MICHIGAN AP NEG V. UTD LO
HEMP CP DEBATE
1NC CP TEXT
The United States should: propose amendments to the international drug control
treaties to authorize signatories to legalize marijuana; freeze any additional moves
towards marihuana legalization, pending the outcome of treaty reform; legalize
commercial hemp production and the importation of hemp seeds; establish a
limited ex ante judicial review process for targeted killing; shift drug interdiction
resources toward financial institutions and bank officials.
The Drug Enforcement Agency should cease all enforcement activities against
industrial hemp
2NC SOLVES HEMP
Legalizing hemp but not marijuana solves
Caulkins et al 2012 (Jonathan P [Stever professor of operation research and public policy @
Carnegie Mellon], Angela Hawken [Associate prof of public policy @ Pepperdine], Beau Kilmer
[co-director of the RAND Drug Research Center], and Mark AR Kleiman [Prof of public policy @
UCLA]; Marijuana Legalization; Oxford University Press; p. 227-9; kdf)
Could the United States allow industrial hemp without legalizing marijuana?
Certainly. Many nations legalized industrial hemp production in the 1990s while continuing
prohibition of marijuana as a psychoactive drug. Different strains of cannabis-and different parts of any given plantproduce very different levels of the plant's psychoactive agents. Typically, laws allowing industrial hemp require the
use of very-low-THC strains (less than 1 percent or even 0.3 percent THC, compared to the 4-18 percent characteristic of
cannabis produced and sold as a drug). So there's a reasonably bold line between industrial hemp and intoxicating marijuana. But
it's hard to imagine that the passionate advocacy of industrial hemp is unrelated to its link to drug policy. Groups such as the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) have picked up the hemp crusade in order to claim the benefits
of industrial hemp as an advantage of marijuana legalization. Politics makes strange bedfellows, and the politics of marijuana are no
exception. Oddly, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other advocates of continued prohibition agree
with hemp advocates in linking the industrialhemp and drug-legalization questions. But they do so
from the opposite perspective, arguing that industrial hemp should not be legalized because it would complicate efforts to enforce
prohibition against use as an intoxicant. One DEA concern is that farmers could line the outside of their fields with low-THC
(industrial) cannabis while growing high-THC (intoxicating) cannabis in the middle. Since relatively few acres would be needed to
supply the intoxicant market, allowing free cultivation of industrial hemp could indeed pose an enforcement challenge. (Even the
upper estimate of s,ooo metric tons of intoxicating cannabis consumed in the United States could be supplied by less than a third of
the acreage Canada cultivates for industrial hemp.) However, unregulated, laissez-faire production is not the only alternative to
complete prohibition. Authorities in other countries use stringent protocols for the licensure, seed
selection, and inspection of hemp operations to monitor the hemp production process. Prospective
growers have to submit substantial paperwork, complete a background check, and join a professional hemp association to become
sanctioned producers. Governments also require farmers to grow specific approved hemp varieties that fall under the THC
threshold. Farms are subject to annual visits by inspectors and sometimes to aerial surveillance. Farms are valuable assets that
would be vulnerable to seizure and forfeiture if farmers were found to be producing illegal (intoxicating) forms of cannabis. There
are also purely technical barriers to hiding pot plants in fields of industrial hemp. For example,
fiber hemp plants are planted close together to encourage tall vertical stalks with few leaves.
Moreover, hemp fiber is harvested early, before the intoxicant- bearing flowers are ready. Marijuana grown amid industrial hemp
would probably have to be the low-value, relatively lowTHe commercial grade rather than higher-value sinsemilla, because the
pollen produced by the hemp plants would pollinate the drug plants. (Sinsemilla comes from unfertilized female cannabis plants.)
Indeed, some medical marijuana growers in California oppose a proposed law permitting an industrial hemp pilot project because
they fear hemp pollen might ruin their harvest. Canadian industrial hemp farmers try to ensure that their crops are at least three
miles from any wild or cultivated cannabis to ensure pedigreed hempseed production; studies show cannabis pollen can travel three
to twelve miles. The really convincing evidence is negative. Like Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark in the night, the absence of
any reports from Europe of diversion from industrial hemp farms into the drug market argues for the success of these regulations. In
sum, while legal industrial hemp production could create a Trojan horse for the production of intoxicating marijuana, there is no
real problem in creating regulations to limit diversion.
Hemp isn’t prohibited by the treaties
Johnson, 13 – Congressional Research Service (Renee, “Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity”
7/24, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32725.pdf)
The United States is a signatory of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961 (as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961).58 The principal objectives of the convention are to “limit the possession, use, trade in,
distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and
scientific purposes and to address drug trafficking through international cooperation to deter
and discourage drug traffickers.”59 The convention requires that each party control cannabis
cultivation within its borders; however, Article 28.2 of the convention states: “This Convention
shall not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis plant exclusively for industrial purposes (fibre
and seed) or horticultural purposes.”60 Thus the convention need not present an impediment to
the development of a regulated hemp farming sector in the United States.
AT: HEMP = MARIHUANA
Hemp seeds not marihuana – their card doesn’t say what they want it to
CSA 70
Controlled Substance Act, Section 802, US Department of Justice, “SUBCHAPTER I — CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT,”
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/21usc/802.htm
(16) The term "marihuana" means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or
resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such
stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom),
fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.
CP
1NC CP
The United States should: propose amendments to the international drug control
treaties to authorize signatories to legalize marijuana; freeze any additional moves
towards marihuana legalization, pending the outcome of treaty reform; legalize
commercial hemp production and the importation of hemp seeds; establish a
limited ex ante judicial review process for targeted killing; shift drug interdiction
resources toward financial institutions and bank officials.
The Drug Enforcement Agency should cease all enforcement activities against
industrial hemp
The CP causes treaty reform and allows legalization down the road
Don, 14 - University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. candidate 2015 (Allison, “Lighten Up:
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 213, Hein Online) The
Board = The International Narcotics Control Board
3. Amending the Single Convention is the Best Option
In light of the newly passed legislation within the United States concerning recreational
marijuana and proposed legislation in the international community, the best means of aligning
the Single Convention with evolving norms is to amend the treaty.153 Amendments allow for
formal changes to be made to a treaty while maintaining the treaty's existence. 154 This allows
for adjustment as "parties' understanding of the issue"' change or circumstances surrounding
the issue change without requiring the drafting of a new treaty or termination of an existing one.
By amending the Single Convention to allow for the recreational use of marijuana, the United
States and other countries considering such legislation would be able to continue the legislative
process without any international obligations impeding the progression towards marijuana
legalization.
Article 47 within the Single Convention provides instructions for amending the treaty, stating
that "[any [p]arty may propose an amendment to this Convention.156 In order to make such a
proposal, the amendment itself and the reasons behind the amendment must be transferred to
the Secretary- General of the United Nations in writing who will then disseminate the proposed
amendment to the other parties of the treaty and the Commission. At this point, the
Commission has the power to decide if a conference should be held to discuss the proposal or if
the parties should simply be asked if they are willing to accept.157 If there is no objection within
18 months, the amendment becomes fully adopted; if there is an objection, the Commission
may then choose to hold a conference to review the proposal.158
With 153 current parties to the Single Convention, arriving at a consensus may prove difficult.
This does not preclude the option to amend as "amendments require agreement between
treaty parties, but not necessarily between all parties." Once an amendment has been proposed
and adopted, parties are free to decide if they will become a party to the amendment.159 Those
who opt not to join the amendment remain bound by the treaty's original obligations.160 By
proposing an amendment that would permit the use of marijuana for recreational purposes,
those countries who wish to pursue such legislation would be permitted to do so and those
countries who remain in opposition would be able to remain parties to the original treaty
preventing the use of recreational marijuana.161
The CP takes a wait and see approach to legalization while the US pursues treaty
amendments – that protects international law
Counts, 14 - J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2014 (Nathan, “INITIATIVE 502 AND
CONFLICTING STATE AND FEDERAL LAW” 49 Gonz. L. Rev. 187,
http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/law-review/files/2014/04/1-Counts-Pgs-187-212.pdf)
In dealing with the conflicting state and federal law, enforcement decisions will affect the United
States’ role as an actor in international law and the direction of international cooperation in
combatting illegal drug trade. First, if the United States breaches its treaty obligations under the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, it would undermine the international rule of law. A
strong international rule of law is desirable “to establish and maintain order and enhance
reliable expectations” in international affairs.142 As there are no enforcement mechanisms for
international legal obligations equivalent to that which exists with domestic law, the weight of
obligations relies to some extent on comity among the states involved.143 As long as states agree
to limit their sovereignty and comply with international law, states will be more likely to respect
one another’s reasonable expectations and fulfill their obligations.144
Both conventions have provisions that read, “If there should arise between two or more Parties a
dispute relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the Parties shall consult
together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by . . . peaceful means of their own choice,”
and should this fail, they agree to jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).145
Despite this possibility of justiciability of breach, it is highly unlikely that any state party would
bring a case before the ICJ over domestic non-enforcement of the treaty obligations, as
diplomatic channels are more predictable and possible noncompliance with ICJ judgments
weakens the international rule of law.146
If the United States fails to enforce the CSA and allows the Washington legalization system to
succeed, it may signal to other states that the United States is willing to allow its domestic
law overcome its international law obligations and may not be reliable in international
transnational enforcement efforts in the future. It also signals to other states that they may allow
their domestic law to inhibit effective enforcement of international treaty obligations,
which may undermine the United States’ goals in the future.
Aside from rule of law concerns, breach of treaty obligations may undermine the international
cooperation required to combat international drug trafficking. The United States has historically
been a strong proponent of drug prohibition and prioritization of enforcement efforts against
trafficking, so legalization and non-enforcement of a Schedule I drug within our borders would
send a conflicting message.147 The former Administrator of the DEA, John C. Lawn,
commented, “A violation of these treaties by the United States would destroy our credibility with
drug source and drug transit countries that are now working with the United States in the global
war on drugs.”148 Some parties have already softened their domestic enforcement policies and
similar action by the United States would make this course more acceptable.149 If other
governments follow suit and legalize drugs in some capacity, this may decrease the focus on
enforcement against drugs generally, which may negatively impact coordinated efforts against
illicit drug trafficking. Thus, if the United States allows legalization of marijuana in its borders,
it should be ready to support the change in policy that this represents and address it at the
international level. The United States would need to restate the importance of cooperation
against international drug trafficking, even though some amount of domestic social
experimentation may be permissible.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Domestically
The possible federal response depends on whether the government wishes to continue to pursue
the policy underlying the CSA or defers to the states in managing local marijuana regulation. If
the policy goals of the CSA are to be continued, the government should take steps to disrupt the
Washington legalization scheme and deter use, which may take three forms.
First, the government could encourage re-criminalization by conditioning state funding on penal
statutes for marijuana use, similar to that used for enforcing a drinking age of twenty-one
throughout the United States.150 “Congress has immense fiscal resources relative to the states,
and the Court has imposed few meaningful restrictions on how Congress may employ those
resources to extract conditions from the states.”151 This option could make up for the difficulties
in enforcing the CSA by causing state actors to resume enforcement. State law enforcement of
marijuana crimes may continue but at a much lower level, because it is likely that Washington
would still have a policy of deprioritizing marijuana-related crimes. This strategy also
undermines federalism and state experimentalism to some extent and should be used
sparingly.152
Second, the government could enforce the CSA against distributors of recreational marijuana in
Washington. If even one marijuana retailer were charged under the CSA, it is likely that the
entire marijuana legalization of system of Washington would cease to function. As the
businesses are licensed by Liquor Control Board, they will be easily investigated by federal
agents and subject to possible felony prosecution, so marijuana distribution will likely return to
black markets. This may make the situation worse if Washington does not enforce against illicit
sellers even when the activity is still illegal under state law, as a result of marijuana crime deprioritization. Federal enforcement would be insufficient and illegal markets may actually grow
in Washington. Arrests of licensed business owners could lead to a sense of injustice as
explained above as the retailers would view themselves as law-abiding citizens, not the drug
traffickers that the CSA was designed to combat.
Third, federal enforcement could pursue civil injunctions or raids focused on forfeiture of
marijuana, which the DEA currently uses against medical marijuana suppliers.153 This strategy
would have similar effects as the second option, but without the perception of injustice, as these
actions only assert the illegality of the activity and force the business to close without employing
the full penal power of the law. Note though that U.S. Attorneys may still pursue felony charges
under the CSA, the directive to use civil remedies will only be departmental guidelines.
With any of these three approaches, the federal government should take an aggressive stance
against marijuana. Advertising in public media by marijuana-related businesses will go a long
way toward shaping attitudes and giving recreational marijuana legitimacy. Injunctions should
be brought to remove any instances of advertising. This should be paired with anti-marijuana
advertising. Conditional funding could be used to ensure that Washington spends some of the
marijuana excise tax on anti-marijuana advertising campaigns. In addition, proceeds from fines
against marijuana producers and distributors, as well as from forfeitures, could be used to fund
a federal anti-marijuana advertising effort targeted to Washington. The advertising will
demonstrate the government’s continued assertion that marijuana’s negative health consequences are too severe for it to be suitable for any use, and combat the change in social beliefs
that coincide with the state legalization of marijuana.
If the policies behind the CSA are to be reconsidered in light of changing public opinion on
marijuana, there are several options for supporting Washington in implementing Initiative 502.
The first would be a wait-and-see approach of non-enforcement. This would be best paired
with an official statement interpreting the CSA as being inapplicable to actors that follow
relevant state law for a certain time period, so that the actor may raise a defense of
entrapment by estoppel. Otherwise U.S. Attorneys may still bring criminal charges against
violators of the CSA who comply with state law and the actor would have no cognizable defense.
At the end of the time period of non-enforcement, the federal government could examine the
success of Washington’s legalization regime and determine appropriate next steps, possibly
reverting to enforcement or going toward rescheduling.
Finally, Congress could remove marijuana from CSA scheduling and allow states to decide how
to penalize or regulate marijuana production, distribution, and consumption. It could remain a
felony to transport marijuana into or out of the United States, which is a level of enforcement
that is likely commensurate with federal law enforcement capacities. This also ensures that the
United States maintains its commitment to international cooperation in the prevention of drug
trafficking and also ensures that state social experimentalism does not negatively impact the
international community.
B. Internationally
On the international level, it is important that the United States respect international
obligations to maintain the integrity of the rule of law and support coordination in
combatting international drug trafficking. First, the federal government could pursue one of the
approaches above in ensuring enforcement of the CSA in Washington. This would demonstrate
the United States’ ongoing dedication to the goals of both conventions despite conflicting state
laws, reinforcing for other countries that they should pursue this policy even as public opinion
shifts in some areas.
Second, the United States could submit an amendment for the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances that would allow for possible recreational use of marijuana within the territory
of state parties, but still require criminal enforcement against international trafficking. Each
convention has a provision for amendments, which would allow the United States to alter the
treaty obligations of all parties such that non-enforcement against Washington recreational
marijuana, and similar actions by other parties, is no longer a breach.154 As other countries
have begun to liberalize their drug laws, there may be support for such an amendment.155 This
must be paired with vigorous enforcement against international traffickers though, so the policy
does not negatively affect supply or transit countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Initiative 502 gives the federal government the opportunity to reevaluate the policies of the CSA
and either renew efforts against recreational marijuana or allow state governments to control
domestic regulation of marijuana. It is important, however, that in selecting an approach, the
impact of the inconsistency between state and federal law be minimized to avoid a culture of
rule-breaking, and that the United States work to bring itself into compliance with
international law, either through enforcement or by amending existing treaties.
Targeting banks solves cartel revenue
Morris 2013 (Evelyn Krache [Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs @ JFK School of Govt, Harvard]; Think Again: Mexican
Drug Cartels; Dec
3;www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels; kdf)
"We Need to Hit Them Where It Hurts: the Wallet." Exactly. Despite
the ongoing arguments about drug
legalization and border security, the most effective way to combat the scourge of the DTOs would
be to interdict not drugs or people but money. As in any business, money is the fuel that keeps the cartels running.
Even if Sinaloa, to give only one example, were to disappear tomorrow, other organizations would
quickly rise to take its slice of the lucrative pie. One of the most basic tenets of business is that highly profitable
markets attract lots of new entrants. This is true for legal and illegal enterprises alike. The staggering
profits of illegal trade would be much less attractive if the DTOs could not launder, deposit, and
ultimately spend their money. But shutting down the cartels' financial operations will be a formidable
task, given the help they have had from multinational financial institutions, which have profited from
the cartels' large-dollar deposits. In 2010, Wachovia bank (which was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008) admitted that
it had processed $378 billion of currency exchanges in Mexico -- an amount equal to about one-third of the
country's GDP -- to which it had failed to apply anti-laundering restrictions. In 2012, British bank HSBC
settled with the U.S. government for $1.9 billion to escape prosecution for, among other things, laundering hundreds of
millions of dollars for the Sinaloa cartel. U.S. law enforcement has also implicated Bank of America and Western
Union in DTO money laundering. Although illegal money transfers can happen without banks' knowledge, the volume and
widespread occurrence of these transactions indicate just how easy it is for the cartels to clean their dirty money. Paying a fine to
avoid prosecution is almost no punishment at all. The fines Wachovia paid amounted to less than 2 percent of its 2009 profit. Even
the record fine assessed on HSBC amounted to only 12 percent of the bank's profits. Furthermore, banks can simply accrue funds to
offset any possible fines, either by increasing what they charge cartels or by setting aside some of the earnings from laundering, even
as they continue to do business with the DTOs. Prosecuting
bank employees involved in money laundering,
up through the highest levels of an institution, would be a better tack. Pictures of a chief compliance officer
as he entered a courtroom for sentencing would have a far greater deterrent effect than any financial penalty. To that end,
investigative techniques and legal precedents for going after global criminal networks are
increasingly robust, and the political payoffs could be substantial. One of the more successful
campaigns in the war on terrorism has been the financial one; experience gained in tracking the
funds of al Qaeda could make it easier to similarly unravel Los Zetas' financing. Malfeasance in the
financial industry is nothing new, but public sensitivity to banks' wrongdoing is arguably higher than it has been in decades. An
enterprising prosecutor could make quite a reputation for herself by tracking DTO money through the financial system. The cartels,
along with the violence and corruption they perpetrate, are threats to both Mexico and the United States. The problem is a
complicated one and taps areas of profound policy disagreement. The way to make progress in combating
the DTOs is to ignore issues like gun control and illegal immigration and follow the
money. Stanching the cartels' profits will do more to end the bloodshed than any new fence or
law.
2NC CP SOLVES
1nc Counts provides uniqueness for treaties and supports our DA story—breaching
treaties prior to revision crushes faith in i-law and signals to other states that legal
obligations are optional. This makes a spillover claim but says changing
international norms THROUGH the treaty maintains legitimacy—answers all their
uniqueness pounders because it says taking a wait and see approach toward
Colorado is goldilocks.
They’ll say yes, that’s 1nc Don—even without consensus, the formal process means
acquiescence will results in de facto treaty revision.
Only we avert treaty collapse—sequencing
Bennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the
Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect
human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of
the hemispheric debate on drug policy (“Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize
International Drug Treaties” October,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuanalegalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)
• Two U.S. states have legalized recreational marijuana, and more may follow; the Obama
administration has conditionally accepted these experiments. Such actions are in obvious
tension with three international treaties that together commit the United States to punish and
even criminalize activity related to recreational marijuana.
• In essence, the administration asserts that its policy complies with the treaties because they
leave room for flexibility and prosecutorial discretion. That argument makes sense on a shortterm, wait-and-see basis, but it will rapidly become implausible and unsustainable if
legalization spreads and succeeds.
• To avoid a damaging collision between international law and changing domestic and
international consensus on marijuana policy, the United States should seriously consider
narrowly crafted treaty changes. It and other drug treaty partners should begin now to discuss
options for substantive alterations that create space within international law for
conditional legalization and for other policy experimentation that seeks to further the
treaties’ ultimate aims of promoting human health and welfare.
• Making narrowly crafted treaty reforms, although certainly challenging, is not only possible
but also offers an opportunity to demonstrate flexibility that international law—in more areas
than just drug policy—will need in a changing global landscape. By contrast, asserting
compliance while letting treaties fall into desuetude could set a risky precedent, one that—
if domestic legalization proceeds—could harm international law and come back to bite the
United States.
Unique offense—if we win a link then ONLY the CP harmonizes international drug
policy to solve all their spillover countries—they conceded the UN will say yes so
case is offense for us
Hasse, 13 – New York consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm
Reduction Coalition (Heather, “The 2016 Drugs UNGASS: What does it mean for drug reform?”
10/14,
http://drogasenmovimiento.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/13-10-14-the-2016-drugs-ungasse28093what-does-it-mean-for-drug-reform_.pdf
But why? With all of the progress made in reform around the world lately, many - especially in
the US - are asking if the UN is even relevant to domestic drug reform at this point. With the
recent marijuana laws passed in Colorado and Washington and the proposed legislation in
Uruguay - not to mention decriminalization measures enacted in Portugal and a growing
number of other countries - reform seems inevitable. At some point, the argument goes, the UN
system will simply be overtaken by "real world" reform on the ground. Why even bother with
advocacy at the UN?
This is not an easy question to answer; however, 1 truly believe that to be effective, reform
efforts must be made at every level - locally, nationally, and globally.
It may be true that reform efforts in the US and around the world have made significant
progress in the last 10 years. But there is still a long way to go - marijuana is still not completely
legal anywhere in the world (despite state laws to the contrary, marijuana still remains illegal
under federal law throughout the US), and many human rights abuses continue to be carried out
against drug users throughout the world in the name of drug control. Meanwhile, the
international drug control treaties - the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its
progeny - remain in place and, in fact, enjoy nearly universal adherence by 184 member
states.
