Theories of (General) War
Systemic & Macro-Theories
Johan M.G. van der Dennen
Raiding (dawn attack) by a Florida Indian tribe (de Bry, ± 1590)
The phalanx: the major invention of ‘civilized’ warfare
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
• The STATE
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
• The STATE
• The International SYSTEM
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
– Intrastate processes
– and characteristics
• The STATE
– Interstate processes
– and characteristics
• The International SYSTEM
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
• Type of government or regime
• Turmoil / Revolution
• Army / Arms technology
• The STATE
• The International SYSTEM
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
• Type of government or regime
• Turmoil / Revolution
• Army / Arms technology
• The STATE
– Dyadic (border disputes)
– Polyadic (alliances)
– Systemic (power distribution)
• The International SYSTEM
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
• Strategic (voluntaristic)
• The STATE
• Cataclysmic (deterministic)
• The International SYSTEM
Theories of (General) War
• LEVELS of ANALYSIS (Waltz):
• MAN
• Strategic (voluntaristic)
• The STATE
• Cataclysmic (deterministic)
• The International SYSTEM
• (State anarchy / Security dilemma)
Theories of (General) War
• WAR: IRRATIONAL?
• “… the emptiness of reasons men verbalize for war
suggests that war does not rest on any rationale" (Donald
Wells, The War Myth, 1967)
Theories of (General) War
• WAR: RATIONAL?
• “The conflicts between states which have usually led to
war have normally arisen, not from any irrational and
emotive drives, but from almost a superabundance of
analytic rationality... in general men have fought during
the past two hundred years neither because they are
aggressive nor because they are acquisitive animals, but
because they are reasoning ones: because they discern, or
believe that they can discern, dangers before they become
immediate, the possibility of threats before they are made”
(Michael Howard, The Causes of War, 1983).
Theories of (General) War
• OR BOTH?
• “As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always
make war a remarkable trinity – composed of primordial
violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a
blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability,
within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its
element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which
makes it subject to reason alone” (Karl von Clausewitz, On
War [Vom Kriege], 1832). (Note: this kind of rationality is
often called ‘bounded’ or ‘myopic’).
Theories of (General) War
• The Nature of War
• Much of the 'nature of war' is found not on the
battlefield, but in the hostile behavior and attitudes
that characterize a state's foreign policy. Q. Wright
(1942) calls attention to the discussion of this
psychological aspect of war in Hobbes' Leviathan,
(1651) where the oscillations of war and peace are
compared to the weather: “As the nature of foul
weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in
an inclination thereto of many days together; so
the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting,
but in the known disposition thereto during all the
time there is no assurance to the contrary”.
Theories of (General) War
• Distinction of peace and war?
• Many political realists point out that the common
basis of policy in both peace and war, namely the
quest for power, makes them two inseparable parts
of the same social activity. Blainey (1973)
contends that the causes of war and peace dovetail
into one another: "War and peace are not separate
compartments. Peace depends on threats and
force; often peace is the crystallization of past
force." Or formulated most succinctly: "In a
system of power politics, there is no difference in
kind between peace and war" (Schwartzenberger,
1950).
Theories of (General) War
• War is a means of achieving an end, a weapon
which can be used for good or for bad purposes.
Some of these purposes for which war has been
used have been accepted by humanity as
worthwhile ends: indeed, war performs functions
which are essential in any human society. It has
been used to settle disputes, to uphold rights, to
remedy wrongs: and these are surely functions
which must be served. One may say, without
exaggeration, that no more stupid, brutal, wasteful
or unfair method could ever have been imagined
for such purposes, but this does not alter the
situation (Eagleton, 1948).
Theories of (General) War
• These formulations are reminiscent of Ambrose
Bierce's sardonic definition of "peace" as: "a
period of cheating between two periods of
fighting" (Devil's Dictionary), or Orwell's famous
dictum from "1984": "Peace is War".
• Diametrically opposed to the vista of peace and
war as a bipolar continuum is the view of a sharp
and clear-cut borderline existing between the two
conditions, thus implying a boundarytransgression in the transition from one state of
affairs to the other (e.g., Brodie, 1973).
Theories of (General) War
• The most outspoken advocate, perhaps, of
this view is Wells (1967), who succinctly
affirms: "Notions of some limbo between
war and peace are either contradictory or
unintelligible". Or, as it was stated in
classical times: "Inter bellum et pacem nihil
medium".
