H388 Presentations 12/05/06
MICRO-ECONOMY
• 19. Miles Hammond – micro-credit
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
• 20. Susan Krissel – gender/health
• 20. Margaret Knowles –
• 13. CJ Dreissen – free trade
• 14. Zachary Roberts –trade policy credit/health
• 15. Trung van Truong – remittances
MACRO-ECONOMY
• 21. Alfonzo Salazar – Sanctions
• 22. Bruno Valle – Debt relief
• 16. Carlos Torres – gender
• 17. Scott Johnson – corruption • 23. Han Zhao – Struct Adustment
• 18. Benjamin Newton – corruption
REGIME TYPE
Chile: Trade and Equality
1990-2002
C.J. Driessen
Exports by Year
Goods
Exported
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
20
02
20
00
19
98
19
96
19
94
19
92
19
90
$0
Imports by Year
Goods
Imported
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
20
02
20
00
19
98
19
96
19
94
19
92
19
90
$0
Income Re-Distribution
By Region
Top 5th vs.
Bottom 5th
10%
Rich gain at
Poor's Expense
Middle
Class Loses
5%
-30.0%
-20.0%
0%
-10.0%
0.0%
-5%
Middle
Class Gains
-10%
-15%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
Poor gain at
Rich's Expense
Income Distribution
Top 5th/
Bottom 5th
$14.5
$14.0
$13.5
$13.0
$12.5
$12.0
$11.5
$11.0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Gini Coefficient
Gini
47.0%
46.5%
46.0%
45.5%
45.0%
44.5%
44.0%
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
GDP at
1996
Prices
Real GDP by Year
$45,000
$40,000
$35,000
$30,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
20
03
20
01
19
99
19
97
19
95
19
93
19
91
$0
Destitute Percentage
Destitute %
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Poverty Percentage
Poverty %
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Inequalities in World Food
Trade
Zachary Roberts
December 5
• Agricultural trade is much more important
in developing countries vs. developed
countries. In Ethiopia, agriculture is 47.5%
of GDP, versus 0.5% of GDP in the United
Kingdom. 80% of Ethiopia’s population
works in agriculture vs. 1.5% in the United
Kingdom.
• African producers can grow food more
cheaply than in Europe and the U.S., so
the West supports the agricultural industry
with an average of $238 billion in
subsidies between 2001-2003.
• This does not include countless tariffs and
quotas on imports from developing
countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa
• With a complete liberalization of food
trade, there would be a $300 billion
increase in food trade per year by 2015.
• Developing countries would account for
45% of this gain, which is highly
disproportionate to their share of global
GDP.
Example: Cattle Trade
• Europe’s tariffs on beef make it profitable only to export
high-quality beef, so poor producers who cannot produce
such quality beef are cut out of the trade. This also
causes a lack of quality beef on the domestic market,
which depresses domestic market prices, leading to
lower income for cattle herdsmen.
• Also, foot and mouth disease standards for European
exports cannot be met by the vast majority of African
producers. The IMF estimates that African cattle
herdsmen lose $1.3 billion for every European life saved
by these measures.
African Liberalization
• The problem is not entirely Western. Up to half
of the gain that would be realized in production
and income from trade liberalization would result
from a liberalization of trade by the African
countries.
• Example: After Zambia lifted restrictions on
maize exports to Europe, hybrid grain producers
saw an increase in income from the new market
access.
Migration, Remittances, and
Poverty Alleviation in Egypt
Trung Van Truong
HIST 388 Hunger And Poverty in
the Market Economy
December 5, 2006
Problem
• Relations between migration, remittances, and
poverty alleviation
• Definitions
• Situation around the world and Egypt
• Why are people immigrating?
• Where do remittances go?
• Do they really help the economy and alleviate
poverty in Egypt and other places around the
globe?
Findings
•
•
•
•
•
Limited Data Set
Need to extend scope
Problematic; receiving countries are OECDs
IMF Records versus Stark and Adam’s findings
Some signs of poverty alleviation from
remittances
• Development of infrastructures in the developing
countries
Data Set
Parity, Polity and Equality
Carlos Torres
December 5, 2006
History 388 - D. Ludden
Terms
• Parity - measure of the gap between
HDI and GDI scores for a country.
• Polity - score given by the Polity IV
Project.
• Equality - here, within society,
measured by the Gini coefficient.
• Social Investment - government
expenditures in public provision of
goods such as education and health
care.
Problem
• Many of the characteristics of gender
parity are those commonly associated with
liberal democracies. Is there a correlation
between Democracy and parity, or are
there other forces at work?
• WB says the former, but there are
important errors in their historical analysis
of institution building.
WB Report
• Stresses the
importance of
institutionalized
structures to
maintain equitable
distribution of
wealth and
income.
