Sjedinjene Američke Države na početku 21. veka –
aktuelni trenutak, izazovi i perspektive jedine svetske
supersile
Sadržaj:
• I Aktuelni trenutak jedine svetske
supersile
• II Izazovi i izazivači jedinoj svetskoj
supersili
• III Perspektive: čiji će biti 21. vek?
• IV Literatura
I Aktuelni trenutak jedine svetske supersile
I Амерички колос: премоћ САД у светским
пословима на почетку 21. века
• “Joш од Римског царства није се
појавила ниједна земља која је била
толико изнад других. Према речима
часописа “The Economist”, Сједињене
Државе су опкорачиле глобус попут
колоса. Оне доминирају пословањем,
трговином и комуникацијама; њихова
привреда је најуспешнија у свету,
њихова војна моћ је без премца”
(Џозеф Нај)
• (Paul Kennedy) “Nothing has ever existed like this
disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the
comparative defense spending and military personnel
statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation
comes close.
• The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap, Britain's army
was much smaller than European armies, and even the
Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies-right
now all the other navies in the world combined could
not dent American maritime supremacy.
•
Charlemagne's empire was merely Western European in
its reach. The Roman empire stretched farther afield,
but there was another great empire in Persia, and a
larger one in China. There is, therefore, no comparison.”
• Сједињене Америчке Државе као
једина светска суперсила
• Сједињене Америчке Државе као
светска империја
• The United Stаtes of America as
country in position of primacy
• Сједињене Америчке Државе као
земља која је у позицији светског
хегемона
• Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine says that he now defines
the United States as a "hyperpower," a new term that
he thinks best describes "a country that is dominant or
predominant in all categories.
• "Superpower," in his view, was a Cold War word that
reflected military capabilities of both the Soviet Union
and the United States. But now, the breadth of American
strength is unique, extending beyond economics,
technology or military might to "this domination of
attitudes, concepts, language and modes of life.
• Mr. Vedrine described France as a "power of world
influence," situated in a category coming immediately
after the United States, and including, he declared,
"Germany, Britain, Russia, Japan, India, and perhaps
others."
• Сједињене Америчке Државе као Überpower (Josef
Joffe)
1.1. Нека теоријска
појашњења
Велике силе, суперсиле...
• “Бити Велика сила – по дефиницији,
држава која је способна да се носи
са било којом другом државом” (Пол
Кенеди)
• “Great Powers, as the words suggest,
are the most influential states in the
international system at any one time”
(Martin Griffiths, Terry O’ Callaghan)
• Термин Велике силе је први пут употребљен на
Бечком конгресу, 1815. године
• Великa силa – земља која је у стању да води
конвенционални рат са свим другим великим
силама, и да из тог рата изађе ако не
непоражена, а оно бар да може да нанесе велике
губитке најмоћнијој држави у међународном
систему којем припада. Са појавом нуклеарног
оружја, постало је јасно да уз конвенционално
наоружање и њега морате имати у својим рукама
да бисте се и даље рачунали као велика сила.
(Џон Миршајмер)
• Како се тврди у Пингвиновом речнику
међународних односа, употребом термина
суперсила означава се „појава нове класе
великих сила чија је моћ супериорнија (војноекономски посматрано) у односу на
традиционални појам европских великих сила“.
По ауторима речника, термин је смислио W. T.R.
Fox 1944. године. Видети: W. T.R. Fox, The SuperPowers: The United States, Britain and Soviet
Union- their Responsibility for the Peace, Harcourt,
Brace, New York, 1944. Наведено према: Graham
Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of
International Relations, Penguin Books, London,
1999,
• “We proposing the following definitional criteria for a
three-tiered scheme: superpowers and the great
powers at the system level, and regional powers at
the regional level” (Barry Buzan)
• Superpowers – The criteria for superpower status
are demanding that they require broad- spectrum
capabilities exercised across the whole international
system. Superpowers must possess first- class
military – political capabilities (as measured by the
standards of the day), and the economies to
support such capabilities…
Империје
• Empires, more than nation-states, are
the principal actors in the history of
world events. Much of what we call
history consists of the deeds of the 50
to 70 empires that once ruled multiple
peoples across large chunks of the
globe.
