A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN INFORMATION SHARING CREATED FROM THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 A Thesis Presented to the faculty of the Division of Criminal Justice California State University, Sacramento Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE in Criminal Justice by Melissa Rose Star SPRING 2014 © 2014 Melissa Rose Star ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN INFORMATION SHARING CREATED FROM THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 A Thesis by Melissa Rose Star Approved by: __________________________________, Committee Chair Sue C. Escobar, J.D., Ph.D. __________________________________, Second Reader William J. Vizzard, DPA ____________________________ Date iii Student: Melissa Rose Star I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for the thesis. __________________________, Graduate Coordinator Yvette Farmer, Ph.D. Division of Criminal Justice iv ___________________ Date Abstract of A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN INFORMATION SHARING CREATED FROM THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 by Melissa Rose Star Statement of Problem The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 confirmed that the terrorist prevention methods in place at that time had failed, and a change was necessary. One explanation for this failure is a lack of necessary information sharing between the agencies that investigate and prevent terrorism. For this reason the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) was enacted to create the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), improve information sharing, and prevent future attacks. This thesis will serve as a policy analysis for the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and will examine the changes this Act made in the way agencies share pertinent information to protect the security of the homeland. Sources of Data This policy analysis has used a four-step policy analysis framework by Houston, Bridgmon, and Parsons (2008) that looks at the changes to information sharing that resulted from the implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the opening of the Department of Homeland Security. It focuses on the first two titles of this Act, v Title 1: Department of Homeland Security and Title 2: Information analysis and Infrastructure Protection, since they directly relate to information sharing. The policy analysis is followed by recommendations for the future of the Department of Homeland Security in order to increase effectiveness based on the current efficiency of the DHS, determined through the Act itself, academic journals, and government publications. Conclusions Reached The HSA and DHS made a lot of changes in the way agencies share information. Individual programs like the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and If You See Something, Say Something improved many of the communication practices between agencies and the public. However, more research on the constantly changing policies of the HSA will be beneficial in keeping it current and effective. _______________________, Committee Chair Sue C. Escobar, J.D., Ph.D. _______________________ Date vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wrestled a lot with this acknowledgment page since I am not very good at sentiments but there were so many people that were involved in the creation and editing of this thesis and that should not be overlooked. Although I can never repay your hard work and support, this thesis is yours as much as mine. Thank you! vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... vii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................1 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 9 Pre September 11th, 2001 .................................................................................. 9 September 11th, 2001 ...................................................................................... 25 Post September 11th, 2001 .............................................................................. 34 3. METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 43 4. POLICY ANALYSIS .......................................................................................... 50 Step 1: Inputs .................................................................................................. 51 Step 2: Government Action ............................................................................ 55 Step 3: Outputs................................................................................................ 57 Step 4: Feedback ............................................................................................. 62 5. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 76 Appendix. Abbreviations ............................................................................................ 81 References ................................................................................................................... 82 viii 1 Chapter 1 Introduction The morning of September 11th, 2001 changed the lives of many people. Within hours, maybe even minutes, it was clear that the United States was under a terrorist attack and that the terrorism prevention methods imbedded in the federal government had failed. The 9/11 Commission Report, officially named “The Final Report” of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, was created to outline the events after the September 11th attacks and provide recommendations for the future (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). It gives a detailed account of the events that occurred on that day; a basic overview of the events is as follows: 08:46:40 - American Airlines Flight 11 crashes into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. 09:03:11 - United Airlines Flight 175 crashes into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. 09:37:46 - American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. 09:57 - Partial collapse of the Pentagon occurs. 09:58:59 - The South Tower of the World Trade Center collapses. 10:03:11 – United Airlines Flight 93 crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. 2 10:28:25 - The North Tower of the World Trade Center collapses (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Time was against the United States to stop the destruction once the terrorist attacks began, and in less than two hours, most of the initial damage had already been done. Since the attacks happened so quickly, it was challenging for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), first responders, and all other response agencies to react in a timely manner. It was apparent that the United States was not only unable to predict and prevent a terrorist attack but respond to one in a timely fashion as well. The Homeland Security prevention methods before September 11th were spread out between many agencies, and collaboration between them was lacking. Perrow (2006) discusses the collaboration issues before September 11th and cites communication, mainly in terms of information sharing, as one of the biggest failures towards not being able to prevent these attacks. Perrow (2006) explains that every agency wants to be the cooperatee and none wants to be the cooperator. This, of course, means that if no one is initiating cooperation, vital information is not being shared. This was particularly true for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These agencies were not sharing vital information that, if analyzed together, could have led them to predict and prevent these attacks before they occurred (Perrow, 2006). Other shortcomings that may have contributed to the inability to prevent the September 11th attacks include: the federal government not adequately training their counterterrorism task force prior to the attacks; agencies being understaffed; and President Bush even felt 3 terrorism was not an urgent topic for discussion, despite warnings that Al-Qaeda was planning an attack where planes would be hijacked and used as missiles (Perrow, 2006). Chertoff (2011), former Secretary of the DHS, describes that, before September 11th, the United States had limited experience with terrorist attacks on American soil and only sporadic experience overseas. This, of course, does not mean that the United States lacked any experience. Airline hijackings and bombings in the 1970s and 80s, the Oklahoma city bombing by Timothy McVeigh, and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 were just a few of the attacks that tested our ability to handle terrorism on our own soil, but they did not prepare Americans for the large scale attack on September 11th (Chertoff, 2011). The inability to communicate across agency lines was apparent, which, along with a lack of experience, most likely contributed to our inability to prevent these attacks (Chertoff, 2011). The United States’ prevention abilities were also hindered by a failure to notice patterns in behavior that could have provided a warning that an attack was imminent (Chertoff, 2011). Had these behavior patterns been noticed, it could have given the United States the valuable information that was needed. In hindsight, all of these shortcomings have shown the United States exactly where the weaknesses are so they can adequately improve them in order to prevent further attacks. Many improvements have already been made but further changes are still necessary. On September 11th, 2001, hijackers made it clear that our prevention methods were not adequate when they used airplanes as weapons of mass destruction, flying them into both the North and South World Trade Center buildings, as well as the Pentagon and a failed attack on a third location which ended with a plane crash in Pennsylvania instead. The 4 U.S. Department of State estimates that the causalities of those attacks reached a total of 3,056: 2,823 victims in the World Trade Center, 189 victims in the Pentagon, and 44 victims from Flight 93 (U.S. Department of State, 2002). These unfortunate statistics cannot be changed, but the Department of Homeland Security was created to bring agencies together in order to increase information sharing and better prevent against future terrorist attacks. Jones (2011), in addition to the authors mentioned previously, suggests that these attacks could have been avoided. The ability of foreign Al-Qaeda members operating inside the United States to hijack four commercial planes occurred because of a preventable intelligence failure. Since our counter terrorism efforts had not been able to prevent this attack, they became the catalysts for change in the federal government (Jones, 2011). At this time, federal agencies and other law enforcement agencies countrywide were forced to adapt to the increasing need for additional terrorism protection. Many things have been done to prevent such attacks in the future, with The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) being just one of them. This Act created the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and changed the way terrorism was investigated. Former President George W. Bush signed the HSA into existence on November 25, 2002 and from this, the DHS was created. According to the DHS website, the formal goals of this department after the HSA was put in place in 2002 include: (A) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and 5 (C) Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States ("Homeland Security Act," 2002). However, the goals of the DHS go beyond the aforementioned items listed, and more goals have been added to the current mission statement for the department. The current mission statement for the DHS now includes a wider range of safety measures, and states: 1. Prevent terrorism and enhancing security; 2. Secure and manage our borders; 3. Enforce and administer our immigration laws; 4. Safeguard and secure cyberspace; 5. Ensure resilience to disasters (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.c). The DHS combined twenty-two different agencies1 under one umbrella and created the Secretary of Homeland Security position, among other supporting positions 1 According to the Department of Homeland Security these twenty-two agencies include the U.S. Customs Service, The Immigration and Naturalization Service, The Federal Protective Service, The Transportation Security Administration, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Office for Domestic Preparedness, The Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System, Nuclear Incident Response Team, Domestic Emergency Support Teams, National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures Programs, 6 (Haynes, 2004). These twenty-two agencies were combined and then dispersed among four main directorates within the department including: Science and Technology; Border and Transportation Security; Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; and Emergency Preparedness and Response (O'Connor, 2002). These changes were designed to strengthen terrorism prevention methods and keep the country safe. However, the actual changes that occurred in information sharing beyond the creation of this new department are a mystery to many citizens, but nonetheless the comfort it provided was evident. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division, comprised of five major agencies2, was one of the key changes towards better information sharing practices (Haynes, 2004). This division analyzes intelligence information from federal, state, local and private sectors, creating a centralized information database. The information can then be analyzed in order to assess where the most pressing threats are Environmental Measurements Laboratory, National Biological Warfare Defense Analysis Center, Plum Island Animal Disease Center, Federal Computer Incident Response Center, National Communications System, National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI), Energy Security and Assurance Program, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 2 National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI), National Communications System, Federal Computer Incident Response Center, National Communications System and Critical Infrastructure simulation and analysis center (Haynes, 2004). 7 and identify what their priorities should be. It also developed comprehensive plans to secure key resources when necessary (Haynes, 2004). This was a big change from the original information sharing practices, which were almost non-existent. In the DHS, these agencies were now required to work together in many instances and there was a basis for information sharing put in place; however, there are still some imperfections in terms of communication that could benefit from further changes to the DHS such as a better communication strategy between federal and local law enforcement agencies. Prior research only partially discusses the changes brought about by the new DHS and few discuss this in terms of the exact changes made by the HSA itself and how it affected information sharing processes. Some of the literature seeks to define homeland security (Bellavita, 2008; Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012; May, Jochim, & Sapotichne, 2011), which is beneficial in determining the areas where DHS should focus. Other researchers discuss discrepancies before September 11th, including the need for a DHS (Berman & Flint, 2003; Birkland, 2009; Burch, 2008; Chertoff, 2011; Jones, 2011; Perrow, 2006). Additional research explains how the HSA created the DHS (Burch, 2008; Haynes, 2004; Monahan, 2011, Perrow, 2006), which is usually limited to how the HSA was introduced and does not discuss the changes made to information sharing. While these previous compilations are all useful, a complete analysis of the information sharing changes that were brought about from the HSA is not currently available in existing research. The remainder of this thesis will serve as a policy analysis for the HSA and work to address the question: What changes did the creation of the Department of Homeland Security via the Homeland Security Act of 2002 create in the way agencies share 8 information? The primary goal of this policy analysis centers on determining the actual changes produced by the HSA and the effect it had on information sharing between the agencies, as well as state, local, and private agencies, that were now organized under one roof. Further improvements of the DHS will be important in preventing terrorist attacks in the future. This introduction section will be followed by a review of the literature that focuses on the overall term “homeland security,” the lack of information sharing between agencies and the events that unfolded on September 11th. It will also briefly discuss the HSA and new DHS. This will be followed by the methodology section, which will provide a guide for the policy analysis, based on a four-step framework by Houston, Bridgmon, and Parsons (2008) on the HSA that explains the changes in information sharing that resulted from implementation. The next section will use this framework and conduct the policy analysis of the HSA. Finally, a conclusion will follow with recommendations for the future of the DHS and information sharing. 