Mh370 1ac
Plan text:
The United States federal government should substantially increase its exploration of
the world’s oceans by deploying the Orion-CURV21 system on a non-military search
and rescue mission for MH370.
Observation one is Inherency
US had deployed sonar searches for Flight 370, but will now bail. Search will shift to
other countries and private contractors.
Siegel ‘14
Matt Siegel, Senior Political and General News Correspondent for Thomson Reuters based in Australia. “United States the first
country to scale back its spending on costly Flight MH370 search, source says” Reuters – April 30, 2014 –
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/04/30/united-states-the-first-country-to-scale-back-its-spending-on-costly-flight-mh370search-source-says/
With the search for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 entering a new, much longer phase, the countries involved
must decide how much they are prepared to spend on the operation and what they stand to lose if they
hold back. The search is already set to be the most costly in aviation history and spending will rise significantly as underwater drones focus
on a larger area of the seabed that Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said on Monday could take six to eight months to search. But
despite U.S. President Barack Obama publicly promising to commit more assets, the United States appears keen
to begin passing on the costs of providing sophisticated sonar equipment that will form the backbone of
the expanded hunt. That means Australia, China and Malaysia – the countries most closely involved in the operation –
look set to bear the financial and logistical burden of a potentially lengthy and expensive search. “We’re already at tens of
millions. Is it worth hundreds of millions?” a senior U.S. defence official asked last week. “I don’t know. That’s for them to decide.”
He made it clear that Washington was intent on spending less from now on, making it the first major
donor country to scale back its financial commitment to the search. “We’re not going to pay to
perpetually use the equipment on an indefinite basis. Basically from here on out – starting next week or
so – they need to pick up the contract,” he said. At least $44 million was spent on the deployment of military ships and aircraft in
the Indian Ocean and South China Sea in the first month of the search, about the same as was spent on the whole underwater search for Air
France’s Flight AF447, which crashed into the Mid-Atlantic in 2009. The Malaysian jetliner carrying 239 people disappeared en route from Kuala
Lumpur to Beijing more than seven weeks ago, and huge surface and underwater searches have failed to solve the mystery of what happened.
That mystery has major implications for airline manufacturers such as Boeing, which builds the 777 model that crashed and is awaiting a verdict
as to what went wrong. Malaysia is leading an investigation into the crash, but Australia has a key role in coordinating the hunt since the plane
is believed to have crashed in its search and rescue zone. Abbott said finding any wreckage on the ocean surface was now highly unlikely and
Australia would forge ahead with the upcoming phase of the search despite it likely costing A$60-million. He added that while private
companies under contract to Australia would soon be taking over from the military assets dispatched in the
wake of the crash, he would be “seeking some appropriate contribution from other nations.”
The US has specifically ended subsurface surveys – phasing-out Bluefin searches.
Telegraph – May 5th
2014 – The Telegraph is a daily morning broadsheet newspaper, published in London and distributed throughout the United
Kingdom and internationally – “MH370: we won't give up search for Malaysia Airlines jet, governments pledge” – May 5th, 2014
– This was originally a Reuters report – http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/malaysia/10808532/MH370-wewont-give-up-search-for-Malaysia-Airlines-jet-governments-pledge.html
No trace of Flight MH370 has been found since it vanished on a scheduled service from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on
March 8, despite the most intensive search in commercial aviation history. A majority of the 239 people on board were
Chinese nationals. Experts have narrowed the search area where the plane is presumed to have crashed to a large arc of the Indian Ocean
about 1,000 miles northwest of the west Australian city of Perth. But after weeks of scouring millions of square kilometres without finding any
sign of debris, Australian authorities have called off the air and surface search. A
new search phase costing around A$60 million (£33m)
will begin after existing visual and sonar search data is analysed and a contractor is found to lease the
sophisticated equipment needed, the officials said after meeting in Canberra. Financial responsibility is a major focus of the talks
and Australian Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss seemed to open the door to Boeing, which produced the 777-200ER jet, and engine maker
Rolls-Royce, to contribute financially. "They also have a vested interested in what happened on MH370 so they can be confident about the
quality of their product, or take remedial action if there was some part of the aircraft that contributed to this accident," he told reporters. "So, I
think we will be looking for increasing involvement from the manufacturers, and their host countries." Last week, Malaysia released its most
comprehensive account yet of what happened to Flight MH370, detailing the route the plane probably took as it veered off course and the
confusion that followed. The officials have said the new focus will be on 24,000 sq mile of seabed in the Indian Ocean that could take eight
months or more to search. U.S. President Barack Obama
had publicly promised to commit more assets, but
government sources say the United States is keen to begin passing on the costs of providing the expensive sonar
equipment the officials say they are trying to source. The United States said over the weekend that it would only
contribute its sophisticated Bluefin-21 underwater drone for one more month, placing pressure on
Australia, China and Malaysia to find funding for the next phase of the search. "At the request of the
Australian Government, the U.S. Navy will continue supporting the MH370 subsurface search effort with
the Bluefin-21 side scan sonar for approximately 4 more weeks," U.S. Navy Commander William Marks of the 7th Fleet said. For
now the search is on hold as the Ocean Shield, an Australian naval vessel carrying the drone, resupplies and conducts maintenance at
a military base in Western Australia. The officials will meet again in Canberra on Wednesday, they said, where they will begin thrashing out the
details of how to proceed and who precisely will shoulder the costs of doing so.
Observation two is Solvency
Observation Two – Solvency
Deep Ocean searches are necessary. Only the US has the tech to find 370.
Lamothe ‘14
Dan Lamothe is an award-winning military journalist and war correspondent. He has written for Marine Corps Times and the
Military Times newspaper chain since 2008, traveling the world and writing extensively about the Afghanistan war both from
Washington and the war zone. He also has reported from Norway, Spain, Germany, the Republic of Georgia and while
underway with the U.S. Navy. Among his scoops, Lamothe reported exclusively in 2010 that the Marine Corps had
recommended that Marine Cpl. Dakota Meyer receive the Medal of Honor. The Complex, maintained by Foreign Policy –
MARCH 10, 2014 –
http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/10/us_navy_stepping_up_involvement_in_search_for_missing_airliner
The Malaysia Airlines flight that mysteriously disappeared 35,000 feet over the Gulf of Thailand on March 8 has prompted a
massive maritime search involving dozens of aircraft and ships from 10 countries, including both the United
States and China. But it has also underscored the lingering technological shortcomings and fragile
communications networks bedeviling many of the nations in a region where territorial and political disputes continue to simmer,
analysts said. The U.S. Navy has dispatched two guided-missile destroyers, the USS Kidd and the USS Pinckney, to assist in a search now
spanning waters from Malaysia to Vietnam. The ships each carry two MH-60R Seahawk helicopters that are designed for search-and-rescue
missions and equipped with infrared cameras. The U.S.
