1AC Flight370 v.1 - Spartan Debate Institutes

Contention One – Inherency
US had deployed sonar searches for Flight 370, but will now bail. Search will
shift to other countries and private contractors.
Siegel ‘14
Matt Siegel, Senior Political and General News Correspondent for Thomson Reuters based in Australia.
“United States the first country to scale back its spending on costly Flight MH370 search, source says”
Reuters – April 30, 2014 – http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/04/30/united-states-the-first-country-to-scale-backits-spending-on-costly-flight-mh370-search-source-says/
With the search for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 entering a new, much longer phase, the countries
involved must decide how much they are prepared to spend on the operation and what they stand
to lose if they hold back.
The search is already set to be the most costly in aviation history and spending will rise
significantly as underwater drones focus on a larger area of the seabed that Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said on Monday
could take six to eight months to search. But despite U.S. President Barack Obama
publicly promising to commit
more assets, the United States appears keen to begin passing on the costs of providing
sophisticated sonar equipment that will form the backbone of the expanded hunt. That means
Australia, China and Malaysia – the countries most closely involved in the operation – look set to bear the
financial and logistical burden of a potentially lengthy and expensive search. “We’re already at tens of millions. Is it
worth hundreds of millions?” a senior U.S. defence official asked last week. “I don’t know. That’s for them to decide.” He
made it clear that Washington was intent on spending less from now on , making it the first
major donor country to scale back its financial commitment to the search. “We’re not going to
pay to perpetually use the equipment on an indefinite basis. Basically from here on out –
starting next week or so – they need to pick up the contract,” he said. At least $44 million was spent on the
deployment of military ships and aircraft in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea in the first month of the search, about the same
as was spent on the whole underwater search for Air France’s Flight AF447, which crashed into the Mid-Atlantic in 2009. The
Malaysian jetliner carrying 239 people disappeared en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing more than seven weeks ago, and huge
surface and underwater searches have failed to solve the mystery of what happened. That mystery has major implications for airline
manufacturers such as Boeing, which builds the 777 model that crashed and is awaiting a verdict as to what went wrong. Malaysia is
leading an investigation into the crash, but Australia has a key role in coordinating the hunt since the plane is believed to have
crashed in its search and rescue zone. Abbott said finding any wreckage on the ocean surface was now highly unlikely and Australia
would forge ahead with the upcoming phase of the search despite it likely costing A$60-million. He added that while private
companies under contract to Australia would soon be taking over from the military assets
dispatched in the wake of the crash, he would be “seeking some appropriate contribution from other nations.”
The US has specifically ended subsurface surveys – phasing-out Bluefin
Telegraph – May 5th
2014 – The Telegraph is a daily morning broadsheet newspaper, published in London and distributed throughout the
United Kingdom and internationally – “MH370: we won't give up search for Malaysia Airlines jet, governments
pledge” – May 5th, 2014 – This was originally a Reuters report –
No trace of Flight MH370 has been found since it vanished on a scheduled service from Kuala Lumpur to
Beijing on March 8, despite the most intensive search in commercial aviation history. A majority of the 239 people
on board were Chinese nationals. Experts have narrowed the search area where the plane is presumed to have crashed to
a large arc of the Indian Ocean about 1,000 miles northwest of the west Australian city of Perth. But after weeks of scouring millions
of square kilometres without finding any sign of debris, Australian authorities have called off the air and surface search. A
search phase costing around A$60 million (£33m) will begin after existing visual and sonar search data is
analysed and a contractor is found to lease the sophisticated equipment needed, the officials said
after meeting in Canberra. Financial responsibility is a major focus of the talks and Australian Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss
seemed to open the door to Boeing, which produced the 777-200ER jet, and engine maker Rolls-Royce, to contribute financially.
"They also have a vested interested in what happened on MH370 so they can be confident about the quality of their product, or take
remedial action if there was some part of the aircraft that contributed to this accident," he told reporters. "So, I think we will be
looking for increasing involvement from the manufacturers, and their host countries." Last week, Malaysia released its most
comprehensive account yet of what happened to Flight MH370, detailing the route the plane probably took as it veered off course
and the confusion that followed. The officials have said the new focus will be on 24,000 sq mile of seabed in the Indian Ocean that
could take eight months or more to search. U.S. President Barack Obama
had publicly promised to commit more
assets, but government sources say the United States is keen to begin passing on the costs of
providing the expensive sonar equipment the officials say they are trying to source. The United States said over
the weekend that it would only contribute its sophisticated Bluefin -21 underwater drone for one
more month, placing pressure on Australia, China and Malaysia to find funding for the next
phase of the search. "At the request of the Australian Government, the U.S. Navy will
continue supporting the MH370 subsurface search effort with the Bluefin-21 side scan sonar for
approximately 4 more weeks," U.S. Navy Commander William Marks of the 7th Fleet said. For now the search is on
hold as the Ocean Shield, an Australian naval vessel carrying the drone, resupplies and conducts maintenance at a military base in
Western Australia. The officials will meet again in Canberra on Wednesday, they said, where they will begin thrashing out the details
of how to proceed and who precisely will shoulder the costs of doing so.
(Note to students: Bluefin or “Bluefin-21” is the name of an underwater drone. The US ended
Bluefin searches for Flight 370 in late May. The Aff will argue that Bluefin searches have not only
stopped – but that they weren’t suitable technology in the first place. Bluefin is designed to
search at depths of 14,700 feet – which is not deep enough for this area of the Southern Indian
Ocean. The US “pushed” Bluefin to go a little deeper – by some reports up to 18,000 feet.
Technical problems ensued. Orion/CURV is designed to go 20,000 feet deep…. “Ocean Shield” –
internally referenced – is the name of the Australian vessel that carries such equipment. In April,
Australia assumed a lead role in the search).
Seafloor Topography
Advantange One – Seafloor Topography
Science has much to learn about Oceans. 370’s search zone holds unique
knowledge gaps vital for better forecasting of natural disasters. Surveys at
greater depths are key.
Smith & Marks ‘14
Walter H.F. Smith is a Geophysicist in NOAA's Laboratory for Satellite Altimetry and Chair of the scientific and
technical sub-committee of GEBCOthis link opens in a new window, the international and intergovernmental
committee for the General Bathymetric Charts of the Oceans. Smith earned a B.Sc. at the University of Southern
California, M.A., M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees at Columbia University, and was a post-doctoral fellow at the Institute for
Geophysics and Planetary Physics of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography before joining NOAA in 1992. Karen
Marks has worked as a Geophysicist since 1990 at the NOAA Laboratory for Satellite Altimetry of the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Silver Spring, Maryland, USA. She received a B.S. in Geology from the
University of Florida, an M.S. in Geophysics from Boston College, and a Ph.D. in Geophysics from the University of
Houston, with a dissertation on the geophysics of the Australian-Antarctic Discordance Zone. – Eos, Vol. 95, No. 21,
May 27th 2014 – Full Journal Title is: “Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union”. It is a weekly magazine of
geophysics. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2014EO210001/pdf
The depths in Figure 1 are from GEBCO [2010], which uses satellite altimetry to interpolate gaps between ship survey data publicly
available in open sources [Smith and Sandwell, 1994, 1997]. The accuracy of the positions and depths in these survey data limits the
accuracy of the satellite estimates. In addition, depth
estimates from satellite altimetry are most accurate
where the seafloor topography is moderate and composed of oceanic crust overlain by less than 200 meters
of sediment [Smith and Sandwell, 1994]. Whittaker et al. [2013] estimate sediment thicknesses in the area
varying from 12 meters to 1.5 kilometers, and Deep Sea Drilling Project site 256 (gray dot in Figure 1) found 251 meters of
sediment [Davies et al., 1974]. The seabed in the MH370 search area records a complex geologic history of
the breakup of Australia, India, and Antarctica approximately 130 million years ago [Williams et al.,
2013a]. The shallowest depth in the area shown in Figure 1 is about 237 meters on Broken Ridge, a structure related to the
separation of Australia and Antarctica whose conjugate, the Kerguelen Plateau, lies on the Antarctic plate. Within the acoustic
search zone of Figure 1, the shallowest depth is about 1637 meters at the summit of Batavia Plateau. The deepest point in the area
shown also lies within the acoustic search zone, where the trough of the Wallaby- Zenith Fracture Zone plunges to an estimated
7883 meters, just south of the Zenith Plateau. These plateaus are fragments of continental crust, leftovers of Indo-Australian
continental breakup [Williams et al., 2013b], and are embedded in old, deep seafloor. The search
for airplane debris in
the open ocean is not without precedent: On 1 June 2009, Air France flight AF447 disappeared over
the Atlantic Ocean. However, the present search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 takes place
under very different circumstances. When AF447 disappeared, there was little doubt about
where it would be found. The flight had not deviated significantly from its intended path from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, and
the aircraft was routinely sending messages monitoring the health of its flight systems along with its position. Warning and failure
messages generated by these systems in the last few minutes of flight helped to locate the crash site, and a surface search there
found floating debris and fuel slicks the very next day. In addition, the AF447 crash
site was in an area already
survey (MBES and GPS), and this knowledge
100% covered by a previous state-of-the-art bathymetric
of the undersea terrain helped searchers select and program autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) to search for
the black boxes. Even so, they were not recovered until nearly 2 years after the crash. In comparison, the MH370 crash
site is very poorly known. There are no measured depths in public databases at the locations
where ping contacts were reported. Satellite altimetry estimates that depths at the Chinese and Australian
contact locations are about 4300 and 5160 meters, respectively, but these estimates are quite uncertain and might be in error
by approximately 250 meters or more. Selecting an appropriate AUV and programming its search path require knowledge of the
terrain. A
Bluefin 21 AUV initially deployed over Zenith Plateau to search for debris, for example, was not
designed to operate at depths below 4500 meters. Lack of knowledge of seafloor topography
has other consequences . Bottom topography steers surface currents [Gille et al., 2004] while bottom roughness controls
ocean mixing rates [Kunze and Llewellyn Smith, 2004],
accuracy of forecasts of
and poor knowledge of these characteristics limits the
everything from the path of floating debris to the path of
and the future of climate
[Mofjeld et al., 2004]
[Jayne et al., 2004]. The state of knowledge of the seafloor in the MH370 search area, although
poor, is typical of that in most of Earth’s oceans, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere. In many remote ocean basins the majority
of available data are celestially navigated analog measurements [Smith, 1993] because systematic exploration of the oceans seems
to have ceased in the early 1970s [Smith, 1993, 1998; Wessel and Chandler, 2011], leaving the ocean floors about as sparsely
covered as the interstate highway system covers the United States [see Smith and Sandwell, 2004, Figure 2]. When these sparse
soundings are interpolated by satellite altimetry, as in Figure 1, the resulting knowledge of seafloor topography is 15 times worse in
the horizontal and 250 times worse in the vertical than our knowledge of Martian topography [Smith, 2004]. Although a new
bathymetric satellite altimeter mission could improve this situation significantly [Smith and Sandwell, 2004], ships
with echo
sounders remain the best technology for ocean mapping . The global ocean deeper than 500 meters (that is,
deeper than the continental shelves) could be fully surveyed with state-of-the art navigation and acoustic multibeam systems with a
total effort of about 200 ship-years of vessel activity at a total cost less than that of a typical planetary exploration mission [Carron et
al., 2001]. Until there is such an effort, knowledge of Earth’s ocean floors will remain limited to the resolution available from satellite
altimetry, which is vastly poorer than our knowledge of the topographies of Earth’s Moon, Mars, and Venus. Perhaps the data
collected during the search for MH370 will be contributed to public databanks and will be a start of
greater efforts to map Earth’s ocean floor.
