Moral Responsibility Toward Other Species
Reading: DesJardins:
Recap:
Lecture #13
Environmental Ethics, Chapter 5
Having completed an introductory study of some of the major ethical theories that have
relevance to environmental ethics (Ch. 1-3), and having studied the applied ethics of
responsibility toward future generations (Ch. 4), we now turn to further application
(extension) of traditional ethical theory to address human responsibility toward the rest
of the living world.
Suggested
Approach:
The following outline should be of help as you distill the main points of DesJardins=
argument for ethical responsibility toward nonhuman life, animals in particular.
I. Introductory Considerations:
A.
Chapter 5 Essay B Examples of ethically questionable uses of animals:
1.
Use of animals to test toxicity of drugs, cosmetics, etc. B LD-50 (certain deaths)
2.
Factory farming B e.g. Raising veal calves (limited nutrition, no exercise)
>
Brings it closer to home B many aspects of our diet (veal, eggs, pork, etc.)
B.
Question:
1.
2.
3.
ADo animals have moral standing?@
B or...
Are anthropocentric ethical systems justified?
> Anthropocentric = ethics that limit moral standing to humans alone
> No ethical obligations toward animals apart from serving human interests
> Actions judged moral if the consequences are acceptable toward humans
Required a Aseparation@ or Agulf@ between human and nonhuman
> Animals have no value beyond instrumental value B no intrinsic moral value
> Animals as objects, property, Ameat@, muscle for work
Discussion Question #1 B most positive experiences we have with animals are
for our pleasure, companionship, nutrition, sport, etc.
II. History B How do our major ethical systems address nonhuman life?
[Recall our AGrid model@]
A.
Aristotle B humans at the top of hierarchy (with Aintellect@ or Asoul@) had moral standing
B Aplants for animals@ and Aanimals for man@
B.
Aquinas B echoed Aristotle while applying his biblical values B Adominion@
B Lynn White, historian (1967) B Judeo-Christian tradition is at fault!!
C.
Kant B moral standing only to rational beings (humans); duty to animals only to the extent that
they contribute to well being of mankind
D.
Rene’ Descartes – two basic types of substances: “mind” (separate and superior) to “body
– animals have no consciousness (“machines”); therefore, no moral standing
– only humans have moral standing because of “consciousness”
– note the influence of Aristotle’s hierarchy
E.
Jeremy Bentham B extended moral considerability to animals that can Afeel pleasure or pain@
13.2
III. Early Environmental Ethics
A.
Reigning ethical paradigm in Western philosophy and religion
1.
Hierarchical... with humans superior to nature B Can such a tradition birth a new ethic?
2.
Yes, says John Passmore (Man=s Responsiblity for Nature, 1974)...BUT...
a.
We shouldn=t replace AWestern tradition@ with alternatives such as mysticism,
spiritism, or animal rights
b.
We should consider reviving Afamiliar ethics@ B e.g. love thy neighbor and
thoughtful action as opposed to Agreed and short-sightedness@
c.
We should revive the emphasis on the Aaesthetic value of nature@ instead of rejecting
any tendency to enjoy the sensual B e.g. beauty, fragrance, feel, etc.
Passmore=s Claim: AOnly if men can first learn to look sensuously at the world will
they learn to care for it.@ <Do you agree?? Why or why not?>>
d.
B.
Passmore (1914-2004) was ultimately anthropocentric: He emphasized that we
must make our environmental decisions on the basis of 'conserving' the environment
for humans, not on 'preserving' it for a nature that can have no awareness of these
ethical decisions.
Do humans have a right to a livable environment?
1.
2.
Conflict between preference utilitarianism and moral right to livable environment
a.
Preference utilitarianism B uses Aeconomic model@ and quantitative grounds; more
is better to produce maximum good for maximum number (see Ch. 3, Sec. 3.4 where
Baxter discusses how market system can function for the Agood@ of clean air/water)
b.
Moral right B uses qualitative grounds; ethical judgements needed to protect interests
that rise above simply preference, wants, or Adesirable state@;
Kantian duty ethic would allow Apreference@ unless the Adignity of people@ is
jeopardized because wants are allowed to function on the same level as rights
William Blackstone B extended Kantian defense of individual human rights to include
Aright to a livable environment@
a. rights are defined as well reasoned human creations that serve as boundaries to protect
certain human interests from being sacrificed
b. Opposition to Blackstone from...
i. Passmore ( A.2.b.) -- traditional moral teaching (e.g. property rights) is sufficient
ii. Some fear a proliferation of Arights@ that would Aparalyze modern life@
13.3
IV. Moral Standing
A.
B.
Duties regarding nature/environment (but for the benefit of humans) versus duties to
nature/environment in its own right
1.
Anthropocentric extensionism B extends ethics beyond traditional boundaries but humans
are still sole possessors of moral standing
B e.g. rights of future generations or Aright to a livable environment@
2.
Nonanthropocentric extensionism B boundaries & moral standing extended to nonhuman
What are the boundaries of moral standing or moral considerability?
Question: What things have a moral claim on us such that we have a duty to consider them
and their interests in our moral deliberations?
1.
2.
C.
Joel Feinberg (1974) B Aconative life@ [capable of interests wishes, hopes, urges, development]
animals (especially higher animals) with Acognitive equipment@
a.
Examples:
b.
Human rights B How about the unborn baby?
c.
But not B species, plants, wilderness, architecture
Future generations? (p. 104-105)
Feinberg was first to raise attention to moral standing of nonhuman life
Do trees have standing?
1.
