E.C.F.R. FIREFIGHTER SUFFERS FACIAL BURNS
HISTORY
TELEPHONE REPORT & DISPATCH INFORMATION
At 01:56 hours on August 12, 2010 the Escambia County Emergency Communications Center (ECC)
received a 911 telephone report of “a house filling with smoke” at 3306 W. Jackson Street in District 17.
The female caller also stated that she didn’t know where the smoke was coming from and that she saw
no flames. The ECC call taker advised her to evacuate the house. A box alarm was transmitted sending
Engine 17, Engine 11, Engine 16, Ladder 12 and Battalion 2 to the fire. The fire dispatcher announced
that the cross streets were Shoemaker and Wentworth and the nearest hydrant was on W. Jackson St
just west of Wentworth.
Engine 11 responded with a complement of four certified firefighters, one of whom had a pre-existing
knee injury and could not fight fire. Engine 17 responded with three certified firefighters. Engine 16
responded with two certified firefighters and one non-certified firefighter. Ladder 12 responded with
four certified firefighters. This response provided eleven certified firefighters, not including the first due
Engine 17’s pump operator. Battalion 2 served as the incident commander.
Engine 17 arrived within five minutes of the dispatch and their radio report size up stated that there was
“light smoke showing from the eaves, continue in all units, have the next in unit give me water.”
Battalion 2 arrived ten seconds after Engine 17 and gave a size up that stated: “Heavy smoke pushing
from the burglar barred front door. This is a working fire. Establishing ‘W. Jackson Command’ and we
will use the Civil Defense channel for fire ground radio traffic.” Battalion 2 immediately spoke with the
family whose house was burning and inquired if anyone was still inside the house. The mother, who was
the woman that made the original 911 call, stated that everyone was safely out of the house and that
the fire was in the front part of the house. Command announced this information over the dispatch
channel.
ARRIVAL SEQUENCE & APPARATUS POSITIONING
As previously mentioned, Engine 17 and Battalion 2 arrived almost simultaneously within five minutes of
the call being dispatched. Travelling in a westerly direction, Engine 17 stopped and parked
approximately five feet past the east (“D” side wall.) Battalion 2 parked in a driveway directly across the
street from the fire building. Ladder 12 approached from the west and parked facing Engine 17’s front
bumper. Engine 11 arrived immediately behind Ladder 12, but did not stop at the Level One Staging
location, which was the intersection of W. Jackson and Wentworth. Command instructed Engine 11 to
find a water source, but they had already passed the last available hydrant at W. Jackson and
Wentworth. Engine 11 had to back up the street to the hydrant they had passed. Once at the hydrant,
the personnel of Engine 11 realized that one of their members was limited by a previous injury and
therefore unable to suit up and fight fire. This necessitated the original driver to don his bunker gear
and trade places with the injured member. Engine 16 arrived next from the same direction as Ladder 12
and Engine 11. Engine 16 stopped at the Level One Staging location and called for instructions.
Command instructed Engine 16 to proceed to the fire scene, pass Ladder 12 and Engine 17 and park just
past Engine 17’s back step.
THE FIRE BUILDING
There are two houses on the lot at 3306 W. Jackson Street. The house on the front of the lot was the
fire building. It is a single story, wood frame, off grade, gabled roof building which was constructed in
1938. Pine was the wood primarily used in its construction. The house is approximately 25 feet wide in
front by 44 feet deep-1,100 square feet total. There is a 19 feet wide by 6 feet deep, enclosed porch ,
with a screen door and simulated burglar bars on the front of the house. There are two steps leading up
to the front porch door. There was a farm or chicken wire type fence which ran from the “A/B” corner
of the house to the west property line. The same type fence was situated from the “A/D” corner of the
house and ran east to an opening approximately twenty feet east of the “A/D” corner. This opening
provided access to a door on the “D” wall of the fire building as well as the rear house on the property.
The aforementioned door on the “D” wall is accessed via a wheel chair ramp with a small landing at the
top. The distance from the edge of the street pavement to the front steps is approximately 20 feet.
THE FIRE ATTACK
The Engine 17 lieutenant riding in the officer’s seat reportedly exited the engine while the engine was
still in motion, causing the driver to abruptly stop the apparatus far short of its desirable location. The
firefighter riding in the “nozzle seat” asked the officer which hose line he wanted pulled and the officer
advised him to pull the pre-connected 1.75 inch hose line with the smooth bore nozzle attached.
Engine 17 keeps their smooth bore nozzle on the 200 feet 1.75 inch pre-connected hose line. This
caused there to be approximately 180 feet of hose piled on the front yard to attack a fire that was
approximately eighteen feet inside the front door. The excess hose caused numerous kinks in the line.
The Engine 17 driver/pump operator then pulled and left on the ground in a pile, the 150 feet preconnected 1.75 inch line with a combination 150 gallons per minute (gpm) @ 50 pounds per square inch
(psi) nozzle attached.
Command met the Engine 17 attack team as they were kneeling on the ground at the base of the front
steps. The Engine 17 officer and nozzle man were donning their self contained breathing apparatus
masks (scba) and their Nomex hoods. Fortunately, they took the time to ensure there was no exposed
flesh near their face pieces. Once they were completely dressed, the nozzle man performed a cursory
bleed off of the nozzle. It lasted only a second and projected a pitifully weak stream. Command