That so many countries comply – at least technically, if not in “spirit” – with the
international drug treaty system, shows just how highly the international community regards
the system. As well it should – the UN system is invaluable and even vital in many areas,
including climate change, HIV/AIDS reduction, and, most recently, the Syrian chemical
weapons crisis (and don’t forget that the international drug treaty system also governs the flow
of licit medication). While it is not unheard of for a country to disregard a treaty, a system in
which countries pick and choose which treaty provisions suit them and ignore the rest is, shall
we say, less than ideal.
But beyond the idea of simple respect for international law, there are practical aspects of reform
to consider. The drug problem is a global one, involving not only consuming countries but
producing and transit countries as well. Without global cooperation, any changes will at best be
limited (marijuana reform in Washington and Colorado hardly affects the issue of human rights
abuses in Singapore or the limitations on harm reduction measures in Russia). At worst, reform
efforts enacted ad hoc around the world could be contradictory and incompatible --‐ as might
be the result if, for example, Colombia and the US opted for a regulated market without the
cooperation of Costa Rica or Honduras, both transit countries.
Solves down the road
Voorhees 14 [Josh Voorhees, Senior Writer for Slate and Former Writer for Politico and
Greenwire, “Yes, We Cannabis: Has the Legalization of Marijuana in America Become
Inevitable?,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/06/marijuana_legalization_w
ill_weed_soon_be_legal_everywhere_in_the_united.html]
An overwhelming majority of Americans believe that legalization of marijuana is inevitable
Voters in Alaska and Oregon will decide
Similar initiatives are at varying stages in more than a half-dozen other states
the
soon find out if they’re right.
possibly
recreational use of pot.
. We’ll
this November whether their states will join Colorado and Washington in legalizing the commercial sale and
—Nevada, Arizona, and
California among them—where advocates are looking toward 2016, when they hope the presidential election will turn out enough liberals to push those efforts across the finish line. All told, more than 1 in 5 Americans live in states where marijuana use has a
It’s not just at the ballot box where the pro-pot crowd is putting
points on the board Lawmakers in at least 40 states have eased at least some drug laws since
2009 according to Pew
Meanwhile, 16 states have already decriminalized marijuana
legitimate chance to become legal between now and when President Obama leaves office.
.
,
a recent
Research Center analysis. According to the Marijuana Policy Project, proposals to treat pot like alcohol have been introduced in 18 states and the District of Columbia this year alone.
, according to the pro-pot group NORML—Maryland will become the 17th in October. In large
swaths of the country getting caught with a small amount of weed at a concert is now roughly the same as getting a speeding ticket on the way to the show. While not leading the charge, the Obama administration is allowing states the chance to experiment.
The feds have given a qualified greenlight to Colorado and Washington to dabble in recreational
weed, and have even taken small steps to encourage banks to do business with those companies
Given this momentum, it’s not difficult to see why 75 percent of Americans
including a majority of both those who support and those who oppose legalization—told Pew
that they now believe it’s a matter of when, not if, the nation’s
prohibition of
pot ends
This moment isn’t the first time that
the United States appeared on the cusp of legalization.
involved in the quasi-legal pot trade.
—
pollsters
in February
eight-decade-long
. The question is: Are they right? It wasn’t until 2013 that a majority of Americans said that they supported making it legal to use weed.
After steep gains in popular support during the early and mid-’70s, support for legalization climbed to 30 percent
in 1978, only to plummet back into the teens the following decade as Baby Boomers became parents and Jimmy Carter’s pro-decriminalization administration gave way to Ronald Reagan’s war on drugs. “This was supposed to be inevitable then,” says Kevin Sabet, a
legalization opponent and former Obama drug policy adviser who helped found Smart Approaches to Marijuana after leaving the administration. “No one could have predicted that [support] would have been wiped away so quickly.” The pro-pot crowd isn’t ready to
Nadelmann who heads the Drug Policy Alliance
says he’s of two
minds when he thinks about the future. “On the one hand we have this extraordinary
momentum,” he says. “On the other, public opinion can be fickle and marijuana is not going to
legalize itself.” While such caution is reasonable, it’s obvious that things are different now than
they were 40 years ago, when then-record levels of support for legalization were good for little
more than a vocal minority It wasn’t until 2013 that a majority of Americans said for the first
time that they supported making it legal to use weed Support now stands at 54 percent in the
most recent Pew poll
Even those fickle Baby Boomers are
back on board, with 52 percent now in favor—5 points more than that generation’s 1970s-era
high
each passing year brings us an electorate more familiar and less fearful of marijuana.
It’s not just a matter of shifting demographics. There’s also the fact that voters have increasingly
gotten an up-close look at state-legal weed in the form of medical marijuana.
declare victory either. Ethan
,
and has spent decades in the reform trenches,
.
.
, 23 points above where the legalization effort stood as recently as 2000 and 13 points higher than in 2010.
. Meanwhile,
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have
legalized pot for medicinal purposes to varying degrees since California became the first to do so almost two decades ago. Voters in Florida are set to decide later this year whether they want to join that group, something that would give advocates their first voterreferendum victory in the South. (Florida law requires at least 60 percent support, however, making it a heavier lift than it has been in other states.)
State legalization inevitable – trends
Adams, 14 [Marijuana Legalization 'Inevitable': But How & When Will Weed Become HassleFree? By Connor Adams Sheets@ConnorASheetsc.sheets@ibtimes.com on April 19 2013 9:46
PM, http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-legalization-inevitable-how-when-will-weed-becomehassle-free-1187787]
Across the country, the liberalization of strict marijuana laws is accelerating. The
trend reached a new peak in November when voters in Colorado and Washington passed ballot
measures to legalize recreational marijuana use. Amid polls showing a major upswing in
support for legalization, marijuana enthusiasts are hopeful that there might soon be enough momentum in Washington to
legalize the drug nationwide. For many Americans, it seems that the end of two of the key "culture war" battles that have long
divided the American populace is within view. Along with the spread of liberalized marijuana laws, support for same-sex marriage
has mushroomed across the country. Both of the movements have soared in recent years, reversing years of low support to become
more the norm than the exception across major swaths of the nation. Although the issues center around vastly different concerns,
they both appeal to an ingrained American tradition of personal liberty. With gay marriage, each election cycle brings a new round of
ballot measures, court decisions and laws expanding the definition of marriage to include same-sex unions, as chronicled by Forbes.
The rising trend also seems to encompass other forms of acceptance of gay Americans. On Friday, the Boy Scouts of America finally
announced a proposal to drop its policy of barring openly gay youths from joining the organization, as reported by Reuters. The
steady march toward federal legalization of these two former taboos is a sign of the fundamental
shift reshaping the U.S. cultural landscape, which is only accelerating with time. Both
movements strive for national legalization, but that goal has remained elusive. Although several
prominent states recognize same-sex marriages -- and President Barack Obama expressed his support for them last year -- the U.S.
Supreme Court recently declined to rule on the issue. Will legal marijuana proponents have better luck, either in the courts or in
Congress? Legalize It (Not Quite Yet) For two decades after reggae star Peter Tosh called on the world to legalize it in 1976,
marijuana remained illegal in all 50 states. Polls showed that most Americans were opposed to legalization and only a small minority
supported loosening the nation’s strict pot laws. But, in 1996, sentiment started to blow in the other direction. Voters in California
approved Ballot Proposition 215, creating the nation’s first state-level medical-marijuana program, bringing hope to dope advocates
and folks suffering from cancer, glaucoma and chronic pain. Since then, 17 other states and the District of Columbia have enacted
some version of medical-marijuana legislation, according to ProCon.org. And in November Colorado and Washington became the
first two states to legalize recreational-marijuana use, as ABC News reported. Last week, the Maryland state Senate followed the lead
of the state House of Representatives and voted overwhelmingly to legalize limited medical-marijuana use in the state, sending the
bill to Gov. Martin O'Malley's desk, as noted by the Marijuana Policy Project. And the Seattle Police Department announced last
week that it had for the first time in its history returned confiscated marijuana to street dealers, as pointed out by RT.com. Although
federal law still holds that possessing marijuana for any purpose is illegal nationwide, Obama said in a December interview with ABC
News’ Barbara Walters that his administration does not consider targeting folks who toke in states where weed is legal to be a “top
priority.” And it appears that public opinion has come full circle, as all the recent legislation has been accompanied by a steady rise
in acceptance of marijuana use, culminating last week in a Pew Research Center poll that found that a majority of Americans support
legalizing weed for the first time since the center began polling on the issue in 1969. In light of the shift in policies and attitudes
across the U.S., how likely is marijuana legalization at the federal level? Inevitable, But When? It’s a brave new world for police,
potheads and medical-marijuana patients alike, and many experts say it’s one in which federal legalization of marijuana -- at first for
medical purposes, and eventually for recreational use -- is inevitable. The only question, they say, is when that day will arrive. Steve
Siebold, the Florida author of “Sex Politics Religion: How Delusional Thinking is Destroying America,” studied the issue in depth,
and he believes that legalization is coming sooner than many may think. Within 10 years, he believes that at least medical marijuana
will be legal in all 50 states. “There’s a lot of money in it, so once they start seeing the money that’s coming in, the states and
Washington will say, ‘We want a cut of that action,’” Siebold told the International Business Times. But Siebold is likely in the
minority, as most experts suggest that the timeline is a longer one, especially when it comes to decriminalizing marijuana across the
board. Dustin Heckler, a partner with the Boston law firm Posternak Blankstein & Lund, said that the hyperpartisan nature of the
current Congress will make it very difficult for any kind of legalization bill to pass in the near term. But he said that, in that time
frame, it is likely that legislation to set up a regulated, taxed medical-marijuana market along the lines of the one Massachusetts
voted to approve in November would have the best chance. “I could see something like that possibly passing Congress in the
foreseeable future,” Heckler said. “I can’t imagine a bill allowing marijuana for general purposes passing any time soon.” And
Benjamin J. Luftman, a managing partner at the Ohio-based Luftman, Heck & Associates criminal-defense law firm who has
represented hundreds of defendants charged with possession of marijuana, believes it will be “a couple more generations” before
Congress legalizes pot for recreational use, although he believes it will eventually happen. Luftman argues that legalization advocates
have a branding problem, and that if they want to see a faster track to less regulation of marijuana on the federal level, they need to
find a public face for the movement, perhaps a grandparent or cancer patient who needs pot to ease their pain but is forced to buy it
illegally because his or her home state doesn’t allow medical dispensaries. “There has to be something, some symbol, some person,
that people can go ahead and rally around and, say ‘You know what? I get it, I can support this,’” Luftman said. “If you can put
someone out front that has a compelling story and speaks eloquently for the cause that we can rally behind, that’s how it gets done.”
How Will It Happen? While experts may disagree on the time frame, they all agree that it's more
than likely that marijuana will eventually be legal in all 50 states. But the question of how
exactly it will come to pass is not yet settled. Will it be through congressional action that ends up on the president's desk or will the
judiciary make it happen through a wide-ranging ruling that forces the government's hand?
SOLVES HEMP
Legalizing hemp but not marijuana solves
Caulkins et al 2012 (Jonathan P [Stever professor of operation research and public policy @
Carnegie Mellon], Angela Hawken [Associate prof of public policy @ Pepperdine], Beau Kilmer
[co-director of the RAND Drug Research Center], and Mark AR Kleiman [Prof of public policy @
UCLA]; Marijuana Legalization; Oxford University Press; p. 227-9; kdf)
Could the United States allow industrial hemp without legalizing marijuana?
Certainly. Many nations legalized industrial hemp production in the 1990s while continuing
prohibition of marijuana as a psychoactive drug. Different strains of cannabis-and different parts of any given plantproduce very different levels of the plant's psychoactive agents. Typically, laws allowing industrial hemp require the
use of very-low-THC strains (less than 1 percent or even 0.3 percent THC, compared to the 4-18 percent characteristic of
cannabis produced and sold as a drug). So there's a reasonably bold line between industrial hemp and intoxicating marijuana. But
it's hard to imagine that the passionate advocacy of industrial hemp is unrelated to its link to drug policy. Groups such as the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) have picked up the hemp crusade in order to claim the benefits
of industrial hemp as an advantage of marijuana legalization. Politics makes strange bedfellows, and the politics of marijuana are no
exception. Oddly, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other advocates of continued prohibition agree
with hemp advocates in linking the industrialhemp and drug-legalization questions. But they do so
from the opposite perspective, arguing that industrial hemp should not be legalized because it would complicate efforts to enforce
prohibition against use as an intoxicant. One DEA concern is that farmers could line the outside of their fields with low-THC
(industrial) cannabis while growing high-THC (intoxicating) cannabis in the middle. Since relatively few acres would be needed to
supply the intoxicant market, allowing free cultivation of industrial hemp could indeed pose an enforcement challenge. (Even the
upper estimate of s,ooo metric tons of intoxicating cannabis consumed in the United States could be supplied by less than a third of
the acreage Canada cultivates for industrial hemp.) However, unregulated, laissez-faire production is not the only alternative to
complete prohibition. Authorities in other countries use stringent protocols for the licensure, seed
selection, and inspection of hemp operations to monitor the hemp production process. Prospective
growers have to submit substantial paperwork, complete a background check, and join a professional hemp association to become
sanctioned producers. Governments also require farmers to grow specific approved hemp varieties that fall under the THC
threshold. Farms are subject to annual visits by inspectors and sometimes to aerial surveillance. Farms are valuable assets that
would be vulnerable to seizure and forfeiture if farmers were found to be producing illegal (intoxicating) forms of cannabis. There
are also purely technical barriers to hiding pot plants in fields of industrial hemp. For example,
fiber hemp plants are planted close together to encourage tall vertical stalks with few leaves.
Moreover, hemp fiber is harvested early, before the intoxicant- bearing flowers are ready. Marijuana grown amid industrial hemp
would probably have to be the low-value, relatively lowTHe commercial grade rather than higher-value sinsemilla, because the
pollen produced by the hemp plants would pollinate the drug plants. (Sinsemilla comes from unfertilized female cannabis plants.)
Indeed, some medical marijuana growers in California oppose a proposed law permitting an industrial hemp pilot project because
they fear hemp pollen might ruin their harvest. Canadian industrial hemp farmers try to ensure that their crops are at least three
miles from any wild or cultivated cannabis to ensure pedigreed hempseed production; studies show cannabis pollen can travel three
to twelve miles. The really convincing evidence is negative. Like Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark in the night, the absence of
any reports from Europe of diversion from industrial hemp farms into the drug market argues for the success of these regulations. In
sum, while legal industrial hemp production could create a Trojan horse for the production of intoxicating marijuana, there is no
real problem in creating regulations to limit diversion.
Hemp isn’t prohibited by the treaties
Johnson, 13 – Congressional Research Service (Renee, “Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity”
7/24, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32725.pdf)
The United States is a signatory of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961 (as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961).58 The principal objectives of the convention are to “limit the possession, use, trade in,
distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and
scientific purposes and to address drug trafficking through international cooperation to deter
and discourage drug traffickers.”59 The convention requires that each party control cannabis
cultivation within its borders; however, Article 28.2 of the convention states: “This Convention
shall not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis plant exclusively for industrial purposes (fibre
and seed) or horticultural purposes.”60 Thus the convention need not present an impediment to
the development of a regulated hemp farming sector in the United States.
SOLVES CARTELS
1nc Morris is phenomenal—comparative with legalization and says all Mexican
criminal enterprises rely on large US banks to launder money. Banks already have
the resources to crack down because of terrorism rules, but the US has laid off on
applying them in this context. That shift immediately shuts down DTOs because
they can’t fund violence or bribe officials with nowhere to process money, whereas
legalization only causes a slow loss of revenue sources
Sends a signal
Murphy 2013 (Dylan; Money Laundering and The Drug Trade: The Role of the Banks; May 13;
www.globalresearch.ca/money-laundering-and-the-drug-trade-the-role-of-the-banks/5334205;
kdf)
Mexico is in the grip of a murderous drug war that has killed over 150,000 people since 2006. It is one of the most violent countries
on earth. This drug war is a product of the transnational drug trade which is worth up to $400 billion a year and
accounts for about 8% of all international trade. The American government maintains that there is no alternative
but to vigorously prosecute their zero tolerance policy of arresting drug users and their dealers. This has led to the incarceration of
over 500,000 Americans. Meanwhile the flood of illegal drugs into America continues unabated. One thing the American
government has not done is to prosecute the largest banks in the world for supporting the drug
cartels by washing billions of dollars of their blood stained money. As Narco sphere journalist Bill Conroy
has observed banks are ”where the money is” in the global drug war. HSBC, Western Union, Bank
of America, JP Morgan Chase&Co, Citigroup, Wachovia amongst many others have allegedly failed to comply with American antimoney laundering (AML) laws. The Mexican drug cartels have caught the headlines again and again due to their murderous
activities. The war between the different drug cartels and the war between the cartels and government security forces has spilled the
blood of tens of thousands of innocent people. The drug cartels would find it much harder to profit from their murderous activity if
they didn’t have too big to fail banks willing to wash their dirty money. In March 2010 Wachovia cut a deal with the US government
which involved the bank being given fines of $160 million under a ”deferred prosecution” agreement. This was due to Wachovia’s
heavy involvement in money laundering moving up to $378.4 billion over several years. Not one banker was prosecuted
for illegal involvement in the drugs trade. Meanwhile small time drug dealers and users go to
prison. If any member of the public is caught in possession of a few grammes of coke or heroin you can bet your bottom dollar
they will be going down to serve some hard time. However, if you are a bankster caught laundering billions of dollars for some of the
most murderous people on the planet you get off with a slap on the wrist in the form of some puny fine and a deferred prosecution
deal. Charles A. Intriago, president of the Miami-based Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists has observed, “… If
you’re an individual, and get caught, you get hammered. “But if you’re a big bank, and you’re caught moving
money for a terrorist or drug dealer, you don’t have to worry. You just fork over a monetary penalty, and then
raise your fees to make up for it. “Until we see bankers walking off in handcuffs to face charges
in these cases, nothing is going to change,” Intriago adds. “These monetary penalties are just a cost of
doing business to them, like paying for a new corporate jet.” This failure on the behalf of the US government to really crack down on
the finances of the drug cartels extends to British banks as well. In July 2012 the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs issued a 339 page report detailing an amazing catalogue of ”criminal ” behaviour by London based HSBC. This
includes washing over $881 for the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel and for the Norte del Valle Cartel in Colombia. Besides this, HSBC
affiliated banks such as HBUS repeatedly broke American AML laws by their long standing and severe AML deficiencies which
allowed Saudi banks such as Al Rajhi to finance terrorist groups that included Al-Qaeda. HBUS the American affiliate of HSBC
supplied Al Rajhi bank with nearly $1 billion in US dollars. Jack Blum an attorney and former Senate investigator has commented,
“They violated every goddamn law in the book. They took every imaginable form of illegal and illicit business.” HSBC affiliate HBUS
was repeatedly instructed to improve its anti-money laundering program. In 2003 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York took
enforcement action that called upon HBUS to improve its anti-money laundering program. In September 2010 the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) sent a,”blistering supervisory letter” to HBUS listing numerous AML problems at the bank. In
October 2010 this was followed up with the OCC issuing a cease and desist order requiring HBUS to improve its AML program a
second time. Senator Carl Levin chairman of the Senate investigation into HSBC has commented that ,”HSBC’s Chief Compliance
Officer and other senior executives in London knew what was going on, but allowed the deceptive conduct to continue.” Let us look
at just a couple of the devastating findings in the Senate report. The main focus of the report is the multiple failures of HSBC to
comply with AML laws and regulations: ”The identified problems included a once massive backlog of over 17,000 alertsidentifying
possible suspicious activity that had yet to be reviewed; ineffective methods foridentifying suspicious activity; a failure to file timely
Suspicious Activity Reports with U.S. law enforcement; … a 3-year failure by HBUS [a HSBC affiliate] , from mid-2006 to mid-2009,
to conduct any AML monitoring of $15 billion in bulk cash transactions … a failure to monitor $60 trillion in annual wire transfer
activity bycustomers …inadequate andunqualified AML staffing; inadequate AML resources; and AML leadership problems.
Sincemany of these criticisms targeted severe, widespread,and long standing AML deficiencies,…..” The report catalogues in great
detail the failings of HSBC affiliates HBUS in America and HMEX in Mexico: ”from 2007 through 2008, HBMX was the single
largest exporter ofU.S. dollars to HBUS, shipping $7 billion in cash to HBUS over two years, outstripping larger Mexican banks and
other HSBC affiliates. Mexican and U.S. authorities expressed repeated concern that HBMX’s bulk cash shipments could reach that
volume only if they included illegal drug proceeds. The concern was that drug traffickers unable to deposit large amounts of cash in
U.S. banks due to AML controls were transporting U.S. dollars to Mexico, arranging for bulk deposits there, and then using Mexican
financial institutions to insert the cash back into the U.S. financial system. … high profile clients involved in drug trafficking;
millions of dollars in suspicious bulk travelers cheque transactions; inadequate staffing and resources; and a huge backlog of
accounts marked for closure due to suspicious activity, but whose closures were delayed.” In the Senate hearing on 17 July 2012 Carl
Levin Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs explained how HMEX helped the Mexican drug
cartels: ”Because our tough AML laws in the United States have made it hard for drug cartels to find a U.S. bank willing to accept
huge unexplained deposits of cash, they now smuggle U.S. dollars across the border into Mexico and look for a Mexican bank or casa
de cambio willing to take the cash. Some of those casas de cambios had accounts at HBMX. HBMX, in turn, took all the physical
dollars it got and transported them by armored car or aircraft back across the border to HBUS for deposit into its U.S. banknotes
account, completing the laundering cycle.” Senator Levin went on to note how: ”Over two years, from 2007 to 2008, HBMX shipped
$7 billion in physical U.S. dollars to HBUS. That was more than any other Mexican bank, even one twice HBMX’s size. When law
enforcement and bank regulators in Mexico and the United States got wind of the banknotes transactions, they warned HBMX and
HBUS that such large dollar volumes were red flags for drug proceeds moving through the HSBC network.” In December 2012 the
Department of Justice cut a deal with HSBC which imposed a record $1.9 billion dollar fine. It may sound a lot to ordinary folks but
it is a tiny fraction of its annual profits which in 2011 totalled $22 billion. Assistant Attorney General Lanny Bauer announced the
settlement at a press conference on 11 December 2012. His comments reveal why the US government decided to go soft on such
criminal behaviour and show quite clearly how there is one law for the richest 1% and one law for the rest of us. Lenny Bauer said:
”Had the U.S. authorities decided to press criminal charges, HSBC would almost certainly have
lost its banking license in the U.S., the future of the institution would have been under threat and the entire banking
system would have been destabilized.”