ships are working in tandem with vessels from China,
Singapore and Malaysia, Pentagon officials said Monday, but it wasn't immediately clear how much they are in communication. The
Pinckney investigated floating debris Sunday, but didn't find any pieces of the missing airplane. The U.S. effort is bolstered by a single P-3C
Orion, a maritime patrol aircraft equipped with high-tech antennas and other surveillance equipment. The plane was originally designed to find
enemy submarines. This time around, Navy officials hope it will be able to find wreckage from the presumably downed plane. The U.S. also will
keep the USNS John Ericsson, an oiler run by U.S. Military Sealift Command, in the region to help if needed. It will allow the Seahawks to refuel
quickly. Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 was a massive Boeing 777-200 aircraft bound for Beijing from Kuala Lumpur, and disappeared with some
227 passengers and 12 crew members aboard. The other countries
involved in the search include Vietnam, Singapore,
Indonesia, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines and New Zealand. Thus far, the countries appear to be cooperating
reasonably well on the search effort despite it occurring in close proximity with the South China Sea, an area rife with territorial disputes
between numerous nations. But
the United States is the only nation that has the technological capability of
searching deep below the surface for the missing plane, said Christopher Harmer, a senior naval analyst
with the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.
Depth of this search area means US assets key and commercial options won’t work.
Orion – unlike Bluefin – can solve.
Austin ‘14
Henry Austin joined NBC News as a contributor in June 2013, and covers domestic and foreign breaking stories for
NBCNews.com. Austin joined NBC News after more than 10 years as a reporter. After starting at British press agency South
West News Service, he moved to British newspapers The Sun and The People, before relocating to Canada to help set up press
agency Hot News. “Missing MH370: Only 'Handful' of Subs Capable of Hunting Jet” – NBC News Reports – May 6th –
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-jet/missing-mh370-only-handful-subs-capable-hunting-jet-n97901
Only "a handful" of submersible vehicles can search the depths of the southern Indian Ocean in the area that is
believed to be the final resting place of missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, experts said Tuesday. Officials announced
Monday that all of the data compiled in the hunt for the Boeing 777 will be re-examined to make sure the right area is being scoured as part of
a new $55 million phase of the operation. Capt. John Noble, the former general manager of the International Salvage Union, told NBC News
that it made sense to narrow down the search area as much as possible. “You'd
be lucky if there was a handful of vehicles
that can to go to the sort depths of the ocean that we are talking about here because they simply don't
make them,” Noble said. A U.S. Navy deep-tow search system called the Orion might be an option, Noble said. It
can search to a maximum depth of 20,000 feet of seawater, according the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving. The Orion
would operate in tandem with a remotely operated vehicle called Curv 21 which could salvage any wreckage. Most commercially
owned remotely operated vehicles (ROV’s) aren’t designed to go to those depths because there simply
isn’t the call for them, according to Dr. Simon Boxall at Britain’s University of Southampton. As a result,
many of those built are used for government research projects. They have a distinct advantage over
autonomous underwater vehicles like the Bluefin 21 sub which has been leading the search, because their cameras allow
a live view of the seabed he said. The Bluefin’s data can only be downloaded and analyzed by researchers after it has resurfaced, he added.
The US’s Orion system is the only device that can pull-off the search.
Malaysia Kini ‘14
This evidence internally quotes John Noble, the former general manager of the International Salvage Union – Malaysiakini.com
offers alternative news and views of Malaysian. Updated daily, the site has won several awards for its quality reporting.
Malaysia Kini – May 7th – https://m.malaysiakini.com/news/262060
While expense is one obstacle, it
looks like technology could be another stumbling block in the way of finding the
plane or its flight recorder, which is believed to be lying at the bottom of the South Indian Ocean. Experts tell
NBC that a device has not been made that could do what MH370's searchers are asking for. Capt. John
Noble, the former general manager of the International Salvage Union that represents marine salvors, says he
what is needed is a device better than US’ autonomous underwater vehicle Bluefin-21, with claws to pick up
the blackbox and a in-built camera to give visuals of the deep ocean bottom. However, such a device are only custom-made
for government research projects. Noble notes that the a US Navy deep-tow search system called the Orion,
which could go down 6kilometres into the sea, might be an option. The Orion would operate in tandem
with a remotely-operated vehicle called Curv 21, which he claims could salvage any wreckage.
Advantage one is Asia Pivot
Advantage Three is Asia Pivot
Continued support for the 370 search is key to US credibility and its “Asia pivot”
strategy.
Zappone ‘14
Chris Zappone – Foreign News editor at the newspaper The Age. Also writes for the Sydney Morning Herald. Formerly wrote for
CNN. “MH370: The Geopolitical Dimension — a list of events and angles” – The Cold War Daily – March 29th –
http://acoldwarmentality.wordpress.com/category/mh370/
The US has had a continual presence in the search efforts, either through direct participation in the search flights. Much
like the US’s quick response to Tyhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013, lots of US credibility in Asia is
on the line. The motivation for the US in the MH370 search is for Washington to show its continued role
and relevance in the Indo-Pacific region, which supports the broader US Pivot to Asia. Amid the understandably
sharp words from China for Malaysia over Kuala Lumpur’s handling of the matter, Malaysia has more
comfortably turned to the US for help with the investigation.
The search is no longer a pure humanitarian mission. It’s spilled-over to geopolitical
dimensions that intersect with the Asia Pivot.
Zappone ‘14
Chris Zappone – Foreign News editor at the newspaper The Age. Also writes for the Sydney Morning Herald. Formerly wrote for
CNN. “Rivalries, sensitivities form prism for MH370 search” – Sydney Morning Herald – April 21, 2014 –
http://www.smh.com.au/world/rivalries-sensitivities-form-prism-for-mh370-search-20140421-zqxa0.html#ixzz32cKISWpl
The co-operation of militaries in the search for the missing Flight 370 has created a unique event in a region increasingly fraught with rivalries.