(Note to students: Air France flight, or AF447, was a 2009 flight that departed from Rio de
Janeiro in transit to Paris. It crashed near the coast of Brazil. It took about two years to recover
the bulk of the wreckage. As you read about this Aff, you’ll notice that references in AF447
come-up frequently. It is worth noting that science was much more familiar with the seafloor
topography of area of the Atlantic Ocean where AF447 crashed…. The phrase “AUV” appears in
this card. It means “autonomous underwater vehicle”. Bluefin and CURV are examples of
autonomous underwater vehicles…. “Tsunamis” – for those unfamiliar – are “tidal waves”.)
This knowledge also boosts information that’s vital to marine conservation and
cures from medicinal biodiversity.
Amos ‘14
Jonathan Amos, BBC Science Correspondent – internally quoting Walter H.F. Smith and Karen Marks. Both are expert
Geophysicists at the NOAA – “MH370 spur to 'better ocean mapping'” – BBC News – May 27th, 2014 –
Drs Walter Smith and Karen Marks have assessed the paucity of bathymetric data in the region in an
article for EOS Transactions, the weekly magazine of the American Geophysical Union. The pair work for the US National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (Noaa). They say only two publically accessible data-acquisition sorties have been conducted close
to where search vessels made possible black box detections, and "both expeditions occurred prior to the use of modern multibeam
echo sounders, so depth measurements were collected by single, wide-beam echo sounders that recorded on analogue paper
scrolls, the digitizing of which is often in error by hundreds of metres". Modern MBES uses GPS to precisely tie measurements to a
particular location. The equipment can not only sense depth very accurately (to an error typically of 2%), but can also return
information on seafloor hardness - something that would be important in looking for wreckage in soft sediment. Just
5% of a
vast region, 2,000km by 1,400km, which includes the search locality, has any sort of direct depth measurement, Smith
and Marks say. The rest - 95% - is covered by maps that are an interpolation of satellite data. These have a
resolution no better than 20km. Maps of the arid surface of Mars are considerably better. "The state of
knowledge of the seafloor in the MH370 search area, although poor, is typical of that in most of Earth's oceans, particularly in the
Southern Hemisphere," the pair write. "In many remote ocean basins the majority of available data are celestially navigated
analogue measurements because systematic exploration of the oceans seems to have ceased in the early 1970s, leaving the ocean
floors about as sparsely covered as the interstate highway system covers the United States. "When these sparse soundings are
interpolated by satellite altimetry, the resulting knowledge of seafloor topography is 15 times worse in the horizontal and 250 times
worse in the vertical than our knowledge of Martian topography." Smith and Marks hope that the detailed survey work now being
conducted in the search for MH370 will be a catalyst to gather better data in other parts of the globe. High-resolution
bathymetry has myriad uses. "Better knowledge of the ocean floor means better knowledge of
fish habitats. This is important for marine conservation, and could help us find biological
resources including new medicines ," Dr Smith told BBC News.
(Note to students – “Bathymetry” is the study of underwater depth of lake or ocean floors….
“Medicinal biodiversity” is the idea that plants and animals have information in their genetic
codes that could be of use when humanity confronts a disease).
This knowledge is also key to marine conservation and cures from medicinal
Amos ‘14
Jonathan Amos, BBC Science Correspondent – internally quoting Walter H.F. Smith and Karen Marks. Both are expert
Geophysicists at the NOAA – “MH370 spur to 'better ocean mapping'” – BBC News – May 27th, 2014 –
Drs Walter Smith and Karen Marks have assessed the paucity of bathymetric data in the region in an
article for EOS Transactions, the weekly magazine of the American Geophysical Union. The pair work for the US National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (Noaa). They say only two publically accessible data-acquisition sorties have been conducted close
to where search vessels made possible black box detections, and "both expeditions occurred prior to the use of modern multibeam
echo sounders, so depth measurements were collected by single, wide-beam echo sounders that recorded on analogue paper
scrolls, the digitizing of which is often in error by hundreds of metres". Modern MBES uses GPS to precisely tie measurements to a
particular location. The equipment can not only sense depth very accurately (to an error typically of 2%), but can also return
information on seafloor hardness - something that would be important in looking for wreckage in soft sediment. Just
5% of a
vast region, 2,000km by 1,400km, which includes the search locality, has any sort of direct depth measurement, Smith
and Marks say. The rest - 95% - is covered by maps that are an interpolation of satellite data. These have a
resolution no better than 20km. Maps of the arid surface of Mars are considerably better. "The state of
knowledge of the seafloor in the MH370 search area, although poor, is typical of that in most of Earth's oceans, particularly in the
Southern Hemisphere," the pair write. "In many remote ocean basins the majority of available data are celestially navigated
analogue measurements because systematic exploration of the oceans seems to have ceased in the early 1970s, leaving the ocean
floors about as sparsely covered as the interstate highway system covers the United States. "When these sparse soundings are
interpolated by satellite altimetry, the resulting knowledge of seafloor topography is 15 times worse in the horizontal and 250 times
worse in the vertical than our knowledge of Martian topography." Smith and Marks hope that the detailed survey work now being
conducted in the search for MH370 will be a catalyst to gather better data in other parts of the globe. High-resolution
bathymetry has myriad uses. "Better knowledge of the ocean floor means better knowledge of
fish habitats. This is important for marine conservation, and could help us find biological
resources including new medicines ," Dr Smith told BBC News.
(Note to students: “Medicinal biodiversity” is the idea that plants and animals have information
in their genetic codes that could be of use when humanity confronts a disease).
Mutating viruses coming. We should maximize knowledge from medicinal
biodiversity to lower the risks.
McNeely ‘6
Jeffrey A McNeely Chief Scientist IUCN. Gland. Switzerland – from the chapter “Risks to People of Losing Medicinal
Species” – from the book – Conserving medicinal species : securing a healthy future p. 22-24
Human diseases, and the species to treat them, are influenced profoundly by the global
ecosystem changes that are taking place. Urbanisation alters the dynamics of disease transfer as an increased density of
hosts typically increases chances of transmission (e.g., influenza); large scale development projects may alter host dynamics or
disease dynamics or both (e.g., irrigation projects increasing the incidence of schistosomiasis); climate change may alter the range of
vector-bome diseases (e.g., malaria); human expansion into new territories may expose people to newly discovered diseases (e.g.,
haemorrhagic fevers such as the Ebola virus in Africa); and translocations of ballast water, changes in water temperature and marine
pollution may cause toxic red tides which can promote the spread of bacteria and viruses such as those that cause cholera and
hepatitis A. Globalisation is, more broadly, bringing with it a series of new threats to both medicinal species and environmental
health. Viruses are a particular problem because they are so difficult to cure; while vaccines for viruses
such as smallpox, polio, and Yellow fever have proven effective, even very substantial investments to find a cure for AIDS have thus
far proven only marginally effective. Even worse, the global
changes that are affecting many parts of the
world are expected to expand the ranges of many viruses that are potentially dangerous to
humans. Moving into wilderness areas brings people into contact with a wider range of viruses, while air travel carries viruses
around the globe, as a sort of excess baggage. A particularly worrisome mechanism is genetic exchange
between viruses infecting people and wild or domestic animals, with the two viruses picking up genes from each
other, enabling the virus to produce a new outer coat and so evade the human immune system
(Miller. 1989). This is the main mechanism by which influenza pandemics arise, often involving an influenza virus that infects humans
and one that is carried by ducks, including wild ducks, and other species of birds. As humans spread into more nesting areas of wild
birds, opportunities for this genetic exchange may increase. As indicated by recent outbreaks of avian influenza in many parts of
Asia, this is a very real threat. Becoming part of the global economy appears to have encouraged many people to believe that human
health is no longer dependent on a healthy natural world. Health has become a personal issue, with both prevention and cure
centred on the individual (McMichael et al. 1999). However, health is also a characteristic of populations, and looking at the issue
from the larger perspective of society can lead us in a very different direction. Of course, it is the individual who finally contracts any
particular disease, but the risk of doing so is influenced significantly by the ecological context within which the population lives.