9 Chapter 2 Literature Review In order to understand the need for a DHS, the events leading up to, and including, September 11th must be examined. A history of terrorism and definition of key terms aid in providing a complete understanding about how we came to witness the attacks on September 11th and how we can better prepare for the future. The timeline of responses from federal agencies, and other response agencies, to the hijacked planes explains how deep the lack of communication was between and within these agencies. The United States has come a long way since then, in part because of the changes provided by the HSA, enacted shortly after the attacks. Pre September 11th, 2001 Brief history of terrorism. Organized terrorism can be dated back as early as 6 C.E. when the Zealot sect practiced systematic terrorism in the Middle East during the Jewish rebellion against Rome (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). Later terrorist acts occurred in the 1800s, both with the assassination of Louis XIV, King of France, during the French Revolution and Alexander II, Emperor of Russia, in 1881 (Carr, 2006). In today’s world, the violence linked to those assassinations would be referred to as terrorism. The fear associated with terrorism was also present in America and Europe during the last two decades of the 19th century. During that time, there were assassinations on both sides; the deaths of ministers, presidents, rulers and royalty only intensified fear in the citizens, which was further increased by press coverage (Carr, 2006). This is similar to the issues 10 we have in today’s media where terrorism and other forms of violence are over covered and instill fear in the citizens (Hoffman, 1998). The world has seen many other acts of terrorism in history, including the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, in 1914 that began World War I. Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian student, along with five other teenage coconspirators carried out this act of terrorism (Carr, 2006). They were a part of the Black Hand Society, a secret militant organization, with the political agenda to stop any possible weakening in the resolve of the nationalist movement in Bosnia (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). After World War I ended there were many changes, including the industrial revolution, that contributed to the creation of a new wave of terrorism, one that we are all too familiar with today (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). This new wave of terrorism continued throughout World War II in large part because of mass communications and technology (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). The use of nuclear weapons and mass murder in particular played a large part in invoking fear in citizens during World War II. The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in Japan, by the United States in 1945 were devastating to that community. In addition, Nazi Germany facilitated the mass murder of many Jewish people, among others, reaching upwards of ten million murders (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). These terrorist attacks focus largely on fear and devastation and are only a select few of the many domestic and international terrorist attacks this world has seen. Although the attacks on September 11th, by the terrorist group al Qaeda, was not by any means the beginning of terrorist acts in the United States 11 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007), it did have a significant impact on how terrorism is investigated and prevented. Al Qaeda was formed in 1988 at the end of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, introducing a new kind of terrorism to the world. Bin Ladin was the leader of this terrorist organization (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). They first gained attention because of the U.S. embassy bombing in 1998 followed by many other international attacks (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). The World Trade Center witnessed its first attack in 1993, by al Qaeda but accomplished by Ramzi Yousef, when a car bomb was placed in an underground parking lot. This did not have the devastating effects that this group was aiming for (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). This is by no means an extensive history of terrorism and terrorist attacks but it describes a basic evolution towards modern day terrorism. Understanding this historical timeline can help prepare the United States for the future of terrorism and aid in the creation of better prevention strategies. In addition to this history, understanding the term “terrorism” is an important task. Terrorism, communication, and homeland security. Despite its frequent use, especially in the media, “terrorism” can be challenging to define because there are so many different interpretations (Hoffman, 1998). In the late 1700s, during the French Revolution, the term “terrorism” actually had a positive meaning. It was used to establish order during the brief anarchical period that followed an uprising in 1789 and was designed to consolidate the new government’s power by intimidating counter- 12 revolutionaries and any other enemies (Hoffman, 1998). Today the word provides a very different meaning, even if one concise definition is hard to determine. As stated on the FBI website, “terrorism” is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (as cited in U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., p. iv). This is a broad definition and many agencies, including the FBI, have included their own additions to it. The FBI distinguishes between domestic and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism includes the use or threatened use of violence by a group or individual that is based entirely in the United States or Puerto Rico, without any international ties, who commits a violent act in order to intimidate the government or civilian population to further their political or social objectives (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). International terrorism differs in that it includes a group or tie outside the United States that violates or would violate the criminal laws of the United States or any state within if committed within the jurisdiction (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). In addition, the HSA has its own definition of terrorism that is thorough even though it does not distinguish between domestic and international forms. It states that terrorism is any activity that: (A) involves an act that: 13 (i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (Homeland Security Act, 2002). In defining terrorism it is also important to understand the goals of the terrorists themselves. Terrorists want make life miserable through fear (Fischhoff, 2011). They directly damage people’s lives by: personal injury, disrupting economics, and discrediting leaders. Not only do they cause tangible damages but they also instill fear, in those that were not yet affected, that they will be next to experience destruction and their government will be unable to protect them (Fischhoff, 2011). In investigating the possible failures that contributed to the United States government’s inability to prevent the September 11th attacks, communication was a big concern. “Communication” can have a variety of meanings but, in this context, it refers to the sharing of information between agencies in any capacity, be it verbal, written, or through any other means. The 9/11 Commission report agrees that information sharing is important and states, “when information sharing works, it is a powerful tool” (The 14 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 419). Information sharing was also a problem during the attacks since first responders did not have an effective way to communicate, or did not use it, with each other and therefore mistakes were made (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The term “homeland security” should not be confused with the Department of Homeland Security and although state, local, and federal officials have used them interchangeably, they have separate distinct definitions (Bellavita, 2008). “Homeland security” is an umbrella term that can have many different meanings, and the Department of Homeland Security is a federal agency that promotes security for the homeland. “Homeland security” is a complex problem that incorporates both foreign and domestic policy issues, government organizations, businesses, non-profit organizations and citizens (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). It has become a very common word, but there is no concise definition of the term agreed upon by everyone (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). Bellavita (2008) explains that there are at least seven definitions for homeland security that stress where homeland security protection should place its emphasis. The first of these definitions involves terrorism overall, referring to a national effort by federal, state and local governments, the private sector, and individuals to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce our vulnerability to terrorism, minimize the damage, and recover from attacks (Bellavita, 2008). The second prioritizes all hazards, including a national effort to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, protect against manufactured and natural hazards, and respond to and recover from incidents 15 (Bellavita, 2008). The third targets terrorism and catastrophes involving what the government does to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist and catastrophic events that affect the United States (Bellavita, 2008). The fourth refers to jurisdictional hazards, which can be different in each jurisdiction and is a locally directed effort to prevent and prepare for incidents most likely to threaten the safety of citizens in that area (Bellavita, 2008). The fifth is Meta-hazards, referring to the national effort to prevent or mitigate any social trend that can disrupt the long-term stability of the American way of life (Bellavita, 2008). The sixth prioritizes national security, which refers to the protection of the territory, population, and critical infrastructures of the United States against threats (Bellavita, 2008). Finally, the seventh is security what they refer to as: über alles. This is a symbol used to justify government efforts to limit civil liberties (Bellavita, 2008). This definition explains the different aspects of homeland security that are important, but does not provide a very compact and useable definition of the term. The Homeland Security Council provides its own, more concise definition of “homeland security” in its publication of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Council, 2007). They state, “Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 3). This definition mainly focuses on terrorism, which is not the only issue for homeland security, as Bellavita (2008) notes. The importance of looking beyond terrorism when protecting the homeland was made clear when the United 16 States was grossly unprepared for Hurricane Katrina3. This proved that our homeland security resources needed to relate to all hazards instead of focusing only on terrorism (Bellavita, 2008). Homeland security is a concept unique to the United States since other countries did not experience the same amount of destruction as was seen in the United States with September 11th and Hurricane Katrina (Morag, 2011). Other countries have experienced terrorist attacks, like Israel and the United Kingdom, and natural disasters, like Japan, but none have experienced both in such a short amount of time (Morag, 2011). Therefore, the United States did not have a model for our need for a homeland security plan that incorporated an all-hazards approach. However, other countries may soon realize the need for homeland security practices and ideas and follow the lead that has been set by the United States (Morag, 2011). Lack of communication. Since the 1980s, federal agencies have recognized the benefits of state and local counterterrorism intelligence sharing (Jones, 2011). The FBI created the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to facilitate better information sharing between federal agencies and state and local agencies. These agents were federalized, 3 Hurricanes account for seven out of ten of the most costly disasters in United States history. Hurricane Katrina is currently the Nation’s most destructive natural disaster but history suggests that it is only a matter of time before another devastating hurricane will hit and being prepared for it should be of high importance (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Council, 2007). 17 meaning they were controlled under the federal government, and discouraged from fully utilizing their home agencies, which decreased the effectiveness of the joint task force (Jones, 2011). The DHS-sponsored fusion centers have some advantages over the JTTF because the state and local agencies have a more substantial role. However, there are still some shortcomings since they changed from terrorism prevention to all hazards prevention producing a large quantity of intelligence information. This information could not be analyzed in a reasonable amount of time, lowering their effectiveness (Jones, 2011). Bellavita (2008) has already expressed how important all hazards prevention is with the description of Hurricane Katrina, making this an effective change in some instances. There is also the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) supported by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center that promotes information sharing between state and local agencies with federal agencies. However, it treats the sub-federal officials as consumers of intelligence instead of a cooperative relationship, which puts the federal government on a pedestal and is not always effective (Jones, 2011). By September 11th, 2001, the federal government was almost exclusively in charge of intelligence collection, but historically this was not always true. Before World War II, large police departments began collecting intelligence information, but the FBI was concerned that this would cause people to give their information to the police rather than the FBI. Former President Roosevelt passed legislation that stated that the FBI would take charge of investigations that related to issues of national security, and police departments were required to hand over any collected intelligence directly to the FBI 18 (Jones, 2011). This did not encourage any information sharing, and the relationship between the police and FBI was threatened, which contributed to the creation of what had been referred to as “the wall” of separation between many federal intelligence agencies (Jones, 2011). This “wall” was not limited to federal agencies and Berman and Flint (2003) explain that there were many “walls” acting simultaneously. There was also a “wall” between law enforcement agencies and intelligence gathering agencies, where there was a constant lack of information sharing and cooperation (Berman & Flint, 2003). Jones (2011) explains that the origins of “the wall” can be traced back to warrantless wiretapping. Congress began regulating wiretapping in 1934 with the Federal Communications Act, which prohibited intercepting and disseminating wire and radio communications (Jones, 2011). In Nardone v. United States (1939), this prohibition was applied to federal agents and wiretapping was inadmissible in court. The Department of Justice (DOJ) interpreted the Federal Communications Act of 1934 broadly and stated it only prohibited the sharing of intercepted communication outside of the Federal government (as cited in Jones, 2011, p. 187). The courts supported this, which further limited information sharing while still ensuring that Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Katz v. United States (1967) established that the Fourth Amendment rights did not apply to places, only people, and amplified the need for legal guidelines (as cited in Jones, 2011, p. 188). Congress then passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968, prohibiting the