2015 NDI 6WS – FISC Reform Case Neg
De Novo Pic
1NC
The United States federal government should require Chevron review of FISC domestic
surveillance determinations that involve significant construction of any statue or
judicial precedent by the FISCR and public release by FISCR of the legal justification for
any determination that contravenes a person's expectation of privacy.
Chevron Review can be used to reform FISC surveillance queries—solves SOP by
enforcing agency statutory compliance and intel cred by evaluating NSA expertise
Margulies 14 (Peter, professor at Roger Williams University School of Law, “FISC Query Preapproval:
Intelligence Burden or Bump in the Road?”, January 18 2014, http://www.lawfareblog.com/fisc-querypreapproval-intelligence-burden-or-bump-road)
The FISC’s case law on preapproval reinforces this scenario. Even though the FISC ordered temporary
preapproval in March 2009, it did so only as a remedy for problems in implementation of its earlier
orders. The FISC authorized a return to NSA RAS-approved identifiers in late 2009, after concluding that
the NSA had addressed the problems. Rather than bow to a presidential request to reinstitute
preapproval, the FISC could hold that preapproval was a matter for the FISC’s own remedial discretion,
which Congress (but not the President) can modify. Any other result, as Orin Kerr suggests and Wells
agrees, would be a violation of separation of powers---an ironic outcome for a step designed to alleviate
concerns about executive branch overreaching! Of course, this is not the only possible result on the
issue of the FISC’s authority. The court could also apply a Chevron-like analysis to the President’s
proposed approach, and defer to it as a permissible reading of Section 215. To support this holding, the
court could find that the language of section 215 was ambiguous, so far as concerns the scope of the
FISC’s role in approving database queries. It could then find that the President had reasonably
construed the statute’s text, which requires the FISC to determine that information sought by the
government is “relevant to an investigation” of terrorism or clandestine foreign intelligence activities.
Since the FISC’s precedents deem querying with RAS-approved identifiers to be integral to compliance
with the statutory relevance standard, then judicial preapproval would arguably be consistent with
the statute. However, this argument also has problems. First, courts often decline Chevron deference
when the executive’s position is inconsistent; and courts in any case generally reserve the doctrine for
application to administrative law situations, where there has been a clear congressional delegation of
lawmaking power to an agency. Here, the executive has for years taken the position that judicial
preapproval was not required. Is the debate triggered by the Snowden revelations a sufficient reason
for a shift? The FISC would have to answer this question in the affirmative. Second, the FISC may take
the view outlined by Judge Bates in his letter, asserting that judicial preapproval and other changes to
the metadata program would adversely affect judicial efficiency. That might be enough for the FISC to
find that the President’s RAS arrangement amounts to an unreasonable reading of section 215---one
unworthy of deference. If the Attorney General can “work with the FISC” to ease these concerns, the
government and the court will have to decide how to implement the President’s idea without causing
dangerous gaps in the government’s gathering of information about terrorism. Terrorists will not go on
vacation while the FISC considers government preapproval requests. To seal such gaps, the government
may ask the FISC for provisional approval of all RAS identifiers now in use at the NSA. The FISC could
grant such approval pending fuller review of the identifiers. The FISC could also accord substantial
deference to the NSA’s determinations, based on the NSA’s long expertise in this area. Moreover, in
construing what constitutes a “true emergency” under the President’s approach, the FISC could borrow
language from the section 702 overseas surveillance program. Section 702 allows the Attorney
General and Director of National Intelligence to determine prior to FISC approval that a given course
of surveillance is appropriate because without immediate action, “intelligence important to the
national security of the United States may be lost or not timely acquired.”
De Novo review undermines military readiness—disrupts operations, reveals
successful tactics and forces the military to adapt strategies to the judicial process—
Hamdi proves
Yoo 03 (John C, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at Berkley School of Law, “Judicial Review and the
War on Terrorism”, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 2003)
The crucial question remains, however, what standard of review will the courts exercise over the facts of
an individual detention and the application of law to those facts. In a regular habeas case, for example, a
federal court reviewing a purely executive detention (rather than, as is usually the case, detention and
conviction of a criminal defendant by the state courts) might exercise de novo review of the facts. If the
executive claimed, for example, that an individual had to be detained because he posed an imminent
threat to public safety,109 a judge might feel it necessary to examine witnesses in court and to review
directly the records of the detention. In wartime, however, as Johnson v. Eisentrager so vividly
explained, such judicial intrusiveness could threaten to interfere with ongoing military operations. It is
worth quoting the relevant passage from Eisentrager at length: The writ, since it is held to be a matter
of right, would be equally available to enemies during active hostilities as in the present twi- light
between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the
enemy. They would dimin- ish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with
wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise a more effective fettering of a field commander than
to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil
courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at
home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict be- tween
judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.110 Add to these
concerns the important military interest, only made more acute by the unconventional nature of the
war with al Qaeda, of interrogating enemy combatants for information about coming attacks. Under
this under- standing of war, de novo judicial review threatens to undermine the very ef- fectiveness of
the military effort against al Qaeda. A habeas proceeding could become the forum for recalling
commanders and intelligence opera- tives from the field into open court; disrupting overt and covert
operations; revealing successful military tactics and methods; and forcing the military to shape its
activities to the demands of the judicial process. Indeed, the discov- ery orders of the trial judge in
Hamdi threatened to achieve exactly these results.
2NC Solves SOP
No reason de novo is uniquely key—the CP also creates institutional independence by
creating a clear and transparent FISC review process which is the warrant in their
HRLA ev—that’s 1NC Margulies
Solves SOP by overriding the structure/rights dichotomy that creates inconsistency by
under and over protecting rights—consensus is on our side
Kinkop 6 (Neil, Georgia State University College of Law, “The Statutory Commander in Chief”, Indiana
Law Journal Volume 81, October 1 2006,
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1485&context=ilj)
An important issue that arises is whether and to what extent deference is owed to the President's
interpretation of his own power. 37 In particular, commentators ask whether Chevron deference
applies to the President.3 s The touchstone for this question is the statute itself. Does the statute
purportedly authorizing the President's conduct evince the intent to accord deference to the
President's interpretation? 39 This, of course, will often be a contentious interpretive question,
especially given the unavoidable ambiguity of statutes in this area.4° Nevertheless, there is something of
a consensus emerging that Chevron deference is appropriate except where individual rights are at
issue.4' As Professor Sunstein has put it, "Insofar as the AUMF is applied in a context that involves the
constitutional powers of the President, it should be interpreted generously. In this domain, the
President receives the kind of super-strong deference that derives from the combination of Chevron
with what are plausibly taken to be his constitutional responsibilities. ' 42 But it is generally appropriate
to recognize "[a] clear statement requirement to protect individual liberties... [under] the AUMF. ' 3 Put
simply, the emerging consensus would hold that as to controversies in which it is asserted that the
President has exceeded his power, and thus violated structural constraints, the President should enjoy
deference. Where, however, the asserted excess invades individual rights, the President's assertion of
power should be more closely scrutinized; it must satisfy a clear statement rule requiring that the
President's authority be clearly expressed in a statute. This clear statement rule is designed to enforce
and protect underlying constitutional guarantees. In the balance of this section, I will endeavor to show
that this formulation is based on a rights/structure dichotomy that is unsupported and untenable. 44
A. The Distinction Is Incoherent The distinction between individual rights and structure withers on
examination. First, the government's constitutional structure is designed, in large part, to promote
liberty. Thus, for example, the states may not consent to federal violations of state sovereignty, because
the federal structure is not designed for the benefit of the states but for the benefit of the people.45
The same holds for separation of powers, especially the separation of powers between the President
and Congress. Thus, the fact that the President signed a bill does not cure objections that it upsets the
constitutional balance of power by aggrandizing Congress at the expense of the President, even where
the objection involves no assertion of individual rights.46 To take an example, Congress enacted the
AUMF in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, authorizing the President to use all
necessary and appropriate force against persons, nations, or organizations he determines to have aided
or participated in those attacks or to harbor those responsible. Imagine, for example, the President
decides to invade another country under the AUMF. The rights/structure distinction would hold that the
President's decision to initiate a war is entitled to deference because it does not implicate individual
rights. President Bush's decision to commence a war in Afghanistan was based on the AUMF and no
deference at all is required to sustain the action; it is nearly impossible to conceive of the argument that
the AUMF did not authorize the war in Afghanistan. But subsequent military ventures, especially as we
move temporally further away from the attacks that prompted the AUMF, may well raise exceedingly
difficult questions. Such a decision would immediately implicate Congress's constitutional power to
declare war. Not because Congress may not delegate the power to initiate a war,47 but because too
readily ascribing such a result to Congress will have the effect of altering the balance of power between
the President and Congress. While this is a structural issue, it is grounded on concerns about
protecting individuals from all that a national engagement in war entails. 48 The distinction also leads
to anomalous results. For example, it requires reading Youngstown as a case that is primarily about
vindicating domestic private property rights rather than about constraining presidential power with
respect to foreign and military affairs. The Supreme Court rejected this reading in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.49 Were Youngstown limited to domestic property rights, would we apply deference to the
President's determination that he was authorized to seize Canadian steel mills to supply the troops
under the laws authorizing the Korean War or under other statutes like the Food and Forage Act?50
Clear statement rules also may both over- and under-protect individual rights. Clear statement rules
notoriously overprotect the values that they are designed to advance. Where a clear statement rule
protects a constitutional value, for example, it provides "cover" for an interpreter-and especially a
court-to push the value further than it would if it had to do so forthrightly as a matter of express
constitutional interpretation, frequently resulting in a declaration that a law is unconstitutional.5' A
clear statement rule designed to protect individual rights would also be underprotective. Those who
benefit from presidential action-for example, by the improved security against terrorist attack-have an
individual liberty interest in seeing that the President carries out his proposed action. The clear
statement approach does not take into account these liberty interests. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,52 for example, the Supreme Court considered whether the FDA's jurisdiction includes
the authority to regulate nicotine and the tobacco products that deliver it. By the terms of the relevant
statute, the FDA has jurisdiction over drugs and the devices by which drugs are delivered. Nicotine
satisfied the statutory definition of a drug, while cigarettes and other tobacco products are well-within
the definition of a device. At first glance, then, the FDA seemed to have jurisdiction over nicotine and
tobacco products. Granting the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products would have dramatic
consequences, and the Court referred particularly to the economic consequences for tobacco
companies and their suppliers, tobacco farmers. Given these consequences, the Supreme Court
declined to find that the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products absent a clear indication
from Congress of the intent to extend the FDA's jurisdiction to tobacco. This decision might be
understood as vindicating the individual rights of the tobacco companies as well as the farmers who
supply them. But it can just as readily be characterized as undermining the individual rights of those
who would have benefited from FDA regulation, particularly children who might have been prevented
from taking up smoking. These individuals are not identifiable and were not before the Court. The
Court's opinion did not consider their interests.5 3 Finally, the rights/structure dichotomy appears to
rest on a negative conception of liberty.5 4 Construing statutes in a way that defers to the President
on structural matters may well detract from the social and political conditions necessary for
individuals to enjoy meaningful liberty. Indeed, this appears to be the theory expressed by James
Madison 55--at the Constitution structures power among the branches of government
56 in order to deploy each branch as a check on the others.
2NC Solves Intel
Deference in Chevron review is K2 effective intelligence—it allows intel innovation
which makes it more effective and less intrusive
Margulies 14 (Peter, professor at Roger Williams University School of Law, “Dynamic Surveillance:
Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden”, Hastings Law Journal
Vol 66, December 2014, http://www.hastingslawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/Margulies-66.1.pdf)
-also good since agencies have superior expertise, they don’t just construe statutes in a sterile textual
vacuum but have thought long and hard about it
-second guessing agency decisions made in a technical complex arena is risky
-de novo review requires going through Congress to get new techother countries can get it,
implementing tech is harder
The courts have also tended to show deference to government decisions on technology and national
security. In granting this deference, courts have recognized that a failure to show deference could confine
technology to the status quo, chilling innovation .232 Moreover, courts have recognized that requiring public
disclosure of surveillance methods would allow terrorists and other adversaries to “adapt” to those
methods and thereby evade detection .233 In addition, courts have viewed technological advances as a shield
as well as a sword, possessing the potential to enhance privacy and enable curbs on government
overreaching.234 The courts’ deference to the executive branch on technology was evident in the Supreme
Court’s canonical decision on deference to agencies, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council. 235 Often, courts defer because of agencies’ superior expertise. As the Chevron Court noted in
deferring to an agency policy on ways to reduce air pollution, an agency construes a statute, “not in a sterile textual
vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and complex arena.”236 That
complexity makes it far more risky and cumbersome for courts to either second-guess agency decisions
developed over time by experts or to require express authorization from Congress for new
technologies. The first point here is most obvious: Executive agencies have access to information on a far
broader scale than courts.237 Courts that secondguess agencies risk getting it wrong. The second point
requires more unpacking. Requiring express authorization from Congress obliges executive branch officials to
repeatedly return to Congress for permission to employ new technology. That requirement has some
advantages for deliberation and individual rights, but it also has two key drawbacks: (1) in the national security field, it increases
the risk that some technological advances will be disclosed before it is in the United States’ interest to
disclose them, and (2) it makes the implementation of new technology far more unwieldy. Two important
cases on secrecy illustrate the first problem. In United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that the government
could invoke the state secrets privilege to shield an accident report prepared by the Air Force on the crash of a B-29 bomber in litigation
brought by the widows of the victims.238 At the time of the accident, the bomber in question was testing an early version of a “pilotless aircraft
guidance system,”239 although the documents that the plaintiffs requested contained no mention of this aspect of the case.240 The
government alleged that disclosure of the accident report was “prejudicial to the efficient operation” of the Air Force, “not in the public
interest,” and “inconsistent with national security.”241 The Supreme Court agreed that the government could decline to disclose the
documents, which in fact merely listed tragically mundane errors in aircraft maintenance.242 Rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that in camera
review of the accident report would suffice to determine whether it contained references to sensitive information, the Court asserted that even
disclosure to a judge could result in compromising sources and methods.243 Noting that “new[] . . . electronic devices have greatly enhanced
the effective use of air power,” the Court opined that “electronic devices must be kept secret if their full military advantage is to be exploited in
the national interests.”244 The Court declined to order production of the accident report, finding a “reasonable danger that the accident
investigation report would contain references to the secret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of the mission.”245 A second
decision that refined the Court’s approach to secrecy, technology, and deference is CIA
v. Sims. 246 In Sims, on which Judge KollarKotelly relied in her FISC opinion on Internet metadata, the Supreme Court upheld denial of a Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) request on grounds that even a seemingly innocuous disclosure might form part of a
“mosaic” that could reveal intelligence sources and methods to U.S. adversaries.247 The Sims Court warned that,
“what may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view
of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context.”248 Judicial deference was therefore
appropriate in assessing the intelligence assessments of the executive, which “must of course be familiar with ‘the
whole picture,’ as judges are not.”249 Such deference was particularly appropriate, the Sims Court concluded, “given the
magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake.”250 The Sims Court’s mosaic theory,
with its stress on judicial deference on secrecy, was a reference point for Senator Kyl in discussing the 2006 amendments to section 215.
Discussing limits in the bill on telecommunications companies’ disclosure of government requests for information, Kyl explained the need for a
measure of deference to the executive branch’s choices: The standard in the conference report . . . recognizes that sensitive
national
security and diplomatic relations judgments are particularly within the Executive’s expertise. The
Constitution has vested these determinations with the Executive, and courts have long recognized that
judges are ill-suited to be second-guessing the Executive’s national security and diplomatic affairs judgments.
Disclosures that seem innocuous to a judge who . . . must view those disclosures without being fully aware of the many other
data points known to our enemies—may nonetheless be quite damaging. 251 Obliging agencies to return to
Congress every time they encounter a new technology can also stifle innovation. In today’s world, technological
change occurs at an astronomical rate.252 Ponder the pitiable fate of the Blackberry, hailed as cutting edge technology in one decade and
nearing collapse less than fifteen years later.253 Even modest alterations in technology can render a regulatory regime ready for mothballs.254
Requiring a trip to Congress for fresh amendments every time technological change mooted out a previously effective regulatory framework
would leave regulators playing Sisyphus. The agency would eagerly draft regulations pursuant to a
current statutory authorization, only to find that technological change had rendered those rules old
before their time, requiring further legislative activity before starting work on a new batch of regulations.255 The cycle would then
repeat itself. Such adventures in futility would seem quixotic were they not dangerous. If adaptability is a
watchword for administrative law, allowing counterterrorism techniques to lag behind technology in smart phones or washing machines seems
perverse.256
AT: Perm
Doesn’t make any sense—make them explain how FISA court would apply de novo
and Chevron review to the same case and come to a coherent conclusion.
Links to flexibility NB since it includes de novo review.
2NC—Law Enforcement Impact Module
Scrapping de novo review doesn’t violate the right to privacy and accommodates the
interconnectivity of national security and law enforcement
Yoo 03 (John C, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at Berkley School of Law, “Judicial Review and the
War on Terrorism”, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 2003)
FISA represents an effort by the political branches to promote judicial
involvement in fighting threats to the national security. At the same time, it
seeks to convince the courts to abandon the usual de novo review and adopt
a standard of review that accommodates both national security needs and the
option for use by law enforcement and prosecutors. It creates a statutory
mechanism that grants national security warrants, but under a standard below that used for Fourth Amendment warrants, at least with regard to
non-United States persons. Unlike military searches, however, the fruits of
these searches will prove presumptively admissible in prosecutions. This allows the federal courts to offer another option to the political branches, that
of prosecution and trial, in the war against the al Qaeda terrorist
organization.
2NC—XT Judicial Deference Key
Judicial deference key
Yoo 03 (John C, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at Berkley School of Law, “Judicial Review and the
War on Terrorism”, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 2003)
By doing so, the exercise of judicial review is playing more than its usual role as a check and balance on
the actions of the other branches. Rather, judicial review presents the president and Congress with
new weapons with which to fight the war on terrorism. In the case of FISA surveillance, for example,
deferential judicial review allows the executive branch to intercept terrorist communications under a
standard similar to that which applies to military surveillance, all the while preserving the possibility
of the use of the evidence in a federal prosecution. With its deferential review toward the de- tention
of enemy combatants, federal courts not only provide the executive with a different way of holding
terrorists, but they also present the option, perhaps, of later moving the detainees into the federal
court system for pros- ecution. In both cases, the more deferential standard of scrutiny allows the
political branches to undertake immediate wartime actions under the more flexible rules of the laws
of war, without forsaking later use of the federal criminal justice system as means of sanctioning and
incapacitating members of al Qaeda. By presenting more options to the war fighting branches of
government, the courts act not merely as a traditional check on government, but as a potential weapon
that can assist the United States' war on terrorism.
Case—Separation of Powers
Defense
SOP UQ – Congress Now
Congress has authority over conflict now – proves that expanded authority isn’t
necessary
Findley 2011 Paul Findley, former representative, 4/10/11, “Obama’s Fateful Abuse of War Powers:
Violated Constitution and 1973 War Powers Resolution”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-sfateful-abuse-of-war-powers-violated-constitution-and-1973-war-powers-resolution/24246
The acts of war ordered by President Barack Obama against the government of Libya violated
provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the War Powers Resolution of 1973. He also exceeded his
authority by pledging U.S. combat support to the United Nations Security Council and to NATO for
military measures against Libya. The United States may soon find itself entrapped in a costly civil war in that North African nation.¶
Congress is complicit in creating this mess, because it failed to demand presidential compliance with
the Constitution and public law and neglected its own explicit constitutional duty in the exercise of
war powers.¶ The War Powers Resolution was enacted in the wake of the Vietnam ordeal by Members of Congress, myself included, who
considered that war unauthorized by Congress and a gross abuse of Constitutional war powers. Our goal was to prevent future unauthorized
presidential wars. I joined other Members of Congress in overriding President Richard Nixon’s veto, and during my remaining years on Capitol
Hill I maintained close vigilance on presidential compliance. Compliance was satisfactory by Presidents Ford and Carter, as well as both
Presidents Bush. In recent years I find no sign of vigilance or compliance. It is a sad, dangerous state of affairs.¶ Mandated
presidential
reports are a major feature of the resolution. In the absence of a war declaration, a written presidential report
must be delivered to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate within 24 hours of each order that moves substantial U.S. military forces into hostile areas .
It must list reasons for the decision, military forces to be committed, and the expected duration of war measures.¶ It cites a
constitutional way for Congress to overturn any such presidential decision. Any Member of Congress
can challenge the president’s decision by introducing a bill called a concurrent resolution of
disapproval. If approved by both House and Senate, this legislation requires the president to rescind his war
decision. The War Powers Resolution even authorizes expedited parliamentary procedures when a disapproval resolution is introduced in
either chamber of Congress.¶ These provisions were intended to bring Congress close to the president as he
ponders war-making decisions, a role clearly intended by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The
resolution limits the time for delivery of presidential reports to 24 hours, hoping the quick deadline
will cause the president to give close attention to the likely reaction of Congress. We believed it could be an
important, timely restraint on a president whose decision at the moment must be reflective and wise. It would also be a strong reminder that
Congress has the power to overturn the president’s decision quickly by enacting a concurrent resolution of disapproval.
War powers are balanced now – Congress has power of the purse, troop limits and the
War Powers Resolution
McMahon 2011 Robert McMahon, expert in foreign affairs, 6/20/11, “Balance of War Powers: The
U.S. President and Congress”, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/balance-war-powers-us-presidentcongress/p13092
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress and the president different responsibilities over military action ,
but there have long been disputes about where one's war powers begin and the other's ends. The Obama administration's decision in August
2013 to seek congressional authorization for a military strike against Syria over its alleged use of chemical weapons has stirred new debate
about the constitutional need for a president to request such approval and whether President Obama is creating a precedent that will
hamstring future commanders in chief.¶ In the administration's previous major military intervention, participating in NATO air strikes against
the Libyan regime in 2011, it stated that prior congressional approval (pdf) was not required because the limited military operations anticipated
"were not a 'war' for constitutional purposes." At the time, many scholars had pointed to Obama's action as consistent with the greater
assertion of presidential war powers since the end of World War II. Announcing his plans on Syria, Obama said he had the authority to take
military action without specific congressional authorization. But the formal approval of Congress, he said, would provide a stronger basis for
action and was "the right thing to do for our democracy."¶ What are the president's war powers?¶ The
U.S. Constitution
empowers the president to wage wars as commander in chief while Congress has the power to
declare wars--in fact to authorize hostilities at any level-- and fund them . Legal scholars largely agree that presidents can
order U.S. troops to fight when the country is attacked or attack appears imminent but chief
executives from both major parties often differ with Congress over their ability to initiate military
force in other combat situations. Presidents have demonstrated greater power to wage wars since the end of World War II. "The
president has been commander in chief since 1789, but this notion that they can go to war whenever they want, and [ignore] Congress, that's a
post-World War II attitude," says Louis Fisher, scholar in residence at the Constitution Project (and former specialist in constitutional law at the
Library of Congress).¶ Legal experts Noah Feldman and Samuel Issacharoff wrote in March 2007 in Slate that while
the Constitution
empowered the Congress to make and end war, it intended the president to have the power to wage
war effectively, once an authorized war was begun. "In the modern era, no country--not even a parliamentary democracy--has been so
foolhardy as to place a war under the guidance of a legislative body, rather than a single, unified command."¶ But other experts point to
established limits of presidential power during wartime, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1952 ruling that struck down
President Harry S. Truman's order to maintain operations of the country's steel mills for national security reasons, which was found to be
against the will of Congress. Some
point to the Supreme Court's 2006 Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld ruling--which found special military
commissions established by the Bush administration to be illegal--to stress the shared wartime powers of the president
and Congress. Susan Low Bloch, a constitutional law expert at the Georgetown University Law Center, says the framers of the Constitution
deliberately divided the war powers between the two branches to induce them to work together on such a vital issue.¶ Will the authorization
process over Syria affect those powers?¶ The president's decision to seek explicit authority for what has been described as a limited action
could have lasting repercussions. In the view of some experts, the move could inhibit Obama for the rest of his term in his ability to initiate
military action without congressional authority, or at a minimum it would heighten public expectations about the need for future presidents to
seek congressional support. But a number of experts also say the Syria action warranted a request for congressional authorization. The planned
use of military force in Syria without authorization would have amounted to a major constitutional stretch, writes Jack Goldsmith, a former U.S.
assistant attorney general and current professor at Harvard Law School. Goldsmith wrote on the Lawfare blog that the envisioned action in
Syria would have set a precedent for presidential unilateralism in part because "neither U.S. persons nor property are at stake, and no plausible
self-defense rationale exists."¶ Can Congress set timelines for a troop withdrawal?¶ The
constitution gives the Congress power
to set troop limits. A late twentieth-century example was the action by the Democrat-controlled Congress in the fall of 1983 setting up
an eighteen-month time limit for U.S. troops already deployed as a peacekeeping force in Lebanon by President Ronald Reagan's Republican
administration. But the eighteen-month limit was never tested. Within two weeks of the president signing that timeline measure into law, a
suicide bomb destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. service personnel. The Reagan administration withdrew its
participation in the multinational force in Lebanon by the end of March 1984.¶ What is the War Powers Resolution?¶ The
1973 War
Powers Resolution followed a period of growing congressional concern over the unilateral presidential
use of military force. Among other things, the legislation, which was passed over a veto by President Nixon, required that a
president terminate combat in a foreign territory within sixty to ninety days unless there was
congressional authorization to continue. It also sought to provide presidents with the leeway to respond to attacks or other
emergencies. The measure was intended to provide more coordination between the executive and
legislative branches on the use of force. It does not fully address the issue of winding down a conflict.