Climate change is likely to affect the ecology of many diseases and insect and arthropod disease transmitters (vectors) such as those
responsible for malaria, dengue, schistosomiasis, yellow fever, onchocerciasis, lymphatic filariasis. leishmaniasis, and American and
African trypanosomiasis. Increases in the incidence of viral tick-borne encephalitis in Sweden have been linked already to recent
milder winters and the earlier arrival of spring. Pollution is a significant global change factor that is threatening many species of
animals. In the US, for example, some 27% of vertebrates and 66% of the invertebrates on the Federal Endangered Species List are
damaged by pollutants; and almost all of the 70 species of threatened mussels are harmed by pollutants (Wilcove et al.. 1998).
Agricultural pollutants that enter lakes and rivers as run-off from farming operations are the worst problem (Richter et al; 1997), but
the problem of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) affects many plant and animal species. The previous discussion may have left the
impression that in some cases animals are disease reservoirs which are best done without, and some wild plants can be even worse
(Anderson et al., 2004). However,
the loss of medicinal species carries numerous hazards for people .
Again, this discussion will introduce briefly a few points for consideration. With the formidable array of threats discussed above,
many medicinal species are at significant risk of extinction. Surely,
an optimist might argue, alternative
medicines can be found, and biotechnology is finding new ways of producing pharmaceuticals that do not necessarily
depend on a wild source. But that argument misses the point: the loss of medicinal species can have
profound influences on many aspects of human health, of which losing a source of medicine is only the first. While
lab researchers are certainly able to discover remarkable pharmaceuticals, nature is even better
and many of the pharmacologically active ingredients are highly unlikely to be found in the lab (Chrvian,
2002). For example, the 500 species of cone snails (Conidae) each have an estimated 50-100 distinct toxins to immobilise prey. The
toxins are highly selective in their receptor binding sites, making them very valuable to biomedical research, with over 2600 studies
published since 1980. However, of the estimated 50,000 conotoxins, only about 100 have been investigated so far, leaving many
more to be studied for their benefits to human health. These species are being harvested heavily for both their toxins and their
attractive shells, posing a very real threat to the survival of at least some populations. Chrvian et al. (2003) conclude that 'cone snails
may contain the largest and most clinically important pharmacopoeia of any genus in nature. To lose them with be a self-destructive
act of unparalleled folly." Scientists already know
many of the species that have medicinal value, but many
more species have not yet been surveyed. While we will never know what we have lost before
we knew about it, conserving the maximum biodiversity would seem a sound risk-adverse
strategy in maintaining future options.
Those outbreaks risk extinction.
Yule ‘13
(et al; Jeffrey V. Yule – Herbert McElveen Professor of Applied and Natural Sciences At the School of Biological Sciences, Louisiana
Tech University, Published April 2nd – Humanities 2013, 2, 147–159; doi:10.3390/h2020147)
Since the 1940s, humans in industrialized nations have been relatively sheltered from the threat that
infectious disease once posed. Modern antibiotics and antivirals have controlled pathogens that once
devastated human populations, but these drugs often remain effective only briefly.
Unprecedentedly large, dense human populations characteristic of modern societies coupled with rapid global travel
create a situation in which emerging pathogens can move much more efficiently between
hosts. Rates of future human mortality from emerging infectious diseases may depend on the levels of
biodiversity that remain in unpopulated regions, which suggests that protection from novel infectious
disease may be what has been, until recently, an overlooked benefit of biodiversity. We have assumed
that humanity’s future will unfold in a way that avoids any of a number of global disasters for Homo
sapiens sapiens. An equally reasonable but less optimistic assessment could take exception to that
position. A variety of things could go badly wrong for humanity . Global human N may not stabilize at or below
where it stands now without being pushed there by some form(s) of crisis that result from humans exceeding global K. As a result,
anthropogenic factors from the intentionally harmful (e.g., warfare) to the unintentionally disastrous (e.g., agricultural practices
leading to topsoil erosion and desertification) could occur singly or in conjunction with one another, with a variety of natural
disasters (e.g., volcanic eruptions, earthquakes), and with disasters that straddle the boundary of natural and anthropogenic, the
sorts of scenarios that otherwise could have been avoided or their impacts lessened with more forethought (e.g., outbreaks
of infectious disease that move easily through dense human population centers and cannot be readily treated
due to pathogen drug resistance). Although we cannot rule out such eventualities, speculation about the future of
humanity is inherently more interesting if it proceeds on the assumption that the species will be at
least moderately successful beyond the short- to medium-term. However , it may not , and the potential
failure of our species has considerable biological implications.
Future diseases address normal take-outs. They’ll mutate; spread globally; and
if they burn-out, they’ll be more explosive. We’ll need cures from medicinal
McNeely ‘6
(et al; Jeffrey A McNeely Chief Scientist IUCN. Gland. Switzerland – from the chapter “The Future of Medicinal
Biodiversity” – a section from the book: Conserving Medicinal Species Securing a Healthy Future – available at:
The introduction of new agricultural practices, or expansion of existing practices, can also increase epidemiological risks through
changing ecological relationships. A particularly
worrisome mechanism is genetic exchange between viruses
the two viruses picking up genes from each other,
enabling the virus to produce a new outer coat and so evade the human immune system (Miller,
infecting people and wild or domestic animals, with
1989). This is the main mechanism by which influenza pandemics arise, often involving an influenza virus that infects humans and
one that is carried by ducks, including wild ducks, and other species of birds. Many believe the recent outbreak of H5N1 avian
influenza arose this way. As humans spread into more nesting areas of wild birds, opportunities for this genetic
are likely to increase, with global air travel enabling the virus to spread around the world,
before its symptoms are expressed. Animal populations that are displaced by habitat alteration can provide new
habitats for pathogens or can carry their pathogens to new areas and new species. Because populations of humans or
animals exposed
to a new infectious organism tend to experience disease in an explosive
manner rather than the sporadic and lower-level outbreaks of disease that characterise endemic infectious
organisms, these 'invasive species' are likely to be especially dangerous. Thus, habitat fragmentation, already
identified as a major threat to biodiversity, can also increase both human and wildlife susceptibility to introduced diseases (MEA,
2005b). Some health concerns resulting from habitat degradation relate to specific biomes. Infectious diseases have often been
associated with wetlands, leading to their modification as a public health measure. Other kinds of water resources development may
increase the risk of disease. Four main diseases are commonly associated with water development projects - schistosomiasis,
lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis and malaria - because of their wide distribution and serious symptoms. Many other diseases, such
as cholera, dysentery, and encephalitis, are also linked to water. As demand for more water development projects increases and
natural wetlands are modified to provide greater flows of economic benefits, an ecological approach has been recommended to
wetlands management and health assessment (Zimermann, 2001; MEA, 2005b). This will involve dealing with an entire landscape,
addressing spatial boundaries, and ensuring that cross-boundary interactions are incorporated in planning decisions. Tropical forests
are not amenable to intervention for control of insect vectors, and it often is difficult to establish effective health care and
surveillance systems to serve the needs of indigenous or migrant populations. Where health care systems do exist, they are likely to
be less able to respond to ecosystem changes projected over the next few decades, especially if resources for public health continue
to diminish. Thus, changes associated with diseases of the tropical forest and its interface, and the consequences of continuing
forest loss to human and wildlife health, will be less predictable in the future. The impacts of deforestation and climate change are
particularly potent combinations that create conditions conducive to the emergence and spread of disease. As
the rate of
change continues to accelerate, we should expect more uncertainty in the future. This implies
that medicinal biodiversity is likely to be even more important in the future, to help rural people
address the challenges of new diseases and living conditions.
US Soft Power
Advantage Two – US soft power
Success in finding 370 is key to the global reach of US soft power.
Zappone ‘14
Chris Zappone – Foreign News editor at the newspaper The Age. Also writes for the Sydney Morning Herald. Formerly
wrote for CNN. “MH 370 Malaysia Airlines search has shades of Cold War contest” – The Cold War Daily – March 25th
– http://acoldwarmentality.wordpress.com/2014/03/25/mh370-malaysia-airlines-search-has-shades-of-cold-warcontest/
Since Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 went missing, there have been moments when the mystery of the plane’s fate
been freighted with geopolitical importance . Obviously, for people in the know, the satellite and search
capabilities of the countries involved must have been very instructive for the rival nations. No doubt the US, China, India, Japan,
Australia have taken a lot of interest in what each other can sense via satellite and other means. But there has also been the
challenge of the nations trying to achieve a task whose dimensions have been largely unknowable at times. The fact that the
search relied on sensitive satellite and radar technology gives the moment a quality of geopolitical
competition that has echoes of the historical Cold War. Moreover, there has been a huge, global
audience following this event in real time, giving an adventure-like quality to the mystery of the
plane’s whereabouts. It’s worth lingering on what a decisive find of the wreckage, or discovery of
the cause of the incident could do for a country’s standing. This is the ultimate soft-power prize.
Families grieve and the Malaysian elite cope with the political fallout but for a lot of the world this event is really about
which nation is more capable of finding a solution to a problem whose extact nature is not readily
known. It reminds me of early spaceflight efforts in a way – a nation’s narrative is about its ability to succeed in a
dealing with an issue whose parameters are unknown, to step into a situation and create the reality through technology and
determination. This is a subtle point – but central to the jockeying for position going on in the Indo-Pacific and more broadly
globally. Any
country that can prevail and succeed in such a confounding situation will gain in the global
public’s eyes.
Waning US global image means Russian expansionism can succeed in Former
Soviet States.
