(Matthew, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis”, http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/publications/presidential-fellows-program/18/289-a-dialogueon-presidential-challenges-and-leadership-papers-of-the-2007-2008-center-fellows)
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gatherin g. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence , domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence . The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning
United States persons
(Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept.
(Gregory, “Reforming The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Interpretive Secrecy Problem”, 11-13, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524067)
Section 702 authorizes the targeting of persons, and persons are defined in FISA. Persons are not only individuals, but also groups, entities, associations, corporations, or foreign powers.27 As the PCLOB noted, the “definition of ‘person’ is therefore broad, but not limitless: a foreign government or international terrorist group could qualify as a ‘person’, but an entire foreign country cannot be a ‘person’ targeted under Section 702.”28 Surveillance under section 702 may not intentionally target U.S. persons .29 To ensure that only the appropriate people are being targeted by the NSA, the agency uses selectors “such as email addresses and telephone numbers. The NSA must make determinations (regarding location, U.S. person status, and foreign intelligence value) about the users of each selector on an individualized basis. It cannot simply assert that it is targeting a particular terrorist group.”30 Pursuant to the terms of the statute, the non-U.S. persons targeted by the NSA must be “reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
.”31
The statute authorizes the government to compel “electronic communication service provider[s]” to assist the government in targeting non U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
.32 Finally, the statute makes clear that the purpose for which non-U.S. persons are to be targeted is “to acquire foreign intelligence information.”
33 Further, the government cannot use “what is generally referred to as ‘reverse targeting,’ which would occur if the government were to intentionally target persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States ‘if the purpose of the acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States.’”34

(Nathan, “NSA SURVEILLANCE: ISSUES OF SECURITY, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY: ARTICLE:
Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy”, I/S: A Journal of Law and
Policy for the Information Society, Summer, lexis)
The second program--known as PRISM or section 702--uses court orders issued under section 702 of FISA n18 to collect the content of certain international communications
.
In particular, the NSA targets specific non-
Americans who are reasonably believed to be located outside the country
, and also engages in bulk collection of some foreign-to-foreign communications
that happen to be passing through telecommunications infrastructure in the United States. n19 The FISA
[*527] court does not approve individual surveillance applications each time the NSA wishes to intercept these communications; instead, it issues once-a-year blanket authorizations. n20 As detailed below, in 2011 the FISA court struck down the program on constitutional and statutory grounds after the government disclosed that it was inadvertently intercepting a significant number of communications involving Americans; n21 the court later upheld the program when the NSA devised a technical solution t hat prevented such over-collection. n22
(Trevor, “"The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power”, 11-20, http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=columbia_pllt)
In 1978, Congress responded by passing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
194 As the Senate Judiciary
Committee explained in a statement outlining the need for the legislation, “This legislation is in large measure a response to the revelations that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security has been seriously abused.”195 Congress sought to “‘curb the practice by which the Executive Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral determination that national security justifies it,’ while [still] permitting the legitimate use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information.”196 FISA is sometimes viewed as a response to the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Keith that Congress adopt special standards for surveillance in national security cases.197
Yet, while Keith and FISA are certainly connected in important respects,198 FISA does not take up the precise invitation issued in Keith
.
That invitation applied to the category of surveillance addressed in the case—so-called “domestic security” surveillance for intelligence purposes
.199
FISA does not cover such surveillance.
In fact, “[n]o congressional action has ever been taken regarding the use of electronic surveillance in the domestic security area.”
200 For cases falling in that area, therefore, Keith’s direct application of the
Fourth Amendment continues to govern.

(Trevor, “"The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power”, 11-20, http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=columbia_pllt)
Although he did not develop the point at length, Judge Keith also drew a distinction between surveillance targeting purely domestic entities and surveillance targeting foreign powers: An idea which seems to permeate much of the
Government’s argument is that a dissident domestic organization is akin to an unfriendly foreign power and must be dealt with in the same fashion
. There is great danger in an argument of this nature for it strikes at the very constitutional privileges and immunities that are inherent in United States citizenship. It is to be remembered that in our democracy all men are to receive equal justice regardless of their political beliefs or persuasions. The executive branch of our government cannot be given the power or the opportunity to investigate and prosecute criminal violations under two different standards simply because certain accused persons espouse views which are inconsistent with our present form of government.67
Judge Keith’s distinction between domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering can be read in at least two different ways. One way is to stress the passage referring to the constitutional rights that come with being a citizen of the United States. Yet citizenship itself generally does not mark the boundary of the Fourth Amendment’s protections
; noncitizens prosecuted in
U.S. courts enjoy the Amendment’s protections just as citizens do. Another (perhaps more descriptively accurate and normatively attractive) reading would treat the distinction as having to do with whether the government’s actions have any proximate connection to the domestic criminal justice system, without regard to the citizenship of those involved
.
On this reading, the point is that the Fourth Amendment must apply fully to “dissident domestic organization[s]” precisely because such organizations are subject to the domestic criminal justice system. “[F
]oreign power[s],” on the other hand, are not likely to face prosecution in the U.S. courts. More generally, the domestic sovereign’s relationship to them is qualitatively different than it is to domestic individuals and organizations. Thus, it makes sense from this perspective to distinguish between domestic and foreign targets of the government’s surveillance efforts.
(Trevor, “"The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power”, 11-20, http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=columbia_pllt)
Second, adopting the same basic distinction observed by Judge Keith and the Sixth Circuit, the Court stressed that the instant case “involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents .”174 The
Court dropped a footnote at that point, citing two lower court cases, as well as the ABA Committee whose standards Powell had earlier worked on, as examples of authorities embracing “the view that warrantless surveillance, though impermissible in domestic security cases
, may be constitutional where foreign powers are involved.”175
An earlier draft of the opinion contained a more detailed list of authorities on that point, suggesting more strongly that foreign surveillance cases would come out the other way.176
The modification of the footnote suggests that at least some on the Court truly did not want to suggest anything one way or the other about cases involving foreign targets. The Court’s embrace of the domestic/foreign distinction arguably marks another important difference between it and Powell’s earlier statements
. The precise distinction that Powell had once derided as “largely meaningless” emerged by the end of Keith as potentially decisive for Fourth Amendment purposes.
How should we read this shift? One possibility is simply that Powell changed his mind. After immersing himself in the Keith materials, he may have become convinced that a distinction he earlier deemed empty can sometimes have coherent meaning.

