Memorandum to the Seventh Central Pay Commission
On behalf of the Officers of the Indian Police Service
Submitted by the Central IPS Association
1
CONTENTS
1.
2.
3.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 5
1.1.
The Indian Police Service- A Factsheet ...................................................................... 5
1.2.
Police Administration in India- The Structural Context ............................................. 5
1.3.
Indian Police Service-Growing Citizen Expectation .................................................. 6
1.4.
Growing Citizen Expectation-Structural Changes: ..................................................... 6
1.5.
Evolution of the Indian Police Service:....................................................................... 8
1.6.
Evolution of the Indian Police Service- Post Independence Developments ............. 11
Principles of determination of pay.................................................................................... 19
2.1.
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 19
2.2.
International Practices ............................................................................................... 19
A.
Lord Edmund-Davies Committee ...................................................................... 20
B.
Sheehy Commission-............................................................................................ 20
C.
The Winsor Report ................................................................................................ 22
2.3.
Comparison with Private Sector ................................................................................ 24
2.4.
Principles of determination of Pay ............................................................................ 26
Conditions of Service ....................................................................................................... 29
3.2
LONG WORKING HOURS OF POLICE IN THE ABSENCE OF SHIFT SYSTEM
29
3.3
Occupational and situational risks specific to Police ................................................ 32
3.4 Stress caused due to job uncertainties, unpredictable nature of job, hostile clientele,
and frequent transfers ........................................................................................................... 33
3.5
Stress due to alienation from families ....................................................................... 35
3.6 Health hazards, psychological and emotional stress associated with Police job and
their manifestations .............................................................................................................. 38
3.7 Summing up of arguments for compensation of police personnel with extra pay and
allowances for working under extremely challenging and stressful conditions ................... 41
4.
Structural issues, Pay Parity and Career Progression Issues ............................................ 49
2
4.2
Parity of Pay with the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Foreign Service .. 49
4.3 Anomalies in Notifications issued for implementing the Sixth Pay Commissions
recommendations on edge in the initial career to IAS/IFS: ................................................. 59
4.4
Misinterpretation of two years gap between IAS and other services to be rectified . 62
4.5
Intra Service Parity .................................................................................................... 63
4.6 Removal of the Grade pay 8900/- in the PB4 Rs37400-67000/- in order to bring
about uniformity in the career progression with the other civil services ............................. 63
4.7
Abolition of the HAG+ scale: ................................................................................... 66
4.8 Reinforcing the Spirit of All India Character of the Service through facilitating
adequate representation of IPS in the Central Deputations .................................................. 69
4.9
Removing inequities in the Central Staffing Scheme ............................................... 69
5. Principles of determination of Allowances, advances and Incentives ................................. 75
5.2
Examples from the United Kingdom: ....................................................................... 75
5.3
Submissions IN RESPECT OF ALLOWANCES ..................................................... 76
5.4
Advances: .................................................................................................................. 77
5.5
Performance linked incentive scheme: ...................................................................... 77
5.6
ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC TO POLICE ................................................................. 77
5.7 Comparison between defence forces and CAPF: How CAPF is working in equally
challenging conditions but do not receive commensurate benefits ...................................... 80
6.Principles of determination of Pension ................................................................................. 83
6.3
Problems with the new Pension Scheme ................................................................... 83
6.4
One rank one pension ................................................................................................ 87
6.5
Irrational Pension Fixation Formula: ........................................................................ 88
6.7
Making Pension Tax Free. ........................................................................................ 95
6.8
Raising the Family Pension:- .................................................................................... 96
6.9
Gallantry Medal Allowance – ................................................................................... 96
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 97
3
4
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE- A FACTSHEET
1.1.1. The officers of the Indian Police Service, being vested with the mandate to
ensure ‘Rule of Law’, prevent and detect crime, and safeguard the country’s
internal security, occupy an extremely significant place in the architecture of
governance. With a cadre strength of 4720, organised into 24 State/Union
Territory Cadres, the service provides leadership to a force of 31,93,808 police
personnel spread across State and Central Police Forces. In the year 2012 (the
last year for which statistics are available), it closely supervised investigations of
60,41,559 fresh criminal cases, handled multifarious agitations, and oversaw
apprehension of 74,20,091 persons in the course of protecting and upholding the
rule of Law. While these statistics are in themselves mindboggling, they
constitute and capture only a minor part of the immense contribution of the
Police. Their real impact, however, resting largely on intangible outcomes, are
not amenable to statistics but fall within the nebulous realm of ‘citizen
experience’. Officers of the service man 711 Police districts (of which 176 are
terrorist/ LWE affected), as well as the higher formations in the Central and
State Police Organisations. This mandate is discharged with a meagre strength of
106.79 civil policemen per lakh population, which stands barely half of the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported global average.
In the discharge of these duties, in the service of the nation, 30 IPS 1 officers
made the supreme sacrifice of laying down their lives, fighting terrorism,
insurgency and organised crime.
1.2. POLICE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA- THE STRUCTURAL
CONTEXT
1.2.1. The Police in India undertake its responsibilities under extremely challenging
circumstances. India is today an evolving democracy, with a large citizenry, that
is both conscious and assertive of their rights. She is home to a rare plurality-of
ethnicity, religion and culture, and brings with it many issues of difference and
dissent. The country is today an emerging economic powerhouse, and is subject
to the resultant churnings, displacements and migrations. She has a large
1
The names of the officers of the Indian Police Service who laid down their lives, in the service of the nation,
may be seen at Annexure A.
5
proportion of youth, with rising aspirations, who seek to dislodge the existing
status quo of inequity and discrimination imposed by the weight of history. The
globalised village that we live in has brought in considerable interconnectedness
that governance must necessarily grapple with. India’s distinctive constitutional
architecture, which is unitary in character, but federal in spirit, renders provision
of uniform administration across the nation a serious challenge. All of the above,
in multifarious ways, has made policing an extremely difficult, albeit rewarding
experience.
1.3. INDIAN POLICE SERVICE-GROWING CITIZEN EXPECTATION
1.3.1. The Indian citizen has extremely high expectations from the Indian Police
Service. Most importantly, (s)he expects the Service to set in place a mechanism
to provide a ‘sense of security’-in both the physical and psychological senses, so
as to freely go about their lives, without undue concern for one’s safety and
security. (S)he expects that the Rule of Law is in place, and that if wronged,
access to justice in a time bound manner is available as a matter of right. As the
visible arm of government, the citizen expects the IPS to set in place a police
system, which is an effective first responder in distress, of any kind. (S)he
expects the Police to manage India’s unique diversity, allowing citizens to
celebrate the differences, while bringing in ‘order’ and social cohesion to
manage the dissonances. The citizen expects the Police to create an enabling
environment to facilitate individual and collective growth, ensuring the
fundamental rights of the citizen. Most importantly, (s)he expects the Police to
ensure that India is secure from ‘within’ and ‘without’.
1.3.2. In order to accomplish these critical responsibilities, the Indian citizen expects
an IPS officer to be the repository of a daunting array of intellectual and
administrative skills. The officer is expected to lead from the front, bringing to
bear qualities of courage- both physical and moral, professional excellence,
daring innovation and strategic vision to the tasks at hand. (S)he is expected to
be a team builder, intelligently appraise crises and even negotiate at times. The
citizen expects him/her to work extremely long workdays, display a high degree
of industry, perseverance and unflagging enthusiasm, and be alert and available
for him round the clock. The IPS officer is expected to bring about change in
remote and difficult places, at times face real risk to life and limb, as well as
meet the increasing, oft unrealistic public expectation.
1.4. GROWING CITIZEN EXPECTATION-STRUCTURAL CHANGES:
6
1.4.1. The growing citizen expectation has very often been perceived by the
constitutional courts and has found voice through a series of their reform
directives. These judgments have led to a slow but sure footed movement
towards police reforms, aimed at converting the Indian Police into a People
friendly and public service oriented Police. The most significant of these has
been the seven steps towards a functionally independent and accountable Police,
laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Prakash Singh v. Union of India
(2006)2. Amongst other things, it called for a State Security Commission, to lay
down broad policy and evaluate Police functioning, Police Establishment Board
to independently decide on transfers and postings in the Police Department, and
Police Complaints Authorities as independent oversight mechanisms. The
judiciary has been in the forefront of unfettering investigation, the latest example
being the Supreme Court decision in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v.
Union of India, (2014),3 in respect of curbs on initiating investigation, under the
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Various State Governments,
recognizing the need to have a more independent Police, have established Police
Commissionerates in 47 cities of India (as on date)4. Internally, Police leaders
have transformed themselves as change agents to improve internal sub-culture,
better processes and meet emerging challenges. The all-round trend towards
greater-community engagement, both as a tool of understanding citizen
priorities, as well as in transforming law enforcement into a shared endeavor,
between the police and the policed, has been a product of citizen expectation5.
All of this brings us in line with progressive, mature democracies across the
world the IPS plays a highly critical role in this transformation.
1.4.2. The enhanced citizen expectation has not only changed the way the IPS
undertakes business, but has also substantially altered its roles and functions.
While maintenance of internal security was a minor, specialised component in
IPS charter, it has undergone considerable change in the post 9/11 era. Internal
security has been considerably integrated with foreign policy, as well as across
all the development sectors. The varied roles played by IPS officers in Indian
establishments abroad, as well as the primacy of its role in development across
2
The relevant extracts of judgement may be found at Annexure B.
3
The relevant extracts may be seen at Annexure C.
4
List of cities with Police Commissionerate system may be seen at Annexure D. Police Commissionerate
system is a system envisaged under S.8, and S.20(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein all or
any of the powers of the executive magistrate in a metropolitan area, is vested in the Commissioner of Police.
5
Community Policing, as an acceptable and effective method of policing has been recognised and adopted in
various jurisdictions over the last three decades. In some states like Kerala, the system has been written into the
new Police legislation.
7
theatres- urban/LWE/terrorism infested, all point to the same fact. There has also
been a growing recognition of the necessity of the participation of the IPS
officers in policy formulation. The regular appointment of IPS officers as
Governors in strife torn areas, or as National Security Advisor/ Dy National
Security Advisor 6 , indicates the considerable skill sets and experiences they
bring to the task. The trend towards induction of IPS officers as Home
Secretaries in various States7, as well as its greater representation in the Ministry
of Home Affairs, also indicates the necessity of engaging domain experts in
internal security functions. The creation of specialised agencies, and new-age
Central Police Organisations- like the National Investigation Agency (NIA),
National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), National Intelligence
Grid(NATGRID), National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) etc, attests to the
importance of the internal security dimension. Police Modernization plans have
also endorsed these changes.
1.4.3. Besides the above, taking into account their unique skills of man management,
execution etc, there is an increasing trend towards induction of IPS officers in
departments like transport, tourism, sports, and in regulatory bodies at both the
Central and State level. This is of course, not accounting for the core
competence of IPS officers in discharging functions as Chief Vigilance Officers
in Public Sector Undertakings. In a nutshell, the IPS today straddles the entire
realm of governance from a police chowki to foreign policy!
1.5. EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE:
1.5.1. It is necessary in this context to dwell on the historical context of the evolution
of the Indian Police. The modern Police system in India was introduced by Lord
Cornwallis, but the first steps towards a unified police administration, under the
British took roots in the mid eighteen hundreds in Sindh, Bombay, and Madras.
However, it was the Indian Police Commission of 1860, which was the first
effort to have a comprehensive look at the Police in India. Interestingly, while its
constitution arose from a concern for a more efficient and effective Police force,
its terms of reference8 were as follows:
6
Out of the five National Security Advisors, two of them, including the incumbent is an officer of the Indian
Police Service, as is the present Deputy National Security Advisor.
7
The list of states with IPS officers as Home Secretaries, is given at Annexure E.
8
Griffiths, Percival, “To Guard My People- The History of the Indian Police”, Allied Publisher, Bombay, p.88.
8
i.
ii.
To ascertain the numbers and cost of all Police and quasi-Police of
every description, at present serving in each province throughout the
British territories in India, who are paid by Government from the
general revenue.
To suggest to Government any measure whereby expenditure may be
economized or efficiency increased, in the existing Police forces.
1.5.2. In other words, the Police Commission, 1860 on which the Indian Police Act
of 1861 was based, was not exactly an attempt to bring in police reform, but
essentially an exercise to bring about savings in public finances. The transition
from the military Police to the civil Police, based on the previous experiment in
Madras presidency, was recommended by the Commission, as the method of
achieving the same9. While affirming that the pay must be adequate, it laid down
the following standards:
a. That the lower rank of the constabulary should be divided into three
grades, the lowest of which should receive a pay equal at least to the
average ordinary wages of unskilled labour, The pay of the head
constables and sergeants should be sufficient to place them above
temptation, and to make promotion to these appointments, an object of
ambition, open to the inferior grades,
b. That the pay of the Inspectors of Police,….should be on such liberal
scale, as will command the services of the Europeans and East Indians of
respectability and education, or of the higher classes of natives, who now
enter the public service.10
However, the Indian Police Act, 1861 created and constituted the Indian Police in
the manner that we see today, with its uniform structure and regulation.
1.5.3. The Public Service Commission, 1886 (Aitchinson Commission),
recommended an overhaul of the system of recruitment to superior grades, so as
to ensure that candidates with good educational qualifications, and habits of
industry are recruited11. It also unanimously suggested that the abuses in the
lower ranks were entirely on account of poorer pay.
9
Indian Police Commission, 1860, para 18.
10
Indian Police Commission, 1860, proposition 42,43,44.
11
Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886, para 116-117.
9
1.5.4. The Indian Police Commission (1902-03) (Fraser Commission) is the next
milestone in the history of Indian Police. Coming down harshly on the Police,
the Commission identified five reasons for the same which include:
i. Unsatisfactory training and recruitment of superior officers of the
department
ii. Undue interference with the Police by Magistrates and
Commissioners
iii. Inadequate staff-both superior and subordinate
iv.
Insufficient remuneration of all ranks12
The Commission commenting on recruitment and training found fault with the
system of nominations, as well as with the practice of sending men to India as
Assistant Superintendents of Police, who were too young, without proper
training in criminal law, languages and Indian history. It suggested that the
pay and prospects of the superior police officers should be improved, as they
were not adequate as compared to the other officers in other departments, and
the initial pay was ‘too little for a young man to live on respectably’13.
1.5.5. However, when the suggestion of a common examination, and its variants
were put forth, the Commission adopted a specious reasoning having no bearing
on administrative requirements, and at variance with their earlier exhortations. It
said: “The Commission have rejected both these suggestions partly because they
are not prepared to say that precisely the same age or class of men is required
for the Police as well as the civil service; and mainly because they think that
men would not work contentedly in the police in the same district or province,
alongside of their contemporaries in the Civil Service, unless the Government
were prepared to make the former as attractive as the latter.”
1.5.6. The Royal Commission on Public Services, 1916 (Islington Commission),
did not make considerable changes to the Police system, as the Fraser
Commission had only recently put forth its recommendations. However, they
recommended retention of the existing system of recruitment wherein candidates
between 19-21 years, would appear for a competitive examination, to be selected
to the Service.
1.5.7. The Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1924 (Lee
Commission), was of the view that the best type of Indian is not being obtained
for the Indian Police Service, partly out of the inadequacy of emoluments, and
12
Griffiths, p.98.
13
Griffiths, p.100.
10
partly because of the hardships of a career in the Police Services 14. It recognised
that conditions have changed, and that ‘whilst …more specialised training is now
necessary to equip the present day police officer, for the efficient discharge of
his duties, his responsibilities on the other hand, have become more onerous and
irksome, and require greater intelligence and resource.’ Consequently, while it
agreed to improve basic pay, ‘to avoid disturbing the relative position of the
Service to other Services’, they did not alter the maximum basic pay. They also
recommended differential overseas pay to the detriment of the Indian Police
Service, on account of the fact that they are recruited at a lower age, and hence,
are likely to be married at a later date in their service life, than their peers in
other services15.
1.5.8. During its initial years, the Indian Police Service, has very often been plagued
by a lack of clarity on its structure, and organisation. The initial recruits to the
service, were from the military, and later on involved a combination of
nominated and selected candidates. The first open competition for the Police was
held in England in June 1893, and the top ten candidates were appointed as
probationary Assistant Superintendents of Police. They were characterised by
various names- the Indian Imperial Police, superior grades of police force etc,
but were not backed by any official promulgation for the same. In 1907, the
Secretary of State’s officers were directed to wear the letters ‘I.P’ on their
epaulettes to distinguish them, from officers recruited otherwise. They were still
however, referred to as the Imperial Branch of the Police Service. The Islington
Commission referred to the Indian Police Service, where-after the name struck.
In 1932, in deference to the wishes of the Indian Police Association, the word
‘Service’ was dropped, and the simpler designation of the ‘Indian Police’ was
officially adopted16. Consequently, while the IPS traces its roots to the Indian
Police Act, 1861 and its consequent developments, it never gained purpose and
character in the manner it is today, till the advent of independence.
1.6. EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE- POST
INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS
1.6.1. The advent of independence, the necessity to protect a nascent democracy, as
well as its transformed role in the service of the people, brought in substantial
changes to the Indian Police Service. The First Pay Commission (1950),
14
Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services, p.19
15
Ibid, at p.28-31.
16
Griffith, at p.95-97.
11
recognizing the above changes, recommended ‘recruitment in the same manner
and by the same standards’ in accordance with the standards of Class I service.
Accordingly, recruitment and pay rules were modified, and the IPS was repositioned in the Indian administrative framework, at par with other Class I
Central Services17.
1.6.2. The framers of the Constitution, recognizing the significance of the Indian
Police Service, introduced Article 312 in the Constitution of India, by which the
IPS along with the IAS was deemed to be an All India Service, created by
Parliament, and carried with it, various Constitutional protections. The necessity
of the same was ferociously defended by Sardar Vallabhai Patel, in the
Constituent Assembly when he said: “We have difficult times ahead. We are
talking here under security kept in very difficult circumstances. These people are
the instruments. Remove them and I see nothing but a picture of chaos all over
the country.”18 In fact, contrary to the first draft, which only created an enabling
architecture for the All India Services, reference to the IAS and the IPS was
made in the Constitution, at the insistence of Sardar Patel 19 . Successive Pay
Commissions as well as other Commissions constituted to go into the issue of
police reform, have by and large, followed this progressive trend, and have
provided strength to the IPS and the cause of police reform.
1.6.3. The Second Pay Commission (1957-59) did not discuss the pay structure of
the All India Services, as the same did not fall within its ambit. However,
pursuant to the revision of pay scales for the Central Services, the Government
of India, looked into the matter and proposed pay scales for the IPS comparable
to Class I Central Services.
1.6.4. The Study Team on Recruitment, Selection, Union Public Service
Commission, the State Public Service Commissions and Training, under the
aegis of the Administrative Reforms Commission, 1967, went into the issue of
recruitment, and suggested that there must be integrated recruitment to the
Higher Civil Services. They also suggested minimisation of the disparities
between the services, and recommended that ‘totally identical pay scales for all
the higher services would be the ideal solution’. They did not however
recommend the same, merely for the reason that they did not want a situation,
17
First Pay Commission, 1950, para 63
18
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol X, p.51.
Shiva Rao, B.(ed), The framing of India’s Constitution- A Study, Indian Institute of Public Administration,
New Delhi, 1968, p.711
19
12
where a new entrant would prefer the easier jobs in the Central Services to the
hazards, stresses and higher responsibility positions, of the IAS and the IPS20.
The first Administrative Reforms Commission, also emphasised the
importance of proper personnel planning, cadre management, and recommended
that recruitment to all Class I services, must only be through a single competitive
examination. They also recommended greater mobility in the services, with staff
appointments in the headquarters organisations in the Centre and State being
filled up on the basis of a competitive examination, to ward against the tendency
to compartmentalise careers21.
1.6.5. The Report of the Committee on Police Training, 1971 (MS Gore
Committee), went to considerable lengths to assess the need for quality
improvement in the IPS and said: “Officers of the IAS and the IPS who have to
run the district administration, face the same difficult and complex situations,
arising out of the problems of social and political confrontation and change,
from the beginning of their career. They have to deal with the same crisis
situations, and meet the same public criticism. They must have the same qualities
of leadership, capacity to take decisions, and ability to rise to the occasion. The
calibre, temperament and character of the members of the two services should
therefore be of the same standard. We are convinced that this is not ensured in
the present system of selection. For all these reasons, we recommend that the
lower age limit for the IPS should be raised to 21 years, and the written
examination and the marks should be the same as for the IAS.”22
1.6.6. The report also went on to say: “A change in the system of recruitment alone
will not ensure that candidates of the required calibre are attracted to the
service. The testimony of the witnesses who appeared before us and the replies
that we have received show that the main factors which inhibit better quality
candidates from entering the IPS, are the general unpopularity of the service
due to an unattractive pay structure, not commensurate with the responsibilities
and the arduous and hazardous nature of police duties, meagre promotion
prospects, lack of social recognition vis-à-vis other services, and sense of
uncertainty arising from political situations.”23
20
Study team on recruitment, selection, Union Public Service Commission, State Public Service Commissions,
and training, Administrative Reforms Commission, New Delhi, 1967, p.19-21.
21
Ibid at p.9.
22
Report of the Committee on Police Training, 1971, p.36
23
Ibid at p.37.
13
1.6.7. The Third Pay Commission (1973) 24 deliberated at length on the need to
attract capable talent for the IPS, and increased a host of allowances to ‘have the
effect of reducing the existing disparity between the IAS and IPS scales of pay’.
