IUPUI
J-260
Spring 2012/Updated Spring 2014
Lecture by Dr Terry Simmons
Dr Simmons is an associate faculty lecturer at IUPUI in Indianapolis, a
visiting lecturer at IU Bloomington and an associate professor of political
science at Ivy Tech Community College. He teaches political science courses at
all three institutions and occasionally international studies at IUB. He has two
commercial publications and four in-house publications involving RussianAmerican relations, international relations and politics of the Middle East to
include a recent publication with American Military University on Syria. He is a
member of The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C. as well as Infraguard
(Indiana) and AFIO, Washington, D.C.
POSTMODERN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
ABSTRACT
Defining terrorism is always the first challenge when treating this
complicated subject. Many definitions have been formulated and circulated.
Some are more functional and precise than others depending on several
variables such as the nature of the organizations and their individual and
collective missions and needs as well as the extant political and security
environment(s) in which they are currently operating.
This paper will utilize two definitions widely accepted by the American
intelligence community as well as academia and the critical media. The United
States Department of States’ working definition is applicable to the general
threat environment currently facing the United States.
Title 22, Chapter 38 of the United States Code (regarding the Department
of State) contains a definition of terrorism in its requirement that annual
country reports on terrorism be submitted by the Secretary of State to
Congress every year; it reads:
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“Definition....the term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”1
Dr Bruce Hoffman, longtime CIA counterterrorism expert and Professor
at Georgetown University, formulated the following descriptive attributes to the
definition of terrorism:
“It is ineluctably political in aims and motives
Violent-or, equally important, threatens violence
Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond
the immediate victim or target
Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of
command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no
uniform or identifying insignia) and
Perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.”2
Hoffman then further stipulates:
“We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism in the
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the
threat of violence in pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts
involve violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have farreaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or
object of terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and
thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a
rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national
government or political party, or public opinion in general.
Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to
consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity
22 U.S.C. section 2656f(d) (http://.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/usc_sec_2200002656–f000-.html)
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2
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd ed., Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 41.
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generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage,
influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change
on either a local or an international scale.”3
This examination will attempt to delineate the long history of classical
terrorism with post-modern constructs and philosophies rooted in new
manifestations rooted in constructivism and internet cyber-terrorism. The basic
definitions still apply but have morphed into viral form(s) catalyzed by
globalization and audacious new technologies and political realities.
Two excellent case studies will introduce this new set of dynamics: the
terrorists attacks in the United States in 2001 and the Madrid train bombings
in 2004, perpetuated by al Qaeda in both cases with the aid of ETA in the
second case. Both of these seminal cases are now classic examples of the
transformation from classical frontal warfare waged by organized military
forces to asymmetrical NGO-type organizations employing non-traditional
tactics and guerilla forces with the singular objective of realizing political goals
without the traditional nation-state mechanisms.
3
Hoffman, pg. 41
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POSTMODERN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Terrorism, in the recognized historical sense, has historical antecedents
as old as warfare itself. From the time of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian
War, and before, terrorism in the form of assassination was used extensively to
demoralize the enemy, particularly an enemy with superior numbers and/or
armaments. This asymmetrical warfare tactic was intended then, as in modern
times, to damage one’s opponent psychologically by inducing fear, or terror.4
From this early period through history terrorism has increased in usage
at all levels and has grown in intensity, complexity and sophisticated
applications. What has remained constant, however, is the continued utility of
terrorism as a tool of irregular warfare. The political objective is paramount
above all else. What cannot be achieved through doctrinaire forms of warfare
can often be achieved using irregular forces working outside the normal
definitions of organized military instrumentalities.
It is the results obtained by terrorism that make it an attractive venue for
nation-states and NGO’s as well as “lone wolf” visionaries and radicals. In
Jonathan White’s Terrorism and Homeland Security, Chapter 15, The Role of
Symbols and Structures, he describes asymmetrical warfare as being
waged…”against symbolic targets, and Homeland Security is designed to secure
symbols.5 Hoffman further uses the Oklahoma City attack of the Murrah
Federal Building as an example: “The bombing of the Murrah Building in
Oklahoma City in 1995, for example, had symbolic value, but the casualties
were horrific.”6
That building was not bombed by soldiers in uniform nor units of a
military air force, but rather, by perpetrators not wearing any military insignia
at all. Their purposes, as claimed by Timothy Mac Veigh and Terry Nichols
4
Robert B. Strassler.
The Landmark Thucydides. A Contemporary Guide to the Peloponnesian War, pages 8,
70.
5 Jonathan R. White. Terrorism and Homeland Security, p.277.
6
Ibid, pg. 277.