Theories of (General) War
• The sociopolitical definition of war
• The general outlook on war as an international or
inter-State phenomenon has been shared by many
students, regardless of their professional background as political scientists, historians,
sociologists, psychologists or military analysts.
Von Clausewitz (1911) defined war as "an act of
violence intended to compel our opponents to
fulfil our will", and elsewhere he emphasized the
continuity of violence with other political
methods: "War is nothing but a continuation of
political intercourse, with an admixture of other
means."
Theories of (General) War
• Sorel (1912) defined war as a "political act by
means of which States, unable to adjust a dispute
regarding their obligations, rights or interests,
resort to armed force to decide which is the
stronger and may therefore impose its will on the
other".
• Deutsch & Senghaas (1971): "By ‘war’ we mean
actual large-scale organized violence, prepared
and maintained by the compulsion and legitimacy
claims of a State and its government, and directed
against another State or quasi-State, i.e., a
relatively comparable political organization".
Theories of (General) War
• The judicial conception of war
• Closely related to a political definition of war is
the judicial conception. Q. Wright (1942; 1965)
describes war as "a legal condition which equally
permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a
conflict by armed force". The Marqués de Olivert
is quoted as declaring that "war is a litigation or
suit (litigio) between nations that defend their
rights, in which force is the judge and victory is
the judicial award". This analogical and figurative
characterization of war is perhaps more literary
than factual (Bernard, 1944).
Theories of (General) War
• Quantitative criteria in the definition of war
• If we are to take this view that war is simply one
form of political intercourse, how do we know
when the line dividing nonviolent conflict from
violence has been meaningfully crossed? One
interesting attempt to fix the threshold
quantitatively was made by Richardson (1960)
who tried to arrange all "deadly quarrels" on a
continuum of violent conflict, ranging from one
killed (murder) to tens of millions killed (Second
World War). The threshold of war was crossed
when deaths went over 1000 (=103).
Theories of (General) War
• Singer & Small (1972) and Deutsch & Senghaas
(1973) call "war" any series of events that meets
the following three criteria:
– (1) Size: it results in at least 1000 battle deaths (not
counting, therefore, the indirect victims through famine,
lack of shelter, and disease).
– (2) Preparation: it has been prepared in advance ,
and/or is being maintained, by large-scale social
organizations through such means as the recruitment,
training and deployment of troops, the acquisition,
storage and distribution of arms and ammunition, and
– (3) Legitimation: it is being legitimized by an
established governmental organization, so that largescale killing is viewed not as a crime but as a duty.
Theories of (General) War
• Multifactoriality of war causation
• War as a complex multi-dimensional social phenomenon has so many sources and causes that no
theory of a single cause can explain its nature. One
cannot find a single necessary condition and a
single sufficient condition; one can only try to find
sources, factors, conditions important for the
occurrence of war. “Any theory of the causes of
war in general or of any war in particular that is
not inherently eclectic and comprehensive, i.e.,
which does not take into account at the outset the
relevance of all sorts of diverse factors, is bound
for that very reason to be wrong” (Brodie, 1974).
Theories of (General) War
• Typologies of war
• Numerous typologies and categorizations of war
have been proposed. Q. Wright (1942; 1965) has
developed a typology of war which distinguishes
among four categories: (1) the civil war, which
takes place within the boundaries of a sovereign
nation; (2) the balance of power war, in which
members of a State system are at war among
themselves; (3) the defensive war, which acts to
guard a civilization against the intrusions of an
alien culture; and (4) the imperial war, in which
one civilization attempts to expand at the expense
of another.
Theories of (General) War
• Singer, Small and Kraft (1965), as do many other
authors, follow Wright's classification in
distinguishing among civil, colonial and
international wars, but with a more focused
emphasis in that wars between civilizations are not
explicitly introduced. Midlarsky (1975) developed
a classification of wars, based on a combination of
the premises of rank order and scope. In addition,
two variables specific to political violence are
included. These are the intensity of violence in the
form of the number killed, and duration, as a
temporal indicator. Finally, the motivation of
actors is taken into account.