Lankina – April 15th
(et al; Dr. Tomila Lankina – teaches political scientists and IR at the London School of Economics –
“What Putin gets about soft power” – a guest post at Monkey Cage, a blog run by the Washington Post – April 15,
2014 – http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/15/what-putin-gets-about-soft-power/)
Much of the commentary on Russia’s recent annexation of the Crimea has focused on Russia’s hard
power—its geo-political designs in the so-called near abroad, ostensible security vulnerabilities to NATO’s eastward expansion, strategic objectives,
and military capabilities. These questions are not moot and have a strong sense of urgency for leaders in Ukraine, Moldova, or even Kazakhstan
nervously pondering Russia’s next moves. Yet an
excessive focus on the hard aspects of Russia’s power risks obscuring
the Kremlin’s skillful manipulation of soft power —a factor perhaps equally important in accounting
for the swiftness of “operation Crimea” as the shady men in balaclavas appearing on the peninsula’s shores. The concept of soft
power has in fact gained substantial traction in recent years in Russia’s foreign policy circles, most recently finding its way into the country’s official
2013 Foreign Policy Concept. The Kremlin ideologues’ peculiar interpretation of soft power dismayed Joseph Nye, who developed and popularized the
concept. According to Nye, Moscow, like Beijing, did not understand soft power, which is the power to attract and co-opt, rather than coerce or
financially induce others to do what you want. In particular, he questioned Russia’s political values; problematized the perceived legitimacy of its
foreign policy; and highlighted that society, and not the government is the main instrument of a country’s soft power. Yet, over the last few years, Putin
has shown himself to be a significantly more artful player in the “smart power” game, skillfully combining elements of both soft and hard power in
pursuing his foreign policy objectives. Russia’s steep learning curve in manipulating soft power has important policy implications. Soft
power, as
about attraction. Underestimating the true magnitude of Russia’s attraction to a
variety of constituencies and audiences risks further miscalculations of Russia’s intentions by Western policy
makers. One reason for the relative neglect of Putin’s brand of authoritarian soft power is the earlier assumption by many observers—including by
Nye reminds us, is
one of the authors of this piece—of a teleological process of a gradual diffusion of democracy and associated values among post-communist nations. A
growing number of observers of post-communist politics are now reconciling themselves to the reality that some
states may be not only
“impervious” fortresses against particular external influences, but could become western democracy “resister states,” or
even active agents in their own right diffusing their own ideas and understandings as to the structuring, functions, and values of political institutions,
the economy, and society. One example of such non-democratic value projection is the Kremlin ideologues’ concept of
“sovereign democracy” whereby states are free to develop their own understandings of democracy, ostensibly suited to the particularities of their
historical paths, culture, and tradition. Ivan Krastev maintains that this notion “embodies
Putin’s Russian nostalgia for the
power of ideological attraction enjoyed by the Soviet Union. . . It embodies Russia’s ideological ambition
to be ‘the other Europe’ – an alternative to the European Union.” These ambitions and alternatives are not
forward-looking; rather, they derive from the continued hold of Soviet-era symbols among segments of post-Soviet populations. As evidence, note the
many monuments to Lenin that continue to dot post-Soviet provincial towns; Soviet-era cultural and linguistic ties binding the former Soviet republics
to Russia. At the center of
Russia’s strategy to exert influence in its neighborhood
and promote a worldview
consistent with Russia’s national interest is state control over popular media outlets and the accessibility of Russian state television channels to
Russian-speaking viewers abroad. Russia’s state-controlled television channels reportedly enjoy greater popularity in Belarus and Moldova than those
countries’ domestic TV outlets. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to portray Russia’s projection of its soft power solely in top-down terms. “If not by
tanks then by banks?” reads the title of a paper by a perceptive scholar of Russia’s soft power in the post-Soviet states. Russia’s large economy, fueled
by petro-dollars, is highly attractive to the tens of thousands of migrants from resource poor economies in Central Asia, and indeed for those from
countries in the Western part of the post-Soviet region like Moldova. The same types of societal “linkages” that arguably facilitate the spread of
democracy can have the opposite effect of diffusing authoritarian values when the more economically, culturally, or socially attractive state happens to
be Putin’s Russia. Russia’s soft power thus rests on a peculiar blend of state-promoted ideology of national exclusivity, manipulation of symbols and
nostalgia for the halcyon days of the Soviet past, Russia’s genuine economic and political attractiveness for migrants escaping far more ghastly political
and economic environments, and Russian-state media whipped up frenzy about an ostensible threat to the Russian ethnos. Underpinning
soft power in foreign policy, Nye argues, are legitimacy and moral authority—resources arguably
lacking in Russia’s arsenal of attractions and ostensibly found in abundance in the West. Yet, if there was
one issue on which Putin would see eye to eye with many an astute observer of European or American
politics, it would be the perception of the fragile and besieged nature of the Western liberal democratic order at home and of
the questionable legitimacy of Western states’ policies abroad. “What’s gone wrong with democracy?” quips the
cover feature of a recent issue of the Economist magazine. The extent of the demise of the West is of course a matter of
debate, yet the Kremlin readily capitalizes on this sentiment to beat the drums of the superiority
of his alternative vision of domestic and global order. The underlying premise in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 is the
perception of the West as a source of instability and danger in the international system—be it through causing economic and financial crises;
intervening in regional crises without a UN mandate; or meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states in the name of democracy promotion.
Joseph Nye has argued that Russia has had to resort to hard power, including military force, partly because of the weakness of its soft power. Yet,
given the resonance of the Kremlin’s message—of the decay of the liberal world order, the West’s double standards in
the application of international law, and its ostensibly weakening moral authority—among a variety of domestic and external audiences, Putin’s “hard
power” could perversely amplify Russia’s soft power. The West
should be less worried about the distorted view of reality of one
that he has succeeded in promoting, distorting, or amplifying
man in the Kremlin, and more about the hold of the messages
among the many in the society at home and indeed abroad.
(Note to students: “The Kremlin” – as it appears in this evidence – is referring to the government
of the Russia…. “Operation Crimea” – in this context – is referring to the Russian aggression to
seize control of territory recognized – by most – as belonging to Ukraine. Crimea is a peninsula
in Eastern Europe. As of the time of this writing, Crimea is occupied by Russia. However, most
countries do not recognize the Russian occupation as legal, and classify Crimea as Ukrainian
If that expansionism takes hold, US-Russia confrontation becomes inevitable by
Goodrich ‘11
(Laura – Senior Eurasia Analyst for Stratfor and is a specialist in the former Soviet states. Ms. Goodrich lived in Russia
during the Yeltsin-Putin transition. There, she worked as a professor at Tomsk University. She holds degrees in
Russian language; Russian, Eastern European and Eurasian studies; Slavic literature and religious studies from both
Tomsk Polytechnical University and the University of Texas. “A New Russian Empire: What Exactly Is Putin Planning?”
– Economy Watch – November 7th – fhttp://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/a-newrussian-empire-what-exactly-is-putin-planning.08-11.html?page=full)
Over the past six years, Russia has pushed back to some degree against Western influence in
most of its former Soviet states. One reason for this success is that the United States has been preoccupied with other
issues, mostly in the Middle East and South Asia. Moreover, Washington has held the misconception that Russia
will not formally attempt to re-create a kind of empire. But, as has been seen throughout history, it must.
Putin announced in September that he would seek to return to the Russian presidency in 2012, and he has started laying out
his goals for his new reign. He said Russia would formalize its relationship with former Soviet states by
creating a Eurasia Union ( EuU) ; other former Soviet states proposed the concept nearly a decade ago, but Russia is now
in a position in which it can begin implementing it. Russia will begin this new iteration of a Russian empire by creating a union with
former Soviet states based on Moscow’s current associations, such as the Customs Union, the Union State and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. This
will allow the EuU to strategically encompass both the economic and
security spheres. The forthcoming EuU is not a re-creation of the Soviet Union. Putin understands the inherent vulnerabilities
Russia would face in bearing the economic and strategic burden of taking care of so many people across nearly 9 million square
miles. This was one of the Soviet Union’s greatest weaknesses: trying to control so much directly. Instead, Putin is creating a union in
which Moscow would influence foreign policy and security but would not be responsible for most of the inner workings of each
country. Russia simply does not have the means to support such an intensive strategy. Moscow does not feel the need to sort
through Kyrgyz political theater or support Ukraine’s economy to control those countries. The
Kremlin intends to have
the EuU fully formed by 2015, when Russia believes the United States will return its focus to Eurasia. Washington is
wrapping up its commitments to Iraq this year and intends to end combat operations and greatly reduce forces in Afghanistan, so by
2015, the United States will have military and diplomatic attention to spare. This is
also the same time period in
which the US ballistic missile defense installations in Central Europe will break ground. To Russia, this
amounts to a US and pro-US front in Central Europe forming on the former Soviet (and future EuU)
borders. It is the creation of a new version of the Russian empire, combined with the US consolidation
of influence on that empire’s periphery that most likely will spark new hostilities between
Moscow and Washington .
(Note to students: The “Eurasia Union” – also called “EuU”, “EaEU”, or “EaU” – is an idea the
Putin has pushed and hopes to complete by Jan 1st, 2015. The goal is to create an economic
union – similar to the European Union – that would include Russia and “Former Soviet States”…
Some argue that the goal is not purely an economic Eurasian Union. This is fairly significant and
recent development. On May 29th, 2014, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed-on to the idea –
although details are still tentative. Russia is interested in an even-larger union.)