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alike, were to redress grievances arising from the perceived injustices caused
by an agency of the United States government and several of their agencies,
particularly the FBI and ATF, in their combined assault on the compound at
Waco, Texas and at Ruby Ridge. This fits the descriptive language of using
asymmetrical means to use terror in a symbolic way to realize a POLITICAL
objective.
The 1993 bombing of the Twin Towers in New York City and the
infamous attack that followed on September 11, 2001, on same as well as the
Pentagon, had the same objectives and symbolism, to realize an assortment of
political objectives not attainable through the standard instruments of war.
After all, the perpetrators in these cases had not the means to attack these
targets in conventional military ways. They chose weapons and methods
afforded to them by their enemies and the surrounding environment; they
turned heavy American aircraft laden with fuel, into devastating cruise
missiles.
Eleven years later, the United States and the rest of the world are still
absorbing those blows.
The political-symbolic aftermath, reverberates today. Long standing
effects are the most desirable results of terrorism.7 A strong argument can be
made, of course, that those objectives were met with al Qaeda, in New York as
well as their many other American and Allied targets around the world, by a
determined and well schooled cadre of new-age warriors, Holy Warriors, on a
self-proclaimed Jihad.8
See Hoffman. His constant theme in his lengthy descriptions of the effects and
objectives of terrorism is that long-term psychological damage against highly symbolic
targets, is the ultimate realization of political terrorism.
7
Lawrence Wright. The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Bin Laden
issued a fatwa in 1996 proclaiming…”terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms in
our land, is a legitimate right and a moral obligation.”
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CASE STUDIES
There were many attacks on American assets both military and political
before the horrendous attacks in New York and Washington DC on September
11, 2001. After Osama bin Laden’s fatwas and his successful assaults against
America afterwards, 9.11 offered the United States, it’s NATO and other allies,
even Vladimir Putin, a vivid demonstration of the new world they were now
entering. This was an unfamiliar and hostile world of unknown possibilities,
the horrifying world of world-wide terrorism! From Khobar Towers, the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, to the USS Cole in Aden, as well
as many others, the intensity and number of attacks changed America.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the American government’s
response to this drumbeat of terrorist assault was as dramatic as the attacks
themselves. Reorganizing the entire American government superstructure was
indicative of the width and breadth of those adaptations. In November 2002 the
United States Congress and President George W. Bush established by law the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.9
The USA Patriot Act resulted from the efforts of Congress to enhance law
enforcement as well as intelligence authorities and coordination in a
comprehensive attempt to prevent another massive attack on the homeland.10
Perhaps more significantly, George Bush embarked on a draconian program
which came under the banner of “The War on Terror.”11
9/11 Commission Report. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, Authorized Edition.
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10
Ibid.
Contained in what became known as “The Bush Doctrine,” the principles of preemption and democratic evangelism replaced traditional precepts of American defensive
reaction to foreign attack. The most basic translation of this new approach was that,
when identified as a threat, America would attack first. Bush further declared that the
new operating principle of the United States government would be anchored upon the
following supposition: “You are either with us, or you are against us!” There were so
many reiterations of this phraseology that a general reference will suffice here. Bush’s
explicit report to West Point in 2002 left no doubt as to the intent of the new Bush
Doctrine.
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Most Americans, in fact most literate world citizens, know the basic story
line of 9.11. It is not necessary to rehash it for our purposes here. Suffice it to
say, that episode changed America forever.
Let us turn to another indirect attack on the United States by Al Qaeda,
the Madrid train bombing in March 2004. It was an indirect attack on
American national interests because it directly affected one of America’s most
important NATO partners, Spain. As a willing participant in the “Coalition of
the Willing,” Spain was helping with the War on Terror by supplying troops to
Iraq.
After the 1996 and subsequent 1998 fatwas, or religious declarations, by
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, the pace of jihadi terrorism picked up
dramatically. Driven apparently by increasing success and obvious frustration
on the part of the United States and its Allies to resist that success, bin Laden
and others were encouraged. The ultimate success was, of course, the dramatic
victories generated by 9.11. Genuine fear and terror was being experienced
throughout the United States for the first time in a sustained way in the United
States. That sense of foreboding gloom spread throughout the American
empire. It did seem, indeed, that terrorism was everywhere and could not be
stopped.
The Madrid train bombings reinforced the sensational advances caused
by 9.11 in 2004. On March 11, 2004, ten bombs exploded on four earlymorning commuter trains in Madrid, killing 191 people and leaving at least
1,800 wounded. Eta, a Basque separatist group, was highly suspected.
A letter sent to a London-based newspaper claimed…Abu Hafs, an Al
Qaeda affiliate, responsible for Madrid, linking ETA and Al Qaeda.12 Al Qaeda
subsequently claimed the attacks were in retaliation for Spain’s collaboration
12
Timeline: Madrid Investigation -BBC Wednesday 28 April, 2004.