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– World politics is statecentric
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– World politics is statecentric
– The world system is anarchically structured
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– World politics is statecentric
– The world system is anarchically structured
– Force is the ultimate ratio of international
politics
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– World politics is statecentric
– The world system is anarchically structured
– Force is the ultimate ratio of international
politics
– The hierarchy of state interests is dominated by
the search for security
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– World politics is statecentric
– The world system is anarchically structured
– Force is the ultimate ratio of international
politics
– The hierarchy of state interests is dominated by
the search for security
– The primary means of security is power
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– World politics is statecentric
– The world system is anarchically structured
– Force is the ultimate ratio of international
politics
– The hierarchy of state interests is dominated by
the search for security
– The primary means of security is power
– Hence international politics is a struggle for
power
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– Action-reaction spiral
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– Action-reaction spiral
– The classic security dilemma
Theories of (General) War
• The Realist Paradigm
– Action-reaction spiral
– The classic security dilemma
• This explains why states that prefer peace
can rationally choose to wage war
Theories of (General) War
• Balance-of-Power Theories
Theories of (General) War
• Balance-of-Power Theories
• According to most balance-of-power
theorists, power is acquired by
– (1) the addition of territory;
Theories of (General) War
• Balance-of-Power Theories
• According to most balance-of-power
theorists, power is acquired by
– (1) the addition of territory;
– (2) the erection of buffer states;
Theories of (General) War
• Balance-of-Power Theories
• According to most balance-of-power
theorists, power is acquired by
– (1) the addition of territory;
– (2) the erection of buffer states;
– (3) undermining the enemy's strength;
Theories of (General) War
• Balance-of-Power Theories
• According to most balance-of-power
theorists, power is acquired by
–
–
–
–
(1) the addition of territory;
(2) the erection of buffer states;
(3) undermining the enemy's strength;
and most importantly (4) forming alliances
Theories of (General) War
• Balance-of-Power Theories
• According to most balance-of-power
theorists, power is acquired by
–
–
–
–
(1) the addition of territory;
(2) the erection of buffer states;
(3) undermining the enemy's strength;
and most importantly (4) forming alliances
• Balance-of-power theories do not provide a
basis for believing that a balance of power
leads to peace
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
• Modelski & Thompson’s long-cycle theory
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
• Modelski & Thompson’s long-cycle theory
• Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic transitions
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
• Modelski & Thompson’s long-cycle theory
• Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic transitions
• Goldstein’s Kondratieff-waves theory
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
•
•
•
•
Modelski & Thompson’s long-cycle theory
Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic transitions
Goldstein’s Kondratieff-waves theory
Doran’s relative power cycle theory
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
•
•
•
•
•
Modelski & Thompson’s long-cycle theory
Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic transitions
Goldstein’s Kondratieff-waves theory
Doran’s relative power cycle theory
Wallerstein’s world economy theory
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
•
•
•
•
•
Modelski & Thompson’s long-cycle theory
Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic transitions
Goldstein’s Kondratieff-waves theory
Doran’s relative power cycle theory
Wallerstein’s world economy theory
– Galtung’s rank-disequilibrium theory
Theories of (General) War
– Blainey’s dyadic power theory
– Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory
– Organski’s power transition theory & variants:
•
•
•
•
•
Modelski & Thompson’s long-cycle theory
Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic transitions
Goldstein’s Kondratieff-waves theory
Doran’s relative power cycle theory
Wallerstein’s world economy theory
– Galtung’s rank-disequilibrium theory
– Choucri & North’s lateral pressure theory
Theories of (General) War
• Blainey's dyadic power theory
– A theory that traces the causes of war to the dyadic
power relationship between two states - emphasizing
the perceptions of this relationship rather than the
objective balance of power - is suggested by Blainey
(1973). He argues that war is a dispute about the
measurement of power and that wars usually begin
when two nations disagree on their relative strength,
defined in terms of military power.
Theories of (General) War
• Blainey's dyadic power theory
– A theory that traces the causes of war to the dyadic
power relationship between two states - emphasizing
the perceptions of this relationship rather than the
objective balance of power - is suggested by Blainey
(1973). He argues that war is a dispute about the
measurement of power and that wars usually begin
when two nations disagree on their relative strength,
defined in terms of military power.
– If states could agree on the 'objective' balance of power they could
predict the outcome of the war, settle their differences on the basis
of compromises proportional to their shared expectations regarding
the outcome of war, and therefore avoid the cost of fighting.