SOP UQ – Exec overreach inevitable
Executive power is inevitable – constitutional trends mean that reductions in power
are only temporary – the aff can’t spill over because only the executive can curtail war
powers
Marshall 2014 William Marshall, Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, 1/20/14,
“ELEVEN REASONS WHY PRESIDENTIAL POWER INEVITABLY EXPANDS AND WHY IT MATTERS”,
http://dhs.deltaschools.com/sandbox/groups/mackendrickhistory/wiki/1c7d8/attachments/00fba/Presi
dential%20power%20Marshall%20Article%2014.pdf
I. THE EXPANSION IN PRESIDENTIAL POWER¶ A. Background¶ The
notion that presidential power has expanded
exponentially since the time of the framing is, of course, uncontestable.4 The extent of that growth,
however, is not always fully appreciated. At the time of the framing, for example, Madison, among others, believed the legislature
was the most powerful branch,5 and for that reason he supported the creation of a bicameral legislature.6 Congress needed to be divided into
two branches so that it would not overwhelm the other branches.7 Correspondingly, the executive needed to be unitary so that it would not be
weakened in its battles with the legislature.8¶ Two hundred years later, any suggestion that Congress is twice as powerful as the executive
would be deemed ludicrous.9 Particularly in the areas of national security and foreign affairs,10 the
Presidency has become the
far more powerful branch . 11 In 2006, for example, a new Congress was elected based in large part on
the desire of the American people to get out of an unpopular war.12 Yet, the President was able to
use his authority to continually out maneuver the newly-elected Congress and pursue a war that even
many of those in his own party opposed.13¶ It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the expansion of presidential
power vis-à-vis the other branches is only a recent development.14 Justice Jackson recognized this trend over fifty years ago when he wrote in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:¶ 15¶ [I]t is relevant to note the gap that exists between the President’s paper powers and his real
powers. The Constitution does not disclose the measure of the actual controls wielded by the modern presidential office. That instrument must
be understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of a government hoped for, not as a blueprint of the Government that is. Vast accretions of
federal power, eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers
of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution.¶ Executive
power has the advantage of concentration in
a single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and
expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear.
No other personality in public life can begin to compete with him in access to the public mind through modern methods of communications. By
his prestige as head of state and his influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance his
power which often cancels their effectiveness.16¶ Notably, the reasons Justice Jackson offered as to why power has concentrated in the
executive go far beyond the ambitions and personalities of those who have held the office.17 Rather, they are the inevitable results of
technological, social, and legal changes encompassing a variety of factors.18 These factors include: 1) the constitutional indeterminacy of
presidential power, 2) the precedential effects of executive branch action, 3) the role of executive-branch lawyering 4) the expansion of the
federal executive branch, 5) presidential control of the administrative state, 6) presidential access to and control of information, 7) the interrelationship between the media and the Presidency, 8) the role of the Presidency in popular culture, 9) military and intelligence capabilities, 10)
the need for the government to act quickly, and 11) the rise of a strong two-party system in which party loyalty trumps institutional
prerogative. I shall discuss each of these factors in turn.¶ B.
Reasons Why Presidential Power Continues to Expand¶ 1.
The Constitutional Indeterminacy of the Presidency¶ The first and perhaps overarching reason underlying the growth of
presidential power is that the constitutional text on the subject is notoriously unspecific, allowing as one
writer maintains, for the office “to grow with the developing nation.”19 Unlike Article I, which sets forth the specific
powers granted to Congress,20 the key provisions of Article II that grant authority to the President are written
in indeterminate terms such as “executive power,”21 or the duty “to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.”22 Moreover, unlike the other branches, the Presidency has consistently been deemed to
possess significant inherent powers .23 Thus, many of the President’s recognized powers, such as the authority to act in times of
national emergency24 or the right to keep advice from subordinates confidential,25 are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution itself.¶ In
addition, case law on presidential power is underdeveloped. Unlike the many precedents addressing Congressional26 or
federal judicial27 power, there are remarkably few Supreme Court cases analyzing presidential power. And the leading case on the subject,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 28 is known less for its majority opinion than for its concurrence by Justice Jackson, an opinion
primarily celebrated for its rather less-than-definitive announcement that much of presidential power exists in a “zone of twilight.”29¶
the question whether a President has exceeded her authority is seldom immediately obvious
because the powers of the office are so openended .30 This fluidity in definition, in turn, allows presidential
power to readily expand when factors such as national crisis, military action, or other matters of
expedience call for its exercise.31 Additionally, such fluidity allows political expectations to affect public
perceptions of the presidential office in a manner that can lead to expanded notions of the office’s
power.32 This perception of expanded powers, in turn, can then lead to the perceived legitimacy of the President actually exercising those
powers. Without direct prohibitions to the contrary, expectations easily translate into political reality.33¶ 2. The Precedential Effects
Accordingly,
of Executive Branch Action¶ Presidential power also inevitably expands because of the way executive
branch precedent is used to support later exercises of power.34 Many of the defenders of broad presidential power cite historical
examples, such as President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, as authority for the position that Presidents have considerable powers in
times of war and national emergency.35 Their position is straight-forward. The
use of such powers by previous Presidents
stands as authority for a current or future President to engage in similar actions.36 Such arguments have
considerable force, but they also create a one-way ratchet in favor of expanding the power of the presidency. The fact is that every President
but Lincoln did not suspend habeas corpus. But it is a President’s action in using power, rather than forsaking its use, that has the precedential
significance.37 In this manner, every extraordinary use of power by one President expands the availability of executive branch power for use by
future Presidents.¶
3. The Role of Executive Branch Lawyering¶ The expansion of presidential power is also a product of
executive branch lawyering. Because
of justiciability limitations, many of the questions surrounding the scope
of presidential power, such as war powers,38 never reach the courts .39 In these circumstances, the Department of
division that is charged with advising the President as to the
scope of his or her powers, are the final legal authorities opining on these issues.40¶ This means, in effect,
Justice (DOJ) and its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the
the executive branch is the final judge of its own authority . Not surprisingly, this dynamic leads to
broad interpretations of executive power for a variety of reasons.41 To begin with, the President, simply by his
power of appointment, can assure that his Attorney General views the primary duty of the office is to
empower the administration and not to some abstract, dispassionate view of the law.42 President Kennedy
that
selected his brother to be Attorney General, President Nixon his campaign manager. Neither appointment, I suspect, was based on the desire to
have a recalcitrant DOJ. Moreover, even when the President chooses a person renowned for her independence, the pressures to bend to the
President’s will are considerable. Not only does the Attorney General act under the threat of removal, but she is likely to feel beholden to the
President and bound, at least in part, by personal loyalty.43¶ Some might argue that even if the Attorney General may be overly susceptible to
the influence of the President who appointed her, the same should not be true of the career legal staff of the DOJ, many of whom see their role
as upholding the Constitution rather than implementing any President’s specific agenda. But the
ability of the line lawyers at DOJ
to effectively check executive branch power may be more illusory than real. First, the lawyers in the
DOJ are likely to have some disposition in favor of the government if only because their clients are the
President and the executive branch.44 Second, those DOJ lawyers who are hired for their ideological and
political support of the President will likely have little inclination to oppose the President’s position in
any case. Third, as a recent instance at DOJ demonstrates, the President’s political appointees can always remove or
redeploy staff attorneys if they find them too independent.45 Fourth, even if some staff lawyers have
initial resistance to the President’s position, the internal pressures created by so-called “group-think”
may eventually take over.46 The ability of a staff attorney to withstand the pressures of her peers in adhering to legal principle in the
face of arguments based on public safety or national security can often be tenuous, particularly when the result of nay-saying may lead the
lawyer to exile in a less attractive assignment.¶ To be sure, the DOJ has, at times, viewed itself as a truly independent voice. Attorney General
Edward Bates, appointed by Lincoln reportedly stated that it was his duty “to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever
quarter of mere will and power.”47 Robert H. Jackson, in contrast, looking back from the perch of a Supreme Court Justice, saw his role as the
Attorney General during the Roosevelt Administration otherwise, describing in one case the opinion he offered as Attorney General as “partisan
advocacy.”48 But whatever the views of those individuals holding the position of Attorney General, those views are, at best, only of secondary
importance. Far more important are the views of the Presidents who appoint the Attorneys General, and in this respect the positions of the
occupants of the White House have been consistent. As one study states, “[t]he President expects his Attorney General . . . to be his advocate
rather than an impartial arbiter, a judge of the legality of his action.”49 Under such a system, the pressure for DOJ to develop expansive
4. The Growth of the Executive Branch¶ A further reason for the growth of
presidential power relates to the expansion of the federal executive branch. The massive federal bureaucracy existing today
extends far beyond what the framers likely imagined.50 And significantly, for our purposes, the head of that
bureaucracy is the President who thereby has all the capabilities and powers of the administrative
interpretations of presidential power is inexorable.¶
state at his disposal.51 The substantive scope of his authority, moreover, is breathtaking.52 The
President leads a federal bureaucracy that, among other powers, sets pollution standards for private
industry, regulates labor relations, creates food and product safety standards, manages the nation’s
lands and natural resources, enforces the federal criminal law, oversees the banking industry, and
governs a host of other activities too numerous to mention.53 This may not have been the way it was intended. As
Gary Lawson has written, it is questionable whether the delegation of powers to the executive, upon which the administrative state is based, is
consistent with the original understanding.54 Yet whether consistent with the Framers’ design or not, the expansion of the federal bureaucracy
necessarily invests the Presidency with enormous powers.55 And
as the federal bureaucracy continues to expand, so
does the power of the Presidency.56 Indeed, even if Congress were able to limit the President’s direct control over the
administrative state (a matter that will be discussed in the next Subsection), the President’s powers stemming from an expanded federal
5. Presidential Control of the Administrative
State¶ Related to the expansion of the federal administrative bureaucracy is the increased ability of
the president to control that bureaucracy. For many years, the federal bureaucracy stood literally as a “fourth branch of
bureaucracy would still increase, if only through his powers of appointment.¶
government,” enjoying considerable independence from both Congress and the Presidency.57 Recently, however, as Deans Harold Krent58 and
Elena Kagan have stated,59 Presidents
are beginning to control the federal bureaucracy for their own political
agendas in a manner that has not occurred previously. Krent demonstrates how President George W. Bush has been
able to circumvent congressional efforts to delegate decision making to office holders and to retain
such authority for himself,60 while Kagan shows how President Clinton was able to use directives and other measures to more
effectively control and claim ownership of agency action.61 The Clinton and Bush Presidencies will likely serve as lessons to future
administrations, suggesting that increased control of the federal bureaucracy is yet another way that presidential power will continue to
6. Presidential Access to and Control of Information¶ If, “[i]n the information age, information is
power”62 then most of that power rests with the executive. Because of its vast resources, the executive branch
has far greater access to information than do the co-branches of government.63 In addition, the executive
expand.¶
branch has far greater ability and expertise to gather, examine, and cull that information than do the transitory legislative staffs in the
Congress. Congress, for
example, does not have at its disposal the information gathering capabilities of
the intelligence agencies or the technical expertise of the military in determining when there is a
threat to national security.64 Instead, it must rely on the executive for that appraisal and therefore must continually negotiate with
the executive from a position of weakness and dependence.65 Moreover, this disparity in access and control of information is only likely to
worsen as the world becomes more complex, because complexity necessarily requires increasingly sophisticated methods of information
collection, analysis, distillation, and dissemination. And because only the executive branch is likely to have the expertise and the resources to
perform these functions, its relative powers will again increase.¶
in Youngstown, the
7. The Media and the Presidency¶ As Justice Jackson recognized
power of the Presidency has also been magnified by the nature of media coverage . This
coverage, which focuses on the President as the center of national power,66 has only increased since Jackson’s day as the dominance of
television has increasingly identified the image of the nation with the image of the particular President holding office.67 The effects of this
image are substantial. Because the President is seen as speaking for the nation, the
Presidency is imbued with a unique
credibility. The President thereby holds an immediate and substantial advantage in any political
confrontation.68 Additionally, unlike the Congress or the Court, the President is uniquely able to
demand the attention of the media and, in that way, can influence the Nation’s political agenda to an extent that no other
individual, or institution, can even approximate.¶ 8. The Presidency in Popular Culture¶ Relatedly, the role of the
institution of the President in popular culture also enhances presidential power. As numerous commentators
have noted, the public often perceives national power as directly related to the power of the incumbent
President.69 For that reason, the citizenry tends to rally behind the President because he is seen as standing
for the country.70 This is why the citizenry tends to become invested in a President as soon as he is elected, and is why his popularity
always rises immediately after an election.71 Of course, it may be true that the perception of the President as allpowerful can work to his detriment in that he can be held responsible, sometimes unfairly, for
matters that are beyond his control.72 But the fact that the President is held responsible in these circumstances is a testament to
his perceived power and authority.¶ To be sure, the role of public culture in enhancing the power of the presidency is not exclusively a modern
phenomenon. Efforts were made to create a popular mythology surrounding the President as far back as President Washington.73 But as the
political and popular culture surrounding the Presidency continue to coalesce, a sitting President’s ability to use popular culture for political
9. Military and Intelligence Capabilities¶ The President’s power is also enhanced by
the vast military and intelligence capabilities under his command. In his roles as Commander-in-Chief and head of the Executive Branch, the
President directly controls the most powerful military in the world and directs clandestine agencies
such as the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency.75 That control provides the President with
benefit is seemingly enhanced as well.74¶
immensely effective, non-transparent capabilities to further his political agenda and/or diminish the political abilities of his opponents. 76
Whether a President would cynically use such power solely for his political advantage has, of course, been the subject of political thrillers and
the occasional political attack. President Clinton, for one, was accused of ordering the bombing of terrorist bases in Afghanistan to distract the
nation from the Lewinsky scandal,77 and President Nixon purportedly used the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate his political
enemies.78 But regardless
whether such abuses actually occurred, there is no doubt that control of covert
agencies provides ample opportunity for political mischief, particularly since the inherently secretive
nature of these agencies means their actions often are hidden from public view. And as the capabilities of these
agencies increase through technological advances in surveillance and other methods of investigation, so does the power of the President.¶ 10.
The Need for Government To Act Quickly¶ Presidential power also has increased because of the exigencies of decision making
in the modern world. At the time of the founding, it would take weeks, if not months, for a foreign government to attack American soil. In the
twentyfirst century, the weapons of war take only seconds to arrive. The
increased speed of warfare necessarily vests
power in the institution that is able to respond the fastest – the presidency, not the Congress.79 Consequently,
the President has unparalleled ability to direct the nation’s political agenda.80 The power that comes with being the first to act, moreover, does
not end when the immediate emergency is over. Decisions made in times of emergency are not easily reversed; this is particularly true in the
context of armed conflict. The
President’s commitment of troops inevitably creates a “rally round the flag”
reaction that reinforces the initial decision.81 As Vietnam and now Iraq have shown, Congress is likely to be very slow in
second guessing a President’s decision that places soldiers’ lives in harm’s way. That Congress would use its powers (as opposed to its rhetoric)
11. The Inceasingly Polarized TwoParty System¶ The final reason why presidential power has increased relates to the rise of a highly
to directly confront the President by cutting off military appropriations seems fanciful.¶
polarized two-party system in which party loyalty trumps institutional concerns . The beginnings of this
polarization can be traced to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 The passage of that Act ended an era that had effectively been a
three-party system in the United States: the northern Democrats, the southern Democrats, and the Republicans. During this “threeparty” era,
members of Congress needed to work across party lines to develop working majorities on particular issues.83 Their political fortunes and
reputations, therefore, were closely tied to the success of Congress as an institution.¶ In contrast, in the
highly polarized two-party
system currently dominating national politics, a member’s political success depends more on the
fortunes of her particular party than on the stature of Congress. This means members of Congress have a greater
personal interest in the President’s success as leader of their party than they have in Congress as an institution. Correspondingly, because the
President is the leader of his or her political party, the
President can expect greater loyalty and discipline from party
members than occurred in previous eras. The result of this is that when the President’s party controls the Congress, he or she
can proceed virtually uncontested.84 Consequently, in an era of highly polarized parties, there no longer exists the constitutional balance
purportedly fostered by separation of powers. Rather, the constitutional balance becomes what Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes term a
“separation of parties.”85 The
problem, of course, is that separation of parties serves as no balance at all
when both the Presidency and the Congress are controlled by the same party. In those circumstances,
the power of the Presidency is effectively unchecked.
Won’t Leave Chad—No one cares
Nobody cares about Africom—it’ll never be cut, its creation proves
Burgess 08 (Stephen F, Associate Professor, Department of International Security, U.S. Air War
College, “US AFRICA COMMAND, CHANGING SECURITY DYNAMICS, AND
PERCEPTIONS OF US AFRICA POLICY”, 2008)
US Africa policymaking has traditionally been centered in the bureaucracies of the State and Defense
departments due to the relative lack of importance of Africa to interest groups and Congress.15
Therefore, the OSD was able to proceed with the formation of AFRICOM without fear of domestic
opposition. The State Department could have voiced its opposition but was not headed by strong
advocates for the departments previous lead role in Africa. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Jendayi Frazer, agreed with the AFRICOM initiative and
cooperated with DOD. As for Congress, it was in the habit of granting most DOD funding proposals in
the wake of September 11. 2001 and agreed to initial DOD requests for AFRICOM.
Can’t Solve—Oversight Fails
Oversight fails—agencies pretend they don’t understand rulings to override them
Brennan Center 15 (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is a nonpartisan law and policy
institute that seeks to improve our systems of democracy and justice, “Strengthening Intelligence
oversight”, 2015,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Church_Committee_Report.pdf, MC)
The documents also revealed that the government repeatedly failed to comply with the legal
restrictions that Congress and the FISA Court imposed on its programs, which it blamed on
misunderstandings regarding the complex technologies involved and the different rules governing the
various programs. Though the opinions show the FISA Court struggled to rein in these programs, Judge
Reggie Walton later acknowledged the court had no ability to conduct independent oversight of the
intelligence agencies and relied entirely on self-regulation and reporting by the agencies.36 Congress
should ascertain whether the FISA Court has the staff and other resources needed to be independent
and effective. Further, Congress should evaluate whether the FISA Court, with its limited capacity and
lack of adversarial process to assist in factual development, is the proper venue to judge the
constitutionality of secret government programs it cannot fully evaluate. The Senate Intelligence
Committee’s CIA torture report revealed similar agency attempts to frustrate oversight by Congress
and the courts.37 According to the report, the CIA “actively avoided or impeded” congressional
oversight by improperly delaying notification that it was using coercive interrogation techniques; only
briefing committee chairmen, vice chairmen, and their staff directors; refusing to answer questions for
the record; and providing incomplete and inaccurate information about the program’s implementation
and management.38 Because of the manner in which these limited briefings were conducted, neither
the CIA nor the Committee retained records fully describing the matters discussed.39 The CIA did not
brief the full Committee on the program until September 2006, four years after it was implemented and
only shortly before President Bush publicly acknowledged it.40 According to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (DCalif.), when the Senate Intelligence Committee investigation began its investigation in 2009, the CIA
placed arduous constraints on committee staff’s access to documents, searched their computers
without warrants, and attempted to intimidate them with criminal referrals to the Justice
Department.41
AT: Africa War Imp
Alt causes to Africa war – poor economic conditions and failure of political institutions
– dozens of previous wars disprove escalation
Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, Economists at World Bank,
“Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict”,
http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/3/244.full.pdf+html
Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries [or about 40%of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)] have experienced at least
one period of civil war. It is estimated that 20% of SSA's population now live in countries which are formally at war and low-intensity conflict has
become endemic to many other African states. This state of affairs has created stereotypes of Africa as a doomed
continent with inescapable ethnic cleavages and violent tribal conflict. The more incidents of political
violence we observe in Africa, the more support for this simplistic and negative perception.¶ However,
careful analysis of the determinants of civil wars in Africa and a systematic comparison to other
regions points to a more complex picture. Deep political and economic development failures - not
tribalism or ethnic hatred - are the root causes of Africa's problems. The implication is that political and economic
development can effectively reduce or eradicate political violence in Africa. In this paper, we focus explicitly on such a comparison between Africa and other
regions, drawing on a detailed and more technical empirical analysis of civil war that we have conducted elsewhere (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000a).¶ Our analysis
is based on the concept of incidence (or amount) of civil war and we try to model its determinants. The
concept of war inci- dence is
equivalent to the concept of the overall amount of civil war that one might observe in a given period,
regardless of whether or not the war started during that period or earlier.2 We focus on overall incidence rather than
on war starts so that we can address the question of the overall amount of civil war in Africa and because it is often dif- ficult to separate closely spaced war
initiations in the same country. Based on the evidence we observe and analyze, we propose a broad strategy of war prevention. ¶ Our empirical analysis is based on
estimating an empirical model of the probability of observing an incident of civil war in any one of 161 countries between 1960 and 1999. We are able to show that
the relatively
high incidence of civil war in Africa is due not to extreme ethno-linguistic fragmentation,
but rather to high levels of poverty, heavy dependence on resource-based primary exports and,
especially, to failed political institutions. Simulations of the effect of political liberalisation and economic
development on the probability of civil war show that the best - and fastest - strategy to reduce the
incidence of civil war in Africa is to institute democratic reforms that effectively manage the sociocultural diversity of African societies. We realise that civil wars in socially diverse societies represent an
extreme failure of inter-group cooperation and argue that the best conflict prevention strategy is to
build institutions for political governance and economic management. We assess the extent to which Africa's social
diversity promotes or impedes this process and consider what type of institu- tions are capable of mitigating the potentially negative consequences of diversity. ¶ In
section 2 we discuss the causes of civil wars, presenting some stylised facts about their incidence, intensity and duration, as well as some basic data on related
variables in Africa and other regions. We use our Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000a) (ES) model to explain the high incidence of civil wars in Africa as compared with
other regions. In section 3 we explore if and by how much improvements in political rights, standards of living and economic diversification influence the risk of civil
war. The evidence from this exercise provides a basis for developing a strategy for war prevention. In the concluding section, we use our empirical analysis to make
some policy recommendations. We argue that a prevention strategy would not be complete without a deep understanding of how political and economic
governance institutions interact with social diversity. While we cannot enter into a full discussion of the nature of peacebuilding institutions, we point to the need
for further research on the relationship between political institutions and violence in Africa. ¶ 2. Understanding the Causes of Conflicts in Africa ¶ Africa has a high
incidence of civil wars and this is commonly attributed to the ethnic diversity of its countries. This inference seems self-evident to many, given that African rebel
movements almost always are ethnically defined. Ethnic identities and hatred are thus seen as the cause of violent conflict. However, more
systematic
analysis of the causes of civil war suggests that Africa's civil wars conform to a global pattern that is
better explained by political and economic factors as well as by the extent of ethnic, cultural and
religi- ous diversity in the society (see, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2000; Collier, 1999a; Collier et ah, 1999; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000a).