1.6.8. The Kothari Commission (Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection
Methods) (1976), recommended a common examination for all civil services in
all respects. Justifying the same, they said that ‘even though the professional
expertise required of a general administrator, or a diplomat or a police officer
or a member of any of the other Central Services vary, their general qualities of
competence, traits of character and sense of commitment necessarily have a
common denominator. The same applies to other qualities needed in an officer
such as intellectual cohesion, articulation, sense of awareness and purpose,
integrity, depth of understanding, courage of conviction and ability to respond to
changing socio-economic and political situations’. In support of the above, they
relied upon the Administrative Reform Commission’s Report on Personnel
Administration (1969) and Committee on Police Training (Gore Committee)
(1971)25. Accordingly, from 1979, the recruitment to the IPS as well as other
Civil Services, including the IAS, was through a common examination.
1.6.9. The National Police Commission, headed by Shri Dharam Vira, and having
as its members Justice NK Reddy, K. P. Rustamji, N. S. Saksena and M. S.
Gore, was setup in 1977, and produced eight reports between February 1979 and
May 1981. It was a watershed development in the history of Indian Police. The
sixth report submitted in March 1981, dealt with the police leadership,
particularly the Indian Police Service. It stated: “As the functions of the IPS
officers have not only multiplied manifold, but are becoming more complex,
hard and hazardous, calling for higher professional and technical skills and
competence, special measures to attract some of the ablest officers from the
lower echelons and also from the outside world are required. This means that
the terms and conditions of this service should be comparable with those of the
best services. There appears, therefore, no justification for the emoluments and
prospects of the IPS being in any way inferior to those of the IAS. The minor
improvements in the various pay scales of the IPS did not adequately improve
the career value of the service because the yawning gap with the IAS has
remained. At present the country is facing such serious dangers that its very
integrity and unity are threatened. Needed in the IPS are men whose calibre is
not only equal to that of the IAS officers but who also profess certain mental
24
Report of the Third Central Pay Commission, 1973, Volume 1, p.120.
25
Report of the Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods, 1976, p.50
14
qualities, courage and higher physical standards, that are specially needed for
effective police work. Therefore, the present differentials are counter-productive
and it would be cost-effective for the Government to improve the quality of
recruitment, emoluments and career prospects of the IPS by bringing them on
par with those of the IAS. This recommendation is made because of the
importance of stability in society and, therefore, to improve the calibre and
performance of this most essential service. This recommendation also flows
logically from the recommendations of the Kothari Committee which should be
implemented in full.”26
1.6.10. It went on to add: “There is persistent public criticism of the police and its role
in society which is in contradiction to the glamour associated with some other
services. A service which is thus associated with a high degree of personal risk
and professional hazards, which suffers from lack of status because of the very
nature of Its work and which does not have within its pay structure and service
conditions an adequate element of compensation cannot be expected to be
popular with young men while choosing a career from among a number of
avenues open to them specially when, in some services, the hazards and risks are
negligible, conditions of work are not so exacting, emoluments and benefits are
greater and social status and recognition better. While the handicaps and
drawbacks inherent in police work cannot be removed they can partially be
compensated for, by putting them on par with officers of other services. That is
why the equality in the pay scales and parity in prospects of the IPS with the IAS
is recommended.27
1.6.11. Emphasising the needs for IPS management of the cadre, the report said: “The
management of the IPS cadre should be by police officers, at the Centre, through
the Central Police Establishment Board and in the States by similar Boards set
up under the State Security Commissions. The High Powered Cadre Review
Committee has no IPS officer on it and operates more or less mechanically with
little scope for going deep into the cadre increase proposals. For purposes of
expert advice, two heads of CPOs should by rotation be included in this
Committee, in addition to its present membership. The Triennial Cadre Review
must involve, in addition to the representatives of the State concerned, the
IGP/DG also and go into the following matters :—
26
National Police Commission, Sixth Report, March 1981, Paras 44.14, 44.15 and 44.16
27
Ibid, Paras 44.20, 44.21 and 44.22
15
i.
ii.
iii.
Review the performance of the State police against its IPS strength and
the relative management by the IPS officers of the Civil and Armed
Police.
Analyse with reference to the current needs and problems of the cadre
structure of the State, the Central Deputation Reserve, the Deputation
Reserve, the Training Reserve, the Leave Reserve and the number of
junior posts.
Formulate plans for the pattern growth in the light of the future needs of
the State police, the challenges it will have to face and its pattern of
growth. To begin with the first stage plan should be made or at least a
decade on the basis of the recommendations made from time to time in
the Triennial Review28”
1.6.12. The National Police Commission, which was the first comprehensive national
level inquiry into the Police in eight decades, also suggested various reform
measures, like the appointment of a Criminal Justice Commission, State Security
Commission, statutory tenure, norms for police stations, besides the enactment
of a new Police Act. Unfortunately, most recommendations remained on paper.
1.6.13. The Fourth Pay Commission (1986) brought about measures to improve the
career progression in the IPS by merging ranks, as well as by recommending
induction of an IPS officer as member of cadre review committee29.
1.6.14. The Fifth Pay Commission (1994-96), emphasized the significance of the
AIS, and made various recommendations to improve the backbone and quality
of AIS officers. They also introduced the rank of ADG, recommended inclusion
of non-IAS Secretary in the Civil Services Board, and brought in the concept of
parity. However, the Commission in its recommendations, possibly on account
of being misinformed, worked on the premise that there is a conventional edge of
two years between the IAS/IFS and the IPS/ Central Services in respect of
empanelment in the Central Staffing Scheme, while in fact there exists no such
stipulation. Similarly, arguments for recognizing the rising role of the IPS vis-àvis other services, was also not acceded to, without any deliberation30.
1.6.15. In 1998, a Committee was set up under Mr. Julio F. Ribeiro, with Ms.
Nirmala Buch, Shri.Arun Bhagat, and Ms. Prabha Shankarnarayanan, as
28
Ibid, Paras 44.33(7) and 44.33(8).
29
Report of the Fourth Central Pay Commission, Part I, June 1986, p.212
30
Report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission, 1994, Part IV, p.518-523
16
members. The Committee was to review action taken to implement the
recommendations of the National Police Commission, National Human Rights
Commission and the Vohra Committee, and to suggest ways and means to
implement the pending recommendations of the above Commissions/Committee.
1.6.16. The Supreme Court also asked the Committee to review action taken to
implement the recommendations of the NPC, particularly focusing on the need,
relevance and practicability of setting up a Security Commission or Police
Authority in each State and at the Centre on the lines suggested by the NPC,
NHRC prescribing a procedure for the appointment of Police Chiefs which
would be transparent and ensure that the best officers are selected and giving the
senior incumbents a minimum tenure, and to insulate the investigative wing of
the police from its law and order functions. It submitted two reports in Oct 1998
and March 1999, providing a host of recommendations to further the cause of
police reform. It recommended the formation of a Police Performance and
Accountability Commission, a Police Establishment Board, and a Police
Complaints Authority, amongst others.
1.6.17. The Padmanabiah Committee on Police Reform, (2000), continued on the
lines of the earlier reform proposals, proposing a fixed tenure policy,
admissibility of confessions of the Police, reform of the criminal justice
administration etc.
1.6.18. A committee on the Criminal Justice system (2000) under Justice VS
Malimath was constituted which evolved wide-ranging proposals for the
comprehensive reform of the criminal justice administration. Besides this, a
Review Committee on police reforms was set up by Ministry of Home Affairs
in 2004, which zeroed in on 49 recommendations for implementation.
1.6.19. An Expert Committee was constituted under Soli J Sorabjee, in September,
2005 to draft a new Model Police Act which submitted its report on 30th
October, 2006. The model Act provides for well-defined duties and
responsibilities of the police and responsiveness, sensitivity of the police
towards public especially the weaker and vulnerable sections, accountability to
the rule of law Community policing through village police system, policing in
urban areas through constitution of citizen policing committee, policing in
Public Order & Internal Security challenges.
1.6.20. Prakash Singh v. Union of India, was the most significant step in police
reform since the recommendations of the National Police Commission.
17
Concerned over the poor pace of police reform, the Supreme Court directed the
States to undertake the following:
i.
Constitute a State Security Commission.
ii.
Select the Director General of Police of the State from amongst
three senior-most officers of the Department empanelled for
promotion to that rank by the Union Public service Commission
and once selected, provide him a minimum tenure of at least two
years irrespective of his date of superannuation.
iii.
Prescribe minimum tenure of two years to the police officers on
operational duties.
iv.
Separate investigating police from law & order police.
v.
Set up a Police Establishment Board.
vi.
Constitute Police Complaints Authorities at the State and District
levels for looking into complaints against police officers.
1.6.21. The implementation of the same is being monitored by a Committee chaired
by Justice KT Thomas31. To its credit, as on date, 15 states have enacted new
legislations, and 14 states have issued executive orders, in deference to the
orders of the Supreme Court.
1.6.22.
The Sixth Pay Commission (2006-08), recognized the ‘pivotal role’ of the
AIS ‘in upholding the rule of law, and the principles of democratic governance’. It
went on to state that ‘they are expected to provide a uniformly high standard of
administration and play a critical role in our federal structure.’ They recommended
an Apex scale for DsGP in the Centre, which was subsequently extended by
Government to all State DsGP. The Commission however, did not accede to
demands for parity among the All India Services, and went on to justify the EDGE to
officers belonging to the IAS
1.6.23. As can be evinced from the discussions above, succeeding Pay Commissions,
while attempting to further police reform, have often been found wanting in
keeping with the scorching pace of police reform recommended by various
Commissions and demanded by the people of India. It is upto the 7th Pay
Commission to buck this trend, and render yeoman service to the cause of police
reform.
31
The status of the implementation may be seen at Annexure-
18
2. PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY
2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.1.1. The first duty of the institutions of the state is the protection and the safety of
the people. The police is the most important instrument by which this objective
is attained as the police represents the executive power of the State. In the
internal affairs of the state, the lack of efficient and effective policing – visible
and otherwise would deny the public safety and conditions of anarchy would
prevail. The police is therefore the most essential of public services of any form
of government, and especially in a democratic form of government.
2.1.2. It follows that the resources of the police and the uses to which they are put
are of the highest importance. The predominant resource of the police is its
human capital. By extension, the quality of the senior leadership will define how
well the human capital of the police is nurtured and utilized to deliver effective
and efficient public service of the highest standards to its nation’s citizens.
2.1.3. The betterment of the police leadership today will beneficially and materially
affect the police service and public interest for many years to come. It is
therefore necessary that the government provides the police officers a system of
remuneration and conditions of service which not only respects and values the
unique nature of policing as a public service, its role in a nascent democracy and
the commitment risks, demands and sacrifices that it entails; but also over a
course of time embeds a culture of professionalism and high achievement across
the police levels and raises the performance of the Indian policing to those of
mature democracies; which is the right of every citizen of the country.
2.2. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
2.2.1. The police system in India, like various other organs of the government, is a
legacy of the erstwhile British rule in the country. As such, there is a great
degree of similarity in the job content, responsibilities and functions of the
various civil services including the police operating in the two countries.
19
2.2.2. However, the high policing standards in mature democracies like the United
Kingdom have not evolved on their accord. These have come about because of
an early realization by the concerned governments that policing is a unique
public service and hence must be appropriately compensated. The process of
improving the police delivery system in the UK started in the late 1970s with a
realization that better policing can be achieved only by improving the quality of
human capital in the police by improving their pay and service conditions.
2.2.3. As a result of these reforms, the service conditions of the police in the UK
gradually improved along with substantial improvements in police performance
on both tangible and intangible factors. For example, not only has crime in UK
has fallen by 50% since 1995 as per the British Crime Survey32, but UK Police is
now universally recognized as one of the best police forces in the world.
2.2.4. Some of the key events / mile stones in this process of metamorphosis of
British police are as below
A.
LORD EDMUND-DAVIES COMMITTEEIn the United Kingdom as early as 1978, the Committee of Enquiry chaired by
Lord Edmund-Davies recommended a substantial increase (of the order of 45%)
in police pay and that police constables pay should be annually uprated in
accordance with an index of private sector non – manual worker pay. The
Edmund-Davies Inquiry concluded that police pay should be linked to “some
general index” because of the special features of policing:
i.
the police had no right to strike and one should not be granted;
ii.
the risks of assault and injury;
iii.
disruption to family life;
iv.
the then manpower and recruitment problem;
v.
the increased responsibilities and workloads falling to the police
service since the previous review.
vi.
In doing so, the Edmund-Davies committee sought to ensure that
police officers should neither financially benefit nor suffer, in
comparison with the community that they police.
B.
SHEEHY COMMISSION -
32 Crime in England and Wales 2009/10, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 12/10, Ed. J. Flatley, C. Kershaw, K.
Smith, R. Chaplin & D. Moon, London, Home Office, July 2010
20
The Sheehy Commission was appointed in July 1992 under the chairmanship of
Sir Patrick Sheehy to examine the rank structure, emoluments and conditions of
service of the police in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland which
submitted its report in June, 1993. The recommendations of the Commission are
reproduced below in their own words.
The police service and other professions
“Police officers are ordinary citizens with extraordinary powers. They have a
special position under the law but many of the qualities and skills which are
required by police officers of various ranks are common to a number of other
professions and organizations. These include the ability to:
i.
articulate clear and measurable objectives, gain internal and external
support for them, and ensure that the organization and individuals within it
are judged on achievement;
ii. identify priorities and plan coherently across a wide spectrum of activities;
iii. manage sometimes small, sometimes significant human and other
resources so as to provide a quality service and achieve value for money;
iv.
communicate and consult effectively at all levels within the organization,
and with all sections of the community, not all of them necessarily well
disposed towards the service.”
“A number of features are particular to policing and require its officers to possess
special qualities and skills…. These are:
i.
the extraordinary nature of police powers, in particular police monopoly of
the use of legitimate force;
ii. the exceptionally high level of integrity required by the nature of police
functions;
iii. the sensitive, quite often dangerous and sometimes explosive situations in
which police are expected to exercise control, often at considerable risk to
themselves.”
Pay levels
“As Chapter 8 makes clear, we consider that there should be a formula approach
to increases in police basic pay and that this should reflect private sector pay
settlements. This is on the basis that, like the 1982 Megaw Commission on Civil
Service Pay, we consider that private sector pay settlements provide a more
accurate reflection of the economic climate and the market than pay settlements in
public sector. They avoid the circular effect of comparing public sector pay
settlements with one another. Our reasons for concluding that a private sector
based formula approach is justified (which are set out more fully in Chapters 7 –
8) are:
21
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
to recognize, on grounds of equity, the absence of right to strike;
to secure a smooth progression in pay rates reflecting the economic
climate and the market;
to avoid the management problems associated with pay-related
inconsistencies between the caliber of officers recruited over time;
to recognize the professional nature of the policing role and reflect the
overall package we are recommending;
to recognize the importance of securing, as indicated in our Terms of
Reference, the recruitment, retention and motivation of officers of the right
quality, and
to recognize the importance of policing to society, particularly in terms of
powers that the police alone are able to exercise, including their monopoly
of the exercise of legitimate force.”
“ On this basis we conclude that police officers of high calibre are and will continue
to be required and that this should be reflected in choosing the benchmark against
which police pay level should be judged….”
The Commissioner of Police of Metropolis: external pay links
“We recognize that this recommendation will break the existing pay link between the
rate for the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the rate for the Permanent
Secretary of the Home Department. We recommend that the link should be broken; in
our view the special features of policing mean that the jobs are not comparable. Since
the link was established there has also been substantial reallocation of responsibilities
within the Home Office and between the Home Office and other departments.”
Bonus levels
“Within this system, performance at constant level with no change to scope of role,
circumstances or experience/skills will not achieve progression. We recommend,
however, that one-off non-pensionable individual bonuses should be available as
should team bonuses.”
“…the bonuses we have recommended will allow individuals performing
satisfactorily to benefit not only from increases in the value of scale points as the
basic scale is uprated (see Chapter 8) but also to be rewarded for special contributions
they or their team have made during the year in question (Chapter 9 discusses bonus
allocation).”
C.
THE WINSOR REPORT
22
The Government of UK in 2010 commissioned the Independent Review of Police
Officers and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. The report of this review, known
as the Windsor report provides the best summary of the existing state of police
pay in the UK and the developed world. As per the Report
i.
The pay scales of police officers in the UK are typically 10-15% higher
than those of the emergency services and those of similar ranks in the
armed forces33
ii. Earnings of police officers are comparable to those of many white collar
and professional occupations.
iii. The position of police officers in the earnings structure has remained
roughly constant in the last decade.
iv.
The police pension scheme has remained the most generous of public
pension schemes through a combination of early normal pension age and
accelerated accrual of pension rights after 20 years of service. This has
remained so even after the shift to the new police pension scheme in 2006
33 Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration and Conditions - Part I Report, Government
of United Kingdom, march 2011, Page 13
23
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
with one of the highest contributions into the scheme by both the employer
and employee.
Police officers pay the highest contribution rate of any public pension
scheme, but contributions from employers to the scheme are also among
the highest in public pension schemes. There are roughly 131,000
contributors to the 1987 pension scheme (and 13,000 to the 2006 scheme),
but almost 125,000 pension recipients and a further 20,000 deferred
beneficiaries. This high ratio of pensioners to contributors is a significant
cost burden. Combined pension contributions as a percentage of earnings
are over 35% in the 1987 scheme and almost 34% in the 2006 scheme.
The report further states that the police pay in other countries with similar
police structures like the Commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada
and New Zealand lies at similar points in the earnings distribution in their
country while the average police pay in the Northern European countries
like Denmark, Germany and Sweden is closer to the national average
earnings in the country, thus reflecting a lower positive differential.
Comparisons with police pay in the US is difficult as police is locally
recruited and its pay is locally bargained, leading to wide differences and
incomparability of data.
For Chief Police Officers, remuneration rises from just over £140,000 to
over £226,000. In comparison, the pay of Permanent Secretaries in the
Civil Service varies between £140,000 and £190,000. The table below
gives the salaries of some senior police officers in UK.
2.3. COMPARISON WITH PRIVATE SECTOR
Policing today is far from the relatively simple occupation it was many years ago. The
sophistication, intelligence and resources of some who are engaged in crime, the malignancy
of their motives and methods, and the technology available to all citizens, mean that the
profession of policing will continue to require people of the highest integrity, intelligence and
skill. The needs of the police service for such qualities are intensified by the complexity and
weight of the modern criminal law, and the demands and expectations of the public and other
agencies of the state.
24
For these reasons, it is important that police officers with skills and competencies which are
of importance in modern policing are rewarded appropriately for their development and use.
Secondly, people should be paid for what they do, the skills they have and are applying in
their work, and the weights of the jobs they do
At the same time, fairness is an essential part of any system of pay and service conditions.
Fairness means not only fairness to the police officers but also to the public, and to the police
service. As such it is essential that a scientific system of job evaluation is used to compare
and determine the relative weights of a police officers job vis a vis private sector jobs and
those in other public services.
Regrettably the previous Pay Commissions did not adopt Job evaluation as a method for
comparing the different jobs / services, despite the fact that it is a universally accepted
technique for comparing and evaluating disparate jobs. For example the Third Pay
Commission did not adopt the job evaluation method as it considered the following
limitations with the system,
1. that there was non-availability of required data
2. that it had “so far been applied mostly to industrial jobs” and rarely to “highest paid
jobs”
3. that it is “time-consuming” and
4. that the “subjective element is still there in any job evaluation”.
.,
However, these objections are not valid in light of the actual experience and practices all over
the world in the field of job evaluation and the developments in technology that have made
the collection and analysis of large volumes of data relatively easy.
Infact, despite the unique nature of policing, in a survey of UK Police forces, 25 out of the
total 43 forces responded that they use a job evaluation scheme to evaluate roles in the
organization.34
Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions –
Final Report, Page 537
34
25
However, it is accepted that such system in the police would need to be customised due to the
unique nature of the police service. As such it is suggested that
1. Job evaluation be made one more input into the process of relative assessment of jobs
rather than the only one
2. Instead of evaluating jobs, “job classes” may be evaluated
A scientific system of job evaluation would not only help objectively compare services and
jobs within the government service but would also lead to an objective assessment of
different government services like the police vis a vis the private and the public sector.
This is especially relevant in the present times when the chief differentiators of government
service viz an assured pension and security of tenure have been negated. The new pension
scheme has in a way removed the chief attraction of government service i.e. of an assured and
defined pension. In addition, the pressures of service including the threat of suspension and
the reality of frequent transfers have made government service particularly that in the IPS as
stressful and uncertain as the employment in a private organization. At the same time, the fact
that government salaries are significantly lower than private sector salaries needs no
substantiating and has been well accepted by subsequent pay commissions themselves.
2.4. PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY
2.4.1. Based on the above, the following basic principles for the determination of
pay for the police in India are proposed.
A. Fairness – The system of pay should be fair in its procedure and conduct of
the review, in its analysis and in arriving at its recommendations for the
different section of employees.
B. Compensation for skills, experience and job complexity – Policing has over
the years become a complex, onerous and intellectual exercise, a far cry from
26
what the service used to be at the turn of the century. The role of a
Superintendent of Police in a district is infinitely more complex than the role
of a Lt Col in an Army battalion or a Superintendent of Post or a Manager in a
private company. Similarly, there is little parallel in the current times between
the role of a police constable and an Army sepoy, a postman or a clerk in a
private company. In addition, the numbers of specialist roles, such as counterterrorism, serious and organised crime, cyber-crime, forensics, VIP protection
and fraud have significantly increased. As such, the changed role of the police
officers must be recognized and they must be compensated for the job
performed by them and its complexity.