Empirically proven
Feinstein and Grassley 13—California and Iowa Senators, Co-Chairpersons of the Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control
(Dianne and Charles, “EIGHT STEPS TO COUNTER THE DRUG TRADE IN WEST AFRICA”, Paper presented on behalf of the Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, dml)
Finding: As in other parts of the world, drug traffickers and terrorist organizations in West
Africa are motivated primarily by the profits generated by trafficking in illicit narcotics.
As the multi-agency takedown of the Lebanese Canadian Bank demonstrated, targeting the
financial activity of transnational criminal organizations is one of the most effective ways to
disrupt their operations and deny them the proceeds of their crimes.
This joint investigation – spearheaded by the Treasury Department, DEA and other agencies –
began in South America in 2006. As described above, by following money trails and electronic
communications, the Treasury Department was able to shut down the Lebanese Canadian Bank
for its role in the money laundering scheme that funded Hezbollah. In the scheme, used cars
from North America were sold in West Africa. These profits were then mixed with proceeds from
cocaine sales in West Africa and routed through the Lebanese Canadian Bank, with a portion of
the involved funds diverted to Hezbollah. The bank has paid a $102 million fine to settle a
lawsuit with the Justice Department and is now defunct.9
Recommendation: U.S. law enforcement agencies should prioritize and devote sufficient
resources, within present budgetary limits, towards the targeting, investigating and sanctioning
of drug traffickers operating in West Africa, in particular with regard to their illicit finances. The
Lebanese Canadian Bank investigation and associated enforcement actions should serve as a
model for future interagency cooperation.
SOLVES DRONES
Drone strikes ceased in Pakistan
Mir, 3/14/14 [One year without any civilian casualty by a drone Amir Mir Friday, March 14,
2014 From Print Edition, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-238164-One-yearwithout-any-civilian-casualty-by-a-drone]
Brennan, who runs the drone programme being the CIA director, had a secret meeting with the Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Shareef on February 21 during a short trip to Rawalpindi. He was appointed the
the CIA-controlled drones have not carried out even a single
attack in any part of Pakistan during the last 77 days. Brennan has stopped the
drone strikes in Pakistan despite the fact that he had led the transformation of the US approach to counter terrorism from that of a ground war in Afghanistan to targeted
Central Intelligence Agency chief on March 7, 2013. In fact,
strikes against the most wanted al-Qaeda terrorists, often involving the use of drones, especially in Pakistan. To recall, Imran Khan’s Tehrik-e-Insaf Party had named Brennan in an FIR lodged with the Hangu
Police in December 2013, seeking registration of a case against him and the Islamabad station chief of the CIA [Craig Osth] for killing Pakistani civilians in drone attacks in the tribal areas and thus “waging war
against the state of Pakistan”. Brennan, who has played a key role in the American efforts to disrupt the al-Qaeda network since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, is the one to have advised Obama to launch a raid on
Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad. Brennan enjoys the full trust and confidence of Obama and has been involved in virtually all the major national security issues during the past five years. He had
visited Pakistan at a time when the CIA-led drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan have been cut back sharply after the Sharif government had asked for restraint. The CIA has had seven different directors in
However, the CIA under Brennan has not
bombed Pakistan since December 25, 2013 for almost 77 days, the longest pause since 2004.
Interestingly, however, while there was no drone attack in Pakistan during the last two months, the Taliban
had intensified their terrorist activities despite the fact that the Sharif government is holding peace talks with them.
the nine years since the first drone struck the Pakistani territory, killing commander Nek Mohammad.
Drones good not unique and empirically denied
Ackerman, 12/31/13 [President Barack Obama’s mid-year decision to wind down drone,
Spencer, The Guardian news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/31/deaths-dronestrikes-obama-policy-change]
President Barack Obama’s mid-year decision to wind down drone strikes has accounted for a lower
number of deaths resulting from such actions in 2013, newly compiled data indicates. Sifting
through the estimates of three non-governmental organizations, the Council on Foreign Relations scholar Micah Zenko published
on Tuesday a tally of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the central theaters of deadly and formally undeclared
counterterrorism operations run in official secrecy. While specific figures are difficult to narrow down and even
harder to verify, the number of strikes, almost exclusively by drones, declined in 2013, as did the casualties they
caused. Between the three countries, there were around 55 strikes this year, a substantial drop
from the roughly 92 in 2012. In 2013 the strikes killed up to 271 people, down from an estimate of between 505 and 532 in 2012.
Approximately one in every nine to 10 deaths is a civilian. The data comes from estimates compiled by the New
America Foundation, the Long War Journal and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Yet attempts
to correlate the decline in strikes to a decline in specific threats are blocked by secrecy, diplomatic contingency and political convenience, Zenko said.
With the drawdown of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Zenko said, “there has never been more available, both dedicated US and leased, satellite
bandwidth; never been more strike drones available; and there’s more people who can watch full-motion video [for targeting]. There has never been
more assets available to kill people and strikes are going down. There’s
been a policy decision, and I think they’ve been
correct to emphasize that.” A number of counterterrorism scholars consider 2013 to have been
a good year for terrorist groups that claim to be motivated by Islam. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of the
conservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies cited a “regeneration” for al-Qaida – although the regeneration
Gartenstein-Ross cited occurred among “affiliate” groups of varying connection to the organization that attacked the US on 9/11, and in places mostly
outside the reach of drones, such as Mali, Libya, Syria and Iraq. The exception is Somalia, where al-Shabab, an Islamist militia that formally joined alQaida in 2012, launched a handful of terrorist attacks in the capital, Mogadishu, and a dramatic, deadly assault on Kenya’s Westgate mall in September
that killed 70 people. The US responded with what is believed to be the only missile strike of the year, apparently launched from a drone in October and
leaving two dead. 'They have not opened a new front' But
despite the strength of groups believed to be aligned with
al-Qaida, observers are yet to see an affiliated rise in either the groups’ sophistication or ability
and ambition to attack the US at home. US officials and sympathetic analysts in 2013 talked more of threats to “US interests”
than threats to the American people. The only domestic attack in 2013 that might be considered jihadism came at the Boston marathon in April, from
two brothers with no known connection to any terrorist organization. The actual threat posed by jihadist terrorism in 2013 remains the subject of fierce
and unresolved debate. In May, Obama signaled a discomfort with the rise in drone strikes that have become
synonymous with his stewardship of counterterrorism, during a speech at the National Defense University. While Obama did not pledge to end the
strikes – and indeed sharply defended them – he placed new emphasis on avoiding them. Zenko
said the available data did not show “big changes
pre-speech or post-speech”, but did indicate that the strikes had, at least temporarily, stopped proliferating. “To their
credit, they have not opened a new front in Syria, Iraq or North Africa,” Zenko said. While the strikes did not end after the speech, there was an increase
in raids, from Libya to Somalia, conducted by elite troops and the CIA and aiming to capture terrorist operatives rather than kill them. Administration
officials have stopped short of declaring such raids a policy shift – either because no such shift occurred or because the veil of secrecy surrounding
drone strikes prevents such a declaration. The data also points to other patterns that cut against the Obama administration’s typical contention that the
strikes kill senior terrorist leaders, the standard the president set in the president's May speech. In tribal Pakistan, the initial front of US drone strikes,
there was a steep rise in strikes in 2010 and a continued high rate in 2011, followed by a decline in 2012 and a steeper decline in 2013. The pattern fits
the rise and fall of the US troop surge in neighboring Afghanistan, suggesting that the strikes in Pakistan had more to do with protecting nearby US
troops than killing al-Qaida’s top operatives. Zenko gave Obama “a lot of credit” for acknowledging the so-called “force protection” component of the
Pakistan strikes in his May speech – a detail that got little media attention. “No longer was there just the nonsense of a significant, imminent threat to
the homeland,” Zenko said. There is no comparable US troop presence in Yemen, but strikes in Yemen, a relative rarity before the 2010 rise of alQaida’s local affiliate, swelled to more than 40 in 2012, before dropping off this year to around 26. The drop occurred despite a highly-publicized threat
warning in the summer, attributed to the group, that prompted the closure of regional US diplomatic facilities and a temporary rise in strikes on
Yemen. When Zenko took a closer look at local announcements of Yemen strikes by the US-sponsored security departments, he said, he found them
typically attributed to reports of threats to the Yemeni military or police; generic “threat warnings”; or to US diplomats. While government statements
on counterterrorism provide no guarantee of truth, those in Yemen rarely had to do with attempts on the United States. Counterterrorism run amok?
Protest against US drone attacks People burn a mock US flag during a protest against US drone attacks in Pakistan. Photograph: STR/EPA As with
Guantánamo Bay and bulk surveillance by the National Security Agency, drone strikes have become an international symbol of US counterterrorism
efforts run amok. The
new government of Pakistan has made the strikes a point of diplomatic
contention with Washington, although the country's security services have facilitated them in the past. In Yemen, where the
government is more openly aligned with the US on counterterrorism, anger about and fear of drones have become a cultural phenomenon, as a local
activist testified to the Senate in the spring, citing parents who used threats of the drones to discipline misbehaving children. In October, the United
Nations special rapporteur investigating drone strikes, Ben Emmerson, cited 33 cases in which drone strikes, mostly by the US, killed civilians and
potentially violated international law. Emmerson called on the US government to lift the veil of secrecy surrounding the strikes, which are conducted by
the CIA and the military’s Joint Special Operations Command, an elite force that has even fewer requirements to brief legislators than does the CIA.
Obama’s speech in May did not yield greater transparency on what the administration has called “targeted killing”. That, Zenko
said,
obscured an analysis of the 2013 frequency of “signature strikes”, the most notorious of US
counterterrorism efforts: operations that kill not specific, known terrorists but individuals, often “military aged males”,
believed to fit a pattern of terrorist behavior. “They can’t say they’re stopping signature strikes,”
Zenko said, “because it acknowledges they’ve done them.”
Their link arguments are wrong
Gonzalez, 14 [Drones: The Power to Kill Alberto R. Gonzales, Former Counsel to the President
and United States Attorney General under the George W. Bush Administration. Before joining
the Bush Administration in Washington, the author served as then-Governor George W. Bush’s
General Counsel, the Texas Secretary of State, and was later appointed to the Texas Supreme
Court. The author is currently the Doyle Rogers Distinguished Chair of Law at Belmont
University College of Law, and Counsel of the Nashville law firm of Waller Lansden. The author
thanks Shellie Handelsman, J.D. Candidate, 2014, Belmont University College of Law, for her
valuable assistance and recognizes the contribution of Christine Oberholtzer, J.D. Candidate,
2014, Belmont University College of Law. Copyright © 2013 by Alberto R. Gonzales]
The President may express concerns that involving a neutral decisionmaker unduly frustrates
his ability to carry out his national security and foreign affairs responsibilities, and is neither required under the Constitution
nor under Youngstown.441 He may object that this procedure would add a hurdle that hinders the Executive’s
flexibility. 442 Such concerns are legitimate because enemy combatants hide in the shadows, and the U.S. may only have limited opportunities—a small window—to
capture or kill them.443 Involving a third party such as a tribunal to decide the enemy combatant status of an American citizen targeted for a drone killing may limit the
these arguments are undercut by the
reality that the Administration already employs a designation process that takes months to
complete.445 Congress, by statute, could provide for expedited procedures for the tribunal in order
to alleviate the risk that the President may be unable to act within a window of opportunity.
President’s ability to act quickly within that tiny window of opportunity against military targets.444 Yet
However, increasing flexibility also increases the risk of enhanced judicial scrutiny. The more truncated the process, the more likely the procedures will be subject to attack in
our courts on due process grounds. Some have suggested the creation of a special national security court to make the determination of whether an American citizen is an enemy
combatant and therefore eligible to be killed by drone strike.446 While this would address some of the concerns about the current process, given the relatively few instances (we
all hope) in which the Executive would be targeting an American citizen, perhaps a less expensive and more efficient alternative to creating a new layer of bureaucracy would be
to use the existing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”)447 was enacted in 1978 to provide the executive branch
with an appropriate means to investigate and counter foreign intelligence threats.448 FISA created a special process to be followed by the government in order to receive a court
order authorizing a search or surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.449 FISA requires that the Attorney General file an application that details the facts that lead to a
finding of probable cause to believe a target meets the statutory requirements for surveillance under FISA.450 These applications are reviewed ex parte in a classified setting by
one Article III judge specially appointed to the FISC by the Chief Justice of the United States.451 If the application meets the statutory requirements, then the judge must issue
the order and the government may commence its search or surveillance.452 As Attorney General, I reviewed and approved hundreds of FISA applications, and I know
completing and approving an application that satisfies the statutory requirements can be burdensome depending on the circumstances. In an age of instant communication,
FISA allows the Attorney
General to authorize an Emergency FISA when Necessary, provided the Attorney General believes all statutory
requirements under FISA are present, and provided further that the Attorney General submits an application to the FISC within a specified time.453 Because of
their experience with surveillance requests, members of the executive branch already have
experience dealing with the FISC in the national security context. Judges on the FISC already
are accustomed to dealing with national security matters. Both lawyers and judges know the
importance of acting with deliberate speed to protect our country, while protecting the rights of American citizens.
unfortunately a delay of just an hour can hinder the government’s ability to identify and stop terrorist plots. For this reason,
Instead of creating a new court to determine if an American is an enemy combatant, Congress should expand the jurisdiction of the FISC for the limited purpose of establishing a
new statutory framework outlining criteria for enemy combatants. Under this proposal, the Attorney General would submit an application detailing facts that satisfy the newly
established statutory framework. If the FISC agrees, it would issue a finding that an American target is an enemy combatant. That judicial finding would be all the President
would need by law from a neutral decisionmaker before executing a drone strike against that target.
No link – the plan’s change is incredibly small, but we still solve
Johnson, 13 [Jeh, former Pentagon General Counsel, 3/18/13, “Keynote address at the Center
on National Security at Fordham Law School: A “Drone Court”: Some Pros and Cons,”
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/jeh-johnson-speech-on-a-drone-court-some-pros-andcons/]
The problem is that the American public is suspicious of executive power shrouded in secrecy. In the
absence of an official picture of what our government is doing, and by what authority, many in the
public fill the void by envisioning the worst. They see dark images of civilian and military national security personnel in the
basement of the White House – acting, as Senator Angus King put it, as “prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner” — going down a list of Americans,
deciding for themselves who shall live and who shall die, pursuant to a process and by standards no one understands. Our government, in speeches
given by the Attorney General,[2] John Brennan,[3] Harold Koh,[4] and myself,[5] makes official disclosures of large amounts of information about its
efforts, and the legal basis for those efforts, but it is never enough, because the public doesn’t know what it doesn’t know, but knows there are things
their government is still withholding from them. The revelation 11 days ago that the executive branch does not claim the authority to kill an American
non-combatant – something that was not, is not, and should never be an issue – is big news, and trumpeted as a major victory for congressional
through
continual unauthorized leaks of sensitive information, our government looks to the American public as
undisciplined and hypocritical. One federal court has characterized the government’s position in FOIA litigation as “Alice in Wonderland,”[6]
oversight. A senator who filibusters the government’s secrecy is compared in iconic terms to Jimmy Stewart. At the same time,
while another, this past Friday, referred to it as “neither logical nor plausible.”[7] An anonymous, unclassified white paper leaked to NBC News
prompts more questions than it answers. Our
government finds itself in a lose-lose proposition: it fails to officially
confirm many of its counterterrorism successes, and fails to officially confirm, deny or clarify unsubstantiated reports of civilian casualties. Our
government’s good efforts for the safety of the people risks an erosion of support by the
people. It is in this atmosphere that the idea of a national security court as a solution to the
problem — an idea that for a long time existed only on the margins of the debate about U.S. counterterrorism policy but is now entertained by
more mainstream thinkers such as Senator Diane Feinstein and a man I respect greatly, my former client Robert Gates – has gained momentum. To be
sure, a national security court
composed of a bipartisan group of federal judges with life tenure, to
approve targeted lethal force, would bring some added levels of credibility,
independence and rigor to the process, and those are worthy goals. In the eyes of the
American public, judges are for the most part respected for their independence. In the eyes of the
international community, a practice that is becoming increasingly controversial would
be placed on a more credible footing. A national security court would also help answer the question many are asking:
what do we say to other nations who acquire this capability? A group of judges to approve targeted lethal force would
set a standard and an example. Further, as so-called “targeted killings” become more controversial with time, I believe there
are some decision-makers within the Executive Branch who actually wouldn’t mind the added comfort of judicial imprimatur on their decisions. But,
we must be realistic about the degree of added credibility such a court can provide. Its proceedings would necessarily be ex parte and in secret, and, like
almost all of the government’s applications would be
granted, because, like a FISA application, the government would be sure to
present a compelling case. So, at the same time the New York Times editorial page promotes a FISA-like court for
a FISA court, I suspect
targeted lethal force, it derides the FISA court as a “rubber stamp” because it almost never rejects an application.[8] How long before a “drone court”
operating in secret is criticized in the same way?
TREATIES DA
1NC
Obama’s position on treaties is a wait and see approach -- the plan shatters treaty
cred
Obama’s position on treaty interpretation relies upon a wait and see approach to current state
legalization and lays the groundwork for treaty reform. The plan’s acceleration of legalization
takes flexibility a bridge too far and shreds US treaty credibility
Bennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the
Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect
human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of
the hemispheric debate on drug policy (“Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize
International Drug Treaties” October,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuanalegalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)
Wherever the limits of the United States’ enforcement discretion under the drug treaties might
be drawn precisely, we know that such discretion by definition cannot be an across-the-board,
categorical affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of regulated, comprehensive
marijuana markets established by state law. And that’s just it: if more states take a legalizeand-regulate approach, a federal-level decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons could
start to look like blanket non-enforcement of implementing legislation—something that, in our
view, the drug treaties do not contemplate.
The prospect of future marijuana regulation raises a second, more fundamental reason to
rethink things: the nation’s experiment with legalizing and regulating marijuana might actually
go well. Suppose Colorado and Washington both operate their regulated marijuana markets
smartly, without offending federal enforcement prerogatives, and—most importantly— without
compromising public health and safety. We don’t think this is a fanciful or improbable scenario.
Our Brookings colleague John Hudak was the first to examine Colorado’s implementation effort
up close. And he tentatively concluded that so far, the state’s initial rollout has been imperfect
but quite effective.39 If this path continues or even bends towards improvement, then other
states may soon elect to follow Washington and Colorado’s lead. And that, in turn, stands to
exacerbate an already visible tension between obligations imposed by the drug treaties, and the
federal government’s enforcement posture towards legalizing states.
To put the point another way, if Colorado and Washington augur a real trend, then the costs to
the United States of treaty breach could be swiftly ratcheted upwards. The INCB could raise
the volume and severity of its criticisms; we wouldn’t be surprised to hear protests from more
prohibitionist countries about the United States’ treaty compliance, or to see other nations start
pushing the limits of other no less important treaties to which the United States is party.
When some or all of this happens, the United States won’t get very far in emphasizing the CSA’s
theoretical application nationwide, subject to enforcement priorities enunciated in the Cole
Memo; or in appealing to larger objectives woven throughout the drug treaties, and their
conferral of policy flexibility. What if twenty or thirty states successfully establish, and police,
regulated markets for marijuana production and sale?
Having that scenario in mind, we lastly emphasize the United States’ unique relationship both to
the drug treaties and to the wider international community. The United States was a—if not
the—key protagonist in developing the 1961, 1971, and 1988 Conventions, as well as the 1972
protocol amending the 1961 Convention; the United States has for decades been widely and
correctly viewed as the treaties’ chief champion and defender.40 That fact feeds back onto this
one: The United States also occupies a singular place in international relations. It can summon
powers no other nation can summon, but it also confronts risks no other nation confronts.41 For
that oft-cited reason, the United States has a profound interest in ensuring that counterparties
perform their treaty obligations. Reciprocity is always a big deal for any nation that trades
promises with other ones—but it is perhaps uniquely so for ours.
These factors mean that caution is in order regarding international law and the viability of the
Cole Memo in the longer run. If the United States can “flexibly interpret” the drug treaties with
regard to marijuana, then Mexico is entitled to no less—though it might view the limits of its
flexibility differently, or apply it to another controlled substance within the treaties’ purview. Or
imagine that a foreign nation’s controversial policy butts up against seemingly contrary
language, in a treaty covering an extremely important global issue other than drug control.
Likely the United States will have a tougher time objecting when, rather than conceding the
problem or changing course, that nation’s foreign ministry invokes the need to “tolera[te]
different national approaches;” or recasts the relevant treaty as a “living document” subject to
periodic, unilateral reinterpretation.
This is not to suggest that compliance challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to
reshape the United States’ treaty commitments. Practice and prudence both support a more
nuanced, case-specific approach than that. Sometimes the United States has sought to make
significant adjustments to multilateral frameworks or even quit them; other times, the United
States has weighed costs and benefits, and pressed on within the treaty despite consequential
breaches—in situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that
regarding marijuana.
But in those instances, the United States’ compliance failures often have come despite some
hard striving by the federal government. The State Department, to name one well known
example, tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of the United States’
obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—notwithstanding some
repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and Arizona.42
In this case, though, no external factors—federalism, say, or a contrary ruling from the U.S.
