can play a vital role in shaping capitalism’s
Challenging the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary, however, will require
not just probing the limits of neoliberalism, but exploring imaginaries that exceed capitalism. Within
trajectories, and viability.
the academy, a plenitude of conceptual alternatives highlight capitalism’s complicity in producing the inequalities and hierarchies that the developmentalist socio-spatial
imaginary claims to overcome, including Marxist, world-systemic, feminist, post-colonial and post-developmental scholarship (cf. Sheppard et al., 2009). These alternatives
imagine capitalism, development and governance otherwise – seeking more just and sustainable alternatives that create space for variegated trajectories, uneven connectivities
Beyond the academy, civil society is expanding the
range of alternatives—and is arguably better equipped to disrupt the current experimentations of
global policymakers. Experiencing the disabling effects of capitalism and its supplements, those
living precariously actively contest neoliberalization, articulating alternative imaginaries and
practices through actions ranging from local initiatives to transnational activist networks. The World
and ineluctable difference, instead of stageism, flattening and commodification.
Social Forum is just the most prominent of innumerable inter-related counter-neoliberal globalization movements (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003, Glassman, 2001, Evans, 2008,
Santos (2008, p. 258) regards its gatherings as a
productive forum for “alternative thinking of alternatives”—where different kinds of
knowledge about social transformation and emancipation, exceeding the hegemonic
epistemologies of the West, are valorized and actively debated, and where the existence
of alternatives is asserted without defining their content. It may seem unlikely that such emerging alternatives constitute
Sheppard and Nagar, 2004, Notes From Nowhere, 2003 and Reitan, 2007).
a serious near-term challenge to capitalist imaginaries, but they are provincializing Western understandings of governance and social transformation, and re-politicizing
Politicization is essential to make space for transformative rather than affirmative
remedies, changing the frameworks that generate unequal power relations, and
dismantling EuroAmerican centrism “so as to undo the vicious circle of economic and
cultural subordination” (Fraser, 1997, p. 28).
capitalism.
Root cause of global environmental degradation is neoliberal drive for
profit-try or die for reorganizing social relations
Abramsky, former Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society
fellow, 2010
(Kolya, Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution: Social Struggles in the Transition to a Post-Petrol World, pg 7-9)
The stark reality is that the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global
CO2emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful
periods of forced economic degrowth—namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May
2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has shown
that a lot of time and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highlyineffective regulatory framework to tackle climate change. Years of COPs and MOPs—the international basis for regulatory
efforts— have simply proven to be hot air. And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the
effect that years of intentional regulations sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to
climate change continue to focus on promoting regulatory reforms, rather than on more
fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments, multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called "civil society,"
especially the major national and international trade unions and their federations, and NGOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this approach, regulatory efforts will certainly
continue to be pursued. Furthermore, they may well contribute to shoring up legitimacy, at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern countries where the
effects of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on people's lives less directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at
The problem has to do with production, not regulation. The current worldwide system of
production is based on endless growth and expansion, which is simply incompatible with a long
this level.
term reduction in emissions and energy consumption. Despite the fact that localized and punctual moments of reduction may well
still occur, the overall energy consumption and emissions of the system as a whole can only increase. All the energy-efficient technologies in
the world, though undoubtedly crucial to any long term solution, cannot, on their own, square the
circle by reducing the total emissions of a system whose survival is based on continual expansion . This is not to say
that developing appropriate regulation is not important—it is completely essential. However, the regulatory process is very unlikely to be the driving force behind the changes,
but rather a necessary facilitation process that enables wider changes. Furthermore, regulation that is strong enough to be effective is only likely to come about once wider
Energy generation and distribution plays a key role in shaping human
relations. Every form of energy implies a particular organization of work and division of labor (both in general, and within the energy sector, in parti cular). The most
changes in production are already underway.
significant social, economic, cultural, political, and technological transformations in history were associated with shifts in energy generation: from hunting and gathering to
agriculture, from human and animal power for transport and production to wind and the steam engine, from coal to oil and nuclear fission as drivers of industry and war. All
these transformations have led to increased concentration of power and wealth. And a very real possibility exists that the coming transformation in the world's energy system will
The ecological and social carrying-capacity of our planet
and existing social relations are overstretched, snapping in different places. This will trigger a
result in similar shifts in power relations. But we live in interesting times.
major change in the next few decades, but nobody knows in which direction. Consequently, the most
important single factor determining the outcome of this change will be the intensity, sophistication, and
creativity of grassroots social mobilization.
The alternative is a process of critique that challenges the ideology of
capital by prioritizing human development over production
Lebowitz 07 (Michael A. Lebowitz is author of Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of
the Working Class (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Build It Now: Socialism for the Twenty-First
Century (Monthly Review Press, 2006), and The Socialist Alternative: Real Human
Development (Monthly Review Press, forthcoming in 2008). Portions of this essay were
presented as “Going Beyond Survival: Making the Social Economy a Real Alternative” at the
Fourth International Meeting of the Solidarity Economy, July 21–23, 2006, at the University of
Sao Paulo, Brazil, “Venezuela: A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin America”,
http://monthlyreview.org/2007/07/01/venezuela-a-good-example-of-the-bad-left-of-latinamerica,)
What constitutes a real alternative to capitalism? I suggest that it is a society in which the explicit
goal is not the growth of capital or of the material means of production but, rather, human development
itself—the growth of human capacities. We can see this perspective embodied in the Bolivarian Constitution
of Venezuela—in Article 299’s emphasis upon “ensuring overall human development,” in the declaration of
Article 20 that “everyone has the right to the free development of his or her own personality,” and in the focus of Article 102 upon
“developing the creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her
personality in a democratic society.Ӧ In these passages (which are by no means the whole of that constitution),
there is the conception of a real alternative—an economy whose logic is not the logic of
capital. “The social economy,” President Hugo Chávez said in September 2003, “bases its logic on the human
being, on work, that is to say, on the worker and the worker’s family, that is to say, in the human being.” That social
economy, he continued, does not focus on economic gain, on exchange values; rather, “the social economy generates mainly usevalue.” Its purpose is “the construction of the new man, of the new woman, of the new society.” ¶ These are beautiful ideas and
beautiful words, but they are, of course, only ideas and words. The first set comes from a constitution and the second comes from
the regular national educational seminar known as Aló Presidente. How
can such ideas and words be made real?
discussion of structural
change must begin from an understanding of the existing structure—in short, from an
understanding of capitalism. We need to grasp that the logic of capital, the logic in which profit rather
than satisfaction of the needs of human beings is the goal, dominates both where it fosters the
comparative advantage of repression and also where it accepts an increase in slave rations. (2) It is
essential to attack the logic of capital ideologically. In the absence of the development of a
mass understanding of the nature of capital—that capital is the result of the social labor of the collective worker—
the need to survive the ravages of neoliberal and repressive policies produces only the desire
for a fairer society, the search for a better share for the exploited and excluded: in short, barbarism with a
human face.¶ (3) A critical aspect in the battle to go beyond capitalism is the recognition that human capacity develops only
Let me suggest four preconditions for the realization of this alternative to capitalism. ¶ (1) Any
through human activity, only through what Marx understood as “revolutionary practice,” the simultaneous changing of circumstances
and self-change. Real human development does not drop from the sky in the form of money to support survival or the expenditures
of popular governments upon education and health. In contrast to populism, which produces people who look
to the state for all answers and to leaders who promise everything, the conception which truly
challenges the logic of capital in the battle of ideas is one which explicitly recognizes the centrality
of self-management in the workplace and self-government in the community as the
means of unleashing human potential—i.e., the idea of socialism for the twenty-first
century.¶ (4) But, the idea of this socialism cannot displace real capitalism. Nor can dwarfish islands of cooperation change the
world by competing successfully against capitalist corporations. You need the power to foster the new productive relations while
truncating the reproduction of capitalist productive relations. You need to take the power of the state away from capital, and you
need to use that power when capital responds to encroachments—when capital goes on strike, you must be prepared to move in
rather than give in. Winning the “battle of democracy” and using “political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the
bourgeoisie” remains as critical now as when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto. Consider these preconditions. Are
they being met by the new Latin American governments on the left? On the contrary, for the most part, we can see the familiar
characteristics of social democracy—which does not understand the nature of capital, does not attack the logic of capital
ideologically, does not believe that there is a real alternative to capitalism, and, not surprisingly, gives in when capital threatens to
go on strike.¶ “We can’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs,” announced the social democratic premier of British Columbia in
Canada (in the 1970s when I was party policy chairman). Here, crystallized, is the ultimate wisdom of social democracy—the
manner in which social democracy enforces the logic of capital and ideologically disarms and demobilizes people. ¶ Venezuela,
however, is
going in a different direction at this point. While the Bolivarian Revolution did not start out
to build a socialist alternative (and its continuation along this path is contested every step of the way), it is both
actively rejecting the logic of capital and also ideologically arming and mobilizing people
to build that alternative.
SCI-DIP
Science Diplomacy is Ineffective – Anti American Sentiment Overwhelms
the Benign Outreach of the Aff
Audra J. Wolfe 2013 August 23 is a writer, editor and historian based in Philadelphia. She
tweets as @ColdWarScience. http://www.theguardian.com/science/politicalscience/2013/aug/23/obama-science-foreign-policy
This new interest in science diplomacy is at least partially explained by the nature of contemporary global problems: issues of
resource distribution, climate change, and uneven economic growth can only be solved with input from science. Climate change, for
instance, does not respect international borders; addressing it will require international partnerships. Nor do American scientists hold
a monopoly on good ideas. For these and a host of other reasons, science diplomacy makes good sense and promises benefits for
the countries on either end of scientific exchange.¶ But science diplomacy programmes also draw on a long tradition
that holds science and scientists as uniquely qualified to spread American ideals. In the 1960s (the
last time that the United States made a sustained effort to use science diplomacy to build international partnerships), the concept
The idea was that foreign elites who
adopted the values of science – objectivity, internationalism, the free exchange of information – would be more
receptive to American overtures more generally. This assumption drove most US science diplomacy throughout
was marred by ties to propaganda campaigns and intelligence operations.
