Guy Axtell, University of Nevada, Reno
Virtue and Vice, Moral and Intellectual Conference
Cal. State Fullerton, 06/26/2008

The Generality Problem. If every token of a

The Global-Trait Problem. If moral psychologists
belief-forming process belongs to many different
types of such processes, there may be no
principled way to select the proper level of
generality to describe the process token that
produced the belief.
or philosophers attribute stable moral character
traits to agents as predictors and explainers of
their moral behavior, the theory makes empirical
claims about “global” traits that might be
unsustainable in light of empirical psychology.
—A genealogical question. There is no single level at
which trait-ascriptions aim. So when and for what
purposes do we use narrowly and broadly-typed
reliability ascriptions?
NTR: Narrowly-typed Reliability
— Low-level virtues (faculty virtues). Dispositions construed as
genetically-endowed abilities cognitive capacities.
—Best suited to evaluating the etiology of a single belief or narrow
range of beliefs; tells us nothing about an agent’s other beliefs.
—The value of low-level virtues is transmitted directly to their products
and only indirectly to the agents who have them.
BTR: Broadly-typed Reliability
— High-level virtues (reflective virtues). Best suit to tell about the
agent’s abilities and practices in a certain domain/area.
— Best suited to holistic evaluation of agents, including the quality of
their activities of inquiry.
— The value of high-level virtues attaches directly to their possessor
but only tenuously to their products.
“There are prima facie important differences between
these two categories and the sort of evaluations they are
involved in…It appears that the value of low-level virtues
is transmitted directly to their products and only indirectly
to the agents who have them, while the value of high-level
virtues attaches directly to their possessor but only
tenuously to their products” (Lepock, Ch 3, 11).
Two claims to help ‘put the generality problem to work’:
— Salience contextualism: reliability is contextual in
epistemology (Greco/Lepock)
— Interconnectedness of BTR and the NTR in the
epistemic evaluation of agents and their beliefs.
A Primer on Situationism:
Situationists hold that numerous studies of behavior show that:
— Relatively minor situation manipulation with no obvious moral
significance exerts a major influence on people’s moral behavior,
and
— No personality variable seems to exert such influence.
Empirical studies of moral behavior situationists cite:
—Milgram’s obedience study, and the Levin, Darley and Bateson,
and Hartshorne and May’s study of child honesty.
Local Use:
— “Situational trait ascriptions like ‘dime-finding,’
or ‘dropped-paper’ compassionate.”
Global Use:
—“Highly general trait ascriptions like ‘honest’ or
‘compassionate.’”
Localist (Situationist ) View
—Posits character as “an evaluatively inconsistent
associations of large numbers of local traits.”
Globalist View
—Posits character as “an integrated association of
robust traits and evaluatively consistent personality
structures.”
Local Use
—A virtue or vice concept is attributed “locally” just
in case it is applied to “specific acts or mental
states such as occurrent desires or feelings” (69).
Global Use
—A virtue or vice concept is attributed “globally” just
in case it is applied to “persons, stable character
trait or dispositions” (69).
Occurrentism
— Attribution concerns only one’s current motives
— Virtues treated and defined “atomistically.”
Dispositionalism
— Attribution concerns primarily stable, standing traits
— Virtues treated and defined holistically
Their associated primacy questions/claims: Which uses,
local or global, occurrent or dispositional, are
conceptually primary?
—Hurka’s example in support of Occurrentism:
The Medal of Honor case.
Summary Comparisons
—Some strong analogies between intellectual &
moral trait-ascription, but the intersections
remain difficult to see.
— Lepock and Hurka on Trait-ascription in ethics
and epistemology.
Thesis: The Lepock/Hurka approaches to
intellectual and moral trait-ascription, are strongly
analogous, up to a point. They (rightly) both hold:
(a) that there is no single level of generality at which traitascriptions in their subfield of philosophy are aimed;
(b) that attribution varies across a narrow/broad spectrum
(c) that the uses of trait concepts at different levels are clearly
connected;
(d) that a philosophical account of virtue should explain this
connection,
(e) that there are different ways of doing this, and
(f) that this often fuels debate between competing accounts of
virtue based on the primacy of uses of trait concepts at one
end of the spectrum or the other.
Contrasts
— Lepock and Hurka, again.
— Hurka and Zagzebski in debates between
Occurrentism and Dispositionalism.
A Deflationary Conclusion