• Officially, there are no empires now,
only 190- plus nation-states. Yet the
ghosts of empires past continue to
stalk the Earth.
• “Imperije su oblici političke kontrole nad efektivnim suverenitetom
nekih političkih društava koje im nameću druga politička društva”
(Majkl Dojl)
• Sve imperije koje su tokom vekova uspostavljene imale su tri
zajednička obeležja: jedno se očituje u podređivanju, svaka
imperija je nejednak odnos, pri čemu je jedna strana superiorna a
druga inferiorna. Drugo se ogleda u prinudi. Iako veliki broj imperija
uključuje i saradnju, katkad ekstenzivnu saradnju između onih koji
vladaju i onih kojima se vlada, iza toga odnosa uvek stoji pretnja
silom, koja se katkad i realizuje, od strane imperije u cilju održavanja
vlastite kontrole. Treće određujuće obeležje sastoji se u
etničkoj, religioznoj ili rasnoj razlici – ili u nekoj njihovoj
kombinaciji – izemđu imperijalne sile i društva koje ona kontroliše.
Imperija je oblik diktature, ali osobenog tipa: diktature koju sprovode
stranci.
• Pojam “vlada” koji potiče od grčke reči za krmaniti, stariji je nego
termin imperija koji se izvodi iz latinske reči “komandovati”… Vlada je
opštiji pojam; imperija je samo jedna od mnogih oblika vladavine.
(Majkl Mandelbaum)
• Naglasak na kvalitetu odnosa između političkih jedinica a ne samo na
kvantitetu. Imperija može biti i regionalna po svom obimu
• “Empire is the rule exercised by one
nation over others both to regulate
their external behavior and to ensure
minimally acceptable forms of internal
behavior within the subordinate states.
Merely powerful states do the former,
but not the latter.” (Stephen Peter
Rosen)
• AN EMPIRE is a multinational or multiethnic state
that extends its influence through formal and
informal control of other polities. The Indian writer
Nirad Chaudhuri put it well: "There is no empire
without a conglomeration of linguistically, racially,
and culturally different nationalities and the
hegemony of one of them over the rest. The
heterogeneity and the domination are of the very
essence of imperial relations. An empire is
hierarchical. There may be in it, and has been, full
or partial freedom for individuals or groups to rise
from one level to another; but this has not modified
the stepped and stratified structure of the
organization.“ (Eliot A. Cohen)
Primacy
• Kao posledica rata u Iraku 2003. godine, drugi
analitičari opisuju međunarodni poredak kao
Američku svetsku imperiju. Na mnogo načina
metafora o imperiji je privlačna.
• Američka vojska ima globalni domašaj, sa bazama
širom sveta i njihovim regionalnim komandantima
koji ponekad deluju kao prokonzuli.
• Engleski je lingua franca kao što je to svojevremeno
bio Latinski jezik.
• Američka ekonomija je najveća na svetu, a
američka kultura je magnet drugim kulturama.
• Ipak, pogrešno je pomešati politiku prvenstva sa
politikom imperije.
• Sjedinjene Američke Države zasigurno nisu imperija
na način na koji mi mislimo o evropskim
prekomorskim imperijama iz devetnaestog i
dvadesetog veka, jer je suštinska osobina takvog
imperijalizma bila politička kontrola nad ostalim
delovima planete.
• Iako odnosi u kojima postoji nejednakost zasigurno
postoje između Sjedinjenih Država i slabijih sila i
lako mogu dovesti do jednog eksploatatorskog
odnosa sa američke strane, odsustvo formalne
političke kontrole nad tim državama, čini termin
"imperijalna" ne samo nedovoljno tačnim, nego i
potpuno pogrešnim...
• Sjedinjene Američke Države imaju više izvora moći nego što ih
je imala Velika Britanija na vrhuncu svoje imperijalne moći, ali
Sjedinjene Države imaju manje moći u smislu kontrole nad
ponašanjem i unutrašnjom politikom drugih zemalja, nego što
je to imala Britanija u doba kada je vladala četvrtinom Planete.