C. Difficult conditions of work should be compensated - Proper weight must
be given to the difficult demands which their occupation places on police
officers and their families and the ways in which they live their lives,
including the long working hours, risks of personal injury and death, and
public responsibility and scrutiny if things go wrong. Successive studies have
also shown that night working and rotating shift patterns can significantly and
adversely affect an individual’s physical health. 35 Similarly the effects of
continued stress on the health and longevity are well documented.
D. Merit and good performance must be rewarded – Progression up the pay
scales based purely on length of service is unfair. High performers should be
paid more than those who perform adequately, and higher again than those
who perform poorly
E. Talent of high calibre should be attracted and retained - The pay and
service conditions for the IPS will affect the type and the calibre of the people
who wish to join the police, their motivation and retention in service through
their career and consequently the effectiveness and efficiency of policing in
India. A motivated and committed police leadership is the starting point for
any attempt at reform of the police functioning and inculcating a culture of
professionalism and high achievement across levels in Indian policing. Thus it
is essential that pay and service conditions are such that the police system
delivers service of a quality that the citizens of the country demand and
deserve.
35 Quality of life, life satisfaction and happiness in shift and non-shiftworkers, K. Lipovcan, P. Larsen, N.
Zganec, Revista de Saude Publica 38 (2004) suppl; pages 3-10.
27
F. System to be simple to administer – Lastly, the system should be simple to
administer and not be too rigid.
28
3. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
3.1
While the primary purpose of submitting this memorandum is to plead for the IPS
officers, in this section as well as section 5 (on allowances and advances ) present facts,
figures and submissions on behalf of the entire police fraternity. This has been done for two
reasons: i) Non gazetted ranks of police are not allowed by statute to form associations and it
is the responsibility of the IPS officers, as leaders of the force, to advance the cause of their
subordinates; ii) Traditionally the IPS association has been presenting arguments on behalf
of the non gazette ranks in addition to the separate memoranda submitted by the heads of
respective CAPFs, and police departments of the Union territories, and the pay commissions
encouraged positive interventions from the IPS association in this regard.
3.2 LONG WORKING HOURS OF POLICE IN THE ABSENCE OF SHIFT
SYSTEM
3.2.1 The issue of long working hours of Police personnel is often discussed in various
fora. One of the earliest available empirical evidence on this issue is job analysis
conducted by National Productivity Council in 1977. Para 2.19 of the 1st National
Police Commission Report highlighted the fact that the job analysis conducted by the
National Productivity Council has shown that the working hours of the subordinate
police officers range from 10 to 16 hours every day of seven days in a week. It also
revealed that a computerized survey conducted by Tamil Nadu Police during that
period had shown that an average Constable worked for 14 hours every day without
any respite.It points out: “....Long and arduous hours of work without facilities for
rest and recreation, continuous employment on jobs under extreme conditions of
stress and strain, both mental and physical, prolonged stagnation in the same rank
without even one rank Promotion throughout their service for a majority of them,
constant exposure to criticism and ridicule by a demanding public, a totally
inadequate pay structure with no compensation for the handicaps and privation they
undergo in their jobs, low status and lack of involvement in planning and executing
field jobs with a full understanding of the objectives set by the police organization,
etc., have all had their telling effect on the morale of the constabulary throughout the
country. The increasing educational level of the Constables-a trend noticeable in the
recent years-has sharpened the edge of their frustration with their existing lot within
the police system. During our visits to several police stations and discussions with the
constabulary, their highly demoralized state was strikingly noticeable. They have
nothing to motivate them into meaningful and positive performance of police tasks
with a full understanding of the implications and objectives of police action. They
function as automatons in situations where they are required to exercise their
discretion and judgment. They function rigidly in circumstances which require
flexibility of approach and understanding of the opposite point of view. We are
convinced that mere changes in their training schedule will not bring about the
29
necessary improvement in their motivation or performance unless some serious
deficiencies in their living and working conditions which have long been neglected
are immediately taken up and remedied. We consider this exercise to be of primary
importance
in
any
attempt
at
police
reform…..”
3.2.2 All the issues mentioned in this report of 1979 are still very much relevant even after
more than 35 years. Moreover the challenges faced by police officers have increased
manifold. The police officers working in the police stations and other field formations
have to face the perennially growing challenges of terrorism, left wing extremism,
threat to internal security from our hostile neighbours, increased crime, caste and
communal strife, student and labour unrest, increasing use of police resources for law
and order duties. This hypothesis has been substantiated by subsequent studies.
3.2.3 A survey conducted by McKinsey and Company in 2003 of approximately 1400
officers and constables across commissionerates and districts in Maharashtra
identified a very demanding lifestyle driven by long working hours (average of 14
hours per day) and limited leaves (average of 35 days in a year against an entitlement
of 90 days, including 52 weekly offs) as the prominent key factor responsible for low
motivation and high stress levels.
3.2.4 A Human Rights Watch report in August 2009 titled – ‘Broken System, Dysfunction,
Abuse, and Impunity in the Indian Police’, in its chapter ‘The Deteriorating State of
the Indian Police’ highlights the poor working conditions of the police officers and
the fact that low ranking police are over-worked and often exhausted due to
requirement that they be available for duty for 24 hours a day. Page 29 of the Report
reveals:“....police are required to be available for work 24 hours day, 7 days a week –
a grueling cruelty for constables and other low ranking officers. As Government
employees, police are allowed paid leaves. However, in practice, the police chief or
district officials may order standing orders to recall officers on vacation and sometimes no leave is permitted for a certain period or when there are exigencies or staff
shortages. Superior officers often deny leave because of staff shortages.......”.
3.2.5 Another study of 286 police officers working in police stations in Karnataka has
revealed that -many police officers stated that they work average of 12 to 16 hours a
day without any weekly or monthly days off36.
36
A Profile of Junior Rank of Karnataka Police – A Survey of Their Attitude, Behaviour , Mental Make Up and
Stress Levels- December 2008 (http://media.ksp.diqtech.com/files/Survey_of_attitudes.htm, accessed on
20/05/2014).
30
3.2.6 While preparing this memorandum, a quick survey was conducted in 14 police
stations spread over six districts in 4 different states to see as to whether the
observations of NPC report of 1977 are still relevant or not. Since most of the police
work is police station based, therefore data about the number of hours police officers
work at police stations was collected from few police stations in districts/ citiesLucknow, Bhiwani, Karimnagar, Adilabad, Khammam and New Delhi. After March
2014, there had been increase in police activity due to the General Election; therefore
the data was gathered for the month of January 2014 (presumed to be a normal
working month). The number of hours of duty was calculated on the basis of
arrival/departure information in General Diary (GD) maintained in the police
station. In all, the study captures data regarding the average working hours of 680
police personnel based at the police stations. The findings were, in average civil
police staff in the police stations work between 12-13 hours a day. Quite often, they
report to duty on Sundays. Moreover their duty hours are staggered duty to the nature
of police work. A typical police officer in the police station may be working 4-6 hours
in morning and 6-8 hours in evening. This clearly means that even if that officer may
have actually worked for 12-13 hours, but adding up the time for commuting, actual
time spent was more than that time.
3.2.7 Ever increasing responsibilities and perennial shortage of staff contribute to
shouldering of additional burden by available hands. If we compare the relative
availability of police officers per lakh of population, we find that in India we have
122.5 civil police officers (including armed and un armed)per lakh of population as
compared to global average of 341.837. Nobody can dispute the fact that nature of job
and responsibilities and challenges shouldered by police officers in India are
significantly higher than police officers of several other countries. Indian police is not
adequately equipped with force multipliers such as vehicles and technological tools
compared with the police forces in developed countries is greatly enhanced by the
extensive use of technology. Therefore in practical terms the shortage of staff is even
more acute than what the figures indicate.
3.2.8 Xavier and Prabhakar (2013) reported that in Indian police force, policemen in higher
ranks have increased work load and areas of jurisdiction. Further, there are conflicting
job demands, responsibilities of subordinates, time pressure and deadlines, physical
strain of work environment, long hours and having to cope with changes at work and
expenses (monetary and career) of making mistakes. It is seen that since subordinates
are incapable of performing their tasks properly, the senior officers tend to take on
their responsibilities also. Increased accountability of any act within their area of
jurisdiction, political interference, fear of explanation of any indiscipline or
37
International data on crime and criminal justice:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crimestatistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf
31
UN
office
on
Drugs
and
Crime
201;
irresponsibility on the part of subordinates, fear of unknown, lack of
communication and cooperation from other departments result in unresolved
frustrations and personal conflicts which further lead to stress and anxiety
among officers at higher levels.
3.3 OCCUPATIONAL AND SITUATIONAL RISKS SPECIFIC TO POLICE
3.3.1 As compared to several professions related to public service, police officers are
exposed to a disproportionate risk of occupational hazards. Main categories of
occupational hazards faced by the police include Risk of physical assault, accidents,
stress and fatigue and risk of communicable diseases.
3.3.1.1 Risk of physical assault: Foremost amongst the occupational hazards faced by police
officers is the risk of assault. Several professional situations which police officers face
while performing their day to day Duties such as public disorder situations, dealing
with disputes, arresting suspects, escorting prisoners, and conducting anti-militancy
operations make them vulnerable to physical assault.
3.3.1.2 Risk of accidents: Police personnel face enhanced risk of accidents, while chasing of
criminals, diffusing explosive devices, driving in extremely hostile weather
conditions, performing border duties and managing traffic.
As per Crime in India, 2013 published by National Crime Records Bureau 3,714
police personnel (comprising 2,739 natural deaths, 740 deaths on duty and 235
suicidal deaths) died during the year 2013 as compared to 3,375 deaths in the year
2012 showing an increase of 10.3.% over the previous year.
BOX 3. 1
Rank wise analysis of police causalities reveals that among 740 police personnel
killed on duty, 3 were DSPs and above (gazetted officer), 55 were upper subordinates
(Inspectors - 13 and Sub-Inspectors - 42) and 682 were lower subordinates (Assistant SubInspectors - 66, Head Constables - 173 and Constables - 443).
As per data on Police organizations in India published by Bureau of Police Research
and Development (2013) total 176 police districts in the country were Terrorists/ extremists
affected in 2012. Number of police districts affected by Extremists/Terrorists during the last
nine years 2004 to 2012 has manifested largely an increasing trend except 2006, 2009, 2011
& 2012 when it decreased as shown in the graph below. This is a disturbing trend and poses
formidable challenge before the security forces.
32
Majority of the police casualties (80.8%)(598 out of 740) were due to ‘accidents’ followed by
‘anti-terrorist/ extremists operations’ and by 'other criminals' which accounted for 10.5% (78 out
of 740) and 6.5% (48 out of 740) respectively of such deaths. However, 1.1% (8 out of 740) of
BOX 3.2
3.3.1.3 Risk of Fatigue induced Stress: Police personnel are obliged by law to be available for
duty round the clock to meet emergencies, even when they are off duty. They suffer
fatigue induced stress due to constant exposure to danger, traumatic events, shortstaffed stations, and continuous work in isolated rural areas. Additionally persons
stationed in armed guards, escorts and static pickets, where the nature of the work
requires constant alertness but no physical action, coupled with uncertainty of facing
the unforeseen threats. This group of personnel faces fatigue due to drudgery of the
work. Excessive fatigue often has long term consequences for mental and physical
health, which will be discussed in a later sub section)
3.3.1.4 Other risks: There are a wide variety of other risks that police personnel face during
the performance of their duties. Police personnel working in the Traffic Police, in
addition to facing greater risks of accidents, are also prone to contact lung and
respiratory diseases due to the continuous exposure to toxic emissions. Police
personnel deployed in long running agitations face the risk of contracting lung
infections from continuous inhalation of tear-gas. Bomb squad and Investigation
Officers personnel may inhale harmful vapors while scrutinizing crime scenes
involving explosions. Such examples may be too many to compile an exhaustive list
but there is no gainsaying that police personnel – given the nature of their jobs- are
more susceptible to physical and internal injury than are most, if not all, other
professions related to public service.
3.4
STRESS CAUSED DUE TO JOB UNCERTAINTIES,
UNPREDICTABLE NATURE OF JOB, HOSTILE CLIENTELE, AND
FREQUENT TRANSFERS
3.4.1 Police personnel deal on a regular basis with an assortment of unique situations and
stressors. Unlike other jobs, the police officers start the day with bad news. There is
only negative feedback in terms of how many murders and robberies have taken place
33
the previous night. The job pattern of a policeman is not structured like his
counterparts in other departments. His work life follows a sequence of unpredictable
events with uncertain consequences - Crimes by their very nature do not follow a
linear time cycle; Receiving a phone call at the in the middle of the night is a
recurring, yet unpredictable experience which is invariably linked to a call of
emergency; there is always a split second difference between a crowd turning into a
mob, often he ends up disappointing members of the public who approach him, he
being the visible symbol of the government, on matters on which he has no mandate
to intervene. Agitations are collective expression of dissatisfaction with the state
authorities and others on a variety of issues like education, essential services,
transport facilities, wages etc. and a policeman who is on the forefront to perform his
duty is often a target for venting the public anger and frustration. A policeman is
always under public gaze -a momentary lapse of concentration due to fatigue and
consequent error of judgement is captured and magnified through the lens of a 24X7
media and haunts him with a lifelong taint. The shock of each tragedy and violent
event takes cumulative physical and mental toll on each police officer in some way or
the other. Increased demands of work impinging upon home life, lack of consultation
and communication with the higher authorities in the organization, lack of control
over workload and inadequate support have been identified as the potential factors
responsible for the stress in the policemen (Collins and Gibbs; 2003; Gisli et. al.
1985).
3.4.2 From the BPR&D data on police organisations 2013, it can be seen that police faced
78,444 agitations in the year 2012 which was 6.96% higher than the previous year. In
these agitations, 13 civilians and 6 policemen were killed whereas 354 civilians and
863 policemen were injured.
3.4.3 The hostile clientele with which police personnel deal and interact predisposes them
to additional stressors. 38Sarason et al. (1979) proposed two types of stressors that
police officers experience, and these are those that engender anxiety and those that
arouse anger and hostility. Anger-related stress is particularly important in
interactions with hostile clientele, and its negative effects are heightened because
officers are prohibited by the decorum of their job from publicly expressing anger and
hostility. The police subculture tends to protect the macho image of the police and
informally teaches its members to follow a code of silence. They are conditioned to
respond to a variety of situations and be under complete emotional control while
doing so. Suppression of emotions like anger, fear, and grief has negative
consequences on the immune system and deteriorate the physical health (Leal, 2006).
To alleviate stress the police officers tend to go into maladaptive behaviours like
drinking, smoking and overeating, which contribute significantly, to this deterioration.
38
Can be accessed at http://bprd.nic.in/showfile.asp?lid=1216
34
3.4.4 Anger has also been found to have negative impacts on emotional as well as the
physical well-being of the people (Sharma et al., 1996). Mearns and Mauch (1998)
observed that anger and hostility predispose people to serious health problems. They
also observed that police officers who reported more anger also reported more
distress. For police personnel, the inability to effectively manage stress has its most
dangerous consequences during the line of duty. Stress management programmes
have been implemented successfully by police organizations in the west (Wagner,
1981).
3.4.5 Frequent transfers are another problem faced among various ranks, more prominently
by the young IPS officers. Such transfers not only cause emotional disturbance to the
entire family of the officer. The abovementioned BPR&D study reports that 221
District SPs were transferred in less than a year’s tenure and 173 in less than two
years, which means that even after discounting some multiple transfers, nearly half
the district superintendents in the country are unable to complete the minimum tenure
rules stipulated by the government. The corresponding figures for the range DIGs is,
as against 178 ranges, 35 range DIGs were transferred within one year and 38 were
transferred within two years of posting. Reply to a Right to Information Act petition
in 2013 disclosed that 43 officers were transferred for more than 40 times in their
career in the state of Uttar Pradesh alone, which was widely reported by the media39.
3.5
STRESS DUE TO ALIENATION FROM FAMILIES
3.5.1 Both Civil Police and personnel of the CAPFs feel alienation from their families for
most of their career. The CAPF personnel are posted in non family stations and meet
their family members only on a few occasions in a year. A significant proportion of
the civil police also are unable to keep their families with them because of their rural
postings. Even those who are fortunate to keep the family with them are unable to
spend quality time with them because of the long hours of duty , including on
weekends and holidays.
3.5.2 Umranikar (2009), consequent to the Mckinsey Mumbai study conducted in 2004,
reported that on festive days, police force is on the streets rather than celebrating
festivals. This means that police officers and other ranks in the commissionerate
cannot avail holidays or leave due to this. For various reasons, police work in 12 hour
shifts while the labour law provides for an 8 hour shift. In view of the shortage of man
power heavy crime work and uncertain law and order duties, policemen have to work
39
May be accessed at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/43-IPS-officers-in-UP-transferred-40-times-intheir-career/articleshow/20202799.cms
35
for 16 hours at a stretch. They also do not avail weekly holidays, casual leave, earned
leave and the other gazetted holidays.
3.5.3 Insufficient time for the family has been among the top ranking stressors (Kumar,
1995. During festivals, constables often work for more than 24 hours at a stretch,
away from their families, and while on duty they see the rest of the world celebrating
and enjoying their holiday. The families of police personnel are often neglected when
head of the family is out on duty. The classic model of a police line or a battalion can
only partially take care of their burden, as only about 30% of the police personnel are
fortunate to get government quarters. Therefore by and large , the families are unable
to get the care and attention by the department in organized manner nor the
individuals are able to do so themselves because of commitment of duty in terms of
time and place. This keeps on hurting policeman internally (Nagar, 2009). He
understand that he is neither able to fulfill aspirations of parents and spouse nor able
to bestow love and guidance to their kids during their growing age. This results
mostly in violent and insensitive manifestation in his behavior. It also results in many
sorts of perversion and avoidable aggressiveness.
3.5.4 The work profile of CAPFs amalgamates the roles of both military and police. The
working conditions in organizations like BSF, ITBP, SSB etc are extremely tough as
the force has to physically guard the long and difficult borders which are mostly
hostile. The personnel are present 24/7, 365 days a year at the border. The border
areas are extremely backward, without basic amenities, and often without any
population for miles. Jawans are isolated, without normal social interactions and away
from their families (Chhabra and Chhabra, 2009).
3.5.5 Staying away from families is common to almost all the personnel except those
posted in various head quarters and training centres. Even in the Army, field and
family postings are rotated. However in the CAPFs, there is no such concept of family
posting. He is located physically at Border outposts or Left wing extremism affected
areas where families are not allowed. Very few jawans are able to get postings to
head-quarter locations for a maximum 5 years in a career spanning 35+ years. While
this is largely true of the Jawans, the other two ranks, i.e. SOs and Officers are also
similarly placed, by and large. For a major part of their career they also stay away
from their families. Many a times even if they are posted in the unit HQ, the locations
are so remote that bringing the family means sacrificing good education for children,
and many are forced to stay alone on this account. Unlike Army cantonments, there
are very few central locations where the families can be left behind and good
schooling & accommodation is available This separation is felt very acutely by the
force. It is a constant source of worry and tension. The human needs for physical
intimacy and companionship is denied to them. This is an unhealthy and unnatural
situation to be in. Higher stress levels are the natural outcome. Jawans are the worst
affected, followed by subordinate officers and then officers. There are many other
36
issues related to the family which act as a stressor. These issues mainly include
marital discord, illness of family member, education and upbringing of children and
family welfare. In a sense, many of these issues are related to the nature of the job and
their not being able to stay with their families.
37
3.6
HEALTH HAZARDS, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL
STRESS ASSOCIATED WITH POLICE JOB AND THEIR
MANIFESTATIONS
3.6.1 The Apex court acknowledged through various judgements that Right to health care is
an integral part of right to life guaranteed under article 21 of the constitution of India.
Stress is an important factor contributing to poor health of police personnel. The
stressful nature of the police work affects the health and family lives of many officers
which encourages alcoholism and other vices amongst them. A majority of police
personnel suffer from various problems such as high blood pressure, heart disease,
diabetes, mental stress disorder etc. due to job induced stress. Stress and related health
and personal problems should therefore be the concern of every police administrator
not only because of the humanitarian aspects but also because a failure to deal with
them can have a profoundly negative effect upon the total operation of the police
organization.
3.6.2 Carrying forward from the previous paragraphs where factors inducing stress among
policemen have been identified and discussed, for the purpose of understanding the
health hazards, stressors can be classified into four categories; viz. External, Internal,
Task related and Individual.
3.6.2.1 External stressors include frustrations with the criminal justice system, discontent
with un-favourable media coverage, resentment or dislike over decisions and interests
of government and administrative bodies affecting the performance of police work.
3.6.2.2 Internal stressors cover a large number of problem areas, many of which are
organizational including training that is felt to be inadequate, equipment, that is
thought to be substandard or in a state of disrepair, poor pay and ambiguously defined
reward structures, as well as inadequate career development guidelines, offensive
departmental policies, excessive paper work and intra-departmental political
favouritism.
3.6.2.3 Task related stressors include role conflicts, the rigors of shift work, boredom, fear,
danger of being exposed to the miseries and brutalities of life, and work overload.
Inter-role conflicts of law enforcement officers, especially the conflict between
occupational and marital roles do affect marital relationships to some degree. The
commitment to twenty four hour duty has a negative effect on marriages and their
spouses report emotional detachment and repression of feelings by policemen.