government from wiretapping without a court order, except in limited situations, such as national security (Jones, 2011). Abusing intelligence information became an issue after it was revealed 19 that the U.S. Army was spying on civilians and the Watergate scandal in the 1970s exposed the political cover up implicating the DOJ, FBI, CIA, and White House. This led to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978, which created a structure for collecting intelligence information by determining if the main focus was to obtain foreign intelligence (Jones, 2011). “The wall” was raised higher when the DOJ issued guidelines in 1995 that made a clear distinction between foreign intelligence investigations and criminal investigations, which further created a divide between foreign and criminal investigators. This caused information sharing to come to a halt, which could have contributed to the September 11th intelligence failure (Jones, 2011). The first of these guidelines was issued by Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick and put limits on information sharing between criminal and intelligence information regarding the 1993 World Trade Center bombings (Sales, 2012). Although this Gorelick memo enacted these severe limitations, it wasn’t supposed to put agents in a position that they were not able to overcome. Even though the second guideline, issued by Attorney General Janet Reno, pushed for criminal and intelligence investigators to share information this was not done because of the already imposed limitations (Sales, 2012). During this time, FBI Deputy Director Bryant warned agents that sharing information could be detrimental to their career, for obvious reasons this lead agents to believe that they did not have the ability to share FISA information and later any kind of information (Jones, 2011). In hindsight, it is easy to spot the issues in communication that could have aided the prevention of the September 11th attacks (Fischhoff, 2011). After all, communication 20 is an essential part in preventing terrorists from achieving their goals (Fischhoff, 2011). The many agencies that investigated terrorism before September 11th were lacking these effective communication strategies to prevent terrorist attacks and there was no remedy for this in the works (Paretta, 2012). Counterterrorism strategies were not created, adopted nor instituted by one central authority, making collaboration almost impossible (Paretta, 2012). There was also no single person responsible for reporting to Congress or the President on important counterterrorism information, which made it so there was no coordination among the information being shared with different officials (Paretta, 2012). These are some of the issues the 9/11 Commission report was referring to that could have been solved with an effective management system (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Aviation security, more specifically, was not taken seriously prior to September 11th especially in terms of hijackings and proper hijacking procedures (Paretta, 2012). With the cost of airline security so high, there is a point when the cost outweighs the benefit of further security (Seidenstat, 2004). When the FAA found that point they were reluctant to push past it. However, when a disaster occurred they were quick to increase security for a little while before falling back into the same relaxed attitude. After the crash of TWA flight 800 in 1996, former President Clinton ordered better security measures at airports. However, by the late 1990’s a more relaxed attitude had returned. It was relatively easy to gain access to the tarmac and airplane and the screening process for passengers and luggage often missed potentially dangerous items. 21 This relaxed attitude made it easier for the hijackers to carry out their plans on September 11th (Seidenstat, 2004). Hijackings were not the only issue that was not a top priority. Perrow (2006) discusses an increase in terror warnings before September 11th that was not properly addressed by the White House, which led to an inadequately trained counterterrorism task force prior to the attacks. Even President Bush did not feel a sense of urgency regarding terrorism before September 11th, despite warnings that Al-Qaeda was planning an attack where planes would be hijacked and used as missiles (Perrow, 2006). For instance, Perrow (2006) notes that the President’s national security leadership team met almost one hundred times in the months before September 11th, and yet terrorism was a topic of discussion during only two of those sessions. In addition, the Bush administration as a whole moved to “de-emphasize” counterterrorism and when the FBI asked for more counterterrorism agents, they were rejected by the White House (Perrow, 2006, p. 3). This is not to say there were no effective terrorism prevention methods in place (Chertoff, 2011). Before September 11th some Islamic terrorist plots had been foiled during the planning stages thanks to intelligence information (Chertoff, 2011). These foiled terrorist attacks, among other attempts or successful attacks, all traveled through the criminal justice system of the time, which included a strict set of rules limiting intelligence sharing between foreign and domestic agencies. As these laws were interpreted, the intelligence information was unable to be collected for law enforcement purposes (Chertoff, 2011). This made it difficult to share information with other agencies and accurately prosecute terrorists. These limitations were a hindrance to information 22 sharing within the intelligence community and may have contributed to the failure to prevent the September 11th attacks (Chertoff, 2011). Berman and Flint (2003) explain that clear guidelines for data collection, use, and dissemination are necessary to fight terrorism. Since the federal government was lacking these qualities, a change was definitely needed. The CIA and the FBI, for example, both had the ability to share important information with each other, but this was not facilitated or promoted and therefore it did not happen. This lack of information sharing also contributed to the bureaucratic structure of these agencies, and the intelligence community as a whole, which hampered their counterterrorism strategies (Paretta, 2012). This is not directly the fault of individual agents, but rather the lack of an appropriate means to share this vital information among agencies (Paretta, 2012). Jones (2011) explains just one example where information sharing between the CIA and FBI could have provided widespread benefits in the prevention of the September 11th attacks. On June 11th, 2001 there was a meeting between a CIA agent, labeled Dave; an FBI agent, labeled Jane; and several other FBI agents to discuss the USS Cole bombing. Jane brought three photographs to this meeting, which were provided to her by a separate CIA agent, and had NSA signal intelligence related to these photographs that she decided not to share with the FBI agents. This decision was made because the intelligence contained information that was not to be shared with criminal investigators. However, the FBI agents had already worked on this case regarding this NSA information. If they had been informed about this additional information during the meeting, they would have wanted additional information about a particular suspect: 23 Mihdhar. Dave also had information about Mihdhar but did not share it because, as a CIA analyst, he felt he was not at liberty to answer the FBI’s questions. Jane believed that if Dave had known about Mihdhar he would have disclosed that information and since he did not do so, the information was not shared. Mihdhar turned out to be the weak link in Al-Qaeda’s planning of the September 11th attacks. Since no one was looking for Mihdhar, he was able to fly into the United States two days after this meeting without issue. The sharing of this information during this meeting could have led to Mihdhar’s capture, which may have assisted in the prevention of these attacks (Jones, 2011). Other failures. Although communication was one of the biggest failures in preventing the attacks on September 11th, there were other possible contributing factors – funding being one of them. On September 10th, 2001, an FBI request for an increase of $58 million annually for counterterrorism agents, analysts, and translators was rejected, and not for the first time (Perrow, 2006). These extra employees may not have made communication between the federal agencies any more efficient, nor helped in the sharing of information, but they could have increased the investigative and analytical abilities of the agency that might have led to the prevention of these attacks. The 9/11 Commission report states that although a lack of information sharing contributed to the inability to thwart these attacks; imagination, policy, capabilities and management were also to blame (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Before the Pearl Harbor attack, in 1941, the United States knew an attack was coming from the Japanese but did not know exactly where it would occur. 24 In hindsight, intelligence information should have led us to Hawaii as a target. Since al Qaeda had used suicide vehicles in the past, imagining that aircraft could have been weapons should not have been that far fetched (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Had the United States been able to use the intelligence that was available and a little imagination, better preparation for this type of attack could have been a reality. During the years leading up to September 11th, ending al Qaeda’s terror regime was almost impossible. Policies were in place that prevented the United States from killing Bin Ladin, and his lieutenants, and ending al Qaeda’s refuge in Afghanistan. The CIA was following Bin Ladin more than any other agency but they did not have the ability to kill him until after the September 11th attacks. The Department of Defense (DoD) was not given the ability to end al Qaeda’s refuge, prior to the attacks, therefore diminishing the military’s abilities. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations saw the invasion of Afghanistan as unimaginable prior to the attacks but a policy change could have led us to try lesser forms of intervention to prevent these attacks (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). This policy ineffectiveness led to the United States’ diminished capabilities to prevent these attacks. Prior to September 11th the DoD was not fully engaged in countering al Qaeda and the United States relied mostly on the CIA for these duties. Domestic issues were also present in that agencies did not have the capabilities to share information, sometimes even with their own agents, making a lot of the information they did have, almost useless. The FAA also did not have the capabilities necessary to handle 25 the possibility of such an attack, making us especially vulnerable to hijackings (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Effective management was lacking in transnational operations and not only was information not shared across agency lines but this meant duties were also not clearly assigned across agency lines (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). To further prove this, the case of Mihdhar is brought up to explain how the inability for agencies to share information led to Mihdhar slipping through the cracks of the system. Both the CIA and the FBI failed at putting Mihdhar on necessary watch lists and sharing information about how dangerous he was, which could have led to the prevention or at least prediction of these attacks (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Many of these other failures lead back to the information sharing failure, showing just how detrimental it was in the prevention of these attacks. September 11th, 2001 Timeline of the attacks and responses. The 9/11 Commission report gives a very detailed account of the events that unfolded on September 11th through the eyes of the many responders, including the New York Police and Fire Departments and the FAA, and shows that even during the attacks communication between the agencies that were, or should have been, responding to the attacks was more than lacking (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Many years after the attacks it can be easy to critique the changes that were made from this terrorist attack but 26 it is important to remember the actual events that unfolded and where the problems lay to further improve these changes. Boarding and hijackings. The five hijackers that were scheduled to board American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston’s Logan International Airport to Los Angeles were able to clear security without any major problems. Some of them had been selected by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), which meant that their checked baggage would not board the flight until it was confirmed that they had actually boarded the plane. This occurred and the flight pushed back from the gate at 07:40 (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). It is believed the hijacking began at or shortly after 08:14, when the pilot stopped communications with Air Traffic Control (ATC). From this point on, the only communications that were received came from two flight attendants on board the flight via an airphone. From these communications we know that two flight attendants were stabbed and the hijackers were able to gain control of the cockpit. The hijackers then forced the passengers to the rear of the plane with pepper spray or mace and claimed they had a bomb. Just before 08:25 the hijackers had unsuccessfully tried to communicate with the passengers and inadvertently communication with ATC instead, alerting them of the hijacking. The flight attendants reported that the plane was flying erratically and were rapidly descending before communication was lost. The plane crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 08:46:40 (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). 27 At Boston’s Logan International Airport, ready to depart to Los Angeles, five hijackers were scheduled to board United Airlines Flight 175. They were all able to clear security without any major problems and CAPPS selected none for extra screening. Their flight pushed back from the gate at 08:00 (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). At 08:42 United Airlines Flight 175 completed a report on a suspicious transmission after hearing the hijackers on American Airlines Flight 11, this was their last communication with ATC. Flight attendants and passengers were able to report that the hijackers were using knives, mace and a bomb threat. These calls came from the back of the plane insinuating that passengers on this flight were also forced to the back of the plane showing similarities in the hijackings. By this time, the two pilots had been killed. Passengers were able to get calls out to family members who were able to contact police to notify them of the hijacking. At 08:58 the flight started heading towards New York and at 09:03:11 it crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). At Dulles International Airport, in Virginia, five more hijackers boarded American Airlines Flight 77 to Los Angeles. CAPPS also selected some of these hijackers but since this only affected their checked baggage, their plans were not hindered. They successfully boarded their flight at 07:50 and took off at 08:20 (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The hijacking began between 08:51 and 08:54 after their last communication with ATC. At 08:54 the flight started to deviate from its scheduled course. Passengers and flight attendants were 28 able to call the ground and update them on what was going on. Family members were able to get in touch with American Airlines and other officials. The hijackers had knives, moved the passengers to the rear of the plane and had box cutters. At 09:00, when it was suspected that two American Airlines flights had been hijacked, the rest of the flights in the northeast were grounded. The Secret Service was advised at 09:34 that an unknown aircraft was headed towards the White House. At 09:37:46 the plane crashed into the Pentagon (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). At Newark Airport, four men boarded United Airlines Flight 93 to San Francisco. Some of them were selected for CAPPS but they were all able to get through the rest of the security measures without issues. There were only four hijackers on this flight because the fifth had been refused entry into Florida by a suspicious immigration inspector. They boarded the flight between 07:39 and 07:48 and it took off at 08:42 (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). This flight was running twenty-five minutes late, but the passengers were unaware of the hijacking of the other flights. The flight went according to plan for the first forty-six minutes. The pilot received a warning to watch for cockpit intrusions only four minutes before the hijacking occurred and the hijackers were able to gain access to the cockpit. Passengers and flight attendants were able to call family and colleagues on the ground and give them details about the hijacking and gain information about the hijacking of the other flights. The hijackers tried to make an announcement that there was a bomb on the plane but this message did not reach the passengers because the hijackers did not know how to use the system. At 09:57 passengers decided to rush the hijackers and tried to take back control 29 of the plane. The hijackers attempted to jerk the plane to stop the passengers but when it was clear they were going to be unable to do so, the hijackers crashed the plane at 10:03:11 in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. The objective was for this plane to reach symbols of the American Republic, such as the Capitol or the White House, which, thanks to the passengers, never occurred (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). By 08:00 all nineteen hijackers had boarded their respective flights and successfully passed through all the security measures in place to prevent such a hijacking, our methods had failed. ATC officials believed it was the air carrier’s responsibility to notify planes and increase security. The airlines were unable to contend with the growing number of hijackings and there was a lack of communication between them and the FAA. The FAA had failed to communicate with other necessary responders as well (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). FAA, the military, federal agencies and the President. The FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are required to work very closely in regards to defending United States airspace. The FAA has twenty-two Air Route Traffic Control Centers and on September 11th, four of these, based in: Boston, New York, Cleveland and Indiana were responsible for tracking the four hijacked planes. They each had their own separate knowledge base of the hijacking and were not communicating with each other, let alone the FAA (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). 