Na primer, škole u Keniji, izbori, proces donošenja zakona i
ubiranje poreza - da ne pominjemo spoljnu politiku zemlje bili su pod kontrolom britanskih zvaničnika.
• U poređenju sa tim, Sjedinjene Države imaju malo takve
kontrole u današnje vreme. Tokom 2003. godine Sjedinjene
Države nisu čak uspele da zadobiju glasove Meksika i Kine za
drugu rezoluciju o Iraku u Savetu bezbednosti Ujedinjenih
Nacija. Analitičari imperije odgovaraju da je termin "imperija"
samo metafora. Ipak, problem sa tom metaforom jeste da ona
podrazumeva kontrolu iz Vašingtona koja se teško uklapa sa
složenim načinom na koji je moć u svetu danas raspodeljena...
(Džozef Naj)
• The U. S. Position in the current World order is
best understood as one of primacy. The United
Stets is not a global hegemon, because it
cannot physically control the entire globe and
thus cannot compel other states to do whatever
it wants… Nonetheless, the United States is also
something more than “first among equals” …If
primacy is defined as being “first in order,
importance or authority” or holding “first or
chief place”, then it is an apt description of
America’s current position.” (Stephen M. Walt)
Хегемонија
• Americans, in short, don't "do" empire; they do "leadership"
instead, or, in more academic parlance, "hegemony."
• According to S. Ryan Johansson, the word "hegemony" was
used originally to describe the relationship of Athens to the
other Greek city-states that joined it in an alliance against the
Persian Empire. "Hegemony" in this case "mean[t] that
[Athens] organized and directed their combined efforts without
securing permanent political power over the other[s].“
• By contrast, according to the "world-system theory" of
Immanuel Wallerstein, "hegemony" means more than mere
leadership but less than outright empire. A hegemonic power is
"a state ... able to impose its set of rules on the interstate
system, and thereby create temporarily a new political order."
The hegemon also offers "certain extra advantages for
enterprises located within it or protected by it, advantages not
accorded by the 'market' but obtained through political
pressure."
• Yet another, narrower definition is offered by Geoffrey Pigman.
Pigman describes a hegemon's principal function as
underwriting a liberal international trading system that is
beneficial to the hegemon but, paradoxically, even more
beneficial to its potential rivals.
• Pigman traces this now widely used definition of the word back
to the economic historian Charles Kindleberger's seminal work
on the interwar economy, which describes a kind of
"hegemonic interregnum." After 1918, Kindleberger suggested,
the United Kingdom was too weakened by war to remain an
effective hegemon, but the United States was still too inhibited
by protectionism and isolationism to take over the role.
• This idea, which became known, somewhat inelegantly, as
"hegemonic stability theory," was later applied to the post1945 period by authors such as Arthur Stein, Susan Strange,
Henry Nau, and Joseph Nye.
1.2. The Foundations of American
Primacy
• “By virtually any measure, the United States
enjoys an asymmetry of power unseen since
the emergence of the modern states system.
Some leading powers in the past had gained
an advantage in one dimension or another –
for example, in 1850 Great Britain controlled
about 70 percent of Europe’s Wealth, while
the number two power, France, controlled
only 16 percent – but the United States is
the only Great Power in modern history to
establish a clear lead in virtually every
important dimension of power…
• The United States has the world’s largest
economy, an overwhelming military
advantage, a dominant position in key
international institutions, and far – reaching
cultural and ideological influence. Moreover,
these advantages are magnified by a
favorable geopolitical position. If primacy is
defined as being “first in order, importance
or authority” or holding “first or chief place”,
then it is an apt description of America’s
current position.” (Stephen M. Walt)
1.2.1. Economic Dominance
• Economic strength as foundation of national power
• The United States has been blessed with the world’s largest for
over a century
• The U.S. share of global production ballooned to nearly 50
percent after World War II – reflecting the damage that other
countries suffered during the war – and then gradually
declined as the rest of the world recovered. Nevertheless, it
has hovered between 25 and 30 percent from the 1960 to the
present, and the U. S. Economy is still the roughly 60 percent
larger than its nearest rival, Japan.