Christopher Stone B Rights exist when they are recognized by an authoritative body that
can review that right to assess possible violation; Stone reflected on Mineral King case
2.
3.
Stone=s logic: Evolution of culture has seen an expanding boundary of extending rights
a.
White males B> females B> Afro-Americans B> corporations/trusts
b.
Why not extend them to Anatural objects?@
Four criteria for moral standing (Stone):
1) Rights are recognized by authority (C.1.)
Culture willing to recognize nature and value
2) The entity must institute legal actions at
Attorney can speak for rights of a forest or river
its behest
just as one might speak for a comatose person
3) The court must accept that the entity
Loss of Aenvironmental health@ needs
experienced injury to it
retribution just as person injured by pollution
can file suit
4) Relief must run to the benefit of it.
4.
Evidence of restoration following injury
Concerns:
a. What are the best interests of the entity?
e.g better for river to be restocked or allowed to recover itself?
b.
c.
Who should be the guardian (e.g. of natural area) B philosophy of guardians differs
KEY: Still must have a consensus as to the nature and value of the thing
12.4
V. Animal Liberation Movement B Peter Singer (1970's to present)
Basis for moral standing Bspeciesism B analogous to racism and sexism which also withhold
moral standing to the respective entities.
1. ABasic Moral Principle@ B all interests should receive equal consideration
2. Singer=s Criterion
a.
Aall who can suffer or enjoy pleasantness@ [not a rock being kicked]
b.
sentience = capacity to feel pain
3. Application across animal species:
a.
No requirement to deny distinctions B e.g. treatment of a horse vs. child
b.
Moral consideration in proportion to capacity and amount of suffering possible
Singer is utilitarian
1. First, he defines the Agood@ = Aenjoyment and avoidance of suffering@
2. Second B right actions judged by minimizing overall suffering
A.
B.
VI. Animal Rights B Tom Regan (Arights-based ethic)
A.
Animal abuse is wrong in principle, not because of suffering (consequence)
B.
Violates the Ainherent value@ of animals
C.
1.
value independent of our interests, uses, etc.
2.
Inherent value cannot be reduced to any other type of value (e.g. instrumental)
Regan differs from Kant B i.e. moral standing for those capable of autonomous action
1.
Moral standing extended to both those which are....
Amoral agents@ - Capable of autonomous actions (rational, free, responsible)
Amoral patients@= Incapable of autonomous actions (e.g. handicapped)
2. Wrong to treat animals as instrumental value because they are Asubjects-of-a-life@ (p113)
3.
ASubjects-of-a-life@B not only alive, but Ahaving a life@,beliefs, memory, hopes, desires
VII. Ethical Implications
A. Stop Afactory farming@ - no nutritional, aesthetic, ethical, or other justification
B. Stop sport recreation with animals
C. Stop scientific research that abuses animals
D. Animals but not species have moral standing
1.
Singer B species cannot experience pain
2.
Regan B species are not Asubjects-of-a-life@
13.5
VIII. Critical Challenges to Individualistic Extension of Moral Standing to Nonhuman Entities
A.
How do we know when our rationale is truly nonanthropocentric (duty to nature) rather
than anthropocentric extensionism (duty regarding nature, but for the benefit of humans)?
B. How do we discern good ethics from AWestern tradition@ versus Arubbish?@
1. Long history of anthropocentrism - Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Descartes, etc.
2. Ethicist=s role as Aunder-labourer@ to clear away obstructions to knowledge
3. Passmore - no need for new ethics; revive Afamiliar ethics@ (e.g. regard for neighbor);
recovery of our loss of the aesthetic value of nature (reawakening our senses)
4. Counterbalance preference utilitarianism (Aeconomic model@) with protection of
moral rights (deontological) which itself needs limits
C. How do we define the boundaries that include entities with moral standing?
1. Sentience (capacity to feel pain/pleasure) B Bentham, Singer (utilitarian; animal lib.)
2. Conative life (capable if interests, hopes, development that we can violate) - Feinberg
3. ASubject-of-a-Life@ (alive plus Ahaving a life@)
a. Regan (Animal rights to autonomous beings; deontological)
b. Moral standing not only to moral agents but to moral patients (impaired but subject)
D. How do we define the interests of nonhuman organisms?
1. Rights exist when they are recognized by an authority that can assess (Stone)
2. Basic interests (for survival) versus peripheral interests (amenities)
3. Restoration versus allowing nature to heal itself
4. Helping wildlife (moral patients?)
E.
Practices that are condemned based on moral standing extended to individuals
1. Factory farming B but is there justification for ethically acceptable farming; and eating?
2. Sport recreation B but is there justification for ethically acceptable hunting/trapping?
3. Scientific research B but is there justification for acceptable research?
F.
Problems with ethical extensionism:
1. Anthropocentric extensionism is hard to avoid
Human is Areference point@ for judging sentience, Asubject-of-a-life@
Animals more like us are likely to be granted moral standing
In the end, humans are the definers of moral standing (see b.)
G. Objectivity in defining the boundaries of moral standing
1. Where are the cutoffs in a continuum from rocks to humans?
2. How to deal with variation within a population of individuals
3. How to define the interests of a river, a deer, etc.
H. Dealing with impossible situations B Alimited scope@
Individualistic ethical extensionism ignores ecology of populations and species
Moral responsibility to animals facing disrupted landscapes and food chains
Using sentience or Asubject-of-a-life@ means we are using adaptations that are a means (of
survival) to a larger end; namely, life itself. So, moral standing is based on life=s
manifestations rather than life itself.