History of Modern American
Science and Technology
Session 4
American Science and Technology
during the Cold War
Jokes for Physicists
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“George W. Goes to Heaven”
“Suitcase Bomb”
“Ed’s Got a Bomb”
“Less Edible Americans”
“Top Twenty”
“Garwin at the Guillotine”
Main Arguments
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“Science in Policy” and “Policy for Science” Were
Connected
Rationale for Federal Support of Science Shifted
during the Cold War
American Science Advisers Most Valuable for
Government due to Their Technological
Skepticism
The Goal of the President’s Science Advisory
Committee Was to Control the Nuclear Arms
Race and Promote Federal Support of Basic
Research
Technological Dissent Key to the Working of a
Democratic Society
Background on American Science
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Leaders of American Revolution,
Newtonian Science, and Enlightenment
Debate over the Role of Federal
Government in Science
John Quincy Adams’ “Lighthouse of the
Sky”
Technological Leap in Late 19th Century
Scientific Buildup in Early Twentieth
Century
Coming of Age of American Science
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1920s: Institutional Strength, the
Quantum Generation, and the Coming of
Refugees
World War II: Radar, Proximity Fuse,
Cryptology, and Atomic Bomb
Dominance of Federal Government in
American Science and Technology
Americanization of International Science
and Internationalization of American
Scientific Community: e.g., T. D. Lee and
C. N. Yang
Impact of the Cold War on
Science Policy
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Science Policy: “Science in Policy” and “Policy for
Science”
Dual Allegiance: Science or the Government?
Science in Policy
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Scientists’ Movement
The Nuclear Arms Race
H-bomb Debate of 1950
The Oppenheimer Case of 1954
The TCP Study of 1954
Policy for Science
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ONR
NSF Debate of 1950
AEC and High Energy Physics
Who’s Using Whom?
Shifting Rationales
for Science Funding
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Bush Report of 1945: Assembly-line Model
DuBridge-Rabi: Technological Evaluations
PSAC: Technological Skepticism
Sputnik: National Prestige
1960s: Education
1990s-present: American Competitiveness
The Sputnik Shock
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Rhetoric of American Technological
Superiority
Psychological Impact of Sputnik 10/4/57
Opinion Leaders vs. Average Citizens
White House Not Concerned
Sputnik “Has Done US a Good Turn”
Political and Public Pressure
“Missile Gap”
Ike, Sputnik, and PSAC
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Soviet launching of Sputnik, Oct. 4, 1957
Eisenhower meeting with the Science
Advisory Committee of the Office of
Defense Mobilization (ODM-SAC) in the
Executive Office of the President, Oct. 15,
1957
Eisenhower announced James Killian,
President of MIT, as science advisor, Nov.
7, 1957
White House announced the upgrading of
the ODM-SAC as the President’s Science
Advisory Committee
Traditional Account
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Launching of Sputnik made Eisenhower
realize the deficiency in the use of science
in policy and led him to establish the PSAC
system of presidential science advising.
It was a natural and logical sequence of
events that linked Sputnik with a reform in
American science advising and science
policy.
A New Perspective
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Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik and
establishment of the PSAC system of
science advising were not pre-ordained,
but shaped by a profound rethinking
about nuclear war, a debate over science
policy, and intense negotiations by rival
scientists and politicians over the meaning
of the Sputnik challenge.
Eisenhower’s Rethinking on Nuclear
War
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At a March 1957 meeting with ODM-SAC:
“re-evaluating war as an instrument of
policy,
Had focused on “how to deter war—which
has now become so destructive.”
June 1957: “There will be no such thing as
a victorious side in any global war of the
future.”
A Major Pre-Sputnik Debate on
Science Policy
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Spring 1957, Eisenhower grew concerned
over the rise of federal R&D, including
basic research funding
ODM-SAC scientists defended basic
research
Eisenhower agreed to protect basic
research but DOD, in cutting R&D, went
after basic research first
Scientists, including ODM-SAC,
demoralized
Public Negotiation of Sputnik’s Meaning
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Rival scientists put different spins on Sputnik
Edward Teller in media and Congress:
 Saw it as a military-technological threat
“worse than Pearl Harbor”
 Called for a military-technological response:
“We must win the H-war before It Starts!”
 “we must overcome the popular notion that
nuclear weapons are more immoral than
conventional weapons”
 “we must revamp our military planning to
fight and win a limited nuclear war.”
 Werner von Braun also saw space as battle
ground
Moderate Scientists
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I.I. Rabi in a meeting with Eisenhower:
 Saw it as a challenge to American science and
education: Soviets might overtake Americans
in science just as Americans overtook the
western Europeans a generation ago.
 Called for increased federal funding for
science and education
Test ban:
 Rabi: Despite Sputnik US had advantage and
should enter into test ban with Soviets
 Teller: US needed to catch up; Soviets could
always cheat
Eisenhower Chose ODM-SAC’s
Interpretation of Sputnik
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Nov. 7, 1957 Speech to Nation:
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Announced ODM-SAC member Killian as science
advisor
“My scientific friends told me”: We are ahead but
could fall behind if we do not increase support for
science education and basic research
Nov. 14, 1957, 2nd “chin-up” Speech:
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“My scientific advisers place this problem [science
education] above all other immediate tasks of
producing missiles, of developing new techniques in
the Armed Services.”