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• But they get the distributive mechanism
backwards
• American case study
– Depend on the presence of “authorities” (112) that
didn’t exist in the colonies.
– Pretend that a preexisting social/institutional
structure came from Europe with the settlers, but
that isn’t exactly what happened.
– Brought a system of government for their internal
community of settlers, but institutions were set up
in response to distribution of resources in general.
– Even Mayflower Compact, universally recognized
as the first institutionally directive document in the
New World, mentions nothing more than “binding
together” for the “general good of the colony”
• Curiously, the only time they seem to make
this mistake is when they are talking directly
about institutional formation (and implying a
production mechanism of democratic political
process).
• Otherwise, they recognize equity as the
driving force in the creation and maintenance
of institutionally equitable structures, such as
property rights, habeas corpus, etc…
– “threats of social disorder” (from a powerful public)
force democratic reform; “egalitarian distribution…
eased the transition to Democracy” (114), among
others
Evidence
Gini v. Parity - World
Polity v. Parity
0.02
0.02
0.015
0.015
HDI - GDI
0.025
HDI - GDI
0.025
2
R = 0.1924
0.01
0.01
0.005
0.005
R2 = 0.0655
0
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-10
-5
0
5
10
Polity Score
Gini Coefficient
Stability v. Parity
0.025
0.02
HDI - GDI
0.015
0.01
0.005
2
R = 0.1646
0
0
2
4
6
Absolute value polity score
8
10
12
Stability is introduced to control
for how the polity score is
determined, but is still a less
accurate determinant than the
Gini coefficient. Pattern holds
true across population levels,
GDP and HDI levels and regime
type
15
Institutional Formation
Reality:
(Cash Input)
(Outcome)
(Results)
Health
Economic Situation
Education >> - wealth
>> Power >> Institutional Direction --|
Services
- income
|
^------------------------------Distribution--------------------------------------------- |
Cash can only influence cash inputs, everything else has to flow out of the system
organically. The cash inputs are the base of the causation chain, and an
imbalance anywhere else will not create a self-sustaining shift without the cash
inputs balancing as well. Institutions take time to develop and the build up of
equity is a fairly slow process (45) pointing to a cause that is difficult to influence
on a broad scale and must be done in the long run, rather than an instantaneous
mechanism like policy or polity change.
Point is, they’re looking at the evidences
of institutional problems rather than the
causes and advocate in a round about
way for ‘hollow’ democratic reform while
simultaneously stressing the importance
of solid infrastructure in maintaining
equitable institutions (equitable social
structures in the community, rather than
imposed by the government, are the
ones that last).
- “Morally irrelevant” (19) categories like race, religion
and gender are evidence of institutionalized
inequalities, but not causative in themselves
- Income, too, is evidence of unequal opportunity, but
not wholly causative in itself, either
- Concentration of reproductive wealth, and the power
that comes from it from consequent distributions of
investment in social capital (education, health
care…), is the real source of distribution of power
- The only way to fix the distribution of wealth is to
correct the social investment disparities (34, 45) education, health, credit availability, labor
opportunities, etc…
Problem with WB approach
• Advocates targeting institutions that create
equitable distributions of wealth and
opportunity even while it acknowledges
that without the underlying infrastructure
such efforts are doomed to failure.
• There is no particular pattern, only a
series of correlations that are more or
less accurate in different situations,
because the peculiarities of each
country’s history cause disparities in
social investment in different ways.
Solutions
• Realize that systems of inequality are
only correlated with certain
demographic indicators and institutions,
and that fixing inequalities, while
targeting particular populations, involves
correcting social investments, not
artificially changing institutions without
developing the infrastructure that
supports those democratic institutions.
Measuring Corruption
Scott Johnson
Indexes
• Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
• International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
• International Crime Victim SurveyBribery (ICVS)
• Corruption Control Index (CC)
15.3%
8.1%
8%
8.6%
7.7%
12%
World Average rGDP growth rate: 2.87%
Global Corruption and on the
Perpetuation of Domestic Poverty
Benjamin Newton
Benjamin Newton
Introduction: Global Corruption
• Global corruption is the rule and not the exception
• In 2006, ¾ of Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
states scored below a “5”
• Dysfunctional states share characteristics
• Negative implications vary from state to state
• Poor states get “stuck” in poverty
Research Methodology
• Corruption
measurements are a
modern phenomenon
• Mixed Approach
• Qualitative and
Quantitative uses
• Case sensitivity
Case Studies
• Corruption varies in different parts of the world
• Public vs. private sector corruption
• Some states do not have the luxury of dealing
with corruption
• States who see the benefits in fighting
corruption will do so
Why is this Important?
