Lessons from Great East Japan Earthquake:
Fukushima Nuclear Power Crisis
Makoto Saito, Hitotsubashi University
An outline of talk about Fukushima Crisis
What happened?
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A visual approach
A mechanical approach
Several factors responsible for the crisis
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A failure in the on-going crisis management
Very old facilities
Poor regulation
A corporate finance aspect of the crisis
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Restructuring Tokyo Electric Power Company
Some economic issues
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Disposal of nuclear wastes
Generation costs
Insurance for nuclear damage
Some proposals
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What happened?
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Where is Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Plant?
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Neighboring nuclear power plants: Onagawa,
Fukushima No.2, and Tokai No.1
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Six reactors at Fukushima No.1
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Plant formation at Fukushima No.1
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Key events in Fukushima Crisis
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March 11, 2011 — Magnitude 9.0 earthquake (14:46) and
tsunami (15:41) cripple plant, cutting off power to the entire
site. Government declares nuclear emergency, directing
residents in a 3-km radius of the plant to evacuate.
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March 12 — Prime Minister Naoto Kan inspects the plant.
Hydrogen explosion occurs at reactor 1 building. Government
expands evac zone to 10-km radius.
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March 14 — Reactor 3 building suffers hydrogen explosion.
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March 15 — Reactor 4 building hit by hydrogen explosion
from gas from reactor 3.
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Damage by tsunami
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Fukushima No.1 Plant hit by tsunami
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Before and After
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Severely damaged Reactors 1 through 4
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Damaged Reactor 1
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Damaged Reactor 3
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Damaged Reactor 4
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Damaged Reactors 1 through 4
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Some mechanical aspects of
the crisis
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Serious damages on the primary cooling system
: Damages by the earthquake
Reactor Building
R/B
: Damages by the tsunami
Turbine Building
T/B
Possible effects of
the earthquake
Seawater Pump
Building
?
?
Emergency
Generator
External Power
Sources
Sakashita Dam
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Fact 1: The facilities were not back-fitted according
to the new seismic safety standard.
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Fukushima Dai-ichi was designed in the 1960s, and opened in
1971, prior to the introduction of the seismic safety standard
in 1981.
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Those facilities had not been retrofitted according to the most
recent seismic safety standard, which was revised substantially
in 2006.
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TEPCO reported to the regulator that they would be back-fitted by
2016.
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It cost a lot! (80 billion yen for old Fukushima Dai-ichi)
The nearby transformer substation (Shin-Fukushima Hendensho) and
the cables connected from it to Fukushima Dai-ichi were much less
earthquake-proof.
The conduits and pipes from the Sakashita Dam was not so robust as
it should have been.
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Fact 2: The facilities were not robust with respect to
tsunami risks.
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The seawater pumps were not either water-sealed or
protected by solid buildings at all.
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As TEPCO did not modify the facility arrangement
designed originally by GE, all emergency diesel generators
were located at the lower floors of less robust turbine
buildings.
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Fact 3: In principle, a primary cooling system (PCS)
cannot be substituted for by an emergency core cooling
system (ECCS), much less by an inefficient one.
Water Tank
Note: ECCS relies as water
sources first on water tanks, and
later on pools in a suppression
chamber.
①
ECCS
To T/B
From T/B
②
Containment
Vessel
Pressure
Vessel
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Pool in
Suppression
Chamber
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Why did ECCSs not work effectively?
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ECCS of Unit 1 (isolation condenser) was extremely old.
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An isolation condenser was expected to work for only half a day even it
was handled normally.
Even HPCI and RCIC (installed in Units 2 and 3) are expected to work
for a few days under a normal condition.
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Due to a loss of alternating and direct current power sources, HPCI
(most efficient ECCS) did not work effectively.
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Plant operators were not trained well for how to handle ECCSs.
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There were many human errors in operating ECCSs.
What is most important, without any definite prospective that the
primary cooling system would be recovered quickly, TEPCO and
the regulator relied in vain on ECCS, thereby delaying their decision
of ventilation and seawater-injection.
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Fact 4: Ventilation facilities were considered as
unnecessary.
Supposed to
be filtered, but
they did not
install any
filter.
The water may start to boil
due to extremely hot steam.
Then, boiling water disables
ECCS functions and the ability
to condense radioactive vapor.
Dry Well
Vent
Used to be a
rather fragile one
Wet Well
Vent
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Pool in
Suppression
Chamber
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Why did they not exercise effective
ventilation for Units 2 and 3 reactors?