the Cold War.¶ When government sponsorship was explicit ("overt"), neither intelligence gathering nor pro-American reporting would
have come as a surprise: anyone agreeing to participate in a US government-sponsored scientific meeting, circa 1962, probably
knew what they were getting into.¶ Things got much murkier when the foreign policy establishment turned to groups of private
citizens as ambassadors for science. An oddity of the history of American diplomacy is that the United States routinely conducted its
Cold War cultural campaigns through arms-length arrangements. In a few cases, the groups engaged in so-called "private
diplomacy" really were unaffiliated, but – more often than not – organisations touting their "independent" work on behalf of the US
government received help, usually with financial support channeled through fake philanthropic foundations. The pass-through
strategy was common in US international activities from approximately 1948 until 1967, when an article in Ramparts magazine
uncovered the CIA's covert funding of the National Student Association (a youth organisation), and caused a major foreign policy
scandal.¶ Science turned out to be a particularly good fit for this sort of arm's-length operation. All attempts at private diplomacy
offered benefits of economy and plausible deniability, but private science diplomacy carried the additional weight of reinforcing
American ideals. The American version of "science" that these scientists and their patrons at the CIA had in mind stressed
disinterestedness, objectivity and scientist-driven research organisations. They portrayed Soviet science, in contrast, as enslaved to
the state, overly focused on technology and driven by ideology. Who better to spread this message than private scientists, working
as individuals? By definition, this worldview undermined the ability of overtly sponsored US government science diplomacy to
promote the American message.¶ Consider a specific example. In the early 1960s, the Boulder, Colorado-based Biological Sciences
Curriculum Study produced a series of innovative biology textbooks; it's still around today. In 1961, the BSCS started accepting
funds from the Asia Foundation (now known to be a CIA pass-through) for its international programmes. Like many of the private
organisations that received at least part of their funding through the CIA, the BSCS also received support from legitimate
philanthropic organisations, including the Rockefeller Foundation and US government agencies, including the National Science
Foundation. Nor is it entirely clear whether the BSCS's leaders were aware of the true source of Asia Foundation funds: Arnold
Grobman, the BSCS's long-time executive director, denied any knowledge of such links in an interview with me a few months before
his death, in the fall of 2011.¶ In any case, between 1961 and 1967, the BSCS and its overseas affiliates received 10s of thousands
of dollars from the Asia Foundation to underwrite the adaptation and translation of biology textbooks in Taiwan, Thailand, Japan,
Korea, Hong Kong and other nations on the Chinese perimeter. From the historical evidence, the BSCS's overseas adaptation
offices don't appear to be cover for something nefarious: they really did focus on biology curriculum reform, especially textbook
translation. The only thing sketchy about these offices was that their support came from a different
source than their local participants (and possibly even their American partners) believed.¶ And that's the
problem. Covers can be blown. When the Asia Foundation's board of trustees acknowledged
their ties to the CIA in 1967 (in an attempt to pre-empt yet another damaging story in Ramparts), the BSCS's
entire overseas operation came under suspicion. Indian authorities, for instance, briefly threatened to kick
out any group that received funding from the Asia Foundation; it took the BSCS years to re-establish trust with
the foreign ministers of education who had previously embraced their work. A similar fate befell almost
all projects that involved Americans abroad, as all "private support" became synonymous with "CIA front". Covert operations
discredited the concept of cultural diplomacy for a generation.¶ The Obama administration's resurrection
of the concept
of science diplomacy offers enormous potential. But, once again, the intelligence establishment has
found in science diplomacy a convenient cover for its own needs. The CIA's use of a fake
vaccination campaign in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the subsequent withdrawal of aid
workers from Pakistan over fears for their safety, are all too familiar. Once again, covert operations
are threatening to derail genuinely helpful, hopeful activities that might otherwise go a
long way toward building international goodwill. The state department's insistence on calling its science
envoys "private citizens", too, is cause for concern. Since the science envoys are obviously doing the state department's work, why
not call them "officials" and avoid the potential for confusion? The US has been there before. This time, science diplomacy is worth
doing right.
Budget cuts kill science diplomacy
Forrest 12, Fellow at Center for International Security and Cooperation, 6-18-’12 (Robert,
“Congress Could Deal Death Blow to American Scientific Exceptionalism” Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-forrest/congress-science-research-budgetcuts_b_1606743.html)
Yet as research continues to progress, funding of large scientific projects is waning . Last year, for example, at the
Fermi National Laboratory outside Chicago, the Tevatron -- America's largest and most energetic particle collider -- shut
down. The four-mile atom smasher was deemed too expensive. The closure signaled the end of
U.S. leadership in high energy physics with the Tevatron dethroned by a much more powerful machine, the Large
Hadron Collider, a 17-mile behemoth that spans both France and Switzerland. Not only did the Tevatron excel scientifically, but also
its development forced scientists to create technologies that now benefit everyone. For example, the technology to mass-produce
large superconducting magnets, such as those used in MRI machines, was developed at Fermilab and adopted by industry. Despite
the loss of the Tevatron, Fermilab will press ahead to new frontiers, building accelerators that may not be as energetic as their
European counterparts, but that are much brighter. Experiments using high-power accelerators may not only continue contributing to
scientific understanding of the universe, but could also contribute to our nation's energy independence. Among multiple other uses,
novel nuclear reactor designs driven by such high-powered accelerators could mitigate significant problems associated with our
current nuclear fuel cycle. These reactors would be much safer and less susceptible to meltdowns; they could also treat our spent
nuclear fuel so that it wouldn't need to be stored underground for tens of thousands of years. Many of the new treatments that more
safely kill cancer cells, to which Obama referred, are also performed with such accelerators. Beams of accelerator-generated
neutrons are fired at the cancerous tumor, killing the malignant cells. This treatment is used against inoperable tumors that may be
resistant to conventional radiation therapies. The extent and utility of government supported research and development is profound.
It ranges from discovering new and cleaner sources of energy, to space exploration at NASA, research in agriculture and
transportation, as well as significant medical advances. The list of possible benefits is long. Yet
funding is taking a hit.
The U.S. House appropriations committee last month recommended a significant reduction in
research and development spending. According to an AAAS analysis, next year's cuts alone could be as
high as 8 percent or nearly $5 billion below what the president is requesting. Even more stunning: total
non-defense R&D funding would end up 27 percent less than Obama's request over the decade. These dramatic cuts
would turn off a unique engine of growth, profoundly inhibit innovation, and deal an astonishing
blow to American exceptionalism.
No disease impact
Keller 13 -- Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder
(Rebecca, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,"
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)
Periodic media
reports of bird flu, a new SARS-like virus and a case of drug-resistant tuberculosis have kept the
to a distorted perception of the true threat such
contagions pose. Perhaps the greatest value of the media coverage is the opportunity it provides to discuss the uncertainties and the best
world informed, but they have also contributed
ways to prepare for biological threats, both natural and man-made. It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that,
partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right
tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and
knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the
news can appear far worse than the actual
threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in
Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United
Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season,
bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates
whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The
numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3,
while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are
contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity,
can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning
they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses
is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The
combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this
kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is
less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An
epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic
sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is
possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics
throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In
more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the
1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous
pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and
containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be
effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of
exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual
measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations.
However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by
blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important
aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel
coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13
documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information
relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of
research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have
resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known
history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines
can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and
one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets.
These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the
results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually,
publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving
forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with
H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was
lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily
available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in
the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers
wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm
scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close
communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of
the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the
position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any
influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and
released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods
unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as
in order to
infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile
while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be
wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally,
visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.
No bio-d impact – it’s resilient
Kareiva et al 12 – Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter,
Michelle Marvier --professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at
Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz -- director of science communications for The Nature
Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,”
http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-theanthropocene/)
As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's
justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity.
Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and
abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging,
intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.¶ But
ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once
an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole
ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth
will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to
changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our
planetary ecosystem.¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in
Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of
nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's
the data simply do not
support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one
species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the
same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be
inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in
eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is
surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along
with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or
poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that
even measurable effects.¶ These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough
review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major
disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The
abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function
recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to
decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural
lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded
that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of
the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been
found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from
even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down
in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple
nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has
actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31¶ Today, coyotes
roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down
skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create
new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems
specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the
collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has
recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery
since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and
environmental apocalypse.¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a
melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment
continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar
bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history,
developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential
The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new
environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again.¶ The wilderness ideal
presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is
impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans
have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places
increase of energy-rich prey.
"untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.
Species loss causes better-adapted species to evolve
Dodds 07 – MS in PE. President, North Pacific Research (Donald, The Myth of Biodiversity,
http://northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The_myth_of_biodiversity.doc)
Notice next that at least ten times biodiversity fell rapidly; none of these extreme reductions in biodiversity were caused by humans.
Around 250 million years ago the number of genera was reduce 85 percent from about 1200 to
around 200, by any definition a significant reduction in biodiversity. Now notice that after this
extinction a steep and rapid rise of biodiversity. In fact, if you look closely at the curve, you will find that every
mass-extinction was followed by a massive increase in biodiversity. Why was that? Do you suppose
it had anything to do with the number environmental niches available for exploitation? If you do, you are right. Extinctions are
necessary for creation. Each time a mass extinction occurs the world is filled with new and
better-adapted species. That is the way evolution works, its called survival of the fittest. Those species that could not
adapted to the changing world conditions simply disappeared and better species evolved. How efficient is that? Those that
could adapt to change continued to thrive. For example, the cockroach and the shark have been around well over
300 million years. There is a pair to draw to, two successful species that any creator would be proud to produce. To date these
creatures have successful survived six extinctions, without the aid of humans or the EPA.
US and Cuban science coop is increasing --- hurricanes, biodiversity, and
oil.
Ordonez 12 (Franco, regional correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, “Scientists work to bridge
political gap between Cuba, U.S.,” McClatchy News, 5-21-12,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/21/149603/scientists-work-to-bridge-political.html#.UfwlE22DL1U)
VINALES, Cuba — Cuban
and American scientists have joined forces in an effort to protect baby
sea turtles and endangered sharks. They’re studying Caribbean weather patterns that fuel the
hurricanes that have devastated the Southeastern United States. In the process, they’re chipping
away at a half-century of government feuding, helping to bring the nations together for talks on
vital matters, such as what to do in case of an oil spill. The two countries are so geographically close, and the
environmental concerns so similar, that scientists say it’s crucial to combine forces. “If we’re going to have any hope of protecting
our environment in the future, from climate change to our shared resources in the Gulf of Mexico, we have to collaborate,” said Dan
Under the Obama administration, cooperation
between scientific organizations has increased, scientists say. Visas are being granted more
regularly to Cuban scientists and it’s easier for Americans to get the U.S. government licenses
needed to do research on the island. Peter Agre, a Nobel laureate in chemistry and the head of the Johns Hopkins
Whittle, the Cuba program director at the Environmental Defense Fund.
Malaria Research Institute, led 18 U.S. scientists associated with the American Association for the Advancement of Science on a
trip to Cuba in December to meet with counterparts about potential cooperation in marine and atmospheric sciences, and
sustainable fisheries. For some American scientists, going to Cuba is like tasting a piece of forbidden fruit. The scientific landscape
has been largely untouched for decades. The U.S. trade embargo, which has been in place for 50 years, has in many ways been a
gift to Cuba’s forests, fish populations and coral reefs. It helped insulate Cuba’s ecosystem from the type of tourist development
that’s wracked other nations. Sea turtles that feed in Florida journey back each year to nest in Cuba. Many grunts and snapper fish
that live off the North Carolina coast also spawn in Cuba. The oceanic whitetip shark has almost disappeared from U.S. waters, but
preliminary studies show the predators in abundance around the island. Cuban scientists see the collaboration with Americans as
an honest exchange of work, as opposed to a plea for funding or resources. They complain that they don’t get enough credit for their
science, and they boast that Cuba represents 2 percent of the Latin American population but has 11 percent of the scientists in the
region. There are thousands of Cuban doctors and health professionals on medical missions abroad. The country includes more
than 84 protected areas, making up almost 14 percent of the island. In Western Cuba at the 37,500-acre Vinales National Park,
environmentalists study ways to protect the vast mountains that are home to an array of native plants and animals, including the
“Of maximum
importance is the need to protect and conserve the environment,” said Yamira Valdez, a Cuban
environmental specialist at the park. “Our countries can share experiences, criteria. They can see what works here.
renown “painted snails.” Legend has it that the sun painted their vibrant orange and yellow swirled shells.
And we can apply their experience to the work we do.” Scientists and scholars have helped break through political barriers before.