New tensions in that region increase miscalculation risk. Nuclear escalation
Thompson – April 28th
2014 – Dr. Loren Thompson – Prior to holding his present position, Thompson was Deputy Director of the Security
Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media
affairs at Georgetown. He also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He holds doctoral and
masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science
from Northeastern University. Thompson now focus on the strategic, economic and business implications of defense
spending as the chief operating officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source
Associates. He is also a contributor author for Forbes Magazine – “Four Ways The Ukraine Crisis Could Escalate To Use
Of Nuclear Weapons” – Forbes – April 28th, 2014 http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/fourways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/
Although the Obama Administration is responding cautiously to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s province of Crimea in March, its
credibility is on the line with regional allies and Russian leader Vladimir Putin has not been helpful in defusing the fears of his
neighbors. Having fomented revolt in eastern Ukraine, Moscow now says it might be forced to come to the aid of ethnic Russians
there (it has massed 40,000 troops on the other side of the border, in what was first called an exercise). Meanwhile, the U.S. has
increased its own military presence in the neighborhood, reiterating security guarantees to local members of NATO. So little by
little, tensions are ratcheting up. One facet of the regional military balance that bears
watching is the presence of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons on both sides. Once called tactical
nuclear weapons, these missiles, bombs and other devices were bought during the Cold War to compensate for
any shortfalls in conventional firepower during a conflict. According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional
Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local
allies in a war. Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal —
many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear “to place a
greater reliance on nuclear weapons” to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons. A 2011 study by the
respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian
doctrine explicitly recognizes
the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Not only does
Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate
a conflict. This
isn’t just Russian saber-rattling. The U.S. and its NATO partners too envision the possibility
use in a European war. The Obama Administration had the opportunity to back
away from such thinking in a 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and instead decided it would
retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe under a doctrine known as extended
deterrence. Eastern European nations that joined NATO after the Soviet collapse have been especially supportive of having U.S.
of nuclear
nuclear weapons nearby. So improbable though it may seem, doctrine and capabilities exist on both sides that could lead to nuclear
use in a confrontation over Ukraine. Here
are four ways that what started out as a local crisis could turn
into something much worse. Bad intelligence. As the U.S. has stumbled from one military misadventure to another over the last several decades, it has become clear that Washington isn’t
very good at interpreting intelligence. Even when vital information is available, it gets filtered by preconceptions and
bureaucratic processes so that the wrong conclusions are drawn. Similar problems exist in Moscow . For
instance, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 arose partly from Soviet leader Khrushchev’s assessment that President Kennedy was
weaker than he turned out to be, and the U.S. Navy nearly provoked use of a nuclear torpedo by a Russian submarine during the
blockade because it misjudged the enemy’s likely reaction to being threatened. It is easy to imagine similar misjudgments in Ukraine,
which Washington and Moscow approach from very different perspectives. Any sizable deployment of U.S. forces in the region could
provoke Russian escalation. Defective signaling.
When tensions are high,
rival leaders often seek to send signals about
their intentions as a way of shaping outcomes. But the meaning of such signals can easily be confused by the need of
leaders to address multiple audiences at the same time, and by the different frames of reference each side is applying. Even the
process of translation can change the apparent meaning of messages in subtle ways. So when Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke
this week (in English) about the possible need to come to the aid of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Washington had to guess
whether he was stating the public rationale for an invasion, sending a warning signal to Kiev about its internal counter-terror
campaign, or trying to accomplish some other purpose. Misinterpretation of such signals can
become a reciprocal
process that sends both sides up the “ladder of escalation” quickly, to a point where nuclear
use seems like the logical next step. Looming defeat. If military confrontation between Russia and NATO gave way to
conventional conflict, one side or the other would eventually face defeat. Russia has a distinct numerical advantage in the area
around Ukraine, but its military consists mainly of conscripts and is poorly equipped compared with Western counterparts.
Whichever side found itself losing would have to weigh the drawbacks of losing against those of escalating to the use of tactical
nuclear weapons. Moscow would have to contemplate the possibility of a permanent enemy presence near its heartland, while
Washington might face the collapse of NATO, its most important alliance. In such circumstances, the use of “only” one or two
tactical nuclear warheads to avert an outcome with such far-reaching consequences might seem reasonable — especially given the
existence of relevant capabilities and supportive doctrine on both sides. Command breakdown. Strategic nuclear weapons like
intercontinental ballistic missiles are tightly controlled by senior military leaders in Russia and America, making their unauthorized or
accidental use nearly impossible. That is less the case with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which at some point in the course of an
escalatory process need to be released to the control of local commanders if they are to have military utility. U.S. policy even
envisions letting allies deliver tactical warheads against enemy targets. Moscow probably doesn’t trust its allies to that degree, but
with more tactical nuclear weapons in more locations, there is a greater likelihood that local Russian commanders might have the
latitude to initiate nuclear use in the chaos of battle. Russian doctrine endorses nuclear-weapons use in response to conventional
aggression threatening the homeland, and obstacles to local initiative often break down once hostilities commence. When
consider all the processes working to degrade restraint
in wartime — poor intelligence, garbled
communication, battlefield setbacks, command attenuation, and a host of other influences — it
seems reasonable to
consider that a military confrontation between NATO and Russia might in some manner escalate out of control,
even to the point of using nuclear weapons. And because Ukraine is so close to the Russian heartland (about 250
miles from Moscow) there’s no telling what might happen once the nuclear “firebreak” is crosse d. All
this terminology — firebreaks, ladders of escalation, extended deterrence — was devised during the Cold War to deal with potential
warfighting scenarios in Europe. So if
there is a renewed possibility of tensions leading to war over
Ukraine (or some other former Soviet possession), perhaps the time has come to revive such
Asia Pivot
Advantage Three - Asia Pivot
Continued support for the 370 search is key to US credibility and its “Asia pivot”
Zappone ‘14
Chris Zappone – Foreign News editor at the newspaper The Age. Also writes for the Sydney Morning Herald. Formerly
wrote for CNN. “MH370: The Geopolitical Dimension — a list of events and angles” – The Cold War Daily – March 29th
– http://acoldwarmentality.wordpress.com/category/mh370/
The US has had a continual presence in the search efforts, either through direct participation in the search
flights. Much
like the US’s quick response to Tyhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013, lots of
US credibility in Asia is on the line . The motivation for the US in the MH370 search is for
Washington to show its continued role and relevance in the Indo-Pacific region, which supports
the broader US Pivot to Asia. Amid the understandably sharp words from China for Malaysia over
Kuala Lumpur’s handling of the matter, Malaysia has more comfortably turned to the US for
help with the investigation.
The search is no longer a pure humanitarian mission. It’s spilled-over to
geopolitical dimensions that intersect with the Asia Pivot.
Zappone ‘14
Chris Zappone – Foreign News editor at the newspaper The Age. Also writes for the Sydney Morning Herald. Formerly
wrote for CNN. “Rivalries, sensitivities form prism for MH370 search” – Sydney Morning Herald – April 21, 2014 –
The co-operation of militaries in the search for the missing Flight 370 has created a unique event in a region increasingly fraught
with rivalries. On one hand, global and regional powers are at pains to show off their military capabilities in conducting the search. A
British government statement on its submarine deployment earlier this month captures the mood: “While we do not routinely
comment on submarine operations, we can, exceptionally, confirm that HMS Tireless has been tasked to assist in the humanitarian
search mission for Flight MH370.” On the other hand, the fear of conflict in Asia has made countries wary of exposing too many of
their abilities in sensitive areas such as satellite imaging, surveillance technology and underwater listening. The search for the
Malaysia Airlines flight carrying 239 people has entered a "critical juncture", Malaysia's acting transport minister Hishammuddin
Hussein said on Friday, suggesting the lack of any findings will push authorities to discuss the "next move". An ex-RAAF officer now
active in the aerospace industry described the search, which has been going for six weeks, as a “really interesting dance” in which
civilian and international militaries “want to co-operate without disclosing or compromising their capabilities”. Global powers would
also be tempted to keep an eye on each others’ capabilities, the expert said. Military and commercial imaging satellites have
predictable, low-earth orbits. If photos released of a certain spot in the ocean are thought to have originated with classified
satellites, competing powers could triangulate which satellite is the source, potentially learning about its capabilities, he said. .
“Boiled down, it becomes a matter of maths.” And while governments peer at each others’ satellite abilities, it is expected that any
image that is too revealing of a nation’s capability would be “fuzzed-up” before public release. Driving these concerns are the vastly
strategic objectives of the countries involved, which loom behind the humanitarian mission to
determine the fate of the the plane. China, in addition to the concern for its 153 citizens on the flight, wants to
demonstrate the growing reach of its navy, its operational expertise, and the ease with which it can
deploy far from its shores. The United States wants to show its continued presence in the region, as part
of its pivot to Asia.
It also has an interest in learning what happened to the US-built plane. Australia can reinforce its image
as a vital regional power, able to forge co-operation among Asian neighbours. "It’s heart-rending to see the families [of the missing
passengers] in the middle of high-stakes intelligence games, but they
are caught in a global geopolitical game of
cat-and-mouse ," said US-based Everett Dolman, author of Astropolitik, a study of geopolitics and space. The
geopolitical setting had given the search a unique quality , Dr Dolman said. Military transparency, he said,
was typically considered a confidence-building measure in much of the West. In ‘‘much of Asia — and in every intelligence agency in
the world’’ the opposite view was held, he said. “If your opponents know precisely what your capabilities are, they can come up with
a plan to defeat you in detail." Behind
it all are the concerns of a potential Asian conflict involving China,
Japan and others. In this competitive sphere, countries are also pushing their technology to new
levels to find the missing plane. The Bluefin-21, the undersea drone contracted by the US
Navy, has dived "beyond its depth rating" of 4500 metres in an attempt to locate the plane's black
boxes. Earlier, Royal Australian Navy Commodore Peter Leavy detailed modifications made to RAAF’s P-3 acoustic processor used for
underwater listening. The changes were "only started after the MH370 aircraft was lost", he said. British satellite firm Inmarsat,
which operates 11 satellites in geostationary orbit, pulled a week of all-nighters for “an analysis that had never been done before”
that narrowed down a more precise point of where MH370 dropped off the satellite communication grid. That helped lead to the
current search zone, where the underwater pinging has been detected. These are the modifications and innovations linked to the
search for MH370 that the public knows about. With
so much national pride at stake at a time when a
peace in Asia is less certain, behind-the-scenes competition is likely.