• Globalization is an inevitable force
• Corruption serves as an inhibitor to progress
• If the Global Development movement is
serious, corruption will have to be effectively
tackled
• Efforts to curb corruption will have to be case
sensitive
Micro Finance and Family
Dynamics in Bangladesh
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Miles Hammond
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Important Facts About Bangladesh
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Population (2006): 147,365,352 (7th largest)
Densest pop. excluding small islands and city states
Almost 1/2 of the population lives below the poverty line
10-15% of the population faces life-threatening nutritional risks
Per capita GDP: US $1870
Per capita income: US $440
Women hold 2% of parliamentary seats, make up 25% of professional and technical
workers, and 8% of management and administration
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How Do Micro Finance Organizations Like
Grameen Bank Help?
• Founded in 1974 by Muhammad Yunus
• Gives small loans to rural women to farm
and start cottage industries
• 6.61 million current borrowers, with over 50
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million borrowers
since
inception
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• Empowerment groups
• Sixteen decisions
The Empowerment Index
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Resources
Finance
Transaction Management
Mobility and Networks
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Activism
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Attitudes and husband’s behavior
Family planning and parenting issue
HDI Index suggests that Bangladesh is not doing
particularly well…
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The Problems
-
Reach insignificant portions of the poor population
Not financially viable - despite the hype
Target insignificant industries
Cycle of debt - burden falls on women
NGOs prop up existing social institutions
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Ethical debateTIFF
over
‘sixteen decisions’
(Uncompressed)
decompressor
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to see this picture.
Promote poor business
practices
Distract funds and attention from more effective forms of aid
Programs to improve maternal
and child nutritional status
Susan Krissel
Examples of Interventions
• UNICEF
– Fortification of food (ex. Iodization of salt)
– Supplemental micronutrient formula with RDIs
for pregnant/lactating women
– Education for the empowerment of women
– Baby-Friendly Hospital Initiative
– International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk
Substitutes
• Earthwatch
– Educate women about nutrition and hygiene as
related to disease prevention
– Involve and train community members/leaders
– Make community self-sufficient
• Canada Prenatal Nutrition Program
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Supplementation
Community gardens
Gift certificates to buy healthy food
Cooking demonstrations and shopping tours
Nutrition and Health Awareness Education
Budgeting workshops
Breastfeeding incentives
Conclusions
• Various types of organizations are taking
action to improve maternal/child nutrition
• These organizations are mainly focused
on improving malnutrition through
nutrients, rather than targeting its causes
Improving Women’s Health
through Micro-credit: Cases of
BRAC in Bangladesh
Margaret Knowles
December 5, 2006
• Two separate studies suggest that participation
in the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee’s (BRAC) micro credit program has
led to significant increases in maternal health
knowledge and child survival rates
• Can these effects be attributed to the microcredit program’s success or have other factors
played a role?
• What components of the program are truly
influencing health of these women and their
children?
Study conducted by the Research and Evaluation Division of
the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC):
Women's Knowledge of Prenatal Care among Credit
Forum Participants
70
64.9
62.6 63.7
60
48.3
Non participant
Participant <5 yrs
Participant ≥5 yrs
not eligible
40
30
20
15.9
13.2
17.7
11.2
7.6
10
5.3
6.5
1.7
0
Tetanus vaccines
90
Vitamin
Medical check up
supplementation
Women's Knowledge of Postnatal care,
BANGLADESH
78.8
80
Categories of Prenatal Health Measures
80.4
79.8
70
60
percent
Percent
50
55.6
56.1 57.3
60.2
50
40
43
38.9
45.8
43.5
30
20
11.9
10
0
EPI doses
Diseases
Prevented
Health topic
Child Survival
Non participant
Participant <5 yrs
Participant ≥5 yrs
not eligible
Joint project between BRAC and the International Centre
for Diarroeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B)
Predicted hazards of infant death during pre- and post
intervention period by mothers participation in
development programme, Matlab, 1988–97.
Findings:
• Participation in BRAC micro-credit program has a positive impact on
health knowledge, reducing and even preventing risks of child
mortality
•
Success cannot be attributed solely to the increase in income and
economic participation among the woman participants.
•
Micro-credit forums play a role as a form of media to reach women
with health information
• Requirements of participation in the program insist that participants
receive basic health services and participate in forums and
educational activities in order to continually acquire loans and credit.
• BRAC uses a multifaceted approach to alleviate poverty and
empower the poor women of Bangladesh.
