Round 1 Texas
1AC
1AC – Plan
The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States. The
process of legalization should at least include the United States limiting the
United States Congress’ commerce clause authority to prohibit marihuana.
1AC Prohibition
Contention 1 is Prohibition
Scenario 1 is Harm Reduction:
The prohibitionist model remains the global norm for drug policy—this prevents
effective Federal legalization sends a global signal in favor of ending drug
prohibition—causes a shift in other countries towards harm reduction strategies
Joshua D. Wild 13, “The Uncomfortable Truth about the United States’ Role in the Failure of the Global War on Drugs and How It
is Going to Fix It,” SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW v. 36, Summer 2013, p. 437-446
The War on Drugs' demise started when the bellicose analogy was created. n77 The correct classification of the global drug
problem was and still is as a set of interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, not a war
to be won. n78 The U.S. has worked strenuously for the past fifty years to ensure that all countries
adopt its rigid, prohibitionist approach to drug policy, essentially repressing the potential for
alternative policy development and experimentation. n79 This was an expensive mistake that the U.S.
unfortunately cannot take back. n80 The current emergence from the economic recession of 2008-2009 has set the stage for a
generational, political and cultural shift, placing the U.S. in a unique moment in its history; the necessary sociopolitical context to
revoke its prohibitionist ideals and replace them with more modern policies grounded in health, science and humanity. n81 The
U.S. can remedy its mistake by using its considerable diplomatic influence and international
presence to foster reform in other countries. n82 One way to do this is by capitalizing [*438] on this unique moment
in its existence and experimenting with models of legal regulation, specifically with marijuana because nearly half
of U.S. citizens favor legalization of it. n83 This will help redeem our image internationally and help repair
foreign relations because the monumental scope of the international marijuana market is largely created by the exorbitant
U.S. demand for the drug which partially stems from the illegality of the market. n84 B. Step 1: Recognize the Ineffectiveness of The
Global War on Drugs and Consider Alternatives An objective way to gauge the effectiveness of a drug policy is to examine how the
policy manages the most toxic drugs and the problems associated with them. n85 With that in mind, at the global level,
having one in five intravenous drug users have HIV and one in every two users having Hepatitis C
is clearly an epidemic and not the result of effective drug control policies. n86 The threat of arrest and
punishment as a deterrent from people using drugs is sound in theory, but in practice this hypothesis is tenuous. n87 Countries
that have enacted harsh, punitive laws have higher levels of drug use and related problems than
countries with more tolerant approaches. n88 Additionally, the countries that have experimented with
forms of legal regulation outside of punitive approaches have not seen rises in drug use and
dependence [*439] rates. n89 Therefore, one sensible first step in placing this issue back into a manageable position is for
national governments to encourage other governments to experiment with models of legal regulation of
drugs which fit their context. n90 This will in turn, undermine the criminal market, enhance national security, and allow other
countries to learn from their application. n91 1. Easier to Say Than Do - A Suggestion for Overcoming Difficulties Associated With
Legal Regulation For this movement to be successful and effectively manage the epidemic at hand there must be a broad
consensus around the world that the current drug control policies are morally harmful. n92 This consensus however is precluded by
the stigma and fear associated with more toxic drugs such as heroin. n93 This note does not propose that heroin and other toxic
drugs should be legalized but instead suggests that society and drug policies tend to consolidate and classify all illicit drugs as
equally dangerous. n94 This in turn restrains any progressive debate about experimenting with the regulation of different drugs
under different standards. n95 [*440] Regardless of these false dichotomies, which often restrain progressive debate, it is difficult
not to give credence to the idea of marijuana being socially acceptable when it has been by far the most widely produced and
consumed illicit drug. n96 There is between 125 and 203 million users worldwide and no indication of that number declining. n97
With this many users, it is reasonable to conclude that if the international community could reach a consensus about the moral
noxiousness of any drug control policy, the repression of marijuana would likely be it. n98 Marijuana, arguably socially
acceptable, represents a simple mechanism to enter into the experimentation process with the
legal regulation of drugs. n99 Without advocating for the UN to adopt new commissions or encouraging drastic moves such
as the decriminalization of all illicit substances, the global decriminalization of marijuana would be a relatively minor adjustment
compared to the monumental impact. n100 If national governments were to decriminalize marijuana, the scope of this movement
would essentially eradicate the public health problem of marijuana abuse and the associated criminality because of its illegal status.
n101 Public health problems can be remedied because it will afford governments the ability to regulate the market and control the
quality and price of the drug, essentially removing toxic impurities and setting a price that will diminish an illegal market. n102 This
will in turn diminish the criminal market [*441] by eradicating the need for users to commit crimes to procure marijuana and removing
the economic incentive for other countries to get involved in the drug's market. n103 Without arguing that this is the panacea for the
global war on drugs, proponents of legalization can aptly point to the archaic drug control policies in place and this macro approach
as an effective way to tackle the problem now. n104 C. Step 2: Real Reform - the U.S. Needs to Stand at the Forefront
of Drug Policy Reformation The U.S. wields considerable influence over the rest of the world, so it
is no surprise that its call for the development and maintenance of prohibitive, punitive drug
policies resulted in a majority of the international community following. n105 Conversely, if the U.S.
leads the call for the development and maintenance of more tolerant drug policies grounded in
health, humanity and science, a majority of the international community will also follow. n106 Cultural
shifts do not take place overnight, and the idea of complete U.S. drug policy reformation is too aggressive and stark in contrast to
succeed against modern bureaucracy and political alliances. n107 On the other hand, a more moderate, piecemeal approach could
effectively act as a catalyst for this transformation while simultaneously serving as a case study for opponents of legal regulation.
n108 [*442] If the U.S. is serious about addressing the ineffectiveness of the War on Drugs, then the
federal government must remove marijuana from its list of criminally banned substances. n109 The
tone of the Obama administration is a significant step in this direction. n110 President Obama has explicitly acknowledged the need
to treat drugs as more of a public health problem, as well as the validity of debate on alternatives, but he does not favor drug
legalization. n111 This progressive rhetoric is a significant step in the right direction, but until there is
some real reform confronting the issue, reducing punitive measures and supporting other countries to develop drug
policies that suit their context, there is still an abdication of policy responsibility. n112 1. Starting Small - Potential
Positive Effects of Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana in the U.S. If marijuana was legal in the U.S., it would function similarly to
the market of legal substances such as liquor, coffee and tobacco. n113 Individual and corporate participants in the market would
pay taxes, increasing revenues and saving the government from the exorbitant cost of trying to enforce prohibition laws. n114
Consumers' human rights would be promoted through self-determination, autonomy and access to more accurate information about
the product they are consuming. n115 Additionally, case studies and research suggest that the decriminalization or legalization
[*443] of marijuana reduces the drugs' consumption and does not necessarily result in a more favorable attitude towards it. n116
The legal regulation of marijuana would relieve the current displaced burden the drug places on law enforcement, domestically and
internationally. n117 In the U.S., law enforcement could refocus their efforts away from reducing the marijuana market per se and
instead towards reducing harm to individuals, communities and national security. n118 Abroad, U.S. international
relations would improve because of the reduced levels of corruption and violence at home and
afar. n119 The precarious position repressive policies place on foreign governments when they have to destroy
the livelihoods of agricultural workers would be reduced. n120 Additionally, legalization and regulation
would provide assistance to governments in regaining some degree of control over the regions
dominated by drug dealers and terrorist groups because those groups would lose a major source
of funding for their organizations. n121 2. Health Concerns? - Marijuana in Comparison to Other Similar Legal
Substances The federal government, acknowledging the risks inherent in alcohol and tobacco, argues that adding a third substance
to that mix cannot be beneficial. n122 Adding anything to a class of [*444] dangerous substances is likely never going to be
beneficial; however marijuana would be incorrectly classified if it was equated with those two substances. n123 Marijuana is far less
toxic and addictive than alcohol and tobacco. n124 Long term use of marijuana is far less damaging than long term alcohol or
tobacco use. n125 Alcohol use contributes to aggressive and reckless behavior, acts of violence and serious injuries while
marijuana actually reduces likelihood of aggressive behavior or violence during intoxication and is seldom associated with
emergency room visits. n126 As with most things in life, there can be no guarantee that the legalization or decriminalization of
marijuana would lead the U.S. to a better socio-economical position in the future. n127 Two things however, are certain: that the
legalization of marijuana in the U.S. would dramatically reduce most of the costs associated with the current drug policies,
domestically and internationally, and [*445] if the U.S. is serious about its objective of considering the costs
of drug control measures, then it is vital and rational for the legalization option is considered . n128
D. Why the Time is Ripe for U.S. Drug Policy Reformation The political atmosphere at the end of
World War I and II was leverage for the U.S., emerging as the dominant political, economic and military
power. n129 This leverage allowed it to shape a prohibitive drug control regime that until now has
remained in perpetuity. n130 Today, we stand in a unique moment inside of U.S. history. n131 The
generational, political and cultural shifts that accompanied the U.S. emergence from the "Great
Recession" resulted in a sociopolitical climate that may be what is necessary for real reform. n132
Politically, marijuana has become a hot issue; economically, the marijuana industry is bolstering a faltering economy and socially,
marijuana is poised to transform the way we live and view medicine. n133 The public disdain for the widespread problems
prohibition caused in the early 20th century resulted in the end of alcohol prohibition during the Great Depression. n134 If history
does actually repeat itself than the Great recession may have been much more telling than expected. n135 V. Conclusion The U.S.
and its prohibitionist ideals exacerbated the failure of both the international and its own domestic drug policies. n136 As a result ,
the U.S. should accept accountability for its mistakes by reforming its drug policies in a way that
will help [*446] place the global drug market back into a manageable position . n137 Marijuana is an
actionable, evidence based mechanism for constructive legal and policy reform that through a domino effect
can transform the global drug prohibition regime . n138 The generational, political and cultural shifts that accompanied
the U.S. emergence from the "Great Recession" have resulted in a sociopolitical climate ready for real reform. n139 The U.S.
will capitalize on this unique moment by removing marijuana from the list of federally banned substances, setting the
stage for future international and domestic drug policies that are actually effective. n140
Global prohibition has massively undermined public health efforts to deal with
the spread of diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis
Steven Rolles 12, senior policy analyst, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, founder, and Jane Slater, Transform
Drug Policy Foundation, THE ALTERNATIVE WORLD DRUG REPORT: COUNTING THE CSTS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS, 2012,
p. 9-12.
5. Threatening public health, spreading disease and death While the war on drugs has primarily been
promoted as a way of protecting health, it has in reality achieved the opposite. It has not only failed in its key aim of reducing or
increased risks and created new health harms – all while establishing political
obstacles to effective public health interventions that might reduce them. • Prevention
and harm reduction messages are undermined by criminalisation of target populations, leading to
distrust and stigmatisation • Criminalisation encourages high-risk behaviours, such as injecting in
unhygienic, unsupervised environments, poly-drug use and bingeing • Enforcement tilts the market towards more
potent but profitable drug products. It can also fuel the emergence of high-risk , new “designer” drugs, or domestically
manufactured drugs (“krokadil”, for instance) • Illegally produced and supplied drugs are of unknown strength and purity,
increasing the risk of overdose, poisoning and infection • The emotive politics of the drug war, and
stigmatisation of drug users, has created obstacles to provision of effective harm reduction, which despite
proven cost-effectiveness remains unavailable in many parts of the world. This contributes to increased overdose
deaths, and fuels the spread of HIV/ AIDS , hepatitis , and tuberculosis among people who inject drugs • The
growing population of people who use drugs in prisons has created a particularly acute health
crisis, as prisons are high-risk environments, inadequately equipped to deal with the challenges they face • The development
impacts of the war on drugs have had much wider negative impacts on health service provision • Drugwar politics have had a chilling effect on provision of opiates for pain control and palliative care,
with over five billion people having little or no access There is an absence of evidence that either
supply- or user-level enforcement interventions have reduced or eliminated use. Instead, drug-related risk is
eliminating drug use, but has
and practical
increased and new harms created – with the greatest burden carried by the most vulnerable populations.
Unchecked AIDS spread causes extinction
(WAIF) 4 Washington AIDS International Foundation, staff, 2004. Available from the World Wide Web at: www.waifaction.org/,
accessed 5-27-09.
Virtually every
nation in the world has been severely hit by the plague of AIDS; we are experiencing an
extinction-causing event. There are no vaccines, no cures, and no group that is not vulnerable .
And, because it is spread largely by sex and by mother-to-child contact, and to a smaller degree by blood contact, it is hitting those
of childbearing age the hardest. This is a silent killer. Without testing, it can go undetected for many years, even as the
carrier transmits it to others. Unfortunately, we know only the most advanced cases in most of the countries of the world. Many
millions of others may be infected, but in the latent stage. WAIF is committed to educate the public about the emergency of the AIDS
epidemic.
Tuberculosis causes extinction—mutations and empirics
Ethan Huff 2/3/14 “Sudden collapse of Harappan civilization may foreshadow superbug threat to modern humans”
http://www.naturalnews.com/043757_harappan_civilization_superbugs_antibiotic_resistance.html#
The mystery surrounding the sudden collapse of the ancient city of Harappa, a major urban center that was a prominent feature of
the now defunct Indus civilization, recently became a little bit less mysterious thanks to new research out of Appalachian State
University. An international team of climatologists, archaeologists and biologists found that rampant disease, among other things,
played a major role in the swift decline of this primordial people group -- and the same thing could happen to modern humanity as a
result of antibiotic-resistant "superbugs," believe some. What exists from the historical record shows that Harappa flourished even
before the Indus civilization as a whole reached its peak, spanning 1 million square kilometers in what is now Pakistan and India.