Recent studies have found that the risk of civil war is reduced by the opportunity cost of rebel labor (proxied by indicators of economic development, such as per
capita GDP or educational attainment). Up to a certain range, greater natural resources are associated with higher risk of war, though for a substantial natural
resource base the relationship is expected to turn negative. Natural
resources provide easily 'lootable' assets for 'lootseeking' rebel movements or conveni- ent sources for sustaining 'justice-seeking' movements (Collier
and Hoeffler, 2000). However, extremely plentiful resources may also provide sufficient revenues that
the government can use to fund its army and ‘buy' popular support.
Turkey DA
1NC Shell
Turkish democracy is on the brink of collapse – Erdogan is expanding executive power
Tisdall 3/25 Simon Tisdall, foreign policy editor for the Guardian, 3/25/15, “Erdoğan plan for superpresidency puts Turkey's democracy at stake”,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/25/erdogan-plan-for-super-presidency-puts-turkeysdemocracy-at-stake
Erdoğan, the founding leader of the neo-Islamist Justice and Development party (AKP), has ruled Turkey in increasingly
authoritarian fashion since becoming prime minister in 2003. Barred under party rules from seeking a fourth term, he
switched to the presidency last August and has been manoeuvring to increase his executive powers
ever since.¶ The strategy looks similar to Vladimir Putin’s successive shifts from the Russian presidency to prime
ministership and back again, which have kept him in overall charge in Moscow since 2000 . The now deposed Pervez Musharraf
pulled off a similar trick in Pakistan, bolstering his presidential authority at the expense of the prime minister and parliament.¶ Ever choleric, Erdoğan
appears oblivious to these precedents, and to his growing reputation for harsh crackdowns on
popular dissent , street protests and independent journalism. This week saw the jailing of two Penguen magazine cartoonists who dared to poke fun at
is counting instead on his high profile and personal popularity among religious-minded working-class and rural
voters to give the AKP a big majority in national elections due on 7 June. In theory, the necessary constitutional changes he wants
him.¶ He
could then be pushed through .¶ It was a surprise, therefore, when the sharpest recent criticism of Erdoğan’s attempted powerfrom a senior colleague and fellow founding AKP member, the deputy prime minister Bülent Arinç. In an exceptionally blunt
grab emanated
public outburst, he told Erdoğan, in effect, to stop sticking his nose into the government’s Kurdish policy and mind his own business.¶ “His statements like ‘I did not
like that’ or ‘I’m not happy about that’ are emotional and are his own views,” said Arinç, the official cabinet spokesman. “The [Kurdish] peace process is being
carried out by the government and the government is responsible.”¶ Erdoğan
hit back with trademark grandiosity. “I consult
with my people on every issue. I am the president,” he said.¶ Arinç has since backed down under pressure from Ahmet Davutoğlu,
whom Erdoğan appointed as his successor as prime minister, but the exchange revealed deep unease within the AKP and the
political establishment over Erdoğan’s refusal to relinquish his role as Turkey’s leading man.¶ For
Turkish voters and the country’s EU and US partners, anxious for Ankara’s cooperation on Syria and jihadi terrorism, there is
an increasing question mark over who is in charge. “The exchange between Erdoğan and Arinç [concerns] the Kurdish issue only on
the surface. Actually, it was about the powers of the president and the government,” said Murat Yetkin, a commentator for the Turkish daily Hürriyet .¶ “This seems
to be a key issue for those watching political and economic developments in Turkey both inside and outside the country. Whose
words should be
taken into account to understand what Turkey says: the president or the government? If the president and the
government were from different parties, this discrepancy could be understood, but they are of the same party,” Yetkin said. ¶ Hopes that the Kurdish peace process
would advance after a broadly positive statement on 21 March by the jailed Kurdish leader, Abdullah Öcalan, have been dented by the spat. The damage caused by
the power struggle, however, is by no means confined to this issue. ¶ There
have been public rows with Erdoğan over government
economic policy, the leadership of the National Intelligence Organisation and a draft anti-corruption law that Davutoğlu was forced to shelve after the president,
who has faced corruption allegations, spoke out against it. ¶ “Erdoğan’s
priority is surely to get rid of any sort of discussion of
corruption, which stands as a ‘red line’ issue for the head of the nation, who was alleged, along with his family, to have unethical
financial relations with a number of wealthy businessmen,” the analyst Serkan Demirtas wrote in Hürriyet. ¶ The authority and credibility of Davutoğlu, a former
academic who owes his political career to Erdoğan, are increasingly challenged. He vowed to restore party discipline following the Arinç row, saying he had met
Erdoğan and there was no disagreement on Kurdish policy or anything else. Those who anticipated “government chaos” would be disappointed. “We will overcome
all troubled processes, as we have done in the past,” he said. ¶ Opposition parties are having none of it. The government faces major internal divisions, according to
Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu, the leader of the secular Republican People’s party. “They have started blaming each other. This is what we will see more of in the upcoming
period,” he said. Davutoğlu, he claimed, was deaf to what was happening. ¶ That may not be entirely true. While Erdoğan
is doing what he does
best – addressing large public rallies around the country, castigating his foes and critics, and building
personal support ahead of the June polls – tensions with Davutoğlu look certain to worsen. They could reach crisis point
over the expansion of presidential powers, which the prime minister has not explicitly endorsed. Davutoğlu has spoken instead of the
need to ensure the new constitution is based on “democratic and pro-freedom” principles.
The plan is modeled by Turkey---sends a signal against executive war power authority
Damrosch 1995 Lori Damrosch, Professor of Law, Columbia University “WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: A
SYMPOSIUM ON CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE AUTHORITY TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES:
Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common Core of Accountability in Democratic Societies?” 50
U. Miami L. Rev. 181 Lexis
My first opportunity to read John Hart Ely's ideas
on war powers came in 1988, when he published the antecedent of one chapter of War and
Responsibility as an article in the Columbia Law Review titled Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked. 1 The punctuation - without a question
mark - makes an important point: The verb "suppose" invites us not to speculate about a counterfactual hypothetical, but rather to assume that Congress must
want its own creation to work. Professor Ely's project was to show Congress how to fix it. But it was already evident in 1988, and had been for some time,
that Congress
did not want a War Powers Act that really worked. Indeed, the dominant legislative proposal
at that time, known as the Nunn-Byrd-Warner bill, 2 would have improved the fit between congressional prescription
and executive behavior by relaxing the strictures of the War Powers Resolution. 3 Current proposals
would improve that fit more forthrightly, simply by repealing the Resolution. 4 It was also evident then that
Congress didn't - and apparently still doesn't - want to discharge the responsibilities concerning war and peace conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Hence
in War and Responsibility, as in [*182] his earlier article, Professor Ely
devotes considerable thought to the notion of forcing (or at
least inducing) Congress to live up to its constitutional responsibilities. 5 Many of us regret that Professor Ely's ideas have not been
taken more seriously by the most important audience for which they were intended, namely the U.S. Congress. Congress, however, is not the only
audience that needs to hear his message. The message of War and Responsibility should be the topic
of conferences not only in Miami or Washington, but also in Buenos Aires, Lima, Quito, Tokyo, Bonn/Berlin,
Rome, Ankara, Pretoria, and maybe even Minsk or Moscow. Taking the message of War and Responsibility to foreign
audiences would link Professor Ely's ideas to an equally ambitious project (of which our colleague Professor Louis Henkin is a leading exponent) - the
spreading of the best of American constitutionalism to foreign lands. Indeed, just about the time that Professor Ely was publishing
his article in the Columbia Law Review, an intellectual event celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution was also taking place at Columbia Law School. There,
under Professor Henkin's direction, scholars from around the world were exploring the Constitution's influence abroad. 6 That investigation did not extend to the
Constitution's war powers clauses, but it is my project to take the inquiry in that direction. There is reason to explore the possibility that
the American
experiment of constitutional control over war power , even while remaining controversial in concept and implementation with
respect to contemporary U.S. military involvements, has generated trends outside the United States toward
subordinating executive warmaking to constitutional control. In places where this American constitutional idea did fall on fertile
soil, significant advances have been made toward constraining the initiation of military
conflict. The argument I propose to make - and I would like to enlist Professor Ely in the effort both to make it and to strengthen the empirical basis for it - is
that around the world, in constitutional democracies everywhere, we see a borrowing of what was an
American innovation in 1787 . That idea is the Madisonian one (elaborated upon as well by other eighteenth-century thinkers and leaders) of
committing the most solemn national decision, the decision to go to war, not to one person or even one body of persons, but rather to the shared judgment of two
branches, with the Legislative branch having the ultimate say. [*183] All constitutional democracies have had to grapple with the fundamental problem of
legal scholarship on
war powers - Professor Ely's and everyone else's - has addressed only single national systems. The present symposium is no
determining when national military power should be committed to situations of actual or potential conflict. To date, however,
exception, for the only mention of other countries' legal systems has come in Professor Bernard Oxman's comments addressed to the problem of fashioning a
United Nations security system that can function efficiently (and in that context, parliamentary involvement was portrayed as a potential impediment to collective
decisionmaking). 7 What is lacking is a crossnational, crossdisciplinary analysis of war-and-peace decisionmaking as a challenge to democratic theory and
constitutionalism. A
comparative understanding of constitutionalism and war powers can show that for all
their many differences, constitutional democracies do share certain basic commitments that
distinguish them from other forms of government and notably affect theirdecision-making processes in the military sphere. As more
and more polities undergo democratic transformation, the identification and consolidation of a common core
of democratic accountability in the war-and-peace sphere will take on ever-increasing significance.
The current model of the Turkish government is preventing accession to the EU –
modeling means Turkey will get added
Duff 2014 Andrew Duff, European policy expert, former member of EU parliament, 12/16/15,
“Turkey’s EU accession negotiations should now be suspended”,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/turkeys-eu-accession-negotiations-should-now-besuspended-310855
Tuesday’s (16 December) meeting of the General Affairs Council is going to have to take a fresh look at the
EU’s deteriorating relationship with Turkey. It is at any case this time of year that the Council re-assesses the enlargement policy of the
Union. The Council’s deliberations bear upon what are dubbed, somewhat euphemistically, ‘Progress Reports’ from the Commission which is responsible for
conducting accession negotiations on behalf of the member states. The current assessment will be the first since Jean-Claude Juncker, the new Commission
President, declared that there will be no new state joining the EU during his five year mandate. In truth, there
are very few candidates.
Norway is too rich too join and Iceland has taken fright . The seven countries of the Western Balkans have a long
way – some a very long way to travel in terms of achieving essential qualities of statehood let alone the necessary capacity to
pool their sovereignty and integrate their economies within the EU. (We need not go here to Moldova or the Ukraine.)¶ Only Turkey remains . After
having been granted accession country status in 2005, only one of the 33 chapters (R&D) has both been
opened and closed. Progress on the other chapters has been imperceptible despite the dogged optimism of Stefan
Fule, enlargement Commissioner under President Barroso. At a technical level the continuing exercise is worthwhile in aligning officialdom and in helping companies
do business in each other’s markets. Some
‘pre-accession’ EU money has been usefully deployed in infrastructure
projects and in helping civil society in Turkey to advance. The largest delegation of the External Accession Service sits in Ankara, waiting the day when both
parties in the relationship will decide that they really want to live together.¶ This Turkey will not join this European Union ¶ But that day
is not foreseeable. Even at a technical level, Turkey does not apply all the rules of its customs union with the EU (notably on
public procurement), and there is next to no chance that Turkey will be included in the TTIP negotiations .
Liberalisation of visas and implementation of the readmission agreement for irregular migrants remain agonisingly slow. Obdurate Turkey refuses to recognise the
Republic of Cyprus. Many
of the accession chapters are blocked because one or other EU state opposes
Turkish membership on grounds which are highly political and sometimes prejudicial. Only one country, the
United Kingdom, still makes friendly noises about Turkey’s eventual membership – but that very same country is itself thinking of leaving the EU. In any case, British
support for Turkey provokes real suspicion in other capitals that its true motive in widening the Union to include Turkey is to weaken European integration.¶
The
real problem, however, rests with Turkey itself . In the early years, the Kemalists who ran Turkey wanted to join the EU as an insurance
policy against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and as an economic adjunct of NATO to which military alliance the Turks are still at least formally committed, as
well as a way of wreaking revenge on Greece for its historic insults. When the Islamists took over in 2002, the EU was seen as an important guarantor of the human
rights whose abuse at the hands of the Kemalists had caused many Islamic brethren, including Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to be imprisoned. The
prospect of
EU accession also played well with the rapidly expanding industrial middle class of Anatolia, who
supported the AKP, the new ruling party, in very large numbers.¶ Gradually AKP’s commitment to Europe has
declined. After years of tinkering with the Turkish constitution there have been minor improvements
but not the radical overhaul it needs to meet EU norms. Torture is proscribed, but the administration of justice remains slow, poor
and unfair.¶ A number of AKP high-ups, notably Ahmet Davutoglu, now prime minister, has never been willing to sacrifice
Turkish sovereignty in order to join the Western liberal community which if not Christian is godless. Davutoglu’s goal is for
Turkey to lead a neo-Ottoman revival across the Middle East and North Africa. AKP founder and former President Abdullah Gul performs well on the
Chatham House circuit that still treats Turkey as if it were a natural ally of the West. But the old school of
smooth talking Turkish diplomats is now dying out, and Gul himself a staunch AKP militant – finds himself more at home in Arabia
than Europe.¶ Erdogan flays his enemies¶ Erdogan himself knows very little about the EU. On his rare visits to Brussels
he tends to shout loudly and act prickly. At home, he flays first one supposed enemy then another. The armed forces, the
bankers, the students, gay rights activists, the Americans – not forgetting the Europeans have all been traduced. Then he turned
ferociously against his former ally Fethullah Gulen when the Imam had the temerity to criticise the AKP government, quite justifiably, for large-scale corruption.¶
Since Sunday many
journalists who align themselves with Hizmet, the Gulenist movement, are under arrest for a range of exotic
charges. Gulen himself is an enigmatic character, with a long history of religious activism. Now in self-imposed exile, implausibly in Pennsylvania, he oversees a
vast network of high-minded Islamic schools and charities in Turkey and elsewhere. Whatever Gulen is, he and his followers do not seem to me to have the makings
of terrorists or plotters of acoup d’état, as Erdogan claims. ¶ In
power now for too long, Erdogan is corrupted. Not only has he lost the
once-beguiling charm of the moderniser, but he has adopted the mantle of the ultra-nationalists. He speaks of Turkish North Cyprus
in the same tones as Putin speaks of Crimea, sacred duty and all. His earlier efforts to recognise the Kurdish problem, including his careful talks with the rebellious
Kurds, have soured with his refusal to help the Kurds against the Sunni fundamentalists in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, some in Western intelligence suspect Erdogan
gives tacit support for ISIS. It is clear at the very least that EU/NATO
is not successful in aligning Turkish foreign and security
policy with that of the West.¶ Erdogan knows how to be elected democratically but not to govern so.
The opposition parties are insulted. Religious and cultural minorities, notably the Alevis, are discriminated against. The liberal media, NGOs and
universities are assailed. The reform of mainstream state education is neglected in favour of Islamic hatipschools. Secular liberal Turkey is
challenged by the rise of conservative Islamic family policy. In short, Turkey is becoming less and less
European.
It is argued that the PS is destined to fail in other countries since it is a peculiarly American form of
government that was designed according to the unique political circumstances and needs of the USA
(Yılmaz 2013). The first president elected with this system was George Washington in 1789. Since then
several countries have adopted the PS taking the American PS as a model modifying it according to their
own needs, so there are different subtypes of the pure PS. However, none of these replicas has been as
successful as its original form. Making modifications to the original American form could be the reason
for the failure of PS in other countries. Therefore, it would be appropriate to take American PS as a base
and describe it in the first place. In fact, despite some variations, most PSs share common features with
the American model.
Unlike the PMS, the PS is a form of government which depends on a rigid separation of powers
(Schmitt and Shullky 1989, 59). Executive, legislative and judiciary powers of the state are independent
from each other and have equal political power. American PS was designed in a way that none of
three powers would prevail over the others in order to have checks and balances between the powers
and to prevent centralization of power in one hand (Kalaycioğlu 2005, 15). The PS has some
fundamental features that distinguish it from the PMS. Lijphart (1992) lists some distinguishing features
of the PS: the president is elected by popular vote (directly or indirectly by Electoral College as in the
USA) for a fixed period of time and becomes both the head of the government and the state. Except for
very rare cases of impeachment, the president completes his fixed term. And the president has the
exclusive authority to determine and conduct the policies of the executive. He decides whom to be
appointed as his ministers, secretaries as they are called in the USA. He is also able to dismiss them
anytime unconditionally. Secretaries are nonpartisan technocrats who are merely responsible to the
president and perform in accordance with the president’s policies and orders. Therefore, there is not a
cabinet in the PS as in the parliamentarian sense (Morlan 1975, 176-177). Another significant difference
is that the president is not responsible to the legislature; therefore the executive does not have to
depend on the vote of confidence of it. The government remains in power even if the president’s party
loses the majority in the legislature since there is no risk of being removed by the mechanism of vote of
no confidence as in
Turkish accession creates multiple scenarios for European crisis, EU disintegration and
conflict
Charalambides 2009 Ioannis Charalambou Charalambides, researcher for Middlesex University, April
2009, “Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the European Union, the structural changes and EU
cohesion”, http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/2696/1/Charalambides__Evaluation_of_the_Turkish_accession_to__the_EU..pdf
Bearing in mind everything mentioned above, Ι focus on the worst case scenario which is the based on the combination of two hypotheses. The first is that
Turkey will meet its obligations and will fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The second is that the EU, guided by
the interests of its member states, will say ‘no’ to full Turkish membership. Under such circumstances we must
examine the political stance of the US, a stance defined by American national interests. A possible 'no' to the Turkish full
membership would be motivated by the national interests of a) a strong member state, b) a club of strong
member states, c) a club of strong member states and other states . It would be difficult -although not impossible- for a small member state to stop
full Turkish membership by veto or through a referendum, because the political cost would be too
high, unless it has the backing in the context of secret coalitions, of strong member states or of a combination of leading and
medium or even small European countries.108¶ If a negative decision on Turkey's full-membership is taken unanimously
or by the majority of the member states then a minimum code of national interests will be met. That is,
the European ‘no’ would stem from common EU interests. However, if this decision results from the serving of the national
interests of a leading country alone or of a block of leading countries and others, then it is likely that
an internal EU crisis would occur , especially if the US, as a super power and an important external EU actor, fully supports the Turkish accession
as full member state . The
crisis may develop in the following manner:¶ 1) Between the EU on the one hand
and the US and Turkey on the other.¶ 2) Between the member- states who will impose their decision
on the EU -or form a majority- on the one hand and the US and Turkey on the other.¶ 3) Among the
member- states of the EU. In this case, we will have an internal crisis within the EU, due to conflicting
national interests resulting from disagreement on Turkey's status in the EU; for instance, whether Turkey is to join the
EU as full member state or in the form of a ‘privileged partnership’, or whether it is to be completely left out. ¶ The US and NATO play a
significant role in the European affairs. It has already been explained that the EU is a subsystem of the global
international system. The data we gathered from Chapters 4 and 5 shows that it is believed that the US influences EU decisions
and especially those concerning the Turkish accession to the EU (see Chapter 5.2 and Questions 8, 9, 10 of the
Questionnaire). Such influence is a matter of serving national interests . However, if the American intervention in
European affairs is not in line with common European interests or with those of the leading countries, then there will
be a conflict of interests. Such a conflict of interests is part of the ‘power game’. If US interests are in line with
common European interests and with those of the leading countries, then all sides will have the most possible benefit and the least possible cost. Thus, there is no
need for any kind of conflict. Regarding this point, we
should also take into consideration the worst case scenario. What will
the event that the EU does not offer
Turkey ‘full membership’, the US may seize the opportunity as a pretext in order to create a crisis and
happen if the EU offers Turkey only the status of a ‘privileged partnership’? A crisis! When? In
harm EU common interests . The areas most likely to be affected by that crisis are the Balkan Peninsula, Greece and Cyprus. ¶ In parallel, if
Turkish accession to the EU upsets the existing balance of power within the EU system by putting
national interests at stake, especially those of the leading countries, then a crisis is likely to burst out.
This may occur in the event that Turkey serves US national interests more than those of the EU as well those of the
European traditional leading countries. The realization of this scenario is to be reinforced in the event that US and EU national interests or the
interests of some leading EU countries are in conflict. Such a scenario is fuelled by the argument that in the context of
globalisation, the EU and the US are not only allies but also competitors, and that the US uses Turkey
as another geo-strategic wedge in the soft European 'belly' of the Balkan Peninsula, thereby targeting
Europe in its southeastern wing (With regard to this, it should be remembered that the US already has allies elsewhere
in Europe: Great Britain in the north and the new EU member-states in Central and Eastern Europe). Such a possibility reinforces the
allegation that Turkey will become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of the US in the EU.¶ Taking into account the principles of
Realism, which are justified by the results of this research, one could note the following: If all the factors-variables mentioned above
come into play, either separately or accumulatively, and if the EU member states do not show positive
political intention by giving Turkey the green light to join the EU as a full member state, then the threat of a crisis will constitute a
continuous `Damocles sword' over the EU109. This is also a justification of the hypothesis of this project: 'if structural
changes occur in the component actors of the international system and result to redistribution of
power, then the international system or sub-systems may be led to decline or even to conflict' .