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GE Mark I engineers considered ventilation as unnecessary.
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While hardened ventilation was forced to be installed by the
U.S. regulation after the Chernobyl disaster, they still
considered ventilation as unnecessary.
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They presumed that the water at suppression chamber pools was
good enough to condense steam and deflate the internal pressure.
They did not even install solid (hardened) ventilation in their original
design.
Consequently, they did not attach filters to ventilation.
The easiness of operations was not considered seriously.
Accordingly, they were reluctant to release highly radioactive
vapor without any filtering, while they delayed in ventilation
due to rather complicated operation procedures.
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Fact 5: TEPCO and the government were reluctant to
inject seawater into Units 2 and 3 reactors.
Portable
Pump
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Why did they delay in injecting seawater
into Units 2 and 3 reactors?
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They seemed to have a dim hope that the primary cooling
system would manage to be recovered.
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They relied in vain on ECCS with such a faint hope.
It is said that they feared that seawater injection would
immediately lead to reactor decommissioning.
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They had had their intention to use these reactors for another
20 years.
However, it sounds a bit odd because once a meltdown
proceeds, a reactor has to be decommissioned anyway.
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They might not have understood the consequence of a meltdown, or
informed of its occurrence.
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Consequence: not only meltdowns (the case
of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident)
ECCS
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But also, melt-throughs (serious damages to
pressure vessels)
ECCS
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But also, hydrogen explosion (serious
damages to reactor buildings)
A top lid might have moved up
due to high pressure.
Note: Many researchers failed
to recognize any possibility that
hydrogen explosion happens
outside containment vessels. But,
a few papers pointed out that
the capacity of BWR’s
containment vessel may be too
small to survive extremely high
pressure.
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But also, serious damages to containment
vessels, then, we had had a tragic situation
Leaks
Leaks
Leaks
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Necessary to develop a large-scale mission
to decommission severely damaged reactors:
1. Need to build another container to contain the damaged
containment vessels.
2. Need to cool down the melted nuclear fuels by fresh water for at
least three years.
3. It might take one century to complete the entire process.
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A corporate finance aspect of
the crisis
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The aftermath: A window-dressing
settlement of TEPCO account
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The Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund (NDF)
facilitates TEPCO to finance expenses for nuclear damage
compensation (2.4 trillion yen).
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NDF was founded by a special measures law in August, 2011, and
backed financially by the government.
But, TEPCO’s borrowing from NDF is regarded as not a loan,
but a grant. (What a generosity!)
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2.4 tril. yen grant from NDF was appropriated as extraordinary
income (revenue) in the TEPCO account!
With such a window-dressing treatment, the current net loss
reduces substantially from 3.2 tril. to 0.8 tril. yen, and such a loan
from NDF was off TEPCO B/S.
NDF’s grant to TEPCO is supposed to be repaid jointly by TEPCO
and the other power companies for the next ten years.
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Without such window-dressing, TEPCO is
immediately insolvent.
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Without such window-dressing, TEPCO is immediately
insolvent at a negative capital of -1.6 tril. yen, instead of
a positive capital of 0.8 tril. yen.
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In addition, TEPCO’s B/S has so far appropriated only the
followings:
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The reserves for scrapping damaged reactors: 0.8 tril. yen
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The reserves for damage compensation: 2.1 tril. yen
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It may reach10 tril. yen.
It is likely to double with decontamination, and would triple with
class actions against TEPCO.
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The asset side of Tepco (book value, unit:
trillion yen)
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Total Assets: 15.5
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Water-power plants
Thermal power plants
Nuclear power plants
0.6
0.9
0.7
Power transmission facilities
Power transformer facilities
Power distribution facilities
2.0
0.8
2.1
Long-term investments
Liquid assets
3.7
2.3
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The liability side of TEPCO (book value,
unit: trillion yen)
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Total Liabilities: 15.5
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Corporate bonds
Long-term bonds
3.7
3.3
Capital
Capital without window-dressing
0.8
-1.6
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Some brief comments on
economic aspects of the crisis
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Economics of disposal of nuclear wastes
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Which way is more economical?
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How long will it take to complete disposal?
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Where should we dispose of nuclear waste?