370 search key to forging lasting allies and will spillover to security questions.
Brewster ‘14
David Brewster is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.
His is the author of the new book, India’s Ocean: the story of India’s bid for regional leadership. “The geopolitics of
flight MH370” – Pragmati: the Indian National Interest Review – May 2, 2014 –
Major international humanitarian and disaster relief efforts are becoming ever more important tools in
generating goodwill, demonstrating capabilities and reinforcing international relationships. The
efforts by the US, Indian, Australian and Japanese navies in providing humanitarian assistance in the wake
of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were seen being as a key factor in prompting the
development of closer maritime security relationships between those states. That is a process
that is still bearing fruit. The absence of China from international relief efforts in response to the
tsunami was also noted by many in the region. The international response to the MH370 disaster
could also have significant long term strategic implications.
The Pivot can build alliances that deter Chinese aggression. The US will need
more diplomatic credibility going forward.
Haddick ‘12
Robert, Managing Editor of Small Wars Journal and lead writer for the “This Week at War” column for Foreign Policy.
In addition to Foreign Policy and Small Wars Journal, Haddick's writing has been published in the New York Times, the
Wall Street Journal, Air & Space Power Journal, and other publications. He has appeared in many radio and television
interviews. This Week at War: An Arms Race America Can’t Win, 6-8-12.
In a speech delivered on June 2 to the Shangri-La Security Dialogue conference in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta attempted to
convince his audience that America's
"rebalancing" strategy to the Asia-Pacific region -- previous called a
"pivot" -- is serious and will be backed by expanded military power. Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be
positioned in the Pacific. He also openly discussed the controversial Air-Sea Battle concept, while denying that the reinforcements and new plans are a
challenge to China. He also promised to step up the presence of U.S. military forces in the region, both through new basing arrangements and by an
expanded list of training exercises with partner military forces. Panetta likely hoped his remarks would bolster the credibility of the administration's
strategy. On closer examination, there is less to Panetta's Pacific naval buildup than meets the eye. The U.S. Navy's intelligence office, by contrast,
expects China's naval expansion this decade to be more substantial, especially when it comes to its submarine force. The reinforcements that Panetta
discussed and new ideas like the Air-Sea Battle concept are necessary but insufficient responses to the worsening military trends in the region. The
United States should not expect to win an arms race in the Western Pacific. Instead, it will have to find other more enduring advantages if it hopes to
craft a sustainable strategy for the region. Panetta's promise to base 60 percent of the U.S. fleet in the Pacific was not news -- Navy Secretary Ray
Mabus announced this intention in a speech back in March. Panetta's assertion that there is currently a "50/50 percent split between the Pacific and
the Atlantic" is also not quite right. According to the department's website, of the Navy's 186 major conventional warships (aircraft carriers, cruisers,
destroyers, amphibious ships, and attack and cruise missile submarines), 101, or 54 percent, current have home ports on the Pacific Ocean. The Navy's
latest 30-year shipbuilding plan forecasts 181 of these major combat ships in the fleet in 2020. A 60 percent allocation implies 109 major combatants in
the Pacific in 2020, an increase of eight such ships from today. On the other hand, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) forecasts that China's navy
will own 106 major warships in 2020, up from 86 in 2009. Seventy-two of these are expected to be attack submarines, compared to 29 for the United
States in the Pacific in 2020, under the 60 percent allocation assumption. For the two decades beyond 2020, the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding plan projects
no increase in the number of major warships. China's long-range shipbuilding plans are unknown; however, its defense budget has increased at an 11.8
percent compound annual rate, after inflation, between 2000 and 2012, with no indications of any changes to that trend. Of course, counting ships
does not tell the whole story. Even more critical are the missions assigned to these ships and the conditions under which they will fight. In
hypothetical conflict between the United States and China for control of the South and East China
Seas, the continental power would enjoy substantial structural advantages over U.S. forces. China, for
instance, would be able to use its land-based air power, located at many dispersed and hardened bases, against naval
targets. The ONI forecasts China's inventory of maritime strike aircraft rising from 145 in 2009 to 348 by 2020. U.S. land-based air power in the Western
Pacific operates from just a few bases, which are vulnerable to missile attack from China (the Cold War-era Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
prevents the United States from developing theater-based surface-to-surface missiles with ranges sufficient to put Chinese bases at risk). A comparison
of ship counts similarly does not include China's land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, fired from mobile truck launchers. Nor does it account for China's
fleet of coastal patrol boats, also armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. The Air-Sea Battle concept began as an effort to improve staff coordination and
planning between the Navy and the Air Force in an effort to address the structural disadvantages these forces would have when going up against a
well-armed continental power like China. The concept is about creating operational synergies between the services. An example of this synergy
occurred in last year's campaign against Libya, when U.S. Navy cruise missiles destroyed Libya's air defense system, clearing the way for the U.S. Air
Force to operate freely over the country. But Air-Sea Battle still faces enormous challenges in overcoming the "home court" advantage a continental
power enjoys deploying its missile forces from hidden, dispersed, and hardened sites. In addition, the United States faces a steep "marginal cost"
problem with an opponent like China; additional defenses for U.S. ships are more expensive than additional Chinese missiles. And China can acquire
hundreds or even thousands of missiles for the cost of one major U.S. warship. Given these structural weaknesses, Air-Sea Battle's success will rely not
on endlessly parrying the enemy's missiles, but striking deeply at the adversary's command posts, communications networks, reconnaissance systems,
and basing hubs in order to prevent missiles from being launched in the first place. Such strikes would mean attacks on space systems, computer
networks, and infrastructure, with implications for the broader civilian economy and society. Some critics of Air-Sea Battle reason that raising the
stakes in this manner would make terminating a conflict much more difficult and would escalate the conflict into domains -- such as space and cyber -that are particular vulnerabilities for the United States. The United States won't be able to win an arms race against China and currently has no plans to
do so. Nor
can the Pentagon count on superior military technology; China already has impressive
scientific and engineering capabilities, which are only getting better. Instead, U.S.
policymakers need to discover enduring strategic advantages that don't require keeping a
qualitative or quantitative lead in weapons. Geography may be one such benefit. In a conflict, the so-called First Island Chain
that runs from Japan to Taiwan and then to the Philippines could become a barrier to the Chinese navy and provide outposts for U.S. and allied sensors
and missiles. China would likely view such preparations as a provocation, but from the allied perspective, they will complicate Chinese military planning.
Second, the United States and its allies are far more experienced at planning and conducting complicated military operations that require coordination
across countries and military services. With a long-established network of alliances and partnerships in the region, U.S. commanders and their
counterparts have accumulated decades of experience operating together. One aspect of Air-Sea Battle is to further extend this advantage. The
most powerful U.S. advantage is the alliance network itself. Washington's long list of treaty allies and partners provides
options for U.S. and allied policymakers and planners. The alliance network could also help convert the threat of
escalation to a U.S. advantage. The more U.S. military forces are able to disperse across the
region, at temporary or rotational basing arrangements, the more difficult it will be for China to gain an
advantage with military power. In order to achieve such an advantage, China will have to attack a wider
number of countries, bringing them into a war on the U.S. side. This prospect should deter conflict from
beginning . The more successful U.S. diplomacy is at building up a large network in the
region, the stronger the deterrent effect and the less risk assumed by each member. With its
outreach to ASEAN countries and others over the past decade, the United States seems to be on this path. New
rotational basing deals with Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines are more evidence of this approach. But more diplomatic
success will be required as the challenge from China increases. U.S. military planners face unfavorable trends in
the Western Pacific. Panetta and his lieutenants have sent reinforcements to the region and are rewriting their military doctrines. Although these
measures necessary, U.S. policymakers will need another way. Good
strategy requires finding enduring advantages. The
alliance network in the region provides U.S. commanders with partner military forces, basing options, operational experience, and
deterrence against escalation, advantages China won't match any time soon. In this sense, the solution to
the challenging military problem U.S. forces face in the Western Pacific will be found as much with more
diplomacy as with more firepower.
Successful Pivot dissuades both China and ASEAN partners from initiating
increasingly proactive stances in the South China Sea.