Scholars say the city thrived primarily between the years of 2600 and 1700 B.C. but suddenly collapsed for reasons that up until
now have remained elusive due to a lack of reliable records and other concrete evidence. But we now know that the
uncontrolled spread of disease played a significant role in the downfall of Harappa, as did the violence
and chaos that erupted as a result of a widening social hierarchy. Specifically, the new research found that a combination of
socioeconomic inequality and disease -- tuberculosis and leprosy, which were new at the time, are believed to
have spread quickly during the final days before the collapse -- were largely to blame for the city's
ultimate demise. "In this case, it appears that the rapid urbanization process in Indus cities, and the increasingly large amount of
culture contact, brought new challenges to the human population," says Gwen Robbins Schug, one of the lead researchers involved
with the project. "Infectious diseases like leprosy and tuberculosis were probably transmitted across an interaction sphere that
spanned Middle and South Asia." Rapid urbanization spawned disease spread that killed
off entire
civilization A recent exhumation of remains from Harappa revealed that, toward the end of the city's existence, violence and
disease had reached epic proportions. Because of this, Harappa was essentially being evacuated in droves by its residents during
the final days leading up to its collapse, a previously unknown fact about the civilization that came as a surprise to historians. "The
collapse of the Indus civilization and the reorganization of its human population has been controversial for a long time," says Schug.
Though the exact cause of all the violence and corresponding disease that ravished Harappa is still somewhat shrouded in mystery,
experts now know that a period of rapid urbanization definitely precluded its undoing. Much like what appears to be occurring in
modern society, Harappa "advanced" too quickly and eventually imploded on itself. "The evidence from Harappa offers insights into
how social and biological challenges impacted past societies facing rapid population growth, climate change and environmental
degradation," adds Schug, as quoted by Science Daily. "Unfortunately, in this case, increasing levels of violence and disease
accompanied massive levels of migration and resource stress and disproportionate impacts were felt by the
most vulnerable members of society." Drug-resistant 'superbugs' threaten to kill off modern civilization There is a tendency when
looking at ancient history through the lens of today to assume that what happened to them could never happen to us. Modern
humanity is simply far too advanced to ever just collapse in on itself, goes the assumption. And yet history also has a seemingly
sinister way of repeating itself when you least expect it, in modern times with the threat of drug-resistant "superbugs"
brought about as a result of so-called advancements in medicine.
AIDS threatens to cause a demographic crisis in Russia—transitioning to a harm reduction
model is key
Simeon Bennett, and Stepan Kravchenko, “HIV Epidemic Plagues Russia as Government Rejects
Prevention Methods,” BLOOMBERG, 1—13—14, www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-13/russian-hivsurge-shows-scourge-sochi-games-swagger-can-t-mask.html, accessed 9-29-14.
Treatment programs would have an immediate impact and costs would drop in two to three years,
according to the World Bank. If Russia doesn’t act, expenses will mount and disruption to workers and
families might further damp the economy , deprive the army of recruits and tear at the social fabric. “You’ve
got impacts on the health system,” says David Wilson, director of the World Bank’s Global HIV/AIDS program.
“You’ve got impacts on the social system, you’ve got impacts on child rearing, you’ve got impacts on crime and
antisocial behavior, all of which exert a toll.” Without effective AIDS prevention, Pokrovsky is seeing
another disturbing trend. HIV cases acquired through heterosexual sex are rising, accounting for about a
third of new infections. That may signal the epidemic is entering the general population, he says. AIDS in
2010 was the third-biggest cause of premature death in Russia, behind heart disease and stroke, up
from 10th in 2005, according to the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of
Washington.
This increases reliance on nukes and risks a miscalculated war
Nicholas Eberstadt, analyst, American Enterprise Institute, “The Dying Bear: Russia’s Demographic
disaster,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 90 n. 6, November/December 2011, p. 106-108.
Throughout the Putin and Medvedev eras, the potential security risks to Russia from the ongoing
demographic crisis have weighed heavily on the minds of the country’s leaders. In his first State of the
Nation address, in July 2000, Putin declared that “year by year, we, the citizens of Russia, are getting
fewer and fewer. . . . We face the threat of becoming a senile nation.” In his 2006 address, he identified
demographics as “the most acute problem facing our country today.” In Medvedev’s May 2009 National
Security Strategy, the country’s demographic situation was noted as one of the “new security
challenges” that Russia must confront in the years ahead. In other words, the potential ramifications of
Russia’s population trends are not entirely lost on the Kremlin—and they are hardly just a domestic
concern. But how will Russia’s bunkered and undemocratic leaders cope with the demographic
pressures and unfavorable human resource trends that are undermining their goals? For the
international community, this may be the single most disturbing aspect of Russia’s peacetime
population crisis: it is possible that Russia’s demographic decline could prompt Moscow to become a more
unpredictable , even menacing, actor on the world stage. Most immediately and dramatically, the decline
could lead Russia’s military leaders, aware of their deficiencies in both manpower and advanced
technology, to lower the threshold at which they might consider using nuclear weapons in moments of
crisis. Indeed, such thinking was first outlined in Putin’s 2000 National Security Concept and was
reaffrmed in Medvedev’s 2009 National Security Strategy. The official Russian thinking is that nuclear
weapons are Russia’s trump card: the more threatening the international environment, the more
readily Moscow will resort to nuclear diplomacy. For the moment, the Kremlin evidently still believes
that its ambitious long-term socioeconomic plans will not only remedy the country’s demographic woes
but also propel Russia into the select ranks of the world’s economic superpowers. But if Russia’s
demographic decline and relative economic decline continue over the next few decades, as they most
likely will, Moscow’s leaders will be unable to sustain that illusion. Indeed, once the Kremlin finally
confronts the true depths of the country’s ugly demographic truths, Russia’s political leaders could very
well become more alarmist, mercurial, and confrontational in their international posture. And in the
process, Moscow might become more prone to miscalculation when it comes to relations with both allies and
rivals. Meanwhile, Russia is surrounded by countries whose stability and comity in the decades ahead
are anything but given: for example, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and the Cen- tral Asian
republics. If Russia's periphery becomes more unstable and threatening at the same time that Russia's
rulers realize their relative power is waning, the Kremlin's behavior may well become less confident—
and more risky.
Extinction
Steven Starr, senior scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility, “The climatic Consequences of Nuclear
War,” BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 3—21—10, http://thebulletin.org/climatic-consequencesnuclear-war, accessed 9-25-14.
This isn't a question to be avoided. Recent scientific studies have found that a war fought with the
deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would leave Earth virtually uninhabitable . In fact, NASA
computer models have shown that even a "successful" first strike by Washington or Moscow would inflict
catastrophic environmental damage that would make agriculture impossible and cause mass starvation.
Similarly, in the January Scientific American, Alan Robock and Brian Toon, the foremost experts on the
climatic impact of nuclear war, warn that the environmental consequences of a "regional" nuclear war
would cause a global famine that could kill one billion people.
Scenario 2 is the Environment:
Unregulated marijuana has a massive environmental impact—federal legalization
key
Zuckerman 13 (Seth, journalist, 10-31-13, "Is Pot-Growing Bad for the Environment?" The Nation)
www.thenation.com/article/176955/pot-growing-bad-environment?page=0,2
As cannabis production has ramped up in Northern California to meet the demand for medical and black-market
marijuana, the ecological impacts of its cultivation have ballooned. From shrunken, muddy streams to rivers choked
with algae and wild lands tainted with chemical poisons, large-scale cannabis agriculture is emerging as a
significant threat to the victories that have been won in the region to protect wilderness, keep toxic chemicals out of the
environment, and rebuild salmon runs that had once provided the backbone of a coast-wide fishing industry. River advocate
Scott Greacen has spent most of his career fighting dams and the timber industry, but now he’s widened his focus to include the
costs of reckless marijuana growing. Last year was a time of region-wide rebound for threatened salmon runs, but one of his
colleagues walked his neighborhood creek and sent a downbeat report that only a few spawning fish had returned. Even more
alarming was the condition of the creek bed: coated with silt and mud, a sign that the water quality in this stream was going downhill.
“The problem with the weed industry is that its impacts are severe, it’s not effectively regulated, and it’s growing so rapidly,”
says Greacen, executive director of Friends of the Eel River, which runs through the heart of the marijuana belt. That lack of
regulation sets marijuana’s impacts apart from those that stem from legal farming or logging, yet the 76year-old federal prohibition on cannabis has thwarted attempts to hold its production to any kind of
environmental standard . As a result, the ecological impact of an ounce of pot varies tremendously, depending on whether it
was produced by squatters in national forests, hydroponic operators in homes and warehouses, industrial-scale operations on
private land, or conscientious mom-and-pop farmers. Consumers could exert market power through their choices, if only they had a
reliable, widely accepted certification program, like the ones that guarantee the integrity of organic agriculture. But thanks to the
prohibition on pot, no such certification program exists for cannabis products. To understand how raising some dried flowers—the
prized part of the cannabis plant—can damage the local ecosystem, you first have to grasp the skyrocketing scale of backwoods
agriculture on the redwood coast. Last fall, Scott Bauer of the California Department of Fish and Wildlife turned a mapping crew loose on satellite photos of two adjoining creeks. In the Staten
Island–sized area that drains into those streams, his team identified more than 1,000 cannabis farms, estimated to produce some 40,000 small-tree-sized plants annually. Bauer holds up the maps, where each
greenhouse is marked in blue and each outdoor marijuana garden in red, with dots that correspond to the size of the operation. It looks like the landscape has a severe case of Technicolor acne. “In the last
couple of years, the increase has been exponential,” Bauer says. “On the screen, you can toggle back and forth between the 2010 aerial photo and the one from 2012. Where there had been one or two sites, now
there are ten.” Each of those sites represents industrial development in a mostly wild landscape, with the hilly terrain flattened and cleared. “When someone shaves off a mountaintop and sets a facility on it,”
Bauer says, “that’s never changing. The topsoil is gone.” The displaced soil is then spread by bulldozer to build up a larger flat pad for greenhouses and other farm buildings. But heavy winter rains wash some of
the soil into streams, Bauer explains, where it sullies the salmon’s spawning gravels and fills in the pools where salmon fry spend the summer. Ironically, these are the very impacts that resulted from the worst
logging practices of the last century. “We got logging to the point that the rules are pretty tight,” Bauer says, “and now there’s this whole new industry where nobody has any idea what they’re doing. You see guys
building roads who have never even used a Cat [Caterpillar tractor]. We’re going backwards.” Then there’s irrigation. A hefty cannabis plant needs several gallons of water per day in the rainless summer growing
season, which doesn’t sound like much until you multiply it by thousands of plants and consider that many of the streams in the area naturally dwindle each August and September. In the summer of 2012, the two
creeks that Bauer’s team mapped got so low that they turned into a series of disconnected pools with no water flowing between them, trapping the young fish in shrinking ponds. “It’s a serious issue for the coho
salmon,” Bauer says. “How is this species going to recover if there’s no water?” The effects extend beyond salmon. During several law enforcement raids last year, Bauer surveyed the creeks supplying marijuana
farms to document the environmental violations occurring there. Each time, he says, he found a sensitive salamander species above the grower’s water intakes, but none below them, where the irrigation pipes
had left little water in the creek. On one of these raids, he chastised the grower, who was camped out onsite and hailed from the East Coast, new to the four- to six-month dry season that comes with California’s
Mediterranean climate. “I told him, ‘You’re taking most of the flow, man,’ ” Bauer recalls. “’It’s just a little tiny creek, and you’ve got three other growers downstream. If you’re all taking 20 or 30 percent, pretty soon
there’s nothing left for the fish.’ So he says, ‘I didn’t think about that.’ ” While some growers raise their pot organically, many do not. “Once you get to a certain scale, it’s really hard to operate in a sustainable
way,” Greacen says. “Among other things, you’ve got a monoculture, and monocultures invite pests.” Spider mites turn out to be a particular challenge for greenhouse growers. Tony Silvaggio, a lecturer at
Humboldt State University and a scholar at the campus’s year-old Humboldt Institute for Interdisciplinary Marijuana Research, found that potent poisons such as Avid and Floramite are sold in small vials under
the counter at grower supply stores, in defiance of a state law that requires they be sold only to holders of a pesticide applicator’s license. Nor are just the workers at risk: the miticides have been tested for use on
decorative plants, but not for their impacts if smoked. Otherwise ecologically minded growers can be driven to spray with commercial pesticides, Silvaggio has found in his research. “After you’ve worked for
months, if you have an outbreak of mites in your last few weeks when the buds are going, you’ve got to do something—otherwise you lose everything,” he says. Outdoor growers face another threat: rats, which
are drawn to the aromatic, sticky foliage of the cannabis plant. Raids at growing sites typically find packages of the long-acting rodent poison warfarin, which has begun making its way up the food chain to
predators such as the rare, weasel-like fisher. A study last year in the online scientific journal PLOS One found that more than 70 percent of fishers have rat poison in their bloodstream, and attributed four fisher
deaths to internal bleeding triggered by the poison they absorbed through their prey. Deep in the back-country, Silvaggio says, growers shoot or poison bears to keep them from raiding their encampments. The
final blow to environmental health from outdoor growing comes from fertilizers. Growers dump their used potting soil, enriched with unabsorbed fertilizers, in places where it washes into nearby streams and is
suspected of triggering blooms of toxic algae. The deaths of four dogs on Eel River tributaries have been linked to the algae, which the dogs ingest after swimming in the river and then licking their fur. The
cannabis industry—or what Silvaggio calls the “marijuana-industrial complex”—has been building toward this collision with the environment ever since California voters approved Proposition 215 in 1996,
legalizing the medicinal use of marijuana under state law. Seven years later, the legislature passed Senate Bill 420, which allows patients growing pot with a doctor’s blessing to form collectives and sell their
herbal remedy to fellow patients. Thus were born the storefront dispensaries, which grew so common that they came to outnumber Starbucks outlets in Los Angeles. From the growers’ point of view, a 100-plant
operation no longer had to be hidden, because its existence couldn’t be presumed illegal under state law. So most growers stopped hiding their plants in discreet back-country clearings or buried shipping
containers and instead put them out in the open. As large grows became less risky, they proliferated—and so did their effects on the environment. Google Earth posted satellite photos taken in August 2012, when