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…with the criminals Bush and his allies.”13 This offers dramatic proof of the
effectiveness of the jihadist terrorist methodology in use during this period of
open confrontation between Bush and the Al Qaeda organization.
Coinciding with this cascade of jihadist successes was the increasing
realization by the Bush administration that the Iraq war was NOT over by any
stretch as the Iraqi insurgency began to take hold negating Bush
proclamations that the American combat role was over. Seven more years of
bitter warfare ensued and American military losses increased progressively and
substantially.
These two case studies chronicle the successful tactics of terrorism in
dramatic fashion and are useful to track the evolution of terrorism.
Why postmodern? What is different now? The identifiable variables to be
used to answer that broad question are these:
1. Globalization has increased its affects throughout the world.
2. Hamas and Hezbollah, along with other jihadist terrorist groups, are
moving toward state-building and away from open violence.
3. Cyber-terrorism is replacing the truck bomb and suicide bomber, with
the exception of post-sovereign Iraq.
4. The definition of terrorism, originally state-sponsored and then
asymmetrical NGO-based, is morphing to technological equity, as
perpetrators are equal in their abilities to terrorize via the internet
and social-networking tools.
In fact, it may be claimed by both cyber warriors as well as governments,
that the hacktivists have the edge. The American government, the Obama
administration to be sure, is actively recruiting for cyber-specialists in this
response to cyber-terrorism.
Groups such as Anonymous, Wikipedia, and a field of others are causing
panic in the intelligence communities.
Ibid, pg 1. As a direct result of this attack…Spain’s Socialist Party won a surprise
victory in the country’s general election, Spanish voters turning on the conservative
government.
13
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The need for violence is diminishing as the real threats are cyber threats
to the infrastructure and the “Grid.” The real violence seems to be originating
from American drone strikes against terrorists and/or their base camps. This is
what the war on terrorism looks like in 2012. The 2011 assassination of Osama
bin Laden himself in Pakistan by an elite seal team already seems
anachronistic; the mechanical drones and their super-intelligence capabilities,
augmented by Hellfire missiles, are rapidly making Special Forces teams less
necessary.
Warfare, doctrinaire or asymmetrical, evolves, of course. The political
machinery must evolve as well. Social networking is revolutionizing
international relations. Witness the politics in a cup (mine) phenomenon in the
recent Arab Spring, the American 99er movement and of course, the current
Russian winter.
CONCLUSIONS
The inevitable struggle for global power is being waged largely with
perceptional threat. Though overwhelming military power still resides with the
United States, American hegemony is being systemically and seriously eroded
on the perceptional front. Nuclear weapons are no longer viable; “a weapon
unused is a useless weapon” as the mantra goes. As the United States suffers
from classic overstretch, as predicted by Paul Kennedy, American power is
being challenged by threats to the infrastructure and the GRID.14
Almost all military offensives are presaged by cyber-attack against the
opponent’s command and control infrastructure or C5I. Witness Russia’s cyber
attack against Georgia in the 2008 war that virtually immobilized Georgian
forces. Coupled with new social networking and cyber threat tools, U S military
hegemony may be dissipating rapidly.
2013 addendum and updates-J260-February 22, 2013:
14
Paul Kennedy. Yale University Press, 1989. The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers.
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Additional information and a fresh perspective has been added to this
lecture for the Spring 2013 class.
With the recent emphasis on the drone (UAV) program employed by the
American Department of Defense and CIA, a return to a kinetic military
response has been emphasized in American counterterrorism methods. The
efficiency of the drones cannot be denied for effectiveness in the
counterterrorism efforts of the United States to decapitate jihadist leadership,
especially in regards to al Qaeda. Reports by President Obama himself on many
public occasions have assured the American public that up to 75 percent of kill
list al Qaeda leaders have been eliminated with this technology.
Drones have become an effective and lethal response for surveillance and
attacking the enemy in his own county. Drones can acquire, profile, pinpoint
and kill jihadists with pinpoint accuracy worldwide. The upside to this scenario
is that American soldiers are not on the ground and in harm’s way. The
downside is that collateral damage from drone attacks has offered jihadists
fodder for propaganda on the internet and in their sponsor governments.
For purposes of our course discussion, it seems appropriate to pose the
question: does the efficiency of the drone campaign negate the thesis argument
that terrorism, as an asymmetrical attack against the superior military forces,
is no longer morphing into postmodern terrorism, or the psychological threat of
attack through cyber and psychological threat campaigns, the position of this
paper? I believe the broad answer to that question is no.