EU collapse causes global power war
Johnston 2014 Seth Johnston, PhD in international relations from Oxford, 11/6/14, “Breaking Up Is
Hard to Do”, http://www.usma.edu/scusa/siteassets/sitepages/round%20tables/scusa%2066%20%20europe.pdf
Consider the narrowly-defeated referendum on Scottish independence, the open question of future
British withdrawal from the European Union, anemic economic growth throughout the continent, untenable fiscal trends in the
derisively called PIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain), or the lingering crisis over the common currency
they share. Much distressing news has cast doubt on Europe’s internal efforts at political and
economic integration, especially the Euro common currency. Is a break-up of the Eurozone or even the European
Union itself possible? Would this be the ‘worst that could happen’?¶ Either scenario would have far-reaching
consequences, but an unravelling of the post-1945 institutions of European integration may not be the only,
or even the worst, potential crisis. Consider a longer view. For more than four hundred year following the age of exploration, Europe
played an outsized role in international affairs, and it remains one of the most prosperous and
influential regions today. The two world wars of the twentieth century hastened the end of Europe’s centuries long dominance, but they
also demonstrated two other significant historical lessons: first, the worst things for Europe can be bad
for the rest of the world too; second, too narrow a focus on troublesome news about the European
Union may obscure more basic risks to peace and stability in Europe. In the long run, Europe’s worst case
scenario includes not only break-up of the current institutions but resurgence of old patterns of
conflict.¶ I. Europe in Historical Perspective: What’s the Worst that has Already Happened?¶ The prospect of both EU collapse and a
return of conflict are linked ultimately to integration. In an age of Autobahns and high-speed rail, Europe’s physical
geography contains few obstacles to integration; its political geography, however, remains
fragmented . Most regions contain a vast country, hegemonic relative to smaller neighbors in one or more aspect
of material power (land area, population, economic or military strength, etc.): the United States in North America, Russia in North and Central Asia, China in East
Asia, Australia as a continent and country unto itself. Brazil’s reach is stopped by the great physical barriers of the Amazon and the Andes. The Sahara and absence
of navigable rivers present physical barriers to integration in Africa. But Europe
contains few such barriers. Navigation on
Europe’s rivers and across the relatively flat north European plain is reasonably easy . Modern
infrastructure such as the bridges through and tunnels under the English Channel, the Alps, and the
Pyrenees mitigate the obstacles that have historically frustrated movement. People and commerce
move freely, yet integration of European political life remains hard. There is no vast European megastate.¶ But this is not for lack of attempts to create one . Imperial Rome conquered much of the ancient world, but Germanic tribes
thwarted its expansion into northern Europe [1]. Charlemagne briefly united European lands under a single ruler in 800 CE, though his successors divided them just
decades later. The so-called Holy Roman Empire never achieved the unity or power that its name implied. In more modern times, the House of Habsburg battled to
establish continental dominance for three hundred years, but was frustrated successively by Ottoman Turks, social transformation in the Reformation and the
Enlightenment, the rise of nationalism in Hungary and other minority areas, and the unification of a rival German state [2]. In the meantime, Napoleon came closer
than anyone since Charlemagne to unifying Europe through conquest, but his successes were short-lived. Hitler’s bid for living space in a greater Germany of
continental scale was shorter still. All of these efforts to consolidate Europe ultimately failed. But the historical pattern of at - tempting European integration
through military force is longstanding. ¶ Failure
to achieve unity through conquest has made war common in
European affairs. The dominant pattern, at least since the creation of the European state system fol - lowing the Thirty Years War in 1648,
was of a constellation of European great powers rising and falling relative to one an - other in a
balance of power. Attempts by one to rise too far above the others often resulted in war and eventual reequilibration, on the continent if not also among
colonial possessions around the world. World Wars I and II (some - times lumped together as a ‘second’ Thirty Years War) wrought such
destruction in Europe that they represented a turning point: for the first time in centuries, European
powers declined relative to new global superpowers. ¶ After 1945, the United States and Soviet Union under - pinned a
postwar European order characterized not by a multipolar balance of power but a bipolar standoff in the Cold War. With security concerns largely dominated by this
external dynamic, the
Cold War freed countries in Western Europe to pursue peaceful internal cooperation in
liberal international institutions. Beginning with the consolidation of coal and steel industries in the 1950s, countries steadily
integrated their economic, political, and social life in to what has become the European Union, its twentyeight member countries now comprising more than five hundred million people, the largest economy in the world, and a historic record of peace and prosperity
that has lasted nearly seventy years [3].¶ Thus, for many, the
worst thing that could happen in Europe is a reversal of the
post-1945 pattern of integration in the European Union. European “disintegration” could undo all of
the positive progress. But there is a negative, more insidious risk that attempts at “integration” in Europe could be
worse if it means a return to the old fashioned method of violence and conquest.
UQ – Turkey Exec Power High
Turkish democracy is on the brink of collapse – Erdogan is expanding executive power
Tisdall 3/25 Simon Tisdall, foreign policy editor for the Guardian, 3/25/15, “Erdoğan plan for superpresidency puts Turkey's democracy at stake”,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/25/erdogan-plan-for-super-presidency-puts-turkeysdemocracy-at-stake
Erdoğan, the founding leader of the neo-Islamist Justice and Development party (AKP), has ruled Turkey in increasingly
authoritarian fashion since becoming prime minister in 2003. Barred under party rules from seeking a fourth term, he
switched to the presidency last August and has been manoeuvring to increase his executive powers
ever since.¶ The strategy looks similar to Vladimir Putin’s successive shifts from the Russian presidency to prime
ministership and back again, which have kept him in overall charge in Moscow since 2000. The now deposed Pervez Musharraf
pulled off a similar trick in Pakistan, bolstering his presidential authority at the expense of the prime minister and parliament.¶ Ever choleric, Erdoğan
appears oblivious to these precedents, and to his growing reputation for harsh crackdowns on popular
dissent, street protests and independent journalism. This week saw the jailing of two Penguen magazine cartoonists who dared to poke fun at him.¶ He is
counting instead on his high profile and personal popularity among religious-minded working-class and rural voters to give the AKP
a big majority in national elections due on 7 June. In theory, the necessary constitutional changes he wants could then be
pushed through.¶ It was a surprise, therefore, when the sharpest recent criticism of Erdoğan’s attempted power-grab emanated
from a senior colleague and fellow founding AKP member, the deputy prime minister Bülent Arinç. In an exceptionally blunt public outburst, he told
Erdoğan, in effect, to stop sticking his nose into the government’s Kurdish policy and mind his own business. ¶ “His statements like ‘I did not like that’ or ‘I’m not
happy about that’ are emotional and are his own views,” said Arinç, the official cabinet spokesman. “The [Kurdish] peace process is being carried out by the
government and the government is responsible.” ¶ Erdoğan
hit back with trademark grandiosity. “I consult with my people
on every issue. I am the president,” he said.¶ Arinç has since backed down under pressure from Ahmet Davutoğlu, whom Erdoğan appointed as
his successor as prime minister, but the exchange revealed deep unease within the AKP and the political
establishment over Erdoğan’s refusal to relinquish his role as Turkey’s leading man.¶ For Turkish voters
and the country’s EU and US partners, anxious for Ankara’s cooperation on Syria and jihadi terrorism, there is an increasing
question mark over who is in charge. “The exchange between Erdoğan and Arinç [concerns] the Kurdish issue only on the surface. Actually, it
was about the powers of the president and the government,” said Murat Yetkin, a commentator for the Turkish daily Hürriyet . ¶ “This seems to be a key issue for
those watching political and economic developments in Turkey both inside and outside the country. Whose
words should be taken into
account to understand what Turkey says: the president or the government? If the president and the government were
from different parties, this discrepancy could be understood, but they are of the same party,” Yetkin said.¶ Hopes that the Kurdish peace process would advance
after a broadly positive statement on 21 March by the jailed Kurdish leader, Abdullah Öcalan, have been dented by the spat. The damage caused by the power
struggle, however, is by no means confined to this issue.¶ There
have been public rows with Erdoğan over government economic policy, the
leadership of the National Intelligence Organisation and a draft anti-corruption law that Davutoğlu was forced to shelve after the president, who has faced
corruption allegations, spoke out against it.¶ “Erdoğan’s
priority is surely to get rid of any sort of discussion of
corruption, which stands as a ‘red line’ issue for the head of the nation, who was alleged, along with his family, to have unethical financial
relations with a number of wealthy businessmen,” the analyst Serkan Demirtas wrote in Hürriyet. ¶ The authority and credibility of Davutoğlu, a former academic
who owes his political career to Erdoğan, are increasingly challenged. He vowed to restore party discipline following the Arinç row, saying he had met Erdoğan and
there was no disagreement on Kurdish policy or anything else. Those who anticipated “government chaos” would be disappointed. “We will overcome all troubled
processes, as we have done in the past,” he said.¶ Opposition parties are having none of it. The government faces major internal divisions, according to Kemal
Kiliçdaroğlu, the leader of the secular Republican People’s party. “They have started blaming each other. This is what we will see more of in the upcoming period,”
he said. Davutoğlu, he claimed, was deaf to what was happening. ¶ That may not be entirely true. While Erdoğan
is doing what he does best –
addressing large public rallies around the country, castigating his foes and critics, and building personal
support ahead of the June polls – tensions with Davutoğlu look certain to worsen. They could reach crisis point over the
expansion of presidential powers, which the prime minister has not explicitly endorsed. Davutoğlu has spoken instead of the need to ensure the
new constitution is based on “democratic and pro-freedom” principles.
Even if Erdogan doesn’t have the votes to push a presidency, the Turkish government
is still in jeopardy
Hamid 6/24 Shadi Hamid, research fellow for the Brookings institute, 6/24/15, “Down, but not out:
The essential resilience of Erdoğan and the AKP”, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-fromchaos/posts/2015/06/24-resilience-erdogan-akp-hamid
It was a major, even “unprecedented” defeat for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Or that’s
how it seemed. But, looked at another way, the election results actually underlined just how successful the party
had become.¶ The AKP had seemingly alienated everyone but its own base. There were Erdoğan’s authoritarian ambitions.
There was a sputtering economy. On top of all of that, Turkey had grown isolated, suffering one foreign policy failure after another. Yet the AKP won 47
percent of the seats (and 41 percent of the vote), with the Republican People’s Party (CHP) finishing a distant second, with only 24 percent of the seats.
¶ If that’s what counts as an “unprecedented defeat,” then this was one very successful party. To put it in comparative perspective, the AKP, at its worst,
still won about 6 percent more seats than Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood or Tunisia’s Ennahda did at their
best.¶ Party hubris¶ Of course, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had originally hoped for 400 or at least 335
seats in parliament (out of 550), which would have allowed him to push for a presidential system and exert
more personal control over the long-term direction of Turkish politics. ¶ The hubris had gotten a bit out of hand. In parliamentary democracies,
it’s generally difficult to reach the magic number of 50 percent, yet here the AKP thought it could win 73 percent. (Because of
Turkey’s unusually high 10 percent electoral threshold, parties can win seats well beyond their popular vote share, but 73 percent is still exceedingly difficult).¶
When I met with AKP official and parliamentary candidate Mazhar Bagli in February, he brought out of a piece of paper and drew a picture for me. There was a small
circle and a big circle. This represented the past, where the small circle—the 20 percent of secularists—controlled the country at the expense of everyone else. He
then drew another pair of circles, one big and one small. In this “new Turkey,” the big circle, inside of which he scribbled “80 percent,” had finally gotten its due, and
secularists now had to accept reality. Another AKP figure I spoke to—also in his own right quite colorful—put the number of “secular idiot elites,” as he called them,
at 5 percent.¶ Perilous
presidentialism¶ Turkey (and ultimately the AKP as well) should count itself lucky. It avoided a political system—
very thing Turkish Islamists have repeatedly
benefited from—parliamentarism—was the one thing Erdoğan wanted to undo. One reason why Turkey has
managed to bounce back from successive coups is that ousted parties can generally reconstitute themselves more quickly in a parliamentary system. On the
other hand, where the president dominates and happens to be an Islamist (or a socialist in other contexts), conflicts become
even more personalized than they might otherwise be. The stakes are simply too high.¶ ¶ Early elections and noconfidence votes are regular features of parliamentary democracy. Presidents, on the other hand, are
generally difficult to impeach or otherwise get rid of, requiring voters to wait four years or longer to express their buyers’ remorse. In
presidentialism—distinctly unsuited for ideologically polarized societies. Ironically, the
Egypt, liberal and other anti-Islamist Egyptians weren’t interested in waiting for the democratic process to play out, opting instead for military intervention. As Juan
Linz wrote in his classic essay, The Perils of Presidentialism: ¶ An embattled president can use his powers in such a way that his opponents might not be willing to
wait until the end of his term to oust him, but there are no constitutional ways—save impeachment or resignation under pressure—to replace him. There are,
moreover, risks attached even to these entirely legal methods; the incumbent's supporters may feel cheated by them and rally behind him, thus exacerbating the
crisis. It is hard to imagine how the issue could be resolved purely by the political leaders, with no recourse or threat of recourse to the people or to nondemocratic
institutions like the courts or—in the worst case—the military.¶ Parliamentary systems, though, can have their drawbacks. So while political scientists might hail the
virtues of coalition governments and no-confidence votes, voters might not. To the extent that parliamentary systems produce fragmented coalitions between
parties that might not otherwise have much in common, they may be less “effective.” ¶ This
was basically Erdoğan’s argument—that
there were too many obstacles to getting things done and that he’d like to remove them, by
concentrating power in a powerful presidency with minimal check and balances. As Erdoğan put it: “I should be
the one determining who I work with, but can’t do this under the present system because there are
those, the judiciary for example, who prevent it. You can’t run a country, or a city in this way.”¶ In a parliamentary system, the proErdoğan columnist Resul Tosin wrote, there were irritating impediments like “votes of confidence” and “interference by opposition parties.” Tosun also
hypothesized that, with as much as the AKP had accomplished during 12 years of power, the achievements would have been “threefold” under a presidential
system.¶ Demonstrating that coalition governments are less stable and effective is what Erdoğan may now be hoping for. Some Turkish voters may already be
feeling buyer’s (or seller’s) remorse. One post-election poll suggested that the AKP would increase its vote share from 41 percent to 45 percent if snap elections
were held. As Mustafa Akyol writes, “some voters, apparently, decided
to ‘punish’ the AKP during the elections but are now
worried about the instability they may have caused.” Ironically, again, the AKP is banking on the inherent
flexibility of Turkey’s parliamentary system—something that they were, just a month earlier, hoping
to undo.
Erdogan will regain the majority – he’s using political tactics to break coalitions and
shift votes – means he’ll be able to force another election
Gurses and Tattersall 7/8 Ercan Gurses and Nick Tattersall, foreign correspondents for Reuters,
7/8/15, “Out of sight but not power, Erdogan eyes snap Turkish election”,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/us-turkey-politics-idUSKCN0PI1M320150708
Delays in efforts to form a coalition government in Turkey are buying time for President Tayyip Erdogan,
heightening the chances of a snap election which could see his AK Party regain its majority and leaving
the opposition floundering.¶ A month after an election which saw the AKP lose its ability to govern alone
for the first time, talks to form a coalition have yet to begin. Opposition parties are as fragmented as ever, and
Erdogan - from the shadows - is calculating how best to maintain his grip.¶ The June 7 vote plunged Turkey into political uncertainty
not seen since the unstable coalition governments of the 1990s and thwarted, for now, Erdogan's ambition to turn the largely figurehead presidency he assumed
last year into the powerful executive position he had all but taken for granted. ¶ The
man who has dominated Turkey's political
landscape for more than a decade is ill-disposed to sharing power. Despite his repeated calls for a new government to be
formed quickly, his interests - and those of the AKP he founded - appear to lie in the failure of coalition talks and a new
election.¶ "A coalition will be hard to form and impossible to maintain. There is need for an urgent snap election, through
which our people will show their will," said one AK Party elder familiar with Erdogan's thinking.¶ Their hope is that a re-run would restore a simple
AK majority, as voters who turned their back on the AKP in June balk at any suggestion of a return to the coalition
bickering that pitched Turkey into economic crisis in the 1990s.¶ That prospect is one that would disturb NATO partners eager
for stability in a country bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria, with Islamic State militants ensconced hundreds of meters from borders constantly criss-crossed by
refugees.¶ Erdogan is turning "banishment" to the shadows - under
the constitution, the president is excluded from party
politics - to his advantage. Others may bicker and snipe, but the man who had estranged many by his
raucous, combative manner in recent years, now holds his peace and appears untainted by the fray.¶
"The opposition is being worn down," said Hakan Bayrakci, chairman of polling firm SONAR. "Erdogan is promoting the image
that they are fighting against each other."
Turkey’s government has gone to shit – proves the thesis of the disad
Sinha 7/8 Shreeya Sinha, reporter for the New York Times covering foreign policy, 7/8/15, “Turkey's
Election Sends Message to Erdogan”,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/04/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-elections.html
Turkey’s parliamentary election last month served as a referendum on the tenure of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and his efforts to consolidate power in his presidency. Once praised by diplomats and analysts for his promise as a leader who could
combine Islam with democratic rule, he has spent more than a decade attempting to quiet political dissent and bolster his power. ¶ Here are some examples of how
Mr. Erdogan has tried to establish himself as Turkey’s paramount leader. ¶ He Pulled a Putin¶ After reducing the influence of the military in politics, Mr. Erdogan
essentially pulled a Putin, absorbing the powers and privileges he exercised for more than a decade as
prime minister into his presidency last August, when he became the country’s first directly elected
leader.¶ Like Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who swapped the presidency for the prime minister's seat before returning to the Kremlin four years later, Mr.
Erdogan is his nation’s top authority, no matter which position he holds.¶ He Aimed to Silence His
Political Rivals¶ A series of leaked telephone conversations posted on social media purported to reveal corruption by Mr. Erdogan and his inner circle. In
the most sensational recording, Mr. Erdogan, worried about an investigation by prosecutors into real estate deals that had already
ensnared the sons of government ministers, allegedly tells his son to get rid of tens of millions of dollars from his home.¶
He said the recording was a fake, and he blamed his former ally, Fethullah Gulen, an influential Muslim cleric who lives in exile in Pennsylvania, for
trying to bring down his government.¶ Mr. Erdogan used the conflict with his political rival to help him silence dissent
and consolidate power: He blocked access to YouTube and Twitter, stifled news media coverage and purged thousands of police officers, prosecutors
and judges who he believed were supporters of Mr. Gulen. ¶ He Demonized Social Media¶ Turkey has become one of the most
aggressive censors of the Internet. The government blocked social media channels during the corruption scandal,
and Mr. Erdogan has called Twitter “the worst menace to society.” ¶ At a political rally of his supporters in March 2014, he
dismissed the social platform as “Twitter, mwitter!” and said he did not care about the international criticism his decision invited. “Everyone will see how powerful
the state of the Republic of Turkey is,” Mr. Erdogan added. ¶ Despite his disdain for Twitter, Mr. Edogan’s
campaign used images taken
from social media to create the biggest campaign poster ever, according to the Guinness Book of Records.¶ He Criticized
the News Media¶ Mr. Erdogan has also tried to intimidate the news media. He recently accused Can Dundar,
the chief editor of Cumhuriyet, a Turkish daily, of "espionage" after the newspaper published images of what it
said were Turkish trucks sending weapons to Syrian rebels. He is seeking an aggravated life sentence for him.¶ He filed a
criminal complaint against editors of the Hurriyet Daily News over a headline he disputed. And after a New York Times article last
September about Turks recruited by the Islamic State, newspapers allied with the president accused the reporter, Ceylan Yeginsu, of being a foreign agent and
traitor.¶ He
Stifled Dissent¶ In 2013, a police crackdown using tear gas and water cannons on peaceful
protesters challenging plans to replace Istanbul’s Gezi Park in Taksim Square with a replica Ottoman-era army barracks that would house a shopping mall,
became a catalyst for a broader outburst of civil unrest. During weeks of demonstrations, largely seen as a rebuke of what many
considered the authoritarian style of Mr. Erdogan, protesters, lawyers, journalist and medics were detained.
Link—Turkey Modeling
Turkey is looking to model US executive power – the aff’s model stabilizes the regime
Aygun 7/3 Eyup Aygun, professor for Institute of Social Sciences, Fatih University, Turkey, originally
published in 2014, last modified 7/3/15, “Presidentialism: Is It a Better Option for Turkey?”,
http://ejeps.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/181.pdf
In both academic and political circles, there is an ongoing debate on whether the parliamentary (PMS
henceforth) or the presidential system (PS henceforth) is able to sustain a more stable democratic
regime. While some argue that the PS entails great risks for democracy because of its some major defects (Riggs 1992; Linz 1994; Özbudun 1996; Uran 2010;
Kalaycıoğlu 2005), others oppose this idea (Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Fendoğlu 2012). The issue is also often
brought up in Turkish public whenever there is a political crisis or during the election period of the
president. In fact, it has been an issue of discussion in Turkey in the last three decades . Turgut Özal is known as the
first political figure that instigated the discussion in the late 1980s. Despite losing its intensity from time to time since then, it has always been a
controversial political debate in Turkey. After Özal’s death, his successor Demirel campaigned for presidentialism although he had harshly
criticized Özal over his efforts for adopting PS in Turkey (Yazıcı 2002). Since 2002 AKP (Justice and Development Party) governments have
been able remain in power without losing majority in the parliament, which is an exceptional political
phenomenon in modern Turkish political history. The demands for presidentialism in Turkey should
reasonably be expected to have diminished as a result of AKP’s has success in maintaining
governmental stability for over a decade since its enthusiasts often put forward the necessity of PS for more stable and effective
governments complaining about ineffective and short-lived coalitions. However, AKP administration has repeatedly expressed their
aspiration for a transition to parliamentarism in Turkey since the early days of their start of ruling. PM
Erdoğan, Cemil Çiçek, Burhan Kuzu and some top AKP politicians continued the debate about the PS (Öder 2005, 31). Although there are
several forms of PSs around the world, supporters of parliamentarism in Turkey primarily refer to the PS in the USA
as a model when they discuss the issue. The latest proposal about adopting parliamentarism which was submitted to the committee of constitution
amendments of Turkish parliament has many features in common with the American model.1¶ The debate over the PS in Turkish political
and academic circles revolves around the compatibility of PS to Turkey’s realities and its benefits and
drawbacks. The main argument of the proponents of the PS in Turkey is that the PMS does not meet the requirements of Turkey as a developing country due
to some of its deficiencies such as its tendency to produce short-lived coalitions, dependence of legislative power to the executive power, and its ineffectiveness in
Turkey needs to adopt either the PS or
the semi-PS in order to have a more stable and effective administration since Turkey needs to
checks and balances. Özal, Demirel, and Erdoğan, prominent political figures of Turkey, argued that
overcome a great deal of social, economic, and political problems in order to become a regional and a
global actor (Uran 2010).