On one hand, global and regional powers are at pains to show off their military capabilities in conducting the search. A British government
statement on its submarine deployment earlier this month captures the mood: “While we do not routinely comment on submarine operations,
we can, exceptionally, confirm that HMS Tireless has been tasked to assist in the humanitarian search mission for Flight MH370.” On the other
hand, the fear of conflict in Asia has made countries wary of exposing too many of their abilities in sensitive areas such as satellite imaging,
surveillance technology and underwater listening. The search for the Malaysia Airlines flight carrying 239 people has entered a "critical
juncture", Malaysia's acting transport minister Hishammuddin Hussein said on Friday, suggesting the lack of any findings will push authorities to
discuss the "next move". An ex-RAAF officer now active in the aerospace industry described the search, which has been going for six weeks, as a
“really interesting dance” in which civilian and international militaries “want to co-operate without disclosing or compromising their
capabilities”. Global powers would also be tempted to keep an eye on each others’ capabilities, the expert said. Military and commercial
imaging satellites have predictable, low-earth orbits. If photos released of a certain spot in the ocean are thought to have originated with
classified satellites, competing powers could triangulate which satellite is the source, potentially learning about its capabilities, he said. . “Boiled
down, it becomes a matter of maths.” And while governments peer at each others’ satellite abilities, it is expected that any image that is too
strategic
objectives of the countries involved, which loom behind the humanitarian mission to determine the fate of the the
plane. China, in addition to the concern for its 153 citizens on the flight, wants to demonstrate the growing reach of its
navy, its operational expertise, and the ease with which it can deploy far from its shores. The United States wants to show
its continued presence in the region, as part of its pivot to Asia. It also has an interest in learning what happened to
revealing of a nation’s capability would be “fuzzed-up” before public release. Driving these concerns are the vastly different
the US-built plane. Australia can reinforce its image as a vital regional power, able to forge co-operation among Asian neighbours. "It’s heartrending to see the families [of the missing passengers] in the middle of high-stakes intelligence games, but they
are caught in a global
geopolitical game of cat-and-mouse," said US-based Everett Dolman, author of Astropolitik, a study of geopolitics and space.
The geopolitical setting had given the search a unique quality, Dr Dolman said. Military transparency, he said, was
typically considered a confidence-building measure in much of the West. In ‘‘much of Asia — and in every intelligence agency in the world’’ the
opposite view was held, he said. “If your opponents know precisely what your capabilities are, they can come up with a plan to defeat you in
detail." Behind
it all are the concerns of a potential Asian conflict involving China, Japan and others. In this
competitive sphere, countries are also pushing their technology to new levels to find the missing plane.
The Bluefin-21, the undersea drone contracted by the US Navy, has dived "beyond its depth rating" of 4500
metres in an attempt to locate the plane's black boxes. Earlier, Royal Australian Navy Commodore Peter Leavy detailed
modifications made to RAAF’s P-3 acoustic processor used for underwater listening. The changes were "only started after the MH370 aircraft
was lost", he said. British satellite firm Inmarsat, which operates 11 satellites in geostationary orbit, pulled a week of all-nighters for “an
analysis that had never been done before” that narrowed down a more precise point of where MH370 dropped off the satellite communication
grid. That helped lead to the current search zone, where the underwater pinging has been detected. These are the modifications and
innovations linked to the search for MH370 that the public knows about. With
so much national pride at stake at a time
when a peace in Asia is less certain, behind-the-scenes competition is likely.
370 search key to forging lasting allies and will spillover to security questions.
Brewster ‘14
David Brewster is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. His is the
author of the new book, India’s Ocean: the story of India’s bid for regional leadership. “The geopolitics of flight MH370” –
Pragmati: the Indian National Interest Review – May 2, 2014 – http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2014/05/the-geopolitics-offlight-mh370/
Major international humanitarian and disaster relief efforts are becoming ever more important tools in
generating goodwill, demonstrating capabilities and reinforcing international relationships. The efforts by the
US, Indian, Australian and Japanese navies in providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami were seen being as a key factor in prompting the development of closer maritime security
relationships between those states. That is a process that is still bearing fruit. The absence of China from
international relief efforts in response to the tsunami was also noted by many in the region. The international
response to the MH370 disaster could also have significant long term strategic implications.
The Pivot can build alliances that deter Chinese aggression. The US will need more
diplomatic credibility going forward.
Haddick ‘12
Robert, Managing Editor of Small Wars Journal and lead writer for the “This Week at War” column for Foreign Policy. In
addition to Foreign Policy and Small Wars Journal, Haddick's writing has been published in the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, Air & Space Power Journal, and other publications. He has appeared in many radio and television interviews. This Week
at War: An Arms Race America Can’t Win, 6-8-12.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/08/this_week_at_war_an_arms_race_america_can_t_win
In a speech delivered on June 2 to the Shangri-La Security Dialogue conference in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta attempted to convince his
audience that America's
"rebalancing" strategy to the Asia-Pacific region -- previous called a "pivot" -- is serious and will
be backed by expanded military power. Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be positioned in the Pacific. He also openly discussed the
controversial Air-Sea Battle concept, while denying that the reinforcements and new plans are a challenge to China. He also promised to step up the presence of
U.S. military forces in the region, both through new basing arrangements and by an expanded list of training exercises with partner military forces. Panetta likely
hoped his remarks would bolster the credibility of the administration's strategy. On closer examination, there is less to Panetta's Pacific naval buildup than meets
the eye. The U.S. Navy's intelligence office, by contrast, expects China's naval expansion this decade to be more substantial, especially when it comes to its
submarine force. The reinforcements that Panetta discussed and new ideas like the Air-Sea Battle concept are necessary but insufficient responses to the worsening
military trends in the region. The United States should not expect to win an arms race in the Western Pacific. Instead, it will have to find other more enduring
advantages if it hopes to craft a sustainable strategy for the region. Panetta's promise to base 60 percent of the U.S. fleet in the Pacific was not news -- Navy
Secretary Ray Mabus announced this intention in a speech back in March. Panetta's assertion that there is currently a "50/50 percent split between the Pacific and
the Atlantic" is also not quite right. According to the department's website, of the Navy's 186 major conventional warships (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers,
amphibious ships, and attack and cruise missile submarines), 101, or 54 percent, current have home ports on the Pacific Ocean. The Navy's latest 30-year
shipbuilding plan forecasts 181 of these major combat ships in the fleet in 2020. A 60 percent allocation implies 109 major combatants in the Pacific in 2020, an
increase of eight such ships from today. On the other hand, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) forecasts that China's navy will own 106 major warships in
2020, up from 86 in 2009. Seventy-two of these are expected to be attack submarines, compared to 29 for the United States in the Pacific in 2020, under the 60
percent allocation assumption. For the two decades beyond 2020, the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding plan projects no increase in the number of major warships. China's
long-range shipbuilding plans are unknown; however, its defense budget has increased at an 11.8 percent compound annual rate, after inflation, between 2000 and
2012, with no indications of any changes to that trend. Of course, counting ships does not tell the whole story. Even more critical are the missions assigned to these
ships and the conditions under which they will fight. In
a hypothetical conflict between the United States and China for
control of the South and East China Seas, the continental power would enjoy substantial structural
advantages over U.S. forces. China, for instance, would be able to use its land-based air power, located at many
dispersed and hardened bases, against naval targets. The ONI forecasts China's inventory of maritime strike aircraft rising from 145 in 2009 to 348 by 2020. U.S.