• The U. S. Economy is also more diverse and self-sufficient than
other major economic powers, making it less vulnerable to the
unexpected economic shifts
• Although the United States is more dependent on the outside
world than it was a generation ago, it still depends far less on
others than they depend on it
GDP real growth
Svet
GDP – Nominalni
1
Evropska unija
18,140,000
2
Sjedinjene Američke Države
14,260,000
3
Japan
4,924,000
4
5
Narodna Republika Kina
Nemačka
4,402,000
3,668,000
Francuska
2,866,000
7
Velika Britanija
2,674,000
8
Italija
2,399,000
9
Rusija
1,757,000
10
Španija
1,683,000
11
Brazil
1,665,000
6
Rank
Country
GDP (purchasing power parity)
Date of Information
1
World
$ 65,610,000,000,000
2007 est.
2
European Union
$ 14,380,000,000,000
2007 est.
3
United States
$ 13,840,000,000,000
2007 est.
4
China
$ 6,991,000,000,000
2007 est.
5
Japan
$ 4,290,000,000,000
2007 est.
6
India
$ 2,989,000,000,000
2007 est.
7
Germany
$ 2,810,000,000,000
2007 est.
8
United Kingdom
$ 2,137,000,000,000
2007 est.
9
Russia
$ 2,088,000,000,000
2007 est.
10
France
$ 2,047,000,000,000
2007 est.
11
Brazil
$ 1,836,000,000,000
2007 est.
12
Italy
$ 1,786,000,000,000
2007 est.
13
Spain
$ 1,352,000,000,000
2007 est.
14
Mexico
$ 1,346,000,000,000
2007 est.
15
Canada
$ 1,266,000,000,000
2007 est.
16
Korea, South
$ 1,201,000,000,000
2007 est.
17
Turkey
$ 888,000,000,000
2007 est.
18
Indonesia
$ 837,800,000,000
2007 est.
19
Australia
$ 760,800,000,000
2007 est.
20
Iran
$ 753,000,000,000
2007 est.
• In 2000, for example, only three countries
had lower ratios of trade to gross domestic
product (GDP) than the United States, and
only one of them was a major military
power. – with Argentina, Brazil and Japan
• For example, Chinese exports to the United
States were a whopping 5 percent of
Chinese GDP (19 percent of total Chinese
exports) and critical to Chinese economic
growth. U. S. exports to China, by contrast,
were a mere 0. 16 percent of U. S. GDP
• A state can be wealthy without being
powerful, of course – think of Brunei,
Kuwait, or Switzerland – but it is
impossible to be a Great Power without
a large diverse economy. In particular,
a strong economy enables a state to
create and equip a powerful military
force.
1.2.2. Military Supremacy –
Command of the Commons
• Today the United States is not only the world’ s foremost
economic power; it is the dominant military power as well
• While America’s military economic advantages are manifold, its
military lead is simply overwhelming.
• U. S. Defense expenditures in 2003 were nearly 40 percent of
the global total and almost seven times larger than that of the
number two power (China). To put it another way, U. S.
Defense spending was equal to the amount spent on defense
by the next thirteen countries combined.
• The United States also spends more to keep itself in the
vanguard of military technology. The U. S. Department of
Defense now spends over 50 billion dollars annually for
“research, development, testing, and evaluation”, an amount
larger than the entire defense budget of Germany, Great
Britain, France, Russia, Japan or China
• The United States deployed more than 500
000 troops in the Persian Gulf for Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm; mobilized
substantial air, ground, and naval forces in
Kosovo in 1999, and in Afghanistan in
2001; and then deployed more than 180 000
troops and other personnel to topple
Saddam Hussein in 2003.
• Over - Sea power projection capabilities
• The United States has the largest and
most sophisticated arsenal of strategic
nuclear weapons, and it is the only
country with global power projection
capability, stealth aircraft, a large
arsenal of precision guided munitions,
and integrated surveillance,
reconnaissance, and command-andcontrol capabilities.
“Command of the Commons- Military
foundation of U. S. Hegemony”
• One pillar of U.S. hegemony is the vast military power of the
United States.