The plan is modeled by Turkey---sends a signal against executive war power authority
Damrosch 1995 Lori Damrosch, Professor of Law, Columbia University “WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: A
SYMPOSIUM ON CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE AUTHORITY TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES:
Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common Core of Accountability in Democratic Societies?” 50
U. Miami L. Rev. 181 Lexis
My first opportunity to read John Hart Ely's ideas
on war powers came in 1988, when he published the antecedent of one chapter of War and
Responsibility as an article in the Columbia Law Review titled Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked. 1 The punctuation - without a question
mark - makes an important point: The verb "suppose" invites us not to speculate about a counterfactual hypothetical, but rather to assume that Congress must
want its own creation to work. Professor Ely's project was to show Congress how to fix it. But it was already evident in 1988, and had been for some time,
that Congress
did not want a War Powers Act that really worked. Indeed, the dominant legislative proposal at
that time, known as the Nunn-Byrd-Warner bill, 2 would have improved the fit between congressional prescription and
executive behavior by relaxing the strictures of the War Powers Resolution. 3 Current proposals would
improve that fit more forthrightly, simply by repealing the Resolution. 4 It was also evident then that Congress didn't - and
apparently still doesn't - want to discharge the responsibilities concerning war and peace conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Hence in War and
Responsibility, as in [*182] his earlier article, Professor Ely
devotes considerable thought to the notion of forcing (or at least
inducing) Congress to live up to its constitutional responsibilities. 5 Many of us regret that Professor Ely's ideas have not been taken
more seriously by the most important audience for which they were intended, namely the U.S. Congress. Congress, however, is not the only
audience that needs to hear his message. The message of War and Responsibility should be the topic of
conferences not only in Miami or Washington, but also in Buenos Aires, Lima, Quito, Tokyo, Bonn/Berlin,
Rome, Ankara, Pretoria, and maybe even Minsk or Moscow. Taking the message of War and Responsibility to foreign
audiences would link Professor Ely's ideas to an equally ambitious project (of which our colleague Professor Louis Henkin is a leading exponent) - the
spreading of the best of American constitutionalism to foreign lands. Indeed, just about the time that Professor Ely was publishing his
article in the Columbia Law Review, an intellectual event celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution was also taking place at Columbia Law School. There, under
Professor Henkin's direction, scholars from around the world were exploring the Constitution's influence abroad. 6 That investigation did not extend to the
Constitution's war powers clauses, but it is my project to take the inquiry in that direction. There is reason to explore the possibility that the
American
experiment of constitutional control over war power, even while remaining controversial in concept and implementation with
respect to contemporary U.S. military involvements, has generated trends outside the United States toward subordinating
executive warmaking to constitutional control. In places where this American constitutional idea did fall on fertile soil, significant advances
have been made toward constraining the initiation of military conflict. The argument I propose to make - and I would like to
enlist Professor Ely in the effort both to make it and to strengthen the empirical basis for it - is that around the world, in constitutional
democracies everywhere, we see a borrowing of what was an American innovation in 1787. That idea
is the Madisonian one (elaborated upon as well by other eighteenth-century thinkers and leaders) of committing the most solemn national decision, the decision to
go to war, not to one person or even one body of persons, but rather to the shared judgment of two branches, with the Legislative branch having the ultimate
say. [*183] All constitutional democracies have had to grapple with the fundamental problem of determining when national military power should be committed to
situations of actual or potential conflict. To date, however, legal
scholarship on war powers - Professor Ely's and everyone else's - has
addressed only single national systems. The present symposium is no exception, for the only mention of other countries' legal systems has
come in Professor Bernard Oxman's comments addressed to the problem of fashioning a United Nations security system that can function efficiently (and in that
context, parliamentary involvement was portrayed as a potential impediment to collective decisionmaking). 7 What is lacking is a crossnational, crossdisciplinary
analysis of war-and-peace decisionmaking as a challenge to democratic theory and constitutionalism. A
comparative understanding of
constitutionalism and war powers can show that for all their many differences, constitutional
democracies do share certain basic commitments that distinguish them from other forms of
government and notably affect theirdecision-making processes in the military sphere. As more and more polities undergo democratic transformation, the
identification and consolidation of a common core of democratic accountability in the war-and-peace
sphere will take on ever-increasing significance.
Internal Link—Yes Accession
The current model of the Turkish government is preventing accession to the EU –
modeling means Turkey will get added
Duff 2014 Andrew Duff, European policy expert, former member of EU parliament, 12/16/15,
“Turkey’s EU accession negotiations should now be suspended”,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/turkeys-eu-accession-negotiations-should-now-besuspended-310855
Tuesday’s (16 December) meeting of the General Affairs Council is going to have to take a fresh look at the
EU’s deteriorating relationship with Turkey. It is at any case this time of year that the Council re-assesses the enlargement policy of the
Union. The Council’s deliberations bear upon what are dubbed, somewhat euphemistically, ‘Progress Reports’ from the Commission which is responsible for
conducting accession negotiations on behalf of the member states. The current assessment will be the first since Jean-Claude Juncker, the new Commission
President, declared that there will be no new state joining the EU during his five year mandate. In truth, there
are very few candidates.
Norway is too rich too join and Iceland has taken fright. The seven countries of the Western Balkans have a long way
– some a very long way to travel in terms of achieving essential qualities of statehood let alone the necessary capacity to pool their
sovereignty and integrate their economies within the EU. (We need not go here to Moldova or the Ukraine.)¶ Only Turkey remains. After having
been granted accession country status in 2005, only one of the 33 chapters (R&D) has both been opened
and closed. Progress on the other chapters has been imperceptible despite the dogged optimism of Stefan Fule, enlargement
Commissioner under President Barroso. At a technical level the continuing exercise is worthwhile in aligning officialdom and in helping companies do business in
each other’s markets. Some
‘pre-accession’ EU money has been usefully deployed in infrastructure projects and in
helping civil society in Turkey to advance. The largest delegation of the External Accession Service sits in Ankara, waiting the day when both parties in the
relationship will decide that they really want to live together.¶ This
Turkey will not join this European Union¶ But that day is not
foreseeable. Even at a technical level, Turkey does not apply all the rules of its customs union with the EU (notably on public
procurement), and there is next to no chance that Turkey will be included in the TTIP negotiations. Liberalisation of
visas and implementation of the readmission agreement for irregular migrants remain agonisingly slow. Obdurate Turkey refuses to recognise the Republic of
Cyprus. Many
of the accession chapters are blocked because one or other EU state opposes Turkish
membership on grounds which are highly political and sometimes prejudicial. Only one country, the United Kingdom,
still makes friendly noises about Turkey’s eventual membership – but that very same country is itself thinking of leaving the EU. In any case, British support for
Turkey provokes real suspicion in other capitals that its true motive in widening the Union to include Turkey is to weaken European integration.¶ The
real
problem, however, rests with Turkey itself. In the early years, the Kemalists who ran Turkey wanted to join the EU as an insurance policy
against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and as an economic adjunct of NATO to which military alliance the Turks are still at least formally committed, as well as a
way of wreaking revenge on Greece for its historic insults. When the Islamists took over in 2002, the EU was seen as an important guarantor of the human rights
whose abuse at the hands of the Kemalists had caused many Islamic brethren, including Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to be imprisoned. The
prospect of EU
accession also played well with the rapidly expanding industrial middle class of Anatolia, who supported
the AKP, the new ruling party, in very large numbers.¶ Gradually AKP’s commitment to Europe has declined. After
years of tinkering with the Turkish constitution there have been minor improvements but not the radical
overhaul it needs to meet EU norms. Torture is proscribed, but the administration of justice remains slow, poor and unfair.¶ A number
of AKP high-ups, notably Ahmet Davutoglu, now prime minister, has never been willing to sacrifice Turkish sovereignty in
order to join the Western liberal community which if not Christian is godless. Davutoglu’s goal is for Turkey to lead a neo-Ottoman revival
across the Middle East and North Africa. AKP founder and former President Abdullah Gul performs well on the Chatham House circuit that still treats
Turkey as if it were a natural ally of the West. But the old school of smooth talking Turkish diplomats is
now dying out, and Gul himself a staunch AKP militant – finds himself more at home in Arabia than Europe.¶ Erdogan flays his enemies¶
Erdogan himself knows very little about the EU. On his rare visits to Brussels he tends to shout loudly and act prickly. At home, he
flays first one supposed enemy then another. The armed forces, the bankers, the students, gay rights
activists, the Americans – not forgetting the Europeans have all been traduced. Then he turned ferociously against his former ally Fethullah Gulen
when the Imam had the temerity to criticise the AKP government, quite justifiably, for large-scale corruption.¶ Since Sunday many journalists who align
themselves with Hizmet, the Gulenist movement, are under arrest for a range of exotic charges. Gulen himself is an enigmatic character,
with a long history of religious activism. Now in self-imposed exile, implausibly in Pennsylvania, he oversees a vast network of high-minded Islamic schools and
charities in Turkey and elsewhere. Whatever Gulen is, he and his followers do not seem to me to have the makings of terrorists or plotters of acoup d’état, as
Erdogan claims.¶ In
power now for too long, Erdogan is corrupted. Not only has he lost the once-beguiling charm of the moderniser, but
he has adopted the mantle of the ultra-nationalists. He speaks of Turkish North Cyprus in the same tones as Putin speaks of Crimea,
sacred duty and all. His earlier efforts to recognise the Kurdish problem, including his careful talks with the rebellious Kurds, have soured with his refusal to help the
Kurds against the Sunni fundamentalists in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, some in Western intelligence suspect Erdogan gives tacit support for ISIS. It is clear at the very
least that EU/NATO
is not successful in aligning Turkish foreign and security policy with that of the West.¶
Erdogan knows how to be elected democratically but not to govern so. The opposition parties are
insulted. Religious and cultural minorities, notably the Alevis, are discriminated against. The liberal media, NGOs and universities are assailed. The reform of
mainstream state education is neglected in favour of Islamic hatipschools. Secular liberal Turkey is challenged by the rise of
conservative Islamic family policy. In short, Turkey is becoming less and less European.
Turkey wants to join the EU – the accession process is accelerating but further reform
in Turkey is key
Reuters 2014 Reuters, news agency, 9/18/14, “Turkey announces EU accession strategy”,
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/turkey-announces-eu-accession-strategy-308560
Turkey said today (18 September) that crises
in the Middle East and elsewhere made closer co-operation between
Ankara and the European Union essential and announced a new programme to revive the country's
stalled drive for EU membership.¶ A document released by the EU Affairs Ministry described the accession
process as "the most important modernisation project after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey".¶ The document
highlights a substantial shift in tone on the part of the Turkish authorities, who have reacted angrily to
criticisms from European officials since last year over their handling of anti-government protests and a
widespread corruption scandal which has swirled around Erdogan's inner circle. ¶ Despite tensions, relations between Ankara and its
European partners have apparently been cemented in recent months over efforts to tackle the flow of
so-called "foreign fighters" heading to and from Europe to join militant groups such as Islamic State in neighbouring Syria and Iraq. ¶ "The
recent dramatic changes, from Syria to Ukraine and Middle East to North Africa, require Turkey and the
EU to act jointly against the global and regional threats," the 12-page document laying out Turkey's strategy, stated.¶ The
programme is due to come into operation in November and will focus on "Political Reform Process,
Socio-Economic Transformation in the Accession Process and EU Communication Strategy," the document
said.¶ The strategy targets a change of the constitution, better implementation of existing laws, as well as
a drive to drum up public support for the EU, and will be part of the government's so-called "action
plan", due to run until 2019.¶ Turkey has struggled to fall into line with the EU on issues including human rights
and rule of law. Countries like France and Germany remain concerned about the accession of the 74 million Muslim
majority nation.¶ Others, including Britain and Sweden, are vocal supporters of Turkey's eventual membership, although European officials remain
wary of predicting any dramatic progress, after a period of stagnation and worsening relations between
Turkish leder Tayyip Erdogan and his counterparts.
Impact—Turkey Accession Bad
Turkish accession creates multiple scenarios for European crisis and EU disintegration
and conflict
Charalambides 2009 Ioannis Charalambou Charalambides, researcher for Middlesex University, April
2009, “Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the European Union, the structural changes and EU
cohesion”, http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/2696/1/Charalambides__Evaluation_of_the_Turkish_accession_to__the_EU..pdf
Bearing in mind everything mentioned above, Ι focus on the worst case scenario which is the based on the combination of two hypotheses. The first is that
Turkey will meet its obligations and will fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The second is that the EU, guided by the
interests of its member states, will say ‘no’ to full Turkish membership. Under such circumstances we must
examine the political stance of the US, a stance defined by American national interests. A possible 'no' to the Turkish full
membership would be motivated by the national interests of a) a strong member state, b) a club of strong member
states, c) a club of strong member states and other states . It would be difficult -although not impossible- for a small member state to stop full
Turkish membership by veto or through a referendum, because the political cost would be too high,
unless it has the backing in the context of secret coalitions, of strong member states or of a combination of leading and medium or
even small European countries.108¶ If a negative decision on Turkey's full-membership is taken unanimously or by
the majority of the member states then a minimum code of national interests will be met. That is, the European
‘no’ would stem from common EU interests. However, if this decision results from the serving of the national interests of a
leading country alone or of a block of leading countries and others, then it is likely that an internal EU
crisis would occur, especially if the US, as a super power and an important external EU actor, fully supports the Turkish accession as full member state .
The crisis may develop in the following manner:¶ 1) Between the EU on the one hand and the US and
Turkey on the other.¶ 2) Between the member- states who will impose their decision on the EU -or form
a majority- on the one hand and the US and Turkey on the other.¶ 3) Among the member- states of the
EU. In this case, we will have an internal crisis within the EU, due to conflicting national interests resulting
from disagreement on Turkey's status in the EU; for instance, whether Turkey is to join the EU as full member state or in the form of a
‘privileged partnership’, or whether it is to be completely left out. ¶ The US and NATO play a significant role in the European
affairs. It has already been explained that the EU is a subsystem of the global international system. The data we gathered from
Chapters 4 and 5 shows that it is believed that the US influences EU decisions and especially those concerning the
Turkish accession to the EU (see Chapter 5.2 and Questions 8, 9, 10 of the Questionnaire). Such influence is a matter of serving
national interests. However, if the American intervention in European affairs is not in line with common
European interests or with those of the leading countries, then there will be a conflict of interests. Such a conflict of
interests is part of the ‘power game’. If US interests are in line with common European interests and with those of the leading countries, then
all sides will have the most possible benefit and the least possible cost. Thus, there is no need for any kind of conflict. Regarding this point, we should also
take into consideration the worst case scenario. What will happen if the EU offers Turkey only the status of a ‘privileged partnership’? A
crisis! When? In the event that the EU does not offer Turkey ‘full membership’, the US may seize the
opportunity as a pretext in order to create a crisis and harm EU common interests. The areas most likely to be
affected by that crisis are the Balkan Peninsula, Greece and Cyprus. ¶ In parallel, if Turkish accession to the EU upsets the existing
balance of power within the EU system by putting national interests at stake, especially those of the
leading countries, then a crisis is likely to burst out. This may occur in the event that Turkey serves US
national interests more than those of the EU as well those of the European traditional leading countries. The realization of this scenario is to be reinforced
in the event that US and EU national interests or the interests of some leading EU countries are in conflict. Such a
scenario is fuelled by the argument that in the context of globalisation, the EU and the US are not only allies but also
competitors, and that the US uses Turkey as another geo-strategic wedge in the soft European 'belly' of
the Balkan Peninsula, thereby targeting Europe in its southeastern wing (With regard to this, it should be remembered
that the US already has allies elsewhere in Europe: Great Britain in the north and the new EU member-states in Central and Eastern
Europe). Such a possibility reinforces the allegation that Turkey will become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of the US in
the EU.¶ Taking into account the principles of Realism, which are justified by the results of this research, one could note the following: If all the factorsvariables mentioned above come into play, either separately or accumulatively, and if the EU member
states do not show positive political intention by giving Turkey the green light to join the EU as a full member state, then the threat
of a crisis will constitute a continuous `Damocles sword' over the EU109. This is also a justification of the hypothesis of
this project: 'if structural changes occur in the component actors of the international system and result to
redistribution of power, then the international system or sub-systems may be led to decline or even to
conflict'.
Impact—EU War Ext.
EU war goes nuclear
Glaser 1993 Charles Glaser, Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies, Summer 1993, "Why NATO is
Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe",
http://iscs.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/iscs.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/cgdocs/NATO-Best-IS-1993.pdf
From an American perspective,
a basic question is whether the United States still has security interests in Europe.
The end of the Cold War is fueling calls for American withdrawal from Europe, adding arguments to the already
extensive debate over American grand strategy.2 Isolationists believe, now more than ever, that whatever dangers
might threaten Europe will not threaten the United States.3 During the Cold War, the most serious challenge to the traditional
case for American involvement flowed from the nuclear revolution, which undermined geopolitical arguments for opposing a European hegemon. Isolationists now
add that we can be confident that Western Europe will be free from military conflict, because the passing of the Soviet Union has eliminated the only serious
external threat, and relations within the West are so good that military conflict is virtually unimaginable. ¶ However, although
the lack of an
imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely
separated from the future of Western Europe . The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has
not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a
smaller conflict in the East .4 And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security,
a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could
be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate
to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American
homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe's future.5
AT: Greece
No impact to Greece leaving the EU – if anything it strengthens all parties
Hartmann 7/7 Margaret Hartmann, reporter for New York magazine citing currency and economics
experts, 7/7/15, “What Happens If Greece Exits the Eurozone?”,
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/what-happens-if-greece-exits-the-eurozone.html
Following Greek voters' overwhelming rejection on Sunday of a bailout deal offered by its creditors, the
long-feared possibility that Greece will exit the eurozone seems more likely than ever. With Greek
banks closed and the nation facing several high-stakes deadlines over the coming weeks, European leaders are now
scrambling to reach an agreement that will allow Greece to continue using the euro. The so-called "Grexit" is often
referred to as a doomsday scenario, but there's actually little consensus on what it would entail. And while some experts say abandoning the
euro would be catastrophic for Greece and cause serious problems for the entire European Union, some
argue that it's actually the smartest way to solve the Greek debt crisis once and for all.¶ Most agree that in the
short-term, going off the euro would lead to more hardships for the Greek people. Dr. Holger Schmieding, chief
economist at Berenberg Bank in London and former adviser to the International Monetary Fund, told Australia's ABC News that transitioning back to the drachma
(or a currency with a new name) would likely entail "months of confusion, hectic negotiations," as there's
no legal road map for how the exit
would work. He continued:
¶ Then the currency that comes into existence under these circumstances — while Greece
is in deep recession, while capital is flowing out of the country, while the government has lost a lot of economic credibility — a currency that comes into existence
under these circumstances would
likely be extremely weak, have high inflation, and that would mean that prices
for oil, food would be very expensive.¶ Last week, Standard & Poor's said the Grexit would cause "severe"
consequences for Greece's economy. The credit ratings agency predicted that soon after exiting the
eurozone, the country's real GDP would drop 25 percent, and in four years it would still be 20 percent lower than it would have
been. It also said unemployment, which is already above 25 percent, would increase past 29 percent and only come down
gradually. Others predict Greeks would see a 40 percent drop in their purchasing power, Greek
businesses that borrowed in foreign markets could go bankrupt, and imports may need to be rationed. Plus,
such tremendous economic problems could spark political upheaval.
¶ However, many believe that in the long-term, reintroducing the
drachma will allow Greece to reinvigorate its economy. Economist Joseph Gagnon of the Peterson Institute for International
Economics in Washington wrote this week that while the Greek government is facing massive challenges, if it plays its cards right, "the Greek economy
could begin to grow within six months and accelerate strongly over the next two or three years."
¶ Writing in
Forbes, University of Georgia economics professor Jeffrey Dorfman argued that Greece and the rest of the E.U. could negotiate a "Grexit" that's a win for both
sides:¶ The idea here is simple. Greece
leaves the eurozone (a Grexit) and returns to the drachma. Greece declares one drachma
is worth one euro. They then print about $300 billion worth of drachmas (it would really just be electronic money for the
most part, so the mechanics are simple). They use about $260 billion to pay off the ECB and IMF, redeeming all their
bailout funds and technically avoiding a default as long as the ECB and IMF play along. Greece then uses the remaining
$40 billion or so to recapitalize its banks so they can reopen and depositors can withdraw their funds freely. Greece’s remaining debt load is
manageable with their current fiscal policy, so no major tax increases or austerity should be needed.¶ Dorfman added that to avoid
inflation, the ECB and IMF just need to leave the drachmas in their vaults. "Then the money supply is only increased slightly and
there will likely be only a moderate devaluation of the drachma, leading to 'acceptable' inflation
considering the alternatives." Dennis J. Snower, president of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, described a different scenario but agreed that
returning to the drachma could mean a "new beginning" for every nation that uses the euro:
¶ Under this
program, creditor countries would write off Greece’s debts, on the condition that the country left the
eurozone voluntarily. This would give Greece the opportunity to start afresh from outside the monetary union: it could restructure its
economy without outside interference, and could be ready to re-enter the eurozone at a later point
under new conditions – this time without false statistical pretenses or unrealistic expectations.¶ Such an option would allow the
Greek government to make a new start in stimulating competition, fighting corruption, and otherwise
building a basis for long-term growth. This would not be easy, but it would no longer be a process that Greece finds humiliating and creditor
countries find exasperating.¶ As for the rest of the eurozone, "Its member states would accept that monetary union is
impossible without fiscal and structural coordination." Michael G. Jacobides, a professor at the London Business School, counters in
Harvard Business Review that Greece needs to cling to the E.U. to prevent further catastrophe: ¶ The bottom line is that away from the EU, Greece will slip ever
further into an economic abyss, characterized by rising income inequality and poverty. This is where most economists, who consider the upsides (for Greece) of a
Grexit, have it wrong. The country’s failings are structural, not just fiscal. Default and Grexit will only aggravate those structural failings, not only immediately, but
also in the medium-term. And having a failed state in such a pivotal geographic location as Greece’s poses significant geopolitical risks. ¶ At one point there
were fears that a Grexit would send shockwaves through the world's financial markets, but over the past
few years the E.U. has taken steps to lower the contagion risk. Ironically, some are arguing that the E.U. should be most worried
about Greece succeeding on the drachma. On Monday a New York Times editorial said " European leaders have made the crisis worse by
their mismanagement," and now it's their responsibility to find a way to keep eurozone together — if
not for Greece, for their own sake:
Chad Presence Good
K2 Terror
US influence in Chad is key to counterterror and drone usage
Turse 2014 Nick Turse, fellow at The Nation Institute, 11/20/14, “Why Is the US Military So Interested
in Chad?”, http://www.thenation.com/article/why-us-military-so-interested-chad/
That the
US military is expanding its efforts in Africa shouldn’t be a shock anymore. For years now, the Pentagon has been
increasing its missions there and promoting a mini-basing boom that has left it with a growing collection
of outposts sprouting across the northern tier of the continent. This string of camps is meant to do what
more than a decade of counterterrorism efforts, including the training and equipping of local military forces and a variety of
humanitarian hearts-and-minds missions, has failed to accomplish: transform the Trans-Sahara region in the northern and
western parts of the continent into a bulwark of stability.¶ That the United States is doing more in Chad specifically isn’t particularly astonishing
either. Earlier this year, TomDispatch and The Washington Post both reported on separate recent deployments of US troops to that north-central African nation.