An environmental agreement reached with the Soviet Union in the 1970s is often credited with easing Cold War tensions. “So later
when things began to loosen up and relations warmed, there was a network of people who knew each other quite well who had
actually had dinners together and been to each other’s homes,” said William Reilly, the head of the Environmental Protection
Agency under President George H.W. Bush. “That is enormously constructive.” The researchers understand that anything involving
Cuba is going to be controversial. A decision to grant President Raul Castro’s daughter a visa to attend an academic conference in
San Francisco this week sparked a wave of criticism from Cuban-American groups, calling her an enemy of democracy. But the
researchers say their work is focused on science, not politics. Their cooperation will serve as a foundation for future dialogue, they
say. “The political relationship at some point, in five years, 50 years, 500 years, whatever it is, will change,” said Vaughan Turekian,
an atmospheric geochemist and chief international officer at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In a rare
move last year, the
Environmental Defense Fund received State Department approval to bring a
senior official from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to Cuba to meet with
officials about rebuilding fish stocks for species of fish that populate the region. Oil is a key area of cooperative
interest. Scientists have helped facilitate talks between the nations as the specter of an oil spill
has raised concerns in both of them. Cuban oceanographers reached out to their U.S. counterparts after the 2010 BP
spill to help them gain reassurances that the U.S. government would step in should the gushing petroleum come near Cuban
shores. “The ocean doesn’t have borders. It’s more about the currents. It’s more how nature works and which are the vulnerable
species,” said Roberto Perez, a scientist at the Antonio Nunez Jimenez Foundation of Man and Nature in Havana. “Fortunately, it
didn’t come to our waters, but the idea really opened up the window of opportunity for the governments to talk.” Those conversations
have increased as Cuba prepares to drill for oil just 70 miles from the Florida Keys. Last year, the U.S. Treasury Department
granted a group of environmentalists and drilling experts, led by the Environmental Defense Fund, permission to travel to Cuban to
meet with top officials at the Ministry of Basic Industry, which regulates the energy sector, as well as the state-run petroleum
company. The group included Reilly, the co-chair of a bipartisan commission that investigated the 2010 BP spill. He said his goal
was to share the commission’s findings with Cuban officials, who had no experience regulating offshore oil and gas, in hopes that
they wouldn’t make the same mistakes that led to the BP disaster. When he returned to the United States, Reilly briefed the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement and other administration agencies, whose officials, Reilly said, were
very interested to learn that the Cubans were reading the Interior Department’s regulatory reports and planned to adhere to
American standards. “That was not known,” he said. U.S.
officials also have engaged with the International
Maritime Organization, which has sent technical teams to Cuba to evaluate its oil drilling
procedures, and Cuban and U.S. officials met in the Bahamas in December along with officials from Mexico and Jamaica to
discuss disaster plans. A similar meeting was held in Trinidad and administration officials say more will come. “In fact, we’re all
comfortable all the entities that would need licenses to respond appropriately either have them or are in the process of getting them
at this point,” said a senior administration official, who requested anonymity in order to speak freely. Reilly notes that his delegation
spent several days speaking directly with top Cuban officials and was able to gather specific details about Cuban plans that may not
have been discussed at other multinational meetings.
No food wars – conflicts are more likely when resources are abundant
Salehyan 07 (Idean, assistant professor of political science at the University of North Texas, “The New myth about climate
change,” August, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)
These claims generally boil down to an argument about resource scarcity. Desertification, sea-level rise, more-frequent
severe weather events, an increased geographical range of tropical disease, and shortages of freshwater will lead to violence
over scarce necessities. Friction between haves and have-nots will increase, and governments will be hard-pressed to provide
even the most basic services. In some scenarios, mass migration will ensue, whether due to desertification, natural disasters,
and rising sea levels, or as a consequence of resource wars. Environmental refugees will in turn spark political violence in
receiving areas, and countries in the “global North” will erect ever higher barriers to keep culturally unwelcome—and hungry—
foreigners out. The number of failed states, meanwhile, will increase as governments collapse in the face of resource wars and
weakened state capabilities, and transnational terrorists and criminal networks will move in. International wars over depleted
water and energy supplies will also intensify. The basic need for survival will supplant nationalism, religion, or ideology as the
fundamental root of conflict. Dire scenarios like these may sound convincing, but they are misleading. Even worse, they
are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments.
Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from
prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few
anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental
conditions lead
to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is
more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of
civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between
1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If
global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the
crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the
U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food
shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the
Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe
shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history,
did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there
is much more to armed conflict than
resource scarcity and natural disasters.
Biotech inevitable.
D'Haeze, ‘7
[Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University,
Senior Technical Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical
Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory Board,
http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html]
Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is still expanding –
booming – in the United States and Europe, but also in major Asian countries such as India, China, and Japan.
A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major
location in the United States or Europe while branching elsewhere in the United States, Europe, and/or Asia.
Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the drug development pipelines and on
how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed. Research and Development hubs are located at the East
coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco,
Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but multinational
companies have been or are stepping on land in countries throughout Asia as well. Reasons for the
latter development may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries
and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place. During recent years, India, for example,
has become the home of a few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and
is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g.,
production of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk,
Aventis Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced Biochemicals are all
represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech
and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the
Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues
annually and representing one million jobs by roughly three years from now. The government tries to achieve this
goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for
investors by centralizing the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010,
financially supporting new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting small
biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up companies.
Relations
Science cooperation is increasing in squo --- meetings prove.
AFP 11 (Agence France-Presse, “Cuba, US scientists kick off cooperation meeting,” Phys.org, 12-1211, http://phys.org/news/2011-12-cuba-scientists-cooperation.html)
Scientists from the Cuba and United States will Monday begin a five-day meeting aimed at
exploring opportunities for cooperation on range of research fields, including biological and
environmental sciences, and science policy, Cuban officials said. The forum, organized by
The Academy of Sciences of Cuba (ACC) and the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS), will be attended by some 40 directors of research centers and researchers from
the two countries, said the ACC in statement, according to official Cuban news agency Prensa
Latina. The aim is to "reach sustainable collaboration between the two countries," said the agency.
The neighbors have not had diplomatic relations since the White House broke off links in 1961, and a strict embargo has strangled
ties and trade between them.
OAS fails- other groups solve
Lee ’12 [Brianna, Senior Production Editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, “The
Organization of American States,” April 13, http://www.cfr.org/americas/organization-americanstates/p27945]
One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a
unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has
made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between
American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates
unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes
(VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of
funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future.¶ Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to
democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't
condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm
in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful.¶ Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on
the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust:
"Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President]
Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S.,
even though Washington seems to have lost interest."¶ Chavez
has called the OAS a puppet of the United
States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to
defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.¶
Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010,
Latin American leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization
that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have expressed the desire for
CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing more than a piece of paper
and a dream."¶ Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a
useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as a means for
Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the
OAS has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis
in 2008
No impact to Latin America
Naim 06 (Moises, Foreign Policy no157 40-3, 45-7 N/D 2006, editor of foreign policy
magazine)
For decades, Latin America's weight in the world has been shrinking. It is not an economic
powerhouse, a security threat, or a population bomb. Even its tragedies pale in comparison to Africa's. The region will not
rise until it ends its search for magic formulas. It may not make for a good sound bite, but patience is Latin America's biggest deficit of all. Latin America
has grown used to living in the backyard of the United States. For decades, it has been a region where the U.S. government meddled in local politics,
fought communists, and promoted its business interests. Even if the rest of the world wasn't paying attention to Latin America, the United States
occasionally was. Then came September 11, and even the United States seemed to tune out. Naturally, the world's attention centered almost exclusively
on terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, and on the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. Latin America became Atlantis--the lost
continent. Almost overnight, it disappeared from the maps of investors, generals, diplomats, and journalists. Indeed, as one commentator recently
quipped, Latin
America can't compete on the world stage in any aspect, even as a threat. Unlike antiAmericans elsewhere, Latin Americans are not willing to die for the sake of their geopolitical
hatreds. Latin America is a nuclear-weapons free zone. Its only weapon of mass destruction is
cocaine. In contrast to emerging markets like India and China, Latin America is a minor economic player whose global
significance is declining. Sure, a few countries export oil and gas, but only Venezuela is in the top league of the world's energy market. Not
even Latin America's disasters seem to elicit global concern anymore. Argentina experienced a massive financial stroke in 2001, and no one abroad
seemed to care. Unlike prior crashes, no government or international financial institution rushed to bail it out. Latin
America doesn't have
Africa's famines, genocides, an HIV/AIDS pandemic, wholesale state failures, or rock stars who
routinely adopt its tragedies. Bono, Bill Gates, and Angelina Jolie worry about Botswana, not Brazil. But just as the five-year-old war on
terror pronounced the necessity of confronting threats where they linger, it also underscored the dangers of neglect. Like Afghanistan, Latin America
shows how quickly and easy it is for the United States to lose its influence when Washington is distracted by other priorities. In both places, Washington's
disinterest produced a vacuum that was filled by political groups and leaders hostile to the United States. No,
Latin America is not
churning out Islamic terrorists as Afghanistan was during the days of the Taliban. In Latin America, the power gap is being filled by a
group of disparate leaders often lumped together under the banner of populism. On the rare occasions that Latin American countries do make international
news, it's the election of a so-called populist, an apparently anti-American, anti-market leader, that raises hackles. However, Latin America's populists
aren't a monolith. Some are worse for international stability than is usually reported. But some have the potential to chart a new, positive course for the
region. Underlying the ascent of these new leaders are several real, stubborn threads running through Latin Americans' frustration with the status quo in
their countries. Unfortunately, the United States'---and the rest of the world's--lack of interest in that region means that the forces that are shaping
disparate political movements in Latin America are often glossed over, misinterpreted, or ignored. Ultimately, though, what matters most is not what the
northern giant thinks or does as much as what half a billion Latin Americans think and do. And in the last couple of decades, the wild swings in their
political behavior have created a highly unstable terrain where building the institutions indispensable for progress or for fighting poverty has become
increasingly difficult. There is a way out. But it's not the quick fix that too many of Latin America's leaders have promised and that an impatient population
demands.
Status quo discussions between US and Cuban scientists solve --- specific
to environmental discussions.
Haven 4-11-13 (Paul, Associated Press Havana reporter, “Under the radar, Cuba and U.S. often
work together,” The Associated Press Nation and World,
http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_22997924/under-radar-cuba-and-u-s-often-work)
HAVANA — Cuba
and the United States might be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with grievances,
but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two kidnapped children
in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable cooperation on many issues.
Indeed, diplomats and observers on both sides of the Florida Straits say American and Cuban law
enforcement officers, scientists, disaster relief workers, Coast Guard officials and other experts work together
on a daily basis, and invariably express professional admiration for each other. "I don't think the story
has been told, but there is a real warmth in just the sort of day-to-day relations between U.S. and
Cuban government officials," said Dan Whittle, who frequently brings scientific groups to the
island in his role as Cuba program director for the Environmental Defense Fund. "Nearly every
time I talk to American officials, they say they were impressed by their Cuban counterparts.
There really is a high level of mutual respect." Almost none of these technical-level interactions
make the headlines, but examples are endless. Just last week, Cuba's top environmental
official Ulises Fernandez and several island oil experts attended a conference in New York of
the International Association of Drilling Contractors after the State Department expedited their
visas. The American government maintains a Coast Guard representative in Cuba, and the two countries work together to
interdict suspicious boats. A U.S. diplomat involved in the process said that security officials on both sides are on a first-name basis
and that the Cubans happily accept FBI and Coast Guard baseball caps as gifts.
Single instances of action do not change perceptions of us
Fettweis, 08 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on
Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)
Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility
helped the U nited S tates achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for
example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence
theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing
to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us
again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and
long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but
not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was
There is
actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains
little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their
ability to influence others . Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further
doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions.
done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson.
Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence
theorists, Jonathan Mercer
argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed
and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions .39 While
policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social
psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational,
dependent upon the constraints of place and time . Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting
impressions of irresolution from single, independent events . Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption
had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40
No country will ever turn away from US commitment – even if they are
tempted, they know they need a superpower
Alterman 11
(Jon, director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at CSIS, Former member of the Policy Planning Staff
at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, June 2011,
“Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power,”
http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_Cohen_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf
Beneath the surface, however, is an appreciation of how much of the region’s security order is a
consequence of U.S. action and how little ability any other country or collection of countries has
to do anything close to what the United States does. While there is fear for the future of the U.S.
role, there is at the same time no alternative to it. No other country has the military resources or
the will to safeguard what is, in the end, a global commons. Rather than seek to eliminate the
U.S. role, regional countries—both friendly and unfriendly—are determined to try to shape it in
order to advance their own interests. It is worth pointing out two things at the outset. The first is that much of this is a
speculative exercise. Decisions on foreign policy are closely held, with no public consultation, at the highest levels of the Gulf
leadership. Those leaders are often mannered when talking with Americans, almost seeming as if they are calibrating their
messages to achieve the desired response rather than to give insight into their own thinking. Although it is worth paying attention to
words spoken in private, those words need to be supplemented with attention to the actions the leaders take as well as to the
parameters of the public debate that they allow to exist. Second, there is a tremendous range of views within the Gulf, not only
between Iran, Iraq, and their GCC neighbors, but even within the GCC itself. The United Arab Emirates feels most vulnerable to
Iran, for example, while Oman and Qatar seem intent on finding a modus vivendi with Iran. Kuwait feels threatened by everyone in
its neighborhood, while Saudi Arabia relies on U.S. backing in order to seek to lead the neighborhood. For each country,
the bilateral relationship with the United States is the most important relation, not least
because it protects each country from the predatory actions of its neighbors. Correspondingly,
there is no single “Gulf” or “Arab” view of the United States, nor a single view of U.S. power or U.S. commitment to the region. Even
within countries, there seems to be considerable diversity. Where there is unanimity, however, is in the
expectation that the region must have some external guarantor, as it has had since the
early sixteenth century.
2nc
CP
AT: Perm Do the CP
Should requires certainty and immediacy
Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court,
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn1
4)
The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May
18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti .14 The answer to this query is
not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its
immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same
hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2)
constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners
of the entire record.16 ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text,
with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered
abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase
to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge
doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel
plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a
court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that
in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to
medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the
statutory policy of this State. IV CONCLUSION Nisi prius judgments and orders should be construed in a manner which gives
effect and meaning to the complete substance of the memorial. When a judge-signed direction is capable of two
interpretations, one of which would make it a valid part of the record proper and the other would render it a meaningless
exercise in futility, the adoption of the former interpretation is this court's due. A rule - that on direct appeal views as fatal to
the order's efficacy the mere omission from the journal entry of a long and customarily implied phrase, i.e., "and the same
hereby is" - is soon likely to drift into the body of principles which govern the facial validity of judgments. This development
would make judicial acts acutely vulnerable to collateral attack for the most trivial of reasons and tend to undermine the
stability of titles or other adjudicated rights. It is obvious the trial judge intended his May 18 memorial to be an in praesenti
order overruling Dollarsaver's motion for judgment n.o.v. It is hence that memorial, and not the later June 2 entry, which
triggered appeal time in this case. Because the petition. in error was not filed within 30 days of May 18, the appeal is untimely.
I would hence sustain the appellee's motion to dismiss.21 Footnotes: 1 The pertinent terms of the memorial of May 18, 1993
are: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BRYAN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA COURT MINUTE /18/93 No. C-91-223 After
having heard and considered arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition to the motions of the Defendant for
judgment N.O.V. and a new trial, the Court finds that the motions should be overruled. Approved as to form: /s/ Ken Rainbolt
/s/ Austin R. Deaton, Jr. /s/ Don Michael Haggerty /s/ Rocky L. Powers Judge 2 The turgid phrase - "should be and the same
hereby is" - is a tautological absurdity. This is so because "should"
is synonymous with ought or must
and is in itself sufficient to effect an inpraesenti ruling - one that is couched in "a present indicative
synonymous with ought." See infra note 15.3 Carter v. Carter, Okl., 783 P.2d 969, 970 (1989); Horizons, Inc. v. Keo Leasing
Co., Okl., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., 655 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1983); Knell v. Burnes, Okl., 645 P.2d
471, 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburgh County, Okl., 630 P.2d 772, 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl. 151,
90 P.2d 656, 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925). 4 "Recordable" means that by force of 12 O.S.
1991 § 24 an instrument meeting that section's criteria must be entered on or "recorded" in the court's journal. The clerk may
"enter" only that which is "on file." The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 24 are: "Upon the journal record required to be kept
by the clerk of the district court in civil cases . . . shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file: cont…
Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown,
supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount
was held to imply an obligation and to be more than
advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of
of contributory negligence of the plaintiff
Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was
interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215
(Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers
they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In
praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or
immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective
in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).
Substantial means unconditional and certain
Words and Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)
The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean
substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation,
reserve, or disguise; in
full existence ; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential,
apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain ; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not
merely nominal; opposed to form ; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole;
opposed to inclusive.
Resolved means certain
AHD 06 (American Heritage Dictionary,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)
Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person)
to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.
Solvency
2NC Counterplan
Immediate Legislation Links to Politics – Counterplan Sends a Signal
Immediately Solving the Aff and Results in Future Binding Legislation
Posner ‘8 Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and
Chicago. Stanford LR, December
When the lawmaking agent does not comply with the rules, its
Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of
communications will not be treated as law in
the strong sense. Executive officials will not arrest or otherwise sanction people whose behavior is inconsistent with the
policy judgment reflected in the communication. However, the public (and other political agents) will
often react as though the communication were in fact law, as we have argued. The public might
bring its behavior into conformity with the policy goals expressed in the communication
because (for example) it predicts that later the lawmaking agent or some other lawmaking
agent will convert the communication into law, or because the pronouncement is a focal
point for behavior. As behavior changes, it may become easier for the original lawmaking
agent to enact a hard-law version of the soft law, or for some other lawmaking agent
(such as a court) to convert the soft law into hard law. cont… Hard law is easiest to create in the regulatory
setting, where not much more than notice and comment are required. Our topic - statutory law - is a middle case. As we have seen,
statute making faces significant formalities, with the result that various soft law
substitutes - concurrent resolutions, hortatory statutes, signing statements - have emerged. One might also
predict that soft law will become popular in periods of uncertainty, where lawmaking agents might
seek to test the waters of public opinion before committing themselves to a hard-law
enactment. In many cases, there is nothing troubling about soft law even though it has real effects on people's
behavior. One can think of it as a useful regulatory instrument that allows governments
to obtain policy goals without resorting to law, which is sometimes too costly, crude, and inflexible. But in
other cases, resort to soft law may be troubling. Some people are better at perceiving soft law than others; the latter group will often
find themselves in a worse position to control their lives. However, much of this argument turns on current expectations about hard
and soft law. If people come to expect that soft law will function as a substitute for hard law, then they will endeavor to identify soft
public law in the same way they do hard public law. Soft statutes are recorded alongside hard statutes; identifying the content of
concurrent resolutions is no easier or harder than identifying the content of hard resolutions.
2NC Solves Foreign Perception
Solves congressional signal – foreign governments perceive
Posner ‘8 Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. Stanford LR, December
Alternatively, the
soft statute might have Condorcetian effects, revealing that members of Congress
independently agree or disagree with the President's assessment. Such a resolution might
affect the President's own views, but even if it does not, it could affect the views of important others - the American
public or foreign governments, for example. Since the President needs the cooperation of
these groups, the soft statute influences future presidential decisions. For example, a concurrent
resolution introduced in the 104th Congress expressed Congress's opposition to President Clinton's planned deployment of United States ground
forces to Bosnia. 124 A proposed Senate resolution in the next session urged the President to facilitate the withdrawal of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 125 The first resolution signaled potential opposition in Congress. The second expressed support for a potential
action by the President. Similarly, a proposed concurrent resolution in 2001 expressed "support for the President in using all means at his disposal to
encourage the establishment of a democratically elected government in Iraq." 126 Contrast an alternative proposed resolution urging that the United
States work through the United Nations to assure Iraq's compliance with existing U.N. resolutions. 127 Each proposed resolution
reveals information both about legislative preferences and about the underlying state of the
world.
AT: CP LINKS TO POLITICS
IT DON’T THO
Avoids even perception of presidential involvement
Posner ‘8 Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. Stanford LR, December
A different rule-of-law objection concerns the enactment of law without the consent of the President.
If Congress can
regulate with soft statutes, then the constitutional requirement of presentment is rendered void and the
President's role in producing legislation is eliminated. The procedural formalities of legislation do
not just clarify congressional action; they also ensure that Congress does not cut the President out of
the picture. Just such a concern lay behind the Supreme Court's rejection of the legislative veto. The analogous concern can
be found in the literature on international soft law. If international law obtains its legitimacy from the consent of states, as is often
argued, 100 how can international soft law - that is, international law that lacks [*599] the consent of at least some states - have
any legitimacy? 101 We address the constitutional question in Part IV.C. For now, consider two points. First, to the extent that the
regulative power of soft law comes from the fact that it anticipates constitutionally valid hard law (with the President's consent, or
approved in another constitutionally accepted way), then the concern falls away. Potentially regulated parties will
understand that the congressional resolution does not predict the President's action and
will place only as much weight on the resolution as it will bear standing alone. The problem, if there is one, arises only when a
congressional resolution affects behavior by generating knowledge about states of the world or supplying focal points, and when
courts or other legal institutions use soft law as inputs for statutory interpretation, common law development, and other regulatory
activities. In these cases, Congress affects behavior without presidential involvement, but importantly
not by using constitutionally prohibited mechanisms. Simple and concurrent resolutions have an old pedigree and are explicitly
contemplated by the U.S. Constitution, if not for the specific uses at issue here.
Only requires simple majority- allows rapid passage
Kelly, 6 (Michael, Major US Army, Judge Advocates General School, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA456565.)
One check has promise if there is broad public 353 backing..Sense
of Congress declarations are nonbinding, but Congress can pass them rapidly, when in session, by a simple majority vote.
Congress can usethese declarations in conjunction with strategies tomarshall public support or its investigatoryfunctions,354 which
rapidly focus public attention.Either way, Congress can generate a lot of political pressure on the president.
Bioterror
1nc – bio-terror
Risk of bioterrorism is extremely low – several constraints
Keller 13 (3-7, Rebecca – Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado
at Boulder, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,"
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)djm
It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily,
the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a
plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the
news can appear far worse than the actual threat.
Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia,
H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was
discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu
season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out.
When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious
period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to
the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent
immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be
thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very s usceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some
mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, throug h a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza,
because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the
population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread
infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year th at
a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned
There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more
recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pand emic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two dis eases was
contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management.
The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility
exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals,
limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve
general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission.
Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize
them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was
made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown
regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help
make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since
then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While
there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus,
before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created
mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed
due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs
was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb.
21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic
resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibilit y that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be
considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to
determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at bios afety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure
environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply
with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal.
The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state
actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor
has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological
weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any
influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack.