most outdoor pot gardens were nearing their peak. Working with Silvaggio, a graduate student identified large growing sites in the area, and posted a Google Earth flyover tour of the region that makes it clear that
the two creeks Bauer’s team studied are representative of the situation across the region. With all of the disturbance from burgeoning backwoods marijuana gardens, it might seem that raising cannabis indoors
would be the answer. Indoor growers can tap into municipal water supplies and don’t have to clear land or build roads to farms on hilltop hideaways. But indoor growing is responsible instead for a more insidious
brand of damage: an outsize carbon footprint to power the electric-intensive lights, fans and pumps that it takes to raise plants inside. A dining-table-size hydroponic unit yielding five one-pound crops per year
would consume as much electricity as the average US home, according to a 2012 paper in the peer-reviewed journal Energy Policy. All told, the carbon footprint of a single gram of cannabis is the same as driving
seventeen miles in a Honda Civic. In addition, says Kristin Nevedal, president of the Emerald Growers Association, “the tendency indoors is to lean toward chemical fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides to stabilize
the man-made environment, because you don’t have the natural beneficials that are found outdoors.” Nevertheless, the appeal of indoor growing is strong, explains Sharon (not her real name), a single mother
who used to raise marijuana in the sunshine but moved her operation indoors after she split up with her husband. Under her 3,000 watts of electric light, she raises numerous smaller plants in a space the size of
two sheets of plywood, using far less physical effort than when she raised large plants outdoors. “It’s a very mommy-friendly business that provides a dependable, year-round income,” she says. Sharon harvests
small batches of marijuana year-round, which fetch a few hundred dollars more per pound than outdoor-grown cannabis because of consumers’ preferences. Sharon’s growing operation supports her and her
teenage daughter in the rural area where she settled more than two decades ago. Add up the energy used by indoor growers, from those on Sharon’s scale to the converted warehouses favored by urban
dispensaries, and the impact is significant—estimated at 3 percent of the state’s total power bill, or the electricity consumed by 1 million homes. On a local level, indoor cannabis production is blocking climate
stabilization efforts in the coastal city of Arcata, which aimed to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent over twelve years. But during the first half of that period, while electricity consumption was flat or
declining slightly statewide, Arcata’s household electrical use grew by 25 percent. City staff traced the increase to more than 600 houses that were using at least triple the electricity of the average home—a level
consistent with a commercial cannabis operation. The city has borne other costs, too, besides simply missing its climate goals. Inexpertly wired grow houses catch fire, and the conversion of residential units to
indoor hothouses has cut into the city’s supply of affordable housing. Last November, city voters approved a stiff tax on jumbo electricity consumers. Now the city council is working with other Humboldt County
local governments to pass a similar tax so that growers can’t evade the fee simply by fleeing the city limits, says City Councilman Michael Winkler. “We don’t want any place in Humboldt County to be a cheaper
place to grow than any other. And since this is the Silicon Valley of marijuana growing, there are a lot of reasons why people would want to stay here if they’re doing this,” he says. “My goal is to make it expensive
enough to get large-scale marijuana growing out of the neighborhoods.” A
tax on excessive electricity use may seem like an indirect way of curbing household
cannabis cultivation, but the city had to back away from its more direct approach—a zoning ordinance—when the federal
government threatened to prosecute local officials throughout the state if they sanctioned an activity that is categorically forbidden
under US law. Attempts in neighboring Mendocino County to issue permits to outdoor growers meeting environmental and publicsafety standards were foiled when federal attorneys slapped county officials with similar warnings—illustrating, yet again, the way
prohibition sabotages efforts to reduce the industry’s environmental damage. Indeed,
observers cite federal cannabis
prohibition as the biggest impediment to curbing the impacts of marijuana cultivation , which
continues to expand despite a decades-long federal policy of zero tolerance. “We don’t have a set of best management practices for
this industry, partly because of federal prohibition,” says researcher Silvaggio. “If a grower comes to the county agricultural
commissioner and asks, ‘What are the practices I can use that can limit my impact?’, the county ag guy says, ‘I can’t talk to you
about that because we get federal money.’ ”
Lack of industry regulation causes widespread use of banned pesticides
Gabriel et al 13 (Mourad, Greta Wengert, Mark Higley, Shane Krogan, Warren Sargent, and Deana Clifford, 4-11-13, "Silent
Forests? Rodenticides on Illegal Marijuana Crops Harm Wildlife" Wildlife Society News) news.wildlife.org/twp/2013-spring/silentforests/
Problem Spreading Like Weeds Illegal marijuana growing is not just a problem for wildlife. The High Sierra Volunteer Trail
Crew is a nonprofit trail-maintenance crew that has spent the past seven years maintaining and cleaning trails throughout the Sierra
Nevadas’ national forests. In the mid-2000s, the group realized that risks associated with large-scale marijuana production
throughout most, if not all, California national forests threatened backcountry use of public lands. Since then, the trail crew’s
Environmental Reclamation Team (ERT) has remediated more than 600 large-scale marijuana cultivation sites on
public lands. The numbers are daunting, especially when considering that these 600 sites were in only two of
California’s 17 national forests and may constitute only a fraction of the actual marijuana cultivation sites that exist in these
forests. Tommy Lanier, Director of the National Marijuana Initiative, a White House supported program, states that “60 percent to 70
percent of the national marijuana seizures come from California annually, and of those totals, about 60 percent comes from public
lands.” Based on data from ERT-remediated sites, at least 50 percent of them have SGARs. Beyond finding anticoagulant
rodenticides, the team and other remediation groups frequently find and remove restricted and banned pesticides
including organo- phosphates, organochlorines, and carbamates as well as thousands of pounds of nitrogenrich fertilizers. Many of the discovered pesticides have been banned for use in the U.S., Canada, and the European Union,
specifically certain carbamates, which gained notoriety worldwide after an explosion of public awareness about their use to kill
African wildlife. Unfortunately, these same malicious uses are occurring in California, where marijuana cultivators place pourable
carbamate pesticides in opened tuna or sardine cans in order to kill black bears, gray foxes, raccoons, and other carnivores that
damage marijuana plants or raid food caches at grow-site encampments. In many cases, law enforcement officers approaching
grow sites observe wildlife exposed to what officers call “wildlife bombs” due to their high potential for mass wildlife killing. For
example, as federal and state officers approached a grow site in Northern California, they discovered a black bear and her cubs
seizing and convulsing as they slowly succumbed to the neurological effects of these pesticides. Because toxicants are usually
dispersed throughout cultivation sites, it is remarkably difficult to detect and remove all pesticide threats.
Those cause endocrine disruption
Cappiello et al 14 (A, LC-MS Laboratory, DiSTeVA, University of Urbino, Piazza Rinascimento 6, 61029, Urbino, Italy, G
Famiglini, Palma P, V Termopoli, AM Lavezzi, L Matturri, May 2014, "Determination of selected endocrine disrupting compounds in
human fetal and newborn tissues by GC-MS." www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24633505
Endocrine disrupting compounds (EDCs) include organochlorine pesticides (OCPs), organophosphate
pesticides (OPPs), carbamate pesticides, and plasticizers, such as bisphenol A (BPA). They persist in the
environment because of their degradation resistance and bioaccumulate in the body tissues of humans
and other mammals. Many studies are focused on the possible correlation between in utero exposure to EDCs and adverse health
hazards in fetuses and newborns. In the last decade, environmental pollution has been considered a possible trigger for Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) and Sudden Intrauterine Unexplained Death Syndrome (SIUDS), the most important death-causing
syndromes in fetuses and newborns in developed countries. In this work, a rapid and sensitive analytical method was developed to
determine the level of OCPs and OPPs, carbamates, and phenols in human fetal and newborn tissues (liver and brain) and to unveil
the possible presence of non-targeted compounds. The target analytes where selected on the basis of their documented presence
in the Trentino-Alto Adige region, an intensive agricultural area in northern Italy. A liquid-solid extraction procedure was applied on
human and animal tissues and the extracts, after a solid phase extraction (SPE) clean-up procedure, were analyzed by gas
chromatography coupled to a quadrupole mass spectrometric detector (GC-qMS). A GC-TOFMS (time-of-flight) instrument, because
of its higher full-scan sensitivity, was used for a parallel detection of non-targeted compounds. Method validation included accuracy,
precision, detection, and quantification limits (LODs; LOQs), and linearity response using swine liver and lamb brain spiked at
different concentrations in the range of 0.4-8000.0 ng/g. The method gave good repeatability and extraction efficiency. Method
LOQs ranged from 0.4-4.0 ng/g in the selected matrices. Good linearity was obtained over four orders of magnitude starting from
LOQs. Isotopically labeled internal standards were used for quantitative calculations. The method was then successfully applied to
the analysis of liver and brain tissues from SIUDS and SIDS victims coming from the above mentioned region.
Extinction
Togawa 99 (Tatsuo, Institute of Biomaterials and Bioengineering – Tokyo Medical and Dental University, Technology in
Society, August)
Advanced technology provides a comfortable life for many people, but it also produces strong destructive forces that can cause
extinction of the human race if used accidentally or intentionally. As stated in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955, hydrogen
bombs might possibly put an end to the human race.1 Nuclear weapons are not the only risks that arise from modem technologies.
In 1962, Rachel Carson wrote in her book, Silent Spring [2], that the amount of the pesticide parathion used on California farms
alone at that time could provide a lethal dose for five to ten times the whole world's population. Destruction of the ozone layer, the
greenhouse effect, and chemical pollution by endocrine destructive chemicals began to appear as the result of
advanced technology, and they are now
considered to be potential causes of extinction of the human
race unless they are effectively controlled.
1AC Federalism
Contention 2 is Federalism
Raich represented the biggest ever expansion of Congress’ commerce powers,
destroying federalism, judicial review and allowing for state control of police
powers
Brandon J. Stoker 9, J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “Note and Comment: Was
Gonzales v. Raich the Death Knell of Federalism? Assessing Meaningful Limits on Federal Intrastate Regulation in Light of U.S. v.
Nascimento”, 23 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, lexis
When the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Raich2 in 2005, it marked the first occasion in over a decade that
the Court broadly construed the Commerce Clause to permit federal regulation of intrastate activity. More
importantly, Raich signaled an abrupt end to the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” by circumscribing three
recent cases delineating meaningful limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.3
It represents the boldest
assertion of congressional power to “regulate commerce . . . among the several states” in the history of the
Court .4 Indeed, Raich and its progeny threaten to undermine the delicate balance of federal and state
power structurally imbued in our constitutional republic by acquiescing to the unbridled exercise of federal power.
Though some have expressed skepticism about the ostensibly broad effect Raich might have on federalism jurisprudence, recent
circuit court cases decided pursuant to the standards set forth in Raich demonstrate federal appropriation of
“core” state powers,5 including, in particular, state police powers. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court
should limit Raich by reviving the limitation on congressional regulation of noneconomic
intrastate activity to circumstances where failure to regulate such activity would undermine a broader regulatory program. The
Court should also narrowly confine Raich’s definition of “economic activity” to prevent lower courts from “piling inference upon
inference” to demonstrate otherwise tenuous connections to interstate commerce. This approach would not require the Court to
overrule Raich, but merely to enforce the clear standards articulated in United States v. Lopez6 and United States v. Morrison.7 Part
II provides background on the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence between 1937 and 1994—a period of virtually
unchecked federal expansion—and the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” between 1995 and 2005 that
reestablished limits on federal commerce powers. This section examines in particular how United States v. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison limited the scope and nature of activity within Congress’s regulatory purview by (1) moving away from
the “rational basis” test when evaluating Commerce Clause challenges, (2) limiting regulation to quintessential “economic” activity,
and (3) enforcing the “essential” component of the broader regulatory regime exception. Part III explains how Raich largely
unraveled the progress made by the Rehnquist Court. First, the Court adopted a definition of “economic” that fails to limit the
scope of activity within Congress’s regulatory purview. Second, the decision opens the door to federal regulation of noneconomic,
intrastate activity that falls within a broader regulatory scheme regardless of whether such activity is “essential” to the larger
regulatory program. Finally, the Court reasserted a “rational basis” test that effectively eliminates judicial scrutiny of the actual
aggregate effect of a regulated activity on interstate commerce, inquiring rather “whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”8
These standards have reduced judicial review of Commerce Clause challenges to a rubberstamping exercise
where the regulated activity is rationally related to commerce. More important, they have rendered “as-applied” challenges to
otherwise valid statutes nearly impossible. Part IV considers one of the first casualties in the breakdown of meaningful limits on
federal commerce powers in Raich’s jurisprudential wake: appropriation of state police powers through RICO
prosecutions. This section contrasts two nearly identical cases in which federal prosecutors charged local street gangs members
with racketeering for engaging in intrastate, noneconomic criminal activity. The Sixth Circuit reversed the federal conviction in United
States v. Waucaush9 by applying the clear principles articulated in Morrison and Lopez without the encumbrances of Raich. The
First Circuit, however, affirmed the criminal convictions in United States v. Nascimento10 by taking Raich to its logical end, which is
to say, by not imposing meaningful limits on the federal government’s prosecutorial powers under RICO. These cases aptly
demonstrate how Raich encourages judicial acquiescence to federal appropriation of traditional state powers by narrowly
limiting the force of judicial review.
That trades off with effective counter-terrorism
Little 6
Erica
, Legal Analyst for Heritage, Brian W. Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies at Heritage, Federalizing “Gang Crime” is Counterproductive and Dangerous,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/wm1221.cfm
Congress should discontinue its habit of expanding federal criminal law. The phenomenon of
overfederalization of crime undermines state and local accountability for law enforcement, undermines
more cooperative and creative efforts to fight crime (that is, allowing the states to act as "laboratories of democracy"), and
injures America's federalist system of government. One of the more concrete problems that comes with federal
overcriminalization is the misallocation of scarce federal law enforcement resources , which results in selective
prosecution. New demands distract the F ederal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Attorneys, and other federal law
enforcers from national problems that undeniably require federal attention, such as the investigation and
prosecution of espionage and terrorism . Moreover, federal prosecution is more expensive than state-level prosecution.