30 Although protocol was already in place for how the FAA and NORAD would respond to a hijacking, the hijacking on September 11th did not follow the plan associated with the protocol. The FAA was not immediately aware that American Airlines Flight 11, or any of the planes thereafter, had been hijacked but when they heard an announcement telling the passengers to stay quiet, which was meant for the passengers to hear not ATC, they knew a hijacking was in progress. Once United Airlines Flight 175 stopped responding and began to change course the FAA determined that this plane had also been hijacked (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The Military was first notified of the American Airlines Flight 11 hijacking at 08:37:53 when the FAA reached out to the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), NORADS northeast sector, asking for help with fighter aircraft to go to New York where the hijacked plane was headed. Since they did not know where they were going, as the hijacked plane had already turned off its transponder, they were told to wait for further instruction. The first plane hit the North Tower only nine minutes after the military was notified; even if they had a destination they would not have arrived in time (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). American Airlines Flight 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 08:54 but was under control of a different FAA office that had not yet heard about the other hijackings. For this reason, they assumed the plane was experiencing an electrical or mechanical failure. They reported that the plane had crashed to FAA headquarters who then informed them of the other hijacking and they started to doubt the crash. This FAA 31 command center ordered a nationwide ground stop for all aircraft while headquarters was still discussing the need for one. The FAA command center was able to get assistance from an unarmed National Guard cargo craft to help find Flight 77. Just seconds after 09:38 they witnessed and reported that the plane had crashed into the Pentagon. At this time NORAD was not aware of Flight 77 and was still searching for Flight 11, which no longer existed, that they now believed was headed to Washington, D.C. (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). NORAD was also unaware of United Airlines Flight 93 that was also headed towards Washington, D.C. It took the FAA command center only seven minutes to notify headquarters, after they lost radio communication and the plane had started descending, of the hijacking. The command center then asked headquarters if they wanted military assistance but they were elsewhere talking about this hijacking and it took a few minutes to hear that the military was being notified. Multiple other aircrafts noticed Flight 93 flying erratically until it crashed at 10:03:11. The military was not notified that assistance was needed until 10:07, after the crash had already occurred (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). It was clear that the FAA and the military were unable to handle a hijacking; they were being run by civilians and military personal that were not prepared to respond to a hijacking with aircraft that were trying to disappear. This was made worse by the fact that the military wasn’t notified in time for their response to make a difference (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). 32 When the President was notified that a second plane had hit the World Trade Center, his first thought was to remain calm. He was seated in a classroom at the time and, even after notification, stayed for another five to seven minutes while the children were reading. Once he left, he began heading back towards Washington when he was notified that the Pentagon was attacked and made this statement to the Vice President Dick Cheney: “Sounds like we have a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon. We’re at war…somebody’s going to pay” (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 39). The Vice President authorized the shoot down of United Airlines Flight 93 but the orders became confusing as they passed through the chain of command and they did not reach the pilots of all the military planes that were looking for the hijacked plane. Had Flight 93 not crashed, NORAD officials are confident that they would have been able to shoot down the aircraft in time but this, of course, cannot be proven (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Not only can we not prove this but the 9/11 Commission Report states that there were too many variables working against NORAD and the military for this to have been accomplished showing doubt that they would have been successful (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). War on Terror. When the president finally reached a safe location, he met, though a secure teleconference, with his principal advisors. He started the meeting by saying: “we’re at war” (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 326). Just nine days after the attacks, on September 20th, 2001, President 33 Bush declared that Americans were now engaged in a “War on Terror” (Carr, 2006). Although they were not certain who was to blame, all signs pointed to al Qaeda (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The goals of the War on Terror went beyond stopping al Qaeda and were focused on stopping every terrorist group in the world (Carr, 2006). Despite this, the War on Terror was geared towards al Qaeda’s bases in Afghanistan but when the Taliban refused to hand him over without evidence against him the United States began bombing raids on Afghan towns and cities (Carr, 2006). The fall of Kabul, and other major Afghan cities, was followed by a manhunt for al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. By January 2001, most of Afghanistan was under the control of American-led forces and the Bush administration felt confident enough to expand the war on terror to Iraq (Carr, 2006). By 2004 Iraq had become one of the most violent countries in the world with an average of seventy attacks a day from the insurgents on American Troops. Although the US military claimed that the war in Afghanistan had disrupted al Qaeda’s regime, there was no evidence that the War on Terror had actually reduced terrorist violence (Carr, 2006). Other events that occurred in the decade following the September 11th attacks include one of the most well-known and impactful events, the death of Osama bin Laden. The New York Times reported on May 1st, 2011 that Osama bin Laden had been killed in Pakistan by a group of Navy Seals and CIA operatives (Baker, Cooper & Mazzetti, 2011). Although this did not end the War on Terror, it is a clear turning point (Baker et al., 2011). The New York Times also reported on May 23, 2013 that President Obama 34 believes it is time to narrow the scope of the War on Terror and move towards the day when the United States is no longer at war (Baker, 2013). President Obama also said he plans to redefine the global War on Terror by limiting the use of drones, recommitting to closing the Prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and seeking new limits on his own war power (Baker, 2013). According to the New York Times, the last few troops quietly left Iraq in December of 2011 marking the end of the war in Iraq (Arango & Schmidt, 2011). They moved out in the middle of the night as to not draw attention or encounter any violence because of their withdrawal and were successfully able to cross the border into Kuwait (Arango & Schmidt, 2011). The timeline to remove troops from Afghanistan is still being determined. President Obama has stated he wants to withdraw troops by the end of 2014, but is still open to leaving troops behind after this deadline for training and counterterrorism purposes (Landler & Cooper, 2014). This will be determined by a pact known as the bilateral security agreement, but the current President, Mr. Karzai, has shown little interest in signing it. Therefore, President Obama is prepared to deal with the next President of Afghanistan to continue negotiations (Landler & Cooper, 2014). Post September 11th, 2001 Changes. After the September 11th attacks, many failures with in the United States government were brought to light and from this many policy changes were introduced to protect the homeland. The 9/11 Commission Report recommended a "unity of effort" in the sharing of intelligence to prevent this type of failure from reoccurring in the future (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, 35 p. 399). Burch (2008) explains that these attacks proved to be the catalyst for change in the federal government and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies countrywide to promote a more united front. The lack of information sharing among the intelligence community was a hot topic among agencies, and led to one of the largest reorganizations the country has ever seen (Burch, 2008). This included the creation of several national organizations – the DHS, the Director for National Intelligence, and the National Counter Terrorism Center, as well as a revamping of the FBI’s intelligence capabilities (Burch, 2008). Even before these agency changes, preventing further hijacking was a top priority (Szyliowicz, 2004). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established in November of 2001 and was responsible for many of these changes (Szyliowicz, 2004). This included reinforcing cockpit doors, placing specially trained air marshals on select flights, and hiring their own qualified fleet of airport screening and safety employees. TSA was awarded approximately $700 million to train these new federal employees (Szyliowicz, 2004). This changed the face of airport security and led to the confiscation of nearly five million unacceptable items at airports nationwide. TSA also appointed 158 Federal Directors that were responsible for all 429 major airports, a safety precaution that was not fully thought out since many of these individuals did not possess the necessary aviation background (Szyliowicz, 2004). In addition to airline safety, it was clear that there was a serious problem with information sharing on the federal, state and local levels. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 36 (PATRIOT) Act was executed shortly after the attacks to tear down “the wall” allowing FISA warrants pertaining to both intelligence and criminal proceedings (Jones, 2011). It took a record of only forty-five days after the attacks for the PATRIOT Act to pass and it immediately began breaking down the many “walls” that had been built (Berman & Flint, 2003). The PATRIOT Act gave intelligence agencies access to law enforcement tools and gave law enforcement officials access to intelligence tools. This increased the information sharing practices without limits, causing other potential problems in the abuse of information sharing (Berman & Flint, 2003). The passage of the HSA in 2002 took the PATRIOT Act further and promoted homeland security information sharing between federal agencies by combining them into one department, and increased communication between these federal agencies and necessary state and local agencies (Jones, 2011). In conjunction with the HSA, Bush filed the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan on November 25, 2002. This scheduled the process of actually moving agencies over to the DHS and they officially opened their doors on March 1, 2003 with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the TSA and the Secret Service as the first agencies to make the change (Haynes, 2004). This was a fast, and unreasonable, opening for the DHS and resulted in many problems with space, staffing, and the budget (Perrow, 2006). Despite these challenges, once the DHS was able to start really growing, it became one of the largest federal departments with over 200,000 employees and has continued to progress (Moynihan, 2005). 