land-based air power in the Western Pacific operates from just a few bases, which are vulnerable to missile attack from China (the Cold War-era Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty prevents the United States from developing theater-based surface-to-surface missiles with ranges sufficient to put Chinese bases at risk). A
comparison of ship counts similarly does not include China's land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, fired from mobile truck launchers. Nor does it account for China's
fleet of coastal patrol boats, also armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. The Air-Sea Battle concept began as an effort to improve staff coordination and planning
between the Navy and the Air Force in an effort to address the structural disadvantages these forces would have when going up against a well-armed continental
power like China. The concept is about creating operational synergies between the services. An example of this synergy occurred in last year's campaign against
Libya, when U.S. Navy cruise missiles destroyed Libya's air defense system, clearing the way for the U.S. Air Force to operate freely over the country. But Air-Sea
Battle still faces enormous challenges in overcoming the "home court" advantage a continental power enjoys deploying its missile forces from hidden, dispersed,
and hardened sites. In addition, the United States faces a steep "marginal cost" problem with an opponent like China; additional defenses for U.S. ships are more
expensive than additional Chinese missiles. And China can acquire hundreds or even thousands of missiles for the cost of one major U.S. warship. Given these
structural weaknesses, Air-Sea Battle's success will rely not on endlessly parrying the enemy's missiles, but striking deeply at the adversary's command posts,
communications networks, reconnaissance systems, and basing hubs in order to prevent missiles from being launched in the first place. Such strikes would mean
attacks on space systems, computer networks, and infrastructure, with implications for the broader civilian economy and society. Some critics of Air-Sea Battle
reason that raising the stakes in this manner would make terminating a conflict much more difficult and would escalate the conflict into domains -- such as space
and cyber -- that are particular vulnerabilities for the United States. The United States won't be able to win an arms race against China and currently has no plans to
do so. Nor
can the Pentagon count on superior military technology; China already has impressive scientific
and engineering capabilities, which are only getting better. Instead, U.S. policymakers need to discover
enduring strategic advantages that don't require keeping a qualitative or quantitative lead in weapons.
Geography may be one such benefit. In a conflict, the so-called First Island Chain that runs from Japan to Taiwan and then to the Philippines could become a barrier
to the Chinese navy and provide outposts for U.S. and allied sensors and missiles. China would likely view such preparations as a provocation, but from the allied
perspective, they will complicate Chinese military planning. Second, the United States and its allies are far more experienced at planning and conducting
complicated military operations that require coordination across countries and military services. With a long-established network of alliances and partnerships in
the region, U.S. commanders and their counterparts have accumulated decades of experience operating together. One aspect of Air-Sea Battle is to further extend
this advantage. The
most powerful U.S. advantage is the alliance network itself. Washington's long list of treaty allies and partners
alliance network could also help convert the threat of
escalation to a U.S. advantage. The more U.S. military forces are able to disperse across the region, at
temporary or rotational basing arrangements, the more difficult it will be for China to gain an advantage with military
power. In order to achieve such an advantage, China will have to attack a wider number of countries, bringing them into a war on
the U.S. side. This prospect should deter conflict from beginning. The more successful U.S. diplomacy is at
building up a large network in the region, the stronger the deterrent effect and the less risk assumed
by each member. With its outreach to ASEAN countries and others over the past decade, the United States seems to be
on this path. New rotational basing deals with Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines are more evidence of this approach. But more diplomatic
success will be required as the challenge from China increases. U.S. military planners face unfavorable trends in the Western
provides options for U.S. and allied policymakers and planners. The
Pacific. Panetta and his lieutenants have sent reinforcements to the region and are rewriting their military doctrines. Although these measures necessary, U.S.
policymakers will need another way. Good
strategy requires finding enduring advantages. The alliance network in the region
provides U.S. commanders with partner military forces, basing options, operational experience, and deterrence against escalation, advantages
China won't match any time soon. In this sense, the solution to the challenging military problem U.S. forces
face in the Western Pacific will be found as much with more diplomacy as with more firepower.
Successful Pivot dissuades both China and ASEAN partners from initiating increasingly
proactive stances in the South China Sea.
Chadha ‘14
(Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) is a Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses -- ASIAN STRATEGIC REVIEW: US
Pivot and Asian Security – a book edited by S.D. Muni, Vivek Chadha – From Chapter Three: “Military Implications of the US
Rebalancing Strategy” – by Vivek Chadha –
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fidsa.in%2Fsyst
em%2Ffiles%2Fbook_ASR2013.pdf&ei=AY-XU8rjNuaO8gG3g4CQBg&usg=AFQjCNG_ooiEIMhuGCnMzg7oy_t67sZTgQ)
The US rebalance or the pivot to the Asia-Pacific is not merely a military move aimed at readjusting the deployment of platforms in light of the
withdrawal from Iraq and drawdown from Afghanistan. It is the fulcrum of the US efforts to retain its economic growth, strategic influence and competitive edge in
all spheres. It is also about the often unsaid China factor—a factor that has the potential to impact every domain of undeniable US leadership. It would be an
overstatement to classify the rebalance as a paradigm shift in the US strategy for the region. The US has been and is likely to remain a Pacific power in the
foreseeable future. In the past, the pillars of its association with the region have been similar to the ones proposed. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the US has
remained a pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific, through its economic and military strength and network of alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea and
Australia. It has also maintained a substantial forward presence in Japan and South Korea. This coupled with a generational lead in military technology has kept the
US ahead of its rivals. It is through these salient pillars of its strategy that the US has maintained a favourable environment in the Asia- Pacific region. It therefore
emerges that the pivot or rebalance is not entirely a fresh perspective, nor is it aimed at achieving anything substantially different. It does, however, reinforce the
importance of the region, in light of the emergence of China as the greatest threat to US supremacy and a desire to move away from nation building, which was a
by-product of the war on terror. Rebalancing rather than being a new strategy can be described as a readjustment of priorities and focus, backed by military
capability. This capability will mirror the policy through asset reallocation both between theatres and within the Asia-Pacific. In addition to the China factor, the
readjustment is likely to be impacted for the first time in the last five decades by the cloud of severe budgetary constraints. When these two factors are viewed in
concert, the challenges posed become evident. China is emerging as the largest trading partner in the area of focus of the pivot.1 Its strategic influence is on the rise
and it is competing with the US in all spheres for leadership, including military modernisation. Simultaneously, the US Armed Forces are threatened by a $ 500
billion budget cut over the next decade. Therefore, the
rebalance should be seen as a larger strategy of the US to maintain its
slipping position as the strategic prime mover in the Asia-Pacific and by co-relation the world. In doing so, it will deter the
ability of China to disturb the regional status quo within the financial constraints of depleting financial outlays. This will
demand of the US both ingenuity and resilient partnerships for it to remain a pre-eminent power in the region. The US is likely to pursue this goal through
the following objectives: • Establish a military posture, which has both deterrence and punitive capability in the region within its reducing means. • Maintain a
strengthen a network of allies and partners,
who have vested interests in building their economies in an environment of peace and security. • Strike a balance between credibility of
alliances with partner countries in the region and simultaneously discourage any temptation on their part to
use this as a leverage for escalating military tensions in bilateral disputes. The paper briefly traces the trajectory of events
generational lead in military technology over China, to achieve its strategic objectives. • Create and
leading to the announcement of rebalance by the US. It further analyses the factors that have forced a more proactive and vocal enunciation of the policy. This is
followed up by a focus on the military shift as a result of the rebalance strategy, its implications and finally the impact of sequestration. The US “Pivot” to the AsiaPacific or the “rebalancing”, as it was subsequently christened, was a shift waiting to happen after the end of the Cold War. With the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of the US as the preeminent power, the strategic significance of both Europe and the Atlantic diminished. This intervening period
witnessed the US in a state of strategic stall, with the absence of a potential adversary, which could challenge the brief phase of unipolarity in world politics.