3.6.2.4 Individual stressors include fears about job competence, individual success and safety.
It also includes stressors arising out of performing police work, particularly health
problems, alcoholism, marital problems, divorce and suicide. Confrontation with
38
physical violence of citizens seems to nearly always generate significant stress in the
police officers involved. Law enforcement officers perceive as stressful those
incidents relating to violence, severe personnel/disciplinary matters and
administrative issues, all of which may be considered as threatening because of their
potential damage to an officer’s person, career or self-image.
3.6.3 Officers who experience high levels of occupational stress report a high incidence of
physical ailments and psychological problems that affect their work performance.
Specifically, they commonly have poor health (Cooper and Davidson 1987; Fletcher,
1988; Kirkcaldy et al; 1995), experience burnout (Brown et al; 1996; Burke and
Deszca, 1986; Crank et al; 1995; Lord, 1996; Stotland and Pendleton, 1989), are
dissatisfied with their jobs and because of weak organizational commitment, they may
not fully invest themselves in their work or they may retire prematurely (Kop et al;
1999; Malloy and Mays, 1984). When individuals are overwhelmed by occupational
stress they suffer from increased chronic stress, depression, heart disease, stomach
disorders, alcohol and drug use and abuse, divorce, and even suicide attempts (Lord,
1996; Anshel, 2000; Biggamet al; 1997; Dietrich, 1989; Walker; 1997).
Box 3.2: Vicious Cycle of Stress
According to Thoits (1996), stress is experienced when people are
faced with undesirable life demands that disrupt their ability to
engage in everyday activities. Stress is presumed to arise when this
appraisal produces the judgment that demands are about to tax or
exceed the individual’s resources for dealing with them, thus
threatening well-being (Holroyal & Lazarus, 1992). The vicious
cycle of stress induced patho-physiology is depicted below:
39
3.6.4 Saha et. al. (2010) evaluated cardio-vascular risk factors in police officers and
reported comparative health complaints of police officers in relation to non-police
personnel as depicted in table below. The risk of having a heart attack in fact doubles
with each decade of law enforcement service (Jahnavi et al; 2012).
3.6.5. The police officers lead a physically inactive life, have irregular and spicy hotel made
diet with limited choice of food while on duty, take overtime and shift work, suffer
from sleeplessness, high rate of alcoholism, tobacco consumption and stress than the
general people (Vila, 2006).
3.6.6. At the psychological level, the stress of police work may result in chronic negative
emotions such as anger, anxiety or depression. Police officers operating under severe
and chronic stress may well be at greater risk of error and over-reaction that can
compromise their performance and public safety. The unrealistic expectations
imposed by this occupational culture discourage officers from admitting feeling
stressed and openly expressing negative emotions. The sleep-wake cycle, under the
circadian control of endogenous regulators or oscillators, is disrupted by a
misalignment between the external demands of police work and biological rhythms.
This produces mood disturbances, decreased work performance, general physical
malaise; sleep-wake complains and increased intake and addiction to alcohol and
drugs and suicidal tendencies. MHA reports revealed that during the period 2009-11
CAPFs had lost 328 men fighting terrorists, North-East extremists and Maoists.
Between January, 2011 and January, 2014 in CAPFs 368 personnel committed suicide
which is almost equal to the number of personnel lost their lives in action which is
371.
40
3.6.7. From 2009-11 the deaths due to suicides and fratricides in the paramilitary forces are
in fact higher than similar deaths reported in the Indian Army. As many as 375 men in
the army committed suicide during 2009-2011 while the seven paramilitary forces
together have reported 398 such deaths. This amounted to 16.58 cases per lakh CAPF
personnel per year in comparison to 10.41 cases per lakh army personnel per year1.
In the last 10 years, a total of 1,018 CAPF personnel, including some officers, have
committed suicide.
3.7 SUMMING UP OF ARGUMENTS FOR COMPENSATION OF POLICE
PERSONNEL WITH EXTRA PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR
WORKING UNDER EXTREMELY CHALLENGING AND STRESSFUL
CONDITIONS
3.7.1 Increased level of education of junior police officers, increased awareness and
constant comparison with other similarly placed government servants has given rise to
lot of resentment. This has a huge impact on the delivery of police services. A feeling
has developed that despite working for longer hours, performing duty on holidays and
festivals and many times not being able to avail leave due to nature of job, the police
officers are not being suitably compensated.
3.7.2 Non gazetted police officers in several police departments including the Delhi Police,
are presently compensated for this extra work by giving them extra salary for one
month (30 Days) in Delhi Police. However this is highly inadequate and does not
compensate for the extra work done by the police. Moreover many police officers are
not able to avail the leave because many times leave is temporarily stopped by the
supervisory officers due to exigencies of duty. If one only considers the average 72
hours of work per week and not count the work done during the gazette holidays,
which is much higher than the standard norm of 40 hours of work per week; and one
month extra pay is far less compensator even by the aforementioned modest
calculation. In addition, taking into account the stress in job due to constant threat to
life and injury, unnatural working hours, difficult working conditions, staying away
from family (as job expects them to stay in rural police stations, even if the family is
urban based, unlike other government officials who commute daily), they deserve
much higher increase in the compensation package.
3.7.3 A police officer, including starting level of a civil police constable, under various
sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code, has the powers to
stop and search person or premises; to arrest anyone under reasonable suspicion of his
having committed an offence; to interrogate, to use force to disperse and even use
force to refrain a person from evading arrest, even to the extent of causing death, in
certain circumstances. A police officer, even at the non gazette ranks, apart from the
negative powers of restraining people, needs to use immense amount of discretion,
make quick and at times life saving decisions, act as a counselor, work as a judge to
41
appreciate facts during an enquiry, be a doctor to be able to provide first aid to
victims, be a scientist to be able to appreciate forensic evidence, be a lawyer to be
able to weigh evidence against law, be a rescuer during disasters. . Successive pay
Commissions missed the point that remuneration package to level of government
functionaries who has the power to impact upon any person’s life and liberty has to be
commensurate with the need to attract, motivate and retain right kind of talent.
3.7.4 Police reforms mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are lagging behind in many
states in spite of the continuous court driven monitoring. Being leaders, the IPS
officers are the prime movers for reforms but direct contribution of the cutting edge
level police officers will be highly critical for the success of police reform agenda. As
already submitted in the beginning commission can make a vital contribution and act
as a catalyst for the much needed police reforms though its recommendations.
Remuneration and allowances commensurate with the responsibilities of police will
greatly help in intake of quality human resources and upkeep of their motivation
levels throughout their career. Further, cardinal to success of the police reforms and
turning the Indian police truly into a people’s police is shedding of the colonial
vestiges, one of which is the fairly static status of the constable. While the primary
responsibility for affecting structural reforms is the central government, attraction of
right talent being one of its terms of reference, pay commission can play a proactive
role in this regard.
3.7.5 Successive pay commissions have carried forward the legacy of equating a constable
with a semi-skilled worker which is an anachronistic approach for the 21st century
policing needs. In most of the states the basic qualification level for a civil police
constable is now class XII and quite often majority of the successful candidates are
graduate. After the recruitment the constables undergo two years of rigorous training
where considerable enhancement of knowledge and skill that takes place ranging
from. He is given inputs in Law (all three major Criminal Acts), Constitution,
investigation techniques, managing law and order, forensic science and medicine,
criminology apart from skills of weapon, explosive and riot handling, swimming, field
craft, operations and survival skills.
3.7.6 Government of India constituted a Committee in September 2005 to draft a new
Police Act to replace the Police Act of 1861. The Committee was chaired by Shri
Soli Sorabjee, former Attorney General. The committee had submitted a Model Police
Act in 2006 , which formed the basis of recommendations of the Apex court in the
Prakash Singh case 9 already mentioned in a previous section) and also a guiding
document for enactment of Police Acts in various states. As per the report, the rank
structure of Group ‘C’ posts in the Civil Police shall consist of Civil Police Officer
Grade II, Civil Police Officer Grade I, Sub Inspector and Inspector. The committee
also proposed that, “Every Civil Police Officers Grade II will undergo three years
intensive training before being posted to the Service as a stipendiary cadet, and will,
42
upon successful completion of training, have a graduation degree in police studies.
Their scales of pay and conditions of service shall therefore be commensurate with
ranks in other services under the state, which require similar levels of educational
qualifications and training”.
3.7.7 In view of the above discussion, the IPS association sincerely urges the pay
commission to consider adopting a similar approach as the Soli Sorabjee committee
and consider the following scales of pay, which essentially would involve stepping up
by one level in the grade pay.
Existing
Rank
Proposed
rank
Mode of recruitment
Proposed salary( as
per the present
scheme, subject to
Constable
Civil Police Direct Recruitment of class XII passed PB1Rs. 5200Officercandidates. Will be imparted three years 20020 + grade pay
Grade II
training after which a degree is awarded 2400/to them.
Head
Constable
Civil Police Time scale after 10 years of joining( the PB1Rs. 5200Officerpresent stage of MACP)
20020 + grade pay
Grade I
2800/-
3.7.8 Statistically, about 90% of CPMFs are constantly deployed in difficult duties, be it
Guarding borders, fighting insurgency or Left Wing Extremism (today probably the most
difficult conditions to work in), anti-riot duties, etc. About 50% of the Armed Forces have
their peace time duties on a rotation. Therefore, so far as the armed police and the CAPFs are
concerned, the association urges the commission that in the lines of armed forces, similar to
Military Special Pay (MSP). Police should also be given Police Special Pay.
43
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48
4.
STRUCTURAL ISSUES,
PROGRESSION ISSUES
PAY
PARITY
AND
CAREER
4.1 One of the terms of reference before the Commission is “To work out the framework for
an emoluments structure linked with the need to attract the most suitable talent to
Government service, promote efficiency, accountability and responsibility in the work
culture, and foster excellence in the public governance system to respond to the complex
challenges of modern administration and the rapid political, social, economic and
technological changes, with due regard to expectations of stakeholders, and to
recommend appropriate training and capacity building through a competency based
framework”. Keeping in view the complex governance challenges before the country and
in recognition of the critical contribution of the Indian Police Service in ensuring good
governance and effectively implementing police reforms, there is a need to identify and
rectify the issues that are causing impediments to attracting and retention of right talent in
the Indian Police Service and their career progression. The following paragraphs
highlight some of the concerns of the service officers and suggest recommendations to set
right the existing anomalies.
4.2 PARITY OF PAY WITH THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE
AND INDIAN FOREIGN SERVICE
4.2.1 Parity of pay with the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Foreign Service has
been consistently pleaded by officers of the Indian Police Service officers with
successive pay commissions but the same has not found favour with them.
Unfortunately, the reasons for turning down the request were never based on merit but
through direct acceptance of flawed arguments made by the other side on the basis of
specious premises. The approach was status-quoist, aimed at perpetuation of
colonial practices. Instead of addressing legitimate concerns expressed by IPS,
IFoS and the Central services on merits from an analytic perspective, the issue
was often erroneously examined with a colored view from a ‘inter service
rivalry’ perspective. Exclusive presence of officers only from the IAS among the
members from the services background in successive pay commissions and
denial of the status of member secretary to the secretaries of the commissions
whenever non IAS officers were posted, has further contributed to the
widespread perception of bias and influence from within. In view of the
importance of the issue not only to the All India Services but across the entire groupA central services, the association sincerely urges this commission to examine
threadbare the contentions being made and resolve it through a reasoned speaking
decision.
49
4.2.2 Before venturing into the parity argument, certain historical facts are being presented
below for the kind perusal of the Commission.
4.2.3 In the constituent assembly, when the clause for creating All India Services was
moved it was accepted with the observations of the president that “All-India Services
will be desirable, I take it, in cases where you wish to attract to the highest services
the best material that may be available in the country, and you will have to transgress
provincial boundaries for the purpose of attracting this material if you want such
material to take service whether under the Provincial Governments or under the
Federal Government40”. Further, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar had clarified to the Constituent
Assembly on Thursday, the 4th November 1948, “India’s Constitution provides that
there shall be an All India Service recruited on an all-India basis with common
qualifications, with uniform scale of pay and the members of which alone could be
appointed to these strategic posts throughout the Union 41 ”. This underscores two
points; that the makers of constitution considered all india services as a single class
and supported the need to attract the best talent for all the All India Services and not
just one service.
4.2.4 In the British India, the Secretary of State controlled the recruitment and service
conditions of the “Indian Civil Service” and the “Indian Police” and the article 244 of
the Government of India Act, 1935 reinforced the status and distinctively mentions
the services in addition to a third service, “The Indian Medical Service”. The origin of
the respective services, qualification requirements of aspirants and the method of
recruitment were different. Therefore there is a reason to support the argument that
the two services formed separate classes. However, the situation was altered after
adoption of the Constitution: Article 312 of the Constitution does not distinguish
among the All India Services and laid down a uniform process for the creation,
regulation of the recruitment, and laying down the conditions of service. Therefore in
the absence of any specific constitutional sanction of the further classification of the
All India Services, any such legal provision determining the service condition by
virtue of any act or rule shall have to necessarily pass the doctrine of reasonable
classification under article 14 of the Constitution. The All India Services Act 1951
was enacted for the purposes of creation and regulation of service conditions of the
All India Services. Rules framed under section 3 of the said Act, which are amended
for time to time, address issues concerning service conditions. While some of the
rules, such as conduct rules and rules on allowances and benefits are common to all
40
Debate
of
Tuesday,
the
29th
July
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol4p12.htm
41
Debate
of
Thursday,
the
4th
November
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1b.htm
50
1947
1948
which
which
can
can
be
be
accessed
at
accessed
at
the three services, some others such as the pay and cadre rules are different with each
service. Significantly, except the pay rules rest of the service specific rules are
identically worded.
4.2.5 Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India lays down the principle of equal pay for
equal work. The spirit of this article can be reasonably interpreted in the present
context that services and posts whose duties and responsibilities are comparable
should carry substantially same or comparable remuneration42.
4.2.6 After the adoption of the Constitution of India, since 1951 although officers for the
civil services were recruited through the same process by the Union Public Service
Commission, the services were divided , for the purposes of examination, into three
categories as below:
S.No.
1
2
3
Category
Category I Services
(IAS & IFS)
Category II Services
(IPS & Police Service
Class II of Union
Territories)
Category III Services
\ (Central Services Class I
and II)
Papers in Civil Services Examination
5 optional subjects & 3 compulsory subjects
2 optional subjects & 3 compulsory subjects
3
optional subjects &
compulsory subjects
5
4.2.7 The Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods (1976), popularly
known as the Kothari Commission recommended a common examination for all
civil services in all respects. In support of the above, they relied upon the
Administrative Reform Commission’s Report on Personnel Administration (1969)
and Committee on Police Training (Gore Committee) (1971). The Government
accepted the recommendations of the Commission and 1979 onwards, officers of the
IAS, IPS and Central Services Group A are being recruited through a common
examination.
42
This argument finds support from the second pay commission report (Chapter X; Section I; Para 8; page 103)
and the third pay commission report Chapter 11.
51
4.2.8 The IPS has consistently, especially post 1979 been among the most preferred service
in the Civil Service examination by the candidates. Statistics collected on the basis of
the data from the recent batches of the civil services examinations (from the table
below), indicates that these days candidates equally prefer IPS and the Indian Foreign
Service. If the artificial edge provided to IAS/IFS is removed, some of the candidates
who presently prefer to joining these services even though they have aptitude for
Police will definitely change their preference.
Service Preference Trends 2005-12
Year
No.
of
Candidat
Rank
of the
es Opting
Last
for
Genera
Central
l
No.
of Services
Candid
Candidat (other
ate
Intake es Opting than IFS)
Opting in IAS for IPS in in
for
Gener preferenc preferenc
IAS
al
e to IAS
e to IAS
No. of
Candida
tes
Rank of
the Last
Opting
General
for IPS
Candida
in
te
preferen
Intake
Opting
in IFS ce
to
for IFS
General IFS
No.
of
Candidat
es Opting
for Other
Central
Services
in
preferenc
e to IFS
2005
56
43
1
0
63
9
2
0
2006
50
35
0
0
75
10
9
1
2007
78
46
1
1
92
8
4
0
2008
81
50
1
1
103
12
7
2
2009
70
49
1
1
108
13
12
0
2010
83
56
0
0
140
17
21
2
2011
97
77
0
0
162
22
19
7
2012
116
76
0
0
134
14
4
1
4.2.9 Various commissions beginning from the Kothari Commission have consistently
advocated the principle of aptitude based choice of service selection. The Kothari
commission had recommended that the allotment of service may be done after the
final stage of their three-stage sequential process, i.e. Prelims, Mains and Post
Training exams.. The Alagh Committee, 2001 had also looked at the question of
52
allotment of services. To help selected candidates to make an informed choice of
service, it recommended that: “the selected candidates may be required to exercise
their service preferences only on the completion of the Foundation Course at
LBSNAA but the allocation would continue to be on the basis of the original merit list
prepared by the UPSC.” The 2nd Administrative reforms Commission, 2008 also
agreed with the recommendation of the Alagh Committee and recommended that
allotment of services to the successful candidates should be done only on the
completion of the Foundation Course, on the basis of the merit list prepared by the
UPSC. The Hota Committee, 2004 also recommended that aptitude and leadership
tests may be introduced for selection, and that probationer may be allowed one
month’s time after commencement of training to exercise their option for Services.
4.2.10 Position taken by pay commissions in the pre Kothari commission era on
relativities of pay scales among various services: For having a correct perspective
on the parity issue, it would be worthwhile to divide the successive pay commission
recommendations into two different periods, i.e. pre Kothari commission and post
Kothari commission. The pre independence commissions and the first three pay
commissions covered the pre Kothari Commission period and the position taken by
the respective commissions on relativity of pay scales is as under:
4.2.10.1
Lee Commission
4.2.10.2
At Paragraph 66 (page 41) of the First pay Commission report it was
acknowledged that the reasons for lower pay scales to the Indian Police Service in
comparison was earlier age of entry and lower educational qualifications. The
commission had advocated for common standards of recruitment with the Class-I
services and in consequence of the same pay structure with the class I services but
less than IAS/IFS, which were to be recruited through different standards.
4.2.10.3
While the Second Pay Commission (1957-59) did not discuss the pay
structure of the All India Services, but pursuant to the revision of pay scales for the
Central Services the Government looked into the matter and proposed pay scales for
the IPS as compared to Class I Central Services43.
4.2.10.4
The Third Pay Commission (1973) deliberated at length on the need to
attract capable talent for the IPS, acknowledged the job complexities and
43
Para 39; Chapter 11 (Page 117) of the Third Pay commission report
53
recommended parity with the IAS in the Junior Scale 44 . Although parity was not
maintained with the senior scale onwards, the commission had recommended for
increasing some allowances to ‘have the effect of reducing the existing disparity
between the IAS and IPS scales of pay’45. As regards relativities between the IAS and
the Class I services, the commission came to a conclusion that there was a case for
gradual narrowing down of the difference over the years depending upon the
prevailing circumstances46.
4.2.11 Flawed Justifications adopted by the Previous Pay Commissions to deny parity
with the IAS/IFS: Post the Kothari Commission report; officers of the Indian Police
Service from 1980 batch onwards are being recruited through a common examination
under uniform criteria for selection. However, successive pay commissions thereafter
have still denied the parity of pay among the services and continued to allow edge to
the IAS/IFS officers in their initial career. Some of the reasons quoted for
continuation of status quo are presented below, with the inherent flaws in the
justifications offered therein.
4.2.12 The Fourth Pay Commission (1986) made a passing mention of the suggestions
made by various services on the issue of parity 47 but evaded a discussion on the
subject. Instead, the commission recommended improvements in the career
progression aimed at reducing disparities. This is a flawed approach, particularly
since the third pay commission had elaborately dealt with the issue in an objective and
highly analytical manner and set a platform for visiting the issue by the future
commissions on the basis of relative importance of the respective services as per the
prevailing situation of governance priorities. Specific to the IPS, the commission
brought about measures to improve the career progression by merging ranks, as well
as by recommending induction of an IPS officer as member of cadre review
committee.
4.2.13 The approach of the Fifth Pay Commission was status quoist. Firstly the
commission erroneously equated performance in the civil service examination as the
criterion for pay determination and observed,“…It is not correct to compare the last
man of the IAS with the first man of the Central Services… the fact is that there is a
split-second difference between a gold medalist and the also ran in an Olympic
44
Para42-43; Chapter 11 (Page 118) of the Third Pay commission report
45
Para 54; Chapter 11 (Page 120) of the Third Pay commission report
46
Para 20; Chapter 11 (Page 113) of the Third Pay commission report
47
Para 12.9; Chapter 12 (Page 212) of the Fourth Pay commission report
54
race48”. In fact, just for preservation of the status quo, the commission went on to the
extent of recommending scrapping of the common civil service examination system
which was introduced with a public interest in mind49. If the commission’s logic of
examination performance as a pay determinator is accepted, all the candidates higher
on the merit list who joined the IPS in preference to IAS/IFS 50 should draw pay equal
to them and as a consequence their pay would be more than their other batch mates of
the IPS and as a further consequence this defeats the concept of ‘equal pay for equal
work’! In any case determination of emoluments is not an exercise of providing
incentive for examination performance, but as the third pay commission had rightly
approached issue, it should be based on the complexity and difficulty of the duties and
responsibilities of the job. Without discussing merits of the other arguments placed by
the service associations, the commission abruptly concluded by stating that “51As far
as the edge enjoyed by the IAS and IFS over the other Services is concerned, we do
not find any persuasive reason that would impel us to do away with the edge currently
enjoyed by them…”. Curiously, on the question of parity between IPS and Indian
Forest service the agument of parity were accepted.