• The U.S. military currently possesses command of the global
commons. Command of the commons is analogous to command
of the sea, or in Paul Kennedy’s words, it is analogous to
“naval mastery.” The “commons,” in the case of the sea and space,
are areas that belong to no one state and that provide access to
much of the globe. Airspace does technically belong to the countries
below it, but there are few countries that can deny their airspace
above 15,000 feet to U.S. warplanes. Command does not mean that
other states cannot use the commons in peacetime. Nor does it mean
that others cannot acquire military assets that can move through or
even exploit them when unhindered by the United States. Command
means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the
sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to
deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest
for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United
States. Having lost such a contest, they could not mount another
effort for a very long time, and the United States would preserve,
restore, and consolidate its hold after such a fight.
• Command of the commons is the key military enabler of
the U.S. global power position. It allows the United
States to exploit more fully other sources of power,
including its own economic and military might as well as
the economic and military might of its allies.
• Command of the commons also helps the United States
to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to
economic, military, and political assistance. Command of
the commons has permitted the United States to wage
war on short notice even where it has had little
permanent military presence. This was true of the 1991
Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and
the 2001 action in Afghanistan.
Command Of The Sea
• U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are perhaps the key
assets of U.S. open ocean antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
capability, which in turn is the key to maintaining command of
the sea.
• At more than $1 billion each (more than $2 billion each for the
new U.S. SSN), modern nuclear submarines are prohibitively
expensive for most states. Aside from the United States,
Britain, China, France, and Russia are the only other countries
that can build them, and China is scarcely able. Several
partially built nuclear attack submarines remained in Russian
yards in the late 1990s, but no new ones have been laid down.
Perhaps 20–30 Russian nuclear attack submarines remain in
service. Currently, the U.S. Navy has 54 SSNs in service and 4
under construction.
• The U.S. Navy also dominates the
surface of the oceans, with 11 aircraft
carriers capable of launching highperformance aircraft.
• The Carrier Mission is:
- To provide a credible, sustainable,
independent forward presence and
conventional deterrence in peacetime,
- To operate as the cornerstone of
joint/allied maritime expeditionary forces in
times of crisis, and
- To operate and support aircraft attacks on
enemies, protect friendly forces and engage
in sustained independent operations in war.
• The Soviet Union was just building its
first true aircraft carrier when its
political system collapsed. Aside from
France, which has 1, no other country
has any nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers. At $5 billion apiece for a
single U.S. Nimitz-class nuclear–
powered aircraft carrier, this is no
surprise.
• Moreover, the U.S. Navy operates for the
Marine Corps a feet of a dozen large
helicopter/VSTOL carriers, each almost twice
the size of the Royal Navy’s comparable (3
ship) Invincible class. To protect its aircraft
carriers and amphibious assets, the U.S.
Navy has commissioned 37 Arleigh - Burke–
class destroyers since 1991—billion-dollar
multimission platforms capable of antiair,
antisubmarine, and land-attack missions in
high-threat environments.
• 24 This vessel is surely the most capable
surface combatant in the world.
Command Of The Air
• and electronic intelligence aircraft allows the U.S
military to achieve the “suppression of enemy air
defenses” (SEAD); limit the effectiveness of enemy
radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and fighters;
and achieve the relatively safe exploitation of
enemy skies above 15,000 feet. Cheap and simple
air defense weapons, such as antiaircraft guns and
shoulderred lightweight SAMs, are largely ineffective
at these altitudes. Yet at these altitudes aircraft can
deliver precision-guided munitions with great
accuracy and lethality, if targets have been properly
located and identified.
Command of the Space
• Though the United States is not yet
committed to actual combat in or from
space, it spends vast amounts on
reconnaissance, navigation, and
communications satellites.
• These satellites provide a standing
infrastructure to conduct military
operations around the globe.
• the United States had 100 military satellites
and 150 commercial satellites in space in
2001, nearly half of all the active satellites in
space.
• According to Air Force Lt. Gen. T. Michael
Moseley, air component commander in the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003,
more than 50 satellites supported land, sea,
and air operations in every aspect of the
campaign.