37 Although the DHS brought together many agencies that investigate terrorism, there were some agencies that are not included under this umbrella (Birkland, 2009). These include important parts of the FBI and DoD as well as the entire CIA. This made the agencies that did fall under the new DHS weaker and brought a new set of ineffective practices with it. Since collaboration was an important aspect of the DHS the agencies that were not moved did not have access to all the shared intelligence and were not able to contribute their intelligence to the mix. This could easily lead to the lack of information sharing that the DHS was trying to avoid (Birkland, 2009). The changes brought about by the HSA and new DHS will be discussed in detail later in this thesis but there were two important changes that sought to fix the very apparent communication problems. The first is the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division of the DHS, which made a lot of headway in bettering information sharing practices between the agencies that investigate terrorism. Since this division created a centralized information database, intelligence information from federal, state, local, and private sectors is now compiled and analyzed in one place (Haynes, 2004). The second is the fusion centers that have also been created across the United States to share and analyze data on both citizens and non-citizens. Most of these centers operate in state and local police departments and they are tasked with prioritizing counterterrorism activities. They facilitate federal and state officials working together to fight terrorism (Monahan, 2011). There have been many changes at the federal level since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. In addition to the information sharing changes, funding for 38 homeland security dramatically increased following the attacks (Haynes, 2004). Funding was needed to create the new DHS and provide better intelligence gathering and terrorism prevention strategies. It is not clear if this money was taken away from other necessary areas but it is clear that the resources spent on terrorism decreased abilities to fight other hazards (Bellavita, 2008). Prevention of other terrorist attacks. The United States is limited in its ability to predict when and where the next terrorist attack will strike. We can make educated guesses since we know that larger cities, like New York, are more likely to be a target, but beyond this our skills are limited only to knowing that there will, in fact, be other disasters (Birkland, 2009). This being said, since the September 11th attacks, the United States has been considerably more diligent in following through on leads of possible terrorists, which has lead to the prevention of many attacks (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Some of these thwarted attacks have been widely publicized (Silver & Fischhoff, 2011). Two of the most well known involve people that were trying to blow up airplanes, the first by a man that hid a bomb in his shoe in 2001 and the second by a man hiding a bomb in his underwear on December 25th, 2009. Less well known attempts include a planned “dirty bomb” in 2002, a planned attack on financial institution on the U.S. East Coast in 2004, a plan to bomb the New York City subway system, and a plan to blow up a vehicle in Times Square (Silver & Fischhoff, 2011). The FBI explains many thwarted attacks as part their terrorism publications (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). The White House also 39 gave a list of ten foiled attacks to CNN ("White house lists," 2006). A few of these are explained below in order to show how the improvements in our terrorism prevention strategies and information sharing practices have increased our ability to foil multiple terrorist attacks. The few that are listed here barely scratch the surface of the many foiled attacks since September 11th and with many of them listed as classified it would be challenging to get a total count. On August 22nd, 2002, police detained Robert J. Goldstein in Pinellas County, Florida (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Goldstein was found with weapons and explosives and a plan threatening to attack Islamic facilities in the United States. He was arrested on weapons charges and an attempt to destroy property along with Michael Wallace Hardee, Samuel V. Shannahan III, and Goldstein’s wife, Kristi Goldstein. During the investigation, it was found that this planned attack was going to coincide with the first anniversary of September 11th by attacking the Islamic Center of Pinellas County, in Florida. The four people arrested all pled guilty for their role in the planned attack and in 2003 received federal prison sentences. Robert Goldstein received the most prison time at twelve years and seven months (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). The alleged mastermind of the September 11th attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, plotted to use shoe bombs to hijack a commercial airliner and attack the tallest building in Los Angeles ("White house lists," 2006). He planned to use young men from Southeast Asia to keep suspicions low. This plan was foiled by the United States before the attack could be executed ("White house lists," 2006). 40 The FBI arrested Paul Revak on June 9th, 2003, for his plot to bomb a U.S. Coast Guard facility in Bellingham, Washington (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Revak also discussed targeting several nearby military facilities, which was planned to be part of a revolution in the United States. The FBI arrested Revak when he negotiated the purchase of explosive device components with an undercover FBI employee. Revak took a plea deal and was only sentenced to five years of probation for threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). In 2003, two possible airline attacks were disrupted. The first was a plot to hijack commercial planes and use them to attack multiple targets along the east coast. The second was a planned attack on London’s Heathrow Airport using hijacked commercial planes ("White house lists," 2006). A major operation figure in the September 11th attacks was said to undertake this plan as well. Both of these plans were foiled by the United States along with other partners ("White house lists," 2006). The Birmingham Joint Terrorism Task Force was successful in arresting David Nelson Hemphill for possession of pipe bombs and a homemade silencer on January 20th, 2004 (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Searches of Hemphill’s person and property revealed multiple weapons and bomb making materials. He also admitted that he had been trying to construct an ammonium nitrate fuel oil explosive device. Bruce Stephen Metzler was arrested as Hemphill’s associate and a search of his person and property revealed more weapons and a partially constructed silencer. They both pled guilty to weapons charges. Hemphill was sentenced to twenty- 41 three months in prison followed by twenty-four months supervised release and Metzler was sentenced to probation (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). After a meeting with undercover officers, the FBI arrested Ronald Allen Grecula on May 20th, 2005 (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). During this meeting, Grecula explained his plan to design a bomb, which was to be used by al-Qaeda, aimed at killing Americans. The U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, indicted him with providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Michael Curtis Reynolds was arrested on December 5th, 2005, in Idaho for arranging a meeting with an alleged al-Qaeda contact (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Reynolds had offered to assist al-Qaeda in acts of terrorism in the United States. He was to be paid by al-Qaeda for identifying targets, planning terrorist attacks, describing bomb-making methods and carrying out violent attacks against pipeline systems and energy facilities. The goal of this was to create a hazardous situation and fear in the citizens. He was caught and has been charged with an attempt to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Although all these thwarted attacks show that the United States is making progress in the prevention of terrorist attacks, there is always the possibility that another attack will occur. Silver and Fischhoff (2011) explain, based on their study of psychological science, that if this does occur, Americans will be able to get through 42 another attack. Their resilience will allow them to survive another attack, and again and again if needed (Silver & Fischhoff, 2011). Summary Although terrorism is not a new concept, it became more of a focus after the attacks on September 11th, 2001. It also brought to light the many communication problems in the federal government in particular information sharing between federal, state, local and private sectors. Not only were we not able to predict or prevent these attacks, we were also not able to adequately respond. In response to this the HSA was enacted, creating the DHS and bringing together many of the agencies that investigated terrorism and creating a central database for information sharing between federal, state, local and private sectors. 43 Chapter 3 Methodology This thesis will consist of qualitative research in the form of a policy analysis of the Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002. Specifically, it has focused on the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the changes made to information sharing with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division of the DHS. The public policy field arose after World War II in an effort to transform policy making from the irrational mess it had been, to a form of rational analysis so the maximum amount of social welfare could be achieved (Stone, 2012). A policy analysis is the examination of the goals, objectives and outcomes of a policy in order to seek out the problems and errors associated with it (Houston, Bridgmon, & Parsons, 2008). This process leads to the correction of such mistakes either with the implementation of an additional policy or with revisions to the current policy, even if these corrections are also laden with problems (Houston et al., 2008). This policy analysis will utilize two books as a general guide. Stone’s (2012) Policy Paradox will be used for concepts and themes throughout this analysis as criteria by which the policy should be evaluated. This book provides many themes and concepts that will be helpful when analyzing a policy and was chosen because of its wide range of terms that can provide further clarity for the reader. Houston et al.’s (2008) Criminal Justice and the Policy Process will be used to conduct the policy analysis using its fourstep approach to studying public policy. This framework was chosen because it allows for an evaluation of a policy that has already been implemented and is conducive to a 44 criminal justice policy. Bardach’s (2012) Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving was also considered, along with other similar frameworks, but those focus primarily on creating and then analyzing possible policy solutions to a problem that have not been implemented. Since these frameworks would require too many alterations to fit an already implemented policy, Houston et al.’s (2008) framework was chosen. Their framework includes four steps: 1. Inputs 2. Government Action 3. Outputs 4. Feedback The first step, inputs, involves getting the problem to the government. Houston et al. (2008) explain that four questions must be answered to determine if the policy should be on the government’s agenda. These include: 1. Is it a trendy issue? 2. Does it have a wide impact? 3. Is, or was, the issue precipitated by a triggering event? 4. Does it involve power perceived as unfairly used (Houston et al., 2008, p. 42) After these questions are answered, a policy can be formulated in response to the initial problem (Houston et al., 2008). Alternatives to the policy that pass and are implemented are also discussed in this step. This step will summarize the need behind a triggering 45 event; September 11th, in this case, which prompted the creation of the HSA as outlined in the literature review. It will focus on the lack of information sharing between agencies to emphasize the need for the DHS and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division. Interest groups, political parties and government officials are also analyzed in this section as to how they relate to the policy at hand (Houston et al., 2008). This section will utilize the term “interests,” from Stone (2012), defined as people and organizations that have a stake in or are affected by an issue. It will describe those that had interests behind the passing of the HSA and how they positively and/or negatively affected its creation. Overall, this section will provide information that shows why the development of the HSA was needed. The second step, government action, involves getting the government to accept the solution to the problem. This focuses on three components of rational decisionmaking: 1. The power of committees in Congress; 2. The power of presidential persuasion; and 3. The role of the Supreme Court in the judicial setting (Houston et al., 2008 p. 45). During this step the political actions behind the policy are analyzed (Houston et al., 2008). In this instance, members of Congress first drafted a version of a policy, similar to the HSA. Once the President was aware of this, he had his own policy drafted, which eventually became the final HSA. The process the Act went through to become the policy that passed has also been further described. The Supreme Court did not play a big 46 role in the decision making process for this policy; therefore, this component did not need to be addressed. This section will utilize the term “power” from Stone (2012), describing the structure of decision-making institutions. The process that the HSA went through to become the policy that passed revolved a lot around power, especially from the President, who guided its creation and implementation. The third step, outputs, analyzes the implementation and outcomes, or changes, of the policy (Houston et al., 2008). This section will explain the implementation and initial opening of the DHS as well as the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division of the DHS. It will also examine the small policy adjustments that were made after the initial HSA and any resistance to change that was present (Houston et al., 2008). The Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan, which was submitted in conjunction with the HSA and was responsible for the actual creation and reorganization involved in the DHS, will also be analyzed in this section. This will show the steps that were taken to ensure the DHS opened properly, according to the HSA, and will focus specifically on the implementation of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division, which changed the information sharing processes between agencies and created a central intelligence database. The last step, feedback, evaluates the effectiveness of the policy by examining if the policy worked to solve the original problem. This is completed using three steps: 1. Measurement: the problem should be measured and the baseline for comparison between the before and after the policy must be determined; 47 2. Analysis: an analysis must be conducted that compares measurements before and after and reveals the impact of the policy; and 3. Recommendations: based on the analysis, recommendations for the future are made (Houston et al., 2008, p.60). In this policy analysis, the HSA will be examined to show the changes that were made in information sharing, and see if those changes were beneficial. To do this, the HSA will be analyzed to see what changes were made to increase information sharing, and journal articles will be reviewed to see if these changes were able to successfully reduce the amount of terrorist attacks. The information provided on the DHS website will also be used to show the effectiveness of the HSA in terms of the changes that were made to information sharing. This step also completes the continuous loop that a policy goes through while it is still in the planning stages, and if further changes are needed, it can send the policy back to the first stage or provide alterations to the current policy (Houston et al., 2008). The term “efficiency” from Stone (2012), defined as getting the most output for a given input, will be utilized. The efficiency of the DHS and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division will be examined to see if information sharing between agencies improved. Possible recommendations for the future will also be laid out. Both primary and secondary sources will be used to explain the creation of the HSA, and changes that occurred because of its enactment and implementation. The two primary sources that will be utilized, in addition to the two books listed above, include the actual HSA and The 9/11 Commission Report. The HSA includes seventeen titles 48 that lay out the changes that were made from the Act, and will be outlined and described in the policy analysis. The 9/11 Commission Report gave recommendations to prevent such a failure in the future that were important in the development of the HSA. Secondary sources will include peer-reviewed journal articles that explain the creation, implementation, and effectiveness of the DHS. Some of the specific search criteria used to find these articles include key words like Department of Homeland Security, terrorism prevention, Homeland Security Act, and information sharing. The Department of State and Department of Homeland Security websites were also used to demonstrate pertinent statistics from the September 11th attacks and explain where the DHS stands today. The main source of data for this thesis will be the actual HSA. Since the focus is the DHS and information sharing, the first two titles of this Act, Title 1: Department of Homeland Security and Title 2: Information analysis and Infrastructure Protection, will be examined so the modifications they provided can be reviewed. The changes that these titles provided for the creation of the DHS and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division will be used in Houston et al.’s (2008) framework to show how the Division was implemented and evaluate its effectiveness. This analysis will be supported by the other academic research discussed previously. Reliability and Validity “Reliability” determines the consistency of the research and proves that if the thesis were duplicated, it would achieve the same results (Babbie, 2010). This thesis uses public information from both primary and secondary sources that are easily accessible to anyone. Therefore, if someone was to do the same research and use the same policy 49 analysis framework, they could easily duplicate this thesis and their effort should yield the same results. “Validity” determines if the thesis accurately studies what it is intended to study, and examines if the instrument is consistent over time (Babbie, 2010). The HSA and The 9/11 Commission Report are both reliable government documents. The journal articles that are used are all scholarly and peer reviewed and the other secondary sources are from The New York Times, a reputable newspaper with nationwide distribution. Since these are all published works, they continue to be accurate over time and will only change as more information becomes available. Limitations There are two limitations of this thesis. One is that only information available to the public will be used. There is classified information, or other information that is not available to the public, that pertains to this topic and policy that cannot be included. This information could provide further and more in depth information for this policy analysis but because of its classified nature will not be included. The other is the generalizability issue showing that this type of research will not relate to many other policies, if any. Although this policy analysis takes an in-depth look at one particular policy, which can have beneficial effects, on a larger scope many aspects of it are inapplicable to other analyses. Summary This thesis will examine all the changes that occurred because of the HSA. The effectiveness of these changes will also be analyzed and policy alternatives and 50 improvements will be discussed. The ability to understand how the HSA was formulated will allow future policy makers to understand the shortcomings of this particular policy so improvements can make it more effective in the future. It will also benefit future policies that are similar in nature, such as a response to a terrorist attack like September 11th, with an equally as short implementation deadline, so these mistakes are not duplicated. 