The attack against Benghazi, Libya, manifests this point. Al Qaeda,
always adaptable, used an al Qaeda franchise affiliate, Ansar al Sharia, to do
what al Qaeda has always done best-adapt to the situation and take what
opportunities the enemy offers you. The United States is a moral and legalistic
society. The deaths of one of its diplomatic personnel and three members of his
support team were a significant blow to American moral. Executed on the
anniversary of 9/11, this attack was largely a symbolic attack against
American prestige and national pride, the FAVORITE target of al Qaeda and
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terrorist groups in general. Four American KIA’s are relatively insignificant in
terms of damage to the U.S. military; the psychological damage to America was
very significant, however, and has given the jihadist cause new life. The
success of this attack propelled the subsequent attack against the oil refinery
in Algeria (Terrorist who attack Algerian oil refinery also took part in US
Consulate attack in Benghazi, 2013). These are prime examples of the
psychological impacts of terrorism.
In a larger strategic sense, the threat of shutting down a nation’s water
supply, electrical grid, financial system or transportation system, is much more
devastating and effective. That is the definition of terror on a massive scale.
This constitutes a new postmodern front in the application of the asymmetrical
threat we have come to know as terrorism.
Updates for 2014:
The basic precepts originally outlined in this 2012 paper remain
constant.
As a confirmation of the theoretical concept, it seems appropriate to add
the controversies surrounding Bradley Manning, Julian Assange and now
Edward Snowden.
Though kenetic acts of terrorism cannot be definitively connected to their
respective activities, it is increasingly arguable that their release of classified
documents worldwide has substantially added to the threat of terrorism. For
example, the fears are palpable that those releases of information of American
and British military actions and covert campaigns both on the battlefield and
in cyberspace have terrorized soldier and citizen alike. A pervasive sense of
uncertainty and the threat of dire consequences and our respective notions of
national security act to destabilize and terrorize the military as well as the
common citizen by dislodging certainty in our foundations, institutions and
national trust. This psychological destabilization is highly effective to create
agency of the most negative type of constructivism; if it can be proposed,
implied and repeated in political and psychological terms, the perception of
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terror is created and may affect the actions of rational actors through
perceptual change.
Wendt, Onuf, and Kabulkova have written extensively about agency as a
product of perceptional change in politics (Wendt, 1999).
(2013). Terrorist who attack Algerian oil refinery also took part in US Consulate attack in Benghazi. The
Sheba Post.
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge .
If it is conceptualized, if it is expressed, it becomes an agent of change from
conjectural and the subjective to reality. Real political change often results. A
convincing argument can be made, and was in the 9/11 Commission Report,
that the threat of terrorism, especially potential nuclear terrorism, would cause
the United States to reorganize its entire government and spend untold billions
of dollars in anticipation of a devastating threat.
As these “information evangelists” (mine) have commandeered the
attention of the world regarding security revelations of the United States in
particular, they have also introduced the fears that release of classified
information will cause irreparable harm to American foreign policy in general
and to our homeland security in particular.
The perception of fear of the NSA is as palpable as fear of al Qaeda or the
myriad other terrorist organizations. Fears of the hacker revelations of Wiki
Leaks and Anonymous have also destabilized the security world.
Violence has morphed from dominant actual kinetic actions such as car
bombings that continue in Iraq and Lebanon today, to the threat of cyberterrorism as witnessed in the thousands of cyber assaults upon American
infrastructure, corporate and military, threatening a cataclysmic cascade of
events against the American stock market, water sources, banking systems, as
well as the various levels of previously secure internet traffic of the Department
of Defense.
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Bibliography
White, Jonathan, R. (2006) Terrorism and Homeland Security. Fifth Edition.
Thompson Wadsworth. Belmont, Ca.
9.11 Commission, Authorized Edition.(2002) The 9.11 Commission Report, Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
W. W. Norton & Co. New York.
Wright, Lawrence. ((2006) The Looming Tower. Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.
Alfred A. Knopf. New York.
Strassler, Robert, B. (1996) The Landmark Thucydides. A Comprehensive Guide
to the Peloponnesian War. Free Press. New York.
Hoffman, Bruce. (2006) Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. New
York.
Kennedy, Paul. (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Yale University
Press. New Haven, Conn.
Timeline: Madrid Investigation-BBC Wednesday, 28 April, 200622 U. S. C.
section 2656f(d), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3597885.stm
http://.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/usc_sec_22~00002656-f000-.html
Lieberman, Joseph, I. and Collins, Susan, M. Flashing Red: A Special Report on
the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi. United States Senate Committee On Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs. December 30, 2012.
Corporate author: “Terrorist who attack Algerian oil refinery also took part in
US Consulate attack in Benghazi.” The Sheba Post. Monday, 18 February, 2013
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