instructed them to bleed the nozzle for at least thirty seconds while Command was removing the kinks
and directing the pump operator to increase the pump discharge pressure (pdp.) These actions
combined to produce an adequate stream.
Ladder 12 members were assigned to force entry and perform horizontal ventilation. The Ladder 12
forcible entry firefighter arrived at the steps with his irons (conventional forcible entry 8 pound axe and
30 inch Pro-Bar Halligan tool.) He pulled on the screen door handle and the door easily opened. The
Ladder 12 officer and nozzle firefighter performed horizontal ventilation on the windows at “A/D”
corner of the front porch and stretched Engine 17’s second 1.75 inch attack line to the door on the “D”
side at the top of the wheel chair ramp. The Ladder 12 driver forced open the farm wire fence at the
“A/B” corner of the house and performed horizontal ventilation of the bedroom window at the “A/B”
corner of the house. This was the room where the fire was started.
The Engine 17 nozzle firefighter and the lieutenant backing him up, made entry with their hose line,
through the front porch door. The Ladder 12 forcible entry man fed them hose and Command
instructed the Ladder 12 driver to get on the hose and follow the attack team into the house.
Simultaneously, the Ladder 12 nozzle man and officer deployed the second 1.75” hose line from Engine
17 to the door on the “D” side of the house. The Ladder 12 driver reported that when he entered the
enclosed front porch, he spotted the Engine 17 hose team standing in the right corner of the front
porch. The Ladder 12 driver, who was down on his hands and knees, called to them and stated that he
found the front door to the living room and that, was the location of the fire. He then instructed the
Engine 17 members to hand him the nozzle so he could advance to the fire area. The Ladder 12 driver
also reported that the Engine 17 hose team didn’t pass him the nozzle, but instead walked past where
he was kneeling at the door to the living room. The Engine 17 hose team took one step into the living,
and the nozzleman opened the bail of the nozzle and began flowing water toward the ceiling, but both
he and his officer remained in the standing position just inside the front door.
Shortly after the Engine 17 hose team made entry into the living room, the nozzleman and officer from
Ladder 12 advanced the second 1.75 inch attack line through the door on the “D” wall. The Ladder 12
lieutenant observed flames rolling across the ceiling toward their position. He also heard someone
loudly screaming as if to indicate fear or pain. The Ladder 12 officer then observed the Engine 17 hose
team standing in the area of the front door, from where the screaming was coming. Upon seeing this,
the Ladder 12 officer immediately radioed “Command” and advised that the Engine 17 members needed
to back out of the house. “Command” radioed the Engine 17 attack team, but they did not answer.
“Command” radioed them a second time, again with no response. “Command” then called Engine 17’s
hose team “in the blind” and instructed them to back out and he repeated it two more times. Engine
17’s hose team complied immediately and began backing out. Unfortunately, the nozzleman shut off
the nozzle before making his retreat. The Ladder 12 driver observed the ill-advised shut down and told
the nozzleman to open the nozzle back up and continue to flow water until they were out of the fire
area, which they did.
Once out of the front door, the Engine 17 officer missed the front porch step and fell to the ground. He
then walked to the back step of Engine 17 and denied injury. The Engine 17 nozzleman took his hose
line to the “D” side door where he was met by the Ladder 12 hose team. The Ladder 12 officer noticed
that the Engine 17 firefighter seemed to be having difficulty breathing and he instructed him to exit the
building and go back to his engine.
FIREFIGHTER’S BURNS
Once at the backstep of Engine 17, the firefighter stated that he needed his air cylinder changed as his
low air alarm was sounding. At that point he was met by “Command” and ECEMS Paramedic Meghan
Godwin who both advised him that he was finished working for the night and that the paramedic
needed to examine him. Observation of his bunker gear, scba facepiece and helmet revealed a high
degree of heat damage. The left sleeve of his bunker coat was black, faded to a fire damage gold color
and the reflective striping was hanging by threads. His polycarbonate helmet was charred and the lens
of his scba facepiece was completely blackened and blistered. His Nomex hood was stained black with
soot and heat damage around the top half of the opening for the wearer’s face. The nozzle firefighter’s
face/ forehead were burnt bright red from jaw line to jaw line in a continuous semi-circle. The burn
location was consistent with the outside perimeter of his facepiece. “Command” conferred with the
paramedic and it was decided that the burned firefighter should be taken to a hospital by ambulance.
The medic instructed the burned firefighter to take his facepiece and bunker gear along with him so the
hospital staff would be able to have a better understanding of his injury.
A nurse examined the injured firefighter and determined that he experienced second degree burns to
the face and scalp. He was given an ointment for topical application, a prescription for pain medication
and released. Interim Public Safety Chief Michael Weaver had gone to Baptist Hospital to check on the
extent of the injuries and he delivered him to Station 17 when he was released.
BUNKER GEAR IMPOUNDED
Both the injured firefighter’s and the Engine 17 officer’s scba and gear were rendered out of service and
impounded. They were taken to the Warehouse for examination by an investigator from the Florida Fire
Marshal’s Office and to be sent back to their respective factories for a repair determination or disposal.
LESSONS LEARNED