More broadly,
Lone wolf terrorism poses a unique threat- we need to use more federal
resources to prevent attacks
Majoran 14, Andrew Majoran (MS from the Transnational Security Studies program at Royal Holloway, University of London in
the United Kingdom, specializes in international security, counter-terrorism, multilateral defense, and maritime security), The
Mackenzie Institute, “Wolves Among Us: The Dangers Of Lone Wolf Terrorism”, July 5, 2014, acc 12/19,
http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/wolves-among-us-dangers-lone-wolf-terrorism/
In conclusion, Western understanding of terrorism must evolve to ensure that the threat of lone wolf terrorism is contained. For too
long Western governments, media outlets, and general populations have stereotyped terrorism as large recognizable extremist
groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram. Although these terrorist groups do pose a threat to Western security, they
have been hindered in recent years by increased law enforcement, government presence, and counter-insurgency
efforts.23 On the other side of the terrorism spectrum, the societal focus on large terrorist groups has benefitted
the individual lone wolf terrorist efforts domestically and internationally. Lone wolves are difficult to detect due
to their isolationist nature and are seldom discovered until after their terrorist attacks have taken place. It is evident that lone wolf
terrorism is difficult to stop using traditional counter-terrorism tactics; however, this does not mean that
more cannot be done to prevent lone wolf terrorism from continuing to grow. Measures such as monitoring of the
internet, identifying overly aggressive political activism publically, enhancement of weapon identification
devices, the expansion of CCTV in public areas, and the use of advanced biometrics to simplify surveillance and gather
data must be taken.24 It is evident that lone wolves pose a significant threat to the security of the West, and they
will continue to do so as long as we remain complacent. Lone wolf terrorism can be fought effectively, but it requires us to move
away from associating terrorism with large international terrorist groups and practicing vigilance in our own communities.
They’ll use WMDs – causes extinction
Gary A. Ackerman 14 & Lauren E. Pinson, Gary is Director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Lauren is
Senior Researcher and Project Manager for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses of Terrorism, An
Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume
26, Issue 1
The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors come and
whether these are overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves and small autonomous cells has been
detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the potential use of CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular
features that either amplify or supplement the attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief
among these is the impact of rapid technological development. Recent and emerging advances in a variety of areas, from
synthetic biology 3 to nanoscale engineering, 4 have opened doors not only to new medicines and materials, but also to
new possibilities for malefactors to inflict harm on others. What is most relevant in the context of lone actors and small autonomous
cells is not so much the pace of new invention, but rather the commercialization and consumerization of CBRN weaponsrelevant technologies. This process often entails an increase in the availability and safety of the technology, with a
concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical knowledge required to operate it. Thus, for example,
whereas fifty years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical weapons might have been a dangerous
and inefficient affair requiring a large plant, expensive equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical
microreactors, 5 the same processes might be accomplished far more cheaply and safely on a desktop assemblage,
purchased commercially and monitored by a single chemistry graduate student.¶ The rapid global spread and increased
user-friendliness of many technologies thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively small scale of harm a single
individual or small autonomous group could historically cause. 6 From the limited reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and
bow, to the introduction of dynamite and eventually the use of our own infrastructures against us (as on September 11), the
number of people that an individual who was unsupported by a broader political entity could kill with a single action has
increased from single digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been asserted that “over time … as the leverage provided by
technology increases, this threshold will finally reach
its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare
war on the world and win .” 7 Nowhere is this trend more perceptible in the current age than in the area of unconventional
weapons.¶ These new technologies do not simply empower users on a purely technical level. Globalization and the expansion of
information networks provide new opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of the globe to become familiar with
core weapon concepts and to purchase equipment—online technical courses and eBay are undoubtedly a boon to would-be
purveyors of violence. Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes, people who would never be able to function socially as
part of an operational terrorist group, can find radicalizing influences or legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of virtual
identities on the Internet.¶ All of this can spawn, it is feared, a more deleterious breed of lone actors, what have been referred to in
some quarters as “super-empowered individuals.” 8 Conceptually, super-empowered individuals are atomistic game-changers, i.e.,
they constitute
a single (and often singular) individual who can shock the entire system (whether national,
regional, or global) by relying only on their own resources . Their core characteristics are that they have superior
intelligence, the capacity to use complex communications or technology systems, and act as an individual or a “lone-wolf.” 9 The
end result, according to the pessimists, is that if one of these individuals chooses to attack the system, “the unprecedented nature of
his attack ensures that no counter-measures are in place to prevent it. And when he strikes, his attack will not only kill
massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the financial, political, and social systems that govern modern life.” 10 It
almost goes without saying that the same concerns attach to small autonomous cells, whose members' capabilities and resources
can be combined without appreciably increasing the operational footprint presented to intelligence and law enforcement agencies
the most likely means by which
to accomplish this level of system perturbation is through the use of CBRN agents as WMD . On the motivational side, therefore,
seeking to detect such behavior.¶ With the exception of the largest truck or aircraft bombs,
lone actors and small autonomous cells may ironically be more likely to select CBRN weapons than more established terrorist
groups—who are usually more conservative in their tactical orientation—because the extreme asymmetry of these weapons may
provide the only subjectively feasible option for such actors to achieve their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the system. The
inherent technical challenges presented by CBRN weapons may also make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may
have a very different risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist organizations that might have to be concerned with a variety of
constituencies, from state patrons to prospective recruits. 11 Many other factors beyond a “perceived potential to achieve mass
casualties” might play into the decision to pursue CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives, 12 including a fetishistic
fascination with these weapons or the perception of direct referents in the would-be perpetrator's belief system.¶ Others are far
more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state actors in general) with respect to their potential for using
CBRN agents to cause mass fatalities, arguing that the barriers to a successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in
today's networked, tech-savvy environment. 13 Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown cells are “less
constrained” in motivations, more challenging plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability, 14 while Michael Kenney
cautions against making presumptions about the ease with which individuals can learn to produce viable weapons using only the
Internet. 15 However, even most of these pundits concede that low-level CBR attacks emanating from this quarter will probably
lead to political, social, and economic disruption that extends well beyond the areas immediately affected by the attack. This
raises an essential point with respect to CBRN terrorism: irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons or an actor's
capability (or lack thereof) to successfully employ them on a catastrophic scale, these weapons invariably exert a stronger
psychological impact on audiences—the essence of terrorism—than the traditional gun and bomb. This is surely not lost on those
lone actors or autonomous cells who are as interested in getting noticed as in causing casualties.¶ Proven Capability and Intent¶
While legitimate debate can be had as to the level of potential threat posed by lone actors or small autonomous cells wielding CBRN
weapons, possibly the best argument for engaging in a substantive examination of the issue is the most concrete one of all—that
these actors have already demonstrated the motivation and capability to pursue and use CBRN weapons, in some
cases even close to the point of constituting a genuine WMD threat. In the context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most
cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator behind one of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in
living memory, the 2001 “anthrax letters,” which employed a highly virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only killed
five and seriously sickened 17 people, but led to widespread disruption of the U.S. postal services and key government facilities.
16¶ Other historical cases of CBRN pursuit and use by lone actors and small autonomous cells highlight the need for further
exploration. Among the many extant examples: 17¶ Thomas Lavy was caught at the Alaska-Canada border in 1993 with 130 grams
of 7% pure ricin. It is unclear how Lavy obtained the ricin, what he planned to do with it, and what motivated him.¶ In 1996, Diane
Thompson deliberately infected twelve coworkers with shigella dysenteriae type 2. Her motives were unclear.¶ In 1998, Larry
Wayne Harris, a white supremacist, was charged with producing and stockpiling a biological agent—bacillus anthracis, the causative
agent of anthrax.¶ In 1999, the Justice Department (an autonomous cell sympathetic to the Animal Liberation Front) mailed over
100 razor blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry.¶ In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was arrested for mailing
samples of the mineral monazite with trace amounts of radioactive thorium to several Japanese government agencies to persuade
authorities to look into potential uranium being smuggled to North Korea.¶ In 2002, Chen Zhengping put rat poison in a rival snack
shop's products and killed 42 people.¶ In 2005, 10 letters containing a radioactive substance were mailed to major organizations in
Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO headquarters, and the U.S. embassy in Brussels. No injuries were reported.¶ In 2011,
federal agents arrested four elderly men in Georgia who were plotting to use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice
Department officials, federal judges, and Internal Revenue Service agents.¶ Two recent events may signal an even greater interest
in CBRN by lone malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norway's Anders Breivik's treatise, his references to CBRN
weapons a) suggest that CBRN weapons could be used on a tactical level and b) reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed
audiences) that even low-level CBRN weapons could achieve far-reaching impacts driven by fear. 18 Whether or not Breivik would
actually have sought or been able to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following in several (often far-right) extremist circles and his
treatise might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released two issues of Inspire
magazine in 2012. Articles, on the one hand, call for lone wolf jihad attacks to target non-combatant populations and, on the other,
permit the use of chemical and biological weapons. The combination of such directives may very well influence the weapon
selection of lone actor jihadists in Western nations. 19¶
Judicial review is key to federalism and SOP
Brandon J. Stoker 9, J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “Note and Comment: Was
Gonzales v. Raich the Death Knell of Federalism? Assessing Meaningful Limits on Federal Intrastate Regulation in Light of U.S. v.
Nascimento”, 23 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, lexis
The political process was not, however, the sole mechanism envisioned by the Framers for warding off federal encroachment.
Indeed, they saw the Supreme Court as a final check on the national government, and frequently raised this
argument in ratification debates to ward off claims that the proposed constitution would facilitate a unitary government.20 Even the
early Court acknowledged the role of the judiciary in defining the limits of federal power vis-à-vis the
states.21 Historically, judicial intervention—rather than political safeguards—has been the surest check
on federal encroachment, though the Court’s willingness to impose limits on federal power fluctuates according to the
philosophical posture of the majority. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky explains that the Court vacillates between two views about the
underlying structure of American government: one that treats federalism as “empowerment” and another that treats federalism as a
fundamental limit on government power.22 The first model—federalism as empowerment—emphasizes the benefit of having
multiple levels of government deal with social and economic problems where the failures of one can be compensated by the
other.23 Those who view federalism as empowerment give the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment expansive
readings to facilitate federal action while leaving limitations on federal action to the political process and other constitutional
mechanisms, such as the separation of powers.24 Those who treat federalism as a limit on federal power, however, see it as the
Court’s responsibility to narrowly define the parameters of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.25
Since the Court plays an active role in safeguarding other aspects of our constitutional framework— namely,
separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review26—the responsibility to preserve balance
between federal and state power—an equally important component of the Framers’ design— is no less incumbent
upon the judicial branch.27 Indeed, proponents of limits see the Court’s failure to fulfill this responsibility as a
threat to our entire system of government,28 and thus read the Tenth Amendment broadly to protect the prerogatives
of state governments.29 The following provides a brief treatment of the vacillating trends in the Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. .¶ [FOOTNOTE n28 STARTS. Id. During the early twentieth century - a period of judicial limitation - the Court took
seriously its charge to limit federal commerce powers. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S, 295 U.S. 495, 548
(1935) ("[ Limiting federal
Commerce Clause powers is] essential to the maintenance of our constitution al
system. Otherwise , as we have said, there would be virtually no limit to the federal power , and for all practical
purposes we should have a completely centralized government."); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) ("The far
reaching result of upholding the act cannot be more plainly indicated than by pointing out that if Congress can thus regulate
matters entrusted to local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, all freedom
of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states over local
system of government be practically destroyed.") FOOTNOTE n28 ENDS].
matters may be eliminated , and thus our
SCOTUS key model
Michael P. Scharf 9 et al., Counsel of Record, Brief of the Public International Law & Policy Group as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Petitioners, Jamal Kiyemba, et. Al., v. Barack H. Obama, et al., SCOTUS, No. 08-1234, 12—09, p. 21-32.
III. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE CONFIRMS THIS COURT’S LEADERSHIP IN PROMOTING ADHERENCE TO RULE
OF LAW IN TIMES OF CONFLICT. PILPG’s on-the-ground experience demonstrating the leadership of this Court is confirmed by a
study of transnational judicial dialogue. Over the past halfcentury, the world’s constitutional courts have been engaged in a rich and
growing transnational judicial dialogue on a wide range of constitutional law issues. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms
and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487 (2005);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (2000). Courts around the world consider, discuss, and cite
foreign judicial decisions not out of a sense of legal obligation, but out of a developing sense that foreign decisions are valuable
resources in elucidating complex legal issues and suggesting new approaches to common problems. See Waters, supra, at 493-94.
In this transnational judicial dialogue, the decisions of this Court have exercised a profound — and profoundly positive — influence
on the work of foreign and international courts. See generally Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States
Constitution Abroad (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of
Rights, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 537 (1988). As Anthony Lester of the British House of Lords has noted, “there is a vigorous overseas
trade in the Bill of Rights, in international and constitutional litigation involving norms derived from American constitutional law.
When life or liberty is at stake, the landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States, giving fresh meaning to the
principles of the Bill of Rights, are studied with as much attention in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in Washington, D.C.” Id. at
541. This Court’s overseas influence is not limited to the Bill of Rights. From Australia to India to Israel to the United Kingdom,
foreign courts have looked to the seminal decisions of this Court as support for their own rulings
upholding judicial review, enforcing s eparation o f p owers, and providing a judicial check on the political
branches. Indeed, for foreign courts, this Court’s rulings in seminal cases such as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803),4 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 436 (1954),5 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),6 and Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 take on a special significance. Reliance on the moral authority of this Court can provide invaluable
support for those foreign courts struggling to establish their own legitimacy , to shore up judicial
authority against overreaching by powerful executives, and to develop a strong rule of law within their own national legal
systems. This Court’s potential to positively influence the international rule of law is particularly important in the nascent
transnational judicial dialogue surrounding the war on terrorism and the primacy of rule of law in times of conflict. As the world’s
courts begin to grapple with the novel, complex, and delicate legal issues surrounding the modern-day war on terrorism, and as
states seek to develop judicial mechanisms to address domestic conflicts, foreign governments and judiciaries are confronting
similar challenges. In particular, foreign governments and judiciaries must consider how to accommodate the legitimate needs of the
executive branch in times of war within the framework of the law. Although foreign courts are just beginning to address these
looking to the experience of the U.S., and to the precedent of this
Court, for guidance on upholding the rule of law in times of conflict. In recent years, courts in Israel, the
issues, it is already clear that they are
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have relied on the precedent of this Court in decisions addressing the rights of detainees.8
In short, as a result of this Court’s robust influence on transnational judicial dialogue, its decisions have proved
extraordinarily important to the development of the rule of law around the world. International
courts have similarly relied on the precedent of this Court in influential decision s. For example, in the
important and developing area of international criminal law, the international war crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda both
relied heavily on the precedent of this Court in their early opinions. In the first five years of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the first in the
modern iteration of the war crimes tribunals, the justices cited this Court at least seventeen times in decisions establishing the
fundamental legal principles under which the Tribunal would function.9 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda similarly
relied on this Court’s precedent, citing this Court at least twelve times in its first five years.10 The precedent of this Court has
provided a crucial foundation for international criminal law. The reliance on the precedent of this Court speaks to the Court’s
international leadership on the promotion of respect for the rule of law in times of conflict.
