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Katie Skaggs
Professor Lund
POLS 429
28 September 2011
Just War Theory: Pacifism and Realism
In his book Arguing about War, Michael Walzer addresses just war theory and its
application in recent US military conflicts, namely the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq
War, and reaction to terrorism in general. He explains that the theory of just war is an
argument “about the moral standing of warfare as a human activity,” and that the theory
argues both that war is sometimes justifiable and that the conduct of war is always subject to
moral criticisms (Walzer ix). Just war theory provides the basis for our conversations about war,
as it includes ideas like “self defense and aggression, war as a combat between combatants, the
immunity of noncombatants, the doctrine of proportionality, the rules of surrender, the rights
of prisoners,” etc., all of which have been developed over time (Walzer x).
Two major criticisms are also important to understanding just war theory. The first of
which is that those who apply the theory are “moralizing war,” and in doing so are making it
easier to justify war by removing the “stigma that should always be attached to the business of
killing” (Walzer x). Essentially, this criticism asks how war can ever be just when it is so terrible;
the answer is different for everyone. For Walzer, it is that “there are acts of aggression and acts
of cruelty that we ought to resist, by force if necessary,” i.e. Nazi Germany, genocide in Rwanda
(Walzer x-xi). The second criticism of the theory is that it “frames wars in the wrong way” by
focusing our attention “on the immediate issues at stake before the war begins….and then on
the conduct of the war, battle by battle, and so it avoids larger questions about imperial
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ambition and the global struggle for resources and power” (Walzer xi). This criticism is basically
that just war theory doesn’t distinguish excuses from actual reasons for going to war.
Walzer points out that just war theory is subjective, and applied to the same situation,
different people could come away with entirely different assessments. However, he is quick to
argue that this in no way invalidates the theory, since it makes disagreements more “coherent
and comprehensible” (Walzer xii). He also argues that just war theory must take three different
factors into account: jus ad bellum, which deals with the decision to go to war; jus in bello,
which deals with the conduct of the battles, and jus post bellum, or justice after the war
(Walzer xiii).
Walzer later clarifies some of the finer points of just war theory; its goal, he argues, is to
look to restore the status quo ante, or the way things were before aggression took place.
Therefore, “war aims legitimately reach to the destruction or the defeat, demobilization, and
(partial) disarming of the aggressor’s armed forces” (Walzer 92). He also argues that, by
definition, just wars are limited wars in that “their conduct is governed by a set of rules
designed to bar, so far as possible, the use of violence and coercion against noncombatant
populations” (Walzer 91).
While just war theory is a major concept to be considered in the discussion of war and
of particular conflicts, there are two perspectives that also must be taken into account, that of
realism and pacifism. The concept of realism comes from Thucydides, who argued that we
cannot and ought not make moral judgments about war. This position comes from the idea that
“might is right,” and that any appeals to justice and therefore to morality come only from the
claims of self interest (Holmes 52). This worked for rulers like Machiavelli, who chose to place
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the sovereign states’ interests above pursuing morality because “sovereign states have no
authority above them, and morality requires such an authority,” so “morality cannot exist at
the international level” because “nations exist in a state of nature where self-preservation
alone is the rule” (Holmes 53).
In a realist point of view, moral talk about war is either misplaced or is a hypocritical
statement meant to justify or make your choices look more attractive. Within realism, there are
two different types of realists: descriptive realists are more skeptical, and believe that there are
no shared norms when it comes to international relations, while proscriptive/normative realists
believe that states should/do consider moral ideals when acting in their best interests, but that
these moral ideals should never make decisions for the state because realists “detach morality
altogether from the conduct of states” (Lecture Notes, Holmes 52). Everything about realism,
therefore, lives in direct contradiction to the concept of just war theory, as it is (ideally) rooted
in the concept of morality and justice.