All members must remain seated with their seat belts fastened until the apparatus has come to
a complete stop and the parking brake has been set.

The first arriving apparatus should try to pull completely past the fire building to afford a
complete three sided view of the building. Parking as close to the curb or edge of the pavement
as possible should leave adequate space for other arriving apparatus to get by the first vehicle
on scene.

The driver should not act as the radio operator. Driving requires the chauffer’s undivided
attention. The member riding in the company officer seat should serve as the radio operator.

The initial radio size-up should be a clear, accurate description of the true fire conditions that
are being observed. Don’t down play or minimize the fire conditions you are observing. Tell it
like it is.

Responding apparatus should operate in compliance with the ECFR Staging SOG which calls for
automatic, unless otherwise stated, Level I Staging by all apparatus arriving after the first engine
and the first ladder company. The second arriving engine’s two primary responsibilities are
establishment of a static water source and assistance in getting the initial attack line in place
and operating.

Command shall request an additional company, designated as the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
immediately upon learning that there is a working fire.

All ECFR apparatus operating in the Second Battalion should be carrying the same lengths, colors
and nozzle types as a matter of standard operating procedure. Front bumper trays carry 150
feet of orange, 1.75 inch hose with a combination Chief’s nozzle attached. The crosslay labeled
“Preconnect # 2” on the pump panel should carry 150 feet of red, 1.75 inch hose with either a
15/16” or a 7/8” smooth bore nozzle attached. The crosslay labeled “Preconnect # 3” on the
pump panel should hold a 200 feet length of blue, 1.75 inch hose with a combination Chief’s
nozzle attached. The tray labeled “2 ½” Crosslay” should carry 200 feet of yellow or blue, 2 ½
inch hose with a 1 1/8” smooth bore nozzle attached.

Members must be able to accurately estimate the length of hose necessary to reach and cover
the fire’s entire growth potential. Be careful not to over estimate the length needed as this will
lead to unnecessary and dangerous kinking. If there is any doubt though, it is better to err on
the side of caution and have more hose than necessary, instead of stretching short and being
unable to reach all the required rooms.

A thermal imager shall always be employed, preferably by the company officer, before and
during any interior operations.

Members should always operate in teams of two, at a minimum and preferably three or four
when advancing a hoseline in a fire situation.

Members should don their facepieces in a safe environment as close to the point of entry as
possible. Members should kneel on the ground and face each other while donning their
facepiece. It is the responsibility of each member to examine their teammate to ensure that
there is no exposed skin and that their bunker gear and scba are on correctly.

The nozzle and hoseline should always be opened and bled, outside the fire area, for a minimum
of five to ten seconds to ensure adequate flow and pressures are present in the hoseline. If
adequate flow has not been achieved, check to ensure proper pump discharge pressure and
remove any and all kinks.

Achieve the lowest possible position on the ground or floor prior to discharging a hoseline or
entering the fire area in order to gain a visual observation of the floor layout, prior to upsetting
the thermal balance or the smoke banking all the way down to the floor.

Always stay as low as possible whenever entering or operating in a fire area. There may be a
1,000 to 1,500 degree difference between the floor and six feet above the floor. Stay low!!

If you think you are getting burned…you probably are. By the time you feel the heat, you’re
already burned.

Open the nozzle bail completely when operating in a fire exhibiting high heat indications. Aim
the straight or solid stream directly at the ceiling and vigorously whip the nozzle back and forth
to achieve adequate cooling of the upper levels. Do not use a fog pattern as this will bring the
steam and heat back to the firefighters at the nozzle. If the heat seems to be inordinately high
and the members aren’t completely sure that they can cool the high temperatures with their
hose stream, back out while continuing to flow as much water as possible at the ceiling.

Constantly train on hoseline advancement, fire behavior and the redeeming values of effective
hoseline placement and adequate water flow application.

Make sure that all members are adequately trained in the aforementioned tactics before being
allowed to operate in the fire area.

Make sure that less experienced firefighters operate under the direct supervision of mature,
experienced senior members.

Never vent areas that will cause the fire to travel toward the nozzle team. Vent openings should
be made in the areas opposite the nozzle’s flow.
CONCLUSION
The Engine 17 nozzleman was probably thirty seconds from a catastrophic failure of his scba mask.
The Ladder 12 officer’s call for an evacuation probably saved the firefighter’s life. When you see,
hear or feel that something is wrong, communicate your observations and suggestions to command
as soon as possible. Had the officer hesitated for one moment to give his instructions, it may have
been too late.