Nor is it shocking that the new American compound is to be located near the capital, N’Djamena. T he
United States has previously employed
N’Djamena as a hub for its air operations. What’s striking is the terminology used in the official
documents. After years of adamant claims that the US military has just one lonely base in all of Africa—Camp Lemonnier in the tiny Horn of Africa nation of
Djibouti—Army documents state that it will now have “base camp facilities” in Chad .¶ US Africa Command (AFRICOM)
still insists that there is no Chadian base, that the camp serves only as temporary lodgings to support a Special Operations training exercise to be held next year. It
also refused to comment about another troop deployment to Chad uncovered by TomDispatch. When it comes to American military activities in Africa, much
remains murky.¶ Nonetheless, one fact is crystal clear: the
United States is ever more tied to Chad. This remains true
despite a decade-long effort to train its military forces only to see them bolt from one mission in the
face of casualties, leave another in a huff after gunning down unarmed civilians, and engage in human
rights abuses at home with utter impunity. All of this suggests yet another potential source of blowback from America’s efforts in Africa
which have backfired, gone bust, and sown strife from Libya to South Sudan, the Gulf Guinea to Mali and beyond. ¶ A Checkered History With Chad¶ Following
9/11, the United States launched a counterterrorism program, known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative, to bolster the militaries of
Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Chad. Three years later, in 2005, the program expanded to include Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and was renamed
the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The idea was to turn a huge swath of Africa into a terror-resistant bulwark of
stability. Twelve years and hundreds of millions of dollars later, the region is anything but stable, which means that it fits
perfectly, like a missing puzzle piece, with the rest of the under-the-radar US “pivot” to that continent.¶
Coups by the US-backed militaries of Mauritania in 2005 and again in 2008, Niger in 2010 and Mali in 2012, as well as a 2011 revolution
that overthrew Tunisia’s US-backed government (after the US-supported army stood aside); the establishment of Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2006; and the rise of Boko Haram from an obscure radical sect to a raging insurgent movement in northern
Nigeria are only some of the most notable recent failures in TSCTP nations. Chad came close to making the
list, too, but attempted military coups in 2006 and 2013 were thwarted, and in 2008, the government, which had itself
come to power in a 1990 coup, managed to hold off against a rebel assault on the capital. ¶ Through it all, the United States has continued to
mentor Chad’s military, and in return, that nation has lent its muscle to support Washington’s interests
in the region. Chad, for instance, joined the 2013 US-backed French military intervention to retake Mali after Islamists began routing the forces of the
American-trained officer who had launched a coup that overthrew that country’s democratically elected government. According to military briefing slides obtained
by TomDispatch, an
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) liaison team was deployed to Chad to
aid operations in Mali and the United States also conducted pre-deployment training for its Chadian
proxies. After initial success, the French effort became bogged down and has now become a seemingly interminable, smoldering counterinsurgency campaign.
Chad, for its part, quickly withdrew its forces from the fight after sustaining modest casualties. “ Chad’s army has no ability to face the kind
of guerrilla fighting that is emerging in northern Mali. Our soldiers are going to return to Chad,” said that country’s president, Idriss Deby.¶ Still,
US support continued.¶ In September of 2013, the US military organized meetings with Chad’s seniormost military leaders, including Army chief General Brahim Seid Mahamat, Minister of Defense General Bénaïndo Tatola and counterterror tsar
Brigadier General Abderaman Youssouf Merry, to build solid relationships and support efforts at “countering violent
extremist operations objectives and theater security cooperation programs.” This comes from a separate set of
documents concerning “IO,” or Information Operations, obtained from the military through the Freedom of Information Act. French officials also attended these
meetings, and the agenda included the former colonial power’s support of “security cooperation with Chad in the areas of basic and officer training and staff
procedures,” as well as “French support [for] US security cooperation efforts with the Chadian military.” Official
briefing slides also mention
ongoing “train and equip” activities with Chadian troops.¶ All of this followed on the heels of a murky coup plot by elements of the
armed forces last May to which the Chadian military reacted with a crescendo of violence. According to a State Department report, Chad’s “security forces shot and
killed unarmed civilians and arrested and detained members of parliament, military officers, former rebels, and others.” ¶ After Chad reportedly helped overthrow
the Central African Republic’s president in early 2013 and later aided in the 2014 ouster of the rebel leader who deposed him, it sent its forces into that civil war–
torn land as part of an African Union mission bolstered by US-backed French troops. Soon, Chad’s peacekeeping forces were accused of stoking sectarian strife by
supporting Muslim militias against Christian fighters. Then, on March 29, a Chadian military convoy arrived in a crowded marketplace in the capital, Bangui. There,
according to a United Nations report, the troops “reportedly opened fire on the population without any provocation. At the time, the market was full of people,
including many girls and women buying and selling produce. As panic-stricken people fled in all directions, the soldiers allegedly continued firing indiscriminately.” ¶
In all, thirty civilians were reportedly killed and more than 300 were wounded. Amid criticism, Chad angrily announced it was withdrawing its troops. “Despite the
sacrifices we have made, Chad and Chadians have been targeted in a gratuitous and malicious campaign that blamed them for all the suffering” in the Central
African Republic, declared Chad’s foreign ministry. ¶ In May, despite this, the
United States sent eighty military personnel to Chad to
operate drones and conduct surveillance in an effort to locate hundreds of schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram in
neighboring Nigeria. “These personnel will support the operation of intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance aircraft for missions over northern Nigeria and the surrounding area,” President Obama told
Congress. The force, he said, will remain in Chad “until its support in resolving the kidnapping situation is no longer required.”¶ In July, AFRICOM admitted that it
had reduced surveillance flights searching for the girls to focus on other missions. Now AFRICOM tells TomDispatch that, while “ the
United States
continues to help Nigeria address the threat posed by Boko Haram, the previously announced ISR support deployment to
Chad has departed.” Yet more than seven months after their abduction, the girls still have not been located, let alone rescued. ¶ In June, according to the State
Department, the
deputy commander of US Army Africa (USARAF), Brigadier General Kenneth H. Moore Jr., visited Chad to “celebrat[e]
the successful conclusion of a partnership between USARAF and the Chadian Armed Forces.” Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus arrived in that landlocked country at
the same time to meet with “top Chadian officials.” His visit, according to an embassy press release, “ underscore[d] the
importance of
bilateral relations between the two countries, as well as military cooperation.” And that cooperation has been
ample.¶ Earlier this year, Chadian troops joined those of the United States, Burkina Faso, Canada, France, Mauritania, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Senegal, the United
Kingdom and host nation Niger for three weeks of military drills as part of Flintlock 2014, an annual Special Ops counterterrorism exercise for TSCTP nations. At
about the time Flintlock was concluding, soldiers from Chad, Cameroon, Burundi, Gabon, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, the Netherlands and the United States took
part in another annual training exercise, Central Accord 2014. The Army also sent medical personnel to mentor Chadian counterparts in “tactical combat casualty
care,” while Marines and Navy personnel traveled to Chad to train that country’s militarized anti-poaching park rangers in small-unit tactics and patrolling.¶ A
separate contingent of Marines conducted military intelligence training with Chadian officers and non-commissioned officers. The scenario for the final exercise,
also involving personnel from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal and Tunisia, had a ripped-from-the-headlines quality: “preparing for an unconventional
war against an insurgent threat in Mali.Ӧ As for US Army Africa, it sent trainers as part of a separate effort to provide Chadian troops with instruction on patrolling
and fixed-site defense as well as live-fire training. “We are ready to begin training in Chad for about 1,300 soldiers—an 850 man battalion, plus another 450 man
battalion,” said Colonel John Ruffing, the Security Cooperation director of US Army Africa, noting that the United States was working in tandem with a French
private security firm.¶ In
September, AFRICOM reaffirmed its close ties with Chad by renewing an Acquisition
Cross Servicing Agreement, which allows both militaries to purchase from each other or trade for basic
supplies. The open-ended pact, said Brigadier General James Vechery, AFRICOM’s director for logistics, “will continue to
strengthen our bilateral cooperation on international security issues…as well as the interoperability of the armed forces of
both nations.”
XT Boko Haram
Chad is currently waging an all-out war on Boko Haram – Chad’s efforts will be
sufficient to destroy the group entirely
Korybko 2/9 Andrew Korybko, political analyst, journalist, member of the expert council for the
Institute of Strategic Studies and Predictions, 2/9/2015, “While Syria and Chad Both Fight Terrorists, US
Plays Favorites”, http://sputniknews.com/columnists/20150209/1018017013.html
Syria has successfully fended off an international terrorist takeover for the past four years, while Chad
has hugely contributed to the
liberation of Northern Mali and is currently making great strides against Boko Haram.¶ Terrorism has
been described as the scourge of the 21st century, and it’s in the interests of every government to
support whichever forces are fighting against it. The creation of a terrorist safe haven in one country
can be used to plot attacks in another (e.g. Afghanistan’s relationship to 9/11), so it’s important that such dens are
eradicated before they become operational, let alone fester into dystopian pseudo-states. Sometimes,
however, the international community either neglects a region until it’s too late (Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria), or
some of its Machiavellian-minded members are actually complicit in allowing the terrorists to take root
in the first place (the US/Turkey/GCC and ISIL). Chad and Syria have been engaged in fierce fighting against these
two major terrorist threats, but the US reaction to each of their Wars on Terror couldn’t be more
different.¶ Breaking Boko Haram¶ Chad has taken on the frontline role in the war against Boko Haram,
having recently sent a few thousand of its soldiers to neighboring Cameroon to flush the terrorists out of
the country. So successful has the operation been, that not only have hundreds of them reportedly been
killed already, but Chad has also taken the war to Boko Haram’s home turf in northeast Nigeria. The
West African integration group ECOWAS is assembling its own fighting force to aid in the anti-terrorist campaign, which
together with Chad’s current efforts, may serve to eradicate the scourge once and for all. The Chadian
Army’s rapid victory spree looks even more striking when one considers that the Nigerian Army had
been fighting against the group for six years already, with hardly any success to speak of. Although corruption and inefficiency
definitely had a lot to do with this, Boko Haram is still a formidable fighting force in its own right. Nonetheless, the US- and
French-trained Chadian Army is even more dangerous, and it has a track record to prove it.¶ The Chadian military’s
reputation as a no-nonsense fighting force preceded its intervention in Nigeria, having recently been deployed in
Northern Mali in January 2013 to defeat the terrorists stationed there. France’s Operation Serval captured news headlines at the time, but aside from their ‘shock
and awe’ aerial bombardments and select special forces operations, it
was really the Chadians who fought the bloody war on the
ground and liberated Mali, which was two countries away. Part of the reason why Chad’s forces are generally so
effective is because they’re constantly fighting against a slew of rebel groups trying to overthrow the
government, which has given them pivotal experience in countering guerilla/insurgent warfare, and places
them a step above most of their Western counterparts in this regard.
XT ISIS Internal
Boko Haram is essential for ISIS to smuggle a nuke into the US – a strong military
presence is key to prevent terror
Isine 6/3 Ibanga Isine, reporter for the Premium Times, Nigerian newspaper“ISIS considers
transporting nuclear weapon to U.S. through Nigeria; says country’s Army ‘collapsed’”,
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/184265-isis-considers-transporting-nuclearweapon-to-u-s-through-nigeria-says-countrys-army-collapsed.html
ISIS, the jihadist group in Syria, Iraq and Libya, has claimed it could purchase a nuclear device and transport same to the
United States, through a network of countries including Nigeria, up to Mexico.¶ In its latest propaganda magazine, Dabiq, published two weeks
ago, the group said the plan is workable the same way banned drugs are transported through West Africa to
Western countries, saying it could even be easier with the presence of Boko Haram, the Nigeria-based
group that recently pledged allegiance to ISIS.¶ ISIS also described the Nigerian Army as “an exhausted
and smashed national army that is now in a virtual state of collapse”.¶ Currently, it said Boko Haram insurgents
have taken control of much of Nigeria and their attacks are intensifying and pushing back the military.¶
That claim contradicts recent successes recorded by the Nigerian military which has recovered several towns seized by the militant group in the last.¶ In an op-ed
piece titled, “The Perfect Storm,” attributed to a kidnapped British photojournalist, John Cantlie, it said the
terrorist organisation which
started as a movement in Iraq has suddenly turned into a global phenomenon that the West and the democratic world
as a whole is ill-equipped to deal with.¶ Mr. Cantlie has appeared in many propaganda videos released by ISIS after he was kidnapped by the extremist group. ¶
“Nothing
on this scale has happened this big or this quick before. Huge swathes of Pakistan, Nigeria,
Libya, Yemen, and the Sinai Peninsula are all now united under the black flag of tawhīd, gelled together as one by the
Islamic State,” the piece said.¶ “They (Boko Haram) declared allegiance to the Caliphate in March, and they are the same group,
remember, that Obama claimed just last year was being successfully pushed back by American intervention policy. ¶ “Indeed, he claimed that the same model
(cutting finances, recruitment tools, and the will to fight) that worked so ‘well’ in the degradation of the mujāhidīn there before their pledge of allegiance, would
work just as well on the Islamic State. Some things just don’t work out as planned.” ¶ The article said the
idea of reaching the U.S. with a
deadly nuclear device is not as far-fetched.¶ “Let me throw a hypothetical operation onto the table,” Cantlie wrote. “The Islamic
State has billions of dollars in the bank, so they call on their wilāyah in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear
device through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region.¶ “The weapon is then
transported overland until it makes it to Libya, where the mujāhidīn move it south to Nigeria. Drug shipments from Columbia bound for Europe
pass through West Africa, so moving other types of contraband from East to West is just as possible.¶ “The nuke and accompanying mujāhidīn arrive on
the shorelines of South America and are transported through the porous borders of Central America
before arriving in Mexico and up to the border with the United States. ¶ “From there it’s just a quick hop through a smuggling
tunnel and hey presto, they’re mingling with another 12 million ‘illegal’ aliens in America with a nuclear
bomb in the trunk of their car.”
Case—NATO
Neg NATO Coop Answers
1NC—Cooperation Resilient
Cooperation is resilient—its angered the public and fringe lawmakers but econ and
security concerns make cooperation inevitable
Francis 13 (David, editor-at-large for The Fiscal Times, David Francis has reported from all over the
world on issues that range from defense to border security to transatlantic relations, “Why Europe
Won’t Punish the U.S. over NSA Scandal”, November 4 2013,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/11/04/Why-Europe-Won-t-Punish-US-over-NSA-Scandal)
The outcry from the German public and politicians continues to this day. German officials have
demanded and been granted meetings with high-level Obama administration officials to complain about
the spying and Merkel called President Obama to voice her displeasure with the practice. Hans-Christian
Stroebele, a legislator for the Germany's opposition Greens party, said that Snowden might be called to
testify in a German investigation into NSA practices. "He made it clear he knows a lot and that as long as
the National Security Agency blocks investigations, he is essentially prepared to come to Germany and
give testimony, but the conditions must be discussed," Stroebele, who met with Snowden in Russia last
week, said. Similar anger has been expressed around the European continent. Some are saying that
irreparable damage has been done to the relationship between the United States and its European
partners. But is this truly the case? Expressing anger over NSA practices is one thing; actually making
policy changes because of the behavior is entirely another. A close examination of statements made by
European officials shows their tone softening. There is not likely to be any long-term fallout in two key
areas: economic negotiations over a $287 billion EU/U.S. trade pact are going to continue, and
intelligence is still likely to pass back and forth across the Atlantic. The only real damage has been to
the standing of the United States with the European public and fringe lawmakers. 1) Economic
cooperation. There are growing concerns that the European Union could make it tougher for private
businesses to operate in Europe. According to reports, some European lawmakers are considering
suspending the “Safe Harbor” agreement that allows American firms to process European personal data,
effectively ending the ability of companies like Apple to sell their products in Europe. But the
cornerstone of EU/U.S. economic ties is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a deal
currently being negotiated. According to a study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the agreement
would increase trade between the partners by $120 billion within five years. At the same time, it
would add some $180 billion to U.S.-EU gross domestic product. After the initial reports on U.S.
snooping, some European lawmakers called for the EU to abandon the deal. But the economic reality
in the European Union makes this impossible. The euro zone s struggling to grow, and Europe needs
the help more than America. Estimates put forth by the European Commission suggest a new trade pact
could increase annual GDP by 0.5 percent in the EU and 0.4 percent in the U.S. by 2027. Even Merkel
dismissed any thought of abandoning the deal, saying on Friday, “Maybe the talks are more important
right now considering the current situation.” 2) Intelligence sharing. Reports out of Germany indicate
that Berlin and Washington are set to sign an agreement forbidding espionage against one another
some time next year. This agreement would go a long way toward placating Germany anger. But each
side will not stop sharing intelligence. Numerous reports indicate that the German foreign intelligence
service uses NSA information to track terrorist on German soil. In fact, authorities have used this
information to foil attacks in Germany. The same kind of exchange is also set to continue among other
NATO allies. All partners share information that could be used to prevent attacks. Some former
European intelligence officials have even admitted that European NATO members also spy on the
United States. “The Americans spy on us on the commercial and industrial level like we spy on them,”
Bernard Squarcini, former head of the French secret services said last week. “No one is fooled.” 3)
American standing. Merkel, in her phone call with the president, said that the NSA targeting of her
phone amounted to a breach of trust. This sense of betrayal has spread among lawmakers across the
continent. Fortunately, Obama has a well of good will to draw upon with the European public. They
might be angry with the NSA, but so far, this anger has not been directed at the president himself. But
diplomatically, the NSA issue could linger for years. Even U.S. lawmakers acknowledge this.
2NC—Cooperation Resilient
Anodyne chastising by EU proves coop will continue—EU won’t give up TTIP,
counterterror coop, intel sharing because it disproportionately benefits them—AT
WORST, the EU sanctions the US and looks like a giant hypocrite
Charlemagne 13 (columnist in the Economist that comments on European affairs, “Controlled anger”,
October 25 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2013/10/europe-and-americanspooks)
THEY huffed and they puffed, but did not dare blow down the house. European leaders expressed
outrage and dismay at news that America may have been eavesdropping on the mobile telephone
conversations of Angela Merkel, the German chancellor and Europe’s most powerful leader. For the first
time since Edward Snowden’s revelations about wholesale surveillance broke last summer, the affair
became the subject of conversations at the high table of European leaders. In the end, though, leaders
issued an anodyne statement saying they would keep talking to the Americans about the affair in
private, with a view to settling matters by the end of the year. "Spying on friends is not on, at all,"
declared Mrs Merkel as she arrived at an otherwise hum-drum summit in Brussels that was supposed to
deal with issues such as promoting a single market in telecoms. As the meeting got under way, the
Guardian reported that the numbers of at least 35 other leaders were being monitored. Who in the
room had not been bugged, some wondered. President François Hollande of France, who met Mrs
Merkel for a 15-minute tête-à-tête over the affair (both France and Germany this week called in the
American ambassadors to protest about the behaviour of America's National Security Agency), later said
the real issue was not political espionage, but the covert war for commercial advantage. The leaders of
Italy and Belgium were among those denouncing America’s spooks. Had the leaders discussed halting
negotiations on a transatlantic trade deal with America, as some in Brussels and Berlin had demanded?
No, said Mrs Merkel. “If you leave the room, you have to figure out how you get back in.” What about
suspending the EU-US agreement on exchanging financial data to track terrorist funding? The
chancellor said she would have to study the issue in greater detail. Did she expect an apology from
America? “I think the most important thing is to find a basis for co-operation in the future.” One
reason for such caution is that the Americans, though they run the biggest electronic eavesdropping
operation, are not the only ones to do so. This is what Bernard Squarcini, the former head of France’s
domestic intelligence agency, had to say to Le Figaro (French version here): I'm bewildered by such
worrying naiveté. You'd think the politicians don't read the reports they're sent—there shouldn't be any
surprise...The agencies know perfectly well that every country, even when they cooperate on antiterrorism, spies on its allies. The Americans spy on us on the commercial and industrial level like we spy
on them, because it's in the national interest to defend our businesses. No one is a dupe. A bigger factor
is that European governments know they rely heavily on American intelligence co-operation to help
prevent terrorist attacks. As German officials are the first to admit, information shared by America has
helped save German lives—in Germany and abroad. Thus the statement issued by the 28 EU leaders
lays great emphasis on the importance of the bilateral relationship, stressed the need for mutual trust
and left it to France and Germany to conduct bilateral talks with America to reach “an understanding on
mutual relations” in intelligence by the end of the year. The full EU statement is in the last page of the
conclusions here. The key passage is: [The Heads of State or Government] stressed that intelligence
gathering is a vital element in the fight against terrorism. This applies to relations between European
countries as well as to relations with the USA. A lack of trust could prejudice the necessary cooperation
in the field of intelligence gathering. The Heads of State or Government took note of the intention of
France and Germany to seek bilateral talks with the USA with the aim of finding before the end of the
year an understanding on mutual relations in that field. They noted that other EU countries are welcome
to join this initiative. So what precisely does Mrs Merkel want from America? Yardsticks, norms and
standards, she said vaguely. In the end, think some, the price that America willl have to pay to settle
the scandal may be to provide Germany with more of the intelligence shared among the Five Eyes:
America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It was never likely that the EU would have much
to say on the affair. The union does not deal with spying (except to investigate allegations that EU
offices had been bugged). Not even the French would want to Europeanise intelligence-sharing. But
even where the EU does have a role, for instance in proposals to update data-privacy rules, the
summit’s conclusions were rather tame: It is important to foster the trust of citizens and businesses in
the digital economy. The timely adoption of a strong EU General Data Protection framework and the
Cyber-security Directive is essential for the completion of the Digital Single Market by 2015. Even
toughening up the rule—the European Parliament has reinstated a clause threatening to fine American
companies that transfer data on European citizens without authorisation—will do nothing to prevent
espionage. The British, given their close intelligence relationship with America, have worked behind
the scenes to tone down the summit statement. For instance they resisted attempts to set a deadline
to approve data-protection rules by next spring, before elections for the European Parliament in May.
The British will be among those hoping that playing for time will allow the NSA affair to blow over and
soothe wounded spirits. David Cameron, the British prime minister, will spend the second day of the
summit promoting his campaign to cut the red tape of EU regulations. Tellingly, Mrs Merkel will be
among those making the time to hear his case. But time may work the other way too, as the drip-drip of
Mr Snowden's revelations corrodes the bonds between the Western allies.
It seriously doesn’t matter and its being resolved with individual countries in the squo
Croucher 13 (Shane, writes features for International Business Times UK, which he joined in
November 2011. Before getting his journalism degree from the University of Lincoln, Shane worked for
Lloyds and Citigroup, “UK Warns EU: Don't Blow $200bn US Trade Talks Over Edward Snowden NSA
Scandal”, July 4 2013, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nsa-edward-snowden-spying-eu-trade-talks-486479)
Britain's government has warned the European Union not to squander "once-in-a-lifetime" trade talks
with the US after Edward Snowden's National Security Agency spying revelations. France demanded a
temporary suspension to landmark EU-US trade talks, which were arranged at the G8 summit in
Northern Ireland, because it is angry about the NSA's surveillance of EU states, including itself, Germany,
and Britain. However, the European Commission (EC) stepped in and helped to appease the French
government by offering to set up discussions and working groups on the NSA's spying activities in
parallel with trade talks. The trade agreement is potentially worth $100bn (£65.5bn, €77bn) a year to
both parties.. "As set out by the European Commission, single or specific issues should not delay what
is a collective EU-wide process," a Department for Business spokeswoman told IBTimes UK. "A EU-US
free trade agreement is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to liberalise trade between the world's two
largest trading blocs and drive growth across the UK, Europe and US. It's vital that we don't let this
opportunity slip." Jose Manuel Barroso, EC president, said that EU-US trade negotiations "are and will
remain a top priority".
Ending cooperation is too risky for the EU and rhetoric has never historically effected
policy
Heuser 13 (Annette, executive director and founder of the Washington, DC office of the Bertelsmann
Foundation, a private, non-partisan operational foundation that promotes and strengthens transAtlantic cooperation, “Spy Games: Trans-Atlantic Relations Should Not Be Jeopardized”, November 1
2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/us-and-eu-should-not-let-nsa-scandal-endangertransatlantic-relations-a-931337.html)
Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's stinging critique of Washington's Iraq policy, which
became one of his electioneering planks, the 2011 German abstention in the UN on establishing a nofly zone over Libya and, most recently, the clear refusal to contribute to any military action in Syria,
perturbed and disappointed Washington. But none of these setbacks led to a fundamental reevaluation of US-German relations. But Europe is taking a risk by reacting to suspected NSA activities
by calling for overhaul of the entire trans-Atlantic relationship. After a week of this, a change in
rhetoric would be worthwhile. Related to this second point are the calls to suspend negotiations on the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). US and European policymakers have already
realized that it serves no one's interest to tie alleged NSA activities to a potential US-EU free-trade pact.