• For fiscal years 2002–07, the Pentagon plans to
spend $165 billion on space-related activities.
• The NAVSTAR/GPS (global positioning system)
constellation of satellites, designed and operated by
the U.S. military but now widely utilized for civilian
purposes, permits highly precise navigation and
weapons guidance anywhere in the world. Full
exploitation of GPS by other military and civilian
users is permitted electronically by the United
States, but this permission is also electronically
revocable. It will not be easy for others to produce a
comparable system, though the European Union
intends to try. GPS cost $4.2 billion (in 1979 prices)
to bring to completion, significantly more money
than was originally projected.
• Hoewer, below 15,000 feet, within
several hundred kilometers of the
shore, and on the land, a contested
zone awaits United States. The
U.S. military hopes that it can
achieve the same degree of
dominance in this zone as it has in
the commons, though this is
unlikely to happen.
1.2.3. Institutional Influence
• The norms and rules that govern these
institutions will prevent any single state (or
group of states) from controlling them
completely, yet the United States plays a
unique role in the most important global
organizations.
• UN
• WTO
• NATO
• 22 percent of UN budget
• Who determines agenda of something,
he is powerful
• IMF, World bank
• “The record of landing from both
institutions strongly supports a pattern
of U. S. interests and preferences”
1.2.4. Cultural and Ideological Impact
• Another key advantage for the United States is its
ability to shape the preferences of others – to make
them want what America wants – through the
inherent attractiveness of U. S. culture, ideology
and institutions.
• The “soft power” is remains hard to define or
measure, but there is a little doubt that the United
States casts a long cultural and ideological shadow
over the rest of the world.
• English as a “lingua franca”
• American University system as a potent mechanism
for socializing foreign elites
• Nearly 600 000 foreign students at American universities in
2002/2003
• “If there is a global civilization, it is American. Nor is it just
McDonald’s and Hollywood, it is also Microsoft and Harvard.
Wealthy Romans used to send their children to Greek
Universities; today’s Greeks, that is, the Europeans, send their
kids to Roman, that is, American Universities.
• As of 2004, the top twenty five highest-grossing films of all
times were U. S. productions
• American consumer products and brand names are ubiquitous
• Free market and democratic governance become a world
model
• American way of life as a world way of life
1.2.5. The Blessing of Geography
• Economic, military, institutional and
cultural dominance may define U. S.
Primacy, but its geopolitical situation is
the icing on the cake.
• The United States is the only Power in
the Western Hemisphere, and it is
physically separated from the other
major powers by two enormous
oceanic moats
• America is blessed among the nations. On
the north, she had a weak neighbor; on the
south, another weak neighbor; on the east
fish, and the west, fish” (Jules Jusseraud,
French Ambassador to the U.S., 1925.)
• Because the other major powers lie in close
proximity to one another, they are inclined
to worry more about each other than they
do about the United States.
• Tеорија равнотеже претњи сматра да је
претња, односно њихова перцепција оно
против чега се државе удружују. Претња
се састоји од четири дела: процене
нечије моћи, близине (мисли се на
географски положај земље која се схвата
као претња у односу на оног ко претњу
перципира), офанзивних војних
капацитета које поседује и
агресивности намера (Stephen M. Walt)
1.2.6. Контекст
• “То да ли је држава данас моћна и
богата или није, не зависи од обиља
или сигурности њене моћи и
богатства, већ првенствено од
чињенице да ли њени суседи
поседују више или мање тога од ње.”
(фон Хорник, немачки
меркантилистички писац)
• Drugi problem tiče se određivanja koji
resursi pružaju najbolju osnovu za moć
u nekom određenom kontekstu.
Resursi moći uvek zavise od konteksta.
Tenkovi nisu tako dobri u močvarama;
u devetnaestom veku uranijum nije bio
resurs moći. U ranijim razdobljima
ljudske istorije bilo je lakše suditi o
vrednosti izvora moći. (Džozef Naj)
II Izazovi i izazivači jedinoj svetskoj supersili
• Sjedinjene Američke Države kao “depresivna
supersila” (Gabor Steingart – dopisnik
nemačkog časopisa “Der Spiegel” iz
Vašingtona)
• A “Three Thrillion War” – Joseph Stiglitz –
procena troškova rata u Iraku i Avganistanu
do 2017. godine
• Kako su Sjedinjene Američke Države za
samo par godina od “najmoćnije svetske
imperije ikada” postale “imperija čije je
vreme prošlo”?