Theories of (General) War
• Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility theory
– Rational, expected-utility maximizing with respect to
war and peace decisions would involve the following
calculations: Leaders calculate their expected utility
from a bilateral war on the basis of an evaluation of the
costs and benefits of victory and defeat, each weighted
by its probability of occurrence. They then calculate the
additions or subtractions from their expected utility that
would result from the intervention of third parties in
support of their adversaries or themselves. The
probabilities of victory and defeat are a linear function
of the distribution of military capabilities, modified by
a loss-of-strength gradient over distance.
Theories of (General) War
• Organski's power transition theory
– Organski (1968: vii) summarizes the theory as follows:
“The overall patterns of world politics in the modern
era are caused by sharp differences in social, economic,
and political modernization among and within nations.
Differential modernization in turn causes shifts in the
distribution of world power among states. It is these
changes that underlie the wars and other conflicts of our
era. The immensely complex patterns that create these
shifts in power, the shifts themselves, and their
consequences are not easily deflected by diplomacy or
military power”.
Theories of (General) War
• Organski's power transition theory (2)
– Organski's basic argument is that the likelihood of a
major war is greatest when the military power of a
dissatisfied challenger begins to approach those of the
leading state in the system, for the challenger will
eventually initiate a war to gain benefits, privileges, and
influence commensurate with its newly acquired
military power. Thus the key condition for war is not
the equality of capabilities per se nor the changes in
those capabilities but, instead, the interaction effect
between these two variables.
Theories of (General) War
• Organski's power transition theory (3)
– The idea that changing power differentials are a
primary cause of international war, particularly major
wars involving the leading states in the system, is not
really new. It can be traced to Thucydides' ([431-411
B.C.] 1954: 1/23) argument that "what made the
Peloponnesian War inevitable was the growth of
Athenian power and the fear which this caused in
Sparta", and scattered references to the importance of
uneven rates of growth can be found in a long history of
realist thinking on international politics.
Theories of (General) War
• Organski's power transition theory (4)
– An alternative hypothesis suggests a more plausible
mechanism by which an impending power transition
may lead to war: the leading state may launch a
'preventive war' in an attempt to block or retard the rise
of the challenger while that opportunity is still available
(Levy, 1989: 253).
Theories of (General) War
– The theoretical importance of preventive war has been widely
recognized by political scientists. Its historical importance has also
been recognized. For Thucydides ([431-411 B.C.] 1954: 1/69),
Sparta's primary motivation was reflected in the Corinthians'
argument for war against Athens: "instead of going out to meet
them, you prefer to stand still and wait till you are attacked, thus
hazarding everything by fighting with opponents who have grown
far stronger than they were originally". Howard (1983: Ch.1)
suggests that Thucydides' explanation for the origins of the
Peloponnesian War is true for most wars: "The causes of war
remain rooted, as much as they were in the pre-industrial age, in
perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the
fears for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own". Taylor
(1954: 166) suggest that "every war between Great Powers [in the
1848-1918 period]... started out as a preventive war".
Theories of (General) War
• Modelski & Thompson's long-cycle theory
– The power transition hypothesis has been incorporated
into several recent theories of systemic change and
hegemonic war in world politics. One is 'long-cycle
theory'. which has been developed by Modelski &
Thompson (1989). According to this view, there are
three principal structures in the world system: the
global political system, the world economy, and the
world cultural subsystem.
Theories of (General) War
• Modelski & Thompson's long-cycle theory (2)
– They identify a global political system originating in
1494 and characterized by regular cycles of world
leadership, system management, and global war over
the last five centuries. Leadership in the system is based
on control over military capabilities of global reach (sea
power prior to the mid-twentieth century and air power
since then). A world power emerges from a global war
with monopoly control over sea power and world trade,
which allows it to structure the global political and
economic systems in its own interests and to maintain
order in the system.
Theories of (General) War
• Modelski & Thompson's long-cycle theory (3)
– The costs of world leadership and the emergence of
new rivals invariably leads to a deconcentration of
power and a decline in the leader's dominant position,
and ultimately to a new struggle for world leadership
and a renewed period of global war, a cycle that has
repeated itself once every hundred years.
Theories of (General) War
• Modelski & Thompson's long-cycle theory (4)
– Long-cycle theory does not attempt to explain all wars
in the system, but only a restricted class of global wars,
defined as those wars that determined the constitution
or authority arrangement of the global political system.
They are the result of a structural crisis in the system
and are basically succession struggles for leadership in
the system. Thus, their fundamental cause is changing
distributions of power arising out of states' uneven rates
of economic development.