(Milad, “Global Economy Remains Weak; Another Recession Coming?”, 5-19, http://www.profitconfidential.com/economic-analysis/global-economy-verge-another-recession/)
It has been six years since the global economy and U.S. entered the worst recession since the Great Depression.
While many are championing the economic recovery, on closer inspection, it looks like history might repeat itself sooner rather than later.
U.S. Economy Grows at Slowest Pace Since WWII
The rate of growth in the U.S has been dismal since the
2008
housing bubble and financial crisis topped the country into the worst financial disaster since the Great Depression. For example, before the Great Recession, the biggest economy in the world reported annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3.8% in 2004, 3.3% in 2005, and 2.7% in 2006. Then the ripples of the
Great Recession began to make themselves felt. In 2007, the U.S. reported a GDP of 1.8%, followed by -0.3% in 2008 and -2.8% in 2009. (Source: Worldbank.org, last accessed May 14, 2015.)
Between the devastating recovery years of 2009 and 2012, the cumulative rate of GDP growth was nearly nine percent below the average growth rate for previous recoveries.
(Source: Congressional Budget Office, last accessed,
May 14, 2015.) The so-called recovery has been pretty uneventful. In 2013, the U.S. reported annual GDP growth of 2.2%; last year it was just 2.3%. In the first quarter of 2015, GDP came in at a dismal 0.2%.
As it stands, weak recovery, massive budget deficits, and high debt level could push the fragile U.S. economy into another recession
. China Economy Slowing Down
China, the world’s second-largest economy, is also losing steam.
Since 2010, the country’s GDP has been steadily declining from 10.6% to 7.4%
in 2014.
Not surprisingly, China’s money supply grew and investment growth sank to the slowest pace in over 15 years. (Source: Reuters, May 13, 2015.) The future remains bleak. For 2015, China’s economy is forecast to climb at around seven percent; its slowest pace in 25 years and well below historical averages.
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has lowered its benchmark interest rate for the third time in six months. By lowering interest rates, the central bank is hoping to make borrowing cheaper and stimulate economic growth. Greek Debt Crisis Can Drive Eurozone Back into
Recession
After six years, Greece emerged from a recession in 2014. But that was short-lived; falling business confidence, national debt, and deflation have driven Greece back into a recession. To make matters worse,
Greece’s government has not been able to cut a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ease its debt crisis . Greece’s finance minister insisted on Thursday that he will reject any deal from international bailout creditors that does not help the country exit its economic crisis. (Source: abcnews.com May 14, 2015.)
All told, I think that the signs of deteriorating economic conditions are set to emerge in late 2015 or early 2016. With this, don’t expect stock markets to perform the way they have been for some time.

(Frank, “‘Like an ocean liner without lifeboats’: HSBC’s dire warning for global economy”, 5-27, http://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/like-an-ocean-liner-without-lifeboats-hsbcs-dire-warning-for-globaleconomy/story-e6frflo9-1227371228341)
THE world economy is in serious danger of falling into another recession — and if it does, governments have few tools left at their disposal to combat it. That’s the dire warning from HSBC chief economist Stephen King, who describes the situation as like being on an “ocean liner without lifeboats”. With interest rates at near zero across the developed world, record levels of public debt and little room for further stimulus spending, the conventional “monetary ammunition” that has been built up following previous recessions is all but non-existent. “In effect, the world economy is sailing across the ocean without any lifeboats to use in case of emergency,” he writes in a new report, ‘The world economy’s titanic problem’. That’s bad news. As the UK’s Telegraph points out, the United Nations has cut its global growth forecast for this year to 2.8 per cent — only slightly above the 2.5 per cent which used to be regarded as a recession.
The biggest danger comes from China. If the
Chinese economy weakens so much that the authorities have no other choice than to let the renminbi slide, it will have severe knock-on effect. “[In this situation, collapsing] commodity prices lead to severe weakness elsewhere in the emerging world ,” Mr King writes
. “The dollar surges, but the Fed is unable to respond via interest rate cuts. The US is eventually dragged into a recession through forces beyond its control.”
And the situation in China is already worse than authorities are letting on, experts have warned.
China accounted for 85 per cent of global growth in 2012, 54 per cent in 2013, and 30 per cent in 2014 — that figure is expected to fall to 24 per cent this year. “If there is only one statistic that you need to know in the world right now, this is it,”
RBS economist Andrew Roberts told The Telegraph. In every recession since the 1970s, the US Federal
Reserve has cut interest rates by a minimum of 5 percentage points. “That kind of traditional stimulus is now completely ruled out,” HSBC’s Mr King writes. “Meanwhile, budget deficits are still uncomfortably large and debt levels uncomfortably high.” While in the past, deep recessions have typically been followed by strong recoveries, this time around, “a deep recession has been followed by an insipid recovery: more L-shaped than Vshaped”. “Today, inflation isn’t just low. It is, arguably, too low,” he warns. When debt levels are low, interest rates are high and budget deficits are small, dealing with recessions is relatively easy , he says. “ When debt levels are high, interest rates are at zero and budget deficits are large, dealing with recessions is a lot more troublesome.”
Attempts in various global economies to “rebuild their ammunition” over the past six years have failed. The European Central Bank had “egg on its face” after trying to raise interest rates in 2011, only to be forced to drop them again.
The danger for policymakers is firstly, that it’s hard to know in advance what the next financial crisis will look like; and secondly, that regardless where it comes from, none of the tools that have helped governments pull themselves out are available this time.
(Jonathan, “Emerging markets: The great unravelling”, 4-1, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ddd8caf0-d86a-11e4ba53-00144feab7de.html#axzz3bMQVLmBe)
Faced with recession, decade- high inflation, a fiscal crisis and water rationing, more than 1m Brazilians took to the streets last month to protest against corruption and mismanagement in their government. In China, growth is slowing as property prices fall, propelling more than 1,000 iron ore mines toward financial collapse. The patriotic citizens of
Russia, meanwhile, are deserting their nation’s banks, switching savings into US dollars. Such snapshots of growing distress in the world’s largest emerging markets are echoed among many of their smaller counterparts
.
Several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are beset by dwindling revenues and rising debts. Even the turbo-powered petroeconomies of the Gulf, hit by a halving in the price of oil over the past six months to $55 a barrel, are moving into a slower lane.
Though these expressions of distress derive from disparate sources, one big and insidious trend is working to forge a common destiny for almost all emerging markets .
The gush of global capital that flowed into their economies in the six years since the 2008-09 financial crisis is in most countries now either slowing to a trickle or reversing course to find a safer home back in developed economies.
Highest outflows since 2009 On an aggregate basis, the 15 largest emerging economies experienced their biggest absolute capital outflow since the crisis in the second half of last year, as a strong US dollar drove emerging market currencies into a swoon and investors grew nervous over the prospect of a tightening in US monetary policy, according to data compiled by ING. At the same time, low commodity prices slammed GDP growth rates across the developing world.
These trends, analysts say, signal a “great unravelling” of an emerging markets debt binge that has swollen to unprecedented dimensions. Importantly, the pain inflicted by this capital flight is being felt beyond financial markets in the real economies of vulnerable countries and in a surging number of emerging market corporations that are forecast to default on their debts. “Certain parts of the world are looking really vulnerable,” says Maarten-Jan Bakkum, senior emerging market strategist at ING Investment Management. “Places like Brazil, Russia, Colombia and Malaysia, that rely heavily on commodity exports, are going to get hit even harder, while those countries that have borrowed most excessively like Thailand, China and Turkey also look risky.” Analysts say that while

emerging markets have been the setting for several recent financial squalls, the current exodus of capital could herald more fundamental changes. Indeed, although the
“taper tantrum” of mid-2013 — triggered by the US Federal Reserve signalling its intention to unwind its monetary stimulus — caused turmoil in financial markets, its impact on real emerging market economies was transitory. This time around, though, things look more serious. The International Monetary Fund said this week that total foreign currency reserves held by emerging markets in 2014 — a key indicator of capital flows — suffered their first annual decline since records began in
1995.
Without steady capital inflows, emerging market countries have less money to pay their debts, finance their deficits and spend on infrastructure and corporate expansion. Real economic growth is set to suffer this year
, analysts say. Capital Economics expects GDP growth in emerging markets to fall to 4 per cent from 4.5 per cent in 2014, as Russia slips deeper into recession,
Brazil continues to struggle and China is hampered by its ailing property market.
Underlying such sober projections is a sense that an inflection point has been reached with the end of the commodity “supercycle” and the advent of low oil prices.
“What is going on is a great unravelling of the market conditions of the past 15 years,” says Paul Hodges of
International eChem, a chemicals and commodities consultancy.