Referring to this period, Condoleezza Rice, wrote: “That we did not know how to think about what follows the US-Soviet confrontation is clear from the continued
references to the ‘post Cold-War period’.”2 It was not until the rise of China was finally acknowledged as a threat to US influence in the world in general and the
Asia-Pacific region in particular that the need for a shift was realised. Rice identifying the threat from China wrote in the year 2000: “What we do know is that China
is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the AsiaPacific region. This means that China is not a status-quo power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its favor [sic].”3 However, the open
admission of a definitive threat from China during the initial years of the Bush administration’s first tenure in the White House faded after the launch of the “war on
terror”. The shift in focus towards terrorism led to a softening of US focus on China, given the need for wide ranging cooperation against a common threat and the
inability to focus militarily on two major fronts. Thus, despite the threat perceptions enunciated by senior officials in the
Bush administration, the pivot
did happen, but it tuned towards Iraq and Afghanistan. This preoccupation with the “war on terrorism” and a
simultaneous economic slowdown, opened a window of opportunity for China to enlarge its area of influence. Its core interests increased in rapid
succession from Taiwan to Tibet and then the South and East China Seas4, bringing into focus the disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei
and Indonesia.5 Chinese activism raised concerns amongst the US allies and partners about the ability and lack of will of the sole superpower to assert its influence
in the region. This was reinforced after the slowdown of the US and European economy in 2008. Joseph S. Nye felt that this very assessment led to an increase in
Chinese activism and a desire
to take a more proactive stance in the South China Sea dispute.6 Reflecting on this strategic
direction, the US clearly signalled its intent to enlarge its role in the region in concert with its allies and partners.9 The amplification of this intent aimed at ensuring
“security” in the region, “international order”, which would guarantee the rights of countries and adherence to “international law”, thereby safeguarding freedom
of navigation. The specific contours of the US rebalance from the overall strategic perspective were outlined by the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when
she said: “Our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers,
including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing
democracy and human rights.”10 Factors Influencing US Rebalancing The strategic guidance laid down by the Department of Defense outlines the shifting contours
of priorities for the US. It aims at a smaller footprint while countering terrorism through surgical strikes, maintaining presence and influence to shape events in the
Middle East, reducing presence in Europe, Africa and Latin America and providing an impetus to its presence and focus on the Asia- Pacific.11 Amongst the areas of
interest outlined, the Asia-Pacific has emerged as a priority for the US in the foreseeable future. Given this reassessment of interests, a rebalance of strategic focus
became inevitable. The US rebalancing has been influenced by a number of factors. This paper will consider three, as a prelude to an assessment of its military
implications. The visual aspect of the US rebalancing, has been the redeployment of its military hardware, which became the focus of world attention. However, the
shift is not merely military in nature and more importantly it represents a strategic rebalance. This includes enhancing economic ties in the region, strengthening
and building partnerships with allies and friendly countries and finally ensuring that a stable environment can be ensured by deterring the disturbance of status
quo.12 The US decision to join the East Asia Summit indicated its willingness to increase its influence at the multilateral level.13 Similarly, an impetus to bilateral
ties, with specific focus on military engagement, is also evident. This is evident through stronger military ties with Australia, India, Japan, Singapore and other
countries of the region, as will be dealt with later in the paper. On the economic front, the US initiative to establish a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with countries
like Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam on November 12, 2011 was seen as an attempt to enhance trade,
investment and influence.14 There is broad consensus on “ensuring that the United States plays a key role in shaping Asian economic architecture will also affect its
influence in the region.”15 This is seen in the US as the economic lever of the pivot to the Asia-Pacific.16 The
feeling that the Asia-Pacific region had
not received adequate attention in the recent past was accentuated most by the rise of China. This was especially in light of
China’s growing assertiveness as well as its enhanced capability. It is evident from the article written by Condoleezza Rice in 2000 that China was firmly on the
US radar. However, the rapidity of its rise and growing assertiveness was a catalyst in the ensuring shift. This assertiveness has been most
pronounced amongst the US partners and allies in Southeast and East Asia, who have territorial disputes with China. The decision to include some of
these disputes as core issues by China, by implication, could lead to the use of force in case of a showdown. China’s
state-owned Global Times in a blunt warning wrote, “If these countries don’t want to change their ways with China,
they will need to prepare for the sound of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the
disputes in the sea to be resolved.”17 China’s military capability gives it the ability to take pre-emptive action to assert its territorial claims and
simultaneously deter US intervention. This could become an important factor in the capacity of the US to retain its influence in the region. China’s ability
to use force and its qualitative enhancement has been a subject of debate in the past. However, recent
advances have greatly augmented its capability. This is increasingly becoming a cause for concern in the US. In its assessment, the US
Department of Defense (DoD) China Report for 2012, says: “China’s approach to dealing with this challenge is manifested in a sustained effort to develop the
capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy and or operate within the western Pacific, which the DoD characterizes [sic] as ‘anti-access’ and
‘area denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities.”
South China Sea war is coming in the squo. The US will get drawn-in. Miscalc is likely.