Theories of (General) War
• Modelski & Thompson's long-cycle theory (5)
– “Invariably, the challenger appears to act on the hope,
belief, or mistaken assumption that one or more of the
globally oriented powers will not oppose its continental
expansion. These misperceptions may be mixed with
impatience and overconfidence stemming from the
challenger's rapid capability improvements and
encouraged by a system characterized by declining
order and increasing strife. But in any event, global
wars tend to begin as relatively localized affairs,
becoming global in scope only after the globally
oriented power(s) decides to participate” (Thompson,
1983: 349).
Theories of (General) War
• Gilpin's theory of hegemonic transitions
– Gilpin's theory is similar in many respects to long-cycle
theory. The theory is based on an extension of
hegemonic stability theory, which argues that stability
in an international political economy requires the
existence of a single dominant state or 'hegemon'. The
hegemon plays the leadership or system management
role on the basis of its power and its will to bear the
costs of maintaining order in the system. In the absence
of a leader to manage the system, the extent of
economic conflict in the system will increase. Similarly,
the decline of a hegemon should lead to decreasing
stability in the system.
Theories of (General) War
• Gilpin's theory of hegemonic transitions (2)
– These and other theories of hegemonic war
(Wallerstein, 1984; Väyrynen, 1983; see also Toynbee,
1954) generally share the view that the underlying
cause of major war is a power transition driven by some
form of uneven economic development and perhaps
other internal variables. There has yet to be conclusive
test of power transition theory or any of these
hypotheses relating to the conditions under which
power shifts lead to war (Levy, 1989: 258).
Theories of (General) War
• Wallerstein's world-economy approach
– Wallerstein (1974 et seq.) is the leader of a rather
diverse school of thought variously called the worldsystems- or world-economy approach. The worldsystems perspective is essentially a political economy
approach to international relations that focuses on
international inequality and dependence. Even though
its primary focus is not on war, its influence on the
study of war is widespread. It also shares much with the
approaches of Gilpin and Modelski (Cashman, 1993:
263).
Theories of (General) War
• Wallerstein's world-economy approach (2)
– Like the realists, Wallerstein emphasizes the anarchic
nature of the international system. The competitive
nature of the system prevents monopolization, while the
balance of power in the interstate system prevents any
one state from controlling the world economy. Political
anarchy leads to a particular form of global economic
system - a capitalist world economy with an international division of labor. This world economy is
divided by these analysts into 3 segments: the core, the
periphery, and the semiperiphery. There is constant
conflict over membership in these groups; all states
hope to be upwardly mobile. Mobility is conflictual.
Theories of (General) War
• Wallerstein's world-economy approach (3)
– World-system theorists place war in the framework of
the development and expansion of the capitalist world
economy. At bottom, "the capitalist system is a system
that has pitted all accumulators of capital against one
another" (Wallerstein, 1983: 62). Thus, says ChaseDunn (1981: 23), "world wars and the rise and fall of
hegemonic core powers... can be understood as the
violent reorganization of production relations on a
world scale", so as to increase the internationalization
of capitalist production. World wars are essentially
attempts to restructure the interstate political structure
to reflect changing economic realities.
Theories of (General) War
• Goldstein’s K-wave theory
– Both long cyclists and world-system theorists have
incorporated certain economic cycles called Kondratieff
waves (K-waves) into their theories of the cycle of
world leadership. The Russian economist Nikolai
Kondratieff claimed in the 1920s to have discovered
fifty-year waves (or cycles) in prices, production, and
consumption in the economies of the major capitalist
nations. He argued that these cycles were indicative of
rhythms within the international economic system as a
whole. His research also suggested that upswings in
economic long waves were related to the occurrence of
major wars.
Theories of (General) War
• Goldstein’s K-wave theory (2)
– A recent study of global economic cycles (called 'long
cycles') and war from 1945 to 1975 by Goldstein
(1988) finds a strong and consistent correlation between
the severity of war and economic upswings. A
psychological explanation for the relationship between
war and economic upturns is also frequently made.
Indeed, both Macfie (1938) and Blainey (1973), as well
as Goldstein, suggest that economic recoveries are
associated with a general mood of optimism which is
the real cause of war (Cashman, 1993: 135-36).