(Daniel, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, World Poltiics, 66.1,
January, proquest)
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

(Samuel, “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”, November, http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4)
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict.
Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine
.
Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility.
Moreover, other
timevarying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes
(Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011).
Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously
. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—
Ultimately
, however, the fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets
, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed
. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous.
If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock.
The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability.
Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis
(2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these.
Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks
. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20
Fravel, MIT political science professor, 2010
(M Taylor, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict”, Security Studies, project muse)
The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. Strong empirical support for diversion would identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict.
The cases investigated
in this article, however, raise doubts about the strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary mechanisms
, such as Mansfield and Snyder’s theory about democratization and war.126
In Argentina and Turkey
, the hypothesis fails to pass two

most likely tests
.
In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for
the use of force
as proponents of diversionary theory must demonstrate. Instead, external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain
Argentine and Turkish decision making.
The historical record , including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger ev idence for a standard realist model
and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain.
My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey complements those quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.
127 In addition, the modified most likely research design used in this article raises questions about those quantitative studies that do provide empirical support for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force.
The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion
.
Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target
because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent.
At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets , as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home
.
Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected
.130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home
. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action
, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion . Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home. Other studies
, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated détente among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China’s concessions in
its many territorial disputes , support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the A ssociation of
S outheast
A sian
S tates and the G ulf
C ooperation C ouncil.
131
(Robert, “Forces in Our Times”, Survival, 25.4, December, ebsco)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties
, which could
itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence
has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed
– states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars.
Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others
. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable
.

(Tom, “US technology deal insights Analysis and trends in US technology 2015”, February, http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-us-technology-deal-insights-2014.pdf)
Out with a bang! Simply put, 2014 was a banner year for the technology sect or
. Alongside broader economic growth in the US, technology set records not seen since the dot com er a. Deals remained active throughout the year, peaking in the fourth quarter as many corporate and financial investors closed large, transformative deals
. In the end, technology deal activity closed out 2014 36% higher, amidst IT spending growth of less than 2%. Equity markets and IPO pricings similarly soared to new highs, and deal makers have not signaled any intent to slow down
. Domestically, continued recovery in the US has been strong and the US trade deficit declined to the lowest level in decades, even in light of a strengthening dollar. The housing market continued to improve, with new housing starts at the highest level since
2007. Consumer confidence increased further and interest rates remain near record lows, each contributing to that overall growth. While the Fed is expected to increase rates in September, the US was the only major economy to receive an increase in its 2015 GDP growth forecasts by the IMF’s most recent estimates. In labor markets, unemployment fell to a post-recession low of 5.6% and wage rates are anticipated to increase in the new year; however the labor participation rate hit a 30year low of 62.7%, signaling an increase in long-term unemployment. On the political front, the US continues to make headlines. The nation’s debt ceiling issue remains unresolved, and with a newly elected GOP-run Congress, the battles over immigration reform and healthcare are escalating. Abroad, Europe was the focus of cross-border technology acquisitions; however, growth estimates in the Eurozone have continually been cut throughout the year, with the IMF now projecting 1.2%
GDP growth in 2015. The outlook for the UK is generally favorable, though challenged by the uncertainty within the Eurozone, for which the saga of Greece’s membership in the EU continues. Russia, on the other hand, is anticipated to enter a recession more severe than that of 2008, as ongoing conflict in Ukraine, dropping oil prices, and a steep decline in the ruble lead the nation toward an economic crisis. In China, economic growth slowed to the weakest level since the Tiananmen
Square sanctions of 1990, at 7.4%, and is projected to decline further below 7% in 2015, as the nation trends to a more “normal” pace of growth amid broader restructuring toward a consumption-based economy. The IMF now projects 4.3% 2015 GDP growth in developing countries, challenged by weak external demand; however, growth is expected to quickly follow recovery in the world’s developed nations. US equity markets continued to set record highs, with the Dow Jones,
NASDAQ, and S&P 500 rising 7.5%, 13.4%, and 11.4%, respectively, during 2014. While there was some volatility that caused immediate pull-back by lenders for a few weeks in the fourth quarter, technology M&A and IPO pricings generally mirrored the activity and valuation of the broader markets
. Leading technology companies continue to remain some of the most valuable in the world, with Apple, Google, and Microsoft each holding three of the top five spots by market cap. These and other technology high-flyers have helped to maintain impressive average EBITDA multiples, with the top 25 US technology companies touting approximately 11x in
20
14
. IPO activity in 2014 continued to increase to the next level, becoming the most active year since 2000
. In total, there were 60 technology IPOs, an increase over the 51 posted in 2013, which was already the most active year since the last recession. Technology IPOs continued to remain a key driver in the market, representing roughly 40% of IPO value and 20% of IPO volume (20% of value excluding the $21.8 billion Alibaba IPO). Proceeds from new pricings neared $35 billion, and year-to-date performance returns approximated 22%, both factors that continue to reaffirm the long-term outlook for the industry as a whole.
IT spending in 2014 posted a growth rate just under 2%, lower than prior estimates given exchange rate movements, while projections anticipate an increase to approximately 2.4% growth in 2015.
Cloud offerings, mobile devices, and enterprise software have remained the focal points for IT investment over the past few years, and 2015 is expected to continue along a similar path. E nterprise software is anticipated to remain the area of highest growth potential, though challenged by increasing price pressure and competition as cloud and traditional providers battle for customers. Mobile devices are expected to remain a key growth area and focal point of IT to enable their organizations, while some expect that PCs may make a comeback.
In an already active deal market throughout 2014, technology M&A certainly flexed its muscle to round out the year and raise expectations for what may come. As we consider the almost $350 billion in cash and securities on hand at the top 25 technology companies, record levels of private equity dry powder waiting to be deployed, and see indications of full pipelines from every angle of the market, 2015 promises to be another exciting year in technology M&A.