Supreme Court—have frustrated a strong push by the executive branch to vindicate the drug
treaties; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama
administration. Given the circumstances, we believe it was the correct decision. The Cole Memo
nevertheless establishes at least some friction with a treaty obligation, by holding back on CSA
enforcement, so as to accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the reasons why
are entirely understandable: given the incipient nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo
was reacting, the United States essentially opted to take a wait-and-see approach as to
how problematic the treaty questions might become.
So far as we are aware, this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice. The
United States should approach it carefully and deliberatively, given the country’s outsized
interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations. That depends in part on being able to
credibly call out other nations for treaty failings—something which in turn depends on strictly
performing our own obligations, or at least making a good show of trying hard to do so
before coming up short.
Again, we think the United States can sustain the status quo in the short term. But
today’s model likely won’t hold up year in and year out, for the reasons we describe above. The
government therefore ought to start thinking about some of the fundamental treaty reforms
that its public statements seemingly have downplayed. Better to have weighed such options
early on, should existing policy’s downsides start to overtake its upsides—as we predict they
could.
Sequencing key -- doing the plan in advance of an amendment spills over to every
global issue
Treaty reform is possible but sequencing is key – doing the plan in advance of the gradual
amendment process cracks the entire international treaty regime and spills over to every major
global issue
Bennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the
Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect
human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of
the hemispheric debate on drug policy (“Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize
International Drug Treaties” October,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuanalegalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)
VI. A Stress Test We Can Pass
In making the case for the United States to proactively open the door to future change in the
drug treaties, we have emphasized, so far, the negative value of avoiding conflict and instability.
We would be remiss not to end on an equally important positive note. The political changes and
incentives in play in the marijuana-policy debate open a real opportunity to demonstrate and
improve the adaptability of the international legal system—a system on which the United States
relies more and more.
No treaty can survive the collapse of a political consensus supporting it. And no treaty system
can endure if it cannot cope with changing political conditions. Sustainability in international
law depends not only on commitment but also on resilience and adaptability.
At this writing, one or two more U.S. states may be about to adopt a version of marijuana
legalization. If states continue to legalize, and if the federal government continues to allow their
reforms to proceed, the short run for treaty reform may come quite soon. This is why we refer to
the challenge of marijuana legalization as a “stress test” for the adaptability of
international law. Should legalization prove politically popular or socially successful, it will
spread to more states and nations; should it spread, then one way or another both domestic and
international politics will find ways to accommodate it—either by adapting formal legal
commitments or by cutting new, informal channels around those commitments. The latter
would weaken international law; the former would strengthen it.
Marijuana-related reform to the drug treaties offers, in several respects, good odds of achieving
constructive adaptation. Reform need not entail any wholesale reconsideration of international
drug policy, nor need any brand new treaty be negotiated. Modest incrementalism can do the
job. In the United States, moreover, a growing political constituency, embracing members of
both political parties, favors reform, so the issue is less partisan than many. Persuading the
Senate to make more room for U.S. experimentation by revising an existing treaty is a lighter lift
than persuading it to undertake entirely new treaty obligations. And, if the United States plays
its cards right (with, as we have suggested, suitably narrow and hedged legal changes),
we believe a consensus abroad for modest change could become within reach. In any case,
broaching the subject relatively early on—by ruling treaty change in, now, as a possibility,
instead of ruling it out as a non-starter—may itself open the door to a new international
conversation about modernizing and adapting drug treaties. In other words, marijuana offers as
good a chance as we are likely to see of setting a precedent for creative, consensual, and
gradual adaptation of a well-established international treaty structure.
The international legal system, however suspicious of it many Americans may be, has always
mattered and has never mattered more than now. For example, the campaign against ISIS and
the Ukraine crisis underscore all too dramatically the continuing importance of multilateral
security commitments. If anything, international law’s remit is growing as environmental,
social, economic, and security problems transcend national borders. From global warming to
sanctions on Iran and Russia to the campaign against terrorism and military
intervention in a host of theaters, the United States and its allies increasingly rely on
international agreements and commitments to legitimize and amplify joint action against
common threats.
Of course, marijuana and the international narcotics treaties are only one small piece of that
puzzle. But they are a highly visible piece, and they offer a real opportunity to demonstrate
adaptation through international legal channels, rather than around them. Laying
groundwork for manageably incremental changes—by beginning conversations with treaty
partners and other constituencies about where flexibility might lie—would reaffirm American
commitment to constructive adaptation, and to building consensus. Conversely,
pushing the outer boundaries of the drug treaties’ flexibility could weaken the international
order and damage American interests.
To put the point another way: Marijuana policy reform is a stress test that the United States and
the international order should, and realistically can, pass.
Extinction
Graeme P. Herd 10, Head of the International Security Programme, Co-Director of the
International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010, “Great
Powers: Towards a “cooperative competitive” future world order paradigm?,” in Great Powers
and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, p. 197-198
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic catastrophe that
could trigger US precipitous decline), and the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the
real question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great Powers ? Will global order be
characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world system , in which shared strategic
threats create interest-based incentives and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great
Powers? This pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda based on nascent
similarity across national policy agendas . In addition. Great Powers would seek to cooperate by
strengthening multilateral partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional
variants), regimes (e.g., arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms, including international
law . Alternatively, Great Powers may rely less on institutions, regimes and shared norms, and
more on increasing their order-producing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within
their near neighborhoods. Under such circumstances, a re-division of the world into a competing
mercantilist nineteenth-century regional order emerges 17 World order would be characterized
more by hierarchy and balance of power and zero-sum principles than by interdependence.
Relative power shifts that allow a return to multipolarity - with three or more evenly matched powers - occur gradually. The
transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment in the
post-Cold War has been crowned, according to Haass, by an era of non-polarity, where power is diffuse — "a world dominated not
by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power"18
Multilateralism is on the rise , characterized by a combination of stales and international
organizations, both influential and talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual
system of global governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as groups with no formal rules or permanent
structures coordinate policies and immediate reactions to crises, while formal treaty-based institutions then legitimize the results.'9
As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble:
Global cooperation is the only way to master the new, asymmetric global challenges of the twenty-first
century. No nation can manage these tasks on its own, nor can the entire international community do so without the help of nonstate, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first
century.20
Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined as "multipolarity in an age of interdependence" — Grevi
suggests that managing existential
interdependence in an unstable multipolar world is the key.21
interdependence generates shared interest in cooperative solutions, meanwhile
driving convergence, consensus and accommodation between Great Powers.22 As a result, the
Such complex
multilateral system is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a global age - the rise of emerging
powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a complex balance between multiple
states."23 The G20 meeting in London in April 2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial architecture
so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more participative, transparent and responsive manner: all countries have
contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24
1NR OVERVIEW
Turns warming
Idil Boran 14, Associate Professor & Director of the Certificate Program in Practical Ethics,
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies, York University,
6/11/14, “The Progression of Multilateral Talks on Climate Change and the Challenge of
“Equity”: Notes from the UN Climate Conference in Bonn, June 2014,”
http://blogs.law.widener.edu/climate/2014/06/11/the-progression-of-multilateral-talks-onclimate-change-and-the-challenge-of-equity-notes-from-the-un-climate-conference-in-bonnjune-2014/#sthash.AMOBmAtk.dpuf
This year’s intersessional meetings are of special importance, the June session currently under way being a critical one. This is
because multilateral
negotiations on climate change are on a track to reach a comprehensive and
legally binding agreement by the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21), to be held in Paris at the end
of 2015. But more importantly, everything to be agreed upon at COP 21 must be drafted at COP 20 the year
before, that is in December 2014 . It is the present intersessional meeting – taking place in June in Bonn – where the hard
work needs to be done, so that all the substantive recommendations can be presented, negotiated, and drafted in Lima. In this spirit,
the UN Climate Change Conference convened on June 4 with determination to achieve as much as possible before Lima.
At this point in time, the negotiations are at an important juncture. The goal for the international community is
to draw lessons from the Kyoto Protocol era, and to articulate the terms of an entirely new system of
cooperation for the Post-Kyoto era. In other words, the goal is to avoid the weaknesses of the Kyoto
Protocol.
Given that the Kyoto Protocol was motivated by a well-defined conception of equitable distribution of responsibility, many questions
arise at this juncture over how equity will be defined within the new agreement. Equity has always been central to multilateral
negotiations on climate change. This makes sense for many reasons. First, climate change is expected to affect lives in important
ways. Second, the way in which people’s lives will be affected is expected to be more severe in some places than others. Third,
climate change is a phenomenon that is associated with human activity, which has been going on for some time and which is
intertwined with economic development and growth. For these reasons alone, it becomes obvious to anyone with a sense of fairness
that – to the extent that the international community is to cooperate on addressing the effects of climate change – the terms of
cooperation ought to be fair.
The terms of cooperation set by the Kyoto Protocol were devised in light of the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities”. Given that industrialized nations are responsible for the problem of climate change, the idea was to adopt an
allocation of responsibilities that requires developed nations to take up the bulk of the burden. This gave rise to roughly two
categories of nations: those who are to assume the costs of curbing climate change by contrast to those who are not expected to do
much. But this structure also became highly divisive and unable to generate agreement and compliance, which is desperately needed
for action on climate change to be effective.
As part of the new rounds of negotiations, the UNFCCC adopted the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action at COP 17 in Durban in
2011, where negotiations were put on an ambitious track to work out the details of an entirely new international agreement by 2015.
When it was first put in place, the Durban Platform did not include too many substantive decisions, for the objective was to allow the
terms of international cooperation to be discussed and decided upon through negotiations from 2012 to 2015. The single prior
decision that was made, however, was the rejection of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and the adoption
of a principle of “universality” instead, as the central guiding principle of a post-Kyoto agreement. On this principle, all nations
are to contribute to the cooperative scheme on climate change in some capacity. This shift gave
the international community the opportunity to have a fresh start and to rethink the terms of
cooperation on a (relatively) clean slate.
Additionally, the new international agreement under negotiation is one that is expected to have a richer
composition than the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was focused exclusively on mitigation through reduction of
emissions. The new agreement is expected to have both a mitigation component and an adaptation component. Within the
adaptation component, an International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with climate change impacts in developing
countries vulnerable to the effects of climate change is being negotiated as well. This is an entirely novel issue under negotiations,
and one with important implications for the philosophical, legal, and ethical aspects of international cooperation. In short, this
broader range of issues adds significant dimension to the talks . The principle of “universality” may well be
more suitable for this new round of negotiations, as the allocation of responsibility may need to be customized to each specific issue.
Contrary to what might seem at first blush, the principle of “universality” need not require every nation to assume exactly the same
amount of costs and responsibilities for a given issue. So far, no one has suggested that. Negotiators are discussing how to achieve
equitable conditions within a system of cooperation for each issue. Take the discussions on the Warsaw International Mechanism on
Loss and Damage, adopted recently in Warsaw in November 2013. As the issue is still in its earlier stages, the discussions are mostly
over procedural matters at this point. But the question of equity arises nevertheless, and remains a central concern. For example,
representatives of countries that are particularly vulnerable to the threat of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of
climate change, such as the members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), want to see greater representation of these
countries in the decision-making body. There is an equity argument that motivates this request. A competing argument is that the
advisory and decision-making bodies on this matter will secure more appropriate decisions if they are composed of members with
the appropriate expertise, which may or may not align with regional or national affiliations. This argument, which is also motivated
by a sense of justice, suggests that the expert-based composition will be conducive to decisions that would maximize the benefits to
those whose interests are at stake.
How the discussions will unfold is yet to be seen, but the general parameters of the negotiations are such that
equitable terms are to be discussed and tailored. The concept of “equity” is neither a monolithic nor an inert
concept. It often needs to be formulated from within the concrete circumstances that make it relevant. Sometimes, equitable
conditions devised for specific circumstances can become obsolete if circumstances change, and may need to be rethought and
reformulated. Seen in this way, equity is not lost in this new round of negotiations, it is being worked out as new issues arise. Since
any decision coming out of these negotiations will set precedents for future debates on international relations, it is important that
the international community take the time to think through, and to carefully consider various (and sometimes conflicting)
arguments, leaving no stone unturned.
The advantage of the present round of negotiations is that there is a general motivation to
advance the debates in a productive way, and to reach a genuinely effective and mutually
acceptable agreement . How the talks will unfold in the second week of the June session at the UNFCCC will set the tone for
the Conference of the Parties (COP 20) in Lima. And for anyone interested in the philosophical, legal, and ethical dimensions of
public policy and international cooperation, a close examination of the dynamics of the negotiations is worthwhile.
Turns the global enforcement of the aff (2nc card)
Hasse, 13 – New York consultant for International Drug Policy Consortium and the Harm
Reduction Coalition (Heather, “The 2016 Drugs UNGASS: What does it mean for drug reform?”
10/14,
http://drogasenmovimiento.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/13-10-14-the-2016-drugs-ungasse28093what-does-it-mean-for-drug-reform_.pdf
But why? With all of the progress made in reform around the world lately, many - especially in
the US - are asking if the UN is even relevant to domestic drug reform at this point. With the
recent marijuana laws passed in Colorado and Washington and the proposed legislation in
Uruguay - not to mention decriminalization measures enacted in Portugal and a growing
number of other countries - reform seems inevitable. At some point, the argument goes, the UN
system will simply be overtaken by "real world" reform on the ground. Why even bother with
advocacy at the UN?
This is not an easy question to answer; however, 1 truly believe that to be effective, reform
efforts must be made at every level - locally, nationally, and globally.
It may be true that reform efforts in the US and around the world have made significant
progress in the last 10 years. But there is still a long way to go - marijuana is still not completely
legal anywhere in the world (despite state laws to the contrary, marijuana still remains illegal
under federal law throughout the US), and many human rights abuses continue to be carried out
against drug users throughout the world in the name of drug control. Meanwhile, the
international drug control treaties - the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its
progeny - remain in place and, in fact, enjoy nearly universal adherence by 184 member
states.
That so many countries comply – at least technically, if not in “spirit” – with the
international drug treaty system, shows just how highly the international community regards
the system. As well it should – the UN system is invaluable and even vital in many areas,
including climate change, HIV/AIDS reduction, and, most recently, the Syrian chemical
weapons crisis (and don’t forget that the international drug treaty system also governs the flow
of licit medication). While it is not unheard of for a country to disregard a treaty, a system in
which countries pick and choose which treaty provisions suit them and ignore the rest is, shall
we say, less than ideal.
But beyond the idea of simple respect for international law, there are practical aspects of reform
to consider. The drug problem is a global one, involving not only consuming countries but
producing and transit countries as well. Without global cooperation, any changes will at best be
limited (marijuana reform in Washington and Colorado hardly affects the issue of human rights
abuses in Singapore or the limitations on harm reduction measures in Russia). At worst, reform
efforts enacted ad hoc around the world could be contradictory and incompatible --‐ as might
be the result if, for example, Colombia and the US opted for a regulated market without the
cooperation of Costa Rica or Honduras, both transit countries.
AT: COLLAPSE NOW
The US approach is viable in the short run – it’s only becomes a problem if
legalization increases
Bennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the
Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect
human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of
the hemispheric debate on drug policy (“Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize
International Drug Treaties” October,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuanalegalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)
III. Viable in the Short Run…
Is the United States’ current policy workable? In the short run, we think it probably is.
Consider Brownfield’s claim that the United States is acting lawfully. He did not set out its legal
basis in detail, but nevertheless dropped hints with comments regarding flexibility and scarce
criminal justice resources. Some of the treaties’ features are consistent with his views. The 1961
and 1971 Conventions do not specifically address the issue of enforcement discretion, and thus
don’t obviously seem to cabin its ordinary exercise by governments; for its part, the 1988
Convention explicitly recognized states’ discretion with respect to Convention-required
offenses.24 And, as Brownfield’s “four pillar” approach suggested, the drug control system is
indeed concerned with international trafficking networks, as illustrated by the 1988 Convention.
The latter’s purpose—announced by its second article, and important for the treaty’s
interpretation—is to enable interstate cooperation so as to “address more effectively the various
aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having an international
dimension.”25 The United States’ approach is rather broad-brush, to be sure. But it has a
discernable basis in international law.
We also might evaluate it in light of the roads not taken, which in the rearview mirror look vastly
worse than the one the United States ultimately did take. One much discussed but wisely passed
over option: in early 2013, there was a call in some quarters for the Obama administration to
pursue legal action founded on so-called federal “preemption” doctrines26— asking a court to
declare that the CSA effectively wiped out Initiative 502 and Amendment 64—or through federal
enforcement, whereby federal prosecutors would make an example of some unlucky Coloradan
or Washingtonian who bought or sold marijuana in compliance with state law but in violation of
federal law.27
The “find some fall guy” strategy had an arbitrary feel.28 Neither the criminal nor the civil
approach was a surefire winner legally, owing mostly to the CSA’s rather abstruse language
regarding preemption.29 Both would have replaced one legal problem—a clash between
Washington and Colorado law and more rigid federal and international law—with something
worse. Whether won with prosecution or a civil lawsuit, victory on preemption grounds would
gut Washington and Colorado regulation of marijuana but would not restore their earlier
prohibitions against marijuana. And that in turn would mean relegating essentially all civil and
criminal marijuana enforcement in those jurisdictions to federal authorities—something the
latter certainly did not want, and could not accomplish for practical as well as political reasons.
The preemption strategy thus meant leaping out of the frying pan and into the fire, and
ultimately achieving little, in treaty compliance terms.30
Pragmatism likewise counseled against an immediate push to revise the treaties, given the
incipient nature of changes, and also given the time and effort needed to build a case for reform
that could achieve political traction in the Senate. That chamber, to put it charitably, can be a
difficult environment for treaties.
The diplomatic costs of the United States’ position also have not been intolerably high. The
INCB has disagreed with the United States’ legal arguments, but its critiques have not been
unusually aggressive; the Board has not, for example, paired its objections with a threat to
exercise its rather gentle, purely recommendatory and rarely invoked sanctions power,
regarding the import and export of drugs.31 And while the Board’s former president, Yans, has
spoken more harshly of U.S. policy than the Board has as a whole, he has also reserved his most
high-pitched condemnations for the government of Uruguay, which in December 2013 became
the first country to approve legislation that legalizes and regulates marijuana at the national
level.32 At the same time, most other parties to the drug control treaties have kept mum about
Washington and Colorado, at least publicly. The quiet hardly serves to affirm the United States’
position, of course, but it certainly doesn’t register dissent, either: when their international
relations require it, aggrieved states certainly know how to make loud noises about other states’
flouting of international norms.33
Lastly, there is this surpassingly important fact: so far only two jurisdictions in the United
States have established a legalized, regulated regime for recreational marijuana. (Nearly half the
states permit medical access to marijuana.) Of the pair, Colorado is off to a faster start, while
licensed retail sales in Washington have only recently gotten underway. It is too early to know
how these experiments will play out. Things might go badly. If implementation proceeds
sluggishly, or worse, incompetently, then neighboring states might start to re-think the wisdom
of a legalize-and-regulate approach. And any activity that offends Cole Memo guidance likely
will bring on civil and criminal action by federal prosecutors; that too could imperil the spread
of legalized, regulated marijuana, or even reverse the policy trajectory altogether. The whole
thing could go belly up. If it does, then the United States’ ongoing preference for working within
the treaties, rather than changing them, will seem prudent indeed.
Washington and Colorado create tension with the treaties but don’t undermine the
overall U.S. position – it only collapses and spills over with full legalization
Bennett, 10/17/14 - Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings
Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare (“INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S.
TREND TOWARDS LEGAL MARIJUANA” Brookings Event Transcript
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17-international-impactsmarijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf
Now, it is true that there’s kind of a legal debate at the margins about exactly what that might
mean for the United States, which has conditionally tolerated the creation in Washington state
and Colorado of regulated markets for legal marijuana. And there are essentially two claims.
One is that there is policy flexibility baked into these treaties; that the United States can say, as
it did through the so-called Cole memo issued by the deputy attorney general, that the United
States can pick and choose its enforcement priorities, and provided that those don't get
offended, it can sort of stay its hand and see what happens with marijuana.
There’s also a broader policy claim, namely that the treaties have brought objectives ensuring
access to critical medicine, for example, and that the treaties give a lot of discretion to states’
parties as to figure out to achieve those objectives. The idea is, in so many words, is that those
objectives are essentially consistent or not inconsistent with a conditional toleration for
marijuana.
Now, the United States has paired those arguments with kind of a long-term vision, and that
vision is that the treaties shouldn’t be changed. They are good as they are. And that all the
international communities should sort of come together in a discussion and agree on a way to
live within them while accommodating changing drug policy, chiefly that regarding marijuana.
The core of this is to say that these are living documents that need to be re-interpreted from
time to time, but the world looks fundamentally different, and we should all just figure out that
there’s space in it that we can all accommodate, and I think that’s essentially what the Assistant
Secretary was saying there in remarks that John alluded to. That’s the U.S. position in a
nutshell; what its upsides and downsides point to?
In the short-term, this probably makes some pragmatic sense. There weren’t a lot of good
options for the United States. There had been a call in some quarters to bring a lawsuit founded
on pre-emption, the doctrine that federal statutes trump contrary to state statutes, but that
wasn’t a sure fire winner. It was also not politically or economically a very smart idea to just
send a trove of DEA and FBI guys into Washington and Colorado and just shut the whole thing
down.
So, there’s kind of a least bad alternative, difficult choice matrix kind of in play there that really
does explain what the U.S. was up to. There’s also the prospect that marijuana legalization may
not work. It may go badly. It may stop and the trajectory may be reversed, and if that happens,
the U.S. position is going to look pretty astute in the rear view mirror that by pausing, seeing
what was going to happen and then waiting for the thing to play out, well, it didn’t require any
big adjustments to their international positions or any big adjustments to the international
treaties, either.