The second perspective relevant to this discussion is that of pacifism, or the belief that
all war is always wrong. Pacifism can be applied to various philosophical approaches. For
example, a Utilitarian might argue that no war has ever produced more happiness than it cost,
and that costs always outweigh the benefits in war, while a Kantian could say that humans
everywhere have a right to life, liberty, and freedom from being coerced into certain behaviors,
and that war violates all of these rights. Pacifism also defies the concept of just war theory as
far as the argument that we are obligated to fight for what is just and moral, because for
pacifists, there is no such thing as a just fight, for war is always wrong.
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Walzer, who clearly agrees with the tenets of just war theory, illuminates flaws in both
realism and pacifism through his application of the concept of just war (or lack thereof) to the
Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and terrorism. He points out that many of those
opposed to the Vietnam War, i.e. leftists, had previously abhorred moralizing, but were soon
forced to make moral arguments regarding the war. They looked to a “common moral
language” that used words like aggression, intervention, just cause, self-defense,
noncombatant, immunity, civilians, and war crimes, all of which pertain to the just war theory
(Walzer 6-7). While before the war these leftists could have been considered realists, they were
no longer able to separate morality from the actions of the state.
Walzer is clearly of the same mind, as he demonstrates with his explanation of the
“usefulness of morality,” which argues that morality should be adhered to, not for morality’s
sake, but in order to maintain approval: “a moral regard for civilians at risk is critically
important in winning wider support” (Walzer 10). The United States failed to do this during the
Vietnam War, and lost as a result. For Walzer, this merely emphasizes the fact that “in a war for
‘hearts and minds,’ rather than for land and resources, justice turns out to be a key to victory,”
and that “we should not fight wars about whose justice we are doubtful, and that once we are
engaged we have to fight justly so as not to antagonize the civilian population, whose support is
necessary to a military victory” (Walzer 9-10).
It would be tedious to point out every judgment Walzer makes that reflects the just war
theory; the theory is the filter through which he views all of the facts involved in recent US
military conflicts. He is clearly a proponent of the theory, though at times he takes on a more
realist or pacifist view, as the moral facts and necessities of the situation require.
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In his chapter on the Gulf War, Walzer introduces maxims attached to the concept of
just war theory that had developed only recently: that war “must be a ‘last resort,’” and that
the war’s “anticipated costs to soldiers and civilians alike must not be disproportionate (greater
than) the value of its ends” (Walzer 86). However, he argues that these maxims are not at all
helpful in making moral distinctions. Walzer’s belief in just war theory is demonstrated quickly,
when he “[assumes] that it was morally obligatory to” consider both the options the UN, the
US, etc. possessed, and their potential consequences (Walzer 87).
One of the few concessions Walzer makes to pacifism in his book was a result of this
assumption; if one takes the “last resort” maxim of the just war theory literally, as all pacifists
would naturally do, there would be no such thing. Essentially, there is always something else
that can be done. He points out that “sending troops into battle commonly brings with it so
many unanticipated costs that is has come to represent a moral threshold: political leaders
must cross this threshold only with great reluctance and trepidation…if there are potentially
effective ways of avoiding actual fighting while still confronting the aggressor, they should be
tried” (Walzer 88-89). Walzer also has a problem with the other maxim that states that benefits
must outweigh the costs. How, he questions, can we “measure the value of a country’s
independence against the value of the lives that might be lost in defending it? How do we
figure in the value of defeating an aggressive regime…or the value of deterring other, similar
regimes?” (Walzer 90).
When Walzer applies just war theory to the goal of the war, i.e. resisting Iraqi
aggression, he finds that action (though not necessarily military), was not only justified, but
perhaps imperative: “aggression is not only a crime against the formal rules of international
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society; it is also, more importantly, an assault upon a people, a threat to their common life and
even their physical survival” (91). However, he finds that the United States did not, perhaps,
have the purest motives in expelling Iraq from Kuwaiti. Going against the earlier argument that
just war theory permits the destruction of the aggressor’s military power, it is easy to see that
the US had much more far reaching goals, in its “imperialist” motives: “desire for influence and
power in the Gulf and a strategic presence and control over the flow of oil” (Walzer 93-94). This
proves a bit of a conundrum, in that it is possible to “support a war within its justifiable limits,”
to oppose the reasons a government has for fighting it, but to continue to support it as long as
every effort is made to protect civilian life (Walzer 94). However, Walzer finds that since the
way the United States waged the Gulf War did not protect civilians from being collateral
damage, it was not a just war. Though civilian casualties through direct acts of war (bombing,
etc.) remained relatively low, US strategy was to destroy Iraq’s infrastructure, including the
demolition of water treatment plants, which showed a distinct disregard for civilian lives
(Walzer 95-96).