(Andrew, “The Global Tech Market Outlook For 2015 To 2016”, 3-31, http://www.supplychain247.com/paper/the_global_tech_market_outlook_for_2015_to_2016)
As CIOs prepare and manage their 2015 tech budgets, they can confidently push for increases of 4% to 6% in their purchases of tech goods and services, depending on their country.
Tech spending in the US, China, India, the UK, and the Nordics will be at the high end of this range; in the rest of Europe and Latin America, growth will be at the low end.
Demand will be strongest for software - especially for analytics and cloud apps - and related services but weaker in hardware and outsourcing, creating savings opportunities.
New project spending will be strong, much of it for technologies that support the business technology agenda for winning, serving, and retaining customers. Key Takeaways
The Global Tech Market Will Grow By 5.3% In 2015 In Local Currencies, 5.9% In
2016
Improving economies in the US and elsewhere will help offset weakness in Japan, Europe, and oil-exporting countries, leading to moderate but improving global tech market growth. A strong US dollar in 2015 will hold dollar-denominated growth to 4.1%, with 6.3% for 2016 as the dollar weakens.
The US Will
Be The Major Driver Of Global Tech Market Growth The US tech market continues to be the locomotive that pulls the rest of the tech train. The US is not only the largest and most advanced tech market in terms of adopting new technology; it will also have the fifth-fastest growth of 6.3% in 2015.
New Project Spending Will Grow,
Driven By The Business Technology Agenda
After two years in which uncertain economic outlooks have held back new project spending, this part of the tech budget will grow more rapidly than overall tech spending in 2015 and 2016. The key driver of faster project growth will be the business technology agenda for winning, serving, and retaining customers.
(“2015 BDO Technology Outlook”, March, https://www.bdo.com/insights/industries/tech-life-sciences/2015-bdotechnology-outlook)
Tech CFOs Remain Upbeat About Industry’s Future Last year, the technology industry experienced a robust deal environment and a high volume of investments flowing into companies.
According to the 2015 BDO Technology Outlook Survey of
100 chief financial officers at U.S. technology companies, this ongoing positive environment has caused CFOs to remain optimistic about the year ahead.
While the outlook is robust, finance chiefs remain cognizant of the factors that could inhibit business growth for 2015, such as data security challenges, accounting changes and tax concerns.
Finance Chiefs Confident About Revenue Growth On the heels of an exceptional year for the technology sector, a majority of CFOs (70 percent) anticipate increased sales revenue in
2015, up from 67 percent last year. Overall, finance chiefs project a revenue increase of more than 12 percent, following forecasts of an 11 percent increase in 2014 and an 8.7 percent increase in 2013, pointing to continued optimism in the industry.
With Renaissance Capital reporting that tech IPO issuance rose 22 percent over last year to 55 deals—the highest level since
2007—CFOs are optimistic about IPO activity heading into 2015. A large majority of respondents (86 percent) say IPO activity will remain the same or increase in
2015. This sentiment is also reflected in the January 2015 BDO IPO Outlook Survey, with 73 percent of capital market executives at leading investment banks predicting an increase in technology offerings.
What’s more, venture capital-backed investments soared in 2014. According to
Dow Jones VentureSource, investment returns from VC funds are on the rise as 105 VC-backed companies went public in 2014—the highest number since 2000. Thirty-nine percent of CFOs expect VC-backed companies will give rise to the most tech IPOs this year, followed by private equity (36 percent) and owner/manager or privately held businesses (25 percent; up from 18 percent in 2014).
Despite recent headlines around the uncertainty of another impending tech bubble, only five percent of CFOs believe the concerns about a tech bubble will have the greatest impact on the U.S. IPO market. Meanwhile, more than one-third believe the performance of recent tech IPOs will have the largest influence on the market, followed by U.S. market volatility (25 percent), global political and economic issues
(23 percent) and appeal of IPOs in foreign markets (11 percent). Recent Cyberattacks Fuel Data Security Fears An annual report by the Ponemon Institute, which conducts independent research on privacy, data protection and information security policy, found that 43 percent of companies have experienced a data breach in the past year—up 10 percent from the year before. With the number of cyberattacks increasing, more tech executives are concerned about their own IT infrastructures and response plans. According to our survey, 67 percent have increased their spending on cybersecurity measures during the past year. Of those who have taken action, 90 percent implemented new software security tools, 72 percent created a formal response plan for security breaches, 48 percent turned to an external security consultant and 30 percent hired a chief security officer. While many cyberattacks come from domestic and foreign entities, online security challenges could also stem from geopolitical issues. In fact, 14 percent of CFOs believe global political issues will be the leading barrier to industry growth in 2015. Recent threats have even captured the attention of the White House with President Obama proposing a budget that would increase cybersecurity spending to $14 billion. Along the same lines, finance chiefs are also anxious about their intellectual property (IP) protection, with 47 percent saying foreign IP infringements has had the greatest impact on their IP security, followed by changes in patent law (24 percent) and patent trolls (20 percent). Last year saw a significant uptick in M&A transactions, and according to CB
Insights, technology M&A deals and IPOs combined rose 58 percent in 2014. Following this momentum, nearly all CFOs (96 percent) believe M&A activity will increase or stay the same this year, on pace with last year’s forecast, and 66 percent expect that acquisitions will be primarily offensive. Close to two-thirds of CFOs
(61 percent) believe the software sector, including cloud computing, will drive the most M&A activity in 2015, on trend with last year when 60 percent expressed a similar sentiment. In fact, International Data Group predicts that cloud computing initiatives will be the most important project for the majority of IT departments in
2015 and 42 percent of enterprises plan to increase their cloud computing spending this year. In addition, Forrester reports that Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) sales

have been increasing at over 20 percent per year. As discussed in the Winter 2014 BDO TECH Software Newsletter, SaaS models are becoming more and more relevant as the business environment changes and the tech industry evolves. Traditionally, organizations purchased enterprise software, but on-premise solutions are becoming overpowered by SaaS, especially with the increasing use of mobile devices and related applications. “The software industry is quickly shifting from the traditional licensing model to cloud-based offerings, such as Software-as-a-Service, to meet the overwhelming need for real-time responses and easy integration,” said
Hank Galligan, leader of the Software Practice at BDO. “As the business environment evolves, companies are acknowledging the pressure to upgrade or introduce cloud computing services either through acquisitions or on their own.” When looking at key drivers of acquisitions in today’s tech market, one-third of CFOs believe increased revenue and profitability will be the primary impetus for M&A activity in 2015, followed by improved market share (25 percent), gaining engineering and research capabilities (14 percent) and enhancing technology assets and intellectual property (13 percent), which dropped from 28 percent in 2014. “
Although the tech industry is cautious of overvaluation, finance chiefs are confident that deal activity will continue its momentum well into 2015. As consumers continue to demand innovative products and investments keep pouring into the sector, technology companies may be better positioned for business growth through strategic partnerships to expand their capabilities and offerings as well as to compete effectively and gain market share.” said Aftab Jamil, partner and leader of the Technology and Life Sciences Practice at BDO USA, LLP. Surprisingly, CFOs are unfazed by overvaluation concerns in the industry, with 62 percent predicting that business valuations will increase this year, a
35 percent jump from 2014.

(Aaron, “Speak No Evil”, 5-28, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/28/speak_no_evil_obama_drone_speech)
I'll take the word of those who argue that drones are the poster child for the anger Arabs and Muslims feel toward America. I can see why.
But the grievances toward the United States in this region run deep, and the source of that anger is not only drones. Don't forget: The
Middle East was exasperated with Washington long before droning, and it remains eager to blame America for just about everything.
The list of the Arab world's grievances go on and on:
America is blamed for supporting the authoritarian Arab kings, blindly backing Israel, not talking to Hamas, not intervening militarily in Syria, intervening militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, according to Egyptian liberals, for supporting Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
.
And that's even before we discuss the small but determined minority of Muslims who do, in fact, hate us because of who we are
-- not just because of what we do.
No nuanced modulation of our approach on drone strikes or the closure of Gitmo is going to change any of that.