Theories of (General) War
• Doran's relative power cycle theory
– Doran's relative power cycle theory places a theory of
decision-making about war in the context of the rise
and decline of the relative power of major states. Doran
argues that the power capabilities of states, relative to
other members of the Great Power central system,
follow a cyclical path of growth, maturation, and
decline. Each Great Power will go through this cycle.
The general pattern is that of an "accelerating rise in
relative power that ultimately slows down until relative
power peaks" (Doran, 1989b: 88). The cycle is largely
due to uneven rates of internal economic developments.
Theories of (General) War
• Doran's relative power cycle theory (2)
– War is most likely to occur as a state reaches four
critical points along the cycle. At each of these points
an abrupt inversion occurs in the path of relative
capabilities. A complete cycle contains two (low and
high) turning points and two (halfway) inflection points
(Cashman, 1993: 269).
Theories of (General) War
• Galtung’s rank-disequilibrium theory
– Rank-disequilibrium theory (also known as status
discrepancy theory) is based on the concept of stratification, which can be defined as the arrangement of
units that make up a social system into a hierarchy of
positions that are unequal with regard to power,
property, social evaluation and/or psychic gratification.
The units that make up the social system carry out
different roles in the social division of labor, and they
can be ranked (stratified) on a number of different
criteria or dimensions (Galtung, 1964). The chief
assumption is that one's position within this stratified
structure plays a role in determining one's behavior.
Theories of (General) War
• Galtung’s rank-disequilibrium theory (2)
– Total topdogs (TTT) should be relatively peaceful
because they have already attained most of the rewards
available in the system and are thus satisfied members
of the community. On the other hand, total underdogs
(UUU) may be deprived and thus dissatisfied, but they
lack the necessary resources to successfully force a
change. However, the situation for the rank discrepant
states (UTU, TUT) is different. They have suffered
differential treatment - esteemed because of their
achievements, say, in the military realm, but not
esteemed because of their relative lack of economic
development.
Theories of (General) War
• Galtung’s rank-disequilibrium theory (3)
– This differential treatment produces a destabilizing
pressure for upward mobility. Rank discrepant states
(they have motivation and resources) treat total topdogs
as their 'reference group' and aspire to emulate them. If
no peaceful channels are available, the upward mobility
may be carried out through violence. Galtung notes,
however, that one should not expect rank discrepant
states to initiate wars to change their position in the
system unless (a) other means of attaining total topdog
status have been tried unsuccessfully and (b) the culture
has some practice in violence (i.e., war).
Theories of (General) War
• Choucri & North’s lateral pressure theory
– Another theory in which national growth is an
important variable, but that does not necessarily involve
power transitions and does not restrict itself to the class
of hegemonic wars, is Choucri & North's (1975) lateral
pressure theory of international conflict. The basic
argument is that increasing population and advancing
technology generate increasing domestic demands for
resources that cannot generally be satisfied by a state's
domestic resource endowments or by existing levels of
foreign trade. Resource demands generate 'lateral
pressure' for access to raw materials and markets and
often for political control over external areas.
Theories of (General) War
• Choucri & North’s lateral pressure theory (2)
– This lateral pressure often takes the form of colonial
expansion, and when several states adopt expansionist
policies their interests are increasingly likely to come
into conflict. This generates an 'intensity of
intersections', which leads to internal pressures to
defend one's expanding interests, which in turn leads to
alliance formation and increased military expenditures.
Alliances and military expenditures lead to reciprocal
actions by adversaries, and the resulting action-reaction
process often escalates to violent behavior and possibly
full-scale war (This is essentially Plato’s [c. 428-348
B.C.] theory of war causation).
Theories of (General) War
• Territoriality
– In contemporary state-level war, territorial contiguity
and border disputes have been singled out by quite a
number of researchers as the universal and persistent
underlying cause - during at least the last four or five
centuries (e.g., Luard, 1986; Vasquez, 1993 et seq.). “It
is remarkable how many interstate wars (regardless of
type) from 1816 to 1980 involve states that are
neighbors... These findings provide more than a strong
hint that war is intimately connected with struggles
over contiguous territory. In this analysis, territory is
seen as a general underlying cause of war” (Vasquez,
1993: 293).