The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely
circulate within a population. There
are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods
unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is
beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind
patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method,
but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary
to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a
serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. As
far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward equation to consider. The threat of a terrorist attack using
biological weapons is very low. And while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain
of virus that could result in an epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more effectively. All of this hinges on the level of
preparedness of developed nations and their ability to rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.\
Bio-D/Disease
2nc – Sci- Dip
Soft power doesn’t solve—increases resentment
Gray 11—Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of
Reading, England [Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF
MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Published by
Strategic Studies Institute]
An inherent and unavoidable problem with a country’s soft power is that it is near certain to be
misassessed by the politicians who attempt to govern soft power’s societal owners and carriers.
Few thoroughly encultured Americans are likely to undervalue “the American way” in many of its aspects as a potent source of
friendly self-co-option abroad. Often, this self-flattering appreciation will be well justified in reality. But as an already existing
instrument of American policy, the soft power of ideas and practical example is fraught with the perils of self-delusion. If one adheres
to an ideology that is a heady mixture of Christian ethics (“one nation, under God . . .”), democratic principles, and free market
orthodoxy, and if one is an American, which is to say if one is a citizen of a somewhat hegemonic world power that undeniably has
enjoyed a notably successful historical passage to date, then it is natural to confuse the national ideology with a universal creed.
Such confusion is only partial, but nonetheless it is sufficiently damaging as to be a danger to national strategy. Since it is
fallacious to assume that American values truly are universal, the domain of high relevance and
scope for American soft power to be influential is distinctly limited. If one places major policy
weight on the putative value for policy of American soft power, one needs to be acutely alert to the
dangers of an under-recognized ethnocentrism born of cultural ignorance. This ignorance breeds
an arrogant disdain for evidence of foreigners’ lack of interest in being coopted to join American
civilization. The result of such arrogance predictably is political and even military strategic counterreaction. It is
a case of good intentions gone bad when they are pursued with indifference toward the local
cultural context. Some people have difficulty grasping the unpalatable fact that much of the world is not receptive
to any American soft power that attempts to woo it to the side of American interests. Not all
rivalries are resolvable by ideas, formulas, or “deals” that seem fair and equitable to us. There are
conflicts wherein the struggle is the message, to misquote Marshal MacLuhan, with value in the eyes of local belligerents. Not all
local conflicts around the world are amenable to the calming effect of American soft power. True
militarists of left and right, secular and religious, find intrinsic value in struggle and warfare, as A.
J. Coates has explained all too clearly. The self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction that war generates derive in part from the religious or
ideological significance attributed to it and from the resultant sense of participating in some grand design. It may be, however, that
the experience of war comes to be prized for its own sake and not just for the great ends that it serves or promotes. For many, the
excitement unique to war makes pacific pursuits seem insipid by comparison. This understanding and experience of moral,
psychological, and emotional self-fulfillment increase our tolerance for war and threaten its moral regulation. It transforms war from
an instrumental into an expressive activity.49 It is foolish to believe that every conflict contains the seeds of
its own resolution, merely awaiting suitable watering through co-option by soft power. To be fair,
similarly unreasonable faith in the disciplinary value of (American) military force is also to be deplored.
2nc - generic
Past pandemics prove that disease doesn’t lead to extinction
Peters and Chrystal ‘03 (Dr. Clarence, Director of Biodefense and Emerging Infectious
Diseases @ UT, and Dr. Ronald, Chairman of Genetics Medicine @ Cornell, FDCH Political
Transcripts, “U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER COX (R-CA) HOLDS HEARING ON
COUNTERING THE BIOTERRORISM THREAT”, 3-15, L/N)
the Conquistadors to the New World. They
brought measles, smallpox and a variety of other diseases with them. They didn't wipe
out the Indians, but they destroyed their civilization and were instrumental in the Spaniards being able to conquer the New
PETERS: I think we have one example from the movement of
World with relatively few people. I think we have something going on right now with SARS that we don't know exactly what the end
of it's going to be, but we already know that Asian economies are suffering tremendously. My prediction is that they will not be able
to control it in China. If that's true, then we will be dealing with repeated introductions in this country for the indefinite future so that
we may see a change in our way of life where we are taking temperatures in airports, in addition to taking your shoes off and putting
them through the X-ray machine. And we may see emergency rooms rebuilt so that if you have a cough you go in one entrance and
go into a negative pressure cubicle until your SARS test comes back. So I think that while wiping out human life is
extremely unlikely, we have unengineered examples of bugs that have made great impacts on civilizations. COX: Dr.
Crystal? CRYSTAL: The natural examples of what you suggested were, as hundreds of years
ago, with smallpox and also with the plague. The plague wiped out one-third of the
civilization. We now have treatments for ordinances (ph) like the plague because they were engineered to be resistant. And if
they infected a number of people and had the capability of being spread rapidly from individual to individual, it would cause
enormous havoc. I agree with the panel -- I don't think it would wipe out civilization, but the consequences to
our society would be enormous.
2nc – no impact - Biod
Most species are useless, key ones are protected.
Maier 09 – Env Scholar @ U of St Francis, Don, “What’s So Good About Biodiversity?”, Paper
presented to the 6th Annual Joint International Society for Environmental Philosophy/ISEE
Conferencehttp://www.environmentalphilosophy.org/ISEEIAEPpapers/2009/Maier.pdf
Some particular species are good for people to eat.
Because people need to eat in order to survive, those species might qualify as critically important. Other species have been
found to have value for their production of chemicals of pharmacological
value. Particular species have yielded these benefits, not biodiversity, not species
Once again, there is suspicion of confusion.
diversity. Let us overlook this confusion and presume that the position involves something more like the claim that a great diversity of organisms
increases the odds that at least some few of them are or will be around that are good to eat, that some few others of them do or will provide good
medicines, and that some few others do or will provide good building materials. There remains an apparent assumption that the resourceproviding creatures are a random sample of all creatures. This is almost certainly untrue and we return to this matter of fact just below. But
putting this objection aside (and alongside the previously noted confusion), this is still a singularly unconvincing defense of the value of species
an extraordinarily tiny minority of creatures has benefited
humanity as resource, now or previously. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that this circumstance will
change in the future. These facts combine with the other that any economic resource competes with other economic demands. As a
consequence, from an economic point of view (which includes both resource and "service" value, the topic
of Section 5.3 on "Biodiversity as service provider"), there is scarcely ever justification for not letting a
species go extinct – even if the effort required is minimal. Certainly, many, if not most of the
diversity. The fact is that
symbolic creatures – such as Ursus maritimus (polar bear) and Eubalaena spp. (right whales) – fall into this category. When, as in the case of
both these creatures, there is, in fact, a significant economic cost to saving them – for polar bears, reversing climate warming, 124 for right
whales, slowing down the ships that traverse their thoroughfares – then the mere possibility of a future benefit from their incremental contribution
to species diversity is an essentially nil "expected net present value" (to use the standard economic jargon) by comparison. Faith is one among a
group of conservation biologists who fails to understand this when pressing for the "option value" of biodiversity as a resource. 125 There is
conserving biodiversity preserves the likelihood of conserving one or
more valuable resources in the future, it also preserves the likelihood of conserving creatures
that are destructive of resources or otherwise harmful. Disease organisms,
"pests", and parasites contribute to biodiversity or at least species diversity at
least as much (and possibly much more) than (for example) the trees that
provide good building materials. In fact, because parasitism might be the predominant "lifestyle" on the planet (by
some estimates, outnumbering free-living species by a factor of four), conserving biodiversity is far more likely
to ensure that parasitic creatures continue to be in good supply. 126 Parasites even come
another objection to the resource rationale. Insofar as
with a diversity bonus – namely, the species on which they are parasitic (their hosts). Polyphagous parasites deliver multiple bonuses. 127 Finally,
food for people – the most essential of resources for
humans – is actually supplied by organisms in a set that is vanishingly small in
the total (species) diversity picture, and that for the most part are carefully
maintained and managed by humans on farms. The best recent estimates are
that there are around 7,000 cultivated crop species of plants. 128 That is only
about 2% of the estimated 320,000 kinds of plants on earth. 129 But that percentage is
enormous in comparison to the number of livestock species. There are an estimated 7,600 breeds (in the 2006 Global Databank
for Farm Animal Genetic Resources of the FAO – the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations) of perhaps 40 species.
130 That is a barely noticeable diversity in the context of over 9 million other
animal species. This news should relieve those who worry about the loss of resources from the loss of biodiversity. Apparently,
great diversity of species, at least, is not of any great benefit, considered as
either actual or potential resource
contrary to the random sample assumption,
2nc – Food Wars
Double bind- either no food scarcity or there are tons of alt causes
Adeline 13 – food preservation specialist (02/17, “Food Storage: The Solution to Food Shortage,”
http://beforeitsnews.com/survival/2013/02/food-storage-the-solution-to-food-shortage-2462712.html)
We humans need food for proper nutrition. In times of crisis, access to a stable food supply is the key to continued survival. In
the
presence of natural disasters, human conflicts, climate change, and overpopulation, the
threat of food shortages and total famine is not as far-fetched as it seems. Preparing long-term food supplies can
buffer the effects of these potential catastrophes. The Anatomy of a Catastrophe Many people think that food shortages may be a
thing of the past. Thanks to the marvels of modern technology and scientific farming methods, we have a constant and
abundant supply of food. It is difficult to imagine how a food shortage can happen – but it is still a possibility. During
ancient times, humans hunted and gathered for food. Then a revolution occurred and changed the course of history: we learned
modern technology has
improved farming and fishing techniques, that food production has now become large-scale. People now
how to cultivate the soil, plant crops, and domesticate animals for a stable source of food. Eventually,
depend on hard-working farmers and fishermen for their everyday supply of food. But what happens when the harvests are poor?
The farmer will keep his produce to feed his own family first – other people are left without food. Such scenario is still possible today
because there are man-made disasters and natural calamities that threaten the world’s food supply. For example, a hurricane rages
across the country and floods several states. Our access to food is restricted because travel is nearly impossible. To add to that,
business establishments like groceries and supermarkets are probably closed down due to the flood as well as a power outage.
Some might argue that this is not a real food shortage scenario because the problem is merely logistics: there is food; it is just that
we have no access to it. It is true that natural calamities and wars cause a food shortage only temporarily. However, recent
studies show that at present, we consume more than we produce. The UN warns that grain reserves
are progressively getting lower because of droughts and crop failures in major food producing countries.
The famine in Africa may possibly be felt in other parts of the world. This is an emergency situation that
requires us to prepare beforehand. We must have a supply of food and water for us to survive.