4.2.14 The Sixth Pay Commission attempted to give a functional justification for retaining
the edge, but again the logic was flawed. The commission observed, “The role of IAS
is still very important in the overall scheme of governance. They have an important
coordinating, multi-functional and integrating role in the administrative framework
with wide experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in
Government. They hold important field level posts at the district level and at the
cutting edge at the start of their careers with critical decision making and crisis
management responsibilities. The leadership function, the strategic, coordinating and
integrative role at this level requires the best talent available. The existing position
would, therefore, need to be maintained. It will ensure that IAS officers near the
beginning of their career are given slightly higher remuneration vis-à-vis other
services and act as an incentive for the brightest candidates to enter this service. This
is essential as the initial postings of IAS officers are generally to small places, they
face frequent transfers and the pulls and pressures they have to stand upto early in
their career are much more intense. The slight edge in the initial stages of their
career would, to an extent, neutralize these problems 52”. It essentially laid down
48
Para 47.30 Chapter 47(page 519) of the fifth pay commission report
49
Para 47.36 (i)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth pay commission report
50
There a significant number of such candidates as the table in the following paragraph 3.7 would indicate
51
Para 47.36 (ii)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth pay commission report
52
Para 3.2.7 (Page 167) of the sixth pay commission report
55
three principles, i.e. i) The functions of coordination, integration and experience of
working across various levels in diverse areas in Government are considered superior
within the administrative framework; ii) Slight edge in the initial career helps in
attracting the brightest talent which is required for performing such roles; and iii)
Sight edge mitigates the hardships faced by the IAS officers in their initial careers and
also rewards the leadership roles exercised. The flaws in this line of argument will be
dealt with in the following paragraphs.
4.2.15 Arguments in support of parity in the initial career: As per the sixth pay
commission, the edge of pay between IPS and the IAS/IFS extends from senior scale
to the selection grade , i.e. from the fifth to fifteenth year of service. As explained
above the arguments behind the recommendations of the previous pay commissions
are flawed, they do not satisfy the test of reasonable classification in favour of IAS
/IFS and are liable to be rejected for use by the present pay commission. The
following are some arguments in favour of a full parity, for the kind consideration of
the commission which find strength from the extensive discussion made above.
4.2.16 For achieving objectives of governance, the multi dimensional specialist’s role of
an IPS is as important the multi dimensional generalist’s role of an IAS officer:
Ensuring Rule of Law, Public Order and Internal Security rank among top governance
priorities of any country, as absence of the same can threaten the very existence of the
nation. As already explained in chapter-I, the Police in India currently undertake these
responsibilities under extremely challenging circumstances. Successive pay
commissions have failed to recognise the importance of these issues, more often
accorded primacy to the departments concerned with the general administration,
development, revenue collection, finance and audit activities, and successively
ignored the fact that the working mandate of Police is highly complex and it occupies
a multi dimensional specialist’s role as compared to the multi dimensional
generalist’s role of an IAS and uni-dimensional specialized roles of an IFS officer.
Country needs best talent in equal measure in each of these services for achieving its
governance objectives.
4.2.17 It is incorrect to state that the Central Government attaches a premium to the
functions of coordination, integration and experience of working in diverse
areas, as a matter of policy: The 6th CPC succeeded in propagating a misconception
that it is the government’s policy that functions of coordination, integration and
experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in government are
considered superior within the higher echelons of the administrative framework, and
therefore it is necessary to attract the best possible talent towards the IAS, the job
profile of which matches the aforementioned description. On the contrary, the policy
of the Central Government for selecting officers for manning the senior posts is
56
through the Central Staffing Scheme53 and the stated policy of selection to the CSS
posts has been expressed as, “The raison d'etre is the Centre's need for fresh inputs at
senior levels in policy planning, formulation of policy and implementation of
programmes from diverse sources, viz., the All-India Services and the participating
organised Group 'A' Services”. Therefore, no such premium is attached to a particular
service by the government as a policy.
4.2.18 Persons recruited through the same examination for the comparable jobs should
be treated at par: Justifying the recommendation for having a common examination,
the Kothari Commission said “even though the professional expertise required of a
general administrator, or a diplomat or a police officer or a member of any of the
other Central Services vary, their general qualities of competence, traits of character
and sense of commitment necessarily have a common denominator. The same applies
to other qualities needed in an officer such as intellectual cohesion, articulation,
sense of awareness and purpose, integrity, depth of understanding, courage of
conviction and ability to respond to changing socio-economic and political
situations”. With the acceptance of recommendations of the Kothari commission,
Government had long back accepted the principle of common denominator of traits
for a civil service aspirant, and implemented a system uniform examination with
equal opportunity to the selected candidates to choose a particular service as per their
aptitude. Inducement into two specific services through offer of extra increments goes
against the policy.
4.2.19 Complete parity would spur the candidates with right kind of aptitude and
inclination to opt for the service: The requirements of modern day policing are
different from the conventional policing. While the erstwhile regimental police
administration model may, to some extent, still serve the needs of the conventional
policing requirements of maintaining Law & Order and handling of localized crime,
the same is highly inadequate to handle complex organised and economic crimes,
cyber crimes, transnational organised crimes and terrorism, human rights issues, mega
city policing, crimes against women and weaker sections etc. There is an increasing
need for attracting persons with right kind of aptitude and inclination to opt for the
service. The edge factor is driving even those candidates having aptitude for police
into the IAS, as a result not only is police at a loss but IAS is also saddled with
persons without any special aptitude for generalized administrator’s work. The service
preference trend table at para 3.1.2.6 demonstrate that in spite of adverse pay
53
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS
DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND TRAINING O.M. N0.36177194-EO(SM-I) dated the 5th January,
1996
57
conditions there are still some persons every year opting for IPS out of their passion
and special aptitude in preference to the other services , but instead of getting
rewarded they are being unfairly discriminated throughout their career. As already
submitted, if the impeding factors are removed, candidates will choose services as
per aptitude and will be motivated to perform better.
4.2.20 Adequate Compensation to mitigate the hardships and risks: IPS officers face
more risks in their career than any other civil service: As the table enclosed in
Annexure- shows, since Independence 30 members of the IPS have made the
supreme sacrifice in the service of the nation across all corners of the country. The job
of an IPS officer is not becoming any safer by day. In fact the young officers at the
level of SDPOs and SPs are increasingly being called upon to lead their men from the
front at grave risk to their life and well being. The government needs to have a
comprehensive HR policy in place that provides adequate incentives for those fighting
India’s domestic wars but this issue was sidelined by the 6th CPC. The arguments of
posting to smaller places, frequent transfers, pulls and pressure etc. are more
prominent in the case of IPS compared to IAS. Also, IFS officers, who are posted
either in foreign countries or in New Delhi, do not face such difficulties at all but they
are rewarded with same pay scales as IAS.
4.2.21 Changed dynamics of district administration has altered the traditional
relativities of DM and SP: The role of a district Magistrate in relation to District
Policing has witnessed a paradigm change over a period of time. As per the 1861
police act, the District Magistrate was the executive head of the administration and
administration of the police was vested in a Superintendent of police under the
general control and direction of such Magistrate. However, in the past decade, after
the model police act of the Soli Sorabjee committee was circulated by the government
and after the directives of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were significantly based on the
model act, 15 states have so far enacted their respective police acts and a majority of
them are drafted on the basis of the model act. Remaining states are at various stages
of legislative process. In these acts, the role of the district magistrate is that of a
coordinator and does not wield general control and direction on police, and as such
justification of an edge as a symbol of superior authority does not exist any longer.
These changes have taken place after the implementation of the recommendations of
the 6th cpc and therefore highly relevant for the consideration of the 7th cpc. As for
the argument of whether DM as a coordinator should draw more pay than all the
others posted in the district, the same was rarely the case even in the past, as it was a
fairly common experience that some of the ADMs and almost all of the district heads
of the technical departments were many a time drawing higher pay by virtue of their
longevity in service, and that had never affected the efficiency of coordination
functions.
58
4.3 ANOMALIES IN NOTIFICATIONS ISSUED FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE SIXTH PAY COMMISSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS ON EDGE IN
THE INITIAL CAREER TO IAS/IFS: While a discussion has been made in the
previous paragraphs regarding the edge allowed to two services in an unjustified manner
by the previous pay commissions, the association submits to the commission that glaring
anomalies were created in the fitment tables prepared for implementation of the
government decisions made in this regard, which caused greater benefit than what was
allowed to these services. In spite of representations from several services which found
support from the DOPT, the Ministry of finance, department of Expenditure has so far
resisted to set right the anomalies. The matter therefore deserves attention of the present
pay commission not only for prevention of carry forward of the irregularly awarded
inflated edge, but also to set right the previous pay commission fitment tables with a
retrospective effect.
4.3.1 Pursuant to the cabinet resolutions on the recommendations of the sixth pay
commission, the Government of India issued a Gazette Notification No 470 dated 29
August, 200854 notifying the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008. In
continuation, an Office Memorandum (F.No.1/1/2008-IC) dated 30th August, 200855
has been issued for fixation of salaries. As per the Gazette notification, two
increments were allowed in three grades, viz. senior time scale, junior administration
grade and the non functional selection grade (NFSG) in the form of two increments
@3% which will be adjusted in the pay band.
4.3.2 However, the actual implementation had resulted extra benefits, because the 2
additional increments given to the IAS at the STS grade in the running pay band PB3
and at the NFSG grade in the running pay band PB4 continue to get carried forward to
JAG grade in PB3 and SAG grade in PB4, respectively. In effect, IAS has been given
at least 2 additional increments over other services throughout their career. This
is against the Cabinet decision to limit the edge to middle levels and that too
limited to two increments.
4.3.3 In addition, certain further anomalies had crept in due to wrong fitment tables.
Following table shows the anomaly in fixation of pay in respect of pre-revised scale
of Rs.14300-400-18300 (S-24) which is Non Functional Selection Grade (NFSG) of
all services vis-à-vis pre-revised pay scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25) which is
NFSG of IAS:
54
May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcdecision.pdf
55
May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcmemo.pdf
59
Pre-revised
basic pay
Revised Pay in the Pay Band in case of Revised Pay in the Pay Band in
all other services
case of IAS
14300
37400
14700
37400
15100
38530
39690
15500
38530
39690
15900
39690
40890
4.3.4 From the above chart, it is clear that IAS had been given 2 extra increments over
and above the 2 year edge they already had built into the scale S-25. Hence, if an
IAS officer got into the NFSG on 1.1.2006, his pay in pay band was fixed at 39690,
whereas the pay of an officer of other service gets fixed at Rs 39690 after completion
of four years of service,. Thus, the edge increases to 4 increments at the start of
PB-4. This was not the decision of the Cabinet. An IAS officer drawing a basic pay
of Rs 15100 will get Rs 39690 as per the fitment table, whereas officers of other
services drawing the same basic pay of Rs 15100 will get Rs 38530. There cannot be
any difference in fixation of equal pay of the two NFSGs with equal grade pay. It
may be noted that in PB-3, the pre-revised pay of Rs 10650 in S-20, which is 2
increments ahead of starting pay of Rs 10000 in S-19, has been fixed at the same level
that is indicated by the fitment table of S-19 at Rs 19810. Similarly, the pre-revised
pay of Rs 12750 in S-22, which is 2 increments ahead of starting pay of Rs 12000 in
S-21, has been fixed at the same level that is indicated by the fitment table of S-21, Rs
23720.Thus, in PB-4, a pay of Rs 15100 in S-24 must be fixed at the same level
that is indicated by the fitment table of S-25, i.e. 39690. In order to fix pay in
compliance of the decision of the Cabinet, the fitment tables should be modified
as suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.
4.3.5 The following table shows the relativities in fixation of pay in respect of pre-revised
scale of Rs.16400-450-20000 (S-26) for Conservator of Forests for IFS/DIG of Police
for IPS and other CPMFs/Brigadiers of Armed Forces/SEs of Engineering
Services/Scientific Officers Grade ‘F’, etc vis-à-vis pre-revised NFSG of IAS pay
scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25):
Pre-revised basic Revised Pay in the Pre-revised basic Revised Pay in the
pay in the pay Pay Band for NFSG pay in the pay scale Pay
band
for
scale of Rs.15100- for IAS
of Rs.16400-450- Conservator/
60
400-18300 (S-25)
for NFSG for IAS
20000 (S-26) for DIG/Brig/SE, etc
Conservator/
DIG/Brig/SE, etc
15100
39690
15500
39690
15900
40890
16300
40890
16400
39690
16700
42120
16850
40890
17100
42120
17300
40890
17500
43390
17750
42120
17900
43390
18200
42120
4.3.6 From the above chart, it is clear that the basic pay of Rs.16400/- for
IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the basic pay of
Rs.15100/- for IAS has been fixed at the same stage though there was a difference of
Rs.1300/- at initial stage itself in the pre-revised scales. The basic pay of Rs.16400/for IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the lower basic
pay of Rs.16300/- for IAS has been fixed as Rs.40890/-. In the pre-revised pay,
officer in NFSG of IAS, even after three increments, was at a lower basic pay (Rs
16300) than IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc (Rs 16400). However, in the new fitment table,
the officer of IAS on entry to NFSG will get the same pay of Rs 39690 as a
Conservator of IFS/DIG of IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc. This has adversely impacted the
existing relativities between the services. Thus, the Super time Scale-I of
IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been downgraded even below NFSG of IAS. This was
neither the recommendation of the Pay Commission, nor decision of the Cabinet.
Thus, the fitment tables should be modified as suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.
4.3.7 Suggested Fitment table: The following fitment table is suggested to be worked by
the seventh pay commission as a starting point of working out the recommendations,
instead of compounding the patent errors committed by the earlier pay commissions.
Pre-revised
Revised
Pre-revised Proposed
basic pay in Pay in the basic pay in Revised
61
Pre-revised
Proposed
basic pay in Revised
the pay scale Pay Band
of Rs.15100400-18300
(S-25) NFSG
for IAS
the
pay Pay in Pay the pay scale Pay in the
scale
of Band
of Rs.16300- Pay band
Rs.14300450-20000
400-18300
(S-26) for IFS
(S-24)
/IPS/SE/
Selection
Brigadier, etc
Grade for
other
services
14300
37400
14700
38530
15100
39690
15100
39690
15500
39690
15500
39690
15900
40890
15900
40890
16300
40890
16300
40890
16700
42120
16700
42120
16400
42120
17100
42120
17100
42120
16850
42120
17500
43390
17500
43390
17300
43390
17900
43390
17900
43390
17750
43390
18300
44700
18300
44700
18200
44700
18700
44700
18700
44700
18650
44700
19100
46050
19100
46050
19100
46050
19500
46050
19500
46050
19550
46050
20000
47440
20450
47440
4.4 MISINTERPRETATION OF TWO YEARS GAP BETWEEN IAS AND
OTHER SERVICES TO BE RECTIFIED
4.4.1 In order to mitigate the hardships due to slow promotions in some of the Group-A
services, the sixth pay commission has provided that; “The Government should,
accordingly, consider batch-wise parity while empanelling and/or posting at Centre
between respective batches of IAS and other organised Group A services with the gap
62
being restricted to two years. Whenever any IAS officer of a particular batch is posted
in the Centre to a particular grade carrying a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3
or PB-4 , grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to the officers belonging
to batches of organised Group A services that are senior by two years or more should
be given by the Government56”. The facility was subsequently extended to IPS and
IFS in the states and the centre. What was introduced as stagnation mitigation
measure has in practice being misinterpreted as a mandatory gap of two years
between IAs and the rest of the services. It has been experienced many a time that
even when vacancies exist and the officers of a particular batch meet the minimum
qualifying service requirement, the promotions are stalled unless two years junior to
them in the IAS get first promoted. This has no only created demoralization among
the officers, but such a practice is against the public interest since vacancies remain
unfilled. The commission should address this issue and clarify that the two years
gap is the maximum and not the minimum gap , and further clarify that if the
vacancies exist and the pool of officers meeting the eligibility criteria are
available, promotions should not be stalled showing the two year gap.
4.5 INTRA SERVICE PARITY
4.5.1 As per the existing policy of cadre allotment, IPS officers are allotted different state
cadres. While the conditions of pay and service are uniform across the cadres, in some
cadres promotions are delayed compared to others and the gap sometimes extends to
more than two years. The delays are often caused due to faulty cadre management,
sluggish response of the state home departments etc. on which the officers do not
have any control .This results in demoralization of the officers of the affected cadres,
who suffer because of no fault from their side. In the sixth pay commission the
concept of grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to reduce the inter service
gap, extending the same principle, the commission may recommend that Whenever
any IPS officer of a particular batch is posted in a state cadre to a particular grade
carrying a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3 , PB-4 or HAG , grant of higher
pay scale on non-functional basis to the IPS officers of the same batch belonging to
the other cadres or those serving in the centre.
4.6 REMOVAL OF THE GRADE PAY 8900/- IN THE PB4 RS37400-67000/IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT UNIFORMITY IN THE CAREER
PROGRESSION WITH THE OTHER CIVIL SERVICES
4.6.1 The super time scale for the IAS/IFS and Central Services has been uniformly fixed at
Pay-Band - 4: Rs.37400-67000; plus Grade Pay Rs.10000, where as in the case of IPS
56
Para 3.3.12 page 173 6 cpc report
63
and the IFoS the same has been split into two levels, i.e. Grade pay Rs 8900/(DIG/Conservator of Forests) and the Grade pay Rs 10000/-(IG/Chief Conservator of
forests). Historically this factor was a major impediment in the promotion prospects
of IPS/IFS officers.
4.6.2 The Police ranks were traditionally equated with the corresponding ranks. The rank of
DIG was equated with the rank of Brigadier in status, and his duties in the states
primarily included supervision of policing in the ranges. Earlier there were two levels
of DIGs, and in their endeavor to reduce the total number of pay scales, the fourth pay
commission had amalgamated the levels, but the exercise was of adverse consequence
to the service, as the amalgamation was into the lower of the two levels. On the
contrary, the SAG grades of the Central Services, which had also existed in two
levels, were merged into a single level, which was at higher of the two. The fifth pay
commission had formally given approval for creation of the Additional Director
General rank raising the supervisory ranks above the SP into four, i.e. DIG.IG.ADG
and DG. Rank proliferation continued with the sixth pay commission, when the DG
rank was split into two levels, i.e. HAG+ level and Apex scale.
4.6.3 From time to time, IPS association has been demanding for abolition of the rank of
DIG. When the matter came up before the fifth pay commission, the commission has
declined the request on the grounds of l) functional utility of the scale as head of the
range; and ii) traditional relativities between the armed forces and the police57. The
matter again came up before the sixth pay commission. The Commission,
accordingly, recommends that the grade o be retained on similar grounds as
mentioned in the fifth pay commission report. However, the commission had left the
option for reconsideration on the issue, by stating that, ” the government may,
however, review the position in future in case functional justification for continuing
with this grade ceases to exist completely58”.
4.6.4 The association recommends for abolition of level-I of the suppertime scale of the
IPS having grade pay of Rs 8900/- and direct promotion from the NFSG to the
Super time scale having grade pay Rs 10, 000/-, as is the case with the IAS/IFS and
other central Services. In order to achieve parity among the All India services, the
scale should be started at 16th year of service as in the IAS. For implementing this
recommendation, half of the existing cadre posts of DIG can be upgraded to the rank
of IG and the rest half can be downgraded to the rank of SP (NFSG). Typically IPS
officers spend four years time as DIGs, and for the purpose of avoiding reversions, a
57
Para 47.46 page 523 of the 5th cpc report
58
Para 3.2.9 page 1686th cpc report
64
gradual up gradation /down gradation exercise may be undertaken over a period of
time. The justification for the abolition of scale is presented below:
4.6.5 Reduction of levels in Police does not adversely affect the functionality: In the
IPS, majority of the posts (more than 80%) are with the states. In a democracy charter
of responsibilities of the armed forces and the civil police are vastly different and their
mutual interaction is very minimal, except in the Border States or disturbed states.
Therefore relativity argument with the armed forces does not stand the scrutiny of
ground realities. Coming to the aspect of functional utility, range level supervision is
an important component of the state police functioning. In the distant past, IGP was
head of state police and DIG was the only intermediate rank between the district
superintendent of police and the IGP. Therefore only a DIG rank officer could have
head the police range. However, at present there are three intermediate ranks between
the head of the state police, i.e. DGP and the District Superintendent of Police- These
are ADG, IG and the DIG. Therefore, it is not mandatory that only a DIG rank officer
should head the range- the function can be performed by the IG as well. In fact such a
system has already been successfully implemented in various states, as observed by
the commission itself. Further, the IAS counter part of DIG is the Divisional
Commissioner, who is an officer equivalent to IG in police. Usually, the District
Collector and the Superintendent of Police are of comparable seniority and most of
the time they would be at similar stages of the time scales. Therefore, it is logical to
extend similar working relation at the division /range level.
4.6.6 Abolition of DIG posts in the states will provide more hands for the field level
posts: At present the eligibility level for promotion to the rank of DIG is 14 ears. IPS
officers typically serve for more than 30 years and 14 years is not even the mid-point
of their career. Therefore, allowing them to serve as SsP for at least two more years
will benefit the system, with more number of experienced officers available for field
postings.