(Marc, “U.S. soft power takes a hit in wake of report”, 12-16, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/12/16/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-soft-power-takes-a-hit-inwake-of-report/#.VWYkjs9VhBd)
It’s hard to imagine any nation other than the United States persuading so many allies and dependents to take part in a program they must have known would one day blow up in their faces. In that sense, the Senate report isn’t only a revelation of U.S. intelligence malfeasance — it’s a testimony to U.S. soft power, the diplomatic advantage that it has long wielded over geo-political competitors such as Russia and
China. One need only compare Washington’s success at finding international hosts for the CIA’s so-called black sites with Russia’s utter inability to persuade the world — aside from a small handful of countries including Cuba, Venezuela and Syria — to recognize its annexation of Crimea.
But it’s an open question whether soft power can survive being used to such grotesque ends
.
One of the many reasons for which the torture program was a terrible idea was that once exposed it has deeply damaged the U.S. brand and thus eroded U.S. alliances:
Forced rectal feeding just isn’t something that most people associate with the values of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. As many have pointed out, one great benefit of the Senate report is that it has demonstrated the ability of the U.S. political system to subject itself to scrutiny — a test that most democracies, and all autocratic regimes, routinely fail. Taken as a whole, people aren’t naïve. They understand governments do bad things and pursue their own selfish interests abroad. So when a country confesses and tries to rectify the transgression, people are impressed. If the U.S. goes on to prosecute those who approved and used the most extreme torture methods, that would do still more to repair the damage.
But it’s worth remarking that torture is not the only national security policy that poses a threat to U.S. alliances
. Friendly governments are still being asked to trust in the good judgment and good offices of the U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as in their effective oversight, even when there’s reason to question whether that trust is being honored.
One such policy is U.S. President Barack Obama’s expansive use of drone strikes against suspected terrorists
. The tacit rationale for this policy is that the targeted individuals are conducting activities so heinous that all nations should accept the right of the U.S. to kill these criminals without due process, wherever they may be, based on U.S. intelligence assessments. As with the arguments in support of torture, however, this justification quickly falls apart.
Even Americans don’t believe in it: Look at the controversy that arose when Anwar al-Awlaki, a terrorist suspect who happened to be a U.S. citizen, was targeted and killed in a drone strike. If many Americans thought al-Awaliki deserved due process, on what basis should a Yemeni, German or Pakistani national suspected of the same heinous crimes not deserve it, too?
Not surprisingly, the U.S. has very little backing worldwide for drone strikes. In July’s edition of the Pew Global Attitudes Research Project, there was net support for the policy in only four of 44 countries: Israel, Kenya, Nigeria and the U.S. Majorities opposed the strikes even in staunch U.S. allies such as
Japan (82 percent), the United Kingdom (59 percent) and Poland (54 percent).
(Kristin, “Soft Power Outage”, 12-23, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/soft-power-outage/)
To understand the immediate damage done to U.S. influence, look no further than the commentary surrounding the report’s release. According to the Washington Post, the state-run Chinese news service Xinhua editorialized that
“America is neither a suitable role model nor a qualified judge on human rights issues in other countries,” while a pro-government television commentator in Egypt observed, “The United States cannot demand human rights reports from other countries since this [document] proves they know nothing about human rights.”
The Islamic State and other extremists joined the propaganda gold rush. One tweet, quoted in a report from the SITE Intelligence Group, pointed to the audacity of the United States lecturing
Muslims about brutality, adding, “Getting beheaded is 100 times more humane, more dignified than what these filthy scumbags do to Muslims.” Such reactions are galling and they do real harm to U.S. credibility.
But the fault lies not with those who released the report, as some critics argue, but with those who permitted and perpetrated acts of torture, those who lied about it to America’s elected representatives, and those who willfully kept the president and senior members of the Bush administration in the dark.
Their actions undermined not only American values, but also
American influence and national security interests. In the words of a former prisoner of war, Sen. John McCain (R-
Ariz.), the actions laid out in the Senate report “stained our national honor” and “did much harm and little practical good.”

(Benjamin, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable”, Orbis, 56.2, Science Direct)
Standard arguments for maintaining the alliances come in two contradictory strains. One, drawn mostly from the run-up to World War II, says that without
American protection, the ally would succumb to a rival power , either by force or threat of force, heightening the rival’s capability and danger to the United States. The other argument says that without the United States, the ally would enter a spiral of hostility with a neighbor, creating instability or war that disrupts commerce and costs America more than the protection that prevented it. The main problem with the first argument is that no hegemon today threatens to unify Europe or Asia
.
Europe is troubled by debt, not conquest
. Russian GDP is today roughly equivalent to that of Spain and Portugal combined. Whatever Russia’s hopes, it has no ability to resurrect its Soviet Empire, beyond perhaps those nations in its near abroad that Americans have no good reason to defend. Even today, the military capabilities of Europe’s leading powers are sufficient to defend its eastern flank, and they could increase their martial exertions should a bigger threat arise. Asia is tougher case. South Korea’s military superiority over its northern neighbor is sufficient to deter it from an attempt at forcible reunification. By heightening North Korea’s security, nuclear weapons may reinforce its capacity for trouble-making, but they do not aid offensive forays. U.S. forces long ago became unnecessary to maintaining the peninsula’s territorial status quo.
Chinese efforts to engage in old-fashioned conquest are unlikely, at least beyond Taiwan. Its more probable objective is a kind of Asian Monroe doctrine, meant to exclude the United States.6
China naturally prefers not to leave its maritime security at the whim of U.S. policymakers and, thus, has sought to improve its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In the longer term, China’s leaders will likely pursue the ability to secure its trade routes by building up longerrange naval forces. They may also try to leverage military power to extract various concessions from nearby states. Washington’s defense analysts typically take those observations as sufficient to establish the necessity that U.S. forces remain in Asia to balance Chinese military power. But to justify
a U.S. military presence
there, one
also needs to show
both that
Asian nations cannot
or will not balance Chinese power
themselves and that their failure to do so would greatly harm U.S. security . Neither is likely
.
Geography and economics suggest that
the states of the region will successfully balance Chinese power — even if
we assume that
China’s
economic growth allows it to continue to increase military spending
.7
Bodies of water are natural defenses
against offensive military operations. They allow weaker states to achieve security at relatively low cost by investing in naval forces and coastal defenses. That defensive advantage makes balances of power more stable. Not only are several of China’s Asian rivals islands, but those states have the wealth to make Chinese landings on their coast prohibitively expensive . India’s mountainous northern border creates similar dynamics. The prospects of Asian states successfully deterring future Chinese aggression will get even better if, as seems likely, threats of aggression provoke more formal security alliances
. Some of that is already occurring. Note for example, the recent joint statement issued by the Philippines and Japan marking a new
‘‘strategic partnership’’ and expressing ‘‘common strategic interests’’ such as ‘‘ensuring the safety of sea lines of communication.
’’8 This sort of multilateral cooperation would likely deepen with a more distant U.S. role
. Alliances containing disproportionately large states historically produce free-riding; weaker alliance partners lose incentive to shore up their own defenses.9 Even if one assumes that other states in the region would fail to balance China, it is unclear exactly how U.S. citizens would suffer. China’s territorial ambitions might grow but are unlikely to span the Pacific. Nor would absorbing a few small export-oriented states slacken China’s hunger for the dollars of American consumers. The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and global commerce is only slightly more credible.
One problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create moral hazard—emboldening weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings with neighbors
.
Alliances can then discourage accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States into wars facilitated by its benevolence.
Another point against this argument is that even if regional balancing did lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance said to prevent it
.
Neutrality historically pays
.10 The larger problem with the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they prevent is that wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms competition provokes
. Namely, there is usually a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict.
Historical examples of arms races alone causing wars are few
.
11 This confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War I —seeing it as a consequence of mutual fear alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states.
12
Balances of power
, as noted, are especially liable to be stable when water separates would-be combatants
, as in modern Asia.
Japan would likely increase defense spending if U.S. forces left it, and that would likely displease China. But that tension is very unlikely to provoke a regional conflagration. A nd even that remote scenario is far more likely than the Rube Goldberg scenario needed to argue that peace in Europe requires
U.S. forces stationed there.
It is not clear that European states would even increase military spending should U.S. troops depart. If they did do so, one struggles to imagine a chain of misperceived hostility sufficient to resurrect the bad old days of European history.