Such an accord is of geopolitical importance. It would boost employment and economic growth from
North Carolina to North Rhine-Westphalia. It would also seal agreement on a data protection portfolio
that should prevent a recurrence of the momentary rift. Detaching the NSA debate from the TTIP talks
would put back on course the only major new project in which both sides are invested. No one now
denies that everyone is spying on everyone else. Yes, friends spy on one another, including their
political leaders, and will continue to do so. The current trans-Atlantic tension has forced a serious
and long-overdue debate among allies about the appropriate balance between liberty and security.
Any concrete outcome from this discussion remains unclear, but the good news is that both sides are
talking. Their conversations must consider the totality of what is at stake, with a clear
acknowledgement that a fundamental rupture risks great losses on the political, economic and security
fronts. This is no time for visceral reactions. This is a time -- and an opportunity -- to comprehend each
other's perceptions and political realities.
1NC—US-EU reforms now
Multitude of reforms now solve the internal link—domestic judicial redress reform,
Safe Harbor etc
Reuters 14 (“US promises EU citizens more privacy rights over data protection”, June 24 2014,
http://www.rt.com/news/168440-usa-eu-privacy-legislation/)
The US has vowed to extend data protection laws to EU citizens and give them more privacy rights.
The EU has called the move “a step in the right direction” as the two sides are seeking to recover
relations strained by Snowden’s NSA revelations. "The Obama administration is committed to seeking
legislation that would ensure that ... EU citizens would have the same right to seek judicial redress for
intentional or willful disclosures of protected information and for refusal to grant access or to rectify
any errors in that information, as would a US citizen," US Attorney General Eric Holder said as the EU
and the US justice and home affair ministers met for discussions in Greece, which holds the rotating EU
presidency. The commitment, “which has long been sought by the EU,” shows the determination of
the US “to move forward," Holder stressed. The planned legislation, once enacted by Congress, will
extend the guarantees made under the US Privacy Act - which now protects only Americans - to EU
citizens, allowing them in addition to see and correct records about themselves and challenge any
misuse of information. Giving EU citizens outside America the right to go to the US courts and sue over
improper use of their private data has been one of the stumbling blocks to sealing the long discussed
personal data protection agreement between the two sides. Welcoming the announcement as "an
important step in the right direction towards rebuilding trust" in EU-US “transatlantic relations,” the EU
Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding has called on the US to “swiftly” translate it into legislation “so that
further steps can be taken in the negotiation.” "Words only matter if put into law. We are waiting for
the legislative step," Reding said in a statement. The legislation would "fill the gap between the rights US
citizens enjoy in the EU today, and the rights EU citizens do not have in the US," Reding stated. German
Chancellor Angela Merkel (Reuters/Jesco Denzel) This issue has caused friction in EU-US ties in recent
years, but there are ongoing efforts to resolve the problems, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia
Malmstrom said at a news conference in Athens. “EU-US relations have been strained lately in the
aftermath of the Snowden revelations, but we have worked very hard to restore trust and there is
strong commitment on both sides to work jointly and closely on our common challenges,” Malmstrom
said. The announcement by the US paves the way for a key data protection deal aimed at protecting
personal information transferred for law enforcement purposes. European and American governments
have been discussing the agreement since 2011 and the negotiations are at a "final stage," Brussels
said. The EU and the US are also in talks to find ways to strengthen the so-called "Safe harbor"
agreement that allows US companies to gather customers’ personal data in Europe and transfer it to
America. Relations between the EU and US have been tense after the NSA’s Edward Snowden leaked
evidence that American spies were listening to the phone calls of top European citizens, and leaders
such as Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel.
2NC—US-EU Reforms Now
Obama’s ban on eavesdropping proves US is receptive to EU complaints and that
existing transatlantic dialogue is sufficient to solve
Euractiv 14 (European Media Network present in 12 EU capitals, publishes free EU news and facilitates
EU policy debates for policy professionals, “Brussels welcomes Obama’s review of US spying programs”,
January 20 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/commission-welcomes-obama-review-news532871)
The European Commission has welcomed President Barack Obama's remarks and presidential
directive on the review of US intelligence programmes. Obama banned US eavesdropping on the
leaders of close friends and allies on Thursday (16 January). In a major speech, Obama took steps to
reassure Americans and foreigners alike that the United States will take into account privacy concerns
highlighted by former spy contractor Edward Snowden’s disclosures about the sweep of monitoring
activities of the National Security Agency (NSA). Obama promised that the United States will not
eavesdrop on the heads of state or government of close US friends and allies, “unless there is a
compelling national security purpose”. A senior administration official said that would apply to dozens
of leaders. The step was designed to smooth over frayed relations between, for example, the United
States and Germany after reports surfaced last year that the NSA had monitored the cellphone of
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The Commission said that Obama's remarks have shown that “the
legitimate concerns expressed by the EU” have been listened to by Washington and that “the
intensive transatlantic dialogue on these issues has been genuine and is beginning to produce
results”. “We in particular welcome the President's willingness to begin to address wide-spread
concerns related to the large-scale data collection by the NSA, concerns which are shared by many
European citizens,” Commission’s spokeswoman Pia Ahrenkilde Hansen said in a communiqué. One of
the biggest changes announced by Obama will be an overhaul of the government’s handling of bulk
telephone “metadata” – lists of millions of phone calls made by Americans that show which numbers
were called and when. Obama said the programme as it currently exists will end.
1NC—Intel Not K2 NATO
Refusal to cooperate in Iraq disproves the impact and countries spy on allies too
Huggler 15 (Huggler, reporter for the Independent and the Telegraph, Oxford University, “US 'freezes
intelligence cooperation with German troops in Iraq'”, June 3 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11648852/US-freezes-intelligencecooperation-with-German-troops-in-Iraq.html)
The US has reportedly frozen intelligence cooperation with Germany in Iraq over fears of possible
leaks. American concerns centre on a German parliamentary inquiry into foreign spying, according to
Bild newspaper. Britain earlier this year threatened to end all intelligence cooperation with Germany if
any details of joint operations were revealed to the inquiry. The US has failed to respond to requests
for electronic surveillance assistance for German troops in Iraq, according to Bild. Some 100 German
soldiers are based just 30 miles from the front line with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil). “It's
all about high-performance technology for electronic reconnaissance,” an unnamed US intelligence
source told the newspaper. “On our side, there’s concern that such hardware could become part of the
German committee of inquiry. “As long as there is this risk, it seems hard to imagine that’d we make
sensitive technology available.” German troops are in Iraq on a mission to train Kurdish peshmerga
militia fighting against Isil in the use of sophisticated weapons. There are concerns they could be a
target for attack. “It’s about things you can’t buy off the shelf,” German intelligence sources told Bild.
“Without the technology of the Americans, we’re blind.” The Bundestag’s inquiry into foreign spying,
known in Germany as the “NSA Committee”, is not new to controversy. Last year Angela Merkel’s office
wrote to its members threatening them with criminal charges after a number of secret documents were
leaked to the press. The inquiry was formed in the wake of German public anger after it emerged that
the US National Security Agency (NSA) spied on Mrs Merkel’s mobile phone. In a separate development,
a secretive commission that oversees German intelligence has reportedly threatened to order a stop
to all surveillance. Despite the diplomatic fallout over NSA spying, it has emerged in recent months that
Germany’s own BND intelligence service spied on European targets – at the NSA’s request. The G10
Commission, made up of four former MPs and judges, has threatened to block future surveillance unless
it is allowed to see a list of the targets requested by the NSA, according to Welt newspaper.
1NC – AT: NATO – No Impact
Ukraine non-uniques and proves members favor conserving resources rather than
fighting
Logan 14 (Justin, Foreign Policy director of the Cato Institute, “Ukraine is more important, yet
everyone in Washington agrees it's not worth fighting Russia over. What's that mean for NATO?”, April
10 2014, MC)
Given that Russia could not threaten Western Europe, or even most of Central Europe, it’s hard to
argue that the United States has a similar interest in threatening wars to defend most of its
modern-day NATO protectorates. War with Russia would be devastating for the United States, for
the country on whose territory such a war would be fought, and for Russia. Allowing a
state to be pulled into the Russian sphere of influence would be less costly to U.S. taxpayers and
servicemembers—and likely even to citizens of the targeted state itself—than fighting over it. It’s
thus tempting to judge that NATO expansion was one giant bluff, but it’s probably more accurate to say
that Washington rammed through two rounds of NATO expansion without serious consideration of the
costs of defending the new allies. As Columbia’s Richard Betts wrote, “NATO’s ostensible purpose,
collective defense, appears to have been barely in the minds of the sponsors of the organization’s
enlargement.” During the NATO expansion debates, to question whether the prospective memberstates would really be worth fighting a war with Russia over was considered impolite and retrograde. It
was Old Thinking. The foreign-policy establishment wants two things from NATO: the ability to retain
outsized influence on European defense and foreign policy, and cheap deterrence of Russia. For
decades, Washington’s NATO policy seems to have worked, or at least hasn’t failed. EU security
cooperation has floundered, and Russia hasn’t militarily threatened any NATO member-state. But the
Ukraine crisis raises questions about U.S. interests and the Russian perception of them. The unanimity in
Washington that there was no interest in fighting Russia over Ukraine could cause deterrence to fail
where Washington has even smaller interests, such as the Baltic states. Putin could easily see that the
U.S. interests in one of those countries are smaller than they were in Ukraine and decide to violate their
sovereignty in spite of the NATO commitment. Given that no American political leader favored fighting
for Ukraine, the only argument for fighting for a NATO member that is even less strategically important
would be a sheet of paper.
NATO can’t solve anything – structural barriers prevent – and multiple alt causes to
alliance collapse
Johnson 10 (Rebecca, Acronym Institute Director. “NATO: fiddling with nuclear bombs while the planet burns” 6 October 2010
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/1010/doc01.htm)
When the West appeared to emerge victorious from the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact dissolved. NATO should have dissolved too, but was
That decision has resulted in an
unresolved identity crisis and a squandering of opportunities to construct more appropriate ways and
instead enlarged to accommodate some but not all of the Warsaw Pact’s members.
means to support Europea n and international security. Article V, the Musketeers’ Commitment at the heart
of NATO (all for one and one for all), took NATO countries into Afghanistan after the Al Qaeda
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Notwithstanding political spin, after a decade of fighting,
killing and dying, that war has been lost in every significant aspect, while Al Qaeda has regrouped elsewhere,
including Pakistan and Yemen. For the best part of a decade, NATO has been papering over a series of widening cracks,
with diminishing coherence. The divisions over Afghanistan were exacerbated by the US-UK war on Iraq, which was not a NATO war
as such because of the opposition of a number of prominent members, including France and Germany, who considered it illegal and
unnecessary. Tw o
other internal contradictions have divided NATO since the Cold War ended . The
Europeans resent the perennial American complaints that they are not sufficiently ‘sharing the
burden’ of defending Europe, while the US-led demand for military ‘interoperability’ has poured
money into its defence industries, which marketed most of the arms and technologies necessary to
bring European military forces into operational synch with the superior US equipment. The other, which is the
subject of this article, is what to do about nuclear weapons in Europe . Depending on how they are counted, there
are around 200 US nuclear weapons in Europe, stored at US bases in five countries: Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey. These are
B-61 bombs – misleadingly called ‘tactical nuclear weapons’ – intended to be launched out of aeroplanes.
Many of the countries
that they were initially designed to be dropped on are now members of NATO. As Germany, Norway,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg push once again within NATO to get rid of these insecure
nuclear relics and minimise the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance, it is a number of former Eastern bloc
countries, including Latvia and Poland, that appear to be most desperate for NATO to maintain nuclear business as usual. Since nuclear
weapons cannot be deployed in former Eastern bloc territories without breaching an important commitment made by NATO in 1996
(confirming US Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s “Three No’s”), it seems paradoxical to find governments pushing to maintain a two-tier
nuclear NATO that consigns their own countries to the political back seats. A few days ago, an impressive list of 35 European heavyweights,
including Germany’s former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Defence Secretaries Michael Ancram, Tom King and Malcolm Rifkind,
endorsed a statement published by the European Leaders Network (ELN), coordinated by former Defence and Foreign Secretaries Des Browne
and Margaret Beckett. This group
argued that in order to reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons
globally, NATO needed to “make disarmament a core element of its approach to providing security”.
At a time when insider reports suggest that NATO is having great difficulty reaching consensus on
anything other than the fudged language of past agreements , the ELN statement warned the Alliance not to avoid
debating nuclear issues, as it had done in 1999, but to adapt its strategic policies to address the real security challenges of our present and
future. It argued for a more constructive relationship with Russia, posed several useful questions about nuclear deterrence, and pointed to
inconsistencies between the declaratory policies currently espoused by NATO and its three nuclear members, Britain, France (which has not yet
joined NATO’s nuclear planning group (NPG), though President Sarkozy has taken France closer to NATO than before), and the United States,
particularly since the Obama administration formulated its Nuclear Posture Review earlier this year.
However, the ELN itself shied away from questioning the validity, role, costs and opportunity costs of this nuclear alliance. The issue is not just
that NATO’s nuclear weapons are a useless anachronism. NATO itself has outlived its security
relevance . The majority of its members are well aware that they are irredeemably bogged down in
Afghanistan and that there are no realistic scenarios in which nuclear weapons could be used that would possibility enhance NATO members’
security and survival or be consistent with international law.
They resort to vague mantras about Alliance “cohesion”,
ultimate “insurance”, and the need to reassure states that are worried about terrorism, Russia or
Iran .
2NC – AT: NATO – No Impact
NATO can’t solve anything – internal divisions over nuclear weapons and burdensharing prevent an effective alliance – it’s no longer relevant because of constrained
decision-making – that’s Johnson
NATO is useless
Marian L.
Tupy, policy analyst with the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, 5/1/2003, “Worse Than Useless?” CATO institute,
http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-030501.html
From a military perspective, the case for American withdrawal from NATO seems to have already been made. A
number of
commentators, including the British historian Paul Johnson, have argued that NATO is an anachronism rendered
helpless by distrust and infighting. But there are also compelling economic grounds for American withdrawal. Simply, the
American security guarantee perpetuates the continuation of the European welfare states and thus
encourages economic sclerosis across the European continent. NATO is not only useless, it's harmful.
Even if it doesn’t dissolve, NATO will become irrelevant
Walt 10 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. September 24, 2010, “Is
NATO irrelevant?”, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/24/is_nato_irrelevant)
NATO doesn't have much of a future . First, Europe's economic woes
are forcing key NATO members (and especially the U.K.) to adopt draconian cuts in defense spending. NATO's
European members already devote a much smaller percentage of GDP to defense than the United
States does, and they are notoriously bad at translating even that modest amount into effective
military power. The latest round of defense cuts means that Europe will be even less able to make a
meaningful contribution to out-of-area missions in the future, and those are the only serious military missions NATO is likely
to have. Second, the ill-fated Afghan adventure will have divisive long-term effects on alliance solidarity. If
Nonetheless, I share William Pfaff's view that
the United States and its ISAF allies do not win a clear and decisive victory (a prospect that seems increasingly remote), there will be a lot of
bitter finger-pointing afterwards.
U.S. leaders will complain about the restrictions and conditions that some NATO
allies (e.g., Germany) placed on their participation, while European publics will wonder why they let the
United States get them bogged down there for over a decade. It won't really matter who is really responsible for the failure;
the key point is that NATO is unlikely to take on another mission like this one anytime soon (if ever). And given
that Europe itself is supposedly stable, reliably democratic, and further pacified by the EU, what other serious missions is NATO supposed to
perform? The
third potential schism is Turkey, which has been a full NATO member since 1950. I'm not as concerned about
Turkey's recent foreign policy initiatives as some people are, but there's little doubt that Ankara's diplomatic path is
diverging on a number of key issues. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany have
been steadily ratcheting up pressure on Iran, while Turkey has moved closer to Tehran both diplomatically and
economically. Turkey is increasingly at odds with Washington on Israel-Palestine issues, which is bound to have
negative repercussions in the U.S. Congress. Rising Islamophobia in both the United States and Europe could easily
reinforce these frictions. And given that Turkey has NATO's largest military forces (after the United
States) and that NATO operates largely by consensus, a major rift could have paralyzing effects on the
alliance as a whole. Put all this together, and NATO's future as a meaningful force in world affairs doesn't
look too bright . Of course, the usual response to such gloomy prognostications is to point out that NATO has experienced crises
throughout its history (Suez, anyone?), and to remind people that it has always managed to weather them in the past. True enough, but most
of these rifts occurred within the context of the Cold War, when there was an obvious reason for leaders in Europe and America to keep
disputes within bounds. Of course, given
NATO's status as a symbol of transatlantic solidarity, no American
president or European leader will want to preside over its demise. Plus, you've got all those
bureaucrats in Brussels and Atlantophiles in Europe and America who regard NATO as their life's work. For all these
reasons, I don't expect NATO to lose members or dissolve. I'll even be somewhat surprised if foreign
policy elites even admit that it has serious problems. Instead, NATO is simply going to be increasingly
irrelevant. As I wrote more than a decade ago: . . .the Atlantic Alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, appearing
youthful and robust as it grows older -- but becoming ever more infirm. The Washington Treaty may remain in force, the various ministerial
meetings may continue to issue earnest and upbeat communiques, and the Brussels bureaucracy may keep NATO's web page up and runningall these superficial routines will go on, provided the alliance isn't asked to actually do anything else. The danger is that NATO
will be
dead before anyone notices, and we will only discover the corpse the moment we want it to rise and
respond." Looking back, I'd say I underestimated NATO's ability to rise from its sickbed. Specifically, it did manage to stagger through the
Kosovo War in 1999 and even invoked Article V guarantees for the first time after 9/11. NATO members have sent mostly token forces to
Afghanistan (though the United States, as usual, has done most of the heavy lifting). But even that rather modest effort has been exhausting,
and isn't likely to be repeated. A
continent that is shrinking, aging, and that faces no serious threat of foreign
invasion isn't going to be an enthusiastic partner for future adventures in nation-building, and it
certainly isn't likely to participate in any future U.S. effort to build a balancing coalition against a
rising China. The bad news, in short, is that one of the cornerstones of the global security architecture is likely
to erode in the years ahead. The good news, however, is that it won't matter very much if it does.
Other US-European ties will fill in
The Economist 10 (“A Post-NATO era is beginning” http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/a-post-nato-era-isbeginning/69389.aspx)
Not only has NATO failed as an expeditionary alliance ; plugging Europe's remaining hard-security
gaps no longer needs its bloated civilian and military bureaucracies . The people who work at Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and NATO HQ may not know it, but it is well past closing time in the ‘Last-Chance
Saloon'. Their well-padded Cold War lifestyles will soon be history, withering and vanishing just as the
elephantine and luxurious French, UK and US ‘military governments' in West Berlin did in the early
1990s. When the US needs help, it will seek it from the handful of European countries with real
soldiers willing to kill and be killed in foreign wars. It does not need NATO for that . The US will remain
residually committed to European security, partly out of sentiment, partly for precautionary reasons,
and partly because it retains a lingering worry about Russia's approach to its former empire. But the set of
problems that ties the US to Europe is shrinking. It is Germany, not the US, that is tidying up the western Balkans, getting the Russians to lean
on the Bosnian Serbs, brokering a deal between Greece and its nameless northern neighbour, and trying to unscramble the clotted mess of
Transdniestria. The
US will continue to work with European allies in the High North and the Arctic. Oil and
Israel mean that the US will stay in the eastern Mediterranean and keep an eye on the Black Sea (but not
by pushing NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia: relations with Russia matter more). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
are the only European countries that the US really needs, theoretically, to defend from Russia. To that
end, the US is giving increasing weight to Nordic-Baltic security co-operation (on which a high-level meeting took
place last week in Washington, DC). For the US, non-NATO Sweden and Finland matter a lot more in keeping that
region stable and safe than most ‘nominal NATO' countries do. Europe will be a place where the US
bases its missile defences, which provides logistical support for US missions overseas and which – I
hope – maintains a strong diplomatic transatlantic alliance in support of battered ideas such as
political freedom and the rule of law.
1NC—Russia won’t risk War
Putin won’t risk war---public opinion
Simon Kuper 3-28-14, columnist with the Financial Times, "The surprising power of peace," Financial
Times, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b5df33b8-b539-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2xNRPPErB
Most Russians want Crimea but oppose violence, according to polls. In one recent survey, by Alexei Navalny’s oppositionist
Anti-Corruption Foundation, 74 per cent called war between Russia and Ukraine “impossible”.¶ Most Russians
oppose war with Ukraine partly for the very reason they think Crimea is “theirs”: they consider Ukraine a
kindred territory, almost like Russia. Many Russians have Ukrainian relatives. Many Ukrainians have
mixed Russian-Ukrainian heritage, or aren’t sure what they are. Marc Bennetts, author of Kicking the Kremlin, says:
“An actual conflict with Ukraine is unthinkable to the vast majority of Russians. It would be like England fighting
Wales, or the US fighting Texas. There is no popular support for a protracted war with Ukraine. And Putin very rarely goes against
public opinion .”¶ In Pinker’s terminology, Ukrainians are within the Russian “circle of empathy”. That circle didn’t
prevent vast Russian-Ukrainian killing from 1917 through 1945. But circles of empathy seem stronger nowadays.¶ Then there’s growing
economic interconnectedness, which raises the cost of war: any potential enemy is also a business partner. Indeed, all
western measures against Russia have been economic.
1NC--No Escalation
Chances of conflict are low---too many mitigating factors
Maral Margossian 3-27-14, Collegian columnist, "Five reasons why Russia won't start World War III,"
The Massachusetts Daily Collegian, dailycollegian.com/2014/03/27/five-reasons-why-russia-wont-startworld-war-iii/
The recent events in Eastern Europe involving
Russia and Ukraine have spawned, at their most extreme, apocalyptic
claims. Here are five reasons why Russia won’t start World War III, or any other war for that matter:¶ 1. The world is MAD. The
end of World War II ushered the world into a precarious atomic age that characterized the international atmosphere during the Cold War.
mutually assured destruction (or MAD). Russia knows
that if it pushes that big red button, we have our own even bigger, redder button to push in
retaliation. The odds of a nuclear war with Russia are extremely unlikely .¶ 2. The impact of economic
sanctions on the Russian economy is far too crippling for Russia to fund a war. As a part of a globalized world,
Luckily, the Cold War never escalated to nuclear war. Why? Because of
economic sanctions are more than mere slaps on the wrist. Already the sanctions imposed on Russia have begun to take their toll. The West has
yet to attack Russia’s strongest economic assets, but the
declining strength of the Russian economy puts Putin far
from a position to wage a world war.¶ 3. Putin’s actions demonstrate his longing for Russia’s glory days before the fall of the
Soviet Union. His annexation of Crimea is more out of fear than strength. Putin feels threatened by Russia’s changing role in world affairs and is
using Crimea to tell the world that Russia still matters.¶ 4. Russia is already seen as the “big bad wolf” of Europe. Though Putin may have been
nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his involvement in the Syrian chemical weapons deal, Russia’s popularity among many Western
countries is not very high. The recent suspension of Russia from the G8 group is a symbolic action that demonstrates that Russia will have to
face a united front of world powers if it chooses to start a war.¶ 5. There
is just too much at stake. War between Ukraine
and Russia is one thing; Russia’s military is large enough and strong enough to easily defeat Ukraine.
