Non Face-to-Face Transactions: Risks and Challenges Richard Parlour Financial Markets Law International © FMLI 2006 OARRs • • • • © FMLI 2006 Outcome Agenda Roles Rules Outcome • Risks of non face-toface (NF2F) transactions • Regulation of NF2F transactions • Psychology of NF2F transactions • Developing solutions for challenges of NF2F transactions Agenda • Key Issues • International Experience • Role of Psychology • Developing Solutions Roles Richard Active participants HANDOUT!! Handout Survey • • • • • Ten statements Select which response closest to you No right or wrong answers Be as honest as possible Self marking Rules Background for NF2F • Desire to be Offshore Financial Centre • Growing industrial, financial, tourism, IT sectors • 5-6% annual growth since 1968 • >10,000 offshore entities • Banking sector investment > $1 billion • India, South Africa • Internet banking Local Background Risk • Minor consumer and trans-shipment point for South Asian heroin • Small amounts cannabis produced and consumed locally • Low terrorism risk and experience • Significant offshore financial industry creates ML potential • Corruption levels low (TI level 4.1) • Government committed to regulation, moderate country risk Related Offshore Risk • • • • • • • India Major ML centre Major drug transit, precursors Largest number terrorist incidents Terrorist risk severe Hawala TI level 2.8 Medium country risk • • • • • • South Africa ML centre of concern Not major drug centre Organised crime Terrorism risk elevated TI level 4.6 Medium country risk Non Face-to-Face Transactions Medium • • • • • • • • • • Post Telegraph Telephone Fax Email Internet SMS Instant messaging Dealing system Electronic banking • • • • • • • • • Risks “Physicalities loss” Privacy Hacking Cracking Spyware Data loss Ease of access Depersonalisation of contact Transaction speed NF2F Loss/Gain • • • • • • • Losses Gender check Age check Body language Dress signals Signature Likeness Forensics Gains • • • • • • Speed Reach Reduced costs E tracing E matching Better psychographic profiling? International Experience on NF2F • FATF recommendation 8 – policies and procedures to address any specific risks with NF2F business relationships or transactions • BIS BCBS CDD paper 2001 2.2.6: – Apply equally effective ID procedures – Specific and adequate measures to mitigate higher risk • EU MLD 3 Art 13.2 • Wolfsberg 1.2.5 - specifically address measures to establish ID of NF2F customers satisfactorily BCBS NF2F Risk Mitigation • Certification of documents presented • Requisition of additional documents over F2F clients • Independent contact with client by bank • Third party introduction (subject to conditions) • Requiring first payment through account in client’s name subject to same CDD standards EU Third Money Laundering Directive Art 13.2 Where customer not physically present for ID, take specific and adequate measures for higher risk: • ensuring customer ID established by additional documents, data or information; • extra measures to verify/certify documents supplied, or confirmatory certification by MLD 3 financial institution; • ensuring first payment through account in customer’s name with a credit institution. FATF Suggestions • Reinforce no anonymous accounts • KYC over life of relationship • Uniform standards worldwide • Develop IT to detect suspicions • Limit online services or amounts • On line accounts only if opened off line • Online services only where licensed • Home and host state oversight UK on F2F • Nothing in primary legislation • MLRs – ID procedures to take into account greater potential for ML when applicant for business not physically present when being identified • FSA removal of ML sourcebook, emphasis on senior management principles, JMLSG • JMLSG JMLSG on F2F • Risk based approach • Risk increasing factors: – Ease of access despite time, location – Ease of multiple fictitious applications – Absence of physical documents – Speed of transactions • Verify electronically or by documents • Care over impersonation fraud Psychology and the fraudster • • • • • • • Average fraud 3½ years before detection 51% uncovered by accident 19% uncovered by audit 10% uncovered by management controls 20% disclosed by disgruntled mistress Police no better at detection than public 20: 60: 20 rule The Financial Psychopath – Common Myths and Traits • Don’t look shifty • Do maintain eye contact • Don’t gesture a lot • Speak more slowly • Motivation not so much greed, as fear of failure • • • • • • • • • Work hard Easily bored Take risks Creative Charming No remorse Impulsive Self confident Competitive Uncovering the Financial Psychopath – Key Difficulties • High flyers/gurus most prone • Not in your interest to uncover • They move faster on loopholes • Junior staff understand system better than senior staff • Would have to display own ignorance to uncover • Would have to own up to being not a good supervisor • Cost of checks • Couldn’t happen here • Outcome oriented • Lose objectivity Internet psychology • Informal language as more isolated from consequences of behaviour • Productivity/addiction • Lose inhibitions – increased emotional intensity • Increased social isolation • Different impression formation/creation • NJ teenager manipulated stock market through chat rooms – fined $273k by SEC Scoring • Add up total As and Bs • The more Bs, the more likely you are to be a financial psychopath or more prone to fraud • If more than 7 Bs, likely you have already committed fraud • Also means you are likely to be a high flier Equivalence • SDD for equivalent jurisdictions • EDD for non-equivalents • Highly political • FATF members? • Others deemed equivalent by non-FATF members? • GCC members? • ESAAMLG members? • Other FATF style members – EAG, APG, MENAFATF? • Egmont members? • Risk based? • Effectiveness? NF2F Tools • • • • • • • • • • Specific VISIT THE RISK VTC/webcam? EDD/lifestyle report Limit service/level Only if F2F a/c opening Official documents Information security Encryption, comms choice, e monitoring Backup Privacy policy • • • • • • • • • • • General Risk assessment Added documentation Database/ Internet searches Document certification References/3rd parties Credit checks Sanctions checks Regular KYC Transaction monitoring IT First payment through client account at third bank Disaster recovery plan Conclusion • Key Issues • International Experience • Role of Psychology • Developing Solutions Still Curious? Richard Parlour Financial Markets Law International www.fmli.co.uk © FMLI 2006