Denmark – May 31st
2014 – Abraham M. Denmark is Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research. He
previously served as Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Could Tensions in the South
China Sea Spark a War?” – National Interest – May 31, 2014 – http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-tensions-the-southchina-sea-spark-war-10572
One topic that is raised regularly in both countries is, a bit incongruously, Crimea. Elites
in both Manila and Vietnam see much of
themselves in Ukraine—a small nation embroiled in a serious territorial dispute with their (relatively)
economically vital and militarily dominant neighbor. Russia’s intervention and subsequent annexation of Crimea seemed to
demonstrate to leaders in Southeast Asia that economic dependence and military weakness is a geopolitical liability, and that territorial integrity and national
sovereignty are not inviolate in the twenty-first century. These countries
fear that Russia has set the stage for China to use
force to take control over disputed territories. As a reaction, they are seeking to diversify their economies in order to reduce their
dependence on China while also building their own military power somewhat reduce China’s military advantage. Vietnam has in recent years
purchased 6 Kilo-class submarines from Russia, maritime patrol aircraft from Canada, and Sigma Corvettes from the Netherlands. The
Philippines has likewise announced plans to increase its defense spending and to purchase three decommissioned
Hamilton-class cutters from the U.S. Coast Guard, along with twelve new FA-50 fighters from Korea. Both also seek to buttress their defense cooperation with the
United States—Hanoi’s engagement with Washington has increased noticeably in recent years, and Manila recently signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement with Washington to strengthen defense cooperation and expand the American military presence in the Philippines. Vietnam
and the
Philippines will not stand idly by as China gradually erodes their hold on what they believe to be their
territory. Yet they also do not want a war with China—their strategy appears to be focused on resisting China’s efforts to erode their claims while buying time
to build their power, reduce their dependence on China, and hope the international community will intervene. Manila has brought its dispute with China to the UN
Permanent Court of Arbitration, a decision from which is expected near the end of 2015. Moreover, both have turned to ASEAN to bring added geopolitical weight
to negotiations with Beijing to develop a legally binding maritime code of conduct in the South China Sea—an agreement that would not affect the disputes
themselves, but would considerably reduce tensions. Chilly Times Ahead The
future of these disputes is not promising for longterm peace and stability. Neither side has demonstrated any interest in backing down or compromising,
and the potential for future escalation and crisis is high. China’s approach to these disputes is particularly
problematic. Its refusal to compromise, its continued reliance on escalation, and its commitment to
change the status quo (no matter how gradually) is a recipe for persistent tension. Most troubling is the
confidence with which China approaches escalation. Beijing appears to see escalation as a tool that can
be used with absolute control and predictability. China’s strategists and policy makers are fairly new to major power geopolitics, and
have not learned the lessons their American and Russian counterparts learned during the Cold War: that escalation is a dangerous tool, that an
adversary can respond in very unpredictable ways, and that tension can quickly spiral out of control. One
problem on the near horizon is how China will react to the arrest of Chinese fishermen by the Philippines. Beijing will certainly react, and will again seek to punish
Manila and strengthen China’s claims in the process. One option would be to arrest Philippine fishermen operating in waters claimed by China. Another more likely
and more provocative response would be to evict the Philippine forces currently on the grounded Sierra Madre on the Second Thomas Reef. China has already
harassed routine efforts by the Philippines to resupply those sailors, and may seek to tighten the blockade on the ship in order to force the sailors to withdraw. The
potential for shots to be fired or another ship to be rammed and sunk would be high, and lives may be lost. Without serious engagement, China is unlikely to back
down. Beijing has painted this issue as directly related to its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and its recent public marking of the 95th anniversary of
the May 4 movement—in which the existing government was overthrown by a popular uprising that judged Beijing as weak in the face of foreign exploitation—
strongly suggests that China’s leaders are sensitive to linkages between perceived weakness abroad and instability at home. With the growth of China’s economy
likely to slow dramatically in coming years, Beijing appears to see incidents like these as useful in stirring nationalist sentiments at home to buttress the popular
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Should
China use force against the Philippines, no matter how much Beijing may try to
describe the act as defensive or reactive, the United States would probably be drawn into the crisis—certainly in a diplomatic
sense, and potentially in a military sense as well. The United States will be unlikely to back down in such a situation, as the
credibility of America’s willingness to intervene overseas has already come into question after decisions to not
intervene in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or Assad’s crossing the chemical weapons “redline” in Syria. While Washington would certainly attempt to de-escalate
any crisis and prevent the use of force, it will also be sure to demonstrate will and resolve in order to both deter hostilities and reassure its allies. While the
United States is not a party to these disputes per se, it has a major interest in seeing them resolved peacefully. A conflict in the South
China Sea would be disastrous for regional trade and for U.S.-China relations—both of which are of singular importance to the United States. The United
States could enhance deterrence for Beijing by raising the costs to China for additional incidents—potential initiatives include further
strengthening military cooperation with the other claimants in the South China Sea, building their military
capabilities, and enhancing mechanisms for multinational training and exercises. Additionally, Washington should work as an honest broker among all parties to
identify opportunities for de-escalation and to develop a roadmap to the peaceful resolution of disputes. The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue is an
important opportunity for Beijing and Washington to speak directly about these issues and the dangers they post, and to find a way to prevent a crisis. China
and other claimants in the South China Sea are on a collision course, and it is incumbent on the United
States to demonstrate leadership by forestalling a future crisis that could throw the entire region into
conflict. Unless the claimants are able to turn away from aggression and see de-escalation as a useful tool of strategy, it is only a
matter of time until Beijing miscalculates and escalates over a redline that leads to crisis and raises the potential for conflict. A mix
of countries with incompatible, apparently nonnegotiable interests willing to use force and unwilling to acknowledge any way out than the absolute capitulation of
the other side is a highly dangerous mix—this
is how wars start.
That escalates to a nuclear exchange
Goldstein ‘13
Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of
Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,
“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 49-89
In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either side could decide that the risk
of escalation introduced by conventional, space, or cyberattacks was worth running. Even though no stake in a crisis
would be high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained nuclear exchange, some
stakes might be high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions that elevate the risk of
escalation to such a disastrous outcome.88 As discussed above, both China and the United States have important interests over
which they could find themselves locked in a war threatening crisis in the Western Pacific. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese and
U.S. statements about the handling of persistent disputes in the South China Sea, for example, suggests that
both sides attach a high and perhaps increasing value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high
enough to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that cannot be answered in advance. The most worrisome source
of instability, however, is clear—the temptation to use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain bargaining
leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowable risk of nuclear catastrophe that both China and the
United States will have incentives to manipulate.
Advantage two is Seafloor Topography
Science has much to learn about Oceans. 370’s search zone holds unique knowledge
gaps vital for better forecasting of natural disasters. Surveys at greater depths are key.
Smith & Marks ‘14
Walter H.F. Smith is a Geophysicist in NOAA's Laboratory for Satellite Altimetry and Chair of the scientific and technical subcommittee of GEBCOthis link opens in a new window, the international and intergovernmental committee for the General
Bathymetric Charts of the Oceans. Smith earned a B.Sc. at the University of Southern California, M.A., M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees
at Columbia University, and was a post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for Geophysics and Planetary Physics of the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography before joining NOAA in 1992. Karen Marks has worked as a Geophysicist since 1990 at the NOAA
Laboratory for Satellite Altimetry of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Silver Spring, Maryland, USA.
She received a B.S. in Geology from the University of Florida, an M.S. in Geophysics from Boston College, and a Ph.D. in
Geophysics from the University of Houston, with a dissertation on the geophysics of the Australian-Antarctic Discordance Zone.