The downside though, is that it might work. Marijuana legalization might go forward, and it
might go forward smartly. In that event, it’s going to be -- there’s already tension between U.S.
position and the treaties, and I think that’s safe to say. But that tension will only grow more
acute, and the legal arguments get less and less persuasive the more marijuana legalization
proceeds intelligently and if that trajectory holds.
That is why in a piece that John and I have written, we think that treaty reform should be on the
table and not off the table, presumptively, because if the United States can claim policy
flexibility in the treaties for so long as it needs to, then its treaty partners are entitled to no less.
And I certainly don't mean to be alarmist by saying this, but that holds true not really in the
drug kind of treaty setting, but also in other multilateral regimes where the United States has
pretty powerful interests in securing compliance.
I think most people would agree, we do not want Vladimir Putin in the business of claiming
unilateral flexibility with nuclear weapons or something, even though again, that’s sort of
a -- that’s an example I use just to illustrate the point. I don't mean to be alarmist by it. But that
is the U.S. view and my appraisal of it, in so many words. I want to stop there because I don't
want to take up too much time. I’ll pass it on to Martin.
AT: LINK TURN
Existing state legalization (and the CP) solves their turns – it’s creating political
momentum to reform the treaties at the 2016 UNGASS. State legalization creates
tension with the treaty regime but federal illegality provides legal cover to
maintain the credibility to alter it. The plan’s outright break with the treaty regime
goes too far – it shreds the principle of “Pacta sunt servanda” and wrecks overall
respect for international treaties
Lopez, 10/1/14 – writing fellow at Vox (German, “How much of the war on drugs is tied to
international treaties?” http://www.vox.com/cards/war-on-drugs-marijuana-cocaine-heroinmeth/war-on-drugs-international-treaties)
There is a lot of disagreement among drug policy experts, enforcers, and reformers about the
stringency of the treaties. Several sections of the conventions allow countries some flexibility so
they don't violate their own constitutional protections. The US, for example, has never enforced
penalties on inciting illicit drug use on the basis that it would violate rights to freedom of speech.
Many argue that any move toward legalization of use, possession, and sales is in violation of
international treaties. Under this argument, Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay are technically
in violation of the treaties because they legalized marijuana for personal possession and sales.
Others say that countries have a lot of flexibility due to the constitutional exemptions in the
conventions. Countries could claim, for instance, that their protections for right to privacy and
health allow them to legalize drugs despite the conventions. When it comes to individual states
in the US, the federal government can also argue that America's federalist system allows states
some flexibility as long as the federal government keeps drugs illegal.
"It's pretty clear that the war on drugs was waged for political reasons and some countries have
used the treaties as an excuse to pursue draconian policies," said Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch,
director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program. "Nevertheless, we've seen a number of
countries drop criminal penalties for minor possession of all drugs. We've seen others put drugs
into a pharmaceutical model, including the prescription of heroin to people with serious
addictions. This seems completely possible within the treaties."
Even if a country decided to dismantle prohibition and violate the treaties, it's unclear how the
international community would respond. If the US, for example, ended prohibition, there's little
other countries could do to interfere; there's no international drug court, and sanctions would be
very unlikely for a country as powerful as America.
Still, Martin Jelsma, an international drug policy expert at the Transnational Institute, argued
that ignoring or pulling out of the international drug conventions could seriously damage
America's standing around the world. "Pacta sunt servanda ('agreements must be kept') is
the most fundamental principle of international law and it would be very undermining if
countries start to take an 'a-la-carte' approach to treaties they have signed; they cannot simply
comply with some provisions and ignore others without losing the moral authority to ask other
countries to oblige to other treaties," Jelsma wrote in an email. "So our preference is to
acknowledge legal tensions with the treaties and try to resolve them."
To resolve such issues, many critics of the war on drugs hope to reform international drug laws
in 2016 during the next General Assembly Special Session on drugs.
"There is tension with the tax-and-regulate approach to marijuana in some jurisdictions,"
Malinowska-Sempruch said. "But it's all part of a process and that's why we hope the UN debate
in 2016 is as open as possible, so that we can settle some of these questions and, if necessary,
modernize the system."
Sequencing matters – unilateral legalization wrecks the entire UN treaty system
Rolles, 9 – senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Stephen, “After
the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,”
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ve
d=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBluepr
int.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=v
hMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg)
Parties could simply ignore all or part of the treaties. If multiple states engaged in such a
strategy, the treaties would eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse without any
specific termination or reform. An individual country disregarding the treaties, or applying them
only partially, could in this way institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national
level, including arguably the most likely example: the actual legalisation of cannabis and the
introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland
have been debating at the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the political
agenda in a number of US states).
Such a move however, like all the other possible reforms discussed here, raises serious issues
that go beyond the realm of drug control—particularly if taken unilaterally. The
possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten, or
be perceived to threaten, the stability of the entire treaty system. The cost of such a threat
and the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty system would make states wary of opting
out, even on a limited reform such as cannabis production.
Legalization in advance of treaty revision causes treaty withdrawal
Donohue et al, 10 – C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford (John,
“Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12096)
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law. While many
researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug
control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including
cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and
import, it does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United
States. Article 36 of the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment
programs to either enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.81 The Economist reports
that countries like the Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling
marijuana use through the convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement
of the efficacy of national criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (“A Toker’s
Guide” 2009). Thus, reforms working within the framework of the existing treaty are
possible, though full- scale legalization would require either a country’s withdrawal from
the treaty or revision thereof.
Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more liberal
narcotics policies than the United States lack full- fledged drug legalization and at most
allow for depenalization of marijuana and/ or widespread needle exchange programs. As
discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana
smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and
Reinarman 2006, 64). When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt
outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single
Convention (Cato Institute 2009).
1NR AT: ALT CAUSES
1. The vast majority aren’t about treaty violations – they’re about treaties the
US never chose to ratify, like Kyoto, the ICC and LOST. Our impact is about
maintaining the stability of the existing international system
2. Perceived violations aren’t cut and dry if it’s still possible to remain in
technical compliance – and as long as the US has a legal case, it doesn’t
harm diplomacy
Koplow 13—David, is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies at
Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms Control to the General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to 2011.“Indisputable
Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty?,” The
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37(1): http://www.fletcherforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Koplow_37-1.pdf
Debates about putative treaty violations are also often inconclusive because international law,
like domestic U.S. law, is frequently contestable. For example, the rules for demarcating a
disputed land or maritime boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization
obligation about improper barriers to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, and
debatable. Often, the United States (or any other country) adopts a certain interpretation of the
treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre, the United States might “win” or “lose” the debate
over its interpretation. But if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably
disagree, there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good faith advanced
what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position.
Their evidence assumes Bush-era unilateralism and that did threaten the treaty
system. Obama’s overall approach to international law solidifies U.S. standing
within the drug control regime---makes outright defections by states that matter
highly unlikely
Bewley-Taylor, 12 - Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and
Humanities, Swansea University, UK (David, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured,
p. 315-316)
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way, they
could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the regulation of the
cannabis market and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. Disregarding all or selected
components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The
possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten
the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of simply opting out. Drawing
on provisions within the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, some international lawyers argue that all treaties can
naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing or when an ‘error’
of fact or situation at the time of conclusion has later been identified by a party.89 Both are lines of reasoning pursued in 1971 by
Leinwand in relation to removing cannabis from the Single Convention.
Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in circumstances in the nature, extent and understanding of the ‘world drug problem’ since
the 1960s, the fundamental change of circumstances approach could be applied to the drug conventions or parts thereof. It has been
noted how this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has largely fallen into misuse, probably due to the general availability of the option to
denounce. That said, the case for both this and ‘error’ at time of founding may be useful rationales for reform-minded states to note
when pursuing the denunciation option. Once again the selective application of such principles alone would call into
question the validity of many and varied treaties. This remains an area of concern for many,
particularly European, states that in general maintain a high regard for international law.
This stands in stark contrast to the selective approach towards international law displayed by the
administration of George W. Bush, particularly during its first term. Such disdain for multilateralism generated an
atmosphere within which reformist states may have been able to defend a simple disregard for parts of
the drug control treaties. As the most capable and energetic supporter of the GDPR, the USA was still best
placed to enhance the benevolent appeal of the control system and where necessary dispense costs for
defection beyond those of the reputational variety. Nonetheless, such a position would have been difficult to sustain when defecting
states could justify action on the grounds that they were merely emulating the habits of a hegemony. The likelihood of any significant
state simply disregarding the international legal framework for the control of drugs has always been slim. Yet the election of Barack
Obama and a resultant re-engagement with the UN made this possibility even slimmer. In an
effort to rebuild bridges with the organization, the Obama administration has in many ways attempted to
reverse the policies of its predecessor.90
2NR AT: WITHDRAWAL/REVISION
The plan lacks a formal revision process and revision or withdrawal is not normal
means – Obama will try to justify the plan via reinterpretation
Bennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the
Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect
human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of
the hemispheric debate on drug policy (“Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize
International Drug Treaties” October,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuanalegalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)
So far, the Obama administration has taken a different tack, preferring to work within the
treaties rather than trying to adjust them. The CSA was the subject of a memo issued in
August of 2013 by Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole.5 In it, the Justice Department
announced criteria for the statute’s enforcement in states opting for the legalize-and-regulate
approach. Essentially, growers, sellers and users of marijuana could steer clear of the feds,
provided they strictly hewed to the Washington or Colorado regulations; the latter seem to
uphold, or at least not to offend, the Cole Memo’s enforcement priorities. To be sure—and as
Justice Department officials have been at pains to emphasize since—the federal statute remains
very much on the books. And any marijuana-related conduct that transgresses adequately
robust state regulations, or otherwise impinges on the Cole Memo’s guiding principles, may
provoke action by a United States attorney.
Does this arrangement square with international law? In public and in private, U.S. officials
have maintained that the posture described by the Cole Memo is consistent with U.S. treaty
obligations. They emphasize the United States’ decades-long commitment to the accords’
broader objectives, while highlighting the flexibility reserved to parties in seeking to achieve the
treaties’ aims. The government therefore claims to be acting lawfully; it has not sought to adjust
the drug control treaties in light of the fluid state of play regarding marijuana. In fact, the United
States explicitly opposes both the conclusion of any new drug treaty, and even the possibility of
amending or revising the current treaty framework to account for changing domestic marijuana
policy.
HEMP ADVANTAGE
1NC HEMP
Warming won’t cause extinction
Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7
(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)
First,
climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to
biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical
ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land
area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “ Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover,
and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to
unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or
two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely
to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a
worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by
mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this
harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still
become extinction (though
be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.
Ag is sustainable
Avery 3 (Alex Avery, National Agricultural Aviators Association, Center for Global Food Issues,
12/11/2003)
21st Century Human Society is the Most Sustainable Ever
Roman citizens worried about soil erosion and declining farm yields nearly two thousand years
ago. They had good reason to worry. Soil erosion has always been the most vulnerable aspect of
human society. Fortunately, modern farmers have invented conservation tillage, which cuts
erosion by up to 90 percent and encourages far more earthworms and subsoil bacteria. Organic
farmers refuse to use conservation tillage, because it relies on herbicides to control weeds; thus
the organic farmers are forced to used bare-earth, erosion-inviting weed control techniques like
plowing and hoeing. Plowing also destroys the feeding tubes of the mychorrizal fungi which
produce the most important element of soil health: a recently-discovered gooey glycoprotein
called glomalin. (Again, organic farmers fail to support their claims of better soil health.) Thanks
to the combination of industrial fertilizer and conservation tillage, a highly erodable farming
area in Wisconsin is today suffering only 6 percent as much erosion as it did during the Dust
Bowl days of the 1930s. The author of that study says those who claim high rates of U.S. soil
erosion today “owe us the physical evidence.” We are creating topsoil faster than we are losing it
on millions of hectares across America, Canada, Europe, Latin America, Australia, and most
recently, in Asia.
You can already grow it elsewhere
NORML ‘7(National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws, “"Industrial Hemp Farming
Act" Reintroduced In Congress”, 2-15, http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=7180)
According to the CRS, "The United States is the only developed nation in which industrial hemp
is not an established crop." Farmers in Canada and the European Union grow hemp
commercially for fiber, seed, and oil for use in a variety of industrial and consumer products,
including food.
Legalization doesn’t solve - international competition
Johnson 14—Specialist in Agricultural Policy
(Renee, “Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity”, CRS Report, February 14, 2014, dml)
Other studies focused on the total U.S. market differ from the various state reports and provide
a less favorable aggregate view of the potential market for hemp growers in the United States.
Two studies, conducted by researchers at USDA and University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW-M), highlight some of the continued
challenges facing U.S. hemp producers.
For example, USDA’s study projected
that U.S. hemp markets “are, and will likely remain, small, thin
markets” and also cited “uncertainty about long-run demand for hemp products and the
potential for oversupply” among possible downsides of potential future hemp production.
Similarly, the UW-M study concluded that hemp production “is not likely to generate sizeable
profits” and although hemp may be “slightly more profitable than traditional row crops” it is
likely “less profitable than other specialty crops” due to the “current state of harvesting and processing
technologies, which are quite labor intensive, and result in relatively high per unit costs.”26 The study highlights that U.S.
hemp growers could be affected by competition from other world producers as well as by
certain production limitations in the United States, including yield variability and lack of
harvesting innovations and processing facilities in the United States, as well as difficulty transporting bulk hemp.
The study further claims that most estimates of profitability from hemp production are highly
speculative, and often do not include additional costs of growing hemp in a regulated market,
such as the cost associated with “licensing, monitoring, and verification of commercial hemp .”27
A 2013 study by researchers at the University of Kentucky highlights some of the issues and challenges for that
state’s growers, processors, and industry. The study predicts that in Kentucky, despite “showing some
positive returns, under current market conditions, it does not appear that anticipated hemp
returns will be large enough to entice Kentucky grain growers to shift out of grain production,”
under most circumstances; also, “short run employment opportunities evolving from a new Kentucky
hemp industry appear limited (perhaps dozens of new jobs, not 100s),” because of continued uncertainty in
the industry.28 Overall, the study concludes there are many remaining unknowns and further analysis and production research
is needed.
1NR WARMING DEFENSE
Adaptation
Mendelsohn, professor of forestry and environmental studies – Yale, ‘9
(Robert O., “Climate Change and Economic Growth,”
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf)
These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious
problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low
probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate
change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild
consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the
case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or
little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be
small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a
millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because
people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be
developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.
Experts agree
Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. http://www.livescience.com/culture/canhumans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html)
experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans.
Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human
extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-ofhumanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University
of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve
His views deviate sharply from those of most
the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that
the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The
rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution
to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and
renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But
Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon
dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in
CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the
entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're
essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."
1NR HEMP DEFENSE
Ag subs thump
Gilbert 09 – Sarah Gilbert is a writer for Daily Finance. (“Innovative ways to stimulate the economy: Subsidize small farmers,
not corporate farms”, last updated December 4, 2009, http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/04/11/innovative-ways-to-stimulatethe-economy-subsidize-small-farmer/, Callahan)
A local farmer and friend, Chrissie Zaerpoor, is known as one of the new farming celebrities. She raises truly free-range chickens for
meat and eggs, and grass-fed dairy cows, and she and her husband have a big problem: the government's subsidies and
programs are aligned against them. When the two former engineers went out to look for a loan
to buy their farm property in Yamhill County, Oregon, they were told to try for a loan on a
country estate instead; no one wants to finance a small farm in this economy. Anyone who's
watched King Corn or read Michael Pollan's books on food knows that the real money -- and the real government support -- is
for big "monoculture" farms selling one of the major commodity crops, chiefly corn, soy, and
cotton. To dismiss small farmers -- who, unlike large corporate farms tend to specialize in a few niche-targeted, high-value crops,
and not commodity crops like corn or soy -- and whose primary customer base is typically a local one is, however, short-sighted.
Numerous studies and analysts agree that money spent on food grown by local farmers (typically, "local" is defined as within several
hundred miles) multiplies by a factor of 1.5 to 3 a dollar's purchasing power; one study by Ecotrust on buying local food through
school cafeterias in Oregon came up with a 1.67 multiplier. What's more, developing small, community-based farms, and selling the
resultant food to local consumers, simply makes people happier, as Bill McKibben writes. While consumer confidence
may not be a contributor to GDP in and of itseslf, its status as economic indicator is
unchallenged. To stimulate local economies and to encourage the sort of consumer well-being
necessary to transform our current economic crisis into an entirely different creature -- a robust,
sensible economy in which real value is being created -- I would suggest erasing our current crop
subsidies, most of which benefit only a few large, multinational corporations after all, and
instead spend those development dollars on small farmers who have a commitment to diversity
and resource sustainability.
Small farms fail
McWilliams 09 (James, historian at Texas State University, 10/7,
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/let-the-farmers-market-debatecontinue/?apage=2)
Some academic critics are starting to wonder. Writing in the Journal of Rural Studies,
sociologist C. Clare Hinrichs warns that “[m]aking ‘local’ a proxy for the ‘good’ and ‘global’ a
proxy for the bad may overstate the value in proximity.” Building on this suspicion, she
acknowledges that many small farms are indeed more sustainable than larger ones, but then
reminds us that “Small scale, ‘local’ farmers are not inherently better environmental stewards.”
Personal experience certainly confirms my own inability to make such a distinction. Most of us
must admit that in many cases we really haven’t a clue if the local farmers we support run
sustainable systems. The possibility that, as Hinrichs writes, they “may lack the awareness or
means to follow more sustainable production practices” suggests that the mythical sense of
community (which depends on the expectation of sound agricultural practices) is being eroded.
After all, if the unifying glue of sustainability turns out to have cracks, so then does the
communal cohesiveness that’s supposed to evolve from it. And this is not a big “If.” “[W]hile
affect, trust, and regard can flourish under conditions of spatial proximity,” concludes Hinrichs,
“this is not automatically or necessarily the case.” At the least, those of us who value our local
food systems should probably take the time to tone down the Quixotic rhetoric and ask
questions that make our farmer friends a little uncomfortable.
Industrial hemp is a fantasy
Mitchell 2013 (Dan; Why legalized hemp will not be a miracle crop; Oct 17;
modernfarmer.com/2013/10/legal-industrial-hemp-wont-matter/; kdf)
There has never been a good reason for the ban on industrial hemp. It's no more harmful than industrial switchgrass, or industrial
lumber for that matter. But at the same time, the claims of hemp activists are often overblown. It's a highly useful,
highly versatile crop, but its utility is, for the most part, fairly marginal, at least going by the size of its existing markets
and estimates for how big a domestic U.S. market could be. That “activists” have rallied behind hemp is, of course, mainly due to its
relationship to marijuana. The plants are cousins — both are cannabis. Not that hemp should ever have been illegal, but it’s hard
to imagine that if flax or jute were for some reason illegal, such a large, politically-tinged campaign
would be organized around legalizing either of them. As with any political movement, hemp activism has
generated tons of wildly exaggerated claims, such as when a Daily Kos writer in 2011 declared that “Industrial Hemp
can save America.” But good for the activists, since they appear to be winning, as they should. Several states have formally legalized
hemp production, though most of them are waiting for the federal government to come around, since hemp, incredibly enough, is
still classified as a Schedule I narcotic. That means the government considers it among the most dangerous of illegal drugs and
attaches the most severe criminal penalties to it. Even though smoking it would do no more than perhaps give you a headache. Like
marijuana, hemp contains the psychoactive ingredient THC, but in such small amounts it’s almost not measurable in hemp. Early
this month, a farmer in Colorado harvested the first legally produced industrial hemp crop in 56 years. It’s not even quite legal there,
even by state law (regulations governing hemp production are set to go into effect next year), but farmer Ryan Loflin went ahead and
cultivated 55 acres of the stuff, some of which will be processed into oil and sold to Dr. Bronner’s Magic Soaps, a major U.S. buyer of
hemp. With states like Colorado and Washington making marijuana legal for recreational use, and many others legalizing medical
marijuana, the nation’s laws and attitudes regarding the cannabis plant are quickly changing. It seems likely that a thriving hemp
market will finally develop here. But “thriving” doesn’t mean “huge” — not by a longshot. Worldwide, only about
200,000 acres of land were devoted to hemp cultivation in 2011, according to the Food and Agriculture
Organization, with that number being “flat to decreasing” in recent years in the 30 countries where
hemp is cultivated. Meanwhile, in North Dakota alone, flax was harvested from more than 315,000
acres (95 percent of the U.S. crop) in 2012, according to the Agricultural Marketing Resource Association. For further perspective,
consider that corn is planted on about 85 million acres in the U.S. alone every year (though that might say more about our reliance
on corn than it says about hemp.) There are good reasons for this. Chief among them is demand, which isn’t as high as hemp’s
loudest proponents would have it. In Europe, demand fell through the 20th century as industrial buyers
increasingly chose cheaper or better alternatives for many applications — often artificial fibers. That
phenomenon has been replicated elsewhere. And as more uses for hemp have been found, demand has grown, but not at levels that
would indicate a coming hemp revolution. The crop’s illegality in the United States hasn’t helped either, of course, though imports of
hemp-based products — many of them from China — have been legal since 1998. The total retail market for hemp in
the United States is only about $500 million. That will no doubt grow with domestic cultivation — and perhaps with
innovations in manufacturing technologies that could increase demand. But hemp is unlikely to ever be a worldchanger. Best known historically for its use to make paper and rope (neither of which are often made with hemp these days,
because there are better materials), the crop’s versatility is its major selling point. It’s used in the manufacture of fabrics, household
products, fuels, plastics, construction materials, and all kinds of other stuff. It has gained some popularity as a food ingredient in
recent years. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has said that “the market potential for hemp seed as a food ingredient is unknown.