Economic Sanctions
Against Iraq
Alfonso Salazar
UNSC Resolution
• On August 6, 1990 the United Nations
Security Council implemented Resolution
661
1) banned all imports from Iraq and Kuwait
2) banned all exports except medical and
food supplies
3) froze Iraqi government funds held
abroad
• Sanctions on Iraq held in one form or
another until the Iraq War of 2003
Impact of Sanctions
• Immediate economic decline
Decreases in GDP
Hyperinflation
Collapsed exchange rates
Unemployment
• Humanitarian Struggles
Decreases in Purchasing Power for Food
Growing overall Mortality rates
Declining access to necessary resources
Increases in poverty rate
Sanction Affects on Trade
• Iraq dependent on oil export revenues
Oil Rev US$ billion
GDP US$ billion
1980
26.3
53.9
1984
9.4
35.1
1990
9.6
16.4
1992
0.5
11.9
• Civilian Imports
1988
3.6 billion dollars
1990
2.8 bill
1992
0.6 bill
Up to 1990 domestic food production represented one third
of total consumption for essential food items. Import
dependent economy
Personal Income
•
•
•
Collapse of Iraqi economy seen from per
capita GDP measured in 1980 prices.
1980 $4083
1988 $1756
Per capita does not take into account
1990 $906
inequality among households
1991 $627
1994 $342
Food purchasing power of private income
declined to 5-7% of its August 1990 level.
Food Prices
Aug. 90
Aug. 91
Percentage increase
Wheat flour
0.05
2.42
4,431
Powdered milk 0.75
27.33
3,561
Sugar
0.20
4.42
2,108
Cooking oil
0.48
10.33
2,038
Rice
0.23
4.08
1,701
Tea
1.70
23.67
1,292
Food Basket for
Family of six 66.0
1,010.00
1,446
• Prices continued to soar. In 1995, a kg of rice cost 1,184
ID. Unsustainable entitlement exchange
Total Deaths from Specified Health
Conditions
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
Children under 5
Population above 5
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1989
1991
1993
1995
•Republic of Iraq, Baghdad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000
Government Solutions
• In response to sanctions, Iraqi government
instituted food rationing system covering wheat
flour, rice, sugar, tea, cooking oil, and children’s
powdered milk.
• The ration system provided 1,270 calories per
day per person.
• Dietary intake in the late 1980s averaged 3120
calories per day.
• While the program somewhat prevented
starvation, chronic hunger remained prevalent.
Bruno Valle
Do World Bank and IMF PRSP-based Economic Guidelines
Hamstring Debt Cancellation and Poverty Deduction?
SAP = Structural Adjustment Programme
PRSP = Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
Malawi
Malawi External Debt Over Time
4,000,000,000.00
3,500,000,000.00
3,000,000,000.00
2,000,000,000.00
Series1
1,500,000,000.00
1,000,000,000.00
500,000,000.00
0.00
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
US$
2,500,000,000.00
Year
Malawi Life Expenctancy At Birth Over Time
44
Years of Life
43
42
41
Series1
40
39
38
37
1995
1997
2000
2002
Year
2003
2004
Zambia
Zambian External Debt Over Time
8,000,000,000.00
7,000,000,000.00
6,000,000,000.00
4,000,000,000.00
Series1
3,000,000,000.00
2,000,000,000.00
1,000,000,000.00
0.00
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
US$
5,000,000,000.00
Year
Zambian Life Expectancy at Birth Over Time
Years of Life
41
40.5
40
39.5
39
38.5
38
37.5
37
Series1
36.5
36
35.5
1995
1997
2000
2002
Year
2003
2004
Trade Liberalization and
Developing Nations
Miracle Tonic or False Elixir?
Han Zhao
HIST388 Fall 2006
What is Trade Liberalization?
Trade Liberalization = Dual-Sided
•Responsibilities of Developed Countries
•Responsibilities of Developing Countries
What is it supposed to do?
•Specialization => efficiency in markets and lower costs
•Competition from abroad as stimulus
…should lead to… demand, growth, employment
BUT does it really do all that???
Some Analysis
GDP Growth vs.
Trade Openness
Correlation: .09201
Consumption per Capita vs.
Trade Openness
Correlation: -.2071
200
90
80
100
openness
consumption
70
60
50
200
15
10
5
0
grow th rate
-5
/ capita
openness
100
-10
-15
100
200
-15 -10
-5
0
5
10
15
50
60
70
80
90
100
200
What are its real effects?
“Review of the evidence of links between trade
liberalization and economic growth concluded there is no
clear causality” – Alan Winters
• Case Studies from SAPRIN
- Philippines, Ecuador, Bangladesh, Hungary, Mexico…
• Trends among countries: benefits to exclusive sectors, importsexports imbalance, price shifts, loss of tariff revenues and losses to
agriculture and manufacturing
• Most of case countries displayed LOSSES due to trade liberalization
as poor bear the brunt of trade adjustment policies