4.6.7 Uniformity of ranks across the civil services is in the interest of harmonious
working relations in the states: Although officers of the rank of DIG are placed at a
lesser grade pay than their IAS counter parts in the Super time scales and end up
getting promoted later to the equivalent rank of IG, the fact that the post is termed as
super time scale and the IPS officers usually get promoted in their 14th year of service
to that scale, a lot of heart burn is experienced by their IAS counterparts and in the
past this had triggered a race for reducing the qualifying service. In fact, in the year
2008 the qualifying service for super time scale was reduced to 14 years for the IAS,
but after realizing the folly that officers are getting promoted at a very early stage of
their career which is depriving the system of the capable hands for field postings, the
earlier position of 16 years eligibility criterion was restored. Uniformity of ranks
65
between the IAS and IPS therefore, is in the interest of harmonious working relations
in the states.
4.6.8 Functionality in the Central Armed Police Forces(CAPF) can be maintained by
retaining the rank of DIG at grade pay of Rs. 8700/-: IPS being an All India
Service, it is expected that an appropriate number of posts are created at the centre
for enabling officers to come on deputation. At present there are about 120 posts of
DIG earmarked for IPS officers in the CAPFs. As the CAPFs are organized similar to
Army pattern, relativities with the armed forces have a functional utility in
maintaining inter organizational coordination. Therefore the rank of DIG may be
allowed to remain intact for the purposes of central deputation.
4.6.9 Retention of DIG posts in centre with lesser grade pay does not conflict with the
service rules: The practice of IPS officers of the rank of DIG and even the IAS
officers already promoted in their cadres to the grade pay of 10,000/- join as directors
(for which the qualifying service is 14 years, same as for DIG), in the central staffing
scheme with a reduced grade pay of Rs 8700/-. Having IPS officers join CAPFs with
grade pay of Rs 8700/- does not set any new precedent in the government of India. All
of the central deputation posts are non cadre posts and their pay is regulated by
schedule II under rules 10 and 11 of the IPS (pay) rules as amended from time to time.
Therefore a simple amendment of the schedule II-B would suffice to implement the
changes, and that is not a big issue since the pay rules any way get amended after
every pay commission. Now coming to inter personal relations between the IPS
officers with Rs 8700/- grade pay and their CAPF colleagues with Rs 8900/- grade
pay, firstly the difference is very minimal, and secondly, there are precedents
available in the states where IAS and IPS officers posted in the districts get lesser pay
even compared to not only their state service colleagues but even their subordinates.
4.6.10 There will be no additional financial burden on the exchequer: At present the
level jump between DIG and IG is Rs 1100/- . Also, it is being proposed to upgrade
only half of the existing posts of DIG, which are roughly 250 cadre posts and 26%
more state deputation reserve/ex-cadre posts. Therefore the financial burden of the
exercise is miniscule minimum.
4.7 ABOLITION OF THE HAG+ SCALE:
4.7.1 The DG rank in the IPS now carries two pay scales; i) Apex Scale of Rs.80, 000
(fixed) which is allowed to DGs of most of the CPOs, IB, CBI, RAW etc. and one DG
in each State who is HoPF (Head of Police Force); and ii) HAG+ Scale of Rs.75, 50080,000 for other DGs in the States and some CPOs.
66
4.7.2 Due to the classification of DGs into Apex scale and the HAG+ scale several
difficulties have arisen while implementation in the states resulting in several
petitions in the courts/tribunals. Quite often selection to the post of HoPF is not done
on the basis of seniority, selection process is not transparent and HoPFs are
sometimes transferred out without adhering to the two years tenure rule. The legal
challenges arise when: an apex scale DGP (HoPF) is removed to a post carrying the
inferior HAG+ scale and his pay scale is reduced from apex to HAG+. This
technically amounts to demotion without disciplinary proceedings; and when a junior
DG is posted to the apex scale post, ‘superseding’ the senior DG who languishes in
the inferior scale. This results in subversion of the NBR (Next below Rule). The
aforementioned situation has resulted in a plethora of litigations all over the country
against the Govt as well as against the ‘superseded’ officers. Government has so far
not one a single case.
4.7.3 The Government erroneously insists that grant of apex scale to one of the DGs is not a
promotion though it is a superior scale. It ignores the fact that the status/rank of an
officer is defined solely by the Pay Scale. The following facts clearly prove the
superiority of Apex Scale over HAG+ scale:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
In the ‘Order of Precedence’, an Apex Scale holder precedes all the others;
In respect of official residential accommodation, Apex Scale officers are
entitled to the highest category type houses in Delhi. No such priority is given
to the HAG+ officers who are placed in the general waiting list;
CPOs like CRPF and BSF are headed by a DG in the Apex Scale. Under him
are two more DGs designated as special DGs to distinguish them from the
head DG. They are placed in the HAG+ scale. They are directly subordinate to
the DG holding the Apex Scale;
Officers who retire from the HAG+ scale draw significantly draw fewer
pensions compared to their colleagues who retire in the Apex scale.
4.7.4 Vide Notification No. G.S.R 692(E) dated 27th September, 2008 of Government of
India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions regarding the
recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission dealing with Indian Police
Service (Pay) Rules, 2007, the post of Director-General of Police as head of police
force was identified and given a higher pay scale [the Apex Scale of Rs 80,000/(fixed)] while the rest of the DGs were given a lower pay scale of HAG+ of Rs
75,500-80,000, as extracted below:Rule 3(D) (iii) Apex Scale: Rs 80000 (fixed), Grade Pay: nil (by up gradation of one
existing post of Director General of Police as head of police force in each State cadre
67
[with effect from the date of issue of notification of the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules,
2008].
Thus, on the one hand, the Govt says DGP (HoPF) is not a promotion/up gradation while,
on the other hand, it clearly describes the post as ‘up gradation’. These contradictions
remain unexplained by the Govt till date and no corrective action has been taken so far.
4.7.5 Factually speaking, the use of the word “up gradation” in the above amendment is
legally untenable, as it goes against the Cabinet decision taken vide GOI Gazette
Notification No.1/1/2008-IC dated 29.8.08. This notification is regarding the
implementation of the accepted Recommendations of the Sixth CPC. It mentions
about "up gradation" to the Apex Scale of Rs. 80,000/- (Fixed) only of the additional
posts of two DGs of CPOs, namely, DGs of SSB and ITBP. There is no mention of
the "up gradation" of the posts of DGPs of States / HoPF to the Apex Scale. In the
Schedule, it specifically mentions that in each State, one of the DGPs, who is the
HoPF, will be placed (as against upgraded) in the Apex Scale. It is to be noted that
the GOI (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961, particularly Schedule II, clearly
forbids any Ministry, Minister and/or Department etc from superseding, amending,
modifying or changing any decision of the Union Cabinet. Only the Union Cabinet is
empowered to do so. It clearly proves that the use of the word “up gradation” in the
above DOPT Notification is illegal.
4.7.6 After the revision of the pay scale of the post of DGP (HoPF), there is no additional
qualification added for appointment to that post nor there is any change at all in the
responsibilities, powers and functions of the post which the previous incumbents did
not exercise. The so called up gradation is absolutely illusory, a mere re-designation
of a particular post in the rank of DGP with a higher pay scale. Whenever there is
change in the power structure in the State Government, very often, the incumbent
DGP (HoPF) is removed to an innocuous post. If the argument of the Government
about up gradation is accepted, then how can an officer holding a superior post are
transferred to an inferior post without framing charges against him for disciplinary
action? How can a person be demoted without any departmental proceedings? This
only confirms that all posts of DG are equal and they exercise/draw powers from an
equivalent post. What logic, therefore, can there be to discriminate between DGs and
allow the benefit of higher pay to only one DG? The facts are clear: there is no up
gradation of the post but merely up gradation of the pay scale of the same post.
4.7.7 In view of the above reasons, and also keeping in view the fact that government has
been consistently losing all the cases on this issue, the commission may consider
confirming the principle that discrimination between DGs is arbitrary and all the DGs
are entitled to the same Apex Scale.
68
4.8 REINFORCING THE SPIRIT OF ALL INDIA CHARACTER OF THE
SERVICE THROUGH FACILITATING ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION OF IPS IN THE CENTRAL DEPUTATIONS
4.8.1 As per the scheme of the All India Services, officers serve both in the states and the
centre. For facilitating such movement, a central deputation reserve at the scale of
40% of the cadre posts has been created in the state cadres. As per the present strength
of IPS, there is a requirement of 1022 posts for fulfilling the central deputation
obligations as per the cadre rules. At present there are only 569 posts (just a little
more than 50% of the CDR quota) available with the CAPFs/CPOs for deputation of
IPS officers. Therefore there is a need to identify more posts where IPS officers can
be inducted at the centre. It is also relevant to mention here that between the years
1999- 2003, intake in the service was drastically reduced to 30-35 officers per year
implement a downsizing strategy. Therefore states were highly reluctant to spare the
officers for central deputations since there was huge shortage of officers at the field
level, and as a consequence there was not much pressure on the central deputation
posts in the ranks of SP and DIG. However, subsequent cadre reviews had realized
the need to increase the number of officers in order to tackle the difficult internal
security challenges, and as a result the intake in the past 10 years has sharply
increased. Between the years 2005-2013 was as much as 1189. These trends indicate
that in the near future there will be significant pressure on the central deputation
posts. Also, the profile of the officers inducted into the IPS indicates that most of
them are highly educated with professional degrees59. This, added with the exposure
to complex governance challenges which they receive in their initial career in the state
police grooms them to develop a rich domain knowledge on public order, security,
human resource management, regulatory and enforcement functions, handling natural
disasters, elections and major events etc. will make them suitable candidates for
competing to the central staffing scheme posts. Therefore, in addition to maintaining
the present strength of earmarked posts in CPOs/CAPFs there is also a need to create
a level playing field for enabling IPS officers to compete in the open competition
posts, including the Central Staffing Scheme for reinforcing the spirit of All India
Service character of the IPS as well as gainfully utilizing the domain expertise of the
IPS officers in the Central Government Ministries/departments.
4.9 REMOVING INEQUITIES IN THE CENTRAL STAFFING SCHEME
4.9.1 The central staffing scheme has been existing for almost the past 50 years in the
present form. Postings under the central staffing scheme are done as per the
59
The education profile of the IPS Probationers who received training at the SVP National Police Academy in
the recent past has been:
69
instructions contained in the DOPT office memorandum no. 36/77/94 – EO (SM I),
dt. 5th January, 1996. As already submitted earlier, as per the stated policy, “The
raison d'etre is the Centre's need for fresh inputs at senior levels in policy planning,
formulation of policy and implementation of programmes from diverse sources, viz.,
the All-India Services and the participating organised Group 'A' Services”. If one
goes by the letter, it provides equal opportunity for selection to 37 participating
services and is mutually beneficial to service cadres and Government of India.
However, in operation the system secures neither. The sixth pay commission aptly
summed up the situation in its report as “While the system appears to be very equitous
on paper, it is non-transparent and does not inspire confidence amongst the
concerned officers about its fairness60”.
4.9.2 In addition to the opaqueness of the process, there is ample evidence to suggest that it
is highly iniquitous and does not value domain expertise of various competing
services. The following table explains the breakup of the officers at various points of
time.
1972#
Level
1984#
1995#
2010@
AIS* Ce CS AIS*
ntr S
al
_G
rou
pA
Cent
ral
_Gro
up A
Secy.
30
15
0
36
25
0
71
21
0
69
2
5
1
13
AS
20
11
1
27
38
1
72
12
0
44
0
0
0
3
JS
86
60
23
135
50
1
285
44
4
198
7
3
3
60
CS AIS
*
S
Cent
ral
_Gro
up A
CS IAS I
S
P
S
IF IFt Centr
S S
al
_Grou
p
A
and
CSS
# Based on the fifth CPC report (page 470); @Based on the Centre for Good
Governance Report61.
4.9.3 Although no separate figures are available in respect of the IPS and IFoS for the years
of 1972, 1984 and 1995 it will not be inaccurate to assume that they had accounted for
60
Para 6.1.7 page No. 355 of the 6th cpc report
61
survey on Status of the civil services in India, conducted by the Centre for Good Governance in
2010, commissioned by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and
Pensions, Department of Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances
70
less than 10% . The trends clearly indicate that there is a skewed distribution in favour
of a single service, and that over a period of time, instead of becoming more
egalitarian, the distribution is getting more skewed.
4.9.4 Much of the unfairness of the system could be attributed to a flawed Process of
Empanelment. Annual exercise of drawing suitability lists of eligible officers from the
participating services, known as ‘empanelment’ has been the biggest bottleneck for
non-IAS officers to get appointments under the Central Staffing Scheme. The
following table shows the service wise status of empanelment. Huge gap among
services in empanelment is highly unusual and this causes serious doubts in the minds
of the officers regarding the fairness of the system.
Junior most Batch empanelled for Secretary, Special Secretary & Secretary
Equivalent
1972#
Level
1984#
1995#
2010@
AIS* Ce CS AIS*
ntr S
al
_G
rou
pA
Cent
ral
_Gro
up A
Secy.
30
15
0
36
25
0
71
21
0
69
2
5
1
13
AS
20
11
1
27
38
1
72
12
0
44
0
0
0
3
JS
86
60
23
135
50
1
285
44
4
198
7
3
3
60
CS AIS
*
S
Cent
ral
_Gro
up A
CS IAS I
S
P
S
IF IFt Centr
S S
al
_Grou
p
A
and
CSS
4.9.5 Unfairness of the present system has been a matter of scrutiny of several commissions
in the past. The 2nd Administrative Commission has remarked, “The Commission is of
the view that the present procedure for empanelment of officers to the level of
Joint/Additional Secretary and above needs to be replaced by a transparent, objective
and a fair placement system62.” The Commission recommended that an independent
‘Authority’ should deal with matters of assignment of domains, preparing panels for
posting of officers at the level of SAG and above, fixing tenures for various posts,
deciding on posts which could be advertised for lateral entry 63 etc. Similar
recommendations were also made by the Surindernath Committee (2003) to review
62
63
Chapter 9, para 9.3.8, page 204
Chapter 9, para 9.7, pages 210-11
71
and make recommendations with regard to the present systems of performance
appraisal, promotions and lateral movement in respect of the All India Services and
other Group A services; and by the P.C.Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms
(2004). The sixth pay commission observed that, “ The Commission is fully aware
that in theory these posts are already open to all AIS as well as Central Group A
Services., However, in practice, the selection procedure for these posts has been made
so non-transparent that the credibility of the entire selection procedure is now being
questioned. The pressing need is to ensure a selection process that is open, transparent
and gives equitable chance to all the eligible officers64”.
4.9.6 After comprehensively dealing with the issue, Sixth pay commission recommended a
new system of appointment, vide paras 6.1.8 to 6.1.12 of the report as per which all
the posts filled by deputation in the Senior Administrative Grade and Higher
Administrative Grade should be filled through an open selection process conducted by
an independent agency. The function of the independent agency should be done by the
UPSC by involving few outside experts in the relevant field. The commission has also
recommended for doing away with preparation of panels and observed that, “for
officers belonging to AIS, appointment of any one officer of the service in any State
cadre in the scale attached to the posts in SAG or HAG, as the case may be, would be
a sufficient condition for consideration of all the officers of a particular year of
allotment”.
4.9.7 Unfortunately, the DOPT did not act further on the recommendations, and continued
with the earlier system. As a consequence, huge frustration has set in the cadres of
IPS, IFoS and Group A central services. This pay commission may therefore address
this important issue.
64
Para 6.1.9 page 356 6 cpc
72
ANNEXURE
List of IPS martyrs who laid down their lives in the line of duty
Sl No Name of the Martyr IPS Officers Batch Cadre
1
S/Shri
G.S.
Arya
1950
UP
2
L.B. Sewa
1958
A&M
3
K Panchapagesan
1974
UT
4
A.S. Atwal
1964
Punjab
5
V.K. Mehta
1971
WB
6
A.K. Arora
1984
RAJ
7
A.S. Brar
1979
Punjab
8
K.R.S. Gill
1982
Punjab
9
Sital Dass
1976
Punjab
10
Vandan Malik
1987
M/T
11
Gobind Ram
1975
Punjab
12
Daulat Singh
1976
A&M
13
R.P. Verma
1974
Bihar
14
Ajit Singh
1968
Punjab
15
K.S. Vyas
1974
A.P.
16
G. Paradesi Naidu
1987
A&M
17
Ved Prakash
1989
Nagaland
18
Raman Prakash
1990
Gujarat
19
R.N.Hopingson
1992
M/T
20
Ravi Kant Singh
1987
A&M
73
21
C. Umesh Chandra
1990
AP
22
Ajay Kumar Singh
1995
Bihar
23
KC Surendra Babu
1997
Bihar
24
A.P. Thang Thuam
1979
M/T
25
PK Lohia
1993
A&M
26
Jaswinder Singh
1990
Orissa
27
Mohammad Amin Bhat
1990
J&K
28
T. Harikrishna,
1983
Karnatak
29
SK Deb
1973
A&M
30
Narendra Kumar
2009
MP
74
5. PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF ALLOWANCES,
ADVANCES AND INCENTIVES
5.1 Submissions being made by the association in respect of Allowances , Advances and
Incentives for police personnel are based on following basic principles:
 Reasonable expenses incurred in the course of police work should be promptly
reimbursed.
 Police duty often places officers in extenuating and difficult circumstances. In
such cases, the Government should attempt to provide relief to the affected
officer through appropriate monetary compensation.
 Police officers should neither benefit nor suffer a loss from the payment of
allowances.
 Allowances should remain stagnant and net value should not erode with inflation
 Advances should be realistic with respect to market trends
 Incentives should be paid to police officers to attract right talent and motivate
them to perform better
5.2
EXAMPLES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM: Before discussing the issue
it is submitted that two practices that are followed in the United Kingdom and not yet
adopted in India in India deserve some attention.
5.2.1
Overtime Allowance: Unpredictable demands on a police officer’s time mean
that he may have to work beyond his ordinary scheduled hours. A police officer is subject
to restrictions on his private life, one of which is the obligation to obey an order to return
to duty. In UK, the Sheehy review of police pay in 1993 resulted in the buy-out of
overtime from the inspecting rank that is a rise in the basic pay of inspectors and chief
inspectors in exchange for the abolition of their entitlement to overtime pay. But, the
Winsor report (2011-12) concluded that it is important to ensure that police officers are
being adequately paid for the role they undertake, which in some cases requires the regular
working of overtime. The report also recommended for police staff double over time rates
for working on public holidays while recommending plain over time rates for additional
working on Sundays.
5.2.2
Allowance for Un-Social Hours: The Winsor report also concludes that
working unsocial hours (8:00pm to 6:00am) is an accepted part of life for a police officer,
depending on the type of role to which he has been deployed. To offset this effect, based
on the 1978 recommendation of Edmund-Davies a supplementary amount of nine per cent
was initially incorporated into the basic pay of all officers up to and including chief
inspectors. Winsor report (2011-12) recommended additional 10% in pay for each
unsocial hour worked by officers while recommending payment to police staff at the rate
of 100% uplift in pay (double time) for each unsocial hour worked.
5.2.3
On-Call Allowance: The unpredictable nature of policing requires forces to
ensure the availability of their workforces to enable them to respond to events and other
operational requirements. This generally translates into a requirement for a certain
percentage of officers, whilst off-duty, to remain on-call in case they are needed. Officers
may be put on-call during their rest days, on public holidays or on annual leave, depending
on the needs of the force. When an officer of any rank or role receives notification that he
must return to duty, during rest period or leave, he is required to comply. In UK, Winsor
75
report (2011-12) recommended for a nationally determined on-call allowance of £15 per
day for all officers in Federated ranks who are placed on-call following 12 preceding
instances in the year.
5.3 SUBMISSIONS IN RESPECT OF ALLOWANCES
5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.3.4
5.3.5
5.3.6
5.3.7
A number of allowances are payable to Central Government employees at present,
which can be categorized into those which are common to all the services, and those
which are specific to the police service. submissions in respect of the commonly
granted allowances, in the context of police officers, are presented below:
As per 6th CPC recommendations all allowances automatically increase by 25% for
every 50% increase in DA. This increase is not commensurate with inflation to retain
the value of allowances granted. Hence, it is proposed that all allowances should be
neutralized with the DA, and enhanced whenever DA crosses 25%.
Travelling Allowance – The food bills component of Daily Allowance should be
uniform across all slabs (based on grade pay) as the nutritional requirements of
individuals are similar irrespective of pay scales / grade pay.
Special Duty Allowance (in all the districts declared as affected with Militancy/
LWE areas??-write up needed)
Children Education Allowance – As the cost of education is considerably higher in
metros and other cities in comparison to smaller towns, it is proposed that CEA
should be granted based on classification of various cities/ towns (as is the case of
HRA) where the employee is posted. CEA initially granted by 6th CPC was Rs. 12000
per annum, which has increased to Rs. 18000 per annum now, consequent to two
increases in DA by 50% between 2006 and 2014. This increase is insufficiently
keeping pace with increase in cost of education especially in metros and bigger cities.
Hence it is proposed for CEA to be granted as a percentage of pay of the employee. It
can initially be pegged at 10% ,7%, and 5% of the basic pay +grade pay of employee
per month per child up to two children in class X,Y, and Z cities respectively , subject
to a minimum of 20,000/- per year per child.
Transport Allowance: Entire amount of transport allowance should be exempted
from taxation and the allowance should be indexed with petrol prices and not with the
D.A. rates, to render it realistic.