• Nova administracija, novi ljudi, nova
politika?
Raspored moći u međunarodnim odnosima kao
međuzavisnost na više nivoa
• U globalnom informatičkom dobu, moć je među
državama raspodeljena po obrascu koji podseća na
složenu trodimenzionalnu šahovsku tablu, na kojoj se
igra odvija i horizontalno i vertikalno.
• Na vrhu šahovske table gde su političko-vojna
pitanja, vojna moć je uglavnom unipolarna sa
Sjedinjenim Državama kao jedinom supersilom, ali u
sredini table gde su ekonomska pitanja, Sjedinjene
Države nisu hegemon ili imperija, i moraju da se
cenjkaju sa Evropom sa jednakih pozicija kada
Evropa deluje kao ujedinjena celina.
• Na primer, povodom antimonopolskih ili pitanja koja
se odnose na privredu, one moraju naći kompromis,
da bi postigle sporazum.
• I na dnu table transnacionalnih odnosa koji prelaze
granice van kontrole vlada država i tako uključuju
raznovrsne aktere kao što su bankari i teroristi, moć se
haotično raspršava.
• Uzmimo kao dodatak pitanjima terorizma samo nekoliko
primera; privatni akteri na globalnom tržištu kapitala
ograničavaju način na koji se kamatne stope mogu
koristiti za upravljanje američkom ekonomijom, a trgovina
droge, AIDS, migracija stanovništva, i globalno zagrevanje
koji imaju duboke društvene korene u više od jedne zemlje,
izvan su kontrole američkih vlasti.
• U takvoj jednoj situaciji čini se da nema baš puno smisla
koristiti tradicionalne termine poput unipolarnost,
hegemonija ili imperija s ciljem da se opišu takvi problemi.
(Džozef Naj)
Да ли Америка може и хоће да буде
светска империја?
• „Tри дефицита“ са којима се Сједињене Америчке Државе
данас суочавају, а све у вези са евентуалним покушајем
ове земље да постану светска империја. Најал Фергусон
сматра да Америка „пати“ од дефицита војних трупа,
буџетског дефицита и дефицита пажње (мисли се на слабу
заинтересованост самих Американаца за тако нешто и за
светске послове уопште).
• На пример Велика Британија је 1920. године (у време
гушења тадашње побуне у Ираку) имала једног војника на
23 становника Ирака, данас један војник америчке војске
долази на 210 Ирачана. Проблем није у томе да
Американци немају довољан број младих људи (САД имају
већи број становника између 15 и 24. године него Ирак или
Авганистан), већ је проблем у томе, тврди он, да САД
преферирају да ниво својих војних снага држе на нивоу
релативно малог процента становништва.“
• Такође, он тврди да се због недостатка
воље и капацитета, али и огромних
унутрашњих проблема изазваних пре
свега енормним трошковима око
пензионог и социјалног осигурања
(рачуна се да ће у годинама које долазе),
Америка бити „кратка“ за неких 45 000
милијарди долара, колико износи разлика
између оног што треба исплатити у
корисницима тих осигурања и оног што ће
бити државни приходи.
• Према најновијем истраживању јавног мњења спроведеног
од стране Асошиејтед преса (Associated Press- Ipsos poll),
„иако 6 од 10 Американаца подржава Бушове поступке у
вези са самим нападом (мисли се на терористичке нападе
од 11. септембра 2001 – прим. Д. Ж.), половина од њих
сматра да су трошкови бробе против тероризма превисоки,
док 6 од 10 испитаника верује да ће рат у Ираку призвести
само још више антиамеричког тероризма...
