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Is Pre-Emptive
War Wrong?
III
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Brad Roberts: “NBC-Armed Rogues: Is There a
Moral Case for Preemption?”
Roberts’ Central Argument
The moral debates surrounding preemption are not as
straightforward as typically thought.
• Not only must the standard prudential considerations of Last
Resort, Reasonable Chance of Success, and Proportionality
be given subtler thought, but the criteria of Self-Defense and
Competent Authority must also be rethought in the context of
today’s political climate.
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Background
Note: This article was written before 9-11.
1996: Secretary of Defense William J. Perry declares that a new
chemical weapons facility in Libya “will not be allowed to begin
production,” implying US military force.
• Would such an action be defensible in moral terms?
• How are we to treat the apparent threats of “rogue” states
brought about by their development of nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) weapons?
Ethical considerations that typically shape debate about
preemption:
• Is the action undertaken as a last resort?
• Does the action have a reasonable chance of success?
• Will the action be proportional to the threat being removed?
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Background (cont’d)
An act of preemption cannot be deemed “just” merely on the
basis of these criteria.
• Justice requires fulfilling principles of self-defense, and of
competent authority.
• The US has emerged in recent decades as “the world’s only
superpower,” leading an international system in which most
other states are participants.
• Recent decades have also seen ongoing diffusion of NBC
weapons.
• If the US fails to use its power in ways that others accept as
just, a terrible backlash could result.
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Three Prudential Considerations
I. Last Resort (319)
Not every conceivable alternative must be exhausted before
preemptive action can be taken.
• We can never reach “lastness”, or we can never know that
we have reached it.
• However, an assessment is required of all means available
to meet a particular threat: economic, political, and military.
• There must be a preference for means other than war.
The Last Resort criterion does not mean that military action
must be forestalled until it cannot be successful (or can
succeed only at a higher cost).
• In the time it takes to fulfill economic sanctions, weapons
programs can reach maturity.
• The Last Resort consideration requires a narrow
interpretation.
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Three Prudential Considerations
II. Reasonable Chance of Success (320)
The Reasonable Chance of Success criterion requires that
military actions not be taken unless they offer a meaningful
prospect of eliminating the targeted threat.
• Suffering must be minimized.
• Peace must be restored that has been disordered by the
threat.
If the military actions fail, the actions may motivate retaliation,
resulting in the loss of many lives.
• The problem is complicated by the fact that NBC facilities
tend to be very hard to attack successfully.
• This leads to questions of proportionality.
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Three Prudential Considerations
II. Reasonable Chance of Success (cont’d)
“Success” does not mean perfect success.
• Eliminating some but not all of an enemy’s NBC weapons
could have a number of benefits:
 Might induce caution on the part of potential
aggressors.
 Could leave the enemy with so few weapons and
delivery systems as to render them effectively
impotent.
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Three Prudential Considerations
III. Proportionality (321)
The Proportionality criterion is generally taken to mean that
minimum necessary force should be taken to counter the
threat.
• Jus in Bello (proportionality in waging war)
 Provided fewer deaths will result from a preemptive
strike than by the weapons of mass destruction if
unleashed, preemption seems to pass proportionality
in jus in bello.
• Jus ad Bellum (when is it right to resort to force?)
 Several factors impinge upon proportionality in jus ad
bellum:
• Measuring actual casualties vs. potential casualties.
• Weighing probability of the enemy’s using the NBC
weapons as predicted.
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Prior Criteria
I. Self-Defense (322)
Standard ethical assumption: wars of self-defense are just;
wars of aggression are not.
• The crucial issue, then, is how proximate must a threat (of
NBC weapons) be? Does just war require waiting until the
last minute?
The UN Charter only confuses the issue:
• First-Use/Second-Use Distinction: Aggression is defined as
the first use of force, regardless of circumstances, while
defense becomes second use alone. (322)
 Problem: Aggression does not usually begin when the
first weapons are fired.
• War is often the culmination of some failure to coerce,
dissuade, or compel others.
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Prior Criteria
I. Self-Defense (cont’d)
Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars): Establishing a
sufficient threat requires:
1) Manifest intent to injure;
2) Degree of active preparedness;
3) General situation where waiting or otherwise not fighting
increases risk.