Eisenhower Grew Critical of Teller
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July 1957: When asked about science advising,
mentioned Waterman (NSF) and Bronk (NAS) as
well as AEC and DOD scientists
Pre-Sputnik (Summer 1957): Teller and
Lawrence made it “look like a crime to ban
[nuclear] tests.”
“The scientists today in this field seemed to be
running the Government rather than acting as
servants for the Government.”
Nov. 1957, Eisenhower complained about Teller's
Pearl Harbor analogy: “Scientists have suddenly
become military and political experts” and vice
versa .
Funding SLAC
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Project “M”
Rhetoric Shifted from Scientists to Politicians
National Prestige
Republican Accelerator
Politics of Big Science
Zuoyue Wang, “Politics of Big Science in the Cold
War,” Historical Studies in the Physical and
Biological Sciences 25, pt. 2 (1995).
Eisenhower, Sputnik, and PSAC
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Dec. 1960, Eisenhower to PSAC:
 “A deep sense of obligation.”
 “noted that more and more he has tended to put
science advice into more and more subjects of
national policy.”
Why?
 Because they agreed on the meaning of Sputnik
 PSAC was valuable to Eisenhower as an independent
voice of science speaking on not just the potentials
but, even more importantly, the limits of technological
solutions to social and political problems that became
fashionable in the wake of Sputnik.
Sputnik’s Shadow:
 Our own new age of technological enthusiasm
 Operation “Shock and Awe”
 We still need independent and expert voices of
technological skepticism
Eisenhower’s Thinking on Science,
Defense, and Space
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First Concern over National Security
Deterrence: Sufficiency, Not Excess
Against Glamorous Space Projects
No Enemy on the Moon
Genuine Interest in Space Exploration and Basic
Research
Saw Danger of Intensified Inter-Service Rivalry
Concerned with Garrison State, Big Government,
and Momentum of Military Industrial Complex
Eisenhower’s Legacy in Space and
Public Policy
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Space Program Should Be Guided by “Reason, Fact and
Logic”
Priorities Should Go to Scientific Exploration and National
Security but Not Propaganda Stunts
Policy Makers Should Try to Understand the Scientific
and Technical Aspects of Public Policy such as in Space
Policy Makers Should Be Aware of Unwarranted
Influence of Interested Parties in Pushing Space Program
in One Direction or Another
Public Understanding and Support Are Key to Successful
Public Policy
Foreign Policy Should Be Made on the Basis of Accurate
Intelligence and Understanding of the Limit of Am.
Power
Scientists Represent an Important, Independent Voice in
Public Policy, including Space and Defense Policy
Post-Eisenhower
Space Development
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Kennedy Launched Apollo against PSAC Advice
American Scientists Ambivalent toward Apollo
Excited about Landing but Misgiving about
Illusion of Technological Fixes and Impact on
Subsequent Direction of American Space
Program
JPL Mars Rovers Punctured Myth that Only Manin-Space Can Stir Public Interest
After Apollo Decision, PSAC Scientists Helped to
Ensure Its Success
New Members also Supported Manned Space for
Institutional Benefits
PSAC and Environmental Policy
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Use of Pesticides (1963), Report that
vindicated Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring
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Better science to control technological excess
Public right to know
Cautionary principle
Dynamic process of regulation
Wang, “Responding to Silent Spring,” Science
Communication 19, no. 4 (Dec. 1997).
Restoring the Quality of Our Environment
(1965), warning of global warming
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“By the year 2000 there will be about 25% more
carbon dioxide in our atmosphere than at
present.”
“This will modify the heat balance of the
atmosphere to such an extent that marked
changes in climate, not controllable through local
or even national efforts, could occur.”
Vietnam War Era
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Increasing Questioning of Priority of
Manned Space
Vietnam War Polarized American
Society and Scientific Community
PSAC Opposed Anti-Ballistic Missiles
(ABM) and Supersonic Transport
(SST) in late 1960s and early 1970s
PSAC also Opposed Vietnam War as
Misguided Use of American
Technological-Military Power
Nixon Abolished PSAC in 1973
Science Funding Declined during the
Vietnam War Period
Current Debate over Science,
Defense, and Space Policy
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George W. Bush: No Science Advisor until after 9/11
Jack Marburg (physicist): “Invisible Science Advisor” (Bob Park,
“What’s New,” 2/22/2008)
Ambitious Human Return to the Moon and Landing on Mars in View
of China’s and India’s Feats
But Budget Cuts on Scientific Exploration of Space
Political Benefits to Southern (Red?) States?
Hilary Clinton: Reorient Space Program to Focus on Scientific
Exploration and Environmental Problems on Earth
Attacks on Scientific Integrity in Bush Administration:
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“Do You Support the President Politically?”
Censorship over Global Warming
Stem Cell Research
Support for Intelligent Design
Union of Concerned Scientists campaign for the integrity of science
in the federal government: www.ucsusa.org
We Still Need “Voice of Sense and Moderation” and Dissent of
Independent Scientists in the White House—an Important Part of
Eisenhower’s Legacy
For Further Reading and
Involvement
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Zuoyue Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow: The
President’s Science Advisory Committee and
Cold War America and articles on website:
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www.csupomona.edu/~zywang
Daniel Kevles, The Physicists
Union of Concerned Scientists website
(www.ucsusa.org) –sign petition on “Scientific
Integrity”
Robert Park of APS, “What’s New,” weekly email
on science and politics and website:
http://bobpark.physics.umd.edu/index.html