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A basic knowledge about nuclear wastes
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New nuclear fuels (per ton)
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970kg
30kg
Spent nuclear fuels (per ton)
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Uranium 238 (not fissile)
Uranium 235 (fissile)
1. Uranium 238 (not fissile)
2. Uranium 235 (fissile)
3. Plutonium 239 (fissile)
4. Fission products (not fissile)
950kg
10kg
10kg
30kg
A current plan by the Japanese Government:
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Extracting Uranium and Plutonium from spent nuclear fuels,
Using the reprocessed fuels for nuclear power generation again, and
Disposing of fission products, which are extremely radioactive.
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Several fundamental problems
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It costs a lot to reprocess spent nuclear fuels.
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Disposal without reprocessing (called a once-through cycle)
may be much more economical than disposal with reprocessing
(called a fuel recycle).
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It is necessary to store radioactive fission products for a
long time (much longer than a few thousand years!).
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It is hard to find a place to dispose of nuclear wastes
deeply under the ground.
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Power generation costs
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Not including pumped storage costs in nuclear power
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Nuclear power
Thermal power
Water power
8.9 yen/kWh
9.0 yen/kWh
7.5 yen/kWh
Including pumped storage costs in nuclear power
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Nuclear power plus pumped storage
Thermal power
Water power minus pumped storage
10.1 yen/kWh
9.0 yen/kWh
3.6 yen/kWh
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International comparison of mandatory insurance for
nuclear damage
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US: Under Price-Anderson Act,
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Japan:
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requiring EUR 91 million/site insurance security
Switzerland:
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unlimited operator liability and requiring EUR 2.5 billion/site security
France:
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In 2012, required insurance coverage has been lifted from EUR 140 million/site to EUR
1.2 billion/site.
Germany:
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private insurance up to $1.5 billion/site (120 billion yen)
UK:
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the private insurance up to $375 million/site
the industry self-insurance (ex-post financing) up to $11.6 billion/site
the combined insurance capacity up to $12.2 billion/site
planning to increase EUR 600 million/site to EUR 1.1 billion/site
Finland:
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unlimited operator liability and requiring EUR 300 million/site
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Some proposals
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In sum,
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Fukushima Dai-ichi facilities were:

Not back-fitted at all according to the most recent safety standard.

Not so earthquake-proof or tsunami-proof as it was supposed to be.

Neighborhood essential facilities (e.g. transformer substations and pipelines
from the dam) were not so earthquake-proof either.

GE Mark 1 might have had a fundamental design flaw.
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The plant managers and operators were not equipped with a thoughtful severe
accident management at all.
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The location of emergency diesel generators.
The underassessment of the potential role of ventilation in severe accidents.
The capacity of a containment vessel may be too small to survive extremely high
pressure
They relies in vain on ECCS with a dim hope of early recovery of PCS.
They delayed in ventilation and seawater injection.
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Fukushima Dai-ichi and old nuclear plants
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Any nuclear plant which was built prior to the
introduction of seismic standards in 1981 (though it was
mild) is more or less subject to the same problems
Fukushima Dai-ichi had carried.
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Such plants will be 40 years old very soon.
Nevertheless, the regulator was planning to allow the
power companies to extend the operation period of old
nuclear plants from 40 years to 60 years.
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Another ten year extension of Unit 1 of Fukushima Dai-ichi
had been allowed just one month before the earthquake
occurred in March 2011.
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Proposal 1: Rearranging existing nuclear
plants
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Impacts of decommissioning old nuclear plants
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From plants existing in 2010
From plants built in 1970s
From newly planned plants as of 2010
49.1 gWh
13.4 gWh (27.3%)
16.5 gWh
The impacts of decommissioning old plants may not be so
large as it seems, because
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Smaller capacity.
Fully depreciated (for initial 40 years).
Completed reserves for decommissioning (for initial 40 years).
Costly to retrofit old plants to meet new seismic standards.
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Proposal 2: Reorganizing TEPCO
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The current public support for TEPCO is not sustainable at all.
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It assumes that regional monopoly will continue.
It will be given up sooner or later.
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It would be much better to immediately make TEPCO bankrupt.
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After sharing losses among creditors in a reorganization process, the
government would take over the following huge liabilities:
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Unpaid damage compensation, which was determined officially by the Dispute
Reconciliation Committee.
Long-run expenses on scrapping the damaged reactors.
For liquidity reasons, a new-born TEPCO might be forced to sell power
plants or power transmission facilities.
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A spontaneous separation between power producers and power suppliers.
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