Relations
2nc – Latin America
It’s becoming more peaceful – data proves
UNDP 13 [United Nations Development Programme, “UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONFLICT
IN LATIN AMERICA,”
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/Understanding%20Social%2
0Conflict%20in%20Latin%20America%202013%20ENG.pdf]
One of the central findings of this study addresses social inequalities and institutional legitimacy. The data reveal larger numbers of
conflicts in countries with broad social inequality and ¶ regimes that have low institutional legitimacy (Figures 4 and 6). The
Conflicts in
societies with higher levels of institutional support are less likely to evolve into violent
confrontations. The relationship between social inequality and radicalization is not linear. Instead ¶ it is generally U-shaped, as
relationship between institutional legitimacy, social gaps, and the radicalization of conflicts is more complex.
the countries with medium levels of inequality have fewer cases of ¶ violence and confrontation than countries with high or low levels
of inequality (Figure 6). This ¶ is due to the different levels of interaction between State, society, and conflict (particularly ¶ the
data also
reveal that there are no countries that experienced both ¶ high numbers of social conflicts and
high levels of radicalization. This is a positive finding for ¶ the region in terms of democracy and
development.¶ The relationship between collective action and radicalization is linked principally to the region’s chronic gaps
capacity to manage these elements), as well as the political culture and historical experience of each country. The
between institutional capacity and social demands, as well as its political ¶ culture of radicalized collective action. Societies with low
levels of conflict, strong institutions, ¶ and relatively high levels of radicalism are prevalent in the region. ¶ The data correlating
conflict radicalization and number of conflicts (Figure 5) reveal four combinations of the two variables:¶ • Many conflicts and high
levels of radicalization: no cases¶ • Many conflicts and low levels of radicalization: Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, ¶ Peru,
Bolivia, Panama, and Guatemala¶ • Few conflicts and high levels of radicalization: Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay¶ • Few conflicts
and low levels of radicalization: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Costa ¶ Rica, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Mexico¶ Figure 6. Number
of social conflicts per country and percentage of social conflicts involving ¶ violent clashes¶ In general, there is no direct relationship
between the number of conflicts and the level of ¶ radicalization where greater numbers of conflicts correlate with higher levels of
violence ¶ (Figure 6). This is consistent with the study’s theoretical framework which considers conflict ¶ to be a key element in
processes of social change, particularly in democratic contexts. It also ¶ underscores the risks of destabilization and violence that
are implicit in processes of conflict ¶ escalation.¶ The data also show
that there is a fragmentation of conflicts
that employ violent strategies. ¶ This suggests that there is a multiplication of non-institutionalized conflicts. There is also
evidence of a proliferation of more dangerous conflicts that threaten governability. Conflicts ¶ over land represent the largest
percentage of this class of conflict. Structural issues, socioeconomic conditions, and institutional failures also continue to be strong
sources of instability32¶ . ¶ However, in
general the data on conflict radicalization suggest that Latin
America seems to be ¶ entering a period of greater stability, and that social conflict does not
seriously affect governability. Although these struggles represent a small fraction of the total number of conflicts in ¶ the
region, in many cases they reach relatively high levels of violence. Institutional conflicts ¶ related to the nonfulfillment of agreements
comprised the next most significant group of violent conflicts. The hypothesis is that these conflicts tend to escalate due to a lack of
institutional frameworks capable of offering solutions and platforms for negotiation.
2NC OAS
The OAS fails – credibility is inherently ineffective
AP 6/4 (Associated Press, “John Kerry seeks changes to OAS,” 6/4/13,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/john-kerry-latin-america-oas-changes-92245.html)//SJF
Secretary of State John Kerry is demanding reforms in the 35-nation Organization of American States as he visits Latin America for
the first time since taking office. Leading the U.S. delegation in Guatemala to the annual general assembly of the OAS — an
organization he has disparaged as ineffective, inefficient and nearly irrelevant — Kerry will try to convince fellow members of the
need for major changes in its bureaucracy and a return to its core mission of promoting human rights, democracy and development.
Gutierrez dares GOP to vote down bill Bill reduces benefits for lobbyists Rhee's group tripled its budget Balz book: Christie
considered 2012 Udall brother 'hiked everywhere' SEIU pushes House on immigration Officials traveling with Kerry said he also
would be making the case against legalization of marijuana at the national level, lobbying for the election of the U.S. candidate for a
hemispheric human rights panel and trying to improve badly damaged relations with Venezuela. Kerry arrived Tuesday at the
Guatemalan mountain resort of Antigua and began his two-day program with a meeting with Guatemala’s president. Drugs, U.S.
immigration reform and good governance were to top the agenda in those talks, the two men told reporters. The OAS often is
criticized in the United States and Kerry wrote a scathing editorial about its failures and need to reform three years ago while he was
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He then introduced legislation in Congress aimed at requiring significant
budget reforms in the organization. Just last year, shortly before he was nominated to be secretary of state, Kerry penned a letter to
the OAS permanent council with three other senators bemoaning that the group “has been forfeiting its
effectiveness” with a lack of strategic focus and fiscal recklessness. The State Department said Monday
that Kerry believed the bloc was an organization of critical importance to the Americas and that his participation in the general
assembly was aimed at helping to strengthen it. “The fact that he is going to the OAS and he is spending two days there
participating sends a clear signal that he thinks this remains the premier multilateral organization in the hemisphere,” department
spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. “In order to assure that the OAS retains that status, it must refocus on its
core principles,” she said, stressing democracy, human rights, development and regional security. “Strengthening it is of
course part of (Kerry’s) agenda and part of what he’ll be focused on in the next couple of days.” As a senator in 2010, Kerry made
similar, though not as subtle, points in an opinion piece he co-wrote with Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), his successor as head of
the Foreign Relations Committee. “Sadly,
its culture of consensus has often been the breeding ground of
the ideas that reflect the lowest common denominator, rather than the highest ambitions of
diplomacy and cooperation,” they wrote in The Miami Herald. The pair excoriated the OAS for becoming
“a pliable tool of inconsistent political agendas” and suggested that they agreed with critics who
called the organization “a grazing pasture for third-string diplomats.” Psaki played down the last comment,
saying she “would hardly call the secretary of state a third-string diplomat.” Kerry’s mere presence at the meeting demonstrates his
and the Obama administration’s commitment to improving the OAS, she said. In November 2012, Kerry and Menendez, along with
Republican Sens. Richard Lugar of Indiana and Marco Rubio of Florida, wrote that OAS finances had become dangerously
precarious and that it must reform, pare back superfluous projects or risk losing support from its prime contributor, the United States.
The United States has over the past decades found itself at growing odds with numerous Latin and South American members of the
OAS. Many of them, like Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, are led by leftist or populist leaders who have balked at
accepting the dominance of the U.S. in the Americas and pursued policies that often run counter to Washington’s wishes. Apart from
Cuba, which has been suspended from the OAS for decades, the U.S. has most differences with Venezuela, whose president, Hugo
Chavez, reveled in tweaking Washington until his death last year.
OAS cred is unsustainable – distrust and rising alternatives
Lee 12 – Senior Production Editor (Brianna, “The Organization of American States,” 4/13/12,
http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945)//SJF
CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues facing the hemisphere is one
of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a crucial, objective
platform for human rights litigation. However, many state leaders and policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS for its
the
OAS as a political entity "has declined precipitously in recent years." However, analysts say, since the
Democratic Charter was signed, the organization's consensus around democracy promotion has
atrophied. One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which
requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified
within the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The
institutional weakness. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says
polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to
the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she
called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the
expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of
funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of
its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without
the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to
be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS
monitors, which she says has been helpful. Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer
2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza
and the OAS itself are
widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez's
friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S.,
even though Washington seems to have lost interest." Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United
States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund
the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America. Various efforts
have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin
American leaders formed the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and
Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although
Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream." Many consider another regional organization, the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as
a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS
has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in
2008. Despite the OAS's shortcomings and questions over its continued relevance in the region, there is a strong call to reform the
organization rather than eliminate it altogether.
1nr
2nc – earth science module
Turns Science
Abbey and Lane 05 (George, Senior Fellow in Space Policy – Baker Institute and Neal,
Professor of Physics – Rice University, “United States Space Policy: Challenges and
Opportunities”, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications /wp_aaas_spacePolicy.pdf)
Though these foreign-born individuals are an integral part of the continued success of the U nited S tates in
scientific and technological endeavors, export controls inhibit precisely the type of study that attracts these talented individuals and the research collaboration that
benefits U.S. science and technology. While not the subject of this paper, the cumbersome and slow visa approval process compounds
the problem by making it much less attractive for foreigners to come to the United States to study, attend conferences, or
collaborate on research projects. In a survey of 126 institutions released in October of 2004, the Council of Graduate Schools found an 18-percent decrease in admissions of
foreign graduate students in the fall of 2004 compared with the fall of 2003. The graduate school council expected actual enrollments of new foreign graduate students to be down by an amount similar to the 18-
The number of jobs in the U.S.
economy that require science and engineering training will grow; the number of U.S. citizens
prepared for those jobs will, at best, be level; and the availability of people from other countries
who have science and engineering training will decline, either because of visa restrictions or because of intense
percent fall in admissions.16 The NSB identifies three possible outcomes of these trends in the growth and composition of the S&E workforce: “
global competition for people with these skills.”17 The NSB report also notes that actions taken today to alter trends in the U.S. S&E workforce may require 10 to 20 years to take effect. “The students entering the
science and engineering workforce in 2004 with advanced degrees decided to take the necessary math courses to enable this career path when they were in middle school, up to 14 years ago. The students
If action is not taken now to
change these trends, we could reach 2020 and find that the ability of U.S. research and
education institutions to regenerate has been damaged and that their preeminence has been
lost to other areas of the world.”18 Comparison between the U.S. and other industrial nations, as shown in Table 2, clearly illustrates this critical national problem.
Concurrent with these educational challenges, the U nited S tates faces daunting demographic shifts. The American workforce is
aging; over the past 20 years the prime-age (25–56) workforce grew 44 percent, but it will have zero growth over the next twenty years.19 In
addition, the increase in the share of workers with post–high school education grew 19 percent during the last twenty years and is projected to grow only 4 percent over the next twenty years. These
statistics, when compared to numbers from the NSB’s Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, raise concern about future S&E needs. The report notes that the
making that same decision in middle school today won’t complete advanced training for science and engineering occupations until 2018 or 2020.
number of jobs requiring S&E skills in the U.S. labor force is growing almost 5 percent per year. By comparison, the rest of the labor force is growing at just over 1 percent. Before September 11, 2001, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) projected that S&E occupations would increase at three times the rate of all occupations. The rise projected by the BLS was 2.2 million, representing a 47-percent increase in the number
of S&E jobs by 2010. The rates of increase between 1980 and 2000 ranged from 18 percent for the life sciences to 123 percent for jobs in math and computer science.20 The average age of the S&E workforce is
rising. Many of those who entered the expanding S&E workforce in the 1960s and 1970s (the baby boom generation) are expected to retire in the next 20 years. The children of that generation are not choosing
careers in S&E in the same numbers as their parents. During the 1950s and 60s, the U.S. government invested heavily in research and development (R&D). Government research laboratories and agencies
conducted a substantial amount of in-house research. This led to the creation of a workforce with significant technical and management capabilities. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had
outstanding technical skills and potential. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency, formed with Werner Von Braun and his team of scientists and engineers, was equally well qualified. These two groups formed the
nucleus of NASA. Within the contractor community, there was a highly qualified workforce that had conducted aeronautical research from the end of World War II through the 1960s. They pushed the limits of
aeronautical research with their aircraft and research vehicles and arrived at the edge of space with the X-15. NASA grew to approximately 36,000 employees during the 1960s. That organization today employs
Over the past few years, the aerospace industry has been unable to develop the
experienced workforce that they had during the 19 60s due to consolidations and the absence of
new programs. These are important factors in assessing whether the skill base exists to implement a major new space program. [CONTINUES] One of the most
important questions plaguing the current NASA Plan is the degree to which other nations will be invited to
join the U nited S tates as true partners and to participate in the early planning stages of future human
exploration missions. President Bush, in his speech of January 14, 2004, appeared to invite other nations to share the challenges and opportunities of his vision and the new era of
approximately 18,000 people.
discovery. However, NASA leadership subsequently contradicted that promise when then-NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe stated that the new space initiative was “very much going to be a U.S. led endeavor.
That’s our intent. And, again, much of what we had been directed and what the President envisions we do is to achieve this set of American, U.S. exploration objectives.”23 This is not an invitation to partnership.