However, it probably will remain a small market, like those for sesame and poppy seeds.” The one big benefit of hemp? Its
environmental footprint is relatively small. It requires few pesticides and no herbicides. It’s an excellent rotation crop, often used to
suppress weeds and loosen soil before the planting of winter cereals. On the other hand, it requires a relatively large amount of
water, and its need for deep, humus-rich, nutrient-dense soil limits growing locales. And hemp cultivation is highly
labor intensive. Loflin, the Colorado farmer, took to social media to recruit 45 people to help him harvest his crop by hand
over a weekend. “Use of a mechanical combine,” the Denver Post reported, “would have harmed the plants’ stalks.” That’s one reason
prices are so high — about six times the cost of wood pulp. Hemp is an annual crop, which means it
must be stored in order to be processed throughout the year, further adding to the cost of using it — and to the
incentive for using something else. Production of hemp varies considerably year to year, but in general, it had been steadily but
slowly rising. In 1999, 250 million pounds were produced, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization; in 2011, it was 280
million. That’s pounds, not tons. The FAO says the increase is mainly due to rising demand for food, supplements and body-care
products made with hemp. Sales of such products are at the mercy of consumer whims. It would be better news for hemp if
industrial uses comprised the main driver of demand. Once hemp becomes more commonplace, consumers might prefer to just go
back to Aveeno lotions and Dreyer’s ice cream. None of which is to say that the outlook for hemp is not bright. It certainly seems to
be, as long as we keep things in their proper perspective. That means ignoring claims such as
hemp becoming a “trillion-dollar crop” that “could finally allow people to grow money on trees.”
Hemp is useless—every function is more profitably served by other crops—there
will be no scale up
Caulkins et al 2012 (Jonathan P [Stever professor of operation research and public policy @
Carnegie Mellon], Angela Hawken [Associate prof of public policy @ Pepperdine], Beau Kilmer
[co-director of the RAND Drug Research Center], and Mark AR Kleiman [Prof of public policy @
UCLA]; Marijuana Legalization; Oxford University Press; p. 229-31; kdf)
Would allowing industrial hemp in the United States save the planet? No. If legalizing industrial
hemp could save the planet, then Canada and China would already have taken care of it. It seems
silly even to entertain such a question, but some hemp enthusiasts make rather extravagant claims. In
The Emperor Wears No Clothes-the Bible of the hemp movementthe late Jack Herer wrote that hemp "could substitute for all wood
pulp paper, all fossil fuels, would make most of our fibers naturally, make everything from dynamite to plastic," and that "one acre of
it would replace 4.1 acres of trees." According to its advocates, hemp could fuel automobiles, be a staple ingredient in super foods,
and provide superior building materials for developed and developing countries alike. It's certainly true that the hemp
plant can meet a wide variety of needs. So why isn't it an important crop today, as it was in colonial times? Some
hemp advocates place the blame on an irrational prohibition. But that doesn't explain why hemp
remains a minor niche industry even in countries that do not ban it. A more pedestrian explanation is
simply that global trade and technological progress have produced superior alternatives to hemp
for most of its historical uses. Plastics have replaced hemp in many of the primary industries
where hemp fiber was once the leader, because plastic offers greater longevity and resilience.
There are also other plant-based options. Bast-fiber plants, such as jute and abaca (Manila hemp), had already largely supplanted
industrial hemp for making rope before they in turn were rendered obsolete first by nylon and then by other synthetics. The advent
of the cotton gin allowed cotton to outpace hemp as the staple material for fabric and textiles. Hemp does have some advantages.
Hemp is biodegradable while plastic is not. Hemp has essential fatty acids while other oilseeds do not. However, one crop that
consistently competes favorably with hemp across categories is flax. Flax provides comparable
nutritional benefits and textile properties to hemp, and produces a high-quality fabric at lower
processing costs than cannabis: converting flax stalk to linen is easier and less expensive than
converting hemp to hemp fiber to hemp cloth. That's why Hanes, for example, plans to market a blend of cotton
and linen rather than of cotton and hemp. Where does that leave hemp? Likely with a smaller market share than flax which is itself a
modest industry. ' There are also competitors for hempseed and hempseed oil. Flaxseed matches hempseed on a number of factors,
including nutrient profile and density. For example, both contain rare omega-3 fatty acids. Both oils also have short shelf lives and
have to be packaged in dark colored bottles to prevent spoilage. Consumers who want the nutritional benefits from flax seeds and
flaxseed oil can find those products in health food stores. Hemp can also be turned into a biofuel, as corn can be converted to
ethanol. In fact, hemp produces more fuel than corn per unit area-4o gallons per acre compared to 18 gallons per acre-and offers
advantages in efficiency of conversion to oil and usage at low temperatures. But other energy crops eclipse hemp. Soy
produces 48 gallons of biofuel per acre, and jatropha, a crop that, like hemp, can grow in poor soil,
produces 200 gallons per acre. Likewise other energy crops beat hemp on conversion to biomass, which can be used for
heating and electricity production. Switchgrass exceeds the other biomass materials, including hemp, in the amount of energy it
generates from a given amount of mass, and it is a perennial crop that does not need to be planted every year. Hemp is an
impressively versatile plant, but it is not a panacea.
1NC—EVERYTHING ELSE
1NC
Iran deal is a top priority - PC key
Solomon & Lee, 10/23/14 (Jay Solomon And Carol E. Lee, The Wall Street Journal Online,
“White House Seeks Support from Allies, Congress for Potential Iran Deal; Late November Is
the Deadline for Agreement,” Factiva, JMP)
WASHINGTON—The Obama administration is promoting a possible nuclear agreement with
Iran to allies, Congress and U.S. policy makers in an effort to win support ahead of a late
November deadline.
Significant divisions remain between Tehran and global powers in negotiations that seek to
constrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for an easing of Western sanctions, senior officials
stressed in interviews this week. But these officials also said important progress has been
made in recent talks in Vienna and New York.
The White House has subsequently decided to begin more aggressively outlining to various
partners the contours of a prospective deal with Tehran, and its potential merits, they said.
“This is a period of heightened activity. And it’s a chance to level-set people on where we are,”
said a senior U.S. official working on Iran. “There’s a stepped-up effort to show people what this
deal might look like.”
Among the administration’s point people in this effort is Undersecretary of State Wendy
Sherman, the U.S. chief nuclear negotiator with Iran. On Thursday, Ms. Sherman gave her most
expansive address on the status of the negotiations since taking her post and stressed the need
for Iran to seize on the diplomacy to end its international isolation.
“We have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable,” she told a
gathering at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “We
have cleared up misunderstandings and held exhaustive discussions on every element of a
possible text. However, like any complicated and technically complex diplomatic initiative, this
is a puzzle with many interlocking pieces.”
U.S., Iranian and European officials have said in recent weeks that the main barriers to a deal
remain focused on the future size of Tehran’s nuclear-fuel production capacity and the pace of
the potential lifting of Western sanctions in the case of an agreement.
The Obama administration initially demanded a complete dismantling of the nearly 20,000
centrifuges Iran has amassed to enrich uranium for the production of nuclear fuel. Tehran said
it would ultimately need up to at least five times that number to have enough fuel to power the
country’s reactors.
Iran denies it is seeking nuclear weapons and says its activities are for peaceful purposes only,
such as the production of energy.
Signs of a potential compromise have emerged in recent days with Iranian state media
reporting that Tehran and its negotiating partners, the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council along with Germany—a diplomatic bloc known as the P5-+1—focused
on a number of 4,000 centrifuges.
U.S. officials have neither confirmed nor denied the numbers. Outside experts said the
number could be acceptable to the P5+1 and to Congress because it would place
constraints on Iran’s ability to produce weapons-usable fuel.
“It’s not as simple as saying X-number of centrifuges, because it has to be taken as a whole
package,” said another senior U.S. official. “We’re looking at all of the ways that we can basically
block off any potential combination that they could think of how to get to a weapon.”
The White House’s outreach to Congress will be critical to sealing an agreement
with Iran. The issue of Congress’s role is a contentious one.
The White House is arguing that an agreement wouldn’t be a formal treaty, and, therefore,
wouldn’t require congressional approval. Leading U.S. lawmakers are threatening to
impose new sanctions if a deal isn’t seen as doing enough to roll back Tehran’s nuclear
capabilities.
Pro-Israel lawmakers have voiced concern and are demanding the White House seek
congressional approval to forge an agreement with Tehran.
“It’s tough to see a solid agreement when Congress—which was critical to putting in the strong
sanctions that got negotiators to this point—is so clearly sidelined,” said Rep. Ed Royce (R.,
Calif.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Administration officials expect consultations to ramp up significantly in coming
weeks, as President Barack Obama tries to head off a confrontation over the easing of
sanctions—an issue that not only draws criticism from Republicans but also divides his own
Democratic Party.
The White House is looking at a deal that would have a probation period of sorts for Iran, where
sanctions would be in abeyance until Tehran has demonstrated its adherence to the terms of the
agreement over a set amount of time.
Only after that would sanctions be lifted. One senior administration official said that time period
is likely to be more than two years.
“There are going to be conditions on moving forward with this,” the second official said. “As part
of an overall comprehensive agreement, there will be a mix of legislative and executive actions,
but at what point those different actions come in we’re not in position to say because there’s no
deal.”
The U.S. is only looking at lifting nuclear-related sanctions, not others such as those related to
human rights concerns. But officials acknowledged that many of those sanctions are entwined,
making it difficult to separate out the nuclear-related ones.
Mr. Obama, for whom a nuclear deal with Iran is a top priority, is regularly briefed on the
talks, the senior administration official said. He is expected to become even more closely
involved as the deadline nears.
“We will need every single minute of the time through Nov. 24. The goal is to have an
agreement by then but it’s unclear whether that will come to pass,” a senior administration
official said.
Marijuana legalization unpopular --- politicians will get painted as soft on crime
Nagourney, 14 (4/5/2014, Adam, “Despite Support in Party, Democratic Governors Resist
Legalizing Marijuana,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/us/politics/despite-support-inparty-democratic-governors-resist-legalizing-marijuana.html?_r=0, JMP)
LOS ANGELES — California voters strongly favor legalizing marijuana. The state Democratic
Party adopted a platform last month urging California to follow Colorado and Washington in
ending marijuana prohibition. The state’s lieutenant governor, Gavin Newsom, has called for
legalizing the drug.
But not Gov. Jerry Brown. “I think we ought to kind of watch and see how things go in
Colorado,” Mr. Brown, a Democrat, said curtly when asked the question as he was presenting his
state budget this year.
At a time of rapidly evolving attitudes toward marijuana legalization — a slight majority of
Americans now support legalizing the drug — Democratic governors across the country, Mr.
Brown among them, find themselves uncomfortably at odds with their own base.
Even with Democrats and younger voters leading the wave of the pro-legalization shift, these
governors are standing back, supporting much more limited medical-marijuana
proposals or invoking the kind of law-and-order and public-health arguments more commonly
heard from Republicans. While 17 more states — most of them leaning Democratic — have seen
bills introduced this year to follow Colorado and Washington in approving recreational
marijuana, no sitting governor or member of the Senate has offered a full-out
endorsement of legalization. Only Gov. Peter Shumlin, a Democrat in Vermont, which is
struggling with a heroin problem, said he was open to the idea.
“Quite frankly, I don’t think we are ready, or want to go down that road,” Dannel P. Malloy, the
Democratic governor of Connecticut, which has legalized medical marijuana and decriminalized
possession of small amounts of marijuana, said in an interview. “Perhaps the best way to handle
this is to watch those experiments that are underway. I don’t think it’s necessary, and I don’t
think it’s appropriate.”
The hesitance expressed by these governors reflects not only governing concerns but also,
several analysts said, a historically rooted political wariness of being portrayed as soft
on crime by Republicans. In particular, Mr. Brown, who is 75, lived through the culture wars
of the 1960s, when Democrats suffered from being seen as permissive on issues like this.
“Either they don’t care about it as passionately or they feel embarrassed or vulnerable. They fear
the judgment,” said Ethan Nadelmann, the founder of the Drug Policy Alliance, an organization
that favors decriminalization of marijuana. “The fear of being soft on drugs, soft on
marijuana, soft on crime is woven into the DNA of American politicians, especially
Democrats.”
He described that sentiment as, “Do not let yourself be outflanked by Republicans
when it comes to being tough on crime and tough on drugs. You will lose.”
In Washington and Colorado, the Democratic governors had opposed legalization from the start,
though each made clear that he would follow voters’ wishes in setting up the first legal
recreational-marijuana marketplaces in the nation. “If it was up to me, being in the middle of it,
and having read all this research and having some concern, I’d tell people just to exercise
caution,” Gov. John W. Hickenlooper of Colorado said in a recent interview.
Obama’s capital is key to successfully block sanctions that will scuttle negotiations
--- failure will trigger war
Winsor, 10/2/14 (Ben, “A Coalition Is Working Furiously Behind The Scenes To Support
Obama's Iran Talks,” http://www.businessinsider.com/rag-tag-iran-coalition-backingdiplomacy-2014-10, JMP)
Since November 2013, the Obama administration has engaged with Iran in tense, drawn-out
nuclear negotiations which optimists hope could bring an end to decades of hostility and
mistrust.
Throughout it all, Congress has threatened to play the spoiler, with a tough sanctions bill
passing the House and looming in the Senate which would almost certainly scuttle the fragile
talks over the Iranian nuclear program.
Now, as the deadline for the end of the talks approaches, a coalition of legislators, advocacy
groups, and White House officials are working to hold Congress back from the brink of
thwarting what they see as a historic window of opportunity. They're fighting against
legislators and conservative groups like The Heritage Foundation and The Free Enterprise
Institute who are pushing for the US to take a hawkish stance.
Legislators, led by Minnesota Congressman Keith Ellison, have been maneuvering quietly
behind the scenes in Congress to keep the talks alive. At the same time, officials from the
White House have been leaning heavily on Senate Democrats to refrain from
bringing a sanctions bill to the floor.
On the outside, a diverse range of pro-diplomacy groups, led by organisations like the National
Iranian American Council (NIAC) and the liberal Jewish organization J Street, have found a
common cause and rallied together to lobby for restraint. Even the Quakers are energized.
“This is a do-or-die moment, either we succeed, or we go in a much more negative direction,”
said NIAC co-founder Trita Parsi at the group’s annual conference last weekend.
Parsi sees the negotiations as a historic moment during a narrow window of opportunity.
Presidents on both sides have sunk significant time and energy into the talks and
Parsi believes the current leadership in both countries is more likely to make a deal than those
who came before — or might come after.
“The next president, whatever political party they’re in, is not going to spend precious political
capital battling Congress… [Obama] is the guy,” Parsi said.
Supporters fear that failure of the talks could trigger increased sanctions, the rise of hardliners
in Iran, and relations spiraling toward military confrontation.
Goes nuclear
Avery, 13 --- Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen (11/6/2013, John Scales Avery, “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate
Into Global Nuclear War,” http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure
groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global
nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember
that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict.
There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the
Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable
government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government
might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the
conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East.
Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price
of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the
dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would
be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that
besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive
contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a
global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate
ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere.
To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the
peoples of the world, US citizens included.
1NC
The fifty states and District of Columbia should eliminate their prohibitions on
and establish regulations for marihuana.
The United States Attorney General, the fifty states and the District of Columbia
should implement cooperative enforcement agreements under section 873 of the
Controlled Substances Act that bind the states and the District of Columbia to
enforcement against illegal production and sales in return for federal
acquiescence to state initiatives. These agreements should create formal safe
harbor provisions for industries that do business with legal marihuana
businesses, and require compliance by all federal agencies.
The United States should legalize commercial hemp production and the
importation of hemp seeds and should cease all enforcement activities against
industrial hemp.
It’s competitive and avoids politics – the CP doesn’t legalize, it’s a form of legally
binding non-enforcement that creates a better model of federalism
Zeese, 13 – attorney, Zeese began his advocacy career while in law school where he worked at
the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws. He went on to serve as their chief
counsel in 1980 and national director in 1983. In 1986 he left to practice criminal law and, with
Arnold Trebach, began the Drug Policy Foundation which went on to become the largest drug
policy reform organization in history and is now known as the Drug Policy Alliance after
merging with the Lindesmith Center. Zeese continues to serve as president of Common Sense
for Drug Policy. (Kevin, “The Voters of Colorado and Washington Provide A Path to End the
War-on-Marijuana Quagmire”
http://greenshadowcabinet.us/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20Federal%20Response%20t
o%20State%20Marijuana%20Laws%204-2013%20FINAL.pdf)
The federal government has sufficient flexibility under the law to respect the laws of the states
that have reformed their laws and still be true to current federal law. Rather than seeking conflict
between federal and state law, the federal government should seek to respect local democracy and allow
states to implement their laws. The state and federal governments should enter into
contractual agreements, under Section 873 of the Controlled Substances Act, to
accomplish shared goals and ensure each others laws will be effective.
Federal, state and local governments seek to control the marijuana market as well as protect public health and safety. These shared
common goals are a foundation on which to build policies that respect state-level democracy. The Obama administration can
act positively on these issues without any congressional action. As Stuart Taylor points out in a report
for the Brookings Institution “Congress long ago directed in the CSA that the Attorney General ‘shall
cooperate’ with the states on controlled substances and authorized him ‘to enter into contractual agreements
. . . to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities.’”64
The alternative, seeking conflict with state governments, will lead to a battle the federal government will ultimately lose; and that
will undermine control of the marijuana market as well as public health and safety. The federal government has a lot of power to sue
civilly and prosecute criminally; but what it does not have is the people-power to combat the widespread use of marijuana. There is
no question that supremacy laws will allow states to decriminalize possession, personal cultivation or repeal all of their marijuana
laws and leave it to the federal government to be solely responsible for enforcement. The Colorado law already allows cultivation of
up to six plants and sharing up to one ounce without criminal penalties. Stopping a weed that can grow in people’s closets,
possession that can be hidden in pockets and sales that occur behind closed doors has proven impossible with state and local law
enforcement working with the federal government. Currently the vast majority of marijuana arrests, 99 percent, are made by state
and local police. The limited person-power of the federal government will obviously fail without the help of state and local police.
Cooperation between state and federal government is the only practical path to controlling the
market and protecting the public health and safety of the population.
Justice Lewis Brandeis famous phrase
about state’s serving as “laboratories of democracy” is
appropriate to this issue. Brandeis wrote:
“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”65
To block the voters’ clear democratically expressed desire to end the long-failed policy of marijuana prohibition would be a
tremendous denial of democracy but also foolish leadership. The United States has been stuck in a quagmire of mass marijuana
arrests, mass incarceration, destruction of civil liberties and escalating enforcement expenditures since 1937. It has not worked.
Washington and Colorado have given the country a path out of the marijuana war.
These state’s are taking their responsibility seriously and fashioning laws that protect public health and safety as well as raise
revenue and use taxes to discourage use. Both the House and Senate in Colorado passed a law to tax marijuana as this report went to
press. House Bill 1318 would impose a 15 percent excise tax and a sales tax initially set at 10 percent on recreational marijuana sales.
Voters this November will have to give their approval of the tax rates before they could take effect. The money would be used for
school construction and for regulation of marijuana stores. A companion bill, House Bill 1317 has been passed by the Senate. It
regulates the marijuana market. Its provisions include marijuana stores being licensed by the state, only allows Colorado residents
to own stores, for the first nine months only existing medical dispensaries can apply for a license, stores would initially have to grow
what they sell, in October 2014 growers separate from the store would be allowed. The Senate bill also bars cities from operating the
marijuana stores.66
While the “Supremacy Clause” of the US Constitution67 makes it clear that if state marijuana laws conflict with federal law they are
preempted by federal law and can be voided by the courts, the Tenth Amendment recognizes the power of the states and does not
allow the federal government to coerce states to enforce federal laws or to keep or adopt state laws that they do not want.68 Indeed,
there have always been differences between federal and state law on marijuana as well as between the various states on their
marijuana laws. There is no question that if states decide to repeal all marijuana laws, laws against cultivation, distribution or
possession, the federal government cannot force them to keep those laws.69
The Controlled Substances Act makes it clear that the federal government did not intend to pre-empt the field of marijuana laws:70
“No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which
that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together”
Courts have adopted a narrow definition of the conflict, “unless state law requires what federal law prohibits, or state law prohibits
what federal law requires, it is not ‘impossible’ to comply with both laws.”71 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) in analyzing
the preemption issue summarizes the law which begins with the purpose of the Controlled Substances Act:
“The Supreme Court has previously identified the ‘main objectives’ of the CSA as ‘conquer[ing] drug abuse’ and ‘control[ing] the
legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.’ Second, ‘[i]n all pre-emption cases ... we ‘start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’ State drug laws, including those connected to marijuana cultivation, distribution, or possession have generally been
considered to be within ‘the historic police powers of the States.’ Consequently, the Washington and Colorado laws would likely be
accorded a presumption of validity.”72
The states and the federal government operate as two distinct sovereigns, enacting separate and independent criminal regimes with
separate and independent enforcement mechanisms, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the
other.73 As the CRS points out: “If prohibiting certain conduct under federal law had the effect of barring any state attempt to
permit that same conduct, the result would be a legal environment in which states were compelled to adopt criminal measures that
mirrored federal law. The Tenth Amendment prohibits such a requirement.”74
Federal and state courts have previously held that a state’s decision to simply permit what the federal government prohibits does not
create a “positive conflict” with federal law:75 “Nor have courts generally found that simply permitting conduct that the federal
government prohibits stands as an ‘obstacle to the execution of Congress’s objectives.’ The Supreme Court has interpreted this
relatively narrowly, holding that a state law is preempted where the obstacle is of such a degree that ‘the purpose of the [federal] act
cannot otherwise be accomplished.’”76
The regulation and licensing of marijuana could be characterized consistent with the purposes of
the CSA to control drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate distribution of drugs; and thus are not
subject to conflict preemption.77 The CRS points out that:
“it can be argued that the state regulatory and licensing laws have no impact on the enforcement of federal law; are necessary to
implement the state’s decision to remove penalties for certain marijuana-related activities; do not immunize or shield the holder
from federal prosecution; and, therefore, are not preempted. Moreover, it could be argued that a state license acts only as a means by
which the state can impose controls on the production and distribution of marijuana under state law and to identify which
individuals have been preapproved to engage in marijuana-related activities.”78
There has only been one case where a federal court has made any statement about preemption in relation to the Colorado medical
marijuana and legalization initiative. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado dealing with a debtor, who
leased space for the purposes of growing medicinal marijuana in compliance with state law; the court wrote that “conflict
preemption is not an issue here. Colorado constitutional amendments for both medical marijuana, and the more recent amendment
legalizing marijuana possession and usage generally, both make it clear that their provisions apply to state law only. Absent from
either enactment is any effort to impede the enforcement of federal law.”79
By limiting marijuana production and distribution, it could be argued that the envisioned Colorado and Washington regulatory and
licensing provisions “further, rather than obstruct, the purposes of the CSA.” Under this reasoning, the Washington and Colorado
regulatory and licensing aspects could be seen as supporting the federal government’s objectives of “control[ing] the legitimate and
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances,” as opposed to creating an obstacle to that goal.80
With regard to taxation in Colorado, the tax (which may not exceed 15% prior to January 1, 2017) is to be levied on sales of
marijuana by cultivation facilities, product manufacturing facilities, or retail stores.81 In Washington, a 25% tax is to be imposed at
each transaction within the distribution chain, including sales from: producer to processor; processor to retailer; and from retailer to
consumer.82 Although little precedent exists relating to state-imposed taxes on medical marijuana, there is evidence to suggest that
these taxes would likely be considered permissible.83 The Supreme Court has held that a state may “legitimately tax criminal
activities.”84
As the CRS explains, taxes are imposed to either raise revenue, deter conduct, or both. The excise taxes envisioned by Colorado and
Washington appear to be motivated by a desire to raise revenue to both pay for the regulatory and licensing controls on marijuana
and to contribute to other budgetary needs, most notably health services and education. In addition, the Washington law states that
the Liquor Control Board is authorized to make recommendations to adjust the tax levels “that would further the goal of
discouraging use while undercutting illegal market prices.”85 The Colorado law does not explicitly reference any goal of deterring
marijuana use, but it would appear that the envisioned tax may also have that effect. In addition, taxes are already collected from
medical marijuana dispensaries without any conflict with federal law. Thus, the state tax may more accurately be characterized as
“interposing an economic impediment to the activity” as opposed to authorizing the activity.86 Taxes, like regulations, are an
alternative way to control the market and limit abuse.