Theories of (General) War
• Honor
– In foraging societies, revenge is the predominant
motive for feuding and warfare (Davie, 1929; TurneyHigh, 1949; van der Dennen, 1995). Several authors
have suggested that also for the contemporary state
system humiliated honor, inflated ego, narcissistic rage,
and revanchism play a key role in the deliberations of
war and peace. In his discussion on nationalism,
Kennan (1984: 256-57) focused on its emotional power:
“In the view it [the nation-state] takes of itself is
admiring to the point of narcissism. Its symbols always
require the highest reverence; its cause deserves the
highest sacrifice; its interests are sacrosanct...
Theories of (General) War
• Honor (2)
– Once involved in a war, regardless of the specific
circumstances that gave rise to the involvement in the
first place, that nation-state fights for vague, emotional,
essentially punitive purposes. They, the opponents,
must be punished, made to regret their recalcitrance,
made to be sorry. We, on the other hand, must be
vindicated by victory; the justice of our cause must be
confirmed (as though it proved something) by its very
military triumph; our admirableness must be documented by their ultimate recognition of our superiority”. To
paraphrase Shakespeare's character Hotspur (Henry the
Fourth), anything can become a cause for fighting
when honor is at stake (Scheff, 1994: 94).
Theories of (General) War
• Misperception and War
– The idea that wars are cause by misperceptions is very
attractive in many ways. For those who believe that the
human and economic costs of war frequently far
outweigh any benefits that it might bring to the states
that initiate them, a theory based on misperception
provides a satisfying explanation of how wars might
occur in spite of their asserted irrationality.
Misperception-based theories are also appealing to
those who are frustrated by (cataclysmic) theories that
trace war to inexorable systemic and societal forces that
are for the most part beyond the ability of policymakers
or citizens to control or influence (Levy, 1989: 179).
Theories of (General) War
• Misperception and War (2)
– S.Brown (1994: 23) distinguishes two basic types of
cognitive failure: (1) the failure to obtain crucial
information on the intentions and capabilities of the
adversary and of other parties that could help either
side; and (2) the failure to predict correctly the effects
of the actions of the relevant parties upon one another, a
failure sometimes directly traceable to misinformation
but possible also the product of the concepts and
theories by which one processes information. The first
type of cognitive failure is often referred to as
misperception. The second is often called
miscalculation.
Theories of (General) War
• Misperception and War (3)
– Misperceptions of intentions. The exaggeration of the
hostility of the adversary's intentions is one of the most
common and most important forms of misperception.
Theories of (General) War
• Misperception and War (4)
– Misperceptions of intentions. The exaggeration of the
hostility of the adversary's intentions is one of the most
common and most important forms of misperception.
– Misperceptions of capabilities. Misperceptions of
adversary capabilities may be as important as
misperceptions of intentions. The underestimation of
the adversary's capabilities relative to one's own is
critical and historically common, as Blainey (1973),
Lebow (1981), and others have demonstrated.
Statesmen tend not only to exaggerate the likelihood of
victory, but also to underestimate the duration and the
costs of the war.
Theories of (General) War
• Misperception and War (5)
– The ultimate measure of the accuracy of perceptions of
relative military capabilities is the test of an actual war
(as Blainey suggested), which reflects the impact of
both objective and subjective elements of military
strength and also the uncertainties or 'fog of war' (von
Clausewitz, 1832). Stoessinger (1982: 211) sums the
situation up nicely: "When a leader on the brink of war
believes that his adversary will strike him, the chances
of war are fairly high. When both leaders share this
perception about each other's intent, war becomes a
virtual certainty".
Theories of (General) War
• Misperception and War (6)
– Blainey (1973) points out the importance of perceptions
(or misperceptions) concerning the behavior of third
states: who will enter the war on whose side and who
will remain on the sidelines, who will honor their
alliance commitments and who will welsh out. The
typical misperception (which might be seen as a kind of
wishful thinking) is that one's potential enemies will
remain neutral while one's allies will remain faithful to
their commitments.
Theories of (General) War
• Misperception and War (7)
– The perceptions that war will be economically
manageable and militarily winnable and that there will
be no third-party surprises all create a sense of
optimism that Blainey believes is the key to the cause
of war. He argues that it is exceedingly doubtful
whether there has been a war since 1700 in which the
initial hopes about the impending war were low on both
sides. He concludes that "optimism is a vital prelude to
war. Anything which increases optimism is a cause of
war. Anything which dampens that optimism is a cause
of peace" (Blainey, 1973: 53).
Theories of (General) War
• Evaluation
• So, what have we accomplished ever since Plato,
Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and other classical thinkers
about the causes of peace and war?
Theories of (General) War