– Eos, Vol. 95, No. 21, May 27th 2014 – Full Journal Title is: “Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union”. It is a weekly
magazine of geophysics. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2014EO210001/pdf
The depths in Figure 1 are from GEBCO [2010], which uses satellite altimetry to interpolate gaps between ship survey data publicly available in
open sources [Smith and Sandwell, 1994, 1997]. The accuracy of the positions and depths in these survey data limits the accuracy of the
satellite estimates. In addition, depth
estimates from satellite altimetry are most accurate where the seafloor
topography is moderate and composed of oceanic crust overlain by less than 200 meters of sediment [Smith and Sandwell,
1994]. Whittaker et al. [2013] estimate sediment thicknesses in the area varying from 12 meters to 1.5 kilometers,
and Deep Sea Drilling Project site 256 (gray dot in Figure 1) found 251 meters of sediment [Davies et al., 1974]. The seabed in the
MH370 search area records a complex geologic history of the breakup of Australia, India, and Antarctica
approximately 130 million years ago [Williams et al., 2013a]. The shallowest depth in the area shown in Figure 1 is about 237
meters on Broken Ridge, a structure related to the separation of Australia and Antarctica whose conjugate, the Kerguelen Plateau, lies on the
Antarctic plate. Within the acoustic search zone of Figure 1, the shallowest depth is about 1637 meters at the summit of Batavia Plateau. The
deepest point in the area shown also lies within the acoustic search zone, where the trough of the Wallaby- Zenith Fracture Zone plunges to an
estimated 7883 meters, just south of the Zenith Plateau. These plateaus are fragments of continental crust, leftovers of Indo-Australian
continental breakup [Williams et al., 2013b], and are embedded in old, deep seafloor. The search
for airplane debris in the open
ocean is not without precedent: On 1 June 2009, Air France flight AF447 disappeared over the Atlantic Ocean.
However, the present search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 takes place under very different
circumstances. When AF447 disappeared, there was little doubt about where it would be found. The flight
had not deviated significantly from its intended path from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, and the aircraft was routinely sending messages monitoring
the health of its flight systems along with its position. Warning and failure messages generated by these systems in the last few minutes of
flight helped to locate the crash site, and a surface search there found floating debris and fuel slicks the very next day. In addition, the AF447
crash site was in an area already 100% covered by a previous state-of-the-art bathymetric survey (MBES and
GPS), and this knowledge of the undersea terrain helped searchers select and program autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUVs) to search for the black boxes. Even so, they were not recovered until nearly 2 years after the crash. In comparison, the MH370
crash site is very poorly known. There are no measured depths in public databases at the locations where
ping contacts were reported. Satellite altimetry estimates that depths at the Chinese and Australian contact locations are
about 4300 and 5160 meters, respectively, but these estimates are quite uncertain and might be in error by approximately 250 meters or
more. Selecting an appropriate AUV and programming its search path require knowledge of the terrain. A Bluefin 21 AUV initially
deployed over Zenith Plateau to search for debris, for example, was not designed to operate at depths below
4500 meters. Lack of knowledge of seafloor topography has other consequences. Bottom topography steers
surface currents [Gille et al., 2004] while bottom roughness controls ocean mixing rates [Kunze and Llewellyn Smith, 2004], and poor
knowledge of these characteristics limits the accuracy of forecasts of everything from the path of floating debris to
the path of tsunamis [Mofjeld et al., 2004] and the future of climate [Jayne et al., 2004]. The state of knowledge of the seafloor in
the MH370 search area, although poor, is typical of that in most of Earth’s oceans, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere. In many remote
ocean basins the majority of available data are celestially navigated analog measurements [Smith, 1993] because systematic exploration of the
oceans seems to have ceased in the early 1970s [Smith, 1993, 1998; Wessel and Chandler, 2011], leaving the ocean floors about as sparsely
covered as the interstate highway system covers the United States [see Smith and Sandwell, 2004, Figure 2]. When these sparse soundings are
interpolated by satellite altimetry, as in Figure 1, the resulting knowledge of seafloor topography is 15 times worse in the horizontal and 250
times worse in the vertical than our knowledge of Martian topography [Smith, 2004]. Although a new bathymetric satellite altimeter mission
could improve this situation significantly [Smith and Sandwell, 2004], ships
with echo sounders remain the best technology
for ocean mapping. The global ocean deeper than 500 meters (that is, deeper than the continental shelves) could be fully surveyed with
state-of-the art navigation and acoustic multibeam systems with a total effort of about 200 ship-years of vessel activity at a total cost less than
that of a typical planetary exploration mission [Carron et al., 2001]. Until there is such an effort, knowledge of Earth’s ocean floors will remain
limited to the resolution available from satellite altimetry, which is vastly poorer than our knowledge of the topographies of Earth’s Moon,
Mars, and Venus. Perhaps the data
collected during the search for MH370 will be contributed to public databanks
and will be a start of greater efforts to map Earth’s ocean floor.
This knowledge also boosts information that’s vital to marine conservation and cures
from medicinal biodiversity.
Amos ‘14
Jonathan Amos, BBC Science Correspondent – internally quoting Walter H.F. Smith and Karen Marks. Both are expert
Geophysicists at the NOAA – “MH370 spur to 'better ocean mapping'” – BBC News – May 27th, 2014 –
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-27589433
Drs Walter Smith and Karen Marks have assessed the paucity of bathymetric data in the region in an article for EOS
Transactions, the weekly magazine of the American Geophysical Union. The pair work for the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (Noaa). They say only two publically accessible data-acquisition sorties have been conducted close to where search vessels
made possible black box detections, and "both expeditions occurred prior to the use of modern multibeam echo sounders, so depth
measurements were collected by single, wide-beam echo sounders that recorded on analogue paper scrolls, the digitizing of which is often in
error by hundreds of metres". Modern MBES uses GPS to precisely tie measurements to a particular location. The equipment can not only sense
depth very accurately (to an error typically of 2%), but can also return information on seafloor hardness - something that would be important in
looking for wreckage in soft sediment. Just
5% of a vast region, 2,000km by 1,400km, which includes the search locality, has any sort
of direct depth measurement, Smith and Marks say. The rest - 95% - is covered by maps that are an interpolation of satellite
data. These have a resolution no better than 20km. Maps of the arid surface of Mars are considerably better.
"The state of knowledge of the seafloor in the MH370 search area, although poor, is typical of that in most of Earth's oceans, particularly in the
Southern Hemisphere," the pair write. "In many remote ocean basins the majority of available data are celestially navigated analogue
measurements because systematic exploration of the oceans seems to have ceased in the early 1970s, leaving the ocean floors about as
sparsely covered as the interstate highway system covers the United States. "When these sparse soundings are interpolated by satellite
altimetry, the resulting knowledge of seafloor topography is 15 times worse in the horizontal and 250 times worse in the vertical than our
knowledge of Martian topography." Smith and Marks hope that the detailed survey work now being conducted in the search for MH370 will be
a catalyst to gather better data in other parts of the globe. High-resolution
bathymetry has myriad uses. "Better
knowledge of the ocean floor means better knowledge of fish habitats. This is important for marine
conservation, and could help us find biological resources including new medicines," Dr Smith told BBC News.