Specifically, South Sudan models U.S. federalism
Agok Manyang Agok 12-14, The New Sudan Vision, "Federalism: An Idea for South Sudan to Consider", 2014,
www.newsudanvision.com/sudan/2809-federalism-an-idea-for-south-sudan-to-consider
Nations which have attempted or adapted federalism include Canada, U nited S tates of America, Russia, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, South Africa, Australia, and Brazil among others. However, since South Sudan is a presidential system as
opposed to a parliamentarian, it’s imperative to examine the U nited S tates federal system . Scholars and experts on
governance tend to agree that the United States system is a cooperative federal system. Dual federalism holds that the federal
government and the state governments are co-equals, each sovereign. United States had shied away from dual federalism because
the system tends to creates power vacuum between the central government and the States. Cooperative federalism balances the
need for federal oversight without oppressive restraints on the individual state governments. In this model the federal government
and the states’ governments share some responsibilities and assume independence for others. The military for example is a federal
responsibility while the National Guard is the state’s responsibility.¶ With dual federalism, the federal government minimize its
support for local programs while continuing to levy income tax on its citizens. As a result, the State governments are usually forced
to raise taxes on individual incomes in order to fund local programs left unfunded by the federal government. Both systems,
however, have advantages and disadvantages.¶ The litmus test: U nited S tates versus other federal systems¶ Unlike most
federal systems, the U.S. federal system has a constitutionally spelled out system. It identifies responsibilities for both the central
government and the individual states. The express powers of the central government include the right to levy taxes, declare war,
coin money and regulate interstate and foreign commerce (Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution). In addition to the express
powers, the federal government has implied power to pass any law “necessary and proper” for the execution of its express powers.
Other powers called “inherent powers” include the ability of the federal government to acquire more territories whether through
peaceful or other means. The U.S. constitution also sets aside what it referred to as “reserved powers” (10th
Amendment to the US constitution) for the state governments. Additional shared powers between the federal and states
government includes borrowing money and enforcing laws.
Federalism prevents South Sudan collapse
Augustino Lucano 14, Upper Nile Times, "Federalism is Desirable in South Sudan", August 7,
upperniletimes.net/editorials/federalism-is-desirable-in-south-sudan/
South Sudan is highly diverse country with 64 tribes. There is a need for a fair system which helps to serve our
communities equitably. The current political crisis is disastrous with very poor governance in the country and
we need a better system. Doig (2012) explained that “Federalism is the most important political device for the regulation and
accommodation of the world’s most burning and devastating conflicts” (p. 1).¶ Federalism is desirable in South Sudan because it will
allow for sufficient growth in our country. We need a political system which allows the citizens and the government to resolve
problems. Nivola (2005) described that “Federalism is a political system permitting a large measure of regional self-rule and gives
the rulers and the ruled a ‘school of their citizenship’, ‘a preserver of their liberties’, and ‘a vehicle for flexible response to their
problems'” (p. 1). I believe that federalism will lead to political reformation by removing the national government and resolving some
of the contentious issues.
Federalism will allow the South Sudan government to achieve and maintain
stability. ¶ In addition, Doig (2012) described “Those who prefer a federal system of governance generally argue that this plan
reduces the dangers while increasing the benefits. Thus a federal system may be helpful in encouraging and preserving individual
liberty, since citizens who feel aggrieved can appeal to more than one final authority, and they may also be able to move to a
different state or province” (p. 2).¶ Federalism is desirable in South Sudan because it encourages
pluralism. Federal systems will allow the South Sudan government to develop at the national, state, and local levels, giving the
South Sudanese people more access to leaders and opportunities to get involved in their government. Doig (2012) illustrated that
“Federalism encourages each state or province to devise its own strategies for economic development — strategies which may be
more effective because they are based on a closer understanding of local culture, resources and skills, and which, through the
variety of different strategies tried by different states and provinces, may produce innovative programs whose success can then be
emulated by other regions & nations” (p. 2).¶ The South Sudanese people will benefit from federalism because it will ensure the
separation of powers and prevents tyranny in South Sudan. Even if one person or group took control of all the other
branches of the federal government, federalism ensures that governments would still function independently. Federalism, therefore,
fulfills the vision of a governmental structure that ensures liberty in South Sudan.
That escalates – every country has key interests at stake
Gaaki Kigambo 14, Ugandan journalist and a graduate of Carleton University and is currently a special correspondent for The
East African, Regional Tensions Complicate South Sudan’s Crisis, 2-28, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13597/regionaltensions-complicate-south-sudan-s-crisis
The deadly conflict in South Sudan, itself the culmination of a long-running power struggle within the ruling Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement, is increasingly drawing in neighboring countries driven by disparate security and economic
interests, further complicating the crisis and efforts to reach a resolution. ¶ The U.N. has accused both sides of South Sudan’s split
of committing human rights abuses in the conflict, which has so far claimed an unknown number of lives, displaced an estimated
900,000 people both inside and outside the country and shows no signs of letting up. An agreement to cease hostilities
was violated even before its ink dried, jeopardizing an already faltering mediation process led by the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. ¶ Uganda was the first of South Sudan’s neighbors to intervene
militarily, sending an estimated 4,500 soldiers to the country within four days of the outbreak of fighting there on Dec. 15. Uganda
was compelled, Kampala insists, by a distress call from South Sudan’s embattled President Salva Kiir and requests from the U.N.,
Washington and London to step in. ¶ One of the main aims of the intervention, Ugandan Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga told
parliament, was to urgently prevent a potentially genocidal situation from emerging out of the political fallout between Kiir and his
former deputy, Riek Machar. The conflict between their factions had rapidly manifested itself along an age-old ethnic fault line
between Kiir’s majority Dinka and Machar’s Nuer ethnic group. ¶ However, Uganda’s military presence in South Sudan
has unsettled its other neighbors, not least Sudan. There is no love lost between Museveni and longtime Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir, who have repeatedly accused each other of supporting rebel forces hostile to their governments. ¶
Bashir’s quick visit to Juba, South Sudan’s capital, three weeks after the conflict broke out was widely interpreted as a public
gesture that he was ready to cast his lot with South Sudan’s government. But Juba apparently spurned Khartoum’s suggestion to
set up a joint force to protect vital oil fields in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states in the north of South Sudan, which have borne the
brunt of the conflict. Instead, South Sudan preferred to give that role to the Ugandan army. Bashir is now believed to be backing
Machar, his longtime ally. ¶ Analysts say Khartoum fears Uganda’s military involvement will further damage
Sudan’s economic ties with South Sudan, which have been significantly reduced since the South’s independence. Uganda,
together with Kenya, has been pushing a $250 million infrastructure project known as the Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
(LAPSSET) corridor, which comprises a port, an oil pipeline, a railway line and a highway, and which will depend for its success on
South Sudan. Uganda needs the LAPSSET corridor to transport its newly discovered oil, as it would greatly reduce the distance the
oil, which must be heated at some expense for pipeline transit, would need to travel before it reaches the coast. ¶ Ethiopia, too, has
reason to object to Uganda’s military presence in South Sudan. Ugandan intelligence reports say Khartoum is now routing its
support for Machar through Eritrea, Ethiopia’s bitter rival, to cover up its involvement. Analysts say the Ethiopian government also
fears the South Sudan conflict could exacerbate tensions in Ethiopia’s Gambella region, which borders
Sudan and has a high concentration of Nuers, potentially resulting in a full-blown conflict. Indeed, the undercurrents of
such an outbreak are already perceptible. This explains why Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who is the
current chair of IGAD, asked Uganda to withdraw from South Sudan, saying its presence risked regionalizing the conflict
and pointedly declaring that “there are other interests also from other sides.”¶ Although Uganda has expressed willingness to
withdraw, even announcing a two-month withdrawal timeline, there is little appetite to actually do so in Kampala’s
policymaking circles. For one thing, Uganda perceives itself as the guarantor of state stability in South Sudan, which remains in
jeopardy. Renewed fighting has broken out in which Machar’s forces appear to be making gains, despite having initially been
pushed out of nearly all the major centers in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states by joint efforts of the South Sudanese and
Ugandan troops. ¶ Moreover, Uganda’s withdrawal is conditioned on the deployment of the African Union’s African Capacity for
Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), an outfit that is ideally supposed to rapidly respond to crises on the continent.
Unfortunately, the African Union Peace and Security Council has yet to meet to work out modalities for the deployment of ACIRC in
South Sudan. A tough task awaits them in finding countries willing to contribute troops to the mission. As it is, IGAD long ago
approved a force of 5,600 troops for South Sudan, but has received none to date from its eight members. Indeed, only Uganda
appears willing to contribute. The same is true of the U.N., which also agreed last year to augment its presence in this beleaguered
nation by 5,500 troops but has yet to implement its resolutions with more blue berets on the ground. ¶ Uganda’s continued
military presence in South Sudan is further polarizing both sides of the conflict and directly obstructing the
IGAD-led mediation, which holds the best hope for a long-term political solution. Kiir, who enjoys Uganda’s military support, has
demonstrated little interest in the Addis Ababa process, while Machar has preconditioned any progress in Addis Ababa on the
withdrawal of all foreign military forces as well as the release of all SPLM political figures detained since the outbreak of the conflict.
Meanwhile, Kampala is testing the patience of South Sudan’s other neighbors, who might soon feel the need to join
in the conflict in order to safeguard their own interests. ¶ To break the current deadlock, IGAD must clarify the
objectives of the current mediation and, together with the AU, pressure Uganda to withdraw its forces from South Sudan, while also
pushing both Kiir and Machar to engage meaningfully with the mediation process. In the absence of progress in Addis Ababa, the
risk of a regionalization of the conflict looms, further complicating any efforts to resolve the crisis.
Nuclear war
Caroline Glick 7, deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post, Senior Fellow for Middle East Affairs of the Center for Security
Policy, “Condi's African holiday”, December 11, http://www.rightsidenews.com/20071211309/editorial/us-opinion-and-editorial/ourworld-condis-african-holiday.html
The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily
escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which
controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global
conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers.
Synthetic biology makes bioterror inevitable- creates means and motive
Rose, 14 -- PhD, recognized international biodefense expert
[Patrick, Center for Health & Homeland Security senior policy analyst & biosecurity expert, National Defense University lecturer, and
Adam Bernier, expert in counter-terrorism, "DIY Bioterrorism Part II: The proliferation of bioterrorism through synthetic biology,"
CBRNePortal, 2-24-14, www.cbrneportal.com/diy-bioterrorism-part-ii-the-proliferation-of-bioterrorism-through-synthetic-biology/,
accessed 8-16-14]
synthetic biology has made bio-engineering
accessible to the mainstream biological community. Non-state actors who wish to employ biological agents
for ill intent are sure to be aware of how tangible bio-weapons are becoming as applications of
synthetic biology become more affordable and the probability of success increases with each scientific breakthrough.
In Part I of this series, we examined how the advancement of
The willingness of non-state actors to engage in biological attacks is not a new concept; however, the past biological threat
environment has been subdued compared to that of conventional or even chemical terrorism. The frequency and deadliness of
biological attacks has, thankfully, been limited; much of which can be attributed to the technical complexity or apparent ineptitude of
the perpetrators developing biological weapons. Despite the infrequency and ineffectiveness of biological attacks in
the last four decades, the threat may be changing with the continued advancement of synthetic
biology applications. Coupled with the ease of info rmation sharing and a rapidly growing do-ityourself-biology (DIYbio) movement (discussed in Part I), the chances of not only , more attacks , but
more deadly ones will inevitably increase .¶ During the last half century terrorist organizations have
consistently had an interest in using biological weapons as a means of attacking their targets, but only few have
potentially
actually made a weapon and used it. The attraction is that terrorist activities with biological weapons are difficult to detect and even
more difficult to attribute without a specific perpetrator claiming responsibility. Since 1971 there have been more than 113,113
terrorist attacks globally and 33 of them have been biological. The majority of bio-terrorism incidents recorded occurred during the
year 2001 (17 of the 33); before 2001 there were 10 incidents and since 2001 there were 6 (not counting the most recent Ricin
attacks). The lack of a discernable trend in use of bio-terrorism does not negate the clear intent of extremist organizations to use
biological weapons. In fact, the capacity to harness biological weapons more effectively today only increases the risk that they will
successfully be employed.¶ The landscape is changing : previously the instances where biological attacks had the
potential to do the most harm (e.g., Rajneeshees cult’s Salmonella attacks in 1984, Aum Shinri Kyo’s Botulinum toxin, and Anthrax
attacks in the early 90’s) included non-state actors with access to large amounts of funding and scientists. Funding and a cadre of
willing scientists does not guarantee success though. The assertion was thus made that biological weapons are not
only expensive, they require advanced technical training to make and are even more difficult to
effectively perpetrate acts of terrorism with. While it is difficult to determine with certainty whether the expense and expertise
needed to create biological weapons has acted as a major deterrent for groups thinking of obtaining them, many experts would
argue that the cost/expertise barrier makes the threat from biological attacks extremely small. This assertion is supported by the
evidence that the vast majority of attacks have taken place in Western countries and was performed by Western citizens with
advanced training in scientific research.¶ In the past decade the cost/expertise assertion has become less
accurate. Despite the lack of biological attacks, there are a number of very dangerous and motivated
organizations that have or are actively pursuing biological weapons. The largest and most outspoken
organization has been the global Al Qaeda network, whose leaders have frequently and passionately called for the development (or
purchase) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The principal message from Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has included the call to use biological WMDs to terrorize Western nations. Al Qaeda has
had a particular focus on biological and nuclear weapons because of their potential for greatest harm. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman alZawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki have all called for attacks using biological weapons, going so far as to say that Muslims everywhere
should seek to kill Westerners wherever possible and that obtaining WMDs is the responsibility of all Muslims. Before the US-led
invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had spent significant funds on building a bio-laboratory and had begun collecting scientists from
around the world; however, the Afghanistan invasion and subsequent global War on Terrorism is thought to have disrupted their
capabilities and killed or captured many of their assets. Despite the physical setbacks, this disruption does not appear to
have changed the aggressive attitude towards obtaining WMDs (e.g., more recently U.S. Intelligence
has been concerned about AQAP attempting to make Ricin).¶ The emergence of synthetic biology
and DIYbio has increased the likelihood that Al Qaeda will succeed in developing biological
WMDs. The low cost and significantly reduced level of necessary expertise may change how
many non-state actors view bio logical weapons as a worthwhile investment. This is not to say
that suddenly anyone can make a weapon or that it is easy. To the contrary making an effective
biological weapon will still be difficult, only much easier and cheaper than it has been in the past.¶
The rapid advancements of synthetic bio logy could be a game changer , giving organizations
currently pursuing biological weapons more options, and encouraging other organizations to
reconsider their worth. Because the bar for attaining bio logical weapons has been lowered and is
likely to continue to be lowered as more advances in biological technology are made, it is important that the
international community begin to formulate policy that protects advances in science that acts to prevent the intentional misuse of
synthetic biology. Disregard for this consideration will be costly. A successful attack with a potent
biological weapon, where no pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will be deadly and the
impact of such an attack will reverberate around the globe because biological weapons are not
bound by international borders.