Deputation Allowance: At present deputationists transferred from the same station
are paid a reduced allowance of 5%. In some of the central police organisations like
CBI/NIA, induction of officers on deputation with local police works to the advantage
of the organisaiton and reduced Deputation Allowance works to the mutual
disadvantage of the employee and the organisation. Therefore same rate of deputation
allowance should be applied in all the cases.
Deputation Allowance for the All India Service Officers: CDTA as a percentage of
the minimum basic pay of the post has considerably diminished over a period of time
for the IPS officers. Between 1948 to 1986 it came down from 50% to 16% of the
basic pay,, in case of officers of the rank of SP and in almost similar proportion in
case of the rest. As already explained earlier, in order to reinforce the All India
Service character of the IAS,IPS and IFS and to ensure that the Central Deputation
reserve is filled up, the government should create sufficient incentives to attract
officers to serve in the central deputation. At present the comparative incentive
structure in the states and the centre discourages officers to come on deputation.
Keeping this in view, it is recommended that CDTA rates for All India Services may
76
5.4
5.5
be enhanced to 20% subject to the ceiling that the aggregate of pay in the pay band
and Deputation (Duty) Allowance/Central (Deputation on Tenure) Allowance does
not exceed the starting point of the HAG scale.
ADVANCES: Some of the advances extended by government to its employees like
HBA and Conveyance Advance are not realistic and in tune with present day
requirements. Besides, many of these advances are usually not granted for lack of
fund allocation leaving the employee with the only option of availing bank loans at
higher interest rates. Public sector banks extend soft loans to their employees towards
their requirements of housing, conveyance etc.. Hence, it is proposed that the
government extend to police personnel interest subsidy of 2% in respect of advances
and loans availed through public sector banks towards requirements of housing, car,
and other basic amenities.
PERFORMANCE LINKED INCENTIVE SCHEME: (Yet to be added)
5.6 ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC TO POLICE
5.6
The association would like to make the following submissions in respect of the
allowances specific to police.
5.6.1 Uniform Allowance – The following rates of Uniform Allowances are presently
payable to the personnel and officers of CPMFs/CPOs /IPS.
Grant
Rate
Initial grant
Rs. 14000
Renewal grant
Rs. 3000
(payable after every three years)
As per the IPS (uniform) rules 1954 mention 39 different uniform related items, particularly
summer uniform items, have a life cycle of less than a year because of the weather
conditions. In view of the high rate of inflation, initial grant of Rs. 14000/- is highly
inadequate and the officers are compelled to meet the expenses from their pocket. The grant
therefore needs to be enhanced. As a minimum, it needs to be doubled. The renewal grant of
Rs. 3000/- after every 3 years is also highly inadequate. Cost of getting a summer uniform
stitched in the market is approx. Rs. 1800/- and that of a winter uniform is Rs. 3000/-. At the
rate of four summer uniforms and two winter uniforms every 3 years, the renewal cost comes
to Rs. 13200/-. The uniform allowance, therefore, may be revised as under: Grant
Rate
Initial grant
Rs. 28000
77
Renewal grant
Rs. 13200
(payable after every three years)
5.6.2 Kit Maintenances Allowance (KMA) – Police personnel are presently paid KMA at
the following rates: Constable
Head
Constable
Assistant
Sub
Inspector
Sub
Inspector
Inspector
Dy. SP
IPS
Officer
Rs. 90
Rs. 90
Rs. 90
Rs. 450
Rs. 450
Rs. 450
Rs. 450
As evident, the amount of KMA is highly inadequate. The DA as on 1.1.2014 stands
at 100%, meaning thereby that the cost of living has doubled since 1.1.2006. The 7th CPC
recommendations are likely to be implemented w.e.f. 1.1.2016, which is still two years away.
The inflation over the next 2 years is going to further increase the cost of living. Therefore,
the KMA needs to be enhanced as below:
Constable
Head
Constable
Assistant
Sub
Inspector
Sub
Inspector
Inspector
Dy. SP
IPS
Officer
Rs. 200
Rs. 200
Rs. 200
Rs. 1000
Rs. 1000
Rs. 1000
Rs. 1000
5.6.3
Training Allowance – Deputationist trainers working as faculty members in
National/Central Training Academies and Institutes are paid training allowance @ 30 % of
the basic pay. On the other hand, those working in Police Training Academies and Police
Training Colleges are paid training allowance only at the rate of 15% of the basic pay. There
is a strong need to attract and retain the best talent in Police Academies/Colleges. Therefore
their training allowance should also be increased to 30% of the basic pay. Similarly, the
Sumptuary Allowance in Police Training Academies/Colleges should also be paid on the
same scale as is being done in National/Central Training Academies.
5.6.4 Mobile Phone Allowance – Police officials use their personal mobile phone for
communication while on official duty. They, therefore, need to be duly compensated for the
cost incurred by them on this account. Mobile Phone Allowance may therefore be introduced
@ 250/- for all Head Constables/Constables, Rs. 500/- for SIs/ASIs and Rs. 1000/- for
Inspectors.
5.6.5 Conveyance Allowance – Transport Allowance is presently being paid to all Central
Government employees as per their entitlement to take care of transport expenses to and from
their place of work. However police officials, particularly those posted on operational duties
like in police stations, are required to travel a lot in their area of responsibility for discharging
their official duties. Since there is an acute shortage of official vehicles, they are forced to use
personal vehicle for official purposes. For example, a typical police station has only one
vehicle which is used by the officer-in-charge of the police station. All other investigating
78
officers and police personnel have no choice but to use their personal vehicles for
government work or ask the complainant for help. It is, therefore, proposed to introduce
Conveyance Allowance for police personnel posted in operational duties. The amount of
conveyance allowance may be equal to the prevailing cost of 20 litres petrol rounded to the
nearest Rs. 10.
5.6.6 Allowance to the medal holders: At present, monetary allowance is limited to the
holders of the President Police Medal for Gallantry and Police Medal for Gallantry at the rate
of Rs 3,000 and Rs 2,000 respectively. No monetary allowance is provided to the recipients
of the President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service and the Police Medal for
Meritorious Service, which are awarded at the national level to a select few on the basis of
their outstanding track record over a period of decades. Hence, it is proposed that recipients
of President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service and Police Medal for Meritorious
Service be granted at the rate of Rs 2,000/- and Rs 1,500/ respectively per month and the
rates need to be inflation adjusted like other allowances.
5.6.7 Special Compensatory Earned Leave Surrender facility to subordinate police
officers: Presently, Cash Compensatory Allowance equal to 30 days pay and allowances in a
calendar year is admissible to the executive police officials from the rank of constable to
Inspector in lieu of working late hours and on holidays. As explained in chapter III, 30 days
pay is highly inadequate to compensate for the extra hours of work and working under stress
and is insufficient to compensate for the alienation from families and duties performed on
gazetted holidays/ festival days. As explained earlier, the United Kingdom has introduced
overtime allowance, unsocial hours allowance and on-call allowance for its police. Firstly,
the 30 days cap should be increased to at least 45 days and this should apply to all ranks of
police working in field duties. Also, police officers should be eligible to earn two-days of
additional EL per each day of duty performed on gazetted holidays/ festivals, and allow
encashment on yearly basis subject to a maximum of 30 days per financial year. Police
officers of all ranks should also be allowed to accumulate EL up to 450 days in their career.
5.6.8 Insurance cover to Police personnel: As discussed in Chapter-III, Police personnel
and their families are exposed to a great degree of occupational risk in comparison to any
other class of government servants except defence forces. In case of death in action or
permanent total disability, the police officer and his family would be left to fend for
themselves till a dependant is enrolled in government service as per the existing policy of
central/ state government. This issue would be of greater concern to post-2004 batches of
policemen and officers covered under the New Pension Scheme; without any provision for
family pension. It is worth mentioning that even if an individual police officer wishes to avail
life/ risk cover, insurers normally do not cover occupational risk of police personnel in term
policies and often charge additional premium towards occupational risk cover in other life
insurance policies. Hence, it is proposed that police personnel be provided by the government
with term insurance cover for their life and against permanent total disability through public
sector insurers. (Some more material to be added after compiling information from the
states)
5.6.9 Health Insurance shemes: (Some material can be added from the good practices in
the states)
79
5.7
COMPARISON BETWEEN DEFENCE FORCES AND CAPF: HOW
CAPF IS WORKING IN EQUALLY CHALLENGING CONDITIONS BUT
DO NOT RECEIVE COMMENSURATE BENEFITS
Though CAPF personnel perform almost the same duties and suffer the same or even more
severe hardships as those of defence forces, they receive significantly less perks and
emoluments. This fact is substantiated by comparative data on number of combat/ work
related fatalities and injuries per capita in CAPF and defence forces, percentage of force
deployed in IS duties/ border areas etc. Hence the following proposals are made for
enhancement of emoluments, perks and social security of CAPF personnel.
5.7.1 Fixed benefit pension scheme for post-2004 appointees and 70% pension: Keeping
in view of the fact that CAPFs are Armed Forces of the Union and nature of working
condition/ risk to life, fixed benefit pension scheme (old pension scheme) should be restored
for post-2004 appointees in CAPFs and the pension amount should be enhance from 50% of
last pay drawn to 70%.
5.7.2 One rank, one pension: As considered for the defence personnel for grant of one rank
one pension, it should also be extended to the CAPF personnel to boost their morale and to
attract new generation to join the CAPF.
5.7.3 Grant of MACP: The modified Assured Career Progression to CAPF personnel is
being considered after completion of 10 years, 20 years and 30 years of continuous service.
The same should be 8 years at par with the defence personnel being Armed Forces of the
Union. Further, it should be granted 4 times in service instead of 3 MACP i.e. after
completion of 8 years, 16 years, 24 years and 32 years of continuous service.
5.7.4 Special pay for CAPF: At present defence personnel are getting Military Special
Pay. It should be extended to the CAPF personnel being Armed Forces of the Union and
while calculating the pension of CAPF personnel this amount must be taken into
consideration as is being done in the cases of military personnel for calculating pension.
5.7.5 Ration Allowance:Ration allowance should be extended to all officers/ men of
CAPFs at par with the defence personnel.
5.7.6 Medical facility at defence hospital:CAPF personnel and their families may be
allowed to avail the medical facility/ treatment at any defence hospital all over India.
5.7.7 Creation of school/ medical colleges:Schools, medical colleges and engineering
colleges should be set up for the benefit of CAPF personnel at par with defence personnel
like army school, AFMC etc.
5.7.8 Operation allowance: Operation allowance like field area or peace area allowable
may be given at par with the defence personnel.
5.7.9 High altitude allowance: The CAPF personnel posted at high altitude may be given
high altitude allowance par with defence personnel.
5.7.10 Hard area allowance and island special duty allowance: Such allowance should be
given to all CAPF posted at these regions at par with the defence personnel.
5.7.11 Special compensatory (Remote locality allowance): Such allowance should be given
to all CAPF at par with the defence personnel.
5.7.12 Grant of 100% HRA to CAPF personnel: It is the preamble that whoever joins
central government service in connection with the affairs of the Union, shall be entitled to
80
rent-free accommodation or HRA in lieu thereof. The personnel of CAPF are also Central
government employees performing their duty mostly in tough areas, dedicated towards safeguarding the citizens and property of the country, posted at far-flung areas away from their
native place. HRA forms a component of the total salary as part of condition of service. It is
in nature of a compensatory allowance in lieu of accommodation. Thus, the objective of HRA
is to compensate an employee for the amenities which are not available as provided to other
employees. In case where a person is entitled to married accommodation, but is provided with
unmarried accommodation (i.e. barracks), then he may also be entitled for compensation in
lieu of married accommodation, irrespective and in addition to the allotment of barrack
accommodation available for unmarried category if he wants to occupy the said barrack
accommodation. The grant of HRA should not be dependent on a chance factor. The concept
of joint family, with eventual changes in the political, social and economic spheres has been
gradually wiped out in the present era, replacing it with the notion of nuclear family in this
modern industrial society. As such, the employees of CAPF, notwithstanding the fact of
eligibility of 45% marked accommodation, are forced to keep their families in the vicinity of
their duty place or at a different location by paying a huge amount of house rent. Thus, they
are being deprived of the basic amenity and the clause of pay, discriminating and hitting
article 14 of the constitution of India having no relation with other government employees.
5.7.13 Social Security Deposit (SSD) scheme for widows and minor children of the
deceased members: Social Security Deposit (SSD) scheme should be introduced with the aim
to safeguard the interest of the widows and minor children and ensure security of their
deposits under the scheme Armed Police General Insurance on the line of Defence
establishment. Under the scheme APGI, insurance benefits of widows or minor children of
deceased personnel are invested by the CAPF in nationalized banks in cumulative or noncumulative account to the extent of amount and period stipulated by the member in his
nomination.
5.7.14 Post-retirement Extended Insurance Scheme: A compulsory Group Extended
Insurance (EI) scheme should be introduced with the aim of providing insurance cover for the
death without any maturity benefits for eligible members after retirement/ release up to a
specified period. It will be a term insurance scheme under which in case of death of a
Member within the period of cover, the nominee will be paid the amount of insurance cover
and it has no survival benefits. For this scheme, one-time non-refundable single premium will
be deducted from the maturity amount at the time of retirement/ discharge/ release from the
eligible members. Premium will be reviewed periodically based on experience of mortality
and interest rates and revised when considered necessary for future retirees.
81
82
6.PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PENSION
6.1 Retirement benefits, particularly in Government, are essentially deferred wages for work
done today, rightfully due to an employee. Unfortunately in public perception, they have
very often been characterised as doles, which encourages Governments to adopt a stepmotherly treatment to its pensioners. The CIPSA believes that the pensioner must be
given his rightful due, and that pensions must be inflation adjusted and linked to a basket
of basic goods and services necessary to maintain a certain basic quality of life in the nonproductive years. In today’s time, there are grave issues across the spectrum in respect of
pensions, both as regards the existing pensioner as well as the existing and prospective
employee. The Government must desist from adopting short run solutions of addressing
issues of fiscal constraint through reduced emoluments and pension, without takings hard
steps to improve productivity. In other words, CIPSA requests that the Pay Commission
require that the government must remain a model employer.
6.2 The terms of reference vests the Seventh Pay Commission with the mandate to examine
issues relating to pension as below:
“To examine the principles which should govern the structure of pension
retirement benefits, including revision of pension in the case of employees
retired prior to the date of effect of these recommendations, keeping in
retirement benefits of all Central Government employees appointed on
01.01.2004 are covered by the New Pension Scheme (NPS)”.
and other
who have
view that
and after
The recommendations of CIPSA in so far as the above is concerned are as below:
6.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW PENSION SCHEME
6.3.1 The NPS started by the Government of India for employees joining government service
after 1/1/2004 is an ill-conceived scheme, whose deficiencies have been compounded by its
poor implementation. As the affected parties are junior government employees, who further
form a minority, little attention has been paid to the plight of these affected officers. CIPSA
strongly urges the 7th CPC to conduct an in depth evaluation of the NPS as grave injustice is
being done to these budding officers, especially in cases where the officer dies in harness or
resigns for some reason.
6.3.2 The deficiencies in the NPS are enumerated below
83
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
Retirement benefits are essentially deferred wages for work done today, rightfully
due to an employee. By paying two employees doing the same job (A pre 2004
and a post 2004 employee), a different net present value of wages (current salary
plus pension), the Government is violating the fundamental right to equality. SC
judgment of D.C. Nahar & Others Vs. UOI (1982) has upheld that under article 14
of the constitution, Pensioners forms one class.
Further, all categories of Central Civil pensioners are not included in NPS viz.
President, Vice-President, MPs, Armed forces which is against the fundamental
right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Infact, the
Government has taken a step in the opposite direction in case of the Armed forces
by committing to a One Rank One Pension Scheme, which has significantly
increased its pension liability for the Defence personnel in one stroke.
The current scheme does not take care of employees belonging to backward
classes. Because as per the existing rules, candidates from SC/ST category can
enter the services as late as 35 years in central Government and 45 years in some
of the state Governments. This late entry has adverse impact on the rate on return.
For central Government employees their contribution will accrue for only 25 years
(if they enter at the age of 35 and for only 15-20 years if they enter in State
Government). This does not ensure that they will be get basic minimum pension
suitable to sustain themselves or family after retirement. Thus NPS does not
ensure social security to this strata, after retirement.
NPS was implemented in a hurry through a presidential ordinance. NPS should
have been implemented only after framing the rules and getting inputs from the
stakeholders. Scheme should be implemented after it gets proper legislative
sanction & with prospective effect only i.e. it should be made applicable to the
batches coming after this Act has come into force. As per the OM of Government
of India, Rules under any legislation need to be framed within 2 years of the
enactment of the Act or personal responsibility is to be fixed. In the instant case,
Act itself was passed after about ten years of ordinance.
NPS modelled defined contribution pension scheme has been in force in Latin
American & African countries, where it has failed miserably.
In discussion paper of PFRDA, it has been stated that there has been increase of
total pension liability of the government over the past decades. But having a close
look at the figures, we can see that total liability of the government on account of
pension of Central government employees has increased from 0.6% of GDP in
1993-94 to 1.66% of GDP in 2002-03. This increase was with respect to the total
pension liability of Government and not only for Central Civil employees.
However report has not given any bifurcation of the increase due to armed forces
and that on account of central civil employees, who are the only target group
under NPS. Figures at point no. 2.5 of the paper give details of number of
employees under various categories for the year 2002-03. Analysis of this data
84
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
brings out that ratio of pensioners to the total employees is 0.55% for civilian &
1.68% for defence. Thus, the amount of financial burden of pension is much
higher for defence personnel as compared to the civilian employees and that too
without adding the additional burden due to One Rank One Pension. The data
unequivocally brings out that the civilian government employees have been
discriminated against and a grave injustice done to them.
State Governments have adopted NPS, but at different points of time , which has
already caused inequality/disparity w.r.t. the amount credited for investment to
NSDL. This will have long term impact in return, which NPS subscribers will get
after investment of mandatory contribution. Further, for majority of NPS
subscribers, deductions have been started by the State governments after 2010.
No directions have been provided on contribution and rates to be applied on the
contribution from 1.1.2004 till the NPS is notified by the State governments.
Return promised by PFRDA was 14-29% p.a. (as per lecture details of chairman
of PFRDA), while in the past 4 years, return given by PFRDA averaged at 9%
p.a. for central government employees & approx. 6-7% for state government
employees. At this rate of return, it is unlikely that NPS subscribers will get
intended returns, which will reduce the amount of pension annuity that an
individual will receive on retirement on purchase from the PFM.
No disclosure has yet been made by PFRDA for the amount of pension that NPS
subscriber will get, category/grade pay wise. If they come out with any data in
future, it should convey factors like Net Present Value of future pension, what is
the rate of inflation they have taken into consideration etc. It is doubtful if
PFRDA/Market forces can assure minimum 50% pension & dearness relief
thereon for normal pension & 30% family pension as applicable to all pensioners
at present.
Though selection of fund managers has been proposed to be based on their track
record and ability to offer guaranteed returns, however, Indian stock markets have
seen a history of scams and failure of the regulatory agencies to monitor financial
sector agencies. Any major market shock at the time of retirement will expose the
subscriber retiring at that time to market risk which will cause disparity in the
pension of subscribers.
Performance snapshot of fund managers given on page 24 of SFC report (201011) give glaring picture of diminishing returns every year as against the promises
made by PFRDA, which is worrying. The same has been highlighted by SFC
also.
As per details in Standing Finance Committee Report shortfall in the return needs
to be made up by the government from the yearly budget. Modalities of the same
have not been spelt out and is also not being done at present. In addition, in case
of major market crash in any year, or recession which may last for more than a
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xiii.
xiv.
xv.
xvi.
xvii.
xviii.
xix.
xx.
xxi.
xxii.
year, the total government liability in that particular year/years can be
exceptionally high.
The Act provides for a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh per day by the Insurance Company
with the maximum penalty of Rs. 1 crore for violation of the provisions of the
Act. This amount is insignificant when compared to the quantum of monthly
contribution which runs into thousands of crores.
Under NPS, option has been given to subscribers to invest in tier-II contribution.
But this contribution is taxable and average returns on this investment has been
less than 7 %. It is requested that, instead of this possibility may be explored for
continuation of GPF facility to NPS subscribers. This will ensure that at certain
exigencies, NPS subscribers will have at least one secured source of finance.
Further no withdrawal option should be there for Tier I. This will ensure at least
basic minimum pension to the pensioner on retirement as withdrawal from Tier I
will reduce the total contribution based on which NPS subscribers are liable to get
Annuity.
6th CPC recommendations of additional pension are not applicable to NPS
subscribers. Their pension is based on annuity purchased for Annuity Service
Providers which will not take into consideration effects of inflation or additional
benefits related to age.
Service gratuity given under Rule 49 of CCS Pension Rules 1972 is not given
under NPS.
Death cum retirement gratuity under rule 50 of CCS Pension Rules not given
under NPS, as their returns is totally dependent on market forces.
DA relief on pension for which government has taken full responsibility is not
given to NPS subscribers.
As per the existing CCS pension Rules, 1972, after completion of 10 years of
service, minimum guaranteed pension is 50% of last pay drawn or average of 10
months, whichever is more beneficial. This kind of minimum guarantee can not be
there, if the money is invested in the capital market.
No advances admissible under NPS for educational/personal /house building
purposes as available under GPF for the old pensioners (U/Rule 15 of GPF rules).