51 Chapter 4 Policy Analysis Step 1: Inputs The first step in Houston et al.’s (2008) policy analysis involves getting the problem to the government. During this step it needs be determined if the policy should be on the government’s agenda by examining the problem at hand, different ways it can be solved, and looking at those that have an interest in the possible policies. The need for policy regarding homeland security was important after the September 11th attacks exposed many underlying problems, but there were still many steps needed to fully form this policy. Getting the Problem to the Government. The underlying problems that required a policy change for terrorism prevention were discussed in the Literature Review (see Chapter 2). Briefly, these problems include the following: a lack of information sharing between federal agencies, funding, and effective management techniques (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Since information sharing was not facilitated between the different federal agencies or between federal agencies and local law enforcement, a “wall” of separation was created that further limited any sharing (Berman & Flint, 2003; Jones, 2011). This “wall” continued to grow but the passing of the PATRIOT Act finally started the process of breaking it down by allowing law enforcement officials access to necessary intelligence tools (Berman & Flint, 2003). 52 This was a good start but another policy, presumably the HSA, was needed to take this progress one step further (Jones, 2011). A lack of funding put a strain on agencies that investigated terrorism, specifically the FBI, who was consistently denied necessary funding that would have added counterterrorism agents, analysts, and translators who could have provided extra support in the prevention of September 11th (Perrow, 2006). Effective management techniques were lacking in transnational operations. In terms of operations that were occurring across agency lines, information was not being shared and duties were not clearly assigned, leading to mistakes and confusion (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Although the need for a DHS may have been present for some time, the attacks on September 11th, 2001 proved to be the triggering event showing that a change was needed to better protect the United States against terrorist attacks. Since 3,056 people lost their lives from these attacks, it had a vast impact on the lives of many American citizens (U.S. Department of State, 2002). The United States knew that homeland security efforts needed to be updated and altered to ensure the best possible prevention strategies, so an attack like this would not happen again. American citizens wanted to feel safe again, and it was the responsibility of the government to make that happen. Along with enhancing airplane security measures, a policy to improve homeland security procedures was also needed; this was the basis for the HSA. Alternatives. Before the HSA was enacted, other similar policies had been discussed. Less than a month after the September 11th attacks, discussion for creating a new department to handle homeland security affairs had begun. These discussions 53 concluded with the Presidential decision to create the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) on October 8th, 2001 (May, Jochim, & Sapotichne, 2011). Once opened, Tom Ridge became the director of this new Office (Haynes, 2004). This was a good start but it was clear that something further needed to be done to fix the communication problems, and it took the agency, working within the parameters of the law, to fully formulate a plan. In the beginning, the White House was against the creation of this new agency, partially because they were against creating another large bureaucracy (May et al., 2011). Limitations, and politics, behind the proposed OHS led President Bush and Congress to create legislation for a new, more effective department: The Department of Homeland Security (May et al., 2011). Even before President Bush made any changes or approved legislation, members from both houses across party lines, led by Senator Joe Lieberman, decided to introduce a new policy for a cabinet-level Department of National Homeland Security (Haynes, 2004). This department would integrate other areas of the government and act as a focal point for both natural and manmade crises and emergency planning, in order to be better prepared for a similar attack in the future. This legislation would create a White House Office of Combating Terrorism in order to unify the current widespread resources for fighting terrorism (Haynes, 2004). This was the main alternative to the HSA and started the development of the President’s proposal. Only a month after the Lieberman group introduced this legislation, the President formulated a similar bill with a few key differences regarding management flexibility in dealing with the many different agencies, payroll and benefit systems, and unions that 54 would now be combined (Haynes, 2004). The White House realized that if it failed to deliver their own proposal for this type of legislation, they would be forced to accept a proposal that did not fully reflect their public management agenda, such as the one led by Lieberman. As a result, President Bush had his chief of staff, Andrew Card, draft a proposal for the DHS through the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Moynihan, 2005). Interests. There were many organizations that had an interest in the formations of the HSA and DHS. Some of the public interest groups included the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Brookings Institution (Perrow, 2006). Quasi-government groups, such as the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), also had an interest in the DHS and provided some recommendations (Perrow, 2006). According to their website, the Council on Foreign Relations is a nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, that focuses on being a resource to better understand foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). Although they do not take sides on matters of policy (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.), their presence does promote debate and sharing knowledge, which had an effect on this policy. Similarly, The Heritage Foundation is also a think tank, although it is more on the conservative side. Their website explains that their mission deals directly with formulating and promoting public policies based on traditional American values, a limited government, and individual freedom (The Heritage Foundation, n.d.). They emphasized having surveillance of American citizens be considered in the forming of the DHS (Perrow, 2006). The 55 Brookings Institution, also a think tank but with a liberal focus, is a nonprofit public policy organization that emphases practical policy recommendations (The Brookings Institution, n.d.). Brookings considers the economic toll of their policy recommendations and had budgetary considerations to recommend for the DHS (Perrow, 2006). The impact of these think tanks put pressure on the creation of the HSA and assisted in the formation of certain aspects of the policy. The GAO and RAND Corporation brought about a different side of interest groups (Perrow, 2006). The GAO, tasked with doing many studies for Congress, issued many reports on homeland security, both before and after September 11th, which cited a string of failures mixed in with very few successes. They classified the DHS as highrisk, since they had many employees and combined diverse agencies, many of which were high risk, with 650 separate computer systems (Perrow, 2006). The RAND Corporation also exposed some failures of the HSA and DHS, but they were not always able to offer a viable solution (Perrow, 2006). These interest groups, among others, applied pressure during the creation of the HSA in order to expand their initiatives but did not offer a lot in terms of well-rounded suggestions and recommendations. Step 2: Government Action The second step in Houston et al.’s (2008) policy analysis is to get the government to accept the given solution to the problem, in this case the HSA. This step focuses on getting the policy drafted so it can successfully pass through the legislative process. For the HSA, this occurred quickly since it was viewed as a necessary change. Policy. President Bush announced his intention to create the DHS on June 6th, 56 2002 – less than a year after the terrorist attacks. This was the largest reorganization in the federal government since the creation of the DoD in 1947 (Moynihan, 2005). That reorganization was established because of the National Security Act of 1947 and created the CIA, the new National Security Council structure, and unified the military departments in the DoD (Burch, 2008). Information sharing was a goal during that reorganization as well, but organizational challenges became an issue for decisionmakers and there were implementation issues that limited any increase in information sharing (Burch, 2008). Although the Supreme Court did not play a factor in the creation of the HSA or DHS, Presidential persuasion and Congress did play major roles in the passing of this Act. The actual legislation for the DHS was sent to Congress on June 18th, 2002. The announcement was a bit of a surprise since the White House had not displayed an interest in creating a Cabinet-level department in the past (Moynihan, 2005). Within hours of President Bush signing the DHS into law, it received Senate approval (Haynes, 2004). On November 2nd, 2002 Congress officially passed legislation and the HSA was signed into law on November 25th, 2002. The President had been granted his handpicked leadership team, headed by Tom Ridge, former Governor of Pennsylvania. Bush also filed the Reorganization Plan for the Department of Homeland Security on November 25th, 2002, which scheduled the process of actually moving the agencies over to the DHS beginning on March 1st, 2003 (Haynes, 2004). Power. “Power” played a big part in how this policy was formulated. Although the policy needed approval from the Senate, it was evident that the President held a lot of 57 power in how it was created (Haynes, 2004). Stone (2012) describes power as the structure of decision-making institutions, and in this instance the President was at the top of this structure. Tom Ridge also held a good deal of power and once the Act was passed, this former director of the OHS became the secretary of the DHS (Haynes, 2004). Ridge had been able to influence the agenda in the OHS but did not have authority over budgets, people, or programs. The HSA gave Ridge even more power and authority over this new Department (Haynes, 2004). Since information sharing was a big component of the HSA, “power” came about in other areas as well, which will be further discussed in the “Outputs” section. Step 3: Outputs The third step in Houston et al.’s (2008) policy analysis examines the implementation and outcomes of the given policy. In this case the sections of the HSA that created the DHS and made changes to information sharing processes, focusing mainly on Titles 1 and 2 of the HSA, have been studied. The policy adjustments after the initial HSA was implemented, mainly The Reorganization Plan for the Department of Homeland Security, and outline any resistances to change that were present have also been examined. Implementation. Public Law 107–296: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 describes in detail the proposed creation of the Department of Homeland Security including the establishment of the Secretary of Homeland Security position in a total of 58 seventeen titles4. They were all aimed at better preparing the United States for a similar attack in the future, but the first two titles specifically changed the way agencies share information. 4 These seventeen titles are: •Title 1: Department of Homeland Security •Title 2: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection •Title 3: Science and Technology in support of Homeland Security •Title 4: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security •Title 5: Emergency Preparedness and Response •Title 6: Treatment of the Charitable Trusts for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States and other Governmental Organizations •Title 7: Management •Title 8: Coordination with Non-Federal Entities; Inspector General; United States Secret Service; Coast Guard; General Provisions •Title 9: National Homeland Security Council •Title 10: Information Security •Title 11: Department of Justice Divisions •Title 12: Airline War Risk Insurance Legislation •Title 13: Federal Workforce Improvements •Title 14: Arming Pilots Against Terrorism •Title 15: Transition • Title 16: Corrections to the Existing Law Relating to Airline transportation Security •Title 17: Conforming and Technical Amendments 59 Title 1: Department of Homeland Security. The first title, in conjunction with the Reorganization Plan for the Department of Homeland Security, created the actual Department of Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that, in general, the primary mission of the new DHS should be to: 1. Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 2. Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; 3. Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that occur within the United States; 4. Carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning; 5. Ensure that the function of the agencies and sub-divisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress; 6. Ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and 7. Monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to serve such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking (Homeland Security Act, 2002, p. 8). These points are simplified, but represented, in the current mission statement of the DHS that is listed in the introduction. It also states that the responsibility for investigating and 60 prosecuting terrorism falls on the Federal, State, and local law enforcement in the jurisdiction where the terrorist act occurred and not solely from the DHS. The Reorganization Plan for the Department of Homeland Security gave specific actions and dates that needed to be accomplished in accordance with the HSA. It explained the transfer of agencies and specific duties of the Secretary to get the DHS up and running and laid out a plan to open to doors of the department with an ambitious schedule (The President of the United States, 2003). This reorganization plan scheduled the opening of the DHS on March 1st, 2003, which began the transfer of agencies (The President of the United States, 2003). In addition to the Secretary, there were many other positions that the HSA created to support the DHS. To start, the Secretary appointed a Special Assistant to the Secretary to advise the Secretary on homeland security policies, communicate with private sectors and Federal agencies, and promote partnerships with these agencies (Homeland Security Act, 2002). Directly under the Secretary, there is a Deputy Secretary position that is appointed by the President. Following this are Under Secretaries for the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Science and Technology, Border and Transportation Security and Emergency Preparedness directorates; a Director of the Bureau of Citizenship; Under Secretary for Management; and no more than twelve Assistant Secretaries and a General Counsel, who will be the chief legal officer of the Department. It also created a position for an Inspector General and Commandant of the Coast Guard. The President also appointed a Director of the Secret Service, a Chief Information Officer, a Chief Human Capital Officer, a Chief Financial Officer, and an 61 Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (Homeland Security Act, 2002). All of these positions supported the missions of the DHS to prevent and respond to terrorism. Title 2: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The second title, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, focused on improving information sharing between agencies that were now a part of the DHS by creating a centralized system. This directorate is headed by the Under Secretary of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, who is appointed by the President, as well as the Assistant Secretary (Homeland Security Act, 2002). The directorate is assigned to accomplish a total of nineteen tasks that are thoroughly explained in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 201, many of which interact to accomplish the overall goal of improving information sharing between agencies. The first of these tasks include accessing, receiving, and analyzing intelligence information from Federal, State, local and private sectors and providing policy improvements for these processes. The DHS can also request additional information from these agencies relating to terrorist activities. The DHS needs to have access to all the necessary information to carry out the duties throughout this section, including gaining information from other Federal agencies. This information has been organized in a secure database, which includes advanced tools that can be used to access, receive and analyze the information that has been acquired. This database must be compatible with other federal agencies and follow privacy regulations. Training and support have also been offered to employees and other Federal, State and local governments that provide information to the DHS to ensure continuity (Homeland Security Act, 2002). 62 This directorate also needs to identify where priorities should reside for protection from the DHS and its supporting entities. The Under Secretary must consult with the Director of Central Intelligence and other intelligence, law enforcement, or the Federal Government to establish threats of terrorism and address priorities. Therefore they are in charge of assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructures to determine the probability of a terrorist attack in a given location and the effectiveness of countermeasures. They have created a national plan for securing these resources and infrastructures within the United States to ensure safety in the event there were to be an attack. They are also responsible for administrating the Homeland Security Advisory System, which will provide warnings when there is a threat to homeland security (Homeland Security Act, 2002). Resistance to change. Perrow (2006) explains that staffing was one of the issues that the DHS faced during its initial stages due to a resistance to change. For example, when it was announced that 795 people in the FBI’s cyber security office would be transferred to the new DHS, most agents decided to stay with the FBI because of its reliable funding and higher status. The outcome of this was that only 22 people joined the new department (Perrow, 2006). This meant that many people with valuable experiences and expertise were not a part of the DHS. Step 4: Feedback The last step in Houston et al.’s (2008) policy analysis evaluates the effectiveness of the policy and evaluating if the original problem was solved. The effectiveness of this policy will be calculated by the way the DHS was implemented and the changes it made 63 towards better information sharing practices. It will also look at the feedback currently available from these changes, mainly through academic journals. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 set the groundwork for information sharing after the attacks on September 11th, and although change can be beneficial, reorganization doesn’t always mean reform (Burch, 2008). DHS Failures. As explained above, staffing was one of the issues that the DHS faced during its initial opening stages, but it was not the only one (Perrow, 2006). Another problem was the tight budget, which forced agencies to have impossible expectations of their staff to continue their current duties on top of their new homeland security tasks with little to no significant funding increases (Perrow, 2006). This led to overworking employees, which likely decreased effectiveness. Inadequate funding for the new tasks of agencies involved in the department was a clear problem. The United States Border Patrol is just one example of this. After a terrorist was caught bringing explosives over the border to be used in an attack on the Los Angeles airport, and it was learned that some of the September 11th terrorists had used Canada as a port of entry – it was clear that action needed to be taken (Perrow, 2006). In 2002, the Border Patrol had only 330 agents supported by one analyst to intercept illegal crossings of the 4,000-mile border into Canada. In 2004, they finally received some more resources to patrol the border, but it was still an almost impossible task (Perrow, 2006). Another issue is that DHS may have reduced our protection from other types of disasters, natural disasters specifically, by focusing too much on terrorism. Although the 64 department advertises an “all-hazards” approach, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 showed that funds were not being allocated correctly (Perrow, 2006). Programs aimed at relief for natural disasters were having their funding cut to focus more on potential terrorist attacks. Although September 11th offered a challenge to our government unlike those given by natural disasters in years past, that does not mean terrorism should have been the only or even the main focus (Perrow, 2006). Hurricane Katrina became the new narrative that explained that the attention given to terrorism since September 11th greatly diminished the United States’ emergency preparedness system (Bellavita, 2008). This meant the DHS needed to find a way to balance terrorism with its other responsibilities, something that has proven to be difficult. There is also an issue with the type of information that should be shared between the agencies that are now a part of the DHS. This starts with deciding if information consists of raw data, finished intelligence, or both. The problem here lies with fact that the agencies can choose what they want to share, as well as put more restrictions on sharing information that is too sensitive. Agencies also have the ability to only share their information when asked for it, and the right question needs to be asked. If they are not, the information is not shared but can still be considered as such just because the wrong question was asked (Burch, 2008). This shows how sharing can mean a variety of different things and might not be as beneficial as it sounds. It has been suggested by May et al. (2011) that in trying to do too much, little is accomplished. For the DHS, which was quick to be created, this idea has plagued them in many ways. They were weak in instituting cohesion, and better policies should have 65 been implemented to better suit this department in reaching its goals. This is a consistent theme in many articles, and it seems that only more time can help build this department and give it the ability to reach its goals (May et al., 2011). Focusing on the failures is easy, but the successes should not be overlooked or underappreciated. Agencies have been combined, a central database has been created, and valuable information has been collected and analyzed. Issues with the new department are clear, but there is something to be said for the fact that there has been no successful major terrorist attack since September 11th. Some of these have been discussed in the literature review chapter but there are many more attacks that have been foiled because of the creation of the DHS. Changes from the DHS and overall efficiency. Although there were many failures during the beginning stages of opening the DHS, one should not overlook the many changes that came from the new Department. The DHS website highlights some of these changes in a list of four key elements of information sharing: national network of fusion centers, National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and If You See Something, Say Something (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b). Fusion centers, although their efficiency is controversial, are the central point within the state and local governments to gather, analyze and share homeland security information with other federal, state and local governments and private sectors (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b). There is no doubt this was a change meant to improve information sharing between the sectors, but assessments done by the Senate 66 have shown that in fact these fusion centers are not efficient at producing relevant intelligence information (Levin & Coburn, 2012). They also show that claims the DHS has made regarding the efficiency of these centers are inaccurate. Based on the inefficiency of these centers so far, it is clear that reform is necessary to allow these centers to work at their intended capacity (Levin & Coburn, 2012). Communication and information sharing was still an issue for the DHS. For example, when the department received a warning from the intelligence community, it had trouble forwarding that information to its agencies. Perrow (2006) states that both federal and state agencies have reported being informed about a high terrorist alert by listening to the news, instead of through the department. He also reports that some state officials refused to respond to high terrorist alerts because they were vague, and recommended responses were too expensive. Not only is it hard for states to respond but it seems the department has trouble responding as well (Perrow, 2006). For this reason, the Homeland Security Advisory System (Homeland Security Act, 2002) that was being used has been replaced by the NTAS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b). According to Napolitano (2011), former Secretary of the DHS, this new system is better at delivering important information about terrorist threats to all the necessary people in a timely manner. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative works with the DOJ to create a process for reporting, tracking and accessing suspiciously reported activities so that privacy rights and civil liberties are protected (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b). It is also responsible for training state and local law enforcement 67 officials to recognize behaviors related to terrorism so they can be shared nationally with law enforcement officials (Napolitano, 2011). There have been a few issues with this initiative, including the protection of civil liberties and the large amount of information that is obtained through these means (Steiner, 2010). Although these have been categorized as issues, Steiner (2010) states that they have been doing a good job so far in protecting civil liberties and a large amount of data is actually exactly what analysts need to gain as much information as possible and find possible terrorist threats. If You See Something, Say Something is a nation-wide campaign to raise public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and violent crimes and encourage the public to report those activities to state and local authorities (Information sharing, n.d.). Starting in 2010, but written just one day after the September 11th attacks, this campaign serves an important part of integrating the public (Heighington, 2011). It was originally used in New York by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) but has since expanded (U.S. Department of Homeland Security. n.d.a). Although this campaign is important, Heighington (2010) claims it does not always provide the public with the necessary details of exactly what they should be looking for to protect themselves. This may be true for some but clearly not for all, since some attacks have been foiled due to this campaign. In May of 2010 there was a car awkwardly stopped, with the engine still running, and smoke coming out in Times Square (Baker & Rashbaum, 2010). A T-shirt vender reported it to police who responded and found that there was a bomb in the car that had started to detonate but malfunctioned. Even if the bomb had detonated, a quick response 68 from first responders would have limited the casualties (Wirtz, 2011). Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani man, was arrested shortly after the failed attack when he tried to flee on a jet to Dubai, and was charged with several terrorism-related crimes (Mazzetti, Tavernise & Healy, 2010). Even if this was the only usable lead from the campaign, it proves its existence is still effective and important. Recommendations. Many journal articles give, or provide information for, recommendations for the future of the DHS and homeland security policies. They offer suggestions to make the DHS live up to its full potential by realistically improving its overall efficacy and the efficiency of the individual programs that were created by the DHS. It is important for these programs to change with the times and adapt to improving technology as well as the needs of the country. Mueller (2010) states that there is a minimum of eight premises that should be considered when formulating a policy for protecting the homeland. These premises include: 1. The number of potential terrorist targets is essentially infinite; 2. The number of terrorists appears to be exceedingly small and their efforts and competence rather limited; 3. In many cases, target selection is effectively a random process; 4. The probability that any specific target will be attacked is extremely small; 5. If one potential target has a higher degree of protection, terrorist can move onto another one; 69 6. More protection measures can make one target safer but they also make others less safe; 7. Most targets are not very difficult to damage, but can be rebuilt in a short order and at a tolerable expense; and 8. It is impossible to adequately protect a wide variety of potential targets except by completely closing them down (Mueller, 2010, pp. 2-6). Although some of these premises are more statement than policy recommendation, they can all be beneficial in creating, or in this case improving, policies that will serve to protect the homeland. The first premise makes a good point and it is one that has not often been considered in the wake of the attacks. The HSA and the DHS focused a lot on making airlines and air travel safer – which is a good thing – but the many other possible targets and weapons cannot be forgotten. These can include buildings, large gatherings, important locations and many other possible targets along with an infinite amount of weapons. Bellavita (2007) explains that there are many communities in the United States that host sporting events, concerts, festivals, and other large crowd gatherings that have the potential to become targets for terrorists, which shows how important it is to have a security plan for such events. The second premise, although almost debunked by the destruction on September 11th, still holds true in that the number of terrorists is small compared to the rest of the population. This should be considered so that we do not exhaust all of our resources on terrorism and forget other types of hazards. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth premises are related to the first and account for the large number of 70 targets open to attack, as well as the inability to predict where an attack will occur. Therefore, to a certain extent, we need to be ready and able to respond to an attack anywhere. Premise seven is important in the reactive sense, since it is true that most things can be rebuilt – as we saw with the re-building of the World Trade Center – but human life should be the highest priority. Premise eight reminds us that we cannot protect everything at every point in time and we need to be prepared to prioritize if something happens. However, it is important not to take the idea that if we get comfortable in saying that we cannot stop everything, we will be right (Bellavita, 2008). Giving up should not be a part of the DHS and it should continue to fight terrorism as hard as it can despite these challenges. All of these concepts are important in maintaining homeland security and should be used to improve the policies in the department. Using these premises to improve the DHS, and terrorism prevention in general, is just one of the many possible options. Although many of them may seem vague, they have the ability to keep the current policies on track to best protect the nation against terrorism. In addition, the Partnership for Public Service describes four main lessons learned from the creation of the DHS, as well ODNI, and how we can use these to improve in the future (Partnership for Public Service, 2011). ODNI was created a few years after the DHS, in 2005, by Congress to oversee and coordinate with 16 separate intelligence agencies5, including the DHS, that previously operated independently and did not always 5 These 16 agencies included: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, 71 share information (Partnership for Public Service, 2011). It was beneficial because it brought together additional agencies that were not a part of the DHS. Although they are very different, the ODNI and DHS have similar goals and management techniques. ODNI created a Director of National Intelligence and hired supporting staff to oversee and manage the intelligence agencies. Although ODNI was supposed to bring these agencies together, it was not without issues including an uncertainty over the power and authority of the director as well as internal turf wars between agencies (Partnership for Public Service, 2011). Focusing more on the DHS, these lessons described a few of the main problems from the beginning. The first being that the chain of command is necessary but not always sufficient enough and strong leadership is also important. Second, although a clearly defined mission statement and structure are important, the vision, values and culture are more important for the department to succeed. Next, management is important to the entire mission and basic management functions, like procurement, human resources and financial operations, should not be overlooked. Finally, although the structure of the Department is important, the overall system trumps this and those in leadership positions must be able to navigate the federal bureaucracy. These lessons Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigations, National Geo Spatial Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marines, and U.S. Navy. 72 directly correlate to many of the problems within the DHS and understanding them can be beneficial in solving the problems from this point. Many other journal articles also provide specific recommendations for the individual programs within the DHS that could help improve the efficiency of the whole Department. The NTAS and Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative programs are two of the newer programs from the DHS and seem to be effective so far, but further review will be important. Other programs within the DHS are not performing as effectively including fusion centers, the If You See Something, Say Something campaign and adapting an all hazards approach to the DHS. During the Senate’s assessments of the fusion centers, it provided some recommendations for improvement. One of the more important of these is to clarify the purpose of federal funding and other efforts to match the mission statement of these fusion centers (Levin & Coburn, 2012). This will increase effectiveness and ensure resources are being used appropriately. They should also improve the intelligence reporting efforts and training of intelligence reporters, which have been lacking, to keep up with DHS policies (Levin & Coburn, 2012). Fusion centers should also be appropriately evaluated to ensure their effectiveness and solve any significant problems (Levin & Coburn, 2012). Evaluation is a key aspect of any program and can prove to be a beneficial factor for improvement. Heighington (2011) suggests a mobile application for the If You See Something, Say Something campaign to improve the public’s ability to prevent terrorist attacks. This mobile application could disperse information of a possible threat to the target audience 73 and allow the public to notify the proper authorities if they witness a possible threat (Heighington, 2011). There has been some integration of technology in this campaign and the public now has the ability to text information, which is a step in the right direction, but further integration could be beneficial. Using a mobile application has the potential to benefit the public but it does not solve the problem that many people do not know exactly what they should be looking for. To solve this, more information should be available, possibly in the form of pamphlets, posters, and websites and people that work in areas that have a high terrorist threat level should receive additional training so they know what to look for. This can be as simple as an online training in order to receive a permit for a vender on the street or additional training as part of an orientation for employment in the area. There have been some improvements in this area, such as an increase in posters around New York City to better inform people, but expanding this campaign can still prove to be beneficial. Balancing terrorism prevention and all hazards protection has been one of the struggles of the DHS. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the lack of all hazards protection and when the United States was grossly unprepared for such a disaster (Bellavita, 2008). For this reason, developing a better all hazards protection model is important for the future of the DHS. Donahue, Cunnion, Balaban, and Sochats (2012) explain an approach to all hazards protection that can help assess a situation and determine the needs of the citizens at that time and what the emergency response strategies should be to best assist those in danger. They recommend a framework that maps out the needs of different populations and serves as a “decision tree format” for the different functions in disaster 74 response (Donahue et al., 2012, p. 11). They explain that one of the issues during Hurricane Katrina was not being able to inform the public that there was an evacuation order. A decision tree would provide a template to view the needs of different populations and allow the tailoring of assistance to certain communities; in this case, a better way to communicate with parts of New Orleans (Donahue et al., 2012). Identifying needs and solutions to a given problem is a simple way to work towards a better all hazards approach. Templates can be provided and completed ahead of time to give first responders a head start in handling any type of emergency. This would require the federal, state, and local governments to work together and tailor these for specific states and communities. An example of some necessary decision tree templates in New York would include issues of terrorism and natural disasters, especially after the recent Hurricane Sandy, whereas in a city like San Francisco, earthquake protection would be a higher priority. Using these suggestions could greatly affect the efficiency of the DHS and its programs. The implementation of future programs will also be important depending on the needs of the agencies and the public if other emergency events occur, like terrorist acts or natural disasters. Since some of the newer programs have been more effective, future programs could be modeled on them if they continue to be effective. Terrorism prevention is constantly changing because of new intelligence information, terrorist attacks, technology, and the abilities of the public. All hazards prevention is similar and there are constant changes to the parts of the country and types of disasters where assistance is needed. Therefore, it is likely the most important recommendation for the 75 HSA and therefore the DHS, and many other policies, is that their future programs will need to respond accordingly to these ever-changing demands. 76 Chapter 5 Conclusion Terrorism has been an evolving concept from 6 C.E. when the Zealot sect was practicing systematic terrorism in the Middle East to the present day attacks (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). Today it can hold many different definitions but they all revolve around it being an act that is dangerous, or even potentially dangerous, and/or intends to invoke fear in citizens or influence a government (Homeland Security Act, 2002). The events that unfolded on September 11th, 2001 have exposed many failures within the government that, if previously fixed, could have potentially prevented these attacks (Fischhoff, 2011). Just one of these was the lack of information sharing between federal, state, local and private sectors, which could have provided necessary connections and complete information about the upcoming attacks. Therefore, the HSA was enacted to change information-sharing practices and improve terrorism prevention as well as all hazards protection by making agencies even more effective by creating a central database and creating programs that involve the public in terrorism prevention. Title 1 of the HSA, Department of Homeland Security, led to the creation of the DHS that brought the many agencies that investigated terrorism together under one roof, improving the communication between them. Title 2, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, created a centralized system to improve information sharing between these agencies. This centralized system had been severely lacking in the past and was a good start in providing an outlet for these agencies to properly communicate and share necessary information. 77 The DHS officially opened its doors on March 1, 2003 and the transferring of agencies to the new Department began very shortly after (Haynes, 2004). This was a fast and unreasonable timeline for the opening of the DHS and for this reason many problems arose. These included finding proper office space, hiring staff, and navigating the tight budget that was available (Perrow, 2006). Despite these challenges, the DHS grew quickly and began overcoming obstacles and making improvements to the informationsharing field. This policy analysis addressed the changes that the DHS, via the HSA, created in the way agencies share information. In addition to the creation of the DHS and the centralized information sharing system, four of the major changes included a national network of fusion centers, NTAS, Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and If You See Something, Say Something (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b). These programs were based around information sharing between state, local, and federal agencies as well as the public and allowed the government and the public access to necessary and valuable information. These changes, and subsequent ones, did not come without challenges. Some of these challenges include on overload of information from the all the agencies now sharing information and a lack of proper training for law enforcement personnel. Consequently new problems surfaced as a result including employing more individuals to help with the increase in information and providing more effective training to law enforcement personnel. The DHS, similar to many other departments, is constantly improving and new recommendations for the future are always 78 necessary to improve its ability to stay current and continue to provide all hazards protection. The DHS recently passed the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013, which in conjunction with the HSA strengthens cybersecurity and provides more protection for other critical infrastructures (National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, 2013). Information sharing can be a very important tool but without the proper protections it can easily create more problems than it fixes if terrorists or others without permission gain unwanted access. Therefore, this was an important addition to the HSA and will strengthen the information sharing system that was created. Recommendations The recommendations section in the previous chapter, Policy Analysis, describes in detail three main policy specific recommendations that could help strengthen the effectiveness of the DHS through some of its individual programs. One of these improvements includes clarifying the purpose of federal funding and other efforts to match the mission statement of fusion centers to increase their effectiveness and improve communications between federal and state governments (Levin & Coburn, 2012). Another includes better integrating technology in the If You See Something, Say Something campaign, and further training employees that work in high-risk areas to notice possible terrorist activities. The last is to create a framework for an all hazards approach that provides a decision tree to map out the needs of citizens during a disaster (Donahue et al., 2012). This will guarantee that proper measures are taken to ensure the 79 safety of all citizens and decrease the likelihood that we are as unprepared for another event as we were for Hurricane Katrina. These recommendations can help improve the effectiveness of the DHS but there are always additional improvements that can be made. These will constantly change as technology improves and other events occur continuously to alter its course. Since terrorism is not going to disappear any time soon, it is important that these methods keep up with the needs of the country at any given time and this means constant improvements. This is a challenging and time-consuming task but it is necessary for the success of the DHS and terrorism prevention, and many other policies, revolving around terrorism prevention, can benefit from similar constant improvements as well. Implication For Further Research Further research on the constantly changing policies of the HSA will be necessary to keep it current and effective. In addition, further research can include policy analyses on the remainder of the HSA, including the other branches of the DHS, in order to further understand the other changes it produced. It will also be beneficial to make further recommendations based on these findings to better improve the HSA and the terrorism prevention field as a whole. In addition it would be beneficial to further examine how effective the current terrorism prevention strategies are by studying exactly how attacks were foiled, like the ones previously mentioned, and using that information to better the prevention strategies. This can be challenging to research but would be very beneficial in determining what works and what does not. Another possible topic could include examining the ODNI, its 80 effectiveness, and how it oversees the intelligence community. A policy analysis on the newly added National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013 would be another interesting area of study for further research. This Act was only briefly described here but there is a lot more research that can be done on the topic that would benefit cybersecurity in the future. Information sharing, especially in terms of terrorism prevention, can quickly become obsolete if that information falls into the wrong hands. 81 APPENDIX Abbreviations ATC: Air Traffic Control CAPPS: Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System CIA: Central Intelligence Agency DoD: Department of Defense DHS: Department of Homeland Security FAA: Federal Aviation Administration FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation FISA: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act GAO: Government Accountability Office HSA: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ITAGC: Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Forces NEADS: Northeast Air Defense Sector NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command NTAS: National Terrorism Advisory System ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence OHS: Office of Homeland Security RAND: Research and Development Corporation TSA: Transportation Security Administration 82 References Arango, T., & Schmidt, M. 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