Partnership, of course, does not exclude national objectives, but it does require a sharing of vision, objectives, and commitments, at the earliest stages of planning. Otherwise, the United States cannot expect
scientists, engineers, and
policy makers around the world perceive that the U nited S tates has no interest in bringing other
nations into the planning process, though it expects them to take on the operation of the space station and to provide assistance for other U.S.-led space efforts when
asked. Given the present limited U.S. capability to undertake a major program such as returning
humans to the Moon and sending them, eventually, to Mars, it is clear that international
cooperation is necessary for these missions. Furthermore, even if the United States had all the necessary resources, why would it make sense to go it alone in
the scientific and human exploration of space? For international cooperation to be a realistic possibility the U nited S tates will
have to take a very different approach to prospective partnerships, in tone and in substance .
Whatever path the United States chooses to follow with its policies, America does not have a future in space—human
exploration, space science, or commercial space activities—without considerable international
cooperation. The degree of cooperation that will be necessary will not be possible under current export control
and other restrictive policies. The International Space Station and the Space Shuttle programs, as well as many of the most successful robotic science missions, were accomplished with
considerable international involvement and the free exchange of data and technical information. Neither of these programs could have been successful under any other conditions. The creation
of complex systems, which operate in an integrated fashion in order to support human life in a hostile environment,
other nations to participate enthusiastically and to provide the necessary staffing and funding. Based on the authors’ conversations, it is clear that
requires an international partnership, with open discussions and sharing of information and
technology. As important a role as these matters play in discouraging cooperation with the United States in space, the issue most threatening to cooperation may well be a growing international
perception that the United States intends to control space militarily. Although it is not the subject of this paper, military space policy is a matter of profound importance to the future of U.S. civilian space programs
and the space programs of other nations.24 In recent years, the United States has accelerated its efforts to put in place a primitive missile-defense system. The decision was made apparently without any
international consultation and before adequate R&D and testing had shown the feasibility of such a system. This action suggested that the United States is impatient to signal to the rest of the world that it intends
to treat space differently in the future than it has in the past. Many members of Congress who have been advocating for a missile-defense system for several decades heartily endorsed the decision. Powerful
industrial interests are also at stake. Missile defense is only one aspect of the increased military use of space. “The Report of the Commission to Assess the United States National Security Space Management
and Organization,” published in 2001, identifies the importance of space to national security and outlines a series of recommendations for the future of military space activities.25 The report proposes, among
other things, that the military vigorously pursue capabilities that would enable the President to deploy weapons in space “to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.”26 This
proposal represents a departure from President Kennedy’s vision of 1962, when he vowed, “We shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction but with instruments of knowledge and
understanding.”27 Placing offensive weapons in space would be a cause for alarm throughout the world and, in the context of the issues addressed in this paper, would create a major obstacle to international
cooperation in space. American companies could expect an even more restrictive U.S. export control policy. Such restrictions could further damage commercial space activities and preclude the willingness of
other nations to join U.S.-led programs for both human and robotic space science and exploration missions. The placement of weapons in space would reinforce in the world community the feeling that the United
States increasingly is basing its foreign policy on unilateral initiatives. As such, it would severely impact the progress that has been made over the last fifty years towards multilateral international cooperation.
RECOMMENDATIONS The four barriers to progress in the U.S. space program described in this paper need not remain obstacles to future U.S. efforts in space commerce, science and technology, and human
to remove them, the U nited S tates will need to reassess current space policy and, where
make corrections
exploration. However, in order
necessary,
. The world has changed in fundamental ways in the forty years since President Kennedy challenged the American people to take humans to the Moon and return
them safely to Earth. The fear of the Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, has been replaced by a very different, largely decentralized, fear of terrorism. The response of the U.S. government to 9/11 has been to
take visible measures to improve the personal safety of American citizens. Some of those measures are placing unintended barriers in the way of progress for the U.S. space program. There is no question that
the United States must, as its highest priority, protect its citizens from attacks by terrorists and other hostile forces. However, this can and should be accomplished in a manner that does not damage other national
The U nited S tates should base its export control and visa policies on reason and
common sense. Clearly, the government must identify and protect critical technologies, but policies should recognize that the strength of U.S. industry depends on its ability to compete
interests. Get Knowledge In and Peaceful Technologies Out
effectively in the world market. This requires exporting goods and cooperating with other countries when doing so is beneficial to American companies. Just as clearly, the United States should prevent individuals
The future vitality of the
U.S. aerospace industry in the increasingly competitive world market and the ability of the U nited
S tates to undertake major cooperative space-science and human-exploration endeavors, as suggested by the
President, depend on the revision of American export controls and other overly restrictive policies. The international
community believes that U.S. rules currently display arrogance and a mistaken assumption that
the development of advanced technologies is unique to the U nited States. That the United States is alone in its level of technological
who intend to do harm from entering the country; however, the government should put in place a rational and efficient process for making that determination.
development clearly is not the case, nor has it been for some time. The United States must protect its citizens and prevent the proliferation of potentially dangerous technologies. However, restrictions on U.S.
products are ineffective, even counterproductive, when substitutes for regulated products exist on the world market. In this situation, embargos and regulations serve no purpose. The United States should identify
satellite technologies and processes that are unique and vital to national security interests, hence appropriate for licensing by the State Department under ITAR. All other exports of satellites and satellite
components and technologies should be licensed by the Commerce Department. If rational steps are taken to review and modify the U.S. policy on export controls, not only will satellite and related industries be
better positioned to compete in the world space market, but such actions might also foster U.S. cooperation with other nations in space activities. As the United States prepares for future space science and
human exploration, possibly with an expanded role for industry, as outlined in “A Journey to Innovate, Inspire, and Discover,” the report of the President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space
Exploration Policy, the best route will be through strong international cooperation, where collaborators share the costs as well as the benefits.28 While the commission did not address export controls, a serious
weakness of their report, it is clear that present export control policies should be changed.
2nc – tech innovation module
Turn tech leadership
Bush and McLarty 09 (Jeb, Former Governor – Florida and Thomas F. III, President –
McLarty Associates, et al., “U.S. Immigration Policy”, CFR Independent Task Force Report, 63,
July, http://www.cfr.org/publication/20030/ us_immigration_policy.html)
Immigrants are especially important in science, technology, and engineering, which are so
critical to U.S. economic competitiveness. Foreign students and immigrants make up more than
half the scientific researchers in the U nited S tates; in 2006, they received 40 percent of science
and engineering PhDs and 65 percent of computer science doctorates. Among postdoctoral students doing research at the
highest levels, 60 percent are foreign born. This is not a recent development; even in the 1980s, some 40 percent of engineering
and computer science students in the United States came from abroad. On one significant measure of innovation, the number of
immigrants produce nearly 25
percent of those patents, or roughly twice their share of the U.S. population.30 Other studies have shown that an
increase in the number of foreign graduate students in the United States results in significant
increases in the number of patent applications.31 Overall, the share of all patents awarded to U.S. scientists of
patents issued each year, the United States far surpasses any country in the world;
Chinese and Indian origin grew from just 4 percent in the late 1970s to 14 percent in the early part of this decade; at Intel, the
world’s largest semiconductor maker, 40 percent of the patents are for work done by Chinese or Indian immigrants. Just as
important, this increased
innovation by recent immigrants actually coincided with an increase in the number
of patents awarded to native-born scientists as well, indicating that American-born and immigrant
scientists are feeding off each other to enhance the country’s overall innovative capacity.32
One in four engineering and technology companies established in the United States between 1995 and 2005 had an immigrant
founder.33 The four countries that create the greatest number of new companies per capita—the United States, Canada, Australia,
and Israel—all have large immigrant populations.34 It is not an overstatement to say that the
U nited S tates would not
enjoy anything close to its current technological and entrepreneurial leadership if it had maintained a closed
immigration policy. Amy Chua, the Yale historian and legal scholar, argues in her recent book, Day of Empire: How
Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall, that the successful great powers in history have been
those able to attract and make use of the most talented people the world has to offer. “At any given
historical moment,” she writes, “the most valuable human capital the world has to offer—whether in the form of
intelligence, physical strength, skill, knowledge, creativity, networks, commercial innovation, or technological invention—is never
to be found in any one locale or with any one ethnic or religious group. To pull away from its rivals on a
global scale, a society must pull into itself and motivate the world’s best and brightest, regardless of
ethnicity, religion or background.” America, she argues, has been more successful than any other country in the world in recent
maintaining robust levels of
immigration, allowing for fluctuations based on the state of the economy, is firmly in America’s national
interests. In particular, continuing to attract highly skilled immigrants is critical to the
competitiveness of the U.S. economy, and to America’s ability to remain the world’s leader
in innovation . The U nited S tates must open its doors more widely to such people.
history in attracting and mobilizing such talents. The Task Force believes that
Pass – Momentum From Shutdown
Victory From the Shutdown Means Obama Has the Momentum to Pass CIR
McMorris, 10/15/13(Evan McMorris, “Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration
Next”, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for)//Holmes
WASHINGTON — As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling
that it
plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into
the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually
win. The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident
that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a
government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always
intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda. Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political
reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the
Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic
Sen. Chuck Schumer. “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly
damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in
our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s
White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back
into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already
drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a
Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.” The
fiscal deal is struck. “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said.
“There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including
civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’” The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world
after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.
Obama using PC on CIR now and fiscal fights provide impetus for the GOP
to compromise
Hartmann, 10/16/13, writer @ New Yorker(Margaret Hartmann, “Obama Is Over the Shutdown, Wants to
Tackle Immigration Reform”, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/10/obama-plans-for-immigration-reform-postshutdown.html)//Holmes
Shortly after John Boehner's
last-ditch effort to end the shutdown and raise the debt ceiling ended in a humiliating
defeat on Tuesday, reports emerged that President Obama was already plotting out his next move, saying of the
fiscal crisis, "Once that’s done, you know, the day after – I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration
reform." While Democrats appear to have the upper hand, that still seemed a bit presumptuous. Things ended on Tuesday
night with sources reporting that Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell are finalizing a deal, but the nation is still careening toward default. The full transcript
of Obama's interview reveals that he actually made the comments earlier in the day, and was bashing House Republicans for starting a "crisis that was
unnecessary," then throwing a "little bit of a wrench" in the Senate's effort to get us out of it. But yes, Obama does sound anxious to start talking about
immigration again. Obama brought up immigration in an interview with KMEX, L.A.'s Univision affiliate, while rattling off a list of things Congress should
be focusing on instead of engaging in childish brinksmanship, such as infrastructure, jobs, and raising the minimum wage. "We shouldn't be inflicting
damage on the economy simply because one side doesn't get its way," he said. When asked about immigration reform specifically, Obama said it's not
"just a Latino issue," but "an American issue." He explained: We know our economy will grow faster if immigration reform passes. We know businesses
will do better if immigration reform passes. We know that deficits will be reduced if immigration reform passes; because people coming out of the
shadows, paying more taxes growing, the growth accelerating, all that brings down the deficit, so it's important for everybody. Some advocates say
passing immigration reform may actually be easier in the wake of the shutdown. "It’s at least
possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged
as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, 'Alright, what can
we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?'" Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform
group America’s Voice, told BuzzFeed.
e expectancy. This is not a guarantee of living forever, but it does mean that the sands of time will start pouring in rather than only pouring out. What's more, this exponential
progression of information technology will affect our prosperity as well. The World Bank has reported, for example, that poverty in Asia has been cut in half over the past decade
due to information technologies and that at current rates it will be cut by another 90 percent over the next decade. That phenomenon will spread around the globe.