2AC
T
‘Legalization’ is a process that is just removing a legal prohibition while opening up
possibility for regulation
Rolles 9 [Stephen Rolles, Company Director of Transform Drugs Campaign Limited, “A Comparison of
the Cost-effectiveness of Prohibition and Regulation of Drugs”, April,
http://www.tdpf.org.uk/sites/default/files/Cost-Effectiveness.pdf]
‘Prohibition’ is used in this paper to refer to the set of policies that formally prohibit—through the application of
legal sanctions—all production, distribution and possession of specific psychoactive drugs for non-medical use, as defined under the UN drug conventions
and the Misuse of Drugs Act 197137. Reduction in use, specifically the aim of a ‘drug free’ society, is often given as the primary goal. ‘Decriminalisation’, which is
often confused with legalisation/regulation, is the reduction or abolition (actual or de facto) of criminal penalties in relation to certain acts. While decriminalised
acts are no longer crimes, they may still be the subject of regulation; for example, a civil or administrative penalty (commonly a fine) in place of a criminal charge for
the possession of a decriminalised drug for personal use. ‘Legalisation’,
in contrast to decriminalisation, is the process of
removing a legal prohibition against something which is currently illegal. ‘Legalisation’ describes a
process or shift in legal status, rather than describing a policy position or form of legal regulation.
Internet 2AC
Overbroad Commerce Clause causes overregulation of the internet which wrecks it
Renee L. Giachino 1, General Counsel, Center for Individual Freedom, “COMMERCE CLAUSE IN
CYBERSPACE”,
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legal_issues/lega_activities/policy_paper/commerceclause.html
The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain types of commerce, like rail and highway traffic, are uniquely suited to national, as opposed to state, regulation. See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. &
the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he Internet is ‘a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communication’ . . . located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world . . .." (Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 850-51 (1997) (citation omitted). Much like the highway and railway system in the United States and worldwide, the borderless nature of the Internet
makes it difficult to say that activities conducted in cyberspace constitute intrastate or national
transactions.¶ Although the Supreme Court has recently shown considerable hostility toward expanding the reach of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause doctrine, the
recent cases are not conclusive of the Court’s position with respect to the application of the dormant
Commerce Clause to commercial Internet activity. The Supreme Court’s current opinions that support strengthening of states’ rights and support
P.R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). More recently,
state sovereignty resulted from challenges to Congress’ power to regulate an activity under its Commerce Clause jurisdiction that arguably did not arise out of or in connection with a
commercial transaction or substantially affect interstate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), for example, the Court struck down a law prohibiting gun possession near
schools as outside of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because possessing a gun in a local school zone "has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise . . .."
Likewise, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act as outside of Congress’ commerce power because gendermotivated crimes of violence were not considered an economic activity and did not involve interstate commerce.¶ Although the Court has been hostile to expanding the application of the
it is unclear how the current Court will
apply the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to commercial Internet regulation.¶ 5. CONCLUSION¶ Through
the growth of the Internet, expansion of e-commerce results in greater consumer options through
interstate and foreign trade. Overrregulation of the Internet will be fatal to its continued growth. As
evidenced by the recent court rulings in France, Germany and Italy banning content from their borders, attempts to regulate the Internet can cause
national and international conflict and criticism. Individual attempts by states and countries to place burdensome
restrictions on the free flow of trade over the Internet should be avoided in favor of unfettered growth
of the many borderless opportunities and advantages that e-commerce provides.
Commerce Clause to current attempts to regulate activity that does not substantially affect interstate commerce,
Extinction
David Eagleman 10, Neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for
Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law and author of Sum (Canongate). Nov.
9, “Six ways the internet will save civilization,”
http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no
civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: natural disasters, resource
depletion, economic meltdown, disease, poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we
command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which the net has vastly
reduced the threat of societal collapse. Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectiousdisease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key
to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing
human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce
host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in
which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The internet will predict natural disasters We are
Many great
witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to
learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone pictures,
updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded
reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety,
well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today. Discoveries are retained and shared Historically,
critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster.
Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the
idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem.
New discoveries catch on immediately; information
spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in
their fortification against risk. Tyranny is mitigated Censorship of ideas was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press,
airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, China, Iraq and elsewhere. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it directly contributed to the collapse of the nation. Historically, a more
successful strategy has been to confront free speech with free speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of
every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by some
governments to build firewalls, it’s clear that this benefit of the net requires constant vigilance.
Human capital is vastly increased Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet
far fewer than one per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama
The net opens the gates
education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge -- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MIT’s
OpenCourseWare. The new human capital will serve us well when we confront existential threats we’ve never
imagined before. Energy expenditure is reduced Societal collapse can often be understood in terms of an energy budget: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of
who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers.
deforestation or soil erosion; currently, the worry involves fossil-fuel depletion. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as
seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging
and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same
But vast, networked
communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly diseases threatening civilisation. The next time
quantity of information flow. The tangle of events that triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address.
your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us.
Treaties DA 2AC
The UN Drug Conventions will collapse now
Martin Jelsma 14, co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise
and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options
for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf
Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy and policy experimentation have now reached the point
where de jure legal regulation of the whole cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even if it
violates certain outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions between countries seeking more
flexibility and the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies, as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending
the status quo, are likely to further increase. This seems inevitable because the trend towards cannabis
regulation appears irreversible and is rapidly gaining more support across the Americas, as well as among
many local authorities in Europe that have to face the difficulties and consequences¶ of implementing current control mechanisms. ¶ In the untidy
conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a¶
modernized more flexible global drug control regime, the system will likely go through a period of legally
dubious interpretations and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms.
And the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-minded
countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal
inconsistencies and disputes. The question appearing on the international policy agenda is now no longer whether or not
there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how. The
question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing tensions and to
transform the current system in an orderly fashion into ¶ one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and ¶ one that is more
compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon feel forced to
opt out of the current system’s strictures, and, using any of the available reservation, modification or
denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy
reforms they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people.
Court decision doesn’t link
David R. Bewley-Taylor 2, Department of American Studies, University of Wales Swansea,
Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities, International Journal of Drug
Policy 14 (2003) 171-179
Should Parties prefer not to follow the denunciation¶ route, they could
exploit what Webster has called an¶ "important
loophole" in the treaties. As Webster notes,¶ the United Nations Drug Control Programme¶ (UNDCP) (1997) World Drug Report slates:¶ . .[none
of the] three international drug Conventions insist on the establishment of drug consumption per se as a
punishable offence. Only the 1988 Convention clearly requires parties to establish as¶ criminal offences under law the
possession, pur-¶ chase or cultivation of controlled drugs for the ¶ purpose of non-medical, personal consumption.¶ unless to do so would be
contrary to the constitutional principles and basic concepts of their legal systems" (italics added) (Webster.
2001).¶ Thus, if the highest courts in signatory nations ruled that prohibition of a single drug (cannabis for
example)¶ or a selection of outlawed substances, was unconstitutional then the Parties involved would no longer be
bound by the limitations of the Conventions with respect to those drugs. Such action would be perfectly
legitimate according to the provisions of the treaties themselves. Debate already exists with regard to the¶ value of
challenging drug prohibition on the grounds of human rights violations (Riley, 1998; Van Rcc, 1999).
Setting a precedent for withdrawal reinvigorates multilat
Curtis A. Bradley 10, Richard A. Horvitz Professor, Duke Law School and Mitu Gulati is Professor, Duke
Law School, “Withdrawing from International Custom,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 120, No. 2,
November, pp. 202-275
A second set of concerns raised by the Mandatory View is that inefficient rules will be unduly
perpetuated, something that is referred to in scholarship on contract theory as a “stickiness” problem.'8'
Although CIL rules may not be difficult to form in the first instance, the Mandatory View makes it hard to
change established rules by constraining nations from withdrawing. Presumably, the key assumption
underlying this regime is that, unless constrained, nations will engage in excessive withdrawal from CIL
rules. In fact, there are reasons to suspect that, even under a default approach to CIL, the system will
face the opposite problem: CIL rules will remain in place even after they are no longer socially desirable.
If so, the Mandatory View would be worsening an already present stickiness problem.¶ First, consider
the assumption that a Default View will lead to excessive withdrawals. As discussed earlier, there was a
significant period of time during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when commentators believed
that nations could unilaterally withdraw from at least some rules of CIL.'82 We have found no indication
from these commentaries, however, that this Default View led to excessive withdrawals. Nor have we
found suggestions that the shift from the Default View to the Mandatory View occurred because a spate
of withdrawals from CIL had undermined the system.¶ Second, in the modern era, nations are allegedly
able to opt out of CIL rules before they form through persistent objection. Nevertheless, nations rarely
invoke this right. Although there have been predictions that nations would begin invoking the persistent
objector doctrine more frequently, this prediction has not been borne out.183 Professor Byers suggests
that part of the reason for this is that there are significant nonlegal pressures, such as the reciprocal
nature of most interstate relationships, that result in even powerful nations such as the United States,
Japan, and the United Kingdom eventually backing away from their objections to CIL rules.184 Whatever
the reason, the key point is that the Mandatory View does not appear to be necessary to deter exit.¶
Third, as seen from Professor Heifer’s research, many treaties either have explicit withdrawal clauses or
implicitly allow for withdrawal.,8s Commentators have evinced few concerns, however, about excessive
withdrawals from multilateral treaties.'86 Nor do we know of any evidence suggesting that nations have
moved away from including withdrawal clauses in treaties due to perceived abuses.187 While it could be
argued that the Mandatory View of CIL is itself deterring treaty withdrawals, we think this is unlikely.
Treaties and CIL do not have identical content, and many treaties are “progressive” in that they codify
principles not contained in CIL.'88 Moreover, even when treaties and CIL contain substantively similar
rules, treaties tend to be more specific and are more likely to be connected to enforcement and
adjudicative mechanisms. As a result, if a nation no longer agreed with the provisions in a treaty, it
would have an incentive to exercise its right of withdrawal even if it could not also exit from
substantively similar CIL.¶ The foregoing suggests that there is little reason to be concerned that a
Default View would lead to excessive withdrawal. In fact, it is possible that, even under that approach,
there might actually be insufficient withdrawal. Drawing from scholarship on contract theory, there are
reasons to believe that nations will adhere to rules well beyond the point at which they have become
inefficient, even if nations had the ability to withdraw from them. Among the theoretical reasons to
expect stickiness in the CIL context are what are referred to as “network externalities,” “learning
externalities,” and “negative signals.” Network externalities can arise, for example, when members of a
group use a common product, such as a common contract term.'89 If all members of the group commit
to using the same contract term, there are efficiency gains in that the individual parties do not need to
spend time negotiating new provisions; everyone can assume that everyone else understands what the
basic contract rules will be. A similar dynamic might operate with, for example, rules of diplomatic
immunity. If nations can assume that the same rules of diplomatic immunity apply, no matter where,
then there will be no need to negotiate specific rules every time a diplomatic mission is established in a
new country. This benefit of standardization of rules comes with a cost, however, in that individual
nations may be slow to shift to new rules even when the old rules have become suboptimal for the
system.¶ Adding to the network effects, there may also be learning externalities, which arc the benefits that come from using
the same rules over a long period of time.190 The longer a rule or a contract provision is used, the better understood it will be.