However, if Russia decides to take further aggressive action, it must also contend with surrounding
European Union member nations and their potential involvement in the war. Moreover, Russia’s
involvement in other international affairs will be affected. For example, the ongoing effort to normalize relations
between Iran and the rest of the world will be jeopardized, considering Russia is involved in those efforts. Crimea may have symbolic
meaning close to the hearts of Russians, but it isn’t worth risking the domino effect of events that can
potentially occur.¶ So, those of you who feel abnormally unsettled by the recent turn of events can rest easy. While Russia’s actions can’t
be brushed aside and should be taken seriously, the chances of this confrontation escalating to a great war are slim
— assuming these countries act rationally.
2NC—No NATO—Russia Escalation
No escalation---US and the EU won’t get involved
Max Strasser 3-28-14, independent journalist, "Stopping Putin: The Military Option," Newsweek,
www.newsweek.com/stopping-putin-military-option-238783
If NATO wanted to wade into a battle with Russia, Moscow would meet a formidable foe. NATO could
deploy its rapid response force to halt the Russian advance or provide air support to the beleaguered Ukrainian military. ¶ But military
strategists reject those options as profoundly unlikely .¶ No matter what Russia does in Ukraine – even
in the case of a full-scale invasion – there is little chance NATO, or the U.S. acting independent of the
alliance, will engage in a shooting war with Russian troops.¶ War with Russia would escalate the
Crimea crisis to an extent that no one in Washington, or likely even in the much more bellicose
Moscow, would want. Russia and the United States have the world’s two largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons – a war could soon get
ugly.¶ “There are going to be moments where military action is appropriate,” President Barack Obama said in
Brussels on Tuesday. “There are going to be some times where that’s not in the interests – national security
interests of the United States or some of our partners.Ӧ A Russian invasion of Ukraine would not,
apparently, be one of those moments.
No Ukraine crisis escalation — economic incentives overwhelm current momentum
Mohamed A. El-Erian 3/17 Former CEO of PIMCO, chief economic advisor at Alianz, named one of the
world’s top 100 thinkers by Foreign Policy four years running, “Economic Realities Can De-Escalate
Ukraine Crisis,” The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-a-elerian/economyukraine-crisis_b_4975866.html
Can good old-fashioned economic self-interest provide temporary relief for what now seems to be an
intractable crisis in the Ukraine? The answer is yes it can; and, more importantly, may well eventually
and temporarily do so. . .by incentivizing a de-escalation of mounting tensions, but failing to durably
resolve underlying problems that will likely re-emerge down the road.¶ The crisis in Ukraine pits
multiple parties against each other, both domestic and foreign. Each of them is operating with a
different set of internal and external constraints, along with contrasting interpretations of the past and
present -- and of course, the future.¶ As recent developments vividly illustrate, none of the parties
involved is strong enough to impose its will and interpretation of events on the others. Because of this
complex reality, the crisis has already taken quite a few surprising and precarious turns, including this
weekend's referendum. Concurrently, various attempts to find some "circuit breaker" -- no matter how
imperfect, small and temporary -- have proven frustratingly ineffective.¶ Over the next few weeks,
however, another reality is likely to gradually impose itself -- and this one in which rational economic
considerations could gradually dominate geo-political ones.¶ In a rational content, it would only be a
matter of time before it becomes abundantly clear to all major parties involved -- yes all, internal and
external -- that the path that the Ukrainian crisis is currently on is detrimental to both their individual
and collective economic interests. Indeed, the actual and prospective economic losses are likely to be
so large as to seriously overwhelm any real or perceived geo-political victory.¶ Ukraine itself is in the
worst position of all. The country is on the verge of significant economic and financial disruptions.
Already, it urgently needs tens of billions of dollars just to stabilize its shaky finances, limit shortages,
avoid crippling inflation and sidestep international default. Capital flight is a problem notwithstanding
controls. Reports of people standing in line to take money out of ATMs are adding to the general
anxiety.¶ Ukraine's urgent need for large exceptional external assistance does not stop at immediate
stabilization requirements. The country will require even more funding and debt relief to support the
implementation of multi-year reforms aimed at generating high growth and adequate job creation.¶ As
messy as the Ukrainian situation sounds -- and it is very messy -- its standalone systemic implications
could theoretically be contained from both a regional and global perspective. After all, with a GDP of
around $175 billion, its economy is small on the global stage. Other than a conduit for Europe's energy
supplies from Russia, it does not influence important global supply chains and demand patterns. And its
role in international capital markets is very small.¶ This would be good news for the rest of the world,
especially as Ukraine's internal social and political divisions are unlikely to be resolved in a durable
fashion any time soon. However, having said that, Ukraine is indeed systemic for a simple yet powerful
reason: its messy political crisis entangles Russia, western European countries and the United States. ¶
To this point, these external parties have not been able to trigger a circuit breaker, let alone negotiate a
longer-term compromise or, even better, a durable resolution. Neither the calls between Presidents
Obama and Putin nor the face-to-face negotiations among their foreign ministers and the United Nation
meetings have yielded anything substantive. Instead, the rhetoric continues to heat up; and the stakes
keep on getting bigger.¶ This weekend's referendum in Crimea was yet another step away from deescalation, as was the understandable tone and content of last week's G-7 statement that included
strong legal and moral condemnation of Russia together with the west's reminder that it has suspended
"participation in any activities related to preparation" of the G-8 meeting scheduled to be held in Russia.
Needless to say, Russia's response was equally harsh. And the cycle goes on. . .¶ Indeed, wherever you
look, the momentum would seem to call for a further escalation of the crisis. But, importantly, there
may be an important and rational twist out there that could become more apparent and relevant over
time: Neither Russia nor the West can avoid the serious economic damage that would accompany a
continued deterioration at the current rate.¶ Consider the Russian situation. The minute President
Putin moved on Ukraine, international markets immediately jacked up the risk premiums on the
Russian sovereign bonds, quasi-sovereigns (such as Gazprom), banks and companies; and it has kept
the at these elevated levels. The result is higher borrowing costs for all Russian entities, along with
more limited access to international capital.¶ Markets also put immediate pressure on the Russian
ruble, making it the second worse performing currency in the world this year -- and this despite the
central bank using tens of billions of dollars in international reserves to soften the blow. ¶ The financial
pressures will likely be amplified by the prospects of higher capital outflows and lower inward flows
of foreign direct investments. As a result, and in addition to the hit to economic growth, ordinary
Russians would be paying higher prices for a wide range of imported goods in their consumption
basket.¶ Given that Russia is the eighth largest economy in the world (with a $2 trillion GDP) and is
quite integrated in the global financial system, Russians are not the only ones that would suffer from a
further escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. The rest of the world would be impacted, starting with
Europe.¶ Europe accounts for almost 40 percent of Russia's trade. As such, western firms would feel
pain from the reduction in Russian sales while others would be impacted by possible disruptions in
supplies from Russia. And the last thing that Europe needs right now is less demand and higher input
uncertainties. Already, the region's emergence from recession is proving both muted and tentative.¶
Meanwhile, the fall in prices of Russian financial instruments has already translated into mark-tomarket losses for global investors and international banks. If the selloff continues -- which will happen
if the Ukrainian geo-political crisis continues to escalate -- it is only a matter of time before this
contaminates the financial standing of some western entities, starting with banks that are heavily
exposed to Russia.¶ The economic consequences for both Europe and Russia would be significantly
worse if a complete breakdown in the dialogue on Ukraine were to lead to generalized trade and
financial sanctions and boycotts, including a disruption in Russian energy supplies to the West and in
Russian banks' access to international payments and settlement services. Such an outcome would
send Europe and Russia into recession and, most likely, reignite global financial instability.¶ Of all the
major parties, the U.S. is in the best relative shape. Its direct economic and financial linkages to Russia
and Ukraine are limited. Its domestic demand component is a much more effective stabilizer. And its
financial institutions are less exposed.¶ Yet even the United States cannot totally sidestep the adverse
contagion emanating from eastern and western Europe. It would likely experience some economic
collateral damage from the combination of recessions in Europe and Russia and renewed global
financial market turmoil.¶ As recognition mounts of these "lose-lose" dynamics, look for economic
interests to gradually serve as an incentive to push each of the major parties to a messy compromise - one that is far from optimal but still attractive because it avoids a much worse outcome in the shortterm. And while such a compromise, as rational as it seems, is far from guaranteed, it would become a
more possible outcome over the next few weeks.¶ So what could a compromise look like? It would
probably be anchored by two things:¶ - First, the West would tolerate substantive and pervasive Russian
influence over Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine (including by acknowledging that Russia has a
"legitimate interest") while Russia "commits" to respect the de jure territorial integrity of Ukraine; and¶ Second, for its part, Russia would tolerate (indeed, support) a major IMF program for Ukraine which, in
addition to providing significant immediate financial assistance, would (to quote the recent G-7
statement) "be critical in unlocking additional assistance from the World Bank, other international
financial institutions, the EU, and bilateral sources," Russia could even acquiesce to deferring some of
what Ukraine owes it in debt service and other payments (including for energy supplies). ¶ Such a
compromise would reduce immediate economic and financial risks while providing time for all parties
involved to iterate to a more sustainable outcome. But it would only partially address some key issues
while completely ignoring others. As such, its durability would be limited.¶ Over the next few weeks,
good old-fashioned economic self-interest is likely to start dominating geo-political considerations
and could help to de-escalate a Ukrainian crisis that has already gone well beyond what most people
would have expected. However, this far-from-linear process will not resolve the crisis in any durable
and sustainable fashion. For that, Ukraine requires the combination of a strong home-grown solution
and a supportive external power that is influential enough to impose itself on other external players.
Neither of these possibilities seems likely, at least for quite a while.
2NC--No Impact/Authors Biased
The US has no role to play in the Ukraine crisis; it won’t affect us — their authors are
biased
Michael Cohen 3/3 “Don't listen to Obama's Ukraine critics: he's not 'losing' – and it's not his fight,”
The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/obama-ukraine-russiacritics-credibility
In the days since Vladimir Putin sent Russian troops into the Crimea, it has been amateur hour back in
Washington.
I don’t mean Barack Obama. He’s doing pretty much everything he can, with what are a very limited
set of policy options at his disposal. No, I’m talking about the people who won’t stop weighing in on
Obama’s lack of “action” in the Ukraine. Indeed, the sea of foreign policy punditry – already sharkinfested – has reached new lows in fear-mongering, exaggerated doom-saying and a stunning inability
to place global events in any rational historical context.¶ This would be a useful moment for Americans
to have informed reporters, scholars and leaders explaining a crisis rapidly unfolding half a world away.
Instead, we’ve already got all the usual suspect arguments:¶ Personality-driven Analysis¶ Let’s start
here with Julia Ioffe of the New Republic, a popular former reporter in Moscow who now tells us that
Putin has sent troops into Crimea “because he can. That’s it, that’s all you need to know”. It’s as if
things like regional interests, spheres of influence, geopolitics, coercive diplomacy and the potential
loss of a key ally in Kiev (as well as miscalculation) are alien concepts for Russian leaders.¶ Overstated
Rhetoric Shorn of Political Context¶ David Kramer, president of Freedom House, hit the ball out of the
park on this front when he hyperbolically declared that Obama’s response to Putin’s actions “will
define his two terms in office” and “the future of U.S. standing in the world”.¶ Honorable mention goes
to Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group for calling this crisis “the most seismic geopolitical events since
9/11”. Putting aside the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the Arab Spring, Syria’s civil war and tensions in the
South China Sea, Bremmer might have a point.¶ Unhelpful Policy Recommendations¶ Admiral James
Stavridis, former Supreme Commander of Nato, deserves a shout-out for calling on Nato to send
maritime forces into the Black Sea, among other inflammatory steps. No danger of miscalculation or
unnecessary provocation there. No, none at all.¶ Inappropriate Historical Analogies¶ So many to choose
from here, but when you compare seizing Crimea to the Nazi annexation of Austria in 1938, as Leonid
Bershidsky did at Bloomberg View, you pretty much blow away the competition.¶ Making It All About
Us¶ As in practically every international crisis, the pundit class seems able to view events solely through
the prism of US actions, which best explains Edward Luce in the Financial Times writing that Obama
needs to convince Putin “he will not be outfoxed”, or Scott Wilson at the Washington Post intimating
that this is all a result of America pulling back from military adventurism. Shocking as it may seem,
sometimes countries take actions based on how they view their interests, irrespective of who the US
did or did not bomb.¶ Missing from this “analysis” about how Obama should respond is why Obama
should respond. After all, the US has few strategic interests in the former Soviet Union and little
ability to affect Russian decision-making.¶ Our interests lie in a stable Europe, and that’s why the US
and its European allies created a containment structure that will ensure Russia’s territorial ambitions
will remain quite limited. (It’s called Nato.) Even if the Russian military wasn’t a hollow shell of the
once formidable Red Army, it’s not about to mess with a Nato country.¶ The US concerns vis-à-vis
Russia are the concerns that affect actual US interests. Concerns like nuclear non-proliferation, or
containing the Syrian civil war, or stopping Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Those are all areas where Moscow
has played an occasionally useful role.¶ So while Obama may utilize political capital to ratify the Start
treaty with Russia, he’s not going to extend it so save the Crimea. The territorial integrity of Ukraine is
not nothing, but it’s hardly in the top tier of US policy concerns.¶ What is America’s problem is ensuring
that Russia pays a price for violating international law and the global norm against inter-state war. The
formal suspension of a G8 summit in Sochi is a good first step. If Putin’s recalcitrance grows – and if he
further escalates the crisis – then that pressure can be ratcheted up.¶ But this crisis is Putin’s Waterloo,
not ours.¶ Which brings us to perhaps the most bizarre element of watching the Crimean situation
unfold through a US-centric lens: the iron-clad certainty of the pundit class that Putin is winning and
Obama is losing. The exact opposite is true.¶ Putin has initiated a conflict that will, quite obviously,
result in greater diplomatic and political isolation as well as the potential for economic sanction. He’s
compounded his loss of a key ally in Kiev by further enflaming Ukrainian nationalism, and his
provocations could have a cascading effect in Europe by pushing countries that rely on Russia’s
natural gas exports to look elsewhere for their energy needs. Putin is the leader of a country with a
weak military, an under-performing economy and a host of social, environmental and health-related
challenges. Seizing the Crimea will only make the problems facing Russia that much greater.¶ For
Obama and the US, sure, there might be less Russian help on Syria going forward – not that there was
much to begin with – and it could perhaps affect negotiations on Iran. But those issues are manageable.
Meanwhile, Twitter and the opinion pages and the Sunday shows and too many blog posts that could be
informative have been filled with an over-the-top notion: that failure to respond to Russia’s action will
weaken America’s credibility with its key allies. To which I would ask: where are they gonna go? If
anything, America’s key European allies are likely to fold the quickest, because, you know, gas. And
why would any US ally in the Far East want Obama wasting his time on the Crimea anyway?¶ You don’t
have to listen to the “do something” crowd. These are the same people who brought you the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, among other greatest hits. These are armchair “experts” convinced that every
international problem is a vital interest of the US; that the maintenance of “credibility” and “strength”
is essential, and that any demonstration of “weakness” is a slippery slope to global anarchy and
American obsolescence; and that being wrong and/or needlessly alarmist never loses one a seat at the
table.¶ The funny thing is, these are often the same people who bemoan the lack of public support for a
more muscular American foreign policy. Gee, I wonder why.
*****AFF Update*****
De Novo Pic – AT Net Benefit
2AC—Unitary Executive Bad
Unitary executive weakens the presidency
Dean 9 (John W. Dean, former Counsel to the President, Chief Minority Counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of
Representatives, the Associate Director of a law reform commission, and Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States, graduate
fellowship from American University to study government and the presidency, before entering Georgetown University Law Center, 1/9/09,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20090109.html)
During the past eight years, President Bush has asserted presidential power in a singular fashion,
drawing on the concept of a “unitary executive” who has unquestioned authority in times of war and
is not beholden to international laws or treaties. This unusually broad interpretation of the Constitution
provided the rationale for actions after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, including the establishment of
military tribunals to try enemy combatants, the authorization of warrantless electronic surveillance of
Americans and the assertion that the president may use any interrogation technique he deems
necessary to protect national security. There is a widespread perception that Bush’s actions have
collectively strengthened the presidency and fundamentally altered the balance of power between the
executive and legislative branches. Bush, in many ways, embodies the concept of an “imperial
presidency” as sketched by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in the 1970s to describe chief executives
who push their power to the absolute limit. But many experts believe Bush’s assertions of power have
left the presidency fundamentally weaker, both for legal and political reasons. His boldest step, the
order to convene military tribunals, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2006. The
warrantless surveillance program triggered a host of as-yet-unresolved legal challenges and
antagonized Congress, making it unlikely that Obama, for pragmatic reasons, would risk a similarly
daring policy without sensitivity to legal precedents or clear-cut authorization by the legislative
branch. In general, the experts predict, Obama will derive more clout and influence by dialing back
Bush’s conception of executive power and taking a more circumscribed view of the presidency. Bush’s
actions “made the institution of the presidency more suspect in the eyes of Congress,” said Stephen J.
Wayne, a presidential scholar at Georgetown University. “I think it’s generated a lot of resentment that
will result in Congress demanding more collaboration from the president. Obama knows how the Senate
works and understands the needs of members. His thinking is based on bringing groups together and
unity, and that means give and take, not just pronouncing.”
2AC—Executive Overreach Bad
Executive overreach spills over – justifies global preeminence, which results in war
Sloane 2008 (Robert, R. Gordon Butler Scholar in International Law, Professor of Law, BA, magna cum
laude, Columbia University JD, Yale Law School, “SYMPOSIUM: THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: ARTICLE: THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
AN INTRODUCTION”)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century. But it is
vital to appreciate that the scope of the executive power, particularly in the twenty-first century, is not only a constitutional or historical issue.
As an international lawyer rather than a constitutionalist, I want to stress briefly that these
debates and their concrete
manifestations in U.S. law and policy potentially exert a profound effect on the shape of international law.
Justice Sutherland's sweeping dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., that the President enjoys a "very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power ... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress," n52 has been (correctly, in my
view) criticized on a host of grounds. n53 But in practice, in part for institutional and structural reasons, n54 it accurately reflects the
general preeminence of the President in the realm of U.S. foreign affairs. Because of the nature of the international legal
and political system, what U.S. Presidents do and say often establish precedents that strongly influence
what other states do and say - with potentially dramatic consequences for the shape of customary international
law. The paradigmatic example is the establishment of customary international law on the continental shelf following the Truman
Proclamation of September 28, 1945, n55 which produced an echo of similar claims and counterclaims, culminating in a whole new corpus of
the international law of the sea for what had previously been understood only as a geological term of art. n56 Many states took note, for
example, when in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States ("NSS"), President Bush
asserted that the United States
had the right under international law to engage in preventive wars of [*350] self-defense. n57 While, contrary to
popular belief, the United States never in fact formally relied on that doctrine in practice, many would argue that President Bush de facto
exercised this purported right when he initiated an armed conflict with Iraq based on claims, which have since proved unfounded, about its
incipient programs to develop catastrophic weapons. The 2006 NSS notably retreats from the 2002 NSS's robust claims of a right to engage in
preventive wars of self-defense. n58 Yet even within this brief, four-year period, an
astonishing number of other states have
asserted a comparable right to engage in preventive self-defense. These include not only states that the
United States has described as "rogue states," such as North Korea and Iran, but Australia, Japan, the U nited
Kingdom, China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, and (though technically not a state) Taiwan. n59 I doubt we will welcome the
consequences of this pattern for the evolving jus ad bellum of the twenty-first century. Equally, after President Bush's decision to declare a
global war on terror or terrorism - rather than, for example, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their immediate allies - virtually every insurgency or
disaffected minority around the world, including peoples suffering under repressive regimes and seeking to assert legitimate rights to liberty
techniques
justified by the United States, including the resurrection of rationalized torture as an
"enhanced interrogation technique," n61 likewise have emerged - and will continue to emerge - in the [*351]
practice of other states. Because of customary international law's acute sensitivity to authoritative assertions of power, the
widespread repetition of claims and practices initiated by the U.S. executive may well shape
international law in ways the United States ultimately finds disagreeable in the future. So as we debate the scope
and self-determination, has been recharacterized by opportunistic state elites as part of the enemy in this global war. n60 The
employed and
of the executive power in the twenty-first century, the stakes, as several panelists point out, could not be higher. They include more than
national issues such as the potential
for executive branch officials to be prosecuted or impeached for exceeding
the legal scope of their authority or violating valid statutes. n62 They also include international issues
like the potential use of catastrophic weapons by a rogue regime asserting a right to engage in
preventive war; the deterioration of international human rights norms against practices like torture,
norms which took years to establish; and the atrophy of genuine U.S. power in the international arena,
which, as diplomats, statesmen, and international relations theorists of all political persuasions
appreciate, demands far more than the largest and most technologically advanced military arsenal. In short, what
Presidents do, internationally as well as domestically - the precedents they establish - may affect not only the
technical scope of the executive power, as a matter of constitutional law, but the practical ability of
future Presidents to exercise that power both at home and abroad. We should candidly debate whether terrorism or
other perceived crises require an expanded scope of executive power in the twenty-first century. But it is dangerous to cloak the true stakes of
that debate with the expedient of a new - and, in the view of most, indefensible - "monarchical executive" theory, which claims to be
coextensive with the defensible, if controversial, original Unitary Executive theory. n63 We
should also weigh the costs and
benefits of an expanded scope of executive power. But it is vital to appreciate that there are costs.
They include not only short-term, acute consequences but long-term, systemic consequences that
may not become fully apparent for years. In fact, the exorbitant exercise of broad, supposedly inherent, executive powers may
well - as in the aftermath of the Nixon administration - culminate in precisely the sort of reactive statutory constraints and de facto diplomatic
obstacles that proponents of a robust executive regard as misguided and a threat to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.
2AC—No impact
Fourth-generation warfare isn’t a threat—disregard their fearmongering
Echevarria 05 (Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, Director of National Security Affairs, and
Acting Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the Strategic Studies Institute;
Graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College; M.A.
and Ph.D. degrees in History from Princeton University, “Fourth-Generation War And Other Myths”,
November 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB632.pdf)
The notion of [Fourth Generation Warfare] 4GW first appeared in the late 1980s as a vague sort of
“out of the box” thinking, and it entertained every popular conjecture about future warfare. However,
instead of examining the way terrorists belonging to Hamas or Hezbollah (or now Al Qaeda) actually
behave, it misleadingly pushed the storm-trooper ideal as the terrorist of tomorrow. Instead of looking
at the probability that such terrorists would improvise with respect to the weapons they used—box
cutters, aircraft, and improvised explosive devices—it posited high-tech “wonder” weapons.¶ The
theory went through a second incarnation when the notion of nontrinitarian war came into vogue; but it
failed to examine that notion critically. The theory also is founded on myths about the so-called
Westphalian system and the theory of blitzkrieg. The theory of 4GW reinvented itself once again after
September 11, 2001 (9/11), when its proponents claimed that Al Qaeda was waging a 4GW against the
United States. Rather than thinking critically about future warfare, the theory’s proponents became
more concerned with demonstrating that they had predicted the future. While their
recommendations are often rooted in common sense, they are undermined by being tethered to an
empty theory.¶ What we are really seeing in the war on terror, and the campaign in Iraq and
elsewhere, is that the increased “dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and
finance” brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access
worldwide. At this point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more than the state, but states
still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies.¶ We would do well to
abandon the theory of 4GW altogether, since it sheds very little, if any, light on this phenomenon.