A Discrete Cause Named Desire:
Libet, Newcombe and Psychological Explanation
Alizarin crimson
Amaranth
American Rose
Auburn
Burgundy
Burnt sienna
Candy apple red
Cardinal
Carmine
Carnelian
Cerise
Chestnut
Coquelicot
Coral red
Crimson
Dark pink
Falu red
Fire brick
Fire engine red
Flame
Fuchsia
Lava
Lust
Magenta
Maroon
Mauve
Mauve taupe
Orange-red
Persian red
Persimmon
Pink
Raspberry
Red
Red-violet
Redwood
Rose
Rose madder
Rosewood
Rosso corsa
Ruby
Rufous
Rust
Sangria
Scarlet
Sinopia
Terra cotta
Tuscan red
Upsdell red
Venetian red
Vermilion
Simon Bowes, E-Intentionality, 16/11/2010
Psychologically flawed explanation
?
Causalexplanatory
relation?
B&D
Realisation
relation
N
D&A
N&A
Subvenient
Sufficiency
Exclusion?
Libet
(1999, pp. 50-51 )
Libet plus
(Haynes, J-D et al., 2008)
Newcomb
(Gardener, 1974)
Predicted
choice
Actual choice Payout
A and B
A and B
$1,000
A and B
B only
$0
B only
A and B
$1,001,000
B only
B only
$1,000,000
Making a difference
• The exclusion principle: If a property F is causally sufficient for a
property G, then no distinct property F* that supervenes on F
causes G (given physical causal closure). (List & Menzies,
forthcoming, p. 3)
• Proportional causation: Pecking Parrots and Reaching Monkeys
(ibid. p. 4)
• Truth conditions for making a difference: The presence of F makes
a difference to the presence of G in the actual world if and only if it
is true in the actual world that (i) F□→G; and (ii) ~F□→~G.
“Satisfaction of these conditions ensures that causes are specific
enough for their effects, but no more specific than needed.” (ibid. p. 6)
 Crimson coloured spots are sufficient for pecking, but it is red spots
that cause pecking (since (ii) is not fulfilled by crimson), even
though red is in this case realised by crimson.
 Exclusion principle is false as stated. (ibid. p. 10)
Multiple Systems Theory
• Not all decisions are the same.
• “self-initiated quick flexion of the right hand” (Libet,
1999, p. 48) might not be a good model for rational
action.
• Are the desires involved in ‘quick flexions’ of the same
type as those in reasoned deciding?
• “Value systems, and therefore the behavioral systems
they support, vary according to the nature and origin
of their sensitivity to the motivational state of a
subject, its knowledge about its environment, as well
as their intrinsic timescales.” (Dayan, 2008)
• “voluntary action needs
to be tightly linked to a
mechanism that
evaluates the
consequences of
voluntary actions.”
(Brass & Haggard, 2010)
Wittgenstein PI §627
Examine the following description of a voluntary
action: “I form the decision to pull the bell at 5
o’clock, and when it strikes, my arm makes this
movement.”-Is that the correct description, and
not this one:”..... and when it strikes 5, I raise my
arm”? – One would like to supplement the first
description: “and see! My arm goes up when it
strikes 5.” And this “and see!” is precisely what
doesn’t belong here. I do not say “See, my arm
is going up!” when I raise it.
Bibliography
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Shades_of_red
• Brass, M., Haggard, P. (2010) “The hidden side of intentional action: the
role of the anterior insular cortex”, Brain Struct Funct, 214:603–610,
Springer-Verlag
• Dayan, P. (2008) “The Role of Value Systems in Decision Making”, in Engel,
C. & Singer, W. (Eds.) Better Than Conscious? Decision Making, the Human
Mind, and Implications For Institutions, MIT Press, pp. 51-70
• Gardener, M. (1974) “Reflections on Newcomb's problem: a prediction
and free-will dilemma”, Scientific American, March 1974
• Haynes, J-D., Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H-J. (2008) “Unconscious
determinants of free decisions in the human brain”, Nature Neuroscience,
11, No. 5, pp. 543-545
• Libet, B. (1999) “Do We Have free Will?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies,
6, No. 8–9, pp. 47–57, Imprint Academic
• List, C., Menzies P. (forthcoming) “Non-Reductive Physicalism and the
Limits of the Exclusion Principle”