Thus, under the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemption, the federal government can view the regulatory, licensing and
tax laws of Colorado and Washington as consistent with the purpose of the CSA; the same is true for the 18 states that allow the
medical use of marijuana.
Under the law the Department of Justice is not required to zealously enforce every violation of the
CSA. Indeed, as we have noted earlier it would be impossible for them to do so and they already cede enforcement of possession,
cultivation and small sales to states. Under the doctrine of “prosecutorial discretion,” federal law enforcement officials
have “broad discretion” as to when, whom, and whether to prosecute for violations of the CSA .87
Courts have recognized that the “decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review,” as it involves the consideration of
factors, such as the strength of evidence, deterrence value, and existing enforcement priorities “not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”88
Through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Obama administration through Attorney General
Holder is
free to develop a policy that cooperates with the states to achieve their common
objectives and continue to allow federal law to operate.
What are the choices the federal government could make? At one extreme they could decide to aggressively enforce the federal
marijuana laws in Washington and Colorado. As a practical matter, the federal government simply does not have the resources to
enforce federal drug laws without the assistance of state and local police. Approximately 99% of drug offenses are prosecuted under
state law by state authorities. Therefore, if the Obama administration decided to increase the frequency of federal prosecutions in
order to enforce federal law, vast new resources would be needed by the FBI, DEA, and the U.S. Attorneys. During this time of
budget deficits, austerity and sequester including cuts to essential programs like Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and other
programs, it is simply unrealistic to increase federal enforcement spending enough to meet this goal. On the other end of the
spectrum, the DOJ could simply defer to the state policy and stop prosecutions for violations of the
CSA in Washington and Colorado, so long as the individuals are in compliance with state law.
These and all options in between are available to President Obama and Attorney General Holder.
How can we make cooperation work? Stuart Taylor89 explains: “The CSA not only directs
that the Attorney
General ‘shall cooperate’ with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad
discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements.” He also
notes “U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has already been personally urged by John Hickenlooper, Colorado’s veteran Democratic
governor, and Jay Inslee, Washington’s new Democratic governor, to work cooperatively with them.” 90 All parties want to protect
the health and safety of the public as well as control the market, by working together they can do so; failure to work together
is likely to create a chaotic situation more likely to undermine health and safety as well as create a large illegal
marijuana market.
The federal interest of preventing marijuana from medical or legal states from crossing borders to non-legal, non-medical states is a
legitimate federal concern under existing laws. States can certainly agree to focus resources on preventing diversion to other states,
and the federal government can limit its enforcement in legal and medical states to preventing
diversion. A focused, co-operative effort has better chance of success than state and federal
enforcement working against each other.
To make implementation of state laws possible the federal government should state in an ‘873 Contract’ that
it will not enforce federal laws so long as the activity is consistent with state laws and diversion to
other states is prevented. This should be part of a contractual agreement between Colorado,
Washington and the federal government; similar agreements should be reached with the 18 states
and District of Columbia that have passed medical marijuana laws.
Safe harbor provision solves legal uncertainty and chilling effect despite federal
illegality
McDermott, 13 (Ryan, “Fed crackdown legal marijuana states could create larger black
market”, 4/16, http://www.fiercegovernment.com/story/fed-crackdown-legal-marijuana-statescould-create-larger-black-market/2013-04-16)
If the federal government cracks down on the marijuana industry in states that have legalized it,
it could create an unregulated market even more saturated and uncontrollable than before
legalization, Brookings Fellow Stuart Taylor said during a think tank talk on the collission
between federal and state drug laws.
The federal government should declare a safe harbor in Washington and Colorado, states that
have outright legalized marijuana. An additional 14 other states have legalized marijuana for
medical purposes with varying degrees of permissiveness over what constitutes a medical
condition.
Safe harbor would give a federal guarantee to state regulations intended to prevent the sale
of marijuana to minors and its sale outside of a legalized area, Taylor said. States are developing
those rules on their own, but without safe harbor, federal law enforcement could destabilize
state enforcement of them.
In Colorado, there are two tiers to the marijuana market, a legal, regulated side where marijuana
is bought and sold as well as a personal grow side that is unregulated other than the amount that
is allowed to be grown and used personally. The two tiered systems allows Colorado to regulate
most of the marijuana growth in the state, and keep the unregulated market smaller, Taylor
said.
"If Obama shuts down regulated sector, the unregulated sector will expand to huge proportions.
Criminals could bend unregulated sector to its will," Taylor said. "The black market would
proliferate."
But to make the agreement between the state and federal government, a state must show it can
contain marijuana sales and transport within the state where the drug is legal.
"This isn't just the federal government giving a free ride to states," Taylor said. "States must
regulate."
Even if there is a cooperative enforcement agreement between the state and federal
governments, it would still technically be illegal to grow and sell marijuana in those states
where marijuana is legal, noted Mark Kleiman, a public policy professor at the University of
California-Los Angeles.
CARTELS
Marijuana legalization doesn’t undermine cartels or reduce violence in Mexico---if
anything it makes it worse
Beau Kilmer et al 10, Codirector, RAND Drug Policy Research Center; Senior Policy
Researcher, RAND; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School, et al, 2010, “Reducing Drug
Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help?,”
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf
In this paper we also put forward a transparent, and hence, auditable and replicable, method of estimating
the revenues that international drug traffickers derive from U.S. sales. We believe that the method we use
and discuss in this paper can be iteratively improved by research over time, whereas existing methods that rely heavily
on classified information have not been subject to review and have not shown much ongoing
improvement.
Our analysis leads to the following insights:
• Mexican DTOs’ gross revenues
from moving marijuana across the border into the United States and
selling it to wholesalers is likely less than $2 billion , and our preferred estimate is closer to $1.5 billion.
This figure does not include revenue from DTO production and distribution in the United States, which is extremely difficult to
estimate with existing data.
• The ubiquitous
claim that 60 percent of Mexican DTO export revenues come from U.S.
marijuana consumption (Fainaru and Booth, 2009; Yes on 19, undated) should not be taken seriously . No
publicly available source verifies or explains this figure and subsequent analyses revealed great
uncertainty about the estimate (GAO, 2007). Our analysis— though preliminary on this point—suggests that
15–26 percent is a more credible range of the share of drug export revenues attributable to marijuna.
• California accounts for about one-seventh of U.S. marijuana consumption, and domestic production is already stronger in
California than elsewhere in the United States. Hence, if Prop 19 only affects revenues from supplying marijuana to California, DTO
drug export revenue losses would be very small, on the order of 2–4 percent.
• The only way Prop 19 could importantly cut DTO drug export revenues is if Californiaproduced marijuana is smuggled to other
states at prices that outcompete current Mexican supplies. The extent of such smuggling will depend on a number of factors,
including the actions of the federal government and other states. It is very hard to anticipate how the conflict between state, federal,
and international law engendered by Prop 19 would play out, but it is important to note that hopes for substantially undermining
DTO revenues are contingent on varying scenarios concerning that conflict.
• If marijuana can be diverted from legal production in California to other states and if smuggling it is no harder than it is to do
today within U.S. borders, then California production could undercut sales of Mexican marijuana throughout much of the United
States, cutting DTOs’ marijuana export revenues by more than 65 percent and probably by 85 percent or more. However, there is
significant uncertainty regarding the assupmtions underlying this estimate, including (1) whether taxes are collected on the
marijuana before it is diverted out of California’s legal distribution chain, (2) how intense federal, state, and local enforcement
efforts will be against that diverted marijuana, and (3) how many grams of lower-potency Mexican marijuana consumers will see as
being equivalent to one gram of higher-potency, California- grown sinsemilla (i.e., how closely users view the two forms of the drug
as substitutes).
• It is unclear whether reductions in Mexican DTOs’ revenues from exporting marijuana would
lead to corresponding decreases in violence. Some mechanisms suggest that large reductions in
revenues could increase violence in the short run but decrease it in the long run.
• Drug markets are intrinsically difficult to measure, and estimates will never be precise. However, some of the current uncertainty
stems from parameters that are not hard to study, such as the weight of an average marijuana joint. That the best nationally
representative data on something so simple is almost 20 years old and is calculated indirectly reflects how disconnected datacollection agencies are from the policy process, and vice versa.
With respect to whether marijuana legalization in California could help reduce the violence in
Mexico, our best answer is “not to any appreciable extent unless California exports drive Mexican marijuana
out of the market in other states; if that happens, in the long run, possibly yes, but unlikely much in the short run.” There is no
quick, politically feasible fix to reducing the DTO violence in Mexico. As a number of other researchers
have noted, there are fundamental issues related to the justice system that need to be addressed
before anyone can expect significant improvements in the security situation in Mexico (Cornelius
and Shirk, 2007; Schaefer, Bahney, and Riley, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2009; Ingram and Shirk, 2010).
No Mexican state failure
Couch 12—Brigadier, British Army
(Neil, “‘Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’. Reality or Exaggeration?”, Royal College of Defence Studies Seaford House Paper,
2012, dml)
A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of
authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico
disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the
world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK,
Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was
the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony
between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18
A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug
cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not
as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research
and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely
mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed
states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’,
but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use
either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors.
This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime
and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and
extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob
that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled
out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were
killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers,
bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22
Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran
their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither
state failure.
the violence nor the corruption led to
No impact to oil shocks and they won’t happen---newest data obliterates their
offense
KAHN 11 Jeremy Kahn, writer for Newsweek, IHT, and NYT, previous editor of the New
Republic, Masters in IR from LSE and B.S. in History from Penn, "Crude reality" 2/13
www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full
Will a Middle Eastern oil disruption crush the economy? New research suggests the
answer is no -- and that a major tenet of American foreign policy may be
fundamentally wrong.
For more than a month, the world has been riveted by scenes of protest in the Middle East , with demonstrators flooding
streets from Tunisia to Egypt and beyond. As the unrest has spread, people in the West have also been keeping a
wary eye on something closer to home: the gyrating stock market and the rising price of
gas. Fear that the upheaval will start to affect major oil producers like Saudi Arabia has led
speculators to bid up oil prices — and led some economic analysts to predict that higher energy costs could
derail America’s nascent economic recovery.
The idea that a sudden spike in oil prices spells economic doom has influenced America’s
foreign policy since at least 1973, when Arab states, upset with Western support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, drastically cut production and halted
exports to the United States. The result was a sudden quadrupling in crude prices and a deep global recession. Many Americans still have vivid
memories of gas lines stretching for blocks, and of the unemployment, inflation, and
general sense of insecurity and panic that followed. Even harder hit were our allies in
Europe and Japan, as well as many developing nations.
Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the
US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United
States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of
its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term
military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar;
the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain.
But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view
of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the
oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil
market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating
for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US
economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to
changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.
No SCS conflict
Chaibi 13 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of
Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China
Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)
East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South
China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that
regional economies and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number
of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China,
Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam,
and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting spikes in diplomatic tension
and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional
war. Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations
involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance
of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions
appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status
quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of
international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically,
China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to
approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then
in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell
fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines
continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over
the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable
opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the
Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. What then is
the evidence suggesting a
continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen
between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is
one of fundamental interdependence of production, visible in the prevalence of
international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The
burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to
prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China
Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but
would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is
becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for
free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002
Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea
disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area
(ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural
resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between
China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the
deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I.
Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong
interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the
hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common
development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with
a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of
different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries
Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such
interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk
eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea).
The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyberespionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends
to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US
commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that
alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since
RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US
involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in
the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The
relative wealth of economic and
diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions,
disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes
that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that
the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have
demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as
China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently
shown restraint in this regard (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China
were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].
No impact---instability in Latin America won’t escalate
Mauricio Cárdenas 11, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the
Brookings Institution, 3-17, “Think Again Latin America,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=full
"Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's
highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia - and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is
understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is
strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced
in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former
president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather
than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence
could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to
international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of
nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the
whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on
the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in
an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America.
Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos
Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a
large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular
support.
No bioterror
Jefferson, et al, 14 [ Catherine, 21 August 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115, Synthetic biology and biosecurity:
challenging the “myths”, Catherine, Jefferson, imageFilippa Lentzos and imageClaire Marris* Department of Social Science, Health
and Medicine, King’s College London, London, UK, Catherine joined SSHM in January 2013. Before joining the department, she
worked as a senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, where she led a project on Neuroscience, Conflict
and Security. Prior to this she was a research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the
University of Sussex, where she also obtained her DPhil. Catherine’s research interests are focused on the intersection of science and
security policy, with a particular emphasis on chemical and biological security, dual use governance of emerging technologies and
the growth of the amateur biology community. She is currently involved in research on the social dimensions of synthetic biology
within theCentre for Synthetic Biology and Innovation, http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full]
Challenges to Myth 5 There
are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the intention of would-be
terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass casualty weapons
and pursue capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons programs. While
most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale
bioterrorism attack is very real and very present, they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale
bioterrorism attacks to be very small (65). This is backed up by historical evidence.
The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the
past were small-scale, low casualty events aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than
excessive death tolls: (i) the Rajneesh cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters and
make them stay away from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95 attempted use of botulinum toxin and
anthrax by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; (iii) and the “anthrax letters” sent to media outlets and members of US Congress in
2001 resulting in at least 22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67). The second dimension to Myth 5 is the
implicit assumption that producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon of mass
destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes
of scaling up, storage, and developing a suitable dissemination method. These processes present
significant technical and logistical barriers. Drawing from her in-depth study of the
Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains: Scaling up fragile
microorganisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions and susceptible to change — and viruses are more sensitive
than bacteria — has been one of the stiffest challenges for past bioweapons programs to overcome,
even with appropriate expertise at hand. Scaling-up requires a gradual approach, moving from
laboratory sample, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production, and then to even larger-scale production. During each
stage, the production parameters need to be tested and often modified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire
scaling-up process can take several years (68). The dissemination of biological agents also poses difficult
technical challenges. Whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed
through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless the skin has already been broken. Biological
agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection. To expose large numbers of people through the
gastrointestinal tract, possible
means of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet
neither of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban reservoirs are usually
unguarded, but unless terrorists added massive quantities of biological agent, the dilution effect
would be so great that no healthy person drinking the water would receive an infectious dose
(66). Moreover, modern sanitary techniques such as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill
pathogens from natural sources and would probably be equally effective against a deliberately
released agent. Bacterial contamination of the food supply is also unlikely to inflict mass
casualties. Cooking, boiling, pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally sufficient to kill pathogenic
bacteria. The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an
invisible cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by
large numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely
populated urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simultaneously. After an incubation period of a few days,
depending on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed population would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or
fatal illness. Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological
attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to
overcome. To infect through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in size – between 1 and 5 μm in diameter.
Terrorists would therefore have to develop or acquire a sophisticated delivery system capable of
generating an aerosol cloud with the necessary particle size range and a high enough agent concentration to cover a broad
area. Overall, an important trade-off exists between ease of production and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to
produce microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the
ground so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized. In contrast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then
milled into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the drying and milling process is technically difficult. The Aum
Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67, 69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed unknown, but
probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol (most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis from the roof of
the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the eight-story
building, each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were filled
with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed
for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude below
that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol). In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around the Kanagawa
prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to prosecutors’
statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing, amongst other
equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier, DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each having about
a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the Aum was
unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step toward an
effective bioweapon. If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved, the effective delivery of
biological agents in the open air is highly dependent on atmospheric and wind conditions,
creating additional uncertainties. Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the
aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled, rather than being rapidly
dispersed. Moreover, most microorganisms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot
survive more than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time attacks. One major exception is anthrax, which
can be induced to form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of
course, stage a biological attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena.
Such an attack, if it involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people, but even here the technical hurdles would by no
means be trivial. Finally, even if a biological weapon had been disseminated successfully, the
outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed
to the agent, and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical
professionals detected and were able to respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response
with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly
blunt the impact of an attack. Simple, proven ways to curtail epidemics, such as wearing
face masks, hand washing, and avoiding hospitals where transmission rates might soar, can also
prove effective in stemming the spread of a disease. Indeed, this aspect of a bioterrorism attack is often
underplayed in scenarios like Tara O’Toole’s “Dark Winter” and “Atlantic Storm,” where the rates of contagion used are often
significantly higher than those in historical cases of natural outbreaks (71).
2NC—CARTELS
AT: SPILLOVER
Statistics prove spillover thesis is a joke
Del Bosque 8 [Melissa del Bosque is a reporter for The Texas Observer, where a version of
this article originally appeared. She lives in Austin, Hyping the New Media Buzzword: ‘Spillover’
on the Border, https://nacla.org/article/hyping-new-media-buzzword%E2%80%98spillover%E2%80%99-border]
By God, they’re coming to your neighborhood! Looking at another live feed from El Paso, listening
to the breathless reports of violence and “expert” analysis about “spillover,” viewers could only
assume that the city was under imminent assault.¶ The truth differs wildly from the perception. In
2008, according to the FBI, more than 1,600 people were killed by cartel violence in Juárez. El
Paso, a city of 755,000, recorded just 18 murders in the same year. Laredo had 11; Brownsville
and McAllen had three and nine, respectively. By comparison, Washington, D.C., with a population
smaller than El Paso’s, had 186 homicides in 2008.¶ Certainly, El Paso’s symbiotic relationship with Ciudad
Juárez across the border has been disrupted by the explosion of drug violence south of the border, which began to
escalate in January 2008. But it’s not the kind of disruption brought to you by CNN, Fox, The
New York Times, and the rest of the media pack.
Even massive Mexican instability doesn’t get close to state collapse or affecting the
U.S.