Investment return on NPS contribution has been between 8-9% for central
government employees and it is 6-8% for state government employees.
The Government has not conducted any actuarial estimation of the proportion of
its contribution required to obtain a certain pension payout level, but has
arbitrarily fixed the Government’s contribution as a matching contribution of
10%, which is extremely low. The practice the world over with well run defined
contribution pension schemes is that the government assures a level of pension
based on the salary earned over an employees service and then estimates the
yearly contribution required to reach this pension level. Typically the employee’s
contribution is fixed at 10% of the salary and the balance (in the range of 25%) is
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xxiii.
xxiv.
xxv.
xxvi.
xxvii.
xxviii.
contributed by the Government. The Government also commits to make good any
unfunded liability as and when it arises.
The Government’s problems with respect to the NPS have occurred as it has tried
to shirk its responsibility and has attempted to give an impression of fiscal
consolidation through unrealistic means. The current NPS is presently
significantly unfunded and poorly managed. The outcome would be that either the
future governments would have to make a significant addition of cash to make
good the unfunded liability or the government would shirk its responsibility to the
pensioners under the NPS.
CIPSA urges the 7th CPC to study some of the well run international defined
contribution schemes so as to adopt their best practices. In this respect the New
Police Pension Scheme of the UK Government deserves mention. Some of the
salient features of this scheme which was introduced in 2006 are as below.
The New Police Pension Scheme 2006 (NPPS) allows officers to earn one 70th of
final salary for each year of service for 35 years. This provides a target pension of
half final salary. Officers also earn four 70ths of final salary for each year of
service for 35 years, to provide a target lump sum of twice final salary. Officers in
the NPPS currently pay contributions of 9.5% of their pensionable pay; Police
Authorities pay the employer contribution of 24.2%.
The scheme has been open to new entrants since 6 April 2006. The normal
minimum pension age under NPPS is 55. It also provides a more modern range of
benefits, including survivor pensions for nominated unmarried partners.
In addition to ordinary pensions paid on normal retirement, the scheme provides
for compulsory retirement on the grounds of ill-health, age or in the interests of
the effectiveness and efficiency of the police force. In the case of ill-health
retirement, an ill-health pension will be paid, as an officer is required to retire
when permanently disabled for police duty. In case of compulsory retirement on
other grounds, the appropriate ordinary pension is payable.
There is also a system of police injury benefits, which is separate from the pension
schemes and funded from forces’ operating accounts. This provides additional
payments to former officers who have left the police and are permanently disabled
as a result of receiving an injury in the execution of duty. In the event of an
officer’s death as the result of such an injury, the scheme provides for certain
payments to be made to the deceased officer’s surviving family.
6.4 ONE RANK ONE PENSION
6.4.1 In addition, CIPSA strongly feels that as IPS is a uniformed service, it must also be
brought under the One Rank One Pension scheme recently offered to the Defence services.
As earlier mentioned, police in developed countries like the UK, Canada and Australia is
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typically receive remuneration which is 10-15% higher than other public servants including
the armed forces. The practice in India on the contrary is the opposite, which must be
rectified, particularly as the police in India perform not only the basic policing duties but also
roles typically performed by the the armed forces due to high internal security threats that the
country faces.
6.5 IRRATIONAL PENSION FIXATION FORMULA:
6.5.1 Clause 4.2 of the Office Memorandum No. F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A) dated 1.9.08 of
the Department of Pension & Pensioners’ Welfare, Ministry of Personnel, Public
Grievances & Pensions, Govt of India, Lok Nayak Bhawan, New Delhi-110003 reads
as under65:“4.2 The fixation of pension will be subject to the provision that the revised
pension, in no case, shall be lower than 50% of the minimum of the pay in the pay
band plus the grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised pay scale from which the
pensioner had retired. In the case of HAG+ and above scales, this will be 50% of the
minimum of the revised pay scale”.
6.5.2 The above formula, as analysed below, is arbitrary and devoid of logic and rationale
as it has led to ridiculous consequences in that the seniors draw less pension than
juniors of not only the same rank but also of the lower rank:6.5.3 As per the formula, in case of HAG+ scale (applicable to DG rank in the IPS), basic
pension cannot be more than 50% of the minimum of the revised pay scale
(Rs.75,500-80,000), i.e. Rs.37,750 though no such rider has been placed on other
ranks and pay scales. This renders the formula arbitrary and irrational because in the
pre-revised scale (Rs.24,050-650-26,000), most of the DG rank officers had retired at
the maximum of the scale, i.e. Rs.26,000. Their pension was fixed at 50% of their last
pay, i.e. at Rs.13,000. Fixing their pension in the revised scale at the minimum,
instead of the maximum, of the scale deprives them of the benefit of the increments
they had earned and the number of years they had remained in DG rank while in
service. A reasonable and logical fixation of pension should have been at the
corresponding (maximum) level of the revised pay, i.e. 50% of Rs.80,000 = Rs.40,000
instead of Rs.37,750. Fixation of pension at the minimum of the revised scale makes
pre-2006 retiree DGs inferior to the post-2006 retiree DGs most of whom retire at the
maximum of the scale and draw Rs.40,000 as pension. Not only this, it makes pre2006 retiree DGs inferior even to the post-2006 retiree ADGs whose HAG pay scale
is Rs.67,000-79,000. Their maximum pay takes them to Rs.79,000, thus fixing their
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http://circulars.nic.in/WriteReadData/CircularPortal/D3/D03ppw/pensiontable_sixthpc.pdf (Accessed on...)
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pension at Rs.39,500 against Rs.37,750 of pre-2006 retiree DGs. In effect, a pre-2006
retiree gets demoted to the level of a beginner in that rank. This reduction of Rs.2250
in basic pension becomes Rs.4275 p.m. on adding the current DA/DR of 90% (which
is revised every 6 months).The sad truth is that this discrepancy is recurring,
cumulative and life-long. The loss increases with every increase in Dearness Relief.
This cascading financial loss is not confined to the present but will continue to operate
in the future as well. It further has the evil effect of reducing the quantum of family
pension also after the death of the Pensioner.
6.5.4 Specific instances of Seniors Drawing Less Pension than Juniors:
A junior officer who retired as DG on 1.1.2006 gets more pension than a senior
officer who retired only a day earlier on 31.12.2005. Mr. P.V.Sumant (IPS-1967Assam) and Mr. P.K.Senapati (IPS-1967-Orissa) are a few examples of officers who
retired on 31.12.05 at the maximum of their scales but are now drawing pension at the
minimum of the revised scale i.e. Rs.37,750. Almost all the DGs, who retired on or
after 1.1.2006, are getting basic pension of Rs.40,000 per month. There is absolutely
no change in duties, powers and functions of the Pre-2006 and post-2006 DGs which
could justify the reduction in pension. Both the above officers and several others had
stagnated at the maximum of the DG’s scale for several years when they were in
service. But all these factors get ignored in fixing the pension in the revised scale
which is prima facie unjust and needs to be corrected.
The posts of ADGs are the feeder posts for promotion to the rank of DG. Still, they
have been granted more pension than their bosses. Some examples are given below:i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Mr. Hemraj Pannalalji Gahlot, Gujarat cadre, IPS-1974 batch. Retired as ADG
on 31.12.07. Pension fixed at Rs.39,500;
Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sinha, Gujarat cadre, IPS-1976 batch. Retired as ADG on
31.10.11. Pension fixed at Rs.39,500;
Mr. K.Nityanandam, Gujarat cadre, IPS-1977 batch. Retired as ADG on
30.11.11. Pension fixed at Rs.39,500;
Shri S.P.S.Yadav, Maharashtra cadre, retired on 31.1.11 as ADG. Pension
fixed at Rs. 39,500.
This discrimination continues despite crystal clear Orders of the Supreme Court of
India to the contrary in two cases: (i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs. Union of India,
(1983) 1 SCC 305 (at page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130 and (ii) Union of India Vs. Major
General (Rtd) SPS Vains, (2008) 9 SCC 125. Light has been thrown on these rulings
in subsequent paras.
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6.5.5 Legal Analysis of the Irrational Formula
6.5.5.1 Last Pay and Not Last Pay Scale Relevant for Pension Fixation: As per Rule 18 of
the All India Services (DCRB) Rules, 1958, the pension of an officer is fixed on his
retirement on the basis of the average of the pay drawn during the last 10 months or
the last pay drawn, whichever is more beneficial to the retiree. The pension is thus
fixed only on the basis of the last pay drawn and not on the basis of the last pay scale
drawn. “Pay Scale” is relevant only for the serving officers, but is irrelevant for
pensioners for whom the last “Pay” drawn is the only relevant issue and criterion to
determine their pension. Obviously, the pay scale from which this pay is drawn has no
relevance for fixation of pension. Pension once sanctioned can not be revised/reduced
subsequently to the disadvantage of the pensioner except as a punishment or to correct
a clerical error in calculation of the original pension.
6.5.5.2 Illegal Classification of Pensioners: Pensioners have been illegally divided into two
classes: pre-2006 retirees and post-2006 retirees. This is contrary to the crystal clear
Orders of the Supreme Court of India in two cases: (i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs.
Union of India and (ii) Union of India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains. These
cases will be discussed in subsequent paras. To elaborate the above point, if an
officer X retired from the pre-revised running HAG+ scale of Rs.24050-650-26000
and his last pay drawn was Rs.26000, then, as per rule, his pension was fixed at
Rs.13000 p.m. Likewise, if another officer Y retired from the pre-revised Apex Pay
Scale of Rs.26000 (Fixed), then also his pension was fixed at an identical figure of
Rs.13000 p.m. This created perfect equality between both types of pensioners, X and
Y irrespective of their retiring pay scales which become irrelevant and only the last
pay drawn matters for fixation of initial pension. This clearly implies that retired
officers receiving the same basic pension belong to the same class and the principle of
equality applies to them. Their pension revision to Rs.37,750 p.m. in the case of X
and to Rs.40,000 p.m. in the case of Y after the 6th Pay Commission amounts to
creation of two different classes of pensioners who were identical and belonged to the
same class at the time of retirement.
6.5.5.3 Violation of Article 14 (Fundamental Right to Equality): The instance of X and Y
quoted above contemptuously goes against the above cited Supreme Court orders,
leading to an unwarranted disadvantage to X, in clear and patent violation of the
principle of natural justice and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14
(equality before law). A fundamental principle of law settled in several cases is that
Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation. Equals have been made
unequals and vice versa. Since Pension rules determine pension on the basis of last
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pay drawn (and not last pay scale drawn), pension so determined once cannot be later
revised arbitrarily in a discriminatory way so as to create two different classes of
pensioners who were earlier drawing identical pensions. Such discrimination is
clearly a violation of the fundamental right to equality enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
6.5.5.4 Prejudicially Affecting Retrospective Effect Not Permissible: The pay revision
notification certifies that its implementation would not adversely affect any pensioner
but it clearly does. Section 3(1A) of the All India Services Act, 1951 deals with the
rule making power of the Government and requires that “.... no retrospective effect
shall be given to any rule so as to prejudicially affect the interests of any person to
whom such rule may be applicable.” The All India Services (DCRB) Rules, 1958
have been framed under the aforesaid rule-making power under the All India Services
Act. Therefore, it is not permissible to prejudicially affect the interests of the old
pensioners by a subsequent provision that came into effect after their retirement.
6.5.5.5 Violation of Supreme Court Rulings: Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has laid down
certain principles which are a settled law:6.5.5.5.1 D.S. Nakara etc. Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (page 323), AIR 1983 SC
130:
The highlights of this case are given below:i. Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the fixation of a cut off date, as a
result of which equals were treated as unequals, was wholly arbitrary. One of the
questions posed in the aforesaid decision was whether a class of pensioners could be
divided for the purpose of entitlement and payment of pension into those who retired
by a certain date and those who retired thereafter. The question was answered by the
Constitution Bench that such division, being both arbitrary and unprincipled, the
classification did not stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
ii. The question regarding creation of different classes within the same cadre on the
basis of the Doctrine of Intelligible differentia having nexus with the object to be
achieved was taken up in this case by a Constitution Bench. It was observed that the
date of retirement of an employee cannot form a valid criterion for classification, for
if that is the criterion, those who retired by the end of the month will form a class by
themselves. It was held that Article 14 of the Constitution had been wholly violated, in
as much as, the pension rules being statutory in character, the amended rules,
specifying a cut off date resulted in differential and discriminatory treatment of equals
in the matter of calculation of pension. It was further observed that it would have a
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traumatic effect on those who retired just before that date. The division which
classified pensioners into two classes was held to be artificial and arbitrary and not
based on any rational principle and whatever principle, if there was any, had not only
no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by amending the Pension Rules, but was
counter productive and ran counter to the very object of the pension scheme. It was
ultimately held that the classification did not satisfy the test of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
iii.
Liberalisation in computation of pension effective from specified date divides
pensioners so as to confer benefit on some while denying it to others. Such
classification was held arbitrary, devoid of rational nexus to object of liberalisation
and violative of Article 14.
iv. All pensioners entitled to receive pension under the relevant rules form a class
irrespective of the dates of their retirement and there cannot be a mini-classification
within this class. The differential treatment accorded to those who had retired prior to
the specified date is violative of Article 14 as the choice of specified date is wholly
arbitrary and the classification based on the fortuitous circumstance of retirement
before or subsequent to the specified date is invalid.
HELD: Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and
equality of treatment. It is attracted where equals are treated differently without any
reasonable basis. The principle underlying the guarantee is that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation and there should be no
discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the
legislation, their position is substantially the same. Article 14 forbids class legislation but
permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The classification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a
rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. In other
words, there ought to be causal connection between the basis of classification and the
object of the statute.
It is indisputable that pensioners for payment of pension form a class. When the State
considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme in order to augment social
security in old age to government servants, it could not grant the benefits of liberalisation
only to those who retired subsequent to the specified date and deny the same to those who
had retired prior to that date. The division which classified the pensioners into two
classes on the basis of the specified date was devoid of any rational principle and was
both arbitrary and unprincipled, being unrelated to the object sought to be achieved by
grant of liberalised pension and the guarantee of equal treatment contained in Article 14
was violated in as much as the pension rules, which were statutory in character, meted
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out differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of computation of
pension from the dates specified in the impugned memoranda.
6.5.5.5.2 Union of India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains, (2008) 9 SCC 125: In this
case, the issue was whether there could be a disparity in payment of pension
between officers of the same rank who had retired prior to the introduction of the
revised pay scales and those who retired thereafter. The dispute arose due to
disparity in determination of pension of pre-1.1.96 and post-1.1.96 retirees who
retired from Defence services as Major General or equivalent. The Pension of the
pre-1.1.96 retiree Major Generals was fixed lower than the post-1.1.96 retiree
Major Generals. The Court held that the date of retirement was immaterial. The
highlights of this case are as under:- The judgement was rendered on the
touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution and in consonance with the principle
of administrative fair play. Differentiation between officers holding the same rank
on the date of retirement is wholly erroneous and violative of the provisions of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
“The said decision of the Central Govt does not address the problem of a
disparity having created within the same class so that two officers both retiring as
Major Generals, one prior to 1.1.96 and the other after 1.1.96, would get two
different amounts of pension. While the officers who retired prior to 1.1.96 would
now get the same pension as payable to a Brigadier on account of the stepping up
of pension in keeping with the Fundamental Rules, the other set of Major
Generals who retired after 1.1.96 will get a higher amount of pension since they
would be entitled to the benefit of the revision of pay scales after 1.1.96. In our
view, it would be arbitrary to allow such a situation to continue since the same
also offends the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution”. It has to be kept in
mind that the rank of Brigadier is a feeder post for the promotional rank of Major
General having higher and more onerous responsibilities.
“The object sought to be achieved was not to create a class within a class, but to
ensure that the benefits of pension were made available to all persons of the same
class equally. To hold otherwise would cause violence to the provisions of Article
14 of the Constitution. It could not also have been the intention of the authorities
to equate the pension payable to officers of two different ranks by resorting to the
step up principle envisaged in the Fundamental Rules in a manner where the
other officers belonging to the same cadre would be receiving a higher pension”.
It was directed that the pay of all pensioners in the rank of Major General and its
equivalent rank in the two other Wings of the Defence Services be notionally fixed
at the rate given to similar officers of the same rank after the revision of pay
scales with effect from 1.1.1996, and, thereafter, to compute their pensionary
93
benefits on such basis with prospective effect from the date of filing of the writ
petition and to pay them the difference within three months from date with interest
at 10% per annum.
The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is squarely applicable to all the
services. By this judgement, a principle has clearly been laid down that a senior
shall not draw less pension than a junior. The Government’s view in GOI,
DOP&PW F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A) dated 18/11/2009, stating that “the
judgment dated 9-9-08 in CA No. 5566 of 2008 SLP (Civil) No. 12357/2006, UOI
vs Maj. Genl. SPS Vains, would not apply in the case of civil pensioners” is
misconceived and amounts to Contempt of the Apex Court. The Supreme Court
has nowhere limited the principles propounded in this Order to the defence
personnel and has not said anywhere that these will not apply to the civilians.
6.5.6 Suggested Pension Fixation Formula Briefly stated,
i.
The pension fixation formula should give due weightage to the length of service in
the last rank and to the number of increments one had earned in that rank. There is
absolutely no justification in forfeiting the increments which should be kept intact
in the replacement scale.
ii. The equivalent of the last pay drawn must not be diluted in the replacement scale.
iii. As per the settled law, the formula should clearly state that seniors (intra-service
seniors as well as rank seniors) will not draw less pension than juniors.
iv.
Keeping the settled law in view, the pension fixation formula may be modified as
under:a) “The fixation of pension will be subject to the provision that the revised
pension, in no case, shall be lower than 50% of the equivalent of the last pay
drawn in the pay band plus the grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised
pay scale from which the pensioner had retired, subject to the following
conditions:b) The same number of increments which the pensioner had earned while in
service in the last rank and equivalent of the last pay drawn before retirement
will be taken into account for fixation of pension in the revised pay scale;
c) The revised pension will, in no case, be lower than the pension of the lower
rank retirees;
d) Further, the revised pension will, in no case, be lower than the pension of the
intra-service juniors as per the seniority list of the same/similar rank.”
6.6 Liberalisation of Quantum of Pension to Old Pensioners
6.6.1 After the 6th CPC, vide clause 5.7 of the Office Memorandum F.No. 38/37/08P&PW(A) dated 2.9.08, the Government of India, Department of Pension &
94
Pensioners’ Welfare, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions had
increased the quantum of pension available to the old pensioners as under:Age of Pensioner
From 80 years to less than 85 years
From 85 years to less than 90 years
From 90 years to less than 95 years
From 95 years to less than 100 years
100 years or more
Additional Quantum of Pension
20% of basic pension
30% of basic pension
40% of basic pension
50% of basic pension
100% of basic pension
6.6.2 Government of Punjab has gone a step further in sanctioning the increased pension to
senior pensioners (including those of the All India Services) as under:Age of Pensioner
From 80 years to less than 85 years
From 85 years to less than 90 years
From 90 years to less than 95 years
From 95 years to less than 100 years
100 years or more
Additional Quantum of Pension
20% of basic pension
30% of basic pension
40% of basic pension
50% of basic pension
100% of basic pension
Similar benefit may be extended to the pensioners of the Central Government.
6.7 MAKING PENSION TAX FREE.
6.7.1 Pension is described in Section 60 of the CPC and Section 11 of the Pension Act as a
periodical allowance or stipend granted on account of past service, particular merits,
etc. It involves three essential features: firstly, pension is a compensation for the past
service, secondly, it owes its relationship to a past employer-employee relationship or
master servant relationship. Lastly, it is paid on the basis of earlier relationship or
agreement of service as opposed to an agreement for service. Therefore, pension is on
an entirely different footing and cannot be equated with salary. It was held by the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in D.S. Nakara etc. Vs. Union of India,
(1983) 1 SCC 305 (page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130 that “the pension payable to a
Government employee is earned by rendering long and efficient service and,
therefore, can be said to be a deferred portion of the compensation for the service
rendered”.
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6.7.2 By a general analogy and understanding, compensation is not taxable. The mischief is
caused by Section 17(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act which defines salary to include
pension as well though both are distinct. There is no justification to include pension in
the definition of salary. Pension of UN personnel, pension of the recipients of medals
like gallantry, Paramveer Chakra, Mahaveer Chakra etc. is exempt from tax under
Section 10 of the Income Tax Act. Similarly, most of the retirement benefits like
gratuity, leave encashment, GPF and commuted pension are tax exempt. On the same
reasoning, pension of Govt employees (who earn their pension by way of
compensation for the past service) should be delinked from salary and exempted from
income tax as a social welfare measure for senior citizens.
6.8 RAISING THE FAMILY PENSION:6.8.1 Family pension is calculated at the uniform rate of 30% of the basic pay. Our
submission is that the family pension be raised to 50% of the basic pay including the
increments earned by the retiree. This is justified because the family pensioners,
particularly the women, who become helpless after the death of the pensioner need
more sympathy in supporting them financially and otherwise.
6.9 GALLANTRY MEDAL ALLOWANCE –
6.9.1 As per orders of the Secretariat of the President of India this allowance for holders of
Gallantry Medal is payable by the Government of the State to which state cadre an
IPS officer is allotted. This causes problems to those who are drawing pension from
the Central Govt. and not the State Govt. of the Cadre. It is suggested that the VII
CPC may recommend that all those IPS pensioners who opt to draw pension from
GOI may also get the Gallantry Medal Allowance from the GOI.
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CONCLUSION
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