Chadha ‘14
(Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) is a Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses -- ASIAN STRATEGIC
REVIEW: US Pivot and Asian Security – a book edited by S.D. Muni, Vivek Chadha – From Chapter Three: “Military
Implications of the
US Rebalancing Strategy” – by Vivek Chadha –
The US rebalance or the pivot to the Asia-Pacific is not merely a military move aimed at readjusting the deployment of platforms
in light of the withdrawal from Iraq and drawdown from Afghanistan. It is the fulcrum of the US efforts to retain its economic growth, strategic
influence and competitive edge in all spheres. It is also about the often unsaid China factor—a factor that has the potential to impact every domain of
undeniable US leadership. It would be an overstatement to classify the rebalance as a paradigm shift in the US strategy for the region. The US has been
and is likely to remain a Pacific power in the foreseeable future. In the past, the pillars of its association with the region have been similar to the ones
proposed. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the US has remained a pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific, through its economic and military
strength and network of alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea and Australia. It has also maintained a substantial forward presence in Japan
and South Korea. This coupled with a generational lead in military technology has kept the US ahead of its rivals. It is through these salient pillars of its
strategy that the US has maintained a favourable environment in the Asia- Pacific region. It therefore emerges that the pivot or rebalance is not entirely
a fresh perspective, nor is it aimed at achieving anything substantially different. It does, however, reinforce the importance of the region, in light of the
emergence of China as the greatest threat to US supremacy and a desire to move away from nation building, which was a by-product of the war on
terror. Rebalancing rather than being a new strategy can be described as a readjustment of priorities and focus, backed by military capability. This
capability will mirror the policy through asset reallocation both between theatres and within the Asia-Pacific. In addition to the China factor, the
readjustment is likely to be impacted for the first time in the last five decades by the cloud of severe budgetary constraints. When these two factors are
viewed in concert, the challenges posed become evident. China is emerging as the largest trading partner in the area of focus of the pivot.1 Its strategic
influence is on the rise and it is competing with the US in all spheres for leadership, including military modernisation. Simultaneously, the US Armed
Forces are threatened by a $ 500 billion budget cut over the next decade. Therefore, the
rebalance should be seen as a larger
strategy of the US to maintain its slipping position as the strategic prime mover in the Asia-Pacific and by corelation the world. In doing so, it will deter the ability of China to disturb the regional status quo
within the financial constraints of depleting financial outlays. This will demand of the US both ingenuity and resilient partnerships for it
to remain a pre-eminent power in the region. The US is likely to pursue this goal through the following objectives: • Establish a military posture, which
has both deterrence and punitive capability in the region within its reducing means. • Maintain a generational lead in military technology over China, to
achieve its strategic objectives. • Create and
strengthen a network of allies
and partners, who have vested interests in building
their economies in an environment of peace and security. • Strike a
balance between credibility of alliances with
partner countries in the region and simultaneously discourage any temptation on their part to use
this as a leverage for escalating military tensions in bilateral disputes. The paper briefly traces the trajectory
of events leading to the announcement of rebalance by the US. It further analyses the factors that have forced a more proactive and vocal enunciation
of the policy. This is followed up by a focus on the military shift as a result of the rebalance strategy, its implications and finally the impact of
sequestration. The US “Pivot” to the Asia-Pacific or the “rebalancing”, as it was subsequently christened, was a shift waiting to happen after the end of
the Cold War. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as the preeminent power, the strategic significance of both
Europe and the Atlantic diminished. This intervening period witnessed the US in a state of strategic stall, with the absence of a potential adversary,
which could challenge the brief phase of unipolarity in world politics. Referring to this period, Condoleezza Rice, wrote: “That we did not know how to
think about what follows the US-Soviet confrontation is clear from the continued references to the ‘post Cold-War period’.”2 It was not until the rise of
China was finally acknowledged as a threat to US influence in the world in general and the Asia-Pacific region in particular that the need for a shift was
realised. Rice identifying the threat from China wrote in the year 2000: “What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests,
particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is
not a status-quo power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its favor [sic].”3 However, the open admission of a definitive threat
from China during the initial years of the Bush administration’s first tenure in the White House faded after the launch of the “war on terror”. The shift
in focus towards terrorism led to a softening of US focus on China, given the need for wide ranging cooperation against a common threat and the
inability to focus militarily on two major fronts. Thus, despite the threat perceptions enunciated by senior officials in the
Bush administration,
the pivot did happen, but it tuned towards Iraq and Afghanistan. This preoccupation with the
“war on terrorism” and a simultaneous economic slowdown, opened a window of opportunity for China to enlarge its area
of influence. Its core interests increased in rapid succession from Taiwan to Tibet and then the South and East China Seas4, bringing into focus the
disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.5 Chinese activism raised concerns amongst the US allies and partners
about the ability and lack of will of the sole superpower to assert its influence in the region. This was reinforced after the slowdown of the US and
to take a more
proactive stance in the South China Sea dispute.6 Reflecting on this strategic direction, the US clearly signalled its intent to
European economy in 2008. Joseph S. Nye felt that this very assessment led to an increase in Chinese activism and a desire
enlarge its role in the region in concert with its allies and partners.9 The amplification of this intent aimed at ensuring “security” in the region,
“international order”, which would guarantee the rights of countries and adherence to “international law”, thereby safeguarding freedom of
navigation. The specific contours of the US rebalance from the overall strategic perspective were outlined by the former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton when she said: “Our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working
relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a
broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.”10 Factors Influencing US Rebalancing The strategic guidance laid down by
the Department of Defense outlines the shifting contours of priorities for the US. It aims at a smaller footprint while countering terrorism through
surgical strikes, maintaining presence and influence to shape events in the Middle East, reducing presence in Europe, Africa and Latin America and
providing an impetus to its presence and focus on the Asia- Pacific.11 Amongst the areas of interest outlined, the Asia-Pacific has emerged as a priority
for the US in the foreseeable future. Given this reassessment of interests, a rebalance of strategic focus became inevitable. The US rebalancing has
been influenced by a number of factors. This paper will consider three, as a prelude to an assessment of its military implications. The visual aspect of
the US rebalancing, has been the redeployment of its military hardware, which became the focus of world attention. However, the shift is not merely
military in nature and more importantly it represents a strategic rebalance. This includes enhancing economic ties in the region, strengthening and
building partnerships with allies and friendly countries and finally ensuring that a stable environment can be ensured by deterring the disturbance of
status quo.12 The US decision to join the East Asia Summit indicated its willingness to increase its influence at the multilateral level.13 Similarly, an
impetus to bilateral ties, with specific focus on military engagement, is also evident. This is evident through stronger military ties with Australia, India,
Japan, Singapore and other countries of the region, as will be dealt with later in the paper. On the economic front, the US initiative to establish a TransPacific Partnership (TPP) with countries like Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam on November 12,
2011 was seen as an attempt to enhance trade, investment and influence.14 There is broad consensus on “ensuring that the United States plays a key
role in shaping Asian economic architecture will also affect its influence in the region.”15 This is seen in the US as the economic lever of the pivot to the
Asia-Pacific.16 The
feeling that the Asia-Pacific region had not received adequate attention in the recent past
was accentuated most by the rise of China. This was especially in light of China’s growing assertiveness as well as its enhanced
capability. It is evident from the article written by Condoleezza Rice in 2000 that China was firmly on the US radar. However, the rapidity of its rise
and growing assertiveness was a catalyst in the ensuring shift. This assertiveness has been most pronounced amongst the US partners
and allies in Southeast and East Asia, who have territorial disputes with China. The decision to include some of these disputes as core
issues by China, by implication, could lead to the use of force in case of a showdown. China’s state-owned
Global Times in a blunt warning wrote, “If these countries don’t want to change their ways with China,
they will need to prepare for the sound of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only
way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved.”17 China’s military capability gives it the ability to take pre-emptive action
to assert its territorial claims and simultaneously deter US intervention. This could become an important factor in the capacity of the US to retain its
influence in the region. China’s
ability to use force and its qualitative enhancement has been a subject
of debate in the past. However, recent advances have greatly augmented its capability . This is
increasingly becoming a cause for concern in the US. In its assessment, the US Department of Defense (DoD) China Report for 2012, says: “China’s
approach to dealing with this challenge is manifested in a sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might
deploy and or operate within the western Pacific, which the DoD characterizes [sic] as ‘anti-access’ and ‘area denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities.”
South China Sea war is coming in the squo. The US will get drawn-in. Miscalc is
Denmark – May 31st
2014 – Abraham M. Denmark is Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian
Research. He previously served as Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Could
Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?” – National Interest – May 31, 2014 –
One topic that is raised regularly in both countries is, a bit incongruously, Crimea. Elites
in both Manila and Vietnam see
much of themselves in Ukraine—a small nation embroiled in a serious territorial dispute with
their (relatively) economically vital and militarily dominant neighbor. Russia’s intervention and subsequent
annexation of Crimea seemed to demonstrate to leaders in Southeast Asia that economic dependence and military weakness is a geopolitical liability,
and that territorial integrity and national sovereignty are not inviolate in the twenty-first century. These countries
fear that Russia has
set the stage for China to use force to take control over disputed territories. As a reaction, they are
seeking to diversify their economies in order to reduce their dependence on China while also building their own military power somewhat reduce
China’s military advantage. Vietnam
has in recent years purchased 6 Kilo-class submarines from Russia, maritime patrol
aircraft from Canada, and Sigma Corvettes from the Netherlands. The Philippines has likewise announced plans to
increase its defense spending and to purchase three decommissioned Hamilton-class cutters from the U.S. Coast Guard, along with
twelve new FA-50 fighters from Korea. Both also seek to buttress their defense cooperation with the United States—Hanoi’s engagement with
Washington has increased noticeably in recent years, and Manila recently signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington to
strengthen defense cooperation and expand the American military presence in the Philippines.