(Quddus, “The Bipolarity of a Unipolar World: Why Secondary Powers will Stand By America”, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/workshop/papers/the_bipolarity_of_a_unipolar_system.pdf)
The stability inherent in the relationship is threatened when one party fails to live up to its end of the bargain. If the US is in decline, it is likely to scale back its international commitments. It will be less willing to underwrite the security of the many secondary powers that rely on it
. A declining US may be unable and unwilling to perform hegemonic functions to the extent that it was before. It is here that secondary powers face a choice: do I stay or do I go?
Because of their flawed theoretical machinery, balance of power realists believe that secondary powers will turn on a declining US and try to oppose and weaken it
.
But this logic fails to account for the extent to which secondary powers do not fear the US, depend on it, and value the underlying bargain.
Unlike the Soviet Union, the US will not suddenly implode. If there is a relative decline, it is likely to be slow. Though perhaps to a lesser extent, the US will still remain engaged. It will not suddenly withdraw into pre-World War II style isolation.
Under these circumstances, secondary powers are likely to adopt a strategy of accommodation . Robert Kelly describes this as a kind of “bail in” behavior where secondary powers come to the aid of a struggling hegemon that they see as legitimate.52 The US will remain far stronger, at least militarily if not also economically, than most of the secondary powers for a long time to come.
While it might not be able to do as much as it used to, the US will still be able to accomplish more than most. In effect, secondary powers are likely to reason that a weakened hegemon is still much better than no hegemon.
The hegemonic bargain will not be abolished. It will be adjusted in two important ways.
Secondary powers will do more in areas where their vital interests are at st ake. This can be seen in the way France and Britain took the lead in the Libyan intervention. Or, in the way Turkey is taking charge in responding to the Syria crisis. The US will play a very large supporting role. As every NATO operation in the post-Cold War era has demonstrated, secondary powers must ultimately increase their own power capability. This is not to balance the US, but to make up the difference. Compensating for America’s lesser role, firstly, requires that secondary powers spend more on defense. The necessity of doing so will become increasingly evident as various crises threaten the interests of secondary powers and the US shows ever less enthusiasm for cleaning up the mess alone.
Second, the difference can be made up through cooperation
.
Secondary powers are likely to move ever closer to a declining US.
Deeper forms of policy coordination and the combining of capability can go a long way toward remedying individual power deficits —the animating idea behind NATO’s new concept of “smart defense.” Predicting NATO’s demise is a perennial realist pastime. As before, their predictions will be proven wrong again. Not only will NATO persist, but as the US declines it will become more important. Interestingly, just as the American decline debate was heating up,
France rejoined NATO’s allied command in 2009. President Sarkozy explained that his country’s “strategy cannot remain stuck in the past when the conditions of our security have changed radically.”53 Sarkozy’s critics grumbled that France was cozying up to the US just as the world was moving out from underneath American domination. New life will be breathed into America’s alliances in the Asia Pacific region as well, as seen for example in the way Japan has recently been moving closer to the US. The US will find that secondary powers are willing to accommodate and compromise in ways that were perhaps unlikely under unipolarity.
The main concern will not be the unilateral exercise of American power. Rather, secondary powers will worry about
America’s level of commitment to them moving forward. America will no longer be able to stack the deck in some of the ways it has before. But happily, the US will find that it holds a number of high cards in negotiating the terms of cooperation with eager secondary powers
because this time the US can credibly threaten to stand by and watch.
All of this suggests that as the global field is leveled, secondary powers will not turn to balancing, but rather, they will adopt a strategy of bonding
. From time to time, weaker states have bandwagoned with more powerful or threatening states, either to appease or gain from the spoils of a hegemon’s aggression.54 In this case, the US will grow less powerful and less threatening over time, suggesting altogether different motives. Bonding involves both policy accommodation and efforts to ‘move closer’ through deeper cooperative ties. The primary concern of secondary powers will be to keep the US engaged.
After World War II, the European allies were mainly concerned about US abandonment. As Ikenberry explains, “The evolution in American policy…was a story of American reluctance and European persistence.”55 In an era of relative decline, American disengagement may again emerge as the principal problem facing many of the world’s seconda0ry powers. This fear will move them to work ever harder to secure America’s commitment and support.
(Joseph, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”, Foreign Affairs, November/December, ebsco)
A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence
. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries.
This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses
--the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position
. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United

States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive
.
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S.
allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified
Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors
. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention.
Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize.
The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch.
That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall.
Nor is there good evidence that reducing Washington's overseas commitments would lead friends and rivals to question its credibility. Despite some glum prophecies, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from western Europe after the Cold
War neither doomed NATO nor discredited the United States. Similar reductions in U.S. military forces and the forces' repositioning in South Korea have improved the sometimes tense relationship
between Washington and Seoul.
Calls for
Japan to assume a greater defense burden have likewise resulted in deeper integration of U.S. and Japanese force s.
Faith in forward defenses is a holdover from the Cold War, rooted in visions of implacable adversaries and falling dominoes. It is ill suited to contemporary world politics, where balancing coalitions are notably absent and ideological disputes remarkably mild
.
(John, “The Liberal International Order and its Discontents”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, May,
Sage)
Secondly, this order is also distinctive in its integrative and expansive character. In essence, it is ‘easy to join and hard to overturn’
. This follows most fundamentally from the fact that it is a liberal international order – in effect, it is an order that is relatively open and loosely rulebased.
The order generates participants and stakeholders. Beyond this, there are three reasons why the architectural features of this post-war liberal order reinforce downward and outward integration
.
One is that the multilateral character of the rules and institutions create opportunities for access and participation.
Countries that want to join in can do so; Japan found itself integrating through participation in the trade system and alliance partnership. More recently, China has taken steps to join, at least through the world trading system. Joining is not costless. Membership in institutional bodies such as the WTO must be voted upon by existing members and states must meet specific requirements. But these bodies are not exclusive or imperial.
Secondly, the liberal order is organised around shared leadership and not just the United States. Th e G-7/8 is an example of a governance organisation that is based on a collective leadership, and the new G-20 grouping has emerged to provide expanded leadership.
Finally, the order also provides opportunities for a wide array of states to gain access to the ‘spoils of modernity’.
Again, this is not an imperial system in which the riches accrue disproportionately to the centre. States across the system have found ways to integrate into this order and experience economic gains and rapid growth along the way.
Thirdly, rising states do not constitute a bloc that seeks to overturn or reorganise the existing international order. China, India, Russia, Brazil,
South Africa and others all are seeking new roles and more influence within the
global system
. But they do not constitute a new coalition of states seeking global transformation.
All of these states are capitalist and as such are deeply embedded in the world economy. Most of them are democratic and embrace the political principles of the older Western liberal democracies
. At the same time, they all have different geopolitical interests. They are as diverse in their orientations as the rest of the world in regard to energy, religion and ideologies of development. They are not united by a common principled belief in a post-liberal world order.
They are all very much inside the existing order and integrated in various ways into existing governance institutions
.