Cuba (Anti Castro) Lobby Links*
plan costs PC and angers most powerful lobby - cuba policy requires
Obama push and he gets blame anyway –
Stieglitz, 11
Matthew, Law Clerk at Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C, Judicial Intern at United
States District Court, Masters @ Cornell University,
http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Stieglitz-_Final_Paper.pdf
CONCLUSION President Barack Obama’s election came with a variety of campaign promises, including addressing the US-Cuba
embargo. However, after two years in office, normalized relations with Cuba have yet to materialize. Recent
developments have pushed legislators to review the continued existence of the embargo, but the
history of the US presidency and the blockade seems to dictate that the American
presidency will ultimately be what causes any policy change . Thus, how and when will the embargo
American presidents have been directly tied to foreign policy towards Cuba.
policies
and actions in both nations in recent months seem to offer hope of change, yet such a scenario remains elusive .
During the embargo’s existence, Cuban-Americans have maintained an active voice against the
Castro regime. The community’s leaders have met with and advised multiple US
presidents on Cuba, gained immense political clout in Miami, and have formed one of the
end? Clearly,
However, this does not provide clarity to what the future holds for diplomatic relations with the island. Progressive
most dominant ethnic lobbies in Washington. The result has been a hardline stance on
Cuba that progressive Cuban-Americans have failed to overcome . While the
community’s younger generation, as well as recent arrivals from Cuba, prefers a policy of
engagement, normalized relations do not seem feasible at this point in time. The recent
election victory of House Republicans, combined with the political riskiness of
addressing the US-Cuba embargo prior to the 2012 presidential election, make it highly unlikely President
Obama will address Cuba during his first term as president. Nevertheless, his administration has more than enough
tools at their disposal to begin moving the Cuba dialogue forward, even if the Executive Office is compromised in its ability to end
the embargo.
Turns not salient – Cuba lacks enough market size or national security
importance
LeoGrande, 12
William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government
and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America,
Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies,
12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf
Latin America Weighs In
Since the end of the cold war, Cuba simply hasn't been very important to U.S. national
security or foreign relations. Without its Soviet patron, Cuba poses no threat to the United
States,
and with just 11 million people, Cuba (unlike China or even Vietnam) doesn't offer much
of a
market for U.S. exports. Nothing compels a president to re-examine policy toward
Cuba, even
though that policy has been an abject failure for decades-- which is why relations with Cuba
became a domestic political issue driven by the Cuba Lobby , rather than a foreign policy
issue.
2nc – at: Dickinson/Ideology
Their ev is just a blog post, not peer reviewed and solely in the context of
Supreme court nominations – Dickinson concludes neg
Dickinson, 2009 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard
University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a
Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D
2009)
Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in
Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they
often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including
party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various
control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then
presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did
better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies
came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting
behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood
summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have
systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars,
these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and
Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when
dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The
misinterpretation of the
findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing
presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that
case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy
making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's
perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a
president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP
also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often
argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain
members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the
lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying
efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots"
within Congress. This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate
that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative
results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and finds "modest
support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly,
David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive
Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents do influence
the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic
legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew Beckman shows that in addition
to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in
order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more
on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a
vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.). In one of the most concerted efforts to model how bargaining takes place at the individual level,
Terry Sullivan examines presidential archives containing administrative headcounts to identify instances in which members of
Congress switched positions during legislative debate, from initially opposing the president to supporting him in the final roll call
(Sullivan 1988,1990,1991). Sullivan shows that in a bargaining game with incomplete information regarding the preferences of the
president and members of Congress, there are a number of possible bargaining outcomes for a given distribution of legislative and
presidential policy preferences. These outcomes depend in part on legislators' success in bartering their potential support for the president's policy for additional
concessions from the president. In threatening to withhold support, however, members of Congress run the risk that the president will call their bluff and turn elsewhere for the
necessary votes. By capitalizing on members' uncertainty regarding whether their support is necessary to form a winning coalition,
Sullivan theorizes that presidents can reduce members of Congress's penchant for strategic bluffing and increase the likelihood of a
legislative outcome closer to the president's preference. "Hence, the skill to bargain successfully becomes a
foundation for presidential power even within the context of electorally determined
opportunities," Sullivan concludes (1991, 1188). Most of these studies infer presidential influence, rather than
measuring it directly (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996,128-29; see also Edwards 1991). Interestingly, however, although the vote
"buying" approach is certainly consistent with Neustadt's bargaining model, none of his case studies in PP show presidents
employing this tactic. The reason may be that Neustadt concentrates his analysis on the strategic level: "Strategically the question is
not how he masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance" (Neustadt 1990, 4). For
Neustadt, whether a president's lobbying efforts bear fruit in any particular circumstance
depends in large part on the broader pattern created by a president's prior actions when
dealing with members of Congress (and "Washingtonians" more generally). These previous
interactions determine a president's professional reputation--the "residual impressions
of [a president's] tenacity and skill" that accumulate in Washingtonians' minds, helping to "heighten or
diminish" a president's bargaining advantages. "Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but
it can make persuasions easier, or harder, or impossible" (Neustadt 1990, 54).
2nc – at: Hirsch
PC’s real, observable, and quantifiable---scholarly work proves---and you
should reject quibbles like Hirsh
Kimberly L. Casey 8, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at William Jewel
College, 2008, “Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s Interconvertibility
Theory,” http://lilt.ilstu.edu/critique/spring%202008/casey.pdf
Abstract: This article examines the concept “political capital” (PC) and its context in American politics. Political capital is illdefined, little understood, yet an important concept for understanding political exchange and
relationships in the political arena. I establish a definition based upon Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility
theory, which indicates that capital types, such as economic, social, and symbolic forms, interact
and can be exchanged for one another. Since the material and non-material components of capital variations are
transposable, it can be argued that no capital form is essentially “pure”—every type of capital contains elements of other varieties.
Political capital, therefore, is an amalgamation of capital types combined in various ways for
specific political markets. It is market demand that shapes capital formation. Capital elements from other
capital types inherent in the candidacy market are identified as an example. An index for measuring this variant of
political capital is created, demonstrating its conceptual viability. ¶ Introduction: After the 2004 U.S.
presidential election, George W. Bush publicized his intent to utilize “political capital” for future projects
garnered as a result of his victory. But what exactly is political capital? However much the term is bandied about by politicians or the
press, political
capital has no established definition in political science literature. Although it
remains ill-defined and unmeasured, it is an important concept for understanding political
exchange and relationships in the political arena despite the reservations some political scientists
have expressed about its applicability because of its complex material and nonmaterial
associations. An analysis of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory allows for conceptualization of material and
non-material of interactions among capital forms making it possible to define political capital and design an index to measure it
based upon previous capital literature.¶ To develop an empirical basis for political capital, this article first examines the associations
it connotes in the popular press today. In contrast, a definition of political capital based upon capitalization literature and Bourdieu’s
interconvertibility theory is presented. Then, a
theory of political capital functions and markets are suggested.
Theorizing leads to proposals for objective means of identification and measurement. To illustrate the
market association between capital and politics, an index associated with the resources associated with the candidacy market is
offered. The paper concludes with directions that studying the concept of political capital may take towards theory-building and
framework creation.¶ Defining Political Capital ¶ It is erroneous to refer a “body” of PC literature when seeking a definition. Most
writers and concerned actors who invoke the term political capital assume that its meaning is understood. It is inferred to be an
a definition of “political capital” is typically
never stated—the reader or observer is left to determine their own definition based upon the politician’s or journalist’s usage of
the term (Suellentrop 2004; Kennicott 2004; “A Year of Setbacks” 2005; and Froomkin 2004). The subjectivity is not
reflective of what political capital conceptually means in and to the political arena. Without a
sound definition that accurately portrays the elements of political capital as it works within a political
marketplaces, such as the electoral arena, and among office holders (executive, legislative, and judicial), bureaucracy,
entity which political actors possess, build up and spend. 1 However,
and in society in general, the concept is meaningless. ¶ Defining and utilizing PC as a viable political variable can evolve from the
proliferation of capital theories in various fields of study. Political capital can and should be associated with a wide variety of
previous “capital” interpretations. The key to explicating political capital is within capital literatures and how they address
materialism, non-materialism, and combining the two elements.2¶ The theory of capital is traditionally associated with economics.
There is no clear consensus in defining capital as an ideological function applicable beyond material exchange as expounded in
economic capital theory, however. Yet nonmaterial forms of capital are well established in scholarly
literature. Most of the “capital type” definitions hover around the meaning and terminology of economic capital. Certain theorists
believe that all capital forms, regardless of their composition or purpose, connect in some way with economic capital. 3 Pierre
Bourdieu’s work is invaluable in understanding capital as conceptually distinguishable from its individual aberrations as a material
phenomenon. Bourdieu extends the ideas and metaphor of economic interest (material or physical pursuits) to include noneconomic goods and services (symbolic or nonmaterial pursuits). Within this conceptualization, Bourdieu constructs a science of
practices that “analyzed all human functions as ‘oriented towards the maximization of material or symbolic profit.’” 4 His theory of
capital has limitations, however. He relies on ideal types and lacks the empirical research needed to support much theory. It is
impossible to refer to capital-types and not acknowledge Bourdieu’s contributions to multiple capital species (Bourdieu1986; Kane
2001; Putnam 2001; Becker 1993); Fitz-Enz 2000; Davenport 1999; Marr 2005).
2nc – homegrown terror module
Immigration reform helps reduce the threat of domestic terrorism
Price 08, David Price, North Carolina Representative, Chairman of Homeland Security
Appropriations sub-committee, “Price Delivers Major Speech On Homeland Security,” 23 June
2008,
http://price.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2723&Itemid=100260
"Today I will suggest five principal homeland security priorities on which I would advise the next administration to focus. The first is
comprehensive immigration reform. This might, at first glance, seem an odd choice as a top priority for the
Department of Homeland Security, which – after all – was formed in response to the terrorist threat. But the historic missions of the
departmental components did not go away when the Department was formed, and
subsuming them under the rubric
of combating terrorism is apt to confuse as much as it clarifies. Homeland Security encompasses critical areas of national
policy that would demand attention even if 9/11 had not occurred. Immigration, I believe, leads that list. "That is not to say that
immigration policy is unrelated to terrorism; control of our borders and knowing who has entered our country
– legally or illegally – are directly related to our defense against terrorist threats. Moreover, the intense
focus on the broader illegal immigration problem – consisting primarily of an effort to intercept, detain, and deport individuals who
illegally cross our borders in search of work and a better life – is distracting the Department's attention and diverting the
Department's resources away from the truly dangerous threats and challenges we face. "I want to be clear on that point. The
illegal presence of foreign nationals in the United States is a problem, and calls into question
our commitment to the integrity of our immigration laws. But we need to put that problem into
perspective on two counts: First, the integrity of our immigration laws is compromised primarily by the fact that those laws are
grossly unrealistic in relation to our labor market demands. And second, there can be no credible argument that deporting illegal
workers should take precedence over efforts to combat smuggling, prevent terrorism, and deport criminal aliens
Nuclear war
Hellman 08—professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University. PhD from Stanford. (Martin, The Odds for
Nuclear Armageddon, Spring 2008, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf, AMiles)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a fullscale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in
order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe
of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical
work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct
economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages
viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William
Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be
roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq,
estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation
where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A
nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything
but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts,
Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack
involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79
percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a
government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear
terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one
of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed
herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk.
If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies
would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a
number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan).
Download