Natural Disasters/Tsumani Module
Natural Disasters are coming and put millions at risk. Improved forecasting is key to
mitigation.
Huppert ‘6
(et al; Professor Herbert Eric Huppert is an Australian-born geophysicist living in Britain. He has been Professor of Theoretical
Geophysics and Foundation Director for The Institute of Theoretical Geophysics at Cambridge University since 1989 – “Extreme
natural hazards: population growth, globalization and environmental change” – From the Journal: Philosophical Transactions A
– Each issue of Philosophical Transactions A is devoted to a specific area of the mathematical, physical and engineering
sciences. This area will define a research frontier that is advancing rapidly, often bridging traditional disciplines. All articles are
peer reviewed and edited to the highest standards. We currently publish 24 issues per year and, along with all Royal Society
journals, we are committed to archiving and providing perpetual access. Aug 15th – Ev was modified for gendered language. I
also added a comma in “10,000” to make the ev easier to read.
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/364/1845/1875.long#aff-1)
(Hu)mankind
is becoming ever more susceptible to natural disasters, largely as a consequence of population growth
and globalization. It is likely that in the future, we will experience several disasters per year that kill more
than 10,000 people. A calamity with a million casualties is just a matter of time. This situation is mainly
a consequence of increased vulnerability. Climate change may also be affecting the frequency of extreme weather events as
well as the vulnerability of coastal areas due to sea-level rise. Disastrous outcomes can only increase unless better ways
are found to mitigate the effects through improved forecasting and warning, together with more community
preparedness and resilience. There are particular difficulties with extreme events, which can affect several countries, while the largest events
can have global consequences. The hazards of supervolcanic eruptions and asteroid impacts could cause global disaster with threats to
civilization and deaths of billions of people. Although these are very rare events, they will happen and require consideration. More frequent
and smaller events in the wrong place at the wrong time could have very large human, environmental and economic effects. A sustained effort
is needed to identify places at risk and take steps to apply science before the events occur. The natural world can be a dramatic, dynamic and
dangerous place. Life ultimately thrives on Earth because it is a dynamic planet, but the extremes of nature can threaten the survival of
individuals, communities and even species. Every year television pictures and newspapers report scenes of devastation, despair and death
caused by huge earthquakes, floods, droughts, cyclones, landslides and volcanic eruptions. The
Asian tsunami, with around
250 000 deaths, huge economic losses and long-term damage to development programmes in the
affected countries, brought home to the world the realities of the danger. We live in times of increasing vulnerability to
extreme natural hazards. The Asian tsunami was a truly global disaster which affected not only many countries in the region, but also tourists
from the developed world on holiday in southeast Asia. For example, the incident represented the greatest loss of life of Swedish citizens from
a natural event. Again, Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans in September 2005, had global effects on oil prices and showed that
even the world's most powerful and wealthy country experiences difficulties with the extremes of nature.
Even small improvements forecasting data will save millions of lives
Rees ‘12
(et al – Professor John Rees – British Geological Survey; Natural Environment Research Council Natural Hazards Team Leader –
“Anticipation of Geophysical Hazards” – Report produced for the Government Office of Science, Foresight project ‘Reducing
Risks of Future Disasters: Priorities for Decision Makers’ – November 27th 2012 –
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/286641/12-1301-anticipation-of-geophysicalhazards.pdf)
The great majority of all natural hazard casualties in recent decades have been caused by geophysical hazards
- earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis and landslides. Collectively these killed more than 2 million people in the 20th century
and the death toll in the 21st century already approaches 0.75 million. The total economic loss in the 20th century adjusted for inflation
exceeded $2 trillion, and in this century the loss already approaches $0.5 trillion1. Despite substantial increases in our understanding of these
hazards, the
rates of loss from them have increased progressively over time, largely because of increased
societal exposure. The need for better geophysical science in disaster risk reduction is greater now than
ever; even small advances have the potential to save millions of lives. We can see that past investment has brought
notable benefits in recent decades; we have good examples to show that where we have focused research (e.g. on
the geological hazards associated with Montserrat) our anticipatory skills have markedly increased. We now need
to build further anticipatory geophysical programmes that will reduce the risk of disasters, saving both lives and
livelihoods. These should focus on plate boundaries and the Alpine-Himalayan belt systems and capitalize on recent observational technologies.
If we do so it is reasonable to expect that improvements in understanding of these systems, and innovation, will substantially improve
operational anticipatory services by 2040. However, this will rely on a concerted, global, scientific effort, not only on anticipating geophysical
hazards, but ensuring that enhanced skills are built into risk reduction. This paper reviews the nature of the hazards and the relevant current
science, focusing upon anticipation of the location, severity and timing of the most destructive events. It attempts to identify the most
potentially fruitful research directions in terms of impact reduction as well as their successful application.
Risk of another incident in Southeast Asia is uniquely high – geology proves.
Huppert ‘6
(et al; Professor Herbert Eric Huppert is an Australian-born geophysicist living in Britain. He has been Professor of Theoretical
Geophysics and Foundation Director for The Institute of Theoretical Geophysics at Cambridge University since 1989 – “Extreme
natural hazards: population growth, globalization and environmental change” – From the Journal: Philosophical Transactions A
– Each issue of Philosophical Transactions A is devoted to a specific area of the mathematical, physical and engineering
sciences. This area will define a research frontier that is advancing rapidly, often bridging traditional disciplines. All articles are
peer reviewed and edited to the highest standards. We currently publish 24 issues per year and, along with all Royal Society journals, we
are committed to archiving and providing perpetual access. Aug 15th – http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/364/1845/1875.long#aff1)
Earthquakes remain the most difficult of the natural hazards to predict and forecast. Areas at risk from earthquakes are mostly well-known and
forensic geological and historical studies can identify fault zones that have accumulated strain over long periods of time. However, it is
exceedingly difficult to provide predictions on the timing and magnitude of an earthquake. Pessimism about a universal rule for earthquake
prediction is widespread among specialists (e.g. Jackson 2004; Kanamori 2006), and may be physically precluded, although there are counter
views (Uyeda & Meguro 2004). Misconceptions
have also been revealed by the Asian earthquake. For example, senior
officials concluded that another very large magnitude earthquake would be unlikely in southeast Asia
since the stress built up had been relieved. However, as detailed by Sieh (2006) and Kanamori (2006), large
earthquakes are commonly followed by further large earthquakes in neighbouring regions. For example,
stress transfer led to another rupture in the Sumatra region on an adjacent segment of the fault in March 2005,
triggering a magnitude 8.7 earthquake and a 3 m tsunami. The faults to the southeast of the epicentre of the Sumatran
earthquake are still building up stress, and the chances of neighbouring faults also failing become greater
not less. Sumatra remains a highly threatened region where investment in preparedness and mitigation
may save many lives (Sieh 2006).