Jenkins, 2009 (Brian Michael, Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation, 3/23/9, “Mexico: Failing State?,”
http://security.nationaljournal.com/2009/03/mexico-failing-state.php)
A recent Pentagon study concluded that Mexico, like Pakistan, could suffer a “wholesale collapse of civil
government,” which would cause a major national security problem for the United States. The report
understandably has attracted attention here and has caused alarm in Mexico, where any U.S. concerns about border security
summon bitter memories. In 1848, half of what was then Mexico was lost to the United States as the result of a war, which both sides
eagerly sought. And during the Mexican Revolution, the last time the United States deployed large numbers of troops on the border,
General Pershing invaded Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, bringing the two countries to the brink of war. Nothing on the
political horizon even vaguely indicates that Mexico is on the brink of collapse. Mexico is a vigorous if
tumultuous democracy. Unlike Pakistan, there are no significant insurgent challenges, and no history of
coups since the Mexican Revolution nearly a century ago. Until the current global financial crisis, Mexico’s economic situation has
much improved. Instead, the threat comes from the proliferation of criminal gangs profiting from the traffic in
illegal drugs headed for the United States. Law enforcement efforts are hampered by corruption that extends high into Mexico’s
political apparatus. Local police in the border towns simply have been out-gunned. President Calderon has ordered the army to
restore order, and it has had a measure of success in killing or capturing some of the most notorious gang leaders. But Mexico’s
gangs have not been reluctant to fight back, taking on the state through assassination of high-ranking officials and local terror
campaigns. The violence could escalate . Mexico’s gangs could turn to large-scale terrorist bombings,
as the narco traffickers did in Colombia, as a warning to authorities to back off. They could also create and finance local terrorist
groups to distract authorities. And they can finance public protests and, as we have seen in Colombia, back political candidates to
oppose the government’s crackdown and protect their interests. While collapse is highly unlikely, the near- and long-term trends are
worrisome. With 85 percent of its exports going to the United States, Mexico is being hit hard by the sharp decline in the U.S.
economy. Remittances from Mexican workers in the United States—Mexico’ second largest source of foreign exchange—are also
down. Mexico wisely hedged its 2009 oil revenues, but unless oil prices again rapidly ascend, the country’s oil revenues will fall in
2010. The deteriorating security situation also directly impacts the economy. Growing violence discourages foreign investment and
tourism, thereby increasing unemployment. Meanwhile, domestic drug consumption continues to increase. The Mexican Army may
retake the border towns, but that will not alter the fundamental equation. The continuing demand in the United States for illegal
drugs enriches and empowers the criminal cartels that provide them. The United States has also become the principal source of
weapons for Mexico’s gangs. As a consequences of drugs going north, and billions of dollars and thousands of guns going south, the
growing wealth and firepower of Mexico’s crime lords raises a long-term threat to the security of both countries. The
deterioration of northern Mexico from crime-ridden to crime-ruled is likely to be gradual and
insidious. Nominal state authority would still exist . Police would continue to deal with petty crime. Commerce
would continue . Superficially, northern Mexico might appear normal—a failed state does not necessarily have to look like
Somalia. But no-go areas and untouchable crime bosses protected by heavily armed private armies would point to the real locus of
power. Although this situation would hardly be good news, the United States could
the violence were to spread across the border into the United States.
live with it . Concerns would increase if
STUFF
If I had a 10 minute CX this would be a 1 minute 2nc because there’s a wreck of
conceptual flaws with this advantage
--oil shocks, no ev says instability collapses production, most cartel involvement is about
siphoning which requires the maintenance of some production so they have the ability to steal
--Moran is describing CIA paranoia, he doesn’t actually think shutdown will happen, but he does
think production is screwed for other reasons
Moran, 09
[Michael Moran, Policy Analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-31-2009, “Six Crises, 2009: A Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics
Could Upset Global Recovery” http://afghanistanwar.edublogs.org/2009/07/31/rge-six-crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopoliticscould-upset-global-recovery/]
Risk 2: Mexico Drug Violence: At Stake: Oil prices, refugee flows, NAFTA, U.S. economic stability A story receiving
more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across the northern states of Mexico,
where Felipe Calderon has deployed the national army to combat two thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national
police beyond redemption. The tales of carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad
Juarez alone, a city located directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond
has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign that the army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing
question: What
if Calderon loses? The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold War (outside of an
the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The
template then was communism, but narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better. The prospect of a
wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the
northern border so far seems remote. But Mexico’s army has its own problems with corruption,
and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin 2006 electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. With
Mexico’s economy reeling and the traditional safety valve of illegal immigration to America
dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists. Meanwhile, Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia
and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not do without. Should things
come unglued there and Pemex production shut down even temporarily, the shock on oil
markets could be profound, again, sending its waves throughout the global economy. Longterm, PEMEX production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak
and restrictions on foreign investment. Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will
cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment
administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was
and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.
--Colgan is about aggression from petrostates, doing things like antagonizing neighbors and
financing Hezbollah, doesn’t mention the US
No oil wars
Jaffe 8 [ Amy Myers Jaffe is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at the James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, “ Opportunity, not War,” Survival | vol.
50 no. 4 | August–September 2008 | pp. 61–82 ]
We’ve heard the argument before: scarcity of future oil supplies is a danger to the global international system and will create international conflict,
death and destruction. In 1982, noted historian and oil-policy guru Daniel Yergin wrote that the energy question was ‘a question about the future of
Western society’, noting that ‘stagnation and unemployment and depression tested democratic systems in the years between World War I and World
War II’ and asserting that if there wasn’t sufficient oil to drive economic growth, the ‘possibilities are unpleasant to contemplate’.1 His words proved
typical prose foreboding the top of a commodity cycle. A year later, oil prices began a four-year collapse to $12 a barrel. That oil is a cyclical industry is
not in question. Since
1861, oil markets have experienced more than eight boom-and-bust cycles. In 1939,
the US Department of the Interior announced that only 13 years of oil reserves remained in the United States. In more recent history, Middle
East wars or revolutions produced oil price booms in 1956, 1973, 1979, 1990 and 2003. Each time,
analysts rushed to warn of doomsday scenarios but markets responded and oil use was
curtailed both by market forces and government intervention rather than by war and massive
global instability. The question Nader Elhefnawy raises in ‘The Impending Oil Shock’ is whether this time will be different.
Specifically no China oil scenario
Victor 7 – professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy
and Sustainable Development. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
where he directed a task force on energy security (David, “What Resource Wars?”, The National
Interest, 11/12, http://nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)
Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good
material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world. To be sure, resource
money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually
lie elsewhere. Fixing them requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how
resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise,
the weak link isn’t a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.
Feeding the Dragon
RESOURCE WARS are largely back in vogue within the U.S. threat industry because of China’s spectacular rise. Brazil, India, Malaysia and many
others that used to sit on the periphery of the world economy are also arcing upward. This growth is fueling a surge in world demand for raw materials.
Inevitably, these countries have looked overseas for what they need, which has animated fears of a coming clash with China and other growing powers
over access to natural resources.
Within the next three years, China will be the world’s largest consumer of energy. Yet, it’s not just oil wells that are working harder to fuel China, so too
are chainsaws. Chinese net imports of timber nearly doubled from 2000 to 2005. The country also uses about one-third of the world’s steel (around
360 million tons), or three times its 2000 consumption. Even in coal resources, in which China is famously well-endowed, China became a net importer
in 2007. Across the board, the combination of low efficiency, rapid growth and an emphasis on heavy industry—typical in the early stages of industrial
growth—have combined to make the country a voracious consumer and polluter of natural resources. America, England and nearly every other
industrialized country went through a similar pattern, though with a human population that was much smaller than today’s resource-hungry
developing world.
Among the needed resources, oil has been most visible. Indeed, Chinese state-owned oil companies are dotting Africa, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf
with projects aimed to export oil back home. The overseas arm of India’s state oil company has followed a similar strategy—unable to compete head-tohead with the major Western companies, it focuses instead on areas where human-rights abuses and bad governance keep the major oil companies at
bay and where India’s foreign policy can open doors. To a lesser extent, Malaysia engages in the same behavior. The American threat industry rarely
sounds the alarm over Indian and Malaysian efforts, though, in part because those firms have less capital to splash around and mainly because their
stories just don’t compare with fear of the rising dragon.
These efforts to lock up resources by going out fit well with the standard narrative for resource wars—a zero-sum struggle for vital supplies. But will a
struggle over resources actually lead to war and conflict?
To be sure, the struggle over resources has yielded a wide array of commercial conflicts as companies duel for contracts and ownership. State-owned
China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) failed bid to acquire U.S.-based Unocal—and with it Unocal’s valuable oil and gas supplies in
Asia—is a recent example. But that is hardly unique to resources—similar conflicts with tinges of national security arise in the control over ports,
aircraft engines, databases laden with private information and a growing array of advanced technologies for which civilian and military functions are
hard to distinguish. These disputes win and lose some friendships and contracts, but they do not unleash violence.
Most importantly, China’s
going-out strategy is unlikely to spur resource wars because it simply does
not work, a lesson the Chinese are learning. Oil is a fungible commodity, and when it is sourced
far from China it is better to sell (and buy) the oil on the world market. The best estimates suggest that only
about one-tenth of the oil produced overseas by Chinese investments (so-called “equity oil”) actually makes it back to the country. So, thus far, the
largest beneficiaries of China’s strategy are the rest of the world’s oil consumers—first and foremost the
United States—who gain because China subsidizes production.
Until recently, the strategy of going out for oil looked like a good bet for China’s interests. But, despite threat-industry fear-mongering, we need not
worry that it will continue over the long term because Chinese
enterprises are already poised to follow a new
strategy that is less likely to engender conflict. The past strategy rested on a trifecta of passing fads. One fad was the special
access that Chinese state enterprises had to cheap capital from the government and by retaining their earnings. The ability to direct that spigot to
political projects is diminishing as China engages in reforms that expose state enterprises to the real cost of capital and as the Chinese state and its
enterprises look for better commercial returns on the money they invest. Second, nearly all the equity-oil investments overseas have occurred since the
late 1990s, as prices have been rising. Each has looked much smarter than the last because of the surging value of oil in the ground. But that trend is
slowing in many places because the cost of discovering and developing oil resources is rising.
And the third passing fad in China’s going-out strategy is the fiction that China can cut special deals—such as by channeling development assistance to
pliable host governments—to confer a durable advantage for Chinese companies. While there is no question that the special deals are rampant—by
some measures, most of China’s foreign assistance is actually tied to natural-resources projects—the Chinese government and its overseas enterprises
are learning that it is best to avoid these places for the long haul. Among the special havens where Chinese companies toil are Sudan, Nigeria, Chad,
Iran and Zimbabwe—all countries where even Chinese firms find it hard to assure adequate stability to reliably extract natural resources.
As China grapples with these hard truths about going out, the strategy will come unstuck. It won’t happen overnight, but evidence in this direction is
encouraging. China already pursues the opposite strategy—seeking reliable hosts, multiple commercial partners and market-oriented contracts—when
it secures natural resources that require technical sophistication. China’s first supplies of imported natural gas, which started last year at a liquefied
natural gas terminal in Shenzhen, came from blue-chip investments in Australia, governed by contracts and investments with major Western
companies. With time, China will shift to such arrangements and away from the armpits of governance. At best, badly governed countries are mediocre
hosts for projects that export bulk commodities, such as iron ore and raw crude oil. These projects, however, are least likely to engender zero-sum
conflicts over resources because it is particularly difficult to corner the market for widely traded commodities, as China has learned with its equity-oil
projects. Resources
that require technical sophistication to develop tend to favor integration and
stability, rather than a zero-sum struggle.
Their impact to oil shocks is about desperation—not gonna happen
Morrissette and Borer 4 – Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of
International Affairs at Marshall University Douglas, Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Virginia Tech (Jason, “Where Oil and Water Do Mix: Environmental Scarcity and Future
Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa”)
Indeed, reductions in agricultural and economic production can produce objective socio-economic hardship; however,
deprivation does not necessarily produce grievances against the gov- ernment that result in serious domestic
unrest or rebellion. One can look at the relative stability in famine-stricken North Korea
as a poignant example of a polity whose citizens have suffered widespread physical
deprivation under policies of the existing regime, but who are unwilling or unable to risk
their lives to challenge the state. This phenomenon is partly explained by conflict theorists who argue that
individuals and groups have feelings of “relative deprivation” when they perceive a gap between what they believe they
deserve and what in reality they actually have achieved.14 In other words, can a government meet the expecta-
tions of the masses enough to avoid conflict? For example, in North Korea— a regime that
tightly controls the information that its people receive—many people understand that
they are suffering, but they may not know precisely how much they are suffering relative
to others, such as their brethren in the South. The North Korean government
indoctrinates its people to expect little other than hardship, which in turn it blames on
outside enemies of the state. Thus, the people of North Korea have very low expectations,
which their gov- ernment has been able to meet. More important, then, is the question of
whom do the people perceive as being responsible for their plight? If the answer is the people’s
own government—whether as a result of supply-induced, demand- induced, or structural resource scarcity—then social
discord and rebellion are more likely to result in intrastate conflict, as citizens challenge the ruling le- gitimacy of the state
itself. If the answer is someone else’s government, then interstate conflict may result. On numerous occasions, history
has shown that governments whose people are suffering can remain in power for long
periods of time by pointing to external sources for the people’s hardship.15
The China impact is about OTHER disputes like China-Japan territorial issues—no
ev they solve that flashpoint.
No impact to oil shocks and they won’t happen---newest data obliterates their
offense
Kahn 11 Jeremy Kahn, writer for Newsweek, IHT, and NYT, previous editor of the New
Republic, Masters in IR from LSE and B.S. in History from Penn, "Crude reality" 2/13
www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full
Other oil shocks are an alt cause—Saudi instability, Iran conflict, etc.
US oil boom provides cushion they don’t assume – Moran is too old
LATIN AMERICA
No conflict in Latin America
Miami Herald ‘13
(“UN, Latin American leaders stress regional cooperation for global peace” August 6)
UNITED NATIONS Hoping to improve peace and security around the world, Argentine President Cristina Fernández led a day-long
Security Council meeting Tuesday where she and other leaders said regions in turmoil could learn from how Latin
American and the Caribbean have settled internal conflicts.¶ “The lessons that we have learned, in terms of our
regional and sub-regional organizations, (suggest) collaborating with the Security Council, with the United Nations, is a very useful
way of finding solutions,” said Fernández, citing a number of resolved conflicts in South America, including
the trade dispute between neighbors Colombia and Venezuela.¶ Fernandez chaired the meeting as the
representative of Argentina, which has taken over the rotating chairmanship of the Security Council for August.¶ Representatives
from regional organizations — the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR), the Mercosur trading bloc, and the Organization of American States — boasted of benefits to working within the
U.N. system.¶ “South America is a region in which we can say there is no risk of interstate conflicts
involving threats to peace and security and extreme violence,” said Eda Rivas, Peru’s foreign minister.
“However, UNASUR member states recognize that peace and security must be preserved permanently
and all South Americans are convinced that the best way to do this is to strive for an integration
based on respect for the fundamental principles of international law.Ӧ U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon praised CELAC and UNASUR and said he was pleased with last month’s U.N.-Caribbean Community meeting, which included
discussions of how to tackle transnational organized crime and security.¶ But the U.N. chief stressed how cooperation with regional
organizations could improve, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, where conflicts in Syria and Sudan continue to strain U.N.
peacekeeping and mediation efforts.¶ “There is always room for improvement,” Ban said. “We are better at sharing information and
analysis on brewing crises, but we have to work harder on swift response and long-term prevention” of regional conflict.¶ Several
Latin American ministers pointed to participation in the U.N. stabilization mission in Haiti as an examples of their commitment to
cooperation.¶ Haitian Foreign Minister Pierre Richard Casimir lauded the U.N. peacekeeping activities in his country.¶ “Haiti will
continue to work with all those who believe the involvement of regional organizations are essential to continuing to grow the future,”
Casimir said. “I trust this debate will give us food for thought in the U.N. and in regional organizations.”¶ U.S. Ambassador
Samantha Power, who attended her first Security Council meeting since her confirmation last week, said the Obama
administration was pleased with the coalition in Haiti.¶ “The United States applauds states around the
region, including
the essential support they give to Haiti through contributing troops to
MINUSTAH, providing development assistance and helping build Haitian capacity,” she said.
many represented in this room, for
TERRORISM D
Al Qaida’s dying and affiliates are too weak to target America
Fishman and Mudd 12 (Brian; Counterterrorism Research Fellow – New America
Foundation and Fellow and Former Director of Research – West Point’s Combating Terrorism
Center and Phil; Senior Global Advisor – Oxford Analytica and Former Deputy Director of the
CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and Former Deputy Director of the FBI’s National Security
Branch, Foreign Policy, “Al Qaeda on the Ropes,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/23/al_qaeda_on_the_ropes?page=full)
On Feb. 10, 2012, the emir of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, officially accepted Somalia's al-Shabab movement's pledge of allegiance. In a video statement, Zawahiri crowed that
such displays indicate that "the jihadi movement is growing with God's help." This may have been true just before and after the 9/11 attacks, when "homegrown" jihadi
today, al Qaeda's core organization in Pakistan is
battered, the effort to spur homegrown jihadists in the West has faltered, and its regional affiliates
are more often losing ground than gaining it. Public displays of unity don't change the reality
that -- more than a decade after their greatest triumph -- al Qaeda's central leadership and its
affiliates are generally in decline. After 9/11, al Qaeda's model seemed destined to spread. The plan was
extremists in Western countries and regional affiliates valued the al Qaeda brand. But
to support and inspire affiliate organizations, from the Philippines through Indonesia and into South Asia, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Africa. The central leadership would
organize major attacks and develop propaganda while al Qaeda's web of regional partners traded their local reach for the use of a global brand that helped attract recruits,
financial donors, and attention. Affiliates from Indonesia to Iraq seemed to gain ground, spreading al Qaeda's ideology to reject Western cultural and political influence among
local governments and conducting major attacks that showed their relevance. At least five close allies or co-branded al Qaeda affiliates conducted a major operation during the
mid-2000s: Jemaah Islamiyah in Bali and Jakarta, al Qaeda's followers in Riyadh in 2003 and afterward, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other foreign fighters in Iraq, and groups
in Algeria and Yemen against targets from oil facilities to U.N. offices. And new battlegrounds showed promise: Al-Shabab surged into Mogadishu, and the Pakistani Taliban
threatened Pakistan's government. Al Qaeda's expansion was particularly worrisome in regions where extremists could play on deep Islamist roots within the population.
Indonesia, with a long history of Islamist politics, harbored the best-organized group beyond core al Qaeda. The string of attacks in Saudi Arabia looked like it might represent
growing extremism among the conservative population of the Arabian Peninsula. Jihadists gathered in Iraq, which they considered this generation's Afghanistan, igniting
Yet a decade later, the strategy is faltering in almost
every arena. Some affiliates remain focused on local agendas; others have been crippled by their
own mistakes and operational successes against them. Two legs of al Qaeda's three-legged stool,
the core group in Pakistan-Afghanistan and the affiliates, are weak. The third leg, so-called
homegrown jihadists, has not shown the capability to pose more than a modest threat. Al
Qaeda's allies are lethal and broadly dispersed, but they show little sign of producing the global
revolution they espouse. So what happened? Al Qaeda was partially a victim of its own violent success.
Political overreach and excessive violence undercut its claim to be a protector of Islam in the
face of Western imperialism. Those failures have proved debilitating during the Arab Spring,
where al Qaeda has been a sideshow to tech-savvy young people and more mainstream Islamist
groups. Al Qaeda's schizophrenic reaction to the revolt in Libya -- backing the popular movement against Muammar al-Qaddafi but warning against the Western support
sectarian tensions and briefly threatening to dominate swaths of western Iraq.
for the uprising that helped the opposition succeed -- is symptomatic of a leadership that wants to stay relevant but has little street appeal. Al Qaeda's contortions reflect its
desire to remain relevant in a dynamic news cycle by embracing wide-ranging affiliates, an approach that carries risk because many potential affiliates have little operational
Another problem for al Qaeda is that its brand is now closely identified with controversial
suicide attacks that kill Muslims. Al Qaeda's senior leaders are aware of that danger. Just after 9/11, al Qaeda's leadership hesitated to embrace North
capability.
African militants, even as those fighters talked openly of their transition from a local revolutionary group to one with al Qaeda-like goals. The leaders remembered the backlash
against violent and doctrinaire jihadi movements, especially the murder of tens of thousands of Muslims in Algeria during the 1990s. Zawahiri saw firsthand the unintended
consequences of excessive violence undermining jihadi movements in Egypt in the 1990s, and he tried to steer al Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate away from publicly reveling in its violence
Counterterrorism successes have played a role as well in weakening al Qaeda. The
decapitation of leadership across al Qaeda affiliates has limited these groups' ability to plot
major attacks and has undermined the resonance of al Qaeda's message when prominent
communicators are either captured or killed. Such activities have spurred popular backlash in some arenas, but they have no doubt had a
against Iraqis.
major impact on the al Qaeda organization itself. Sometimes killing leadership has redirected the strategic focus of affiliates. From Marwan in the southern Philippines through
elimination of
leadership figures has moved the focus of jihadi affiliates toward local concerns rather than the United
States. As a result, some affiliates have abandoned the al Qaeda moniker, both to avoid attention from the
United States and due to the weakening of the al Qaeda brand. Al Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate abandoned
the label in 2006 and now operates as the Islamic State of Iraq. And the Yemeni Ansar al-Sharia, which has seized swaths of
territory near the southern port of Aden, seems to have a relationship with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but has avoided taking the al Qaeda name. Jihadi
groups with the most expansive local agenda seem to avoid the al Qaeda brand. ¶ Another problem is that al
Qaeda's affiliates tend to "think global" when they are losing the ability to "act local." There is dissonance between al Qaeda's effort to
build a global brand and its ability to project power in regional settings. Al-Shabab is a good example. Pushed out of Mogadishu and
battered by the international community and tribal forces in Somalia, the group is less capable
Hambali, Dulmatin, and Abu Bakar Bashir in Indonesia, to Zarqawi in Iraq, Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin in Saudi Arabia, and Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, the
of projecting power in Somalia today than it was three years ago. Even reports of the group's recruitment of Westerners
over the past half-decade, many of which came from the Somali-American community around Minneapolis, have declined amid a renewed push against extremism.
Al-Shabab's decision to swear allegiance to al Qaeda comes at a moment of weakness, not strength. ¶ One measure of al Qaeda's decreased brand is the attention it gets in
showing
international media. After 9/11, the international community pilloried Al Jazeera, the pan-Arab satellite channel, for
al Qaeda propaganda videos at length.
Today, though such propaganda is available online, the reach of such material is an order of magnitude smaller. Al Jazeera is no longer seen as too close to jihadists, but rather
as a critical media outlet that has contributed some of the most daring and powerful coverage of the Arab uprisings. The impact is that voices like Zawahiri's are largely unheard
successes come not just from Western powers but from political leaders
across the globe who confronted al Qaeda, even when doing so required serious political
courage. Operations in the southern Philippines, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria have
limited the affiliates' ability to build the sort of networks Jemaah Islamiyah used to devastating effect a decade ago.
Consistent U.S. intelligence and military assistance to these countries has been vital, from
sharing technical information that helped local units track terrorists to military backing for
strikes in isolated areas, such as the Philippines' archipelago.
outside already friendly circles. ¶ These