In the CIL context, the primary' actors are government bureaucrats. One might expea that the government bureaucrats
responsible for international relations, once they develop expertise in operating with a certain set of rules, will be reluaant to
change.'9' Network and learning externalities will often operate in conjunction with each other to erect barriers to change.'92
One can imagine, for example, lawyers in the various ministries of defense who are specialists in the rules of war under some
combination of CIL and the Geneva Conventions. Many of the existing rules governing war are likely outdated, in that they were
designed for different types of armed conflict than the types of conflicts we see today.'9* Nevertheless, some combination of
network and learning externalities probably produces barriers to change.194¶ Finally, concerns about sending negative
signals may add to stickiness. In settings where reputations are important, and the parties have
incomplete information about each other’s intentions, parties will be concerned about sending the
wrong signals to their counterparties.195 Altering a standard contract term, for example, presents the
risk that it will raise the suspicions of counterpanics that something is amiss. The same dynamic may
apply in the CIL context. Fearing a negative inference by others, nations may be unwilling to deviate
from long-established rules of interaction, even when those rules arc recognized as inefficient.196¶ The
foregoing theoretical conjectures are supported by empirical evidence from the field of sovereign debt
contracts. The standard provisions in these contracts arc distillations of norms of debtor-creditor
behavior that have evolved over long periods of time (akin to customary norms) and (unlike under the
Mandatory View for CIL) are also defaults in that nations are free to alter them.197 Multiple studies
show that states, despite the option to alter provisions, adhere to inefficient contract provisions long
after these provisions arc recognized to have become inefficient.198 The evidence further suggests that
among the reasons for this stickiness arc network effects and concerns about negative signals.199 A
caveat here is that the foregoing evidence draws on the behavior of officials in ministries of finance
rather than ministries of foreign affairs, and it is the latter who arc primarily involved in CIL matters. It is
unlikely, however, that officials in the ministries of foreign affairs will be less concerned about
reputation and negative signals than their counterparts in the ministries of finance.200 Again, one
would expect this stickiness problem to be exacerbated by the Mandatory View, which (unlike in the
sovereign debt context) disallows unilateral opt-out.¶ Related to the concern about stickiness is the
concern that a disallowance of unilateral opt-out will cause nations to act opportunistically and demand
concessions before agreeing to any alterations of CIL (even efficient ones). In other contexts, this is
referred to as a “holdout” problem.201 As noted, the precise fraction or number of nations whose
approval needs to be obtained before an extant CIL rule can be altered is unclear. That lack of clarity
makes it difficult to describe the precise nature of the holdout problem under the current Mandatory
View. To be able to evaluate the potential holdout problem, therefore, we have to make a series of
assumptions about how the current system works.¶ We assume that if a nation were to act in a fashion
contrary to existing CIL and if few other nations objected, a new CIL rule might gradually emerge, but
that objections from even a minority of nations likely would prevent this from happening.202 In voting
terms, acquiescence (or nonobjection) is treated in the CIL process as the equivalent of a vote of
approval for the change. With that qualification, however, there is, in effect, a supermajority approval
requirement. Such a requirement creates a potential holdout problem because a small group of nations
can threaten to object vocally to, and thereby derail, attempts by other nations to deviate from existing
CIL rules.¶ In small, homogenous groups, where the interests of members arc relatively uniform and
where the members interact repeatedly, social and reputational pressures can serve to alleviate holdout
problems.103 That means that these small groups can often afford to require a high degree of
consensus before decisions are made. As groups get larger and more diverse, however, internal
pressures become more diffuse, asymmetries of information increase, and the threat of informal
sanctions becomes less potent. Those factors increase the risk of holdouts.204¶ Applying this analysis to
the modern international system, which is large, heterogeneous, characterized by significant
asymmetries of information, and has widely varying threats of sanctions, suggests that the system is
vulnerable to holdouts. This is particularly so in contexts involving nations that have limited interactions
with one another. Under such conditions, nations may be tempted to collude with others to block
alterations to CIL so as to extract concessions from the nations seeking change. This could happen even
if the change at issue would be value-enhancing for the group as a whole.¶ Such holdout problems are
likely to dampen cooperation in international lawmaking. Conversely, if there were a right of
withdrawal, a nation that found a CIL rule to be problematic could announce its reasons for withdrawal
and propose a new rule. If there were other nations that also derived benefits from the change, and
relatively few who suffered costs, this could be an occasion for a cooperative move toward a treaty.
Along these lines, allowing withdrawal could also enhance collaboration in innovation and
experimentation in lawmaking. Under the Mandatory View, when there arc suggestions of a new rule,
some nations might be concerned that the rules will turn out to have unforeseen negative
consequences. If so, these nations with concerns will work hard to prevent new CIL from forming out of
a fear that, once it forms, it will be binding and hard to change. By contrast, if a right of future
withdrawal is permitted, it provides nations with a form of insurance, in that they can experiment with
how the rule works for them and then withdraw if its negative effects outweigh the benefits.105
EPA DA
Narrowing the Commerce Clause still allows for federal environmental protection
Jonathan H. Adler 5, Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, “Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental
Regulation”, 2/21, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=690827&download=yes
C. A CONTINUING FEDERAL ROLE¶ This Article’s focus on the extent to which federalism doctrines could,
and perhaps should, curtail federal regulatory authority in the environmental context should not
obscure the fact that federal regulatory power is likely to remain substantial for the foreseeable future.
Federalism limits the regulatory power of the federal government, but it does not eviscerate federal
efforts. Where federalism’s pinch is most severe, it is reasonable to expect one or more justices to blink
before applying the logic of existing precedents. Yet even if the Court applies the federalism principles in
an unflinching manner, it will still be possible to protect environmental values. ¶ Under strict
application of Lopez and Morrison, the federal government will retain the ability to regulate economic
activity and truly interstate environmental problems.625 Industrial operations will remain within the
federal government’s regulatory ambit, as would activities that produce interstate spillovers. Precedents
such as Hodel would not be threatened
by such an approach to the Commerce Clause, nor would lower court decisions upholding federal
regulatory statutes that focus on industrial enterprises and other economic activity. Adding a
jurisdictional element to even the most ambitious federal environmental statutes would preserve their
constitutionality, albeit at the expense of each statute’s comprehensiveness.626 A requirement that
Congress include jurisdictional elements in environmental statutes that criminalize or otherwise regulate
non-commercial activity would still cover the vast majority of environmentally destructive behavior.
Commercial real estate developments of the sort at issue in Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty would satisfy
even fairly narrow readings of such requirements, whereas non-commercial activities by individual
landowners would not.627
States solve better even if they win the plan undermines federal regs
Jonathan H. Adler 5, Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, “Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental
Regulation”, 2/21, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=690827&download=yes
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION¶ The conventional wisdom holds that
constricting federal regulatory authority necessarily sacrifices environmental protection. According to
some environmental groups, the revival of federalism represents a “grave challenge” that is “threatening the
very core of environmental law.”513 Recent Commerce Clause decisions, for example, could provide “the groundwork for
pulling the rug out from under federal environmental protections.”514 This presumption is dominant
both in the environmental literature and in the language of judicial opinions. Dissenting in Solid Waste Agency, Justice Stevens
V.
Though
widespread, this view overstates the environmental impact of judicially enforced limits on federal
regulatory authority. ¶ Judicial reluctance to enforce federalism limits on federal environmental regulation may well stem, at least in part, from concerns that such limits could
suggested that the impact of the Court’s opinion could well be a return to burning rivers, excessive water pollution and “the destruction of the aquatic environment.”515
hamper environmental protection. In Gibbs v. Babbitt, for example, Judge Wilkinson suggests that to strike down the ESA take prohibition on Commerce Clause grounds would necessarily limit
federal species protection efforts “to only federal lands”516 and would “call into question the historic power of the federal government to preserve scarce resources in one locality for the
future benefit of all America.”517 If extended to other statutes, Judge Wilkinson wrote, the holding would leave “many environmental harms to be dealt with through state tort law.”518 Such
concerns are misplaced, and their premises are largely unfounded. The federal government’s inability
to prohibit the take of endangered species, at least without the inclusion of a jurisdictional requirement
to ensure that the given instance was sufficiently tied to commerce, would not affect the federal
government’s ability to protect endangered species via the spending power through direct
subsidization of conservation efforts, funding of state regulatory programs, and support for programs to
increase the awareness of biodiversity concerns and their importance.519 Limiting the use of, or even eliminating,
some tools in Congress’s environmental policy toolbox is hardly tantamount to proscribing all federal
environmental protection. ¶ As discussed above,520 the application of Commerce Clause restrictions to other
environmental statutes would not result in the same curtailment of federal regulatory authority insofar
as such statutes, like the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act521 or Clean Air Act,522 target economic activity. Yet even if the
Court’s federalism doctrines were to disembowel much of the existing federal regulatory structure, it is
simply not true that this would leave “many environmental harms to be dealt with by state tort law.”523
The federal government is hardly the nation’s sole environmental regulator. To the contrary, most
environmental monitoring and enforcement occur at the state and local level,
and there is no a priori reason to assume that states would be unable or unwilling to increase their
environmental efforts were federal regulation not already in place.525 Judge Wilkinson’s concern is even more
misplaced because those environmental concerns most likely to be found beyond Congress’s reach are
those most likely to be regulated by state and local governments. Indeed, most such environmental concerns are
so regulated already, albeit in cooperation with federal efforts.526¶ While limiting federal regulatory authority will necessarily
affect existing federal regulatory programs, it need not result in a significant decline in environmental
quality. Indeed, if responded to properly, limitations on federal regulatory authority could actually improve
environmental performance insofar as it fosters greater reliance on more efficient and effective
approaches to environmental protection.527 First, just as constitutional constraints on federal authority limit federal protection, such constraints
also limit the federal government’s ability to impose environmental harm. Second, in many instances
alternatives to federal environmental protection can be just as, if not more, protective of
environmental values. Reducing the scope of federal environmental regulation produces greater
opportunities for the adoption and implementation of such non-federal efforts. Third, direct regulation is
not the federal government’s only means of advancing environmental values. Even if the Supreme Court
were to impose highly restrictive federalism constraints on federal regulatory power, including the use
of conditional spending under Dole, the federal government would retain substantial authority to advance
environmental protection.
524
Timeframe is 200 years and adaptation solves
Mendelsohn 9 – Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online:
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf
These statements are largely alarmist and misleading . Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves
attention, society’s immediate behavior has anextremely low probabilityof leading tocatastrophic
consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the
next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require
a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there
will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small
regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to
unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not
at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range
climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.
K
They are moral tunnel vision
Jeffrey Issac (professor of political science at Indiana University) 2002 Dissent, Spring, ebsco
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught,
an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be
morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws : (1) It fails
to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring
violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right
thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good
beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and
injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in
injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a
potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain
violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended
consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that
is most significant . Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit
of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough
that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of
pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral
absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance.
And it undermines political effectiveness.
In a nuclear world we have to weigh consequences.
Sissela Bok (Professor of Philosophy) 1998 Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and
Fudlou Shehadi
The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as
to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as
an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making
member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to
risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in
a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of
following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy .” And to say that one did not
intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about
would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we
cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case
where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving,
bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.
The aff is an ontological prereq to any condition of ethics
MICHEL FOUCAULT 97, ETHICS SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH, acc 2/7, http://www.michelfoucault.com/dulwich/freedom.pdf
Q. But doesn't the exercise of practices of freedom require a certain degree of liberation? M.F. Yes,
absolutely. And this is where we must introduce the concept of domination. The analyses I am trying to
make bear essentially on relations of power. By this I mean something different from states of
domination. Power relations are extremely widespread in human relationships. Now, this means not
that political power is everywhere, but that there is in human relationships a whole range of power
relations that may come into play among individuals, within families, in pedagogical relationships,
political life, and so on. The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes
encounters what may be called situations or states of domination in which the power relations, instead
of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked,
frozen. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing
them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is
faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of
freedom do not -exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited. Thus, I agree
with you that liberation is sometimes the political or historical condition for a practice of freedom.
Taking sexuality as an example, it is clear that a number of liberations were required vis-it-vis male
power, that liberation was necessary from an oppressive morality concerning heterosexuality as well as
homosexuality. But this liberation does not give rise to the happy human being imbued with a sexuality
to which the subject could achieve a complete and satisfying relationship. Liberation paves theEthics:
Subjectivity and Truth way for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of
freedom. Q. Can't liberation itself be a mode or form of practice ofthe freedom? M.F. Yes, in some
cases. You have situations where liberation and the struggle for liberation are indispensable for the
practice of freedom. With respect to sexuality, for example-and I am not indulging in polemics, because I
don't like polemics, I think they are usually futile-there is a Reichian model derived from a certain
reading of Freud. Now, in Reich's view the problem was entirely one of liberation. To put it somewhat
schematically, according to him there is desire, drive, prohibition, repression, internalization, and it is by
getting rid of these prohibitions, in other words, by liberating oneself, that the problem gets resolved. I
think-and I know I am vastly oversimplifying much more interesting and refined positions of many
authors-this completely misses the ethical problem of the practice offreedom: How can one practice
freedom? With regard to sexuality, it is obvious that it is by liberating our desire that we will learn to
conduct ourselves ethically in pleasure relationships with others. Q. You say that freedom must be
practiced ethically... M.F. Yes,' for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [rijlechie]
practice offreedom? Q. In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already ethical in
itself. M.F. Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that
freedom takes when it is informed by reflection.
Ressentiment is productive—inseparable for some freedom and their crusade
against it links just as much
Stefan P. Dolger 10, Brock University, "In Praise of Ressentiment: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Glenn Beck",
APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642232&download=yes
After Ressentiment ¶ In closing I would suggest that my praise of ressentiment is also in line with the more
deliberatively conceived multiculturalism of the Left than is the current puritanical disdain. As Monique
Deveaux argues, it is a failure of political imagination when we fixate on liberal principles as preconditions lo multicultural dialogue,
and in particular it is necessary to move toward a deeper level of intercultural respect rather than mere toleration (Deveaux 2000).10
But if it is appropriate to go beyond simply tolerating non- liberal peoples abroad and in immigrant communities, if we must go
beyond toleration to do justice to the rich tradition of cultural pluralism, then perhaps we can also open our hearts and minds to the
possibility that the ressentiment-suffused need to be heard out as well. Perhaps rather than demonizing ressentiment
as a toxin to politics, as the worst of the worst for subjects whom we purport to free, we must
accept that ressentiment is for many inseparable from their conception of their own freedom.
Perhaps rather than pitying these poor fools, in ways that we would never pity a plural wife in the global South, we
should ponder whether ressentiment as a precondition of subjectivity is as much a gift as a
curse.¶ And are we so sure, after all, we late Nietzscheans, that our crusade against ressentiment is not
itself suffused with ressentiment? Is not itself fully in the grips of it? How would we know if it were or
weren’t? Perhaps we are, in our own way, as spiteful, vain, petty, weak, subjected, enraged against the past,
capitalized, consumerized, unfree, as those we purport to want to free from the chains of slave morality. Perhaps it
is ourselves that we need to give a break to, that we need to get over, when we first look to purge the other of ressentiment.