Development of NBC weapons fits many of these criteria, but:
• Rogue states have already established their aggressive
intent – acquisition of NBC weapons only helps to confirm
this threat.
• Waiting for the ‘first blow’ makes protection against rogue
states extremely costly.
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Prior Criteria
I. Self-Defense (cont’d)
Problems:
1) Because of the interdependence of states, aggression
threatens interests beyond that of a given state.
2) Unlike the Cold War, preemptive strikes on rogue states
may risk nuclear confrontation, but not armageddon.
• No rogue state possesses enough power to annihilate a
major power, but any major power possesses enough
power to annihilate a rogue state.
• If the preemptive strike fails, and the rogue state uses
NBC weapons in retaliation, the US has to decide how to
respond, considering deterrence, national survival, and
international order.
• Conventional military operations are unlikely to eliminate
nuclear dilemmas.
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Prior Criteria
II. Competent Authority (326)
The decision to go to war must be made by a competent
authority.
• Limits the right to make war to sovereign entities.
Given the notion of self-defense, above, a nation need not be
directly attacked by an aggressor’s first acts of war to
undertake military actions in reply.
• But can the US justify preemptive strikes on rogue states
that have not first made military attacks on it?
• If the US is not directly threatened, can it authoritatively
make a preemptive strike?
 If the US attacks without the perceived authority, it
may be judged as putting itself above the law, thus
hurting its relationship with allies and potential
adversaries alike.
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Prior Criteria
II. Competent Authority (cont’d)
Building a compelling case for preemption would be
strengthened by:
i. Presenting a clear normative argument.
• The best bet would be an argument on the basis of selfdefense, but unilaterial preemption flies in the face of
multilateral treaties and institutions to which the US is
party.
• Any such preemption risks the US appearing as having
only national interests at heart.
ii. Building a coalition.
• But preemption is notoriously unpopular, and generates
strong reactions by both allies and potential
adversaries.
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Prior Criteria
II. Competent Authority (cont’d)
iii. Seeking a UN mandate.
• Though this may serve to warn the rogue state, inducing
it to attack.
• The UN Security Council lacks the authority to make
war.
• The Council is seen by many as symptomatic of an
unjust world order.
• A veto by the Council on a just act of preemption does
not make it unjust.
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When Is Preemption Just? (331)
There seems no blanket reply to the question, “Is there a moral
case for preemption?”
Strongest Moral Case for US Preemption:
1) Aggressor has actually threatened to use NBC weapons
against the US, and has taken steps toward this end.
2) Those weapons have been built in violation of international
law.
3) The aggressor’s threatened action raise larger questions
about credibility of security guarantees or balance of
power within a region.
4) The president has secured approval of the US Congress.
5) The US has secured backing of the UN Security Council
and relevant regional organizations.
• The tests of last resort, proportionality, and reasonable
chance of success must also be met.
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When Is Preemption Just? (cont’d)
Weakest Moral Case for US Preemption:
1) A state has made no NBC threats and has no prior
behavior of aggression.
2) The state’s NBC weapons are permitted under
international law.
3) The preemption is the culmination of a worsening bilateral
relationship with the US, driven by a US loss of objectivity.
4) US actions have been condemned by the UN or opposed
by the Security Council.
• Even if the proposed strike meets the tests of last resort,
proportionality, and reasonable chance of success, it
cannot be accepted under these conditions.
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Moral Obligations Following Preemption (332)
Just war imposes obligations in the aftermath of military action:
• A clear moral case must be made for the action undertaken.
• The US must work to alleviate the suffering caused by its
military actions.
• “If US action is deemed necessary to recover something
wrongfully taken or to punish evil, then its post-strike actions
must work toward those ends.” (332)
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Difficulties Posed Today
1) The self-defense requirement is too narrow in a world in
which the security of so many depends upon the
orderliness of the system.
• Defense of the world order must have a moral quality
analogous to defending a sovereign nation, but this is
not reflected in traditional moral theory.
• Nuclear issues must be reassessed in the context of
current strategic realities.
2) The competent-authority requirement is likewise out of
date.
• Principles of authority must recognize the issues of
overlapping and international institutions and
sovereignties, and world-order problems.
• The logical focal point is the UN, especially the Security
Council.