(Nicholas, “Why projecting soft power is so hard to do”, 6-14, http://russia-direct.org/content/why-projecting-softpower-so-hard-do)
The theory of soft power, as articulated by Joseph Nye, rests on the notion that admirable culture and attractive values can be harnessed to the ends of foreign policy as power. His book "Soft Power" (2004) was subtitled “The Means to Success in World Politics.”
The problem is that the quest for success is not itself value neutral: a nation that is too obvious in the way it uses soft power to advance its own ends can end up repelling rather than attracting. Countries too eager to embrace soft power can come off like the stereotypical Don
Juan, whose powers of attraction eventually taught women to be wary
.
Others, overconfident in their positive qualities, choose the wrong aspect to emphasize and end up the butt of jokes.
In the context of soft power, this mockery is leveled against countries whose public diplomacy degenerates into propaganda. A further problem stems from a divergence in tastes in what is considered attractive
. Soft power – like beauty – is in the eye of the beholder.
The same tactics don’t work in every context
. For example, the soft power of the United States is rooted in an identification of its culture with the sovereignty of the individual; in contrast, Russia presents itself as guardian of the principle of the sovereignty of the nation-state. Both sets of values have their admirers, but seldom in the same location.
Already powerful states attempting to deploy soft power face an additional challenge – public empathy and admiration naturally adheres to those who have suffered
. Global outpourings of support for the Dalai Lama or the United States in the days after 9/11 are examples of this. Nations that hope to trade on their success are often met with increased skepticism or mistrust. What, then, does this mean for countries – the United States and Russia included – that wish to harness soft power in their dealings with the world? First, they must acknowledge that a nation’s soft power is not kept in a vault at the White House or
Kremlin, but lies in the mind of every one of the billions of people around the world who has an opinion about the country. Secondly, they must realize that when attempting to deploy soft power, your opinion isn’t important; your audience’s is. Therefore, those working on soft power campaigns must be able to step outside their own cultural context and look at their country from a foreigner’s perspective. Third, what works for one country isn’t guaranteed to work for another. India is able to leverage soft power in the form of Bollywood movies, which are loved by millions around the world. China has no cultural equivalent; Chinese calligraphy and ceramics will never be sufficiently relevant to a large enough number of people. Efforts focusing on promoting China’s development projects or spectacular scientific discoveries would likely have more success.
And finally, while there are few moral perceptions around the world that are universally accepted, a near ubiquitous mistrust of power exists
.
Promoting a soft power narrative that emphasizes success and dominance in a field or organization might not be
as effective
as one that focuses on a disadvantaged city, region or group – which exist in every country.
In the final analysis, soft power lies in the allure one person feels for another. And this is why the most enduring soft power strategies have been those founded on people-to-people exchanges. Despite all the efforts of a state government to control its image through a soft power campaign, in the end it comes down to winning the hearts and minds of individuals – something that cannot be ordered from the top down.

(Daniel, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?”, July/August, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67869)
What went wrong?
The administration
, and many others, erred in believing
that improved standing would give the U nited
S tates greater policy leverage. The U nited
S tates' standing
among foreign publics and elites did rebound
.
But this shift did not translate into an appreciable increase in
the
U nited
S tates' soft power
.
Bargaining in the G-20 and the UN Security Council
did not get any easier.
Soft power, it turns out
, cannot accomplish much
in the absence of a willingness to use hard power. The other problem was that
China, Russia, and other aspiring great powers did not view themselves as partners of the United States
.
Even allies saw
the
Obama administration
's supposed modesty as a cover for shifting
the burden of providing global public goods
from the United States to the rest of the world
.
The administration's grand strategy was therefore perceived as promoting narrow U.S. interests rather than global public goods.
(Kazuo, “The Limits of Soft Power”, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=3076)
One blind spot in the soft power concept is the confusion over the source of this power.
For Nye and many others, the power of soft power lies in "attraction." The problem with this idea, however, is that it views things from the perspective of the party exercising powe r.
Seen from the viewpoint of the party being influenced by the power, the question of whether accepting the power accords with this party's own interests is likely to be a far more important consideration
than the attraction of the power.
Here we must keep in mind that sovereign nations in the international community act not on the basis of likes and dislikes but in accordance with their own interests . No matter how attractive a given country may be, other countries will not accept its attractive power if it obstructs their freedom of action or
adversely affects their economic interests
. Hollywood movies, for instance, are often cited as a source of American soft power, but in France they have been subject to partial restriction precisely because of their attractiveness.
The justness and legitimacy of the exercise of power is often an issue in relation to the source of soft power. However, legitimacy is bound to be an issue regardless of whether the power is hard or soft
. The fact that hard power is sometimes exercised without legitimacy stems from a peculiar way of thinking about the use of hard power, and this is a great problem. It is important to note that within the international community the exercise of military and nonmilitary power is basically the same - or, rather, it is when the power is military in nature that there is a need for strict legitimacy in its use. (But whereas military power can exert a coercive influence however vague its legitimacy, when the justification for the use of soft power is tenuous this can prompt the party on the receiving end to resist or refuse the power, preventing the party exercising the power from achieving its aims.) The other side of this problem is the need to consider just what the international justification for military action might be. Leaving this issue to one side, though, it is certainly problematic to regard the legitimacy of soft power as the source of its clout.