Perhaps we all swim in this current, perhaps we are all Ressentiment’s children, and perhaps that
is
OK – even to the extreme of the using ressentiment unconsciously in the effort to rid the world of
ressentiment. Though just in saying so I wouldn’t expect that to do much to overturn Ressentiment’s reign. No, she is far too
puissant for that. But we do not need to rage against the weakness in others because we fear the
dependence and weakness in ourselves. ¶ As Vetlesen puts it, defending Amery: “Against Nietzsche, who
despised victims because he saw them as weak, as losers in life’s struggles, Amery upholds the dignity of
having been forced by circumstances beyond one’s control into that position , thus reminding
Nietzsche that as humans we are essentially relational beings, dependent, not self-sufficient. In hailing the
strong and despising the weak, in denying that vulnerability is a basic ineluctably given human condition, a condition from
which not only the role of victim springs but that of the morally responsible agent too, Nietzsche fails to be the
provocateur he loves to believe he is: He sides with the complacent majority and so helps
reinforce the existential and moral loneliness felt by Amery, the individual victim who speaks up precisely in that
capacity” (Vetlesen 2006, 43). Perhaps we can begin to see how we have been using the weak, the viewers of
Glenn Beck and others, as the targets for our need to find blameworthy agents . And that too is fine. The
trouble comes when we think we’ve gone beyond Ressentiment when in fact we’re just listening
to her whisperings without realizing it. We think that we can well and truly look down on the Rush
Limbaughs, these destroyers of civilization, because they are possessed by something that we are above.
And far be it from me to suggest that we should not resent, should not blame; I merely suggest we direct our blame
toward more useful ends than where it is currently located.
1AR
Both he and Bewley Taylor think we’re already past the breaking point for the treaties
Phillip Smith 14, editor of the Drug War Chronicle, “War of Words: The International Narcotics Control
Board vs. A Changing World,” March 04,
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2014/mar/04/war_words_incb_annual_report
For some years now, some European and Latin American countries have been expressing a desire to see
change in the international system, and "soft defections," such as the Dutch cannabis coffee shop
system and Spain's cannabis cultivation clubs, have stretched the prohibitionist treaties to their legal
limits. But legal marijuana in Uruguay is a clear breach of the treaties, as Colorado and Washington may
be. That is bringing matters to an unavoidable head.¶ After surveying the state of drug affairs around
the globe, the 96-page INCB report ends with a number of concerns and recommendations, ranging
from non-controversial items such as calling for adequate prevention and treatment efforts to urging
greater attention to prescription drug abuse and more attention paid to new synthetic drugs. [Ed: There
is some controversy over how to best approach prescription drug abuse and synthetic drugs. e.g. the
type of attention to pay to them.]¶ But the INCB is clearly perturbed by the erosion of the international
drug prohibition consensus, and especially by its concrete manifestations in legalization in Uruguay,
Colorado, and Washington and the spreading acceptance of medical marijuana.¶ "The Board is
concerned that a number of States that are parties to the 1961 Convention are considering legislative
proposals intended to regulate the use of cannabis for purposes other than medical and scientific ones"
and "urges all Governments and the international community to carefully consider the negative impact
of such developments. In the Board's opinion, the likely increase in the abuse of cannabis will lead to
increased public health costs," the report said.¶ Similarly, the INCB "noted with concern" Uruguay's
marijuana legalization law, which "would not be in conformity with the international drug control
treaties, particularly the 1961 Convention" and urged the government there "to ensure the country
remains fully compliant with international law, which limits the use of narcotic drugs, including cannabis,
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes."¶ Ditto for Colorado and Washington, where the board
was "concerned" about the marijuana legalization initiatives and underlined that "such legislation is not
in conformity with the international drug control treaties." The US government should "continue to
ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory," INCB
chided.¶ But even as INCB struggles to maintain the legal backbone of global prohibition, it is not only
seeing marijuana prohibition crumble in Uruguay and the two American states, it is also itself coming
under increasing attack as a symbol of a crumbling ancien regime that creates more harm than good
with its adherence to prohibitionist, law enforcement-oriented approaches to the use and commerce in
psychoactive substances.¶ "We are at a tipping point now as increasing numbers of nations realize that
cannabis prohibition has failed to reduce its use, filled prisons with young people, increased violence
and fueled the rise of organized crime," said Martin Jelsma of the Transnational Institute. "As nations
like Uruguay pioneer new approaches, we need the UN to open up an honest dialogue on the strengths
and weaknesses of the treaty system rather than close their eyes and indulge in blame games."¶ "For
many years, countries have stretched the UN drug control conventions to their legal limits, particularly
around the use of cannabis," agreed Dave Bewley-Taylor of the Global Drug Policy Observatory. "Now
that the cracks have reached the point of treaty breach, we need a serious discussion about how to
reform international drug conventions to better protect people's health, safety and human rights.
Reform won't be easy, but the question facing the international community today is no longer whether
there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how."
Escape clause can be used for the plan’s legalization method
Dave Bewley-Taylor 12/19, Professor or IR and Public Policy at Swansea University, Email exchange
with Arjun Vellayappan, http://northwesterndebate.blogspot.com/
Dear Mr. Jelsma and Mr. Bewley-Taylor,¶ My name is Arjun Vellayappan and I am a student at Northwestern University conducting an intercollegiate research project
regarding legalization of marijuana in the United States.¶ I have been reading about marijuana legalization and its implications for
the UN international drug conventions. I came across your article “Cannabis reforms: the scope and limits of treaty latitude” and was particularly interested in
the section about article 3 of the 1988 convention which allows for an “escape clause”.¶ I was curious if this opt-out clause could be applied
more broadly than just “personal use” and be used as a justification for U.S. recreational marijuana
legalization if the Supreme Court decided to rule the current prohibition unconstitutional?¶ Happy holidays and
thanks in advance!
Hi,¶ Please accept my apologies for only getting to this now.¶ You might find these of interest.¶ http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dlr18.pdf and attached.¶ As you see
from the Journal article,
I have thought that there is potential to use Article 3 of the 1988
Convention along the lines you suggest, but as you know, these things are all open to different legal interpretations.¶ Best
wishes¶ David R. Bewley-Taylor,¶ Professor of International Relations and Public Policy | Athro
Their card concludes aff – only deleted because US, plan resolves that – that’s BT
Jelsma 14 - co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman
(Martin, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition the History of cannabis in the UN drug control
system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,”
http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf)
The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to
influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S.
now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has
used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control
policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on
the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming
that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still
criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable
flexibility regarding law enforcement¶ practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s
constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal
law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by
allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating
its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still
prohibited under federal law.¶ In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The
INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in
the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties
on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs
to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility
based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its
constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that
principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from
the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a
criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the
negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding
conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in
the previous chapter),¶ non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position
has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal
interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are
sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for nonmedical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the
expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by
issuing additional non- prosecution guidelines.
Second card too --- doesn’t stop reform
Jelsma 14 - co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman
(Martin, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition the History of cannabis in the UN drug control
system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,”
http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf)
A reservation similar to the Bolivian one on coca leaf, by which a state would exempt itself from implementing the Convention’s obligations for cannabis, could thus
be attempted following the same treaty procedure. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that a reservation stand the test of not being
“incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”.21 Those overall aims of the Single Convention are expressed in the preamble’s opening paragraph
regarding concern about “the health and welfare of mankind” and the treaty’s general obligation to limit controlled drugs “exclusively to medical and scientific
purposes”. The absence in the Commentary of any accompanying cautionary text, however, when referring to this as a legitimate option seems to imply that
exemption by means of a reservation of a specific substance from the general obligations would not in
itself constitute a conflict with the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.¶ Arguing that exempting certain
substances from that obligation could in fact even be beneficial for “the health and welfare of mankind”
may strengthen the chance of passing the compatibility test with regard to the object and purpose of
the treaty. Different schools of thought exist regarding these requirements. Some remain close to the letter of the Single Convention itself, others interpret
its¶ object and purpose in view of relevant rules of international law more broadly and in a way that takes into account the fundamental reason or problem it was
supposed to address.22¶ A
downside to this approach, besides the already mentioned risk of creating precedents for
weakening other UN treaty regimes, is that it applies only to the reserving nation and that unilateral escape mechanisms
could reduce pressure on the treaty system to undergo a multilateral and more fundamental process of
reform and modernization. It is in effect a one-off fix for an individual state and could not be applied regularly.
Nonetheless, the procedure is worthy of consideration under specific circumstances, especially after other
avenues for creating more flexibility on a particular topic have been explored and failed.
*Only the plan’s Court based marijuana reform creates long-term stability for the
treaty system
Martin Jelsma 14, coordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, David R. Bewley-Taylor,
University of Wales Swansea and Tom Blickman, “Cannabis reforms: the scope and limits of treaty
latitude”, March, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, Transnational Institute, PDF
the 1988 Convention. Article 3 repeats in slightly broader language the provisions
of article 36 of the Single Convention and article 22 of the 1971 Convention. ¶ Paragraph 2 of article 3 adds: Subject to
its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each party shall adopt such
measures as may be seen necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when
committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for
personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.¶
Even though the language is more restrictive and might be regarded as reducing the flexibility of the earlier treaties, a persuasive legal case can be made
that article 3, paragraph 2 still leaves significant scope for deviation from the punitive approach. “Subject to
its constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system”, represents a clear “escape
clause”. It implies that “any latitude existing under this Convention does not result exclusively from the
Convention but also from the constitutional and other legal principles of each country”. Therefore, “Parties
would not violate the Convention if their domestic courts held criminalization of personal use to be
unconstitutional”,11 and consequently are not obliged to establish possession for personal use to be a
criminal offence. A strong case can also be made that a party need not make cultivation for personal use a criminal offense either.12 Further, the article allows
for alternatives to conviction or punishment for offences related to personal use and other offences “of
a minor nature”, albeit restricting and strongly discouraging national discretionary powers related to illicit trafficking offences of a more serious nature.13¶ As a result, a
country might rule that, in line with its own national circumstances, it is not within the interest of society to
prosecute for possession or cultivation for personal use; that the right to privacy overrules state intervention regarding what people consume or
Circumstances became more complex with the introduction of
possess in their private homes; or that self-destructive behaviour, be it consumption of potentially harmful substances or other behaviour including suicide, shall not be subject to punishment.
These justifications have been argued and accepted respectively in the Netherlands, Alaska and
Germany with regard to possession of cannabis for personal use. More recently, in Argentina the Supreme Court ruled that the section of
the 1989 drug law criminalizing drug possession was unconstitutional.14 The existence of an escape clause of this nature, based on
constitutional principles as well as basic concepts of national legal systems, is relatively rare in
international law.15 It has been utilized by a range of authorities to create more policy flexibility while
remaining within the confines of the treaty framework.16 Thus, despite widespread acceptance of the
1988 Convention, significant room for maneuver in relation to cannabis decriminalization has been retained
since its enactment in 1990.
Reform and flexible interpretation of treaty through the plan is vital for treaty success--collapsing now
John Collins 12/1, PhD Candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of
Economics, and Coordinator of the LSE IDEAS International Drug Policy Project., The State Department’s
move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question,
blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-arational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/
Thirdly, there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approach. There are certain legislative actions which adherence to the treaties
require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by
multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term
very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further, evidence
of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation
against states continuing the repressive model. In the future, increasing pluralism in international drug
policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become
inevitable.¶ Fourthly, no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation
on any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, even
in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is just the
application of this fact to the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy seems to me one
which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When
sufficient national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become
more apparent and practical, but there needs to be a sequential action process here.¶ What would treaty
reform look like?¶ I’ve never heard a treaty reform process elaborated convincingly. Some argue that an open debate would
provide the answers. Given the very real economic and structural interests underpinning the current system, that seems unlikely. Many describe the
treaty system as a ‘prohibitionist regime’. The implication is that it’s a monolithic legal framework,
created to enforce a global prohibitionist model and therefore treaty reform is fundamentally required
to change it. That’s a useful conceptual term, but it’s ahistorical and the reality is far more complicated.¶ It’s a
system which has overseen an array of regimes throughout its history, often running concurrently. Some outlived their
usefulness and simply died out. For example, in the 1930s the drug control system encompassed many regimes, including a regime around regulating global drug
manufacturing; one around minimizing illicit trafficking; another around prohibiting opium smoking (which many states including Britain ignored out of deference to
local security concerns in their colonies) and a regime around developing regulations on production (again happily ignored by many states when it conflicted with
economic interests). These aspects
intersected in various ways at national, regional and international levels, but
were far from monolithic.¶ The implementation of the UN system from the 1970s onwards was overwhelmingly characterized by an extreme
implementation of prohibitionist aspects of the treaties. For certain states it was driven by the US outsourcing its control efforts, particularly in Latin America. But
for many others it was driven by state level responses to a domestic problem. For example, Asia was an epicenter for the prohibitionist model, not a recipient. The
colonial powers stalled implementing prohibition as long as they could, recognising the dangers of the illicit market as well as for fiscal reasons. Post-colonial Asian
elites associated opium and the opium monopolies with colonialism and cultural backwardness and enthusiastically embraced strict prohibitionist models. These
drives towards prohibitionist and repressive models were facilitated by the treaty system but not necessarily driven by it. The implication is that they can be
drastically rolled back without any treaty revision. ¶ The weak regulatory ‘core’ of the treaty system ¶ The current treaty system is essentially a regulatory
framework for a global licit market in opioid medications (such as morphine) for the treatment of severe pain. To enforce this market it mandates certain action
around prohibiting non-medical production and manufacturing of these medicines. It was believed that effective regulation of the licit market would squeeze out
illicit supplies, leaving a minimal role for prohibitionist aspects and police enforcement. This proved profoundly misjudged. When the failures of the regulatory
approach to quell the illicit market became apparent, international policy path determinacy fuelled an exponential growth in enforcement efforts, thereby creating
the modern ‘war on drugs’.¶ Ultimately the
core represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated.
For example, it was based on postwar principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no
access to essential pain medicines. However,
reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even
started to grapple with. The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of
the trading arrangements locked into the system. Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in my
opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and develop our
understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with cannabis – via flexible
interpretations and innovations. When the beginnings of a consensus around reforming the core of
the conventions becomes apparent, states can also put the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by
writing all remnants out of the international treaties.