Vietnam and the Philippines will
not stand idly by as China gradually erodes their hold on what they believe to be their
Yet they also do not want a war with China—their strategy appears to be focused on resisting China’s efforts to erode their claims
while buying time to build their power, reduce their dependence on China, and hope the international community will intervene. Manila has brought its
dispute with China to the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration, a decision from which is expected near the end of 2015. Moreover, both have turned to
ASEAN to bring added geopolitical weight to negotiations with Beijing to develop a legally binding maritime code of conduct in the South China Sea—an
agreement that would not affect the disputes themselves, but would considerably reduce tensions. Chilly Times Ahead The
future of these
disputes is not promising for long-term peace and stability. Neither side has demonstrated
any interest in backing down or compromising, and the potential for future escalation and
crisis is high . China’s approach to these disputes is particularly problematic. Its refusal to
compromise, its continued reliance on escalation, and its commitment to change the status
quo (no matter how gradually) is a recipe for persistent tension. Most troubling is the confidence with
which China approaches escalation. Beijing appears to see escalation as a tool that can be
used with absolute control and predictability. China’s strategists and policy makers are fairly new to major power
geopolitics, and have not learned the lessons their American and Russian counterparts learned during the Cold War: that escalation is a
dangerous tool, that an adversary can respond in very unpredictable ways, and that tension
can quickly spiral out of control. One problem on the near horizon is how China will react to the arrest of Chinese fishermen by the
Philippines. Beijing will certainly react, and will again seek to punish Manila and strengthen China’s claims in the process. One option would be to arrest
Philippine fishermen operating in waters claimed by China. Another more likely and more provocative response would be to evict the Philippine forces
currently on the grounded Sierra Madre on the Second Thomas Reef. China has already harassed routine efforts by the Philippines to resupply those
sailors, and may seek to tighten the blockade on the ship in order to force the sailors to withdraw. The potential for shots to be fired or another ship to
be rammed and sunk would be high, and lives may be lost. Without serious engagement, China is unlikely to back down. Beijing has painted this issue
as directly related to its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and its recent public marking of the 95th anniversary of the May 4 movement—in
which the existing government was overthrown by a popular uprising that judged Beijing as weak in the face of foreign exploitation—strongly suggests
that China’s leaders are sensitive to linkages between perceived weakness abroad and instability at home. With the growth of China’s economy likely to
slow dramatically in coming years, Beijing appears to see incidents like these as useful in stirring nationalist sentiments at home to buttress the popular
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Should
China use force against the Philippines, no matter how much Beijing
may try to describe the act as defensive or reactive, the United States would probably be drawn into the crisis—
certainly in a diplomatic sense, and potentially in a military sense as well. The United States will be unlikely to back down
in such a situation, as the credibility of America’s willingness to intervene overseas has
already come into question after decisions to not intervene in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or Assad’s crossing the chemical
weapons “redline” in Syria. While Washington would certainly attempt to de-escalate any crisis and prevent the use of force, it will also be sure to
demonstrate will and resolve in order to both deter hostilities and reassure its allies. While the
United States is not a party to these disputes
a major interest in seeing them resolved peacefully. A conflict in the South China Sea would be disastrous for
regional trade and for U.S.-China relations—both of which are of singular importance to the United States. The United States could
enhance deterrence for Beijing by raising the costs to China for additional incidents—potential initiatives include further
strengthening military cooperation with the other claimants in the South China Sea, building their
per se, it has
military capabilities, and enhancing mechanisms for multinational training and exercises. Additionally, Washington should work as an honest broker
among all parties to identify opportunities for de-escalation and to develop a roadmap to the peaceful resolution of disputes. The upcoming Strategic
and Economic Dialogue is an important opportunity for Beijing and Washington to speak directly about these issues and the dangers they post, and to
find a way to prevent a crisis. China
and other claimants in the S outh C hina S ea are on a collision
course, and it is incumbent on the United States to demonstrate leadership by forestalling a
future crisis that could throw the entire region into conflict. Unless the claimants are able to turn
away from aggression and see de-escalation as a useful tool of strategy, it is only a matter of time until Beijing
miscalculates and escalates
over a redline that leads to crisis and raises the potential for conflict. A mix of countries with
incompatible, apparently nonnegotiable interests willing to use force and unwilling to acknowledge any way out than the absolute capitulation of the
other side is a highly dangerous mix—this
is how wars start.
That escalates to a nuclear exchange
Goldstein ‘13
Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of
Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of
Pennsylvania, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, no
4, Spring, 2013, pp 49-89
In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either side could decide
that the risk of escalation introduced by conventional, space, or cyberattacks was worth running . Even
though no stake in a crisis would be high enough for either the United States or China to choose an
unrestrained nuclear exchange, some stakes might be high enough for either one to choose to
initiate military actions that elevate the risk of escalation to such a disastrous outcome.88 As
discussed above, both China and the United States have important interests over which they could find themselves locked in a war
threatening crisis in the Western Pacific. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese
and U.S. statements about the
in the South China Sea, for example, suggests that both sides attach
a high and perhaps increasing value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high enough to
contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that cannot be answered in advance. The most worrisome source
of instability, however, is clear—the temptation to use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain
bargaining leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowable risk of nuclear catastrophe
that both China and the United States will have incentives to manipulate.
handling of persistent disputes
Contention Two- Solvency
Deep Ocean searches are necessary. Only the US has the tech to find 370.
Lamothe ‘14
Dan Lamothe is an award-winning military journalist and war correspondent. He has written for Marine Corps Times
and the Military Times newspaper chain since 2008, traveling the world and writing extensively about the Afghanistan
war both from Washington and the war zone. He also has reported from Norway, Spain, Germany, the Republic of
Georgia and while underway with the U.S. Navy. Among his scoops, Lamothe reported exclusively in 2010 that the
Marine Corps had recommended that Marine Cpl. Dakota Meyer receive the Medal of Honor. The Complex,
maintained by Foreign Policy – MARCH 10, 2014 –
The Malaysia Airlines flight that mysteriously disappeared 35,000 feet over the Gulf of Thailand on March 8 has prompted
a massive maritime search involving dozens of aircraft and ships from 10 countries, including both the
United States and China. But it has also underscored the lingering technological shortcomings
and fragile communications networks bedeviling many of the nations in a region where territorial and political disputes
continue to simmer, analysts said. The U.S. Navy has dispatched two guided-missile destroyers, the USS Kidd and the USS Pinckney,
to assist in a search now spanning waters from Malaysia to Vietnam. The ships each carry two MH-60R Seahawk helicopters that are
designed for search-and-rescue missions and equipped with infrared cameras. The U.S.
with vessels from China, Singapore and Malaysia,
ships are working in tandem
Pentagon officials said Monday, but it wasn't immediately
clear how much they are in communication. The Pinckney investigated floating debris Sunday, but didn't find any pieces of the
missing airplane. The U.S. effort is bolstered by a single P-3C Orion, a maritime patrol aircraft equipped with high-tech antennas and
other surveillance equipment. The plane was originally designed to find enemy submarines. This time around, Navy officials hope it
will be able to find wreckage from the presumably downed plane. The U.S. also will keep the USNS John Ericsson, an oiler run by U.S.
Military Sealift Command, in the region to help if needed. It will allow the Seahawks to refuel quickly. Malaysia Airlines flight MH370
was a massive Boeing 777-200 aircraft bound for Beijing from Kuala Lumpur, and disappeared with some 227 passengers and 12
crew members aboard. The other
countries involved in the search include Vietnam , Singapore ,
Indonesia , Thailand, Australia, the Philippines and New Zealand.
Thus far, the countries appear to be
cooperating reasonably well on the search effort despite it occurring in close proximity with the South China Sea, an area rife with
territorial disputes between numerous nations.
But the United States is the only nation that has the
technological capability of searching deep below the surface for the missing plane , said
Christopher Harmer, a senior naval analyst with the Institute for the Study of War in
(Note to students: China has sent a survey vessel to the MH370 area. “Survey vessels” – in this
context – do not look for the plane per se, but map the general area to learn more about the
ocean terrain. That information can be of help in terms of where to start a search, where to not
go, etc. That information is also useful for scientists – as humanity lacks basic knowledge about
the depth and terrain of the Indian Ocean. This is called a “bathymetric” search. Bathymetry is
the study of the underwater depth of lake or ocean floors…. “Zhu Kezhen” is the name of the
Chinese survey ship that was conducting the bathymetric survey. To date, Zhu Kezhen has
suffered technical shortcomings.)
Depth of this search area means US assets key and commercial options won’t
work. Orion – unlike Bluefin – can solve.
Austin ‘14
Henry Austin joined NBC News as a contributor in June 2013, and covers domestic and foreign breaking stories for
NBCNews.com. Austin joined NBC News after more than 10 years as a reporter. After starting at British press agency
South West News Service, he moved to British newspapers The Sun and The People, before relocating to Canada to
help set up press agency Hot News. “Missing MH370: Only 'Handful' of Subs Capable of Hunting Jet” – NBC News
Reports – May 6th – http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-jet/missing-mh370-only-handful-subs-capablehunting-jet-n97901
Only "a handful" of submersible vehicles can search the depths of the southern Indian Ocean in the
area that is believed to be the final resting place of missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, experts said
Tuesday. Officials announced Monday that all of the data compiled in the hunt for the Boeing 777 will be re-examined to make sure
the right area is being scoured as part of a new $55 million phase of the operation. Capt. John Noble, the former general manager of
the International Salvage Union, told NBC News that it made sense to narrow down the search area as much as possible. “You'd
be lucky if there was a handful of vehicles that can to go to the sort depths of the ocean that
we are talking about here because they simply don't make them ,” Noble said. A U.S. Navy deep-tow
search system called the Orion might be an option, Noble said. It can search to a maximum depth of
20,000 feet of seawater, according the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving. The Orion would operate in tandem with a
remotely operated vehicle called Curv 21 which could salvage any wreckage. Most commercially owned remotely
operated vehicles (ROV’s) aren’t designed to go to those depths because there simply isn’t the
call for them , according to Dr. Simon Boxall at Britain’s University of Southampton. As a
result, many of those built are used for government research projects. They have a distinct
advantage over autonomous underwater vehicles like the Bluefin 21 sub which has been leading the
search, because their cameras allow a live view of the seabed he said. The Bluefin’s data can only be downloaded and analyzed by
researchers after it has resurfaced, he added.
The US’s Orion system is the only device that can pull-off the search.
Malaysia Kini ‘14
This evidence internally quotes John Noble, the former general manager of the International Salvage Union –
Malaysiakini.com offers alternative news and views of Malaysian. Updated daily, the site has won several awards for
its quality reporting. Malaysia Kini – May 7th – https://m.malaysiakini.com/news/262060
While expense is one obstacle, it
looks like technology could be another stumbling block in the way of
finding the plane or its flight recorder, which is believed to be lying at the bottom of the South
Indian Ocean. Experts tell NBC that a device has not been made that could do what MH370's
searchers are asking for. Capt. John Noble, the former general manager of the International
Salvage Union that represents marine salvors, says he what is needed is a device better than US’
autonomous underwater vehicle Bluefin- 21, with claws to pick up the blackbox and a in-built camera to give
visuals of the deep ocean bottom. However, such a device are only custom-made for government research
projects. Noble notes that the a US Navy deep-tow search system called the Orion, which could go
down 6kilometres into the sea, might be an option. The Orion would operate in tandem with a
remotely-operated vehicle called Curv 21, which he claims could salvage any wreckage.