Walzer’s judgments on how just war theory applies to the Iraq War are different than
those of the Gulf War, because his essay on the subject was written in September of 2002,
before the war actually began. Walzer fails to see the point of invading Iraq; he argues that all
of the reasons the Bush administration gave for a potential war have been issues for years, and
that the threats that Iraq poses are by no means new threats (Walzer 143-144). For Walzer, a
war with Iraq would have made much more sense in the 1990’s, when Saddam Hussein’s
regime was not complying with the United Nations inspections regarding the development and
possessions of weapons of mass destruction: “that would have been an internationalist war, a
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war of enforcement, and its justice would have derived, first, from the justice of the system it
was enforcing, and second, from its likely outcome: the strengthening of the UN and the global
legal order” (Walzer 144).
Walzer criticizes Bush for his use of the word “preemptive” when describing a potential
war with Iraq—since Iraq did not yet possess nuclear weapons nor had any imminent intention
of attacking or invading the US, the war was preventative, not preemptive (Walzer 146).
However, Walzer acknowledges that the gap between these two types of actions has narrowed:
“the old argument for preventative war did not take into account weapons of mass destruction
or delivery systems that allow no time for arguments about how to respond,” and as a result
there is now little strategic and moral difference between preventative and preemptive (Walzer
147). He also finds fault with the Bush administration’s intention to overthrow Saddam’s
regime, as “change of regime is not commonly accepted as a justification for war” (Walzer 148).
Though it is a common result of war, it does not often comply with the just war theory concept
of just and moral reasons to begin a war.
In short, Walzer would not find the Iraq War in compliance with just war theory. For that
war to be just and moral, he argues, there must first be serious attempts made to reinstate the
inspection system in Iraq, which would have to be supported by the UN and European states
(particularly France and Russia); if, following these attempts, Saddam’s regime continued upon
the path towards the development and potential use of weapons of mass destruction, the same
countries that called for the inspection system to be reinstated must then be prepared to act,
both economically and militarily (Walzer 150).
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I found myself agreeing with nearly every point Walzer made throughout his book; all of
his arguments were both logical and well-supported. While I would like to think that morality in
war is important for more than just maintaining civilian support, and thus improving the odds of
victory, the logic behind such an assertion is obvious. It is easy to see how the lines between
justice and injustice, morality and immorality become blurred during war, but it is also easy to
recognize the appeal of the just war theory as a sort of middle ground between realism and
pacifism. It seems to me that the concept of just war theory is something that has been
ingrained in my mind throughout my life and education, both religious and academic, though,
as Walzer points out is common, I did not know the actual name for the theory before
beginning my studies of political science. Instead, it has been done gradually and indirectly as I,
and I’m sure countless others, have been taught about right and wrong.
For me, realism makes much more sense than pacifism, just because pacifism seems like
a childish ideal that is impossible to abide by. For me, there is such a thing as a just war, and I
believe that is a state’s moral responsibility to engage in these conflicts. While it is easy to see
that realism poses a severe moral quandary in that it is an excuse for a leader or state to
behave as they see fit, with no regard for justice, rights, and freedoms, I am also able to see the
necessity for such injustice in certain cases. I cannot in any way bring myself to agree with the
idea of a total separation of morality and actions, but I can understand why this is sometimes
deemed necessary.
Obviously, there is no right answer to the question of whether realism, pacifism, or just
war theory is “right,” and I think a vast majority of people likely believe in a combination of the
three. For me, I would argue it is best to stay away from war if it is not absolutely necessary
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(whether morally or actually) to engage, and if it is, attempt to wage war in a morally
acceptable manner, but sometimes there really is such a thing as the “greater good,” and
justice and morality may not always be possible all the time in war.