Later Wittgenstein and Post-Carnapian Analytical Philosophy
Overall
programme:
Position on
Kant’s
transcendental
a priori
CARNAP
QUINE
SELLARS
LATER WITTGENSTEIN
Positivist logical empiricism:
(‘unity of science’ thesis)
Post-positivist naturalism:
reductive causal/nominalist
‘explaining away’ of normative
Non-reductive naturalism:
compatible with normativism (?)
cf. DD’s anomalous monism
Anti-naturalism:
critique of scientism
Explanatory theory (science)
as paradigm of knowledge
Explanatory theory (science) as
paradigm of knowledge
Explanatory theory (science) as
paradigm of knowledge, but also
required to ‘save the appearances’
(‘scientific’ vs. ‘manifest’ images)
‘Normativity’ of rule-based
practices irreducible to causalexplanatory theory, thanks to
internal relation between rules and
their applications
Scientific realism: pragmatic
criteria of epistemic success
Scientific realism: pragmatic
criteria of epistemic success
Scientific realism: pragmatic
criteria of epistemic success
No overall pragmatic criteria
needed because no overall
epistemic success needed
Absolute framework/content
distinction as precondition
for scientific theory
Framework/content distinction
dissolved into degrees of
observation-dependency
Multi-levelled framework/content
distinction as precondition for
scientific theory
Absolute framework/content
distinction (cf. TLP), but internal
to particular practices
Analytic/synthetic treated as
basic (for knowledge/truth)
Analytic/synthetic criticized as
irrelevant/unclear
Tripartite analytic/synthetic:
Empirical/logico-grammatical
distinction treated as basic (for
commitments)
As in TLP, analytic a priori
replaces synthetic a priori as
basis for transcendental
limits
[vs. phenomenologically
disclosed limits of what is
given in experience –
Husserl/Heidegger]
Rejection of synonymy on
behaviourist grounds; rejection
of stipulative definitions as
circular [vs. Grice/Strawson]
- Formal stipulation (logic, maths
pure geometry as calculus)
- Posits of postulational theories
holistically supported with
indirect observational backing
(mechanics/geometry/microphysics)
- Empirical claims based on
simple induction/observation
Moveable boundary between
logico-grammatical
presuppositional commitment
(bedrock) and empirically
confirmable beliefs – reflects
‘pragmatic’ commitments based on
actual involvements
Implications
for
epistemology
Language &
concepts
Confirmation holism for
bodies of theory, based on
pragmatic framework criteria
AND direct observational
confirmation relative to a
given framework
Confirmation holism for bodies
of theory, based on general, allencompassing pragmatic criteria
(simplicity, economy), reflecting
underdetermination of theory by
evidence
Inferentialist holism
Anti-empiricist critique of the
‘Myth of the Given’
Rejects foundationalism &
coherentism
Epistemological concepts/issues
not basic so not generalisable
Direct observational reports lack
foundational status because the
same empirical data (sensory
stimuli) can be accommodated
by multiple systems of belief
(i.e. bodies of theory)
Direct observation reports only
have foundational status relative to
holistic structures of inferential
commitment, as non-inferential
reports lack epistemic implications
(as they are non-justifying)
Logically primitive reactions and
commitments count as incorrigible
evidence (not requiring further
justification) (vs. scepticism)
Epistemic implications depend on
pragmatic inferential role
(Brandom) and presuppose
normative conceptual
commitments because of this
dependency
Concepts depend on ‘normative’
contexts for comprehensibility, so
observational beliefs/knowledge
presuppose normative conceptual
commitments independently of any
dependency on pragmatic
inferential role (i.e. prior to issues
of epistemic implication)
Carnapian anthropological
field-linguist:
Quinean anthropological fieldlinguist:
Sellarsian anthropological fieldlinguist:
Wittgensteinian anthropological
field-linguist:
Basic observational concepts
teachable by ostensive
definition alone, with sense
data or physical objects as
basic referents
Epistemology of concepts
revealed through the model of
radical translation based on
strictly behaviourist criteria –
implies teachability by ostensive
definition without reference to
prior normative background
Psychological nominalism entails
verbal behaviourism: Rylean
model of public utterances PLUS
quasi-naturalistic folk-theory of
private thoughts as behavioural
causes (the ‘Myth of Jones’ vs the
‘ghost in the machine’)
Conditions for the possibility of
concept-acquisition revealed via
model of primitive language games
based on public criteria – precludes
teachability by ost. definition
without reference to prior
normative background
Mental &
physical
(Cartesian
dualism)
Metaphysics vs
science
Procedural commitments
reflecting ‘unity of science’
thesis PLUS Tractarian view
of logical limits of empirical
discourse
Anti-Cartesian
Anti-dualism
Anti-Cartesian
(Anomalous monism? cf. DD)
Anti-Cartesian
Anti-dualism
Reductive physicalism
Strict behaviourism
Private mental realm reinstated in
non-Cartesian terms: privately
introspectible thoughts are posited
as theoretical constructs to
causally explain non-verbal (and
then verbal) behaviour (3PP then
1PP) = functionalism
Rejects logical independence of the
private from the public, so the
mental cannot be identified with
the former or separated from the
latter: 1PP reports treated as nonepistemic (‘expressivism’?)
Intendings as causal-explanatory
posits = private mental causes of
action (cf. DD)
Intentions as public ex post facto
rationalizations of action
(Anscombe, von Wright)
Intentionality presupposes
linguistic correlates defined with
reference to pragmatic inferential
role, so no pre-linguistic rational
agency is possible
(cf. Heidegger/Lafont: language as
world-disclosure)
Presupposes public normative
background only, which need not
be linguistically disclosed or
inferentially significant – hence
rational agency need not
presuppose language
Metaphysics of absolute processes
(including neural processes)
(process ontology)
More metaphysical than OLP?
Less metaphysical than Strawson?
Redefines ‘metaphysicality’?
Metaphysics rejected as
nonsense
Naturalized ontology as
metaphysics
Principle of tolerance:
multiple incommensurable
frameworks, each justified by
the explanatory value of the
scientific theories it makes
possible
No principle of tolerance:
ontology governed by overall
‘pragmatic’ criteria of economy,
simplicity, consistency with
science
Reduction – Occam’s razor &
extensionality (cf. Russell)