(Matthew, “Taking Soft Power Seriously”, Comparative Strategy, http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Taking_Soft_Power_Seriously.pdf)
The United States has also sought to apply soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism. Again, despite a concerted effort by the United States, global support for terrorist ideology shows no sign of abating and, according to some measures, may be increasing
.
The inability of the United States to counter ideological support for terrorism can be attributed to an environment hostile to the application of soft power
.
The societies to which the United States has targeted its message lack a functioning marketplace of ideas and the
U.S. message is not credible to the target audience. For these reasons, the application of soft power has been an ineffective tool for countering ideological support for terrorism
, despite the importance of individual attitudes as a driver of terrorist behavior. In the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the United States presented a threepronged strategy for winning the War on Terror.77
The first two elements of
the strategy, attacking terrorist
networks and defending the homelan d, were definitively in the realm of hard power.
The third and, according to many Pentagon officials, the most important element of the strategy, however, was “countering ideological support for terrorism.”78 As part of this soft power strategy, the United States declared its intent to “Support models of moderation in the Muslim world by helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West.”79 Furthermore, the United States vowed to “delegitimate terrorism and extremists by e.g., eliminating state and private support for extremism.”80 The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism continued the theme of ideological combat stating that “from the beginning, [the
War on Terror] has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule.”81
According to the strategy, “winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.”
The United States also singled out state sponsors of terror for its soft power campaign and declared that it desired “to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose.”82 These were serious statements of policy objectives. To isolate state-sponsors of terrorism, President Bush encouraged states to choose a position “either with us or against us in the fight against terror."83 A special task force on “strategic communications” was set up at the Defense Science Board that argued that “the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas.” 84 The
Board concluded that, “policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments.”85 To show the level of commitment the Bush administration made to the task of public diplomacy, President Bush appointed his trusted public relations manager, Karen Hughes, as
Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. 86 Under Hughes’s leadership, the State Department established regional media hubs offering U.S. spokespeople with language capabilities to speak on America’ behalf in media outlets throughout the Middle East.87 The United States Government also increased the budget for the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), the U.S. agency responsible for dispensing foreign aid, by 60%, from 5 billion in 1998 to 8 billion in 2003.88 The United States funded a variety of pro-American media in the Muslim world including H1 magazine, Radio Sawa, and the Al Hurra television station. 89 Furthermore, the United States established reeducation facilities, such as the “House of Wisdom” in Iraq, to teach moderate Muslim theology to detainees captured in the War on Terror.90
Despite this widespread effort to communicate throughout the
Muslim world, the United States, to date, has largely failed in its effort to apply soft power to its advantage in the War on Terror.
The War on Terror will probably be a “generational struggle,” but it is nevertheless troubling that after a sustained multi-year effort to counter ideological support for terrorism, the United States has made real progress on very few of its stated objectives. The United States has, since 9/11, avoided a major terrorist attack, and while the causes of this can be debated, it is not likely the result of a waning of terrorist ideology globally as is evidenced by the string of attacks in other parts of the world. In recent years, terrorists have carried out attacks in: Algeria, Great Britain, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Russia, Spain, and other countries.91 Despite heavy pressure from the United States in the form of hard and soft power, states still support terrorism and Al Qaeda has even reconstituted terrorist training camps in South Asia. 92 Terrorist ideology continues to flourish globally with the help of the Internet.93 The low public opinion of the United States in the Muslim world, often thought to be one of the factors contributing to terrorism against the United States, has not improved in recent years. In fact, a recent study found that people’s “attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy actually worsened slightly since they started listening to Radio Sawa and Al Hurra.”94 Few observers believe that U.S. efforts to combat Al
Qaeda have been effective. In a recent worldwide poll, survey respondents in 22 out of 23 countries reported that the U.S.-led war on terror has not weakened Al Qaeda.95 The U.S. failure to use soft power effectively in the War on Terror is even more pronounced in some of the most important countries. In Egypt and Pakistan, for example, 60% and 41% of the respective publics possess either positive or mixed views of Al Qaeda.96 According to Doug Miller, chairman of the international polling firm Globescan, “The fact that so many people in Egypt and Pakistan have mixed or even positive views of al Qaeda is yet another indicator that the US war on terror is not winning hearts and minds.”97 Why has the United States failed in its effort to use soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism? Part of the reason is that the United States has not been able to compete in a functioning marketplace of ideas in most of the societies where a threat of jihadi terrorism exists. In the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the United States acknowledges that
“terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories
.
The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda .”98 In other words, many countries of the Middle East and the broader Muslim world lack a functioning marketplace of ideas
.
They are disproportionately authoritarian
. 99
These governments often take measures
, generally for the purposes of domestic stability, that have the effect of preventing meaningful competition in their domestic marketplace of ideas.
Foreign media content containing ideas about democracy and freedom are filtered.100
Domestic political opponents are prevented from expressing views that challenge the government
.101 Radical religious groups, extremist parties, and fundamentalist madrassas are supported to shore up the legitimacy of secular regimes.102
Domestic problems are externalized and blamed on an “imperial” United States.
103
The lack of a functioning marketplace of ideas in this region contributes to the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories in the region from private households to the highest levels of government.104 Due in part to these phenomena, public opinion of U.S. foreign policy is lower in the Middle East than in any other world region.
105 The inability of the United States to communicate in this region is aptly described by Norman Patizz, an American media entrepreneur, who notes that “there is a media war going on [in the Muslim world] with incitement, hate broadcasting, disinformation, government censorship, self-censorship, and America is not in the race.”106
Another limiting factor on the United States effort to counter ideological support for terrorism is the logic of persuasion. U.S. efforts to communicate directly with the Muslim world have been thwarted by a lack of credibility. Expert messengers are more persuasive than non-experts, but U.S. government officials are hardly qualified to discuss the intricacies of Muslim theology and the consistency, or lack thereof, of terrorism with the teachings of the Koran. U.S. strategists have recognized this and sought to adjust strategy appropriately, aiming to communicate through surrogates whenever possible.107 Attempts to channel a message through third parties face a number of challenges however. The audiences that the United States targets in the Middle East generally know which media outlets receive U.S. support and, accordingly, discount the messages that they receive from those sources. In a recent study on the effectiveness of U.S. supported media in the Middle East, a Jordanian student wrote that “Radio Sawa serves US interests and helps it spread its control over the world and to serve Zionist interests.”108 A student from
Palestine wrote that the United States “[spreads] lies and fabricates news” through Television Al Hurra.109 According to Al-Ahram Weekly, an Egyptian newspaper, Arab youth listen to Radio
Sawa, but “they take the U.S. sound and discard the U.S. agenda.”110 The United States efforts at persuasion may have also failed because they fail to speak to the intended audience at an emotional level. Shibley Telhami has described Al Hurra as adopting a style of “detached objectivity” to its coverage of highly controversial political issues. Telhami went on to criticize the futility of a mismatched approach that aims “to be precisely dispassionate while facing a passionate audience.”111 As difficult as it may be for the United States to accept , the United
States with all of its hard and soft power is not well-equipped to persuade international audiences about the

legitimacy of terrorism as a tactic
. There are undoubtedly other factors that helped to discredit the U.S. message on issues of terrorism.
The U.S. military intervention in Iraq and the related prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Grhaib, f or example, alienated many in the broader Middle East
.112 But, these factors only further weakened U.S. credibility; the United States was never in a position to be a persuasive messenger on the subject of terrorism in the Muslim worl d. In the War on Terror, however, individual attitudes have had an important, though mixed, effect on international political outcomes. Ideas have a critical (but by no means exclusive) impact on individual decisions to join terrorist organization, but attitudes are less important determinants of the state sponsorship of terrorism.
Exposure to radical ideology is an important component leading an individual to become a terrorist
. While containing an undeniable ideological component, however, many of the factors that convince people to turn to terrorism are material in origin, not ideational, and, thus, cannot be addressed with soft power tool s
. Social science research suggests that many factors may contribute to the production of a terrorist. Few opportunities for political participation, low levels of social integration, personal loss, and foreign occupation are among the variables that have been linked to a higher risk of terrorism . 113 The United States can combat some of these risk factors through the application or withdrawal of hard power, but few of them can be addressed through the application of soft power alone. Despite America’s soft power campaign, the state sponsorship of terrorism also appears to be alive and well and driven by states’ core material interests.
Pakistan continues to walk the fine line of allowing terrorists to operate in the tribal regions while making occasional raids against terrorist hideouts to placate the United States.114 And states that can gain through the active support of terrorism as an extension of their national power, such as Iran and
Syria, continue to do so.115 The United States has been unsuccessful, so far, in its attempt to use soft power to counter global ideological support for terror. This failure is due, at least in part, to the absence of the conditions necessary for an effective soft power strategy.
Attitudes may be influential in determining the strength of the international terrorist movement, but the United States was unable to participate in debates in key regions in which terrorist ideology flourishes and a lack of credibility further hindered
U.S. efforts to change attitudes on important terrorism-related issues.