• Такође, и Пју (Pew) истраживање проналази да „већина
Американаца верује да набољи начин да се умањи опасност
од терористичких напада на Сједињене Америчке Државе
није да се повећа већ да се смањи америчко војно
присуство у иностранству, што представља оштар заокрет у
односу на слично истраживање из 2002. године.“
• “Немогућ је покушај да се далеке
провинције држе у пoкорности” (Едвард
Гибон)
• Myth of Empire (Myths of Security Through
Expansion) – OFFENSIVE ADVANTAGE,
POWER SHIFTS, PAPER TIGER ENEMIES,
BANDWAGONS , BIG STICK DIPLOMACY,
FALLING DOMINOES, EL DORADO AND
MANIFEST DESTINY, NO TRADEOFFS, - Jack
L. Snyder
-
„МИТОВИ ИМПЕРИЈА“:
суштина мита
1. „офанзива доноси предност“
„Напад је најбоља одбрана“
2. „померање у расподели моћи“
Ако ћеш већ морати да нападнеш сутра, нападни данас,
јер изгледа да време није на твојој страни
3. „непријатељи попут тигрова од папира“
Наша одлучност и агресивност победиће сваког
противника. Јер нису они толико јако колико се то чини
4. „Сврставање уз јачег“
„ако не можеш да га победиш, придружи му се“
5. „дипломатија великог штапа“
„Само оштро и на прву“
6. „падајуће домине“
Сваки педаљ земље
безначајних губитака
7. „Ел Дорадо и „manifest destiny”
С мисијом у боље сутра
8. „нема уступака“
На све или ништа
је
стратешки
важан.
Нема
• Nacionalizam kao “rak rana imperija”
• Imperije su iščezle zato što su postale preskupe –
(Majkl Mandelbaum)
• Hierarchy is usually costly. Dominant states can
offer concessions to induce subordinates to give up
their valued freedom. The Soviet Union rejected this
course, at first, electing to extract resources from
Eastern Europe rather than share its benefits from
cooperation. Indeed, by one estimate, Moscow
withdrew nearly $1 billion per year from the region
until 1956. By the late 1950s, however, the flow of
resources reversed, and by the 1980s the Soviet
Union was subsidizing Eastern Europe to a total of
about $17 billion per year. (David Lake)
• “ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦИЈА НАСИЉА” (Fareed Zakaria)
• “Једанаести септембар 2001. био је значајан
догађај у историји политике моћи (Power Politics).
Деветнаест фанатика, од којих нико није имао
западно образовање, са оскудним финансијским
средствима, гурнули су најмоћнију и технолошки
најнапреднију светску силу у панику и довели
Планету у стање политичке кризе.
Никада раније толико много бола није било
нането тако моћном мноштву од тако немоћне
неколицине. Ту лежи дилема за једину светску
суперсилу: Како се борити са непријатељем који
је физички слаб али који поседује фанатичну
мотивацију.” (Zbigniew Brzezinski)
The Inheritance
• The next president will inherit perhaps
the most challenging set of strategic
problems in a generation.
• Not since the Truman administration
has an incoming commander in chief
taken responsibility for two major
ongoing wars.
• First, the next president will inherit
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—conflicts
in which the ability of the United States to
shape outcomes is eroding.
• In both theaters, the dynamics of
insurgency, tribalism, and ethno-sectarian
tensions are preventing the achievement of
anything close to the maximalist goals of the
Bush administration.
• In Iraq, it seems all but certain that the next
commander in chief will take office with
approximately 130,000 troops on the
ground. Much has been made of the drop in
violence associated with the “surge” and the
assorted tribal truces that the U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy has helped to
consolidate.
• The reality, however, is that the underlying
political and security situation is still
exceedingly fragile. Several persistent
tensions threaten to renew the simmering
civil war:
• According to the January 2008 report
of the Afghanistan Study Group, “the
mission to stabilize Afghanistan is
faltering.”
• Second, America’s economy is showing
serious signs of weakness.
• What began as a problem in America’s
subprime mortgage market in 2007 has sent
worrisome ripples across the global
economy.
• Domestic views of America’s economy are
more negative than at any point in nearly 15
years...
• Also, the Bush administration’s last and
largest budget—$3 trillion—will likely push
this year’s budget deficit to at least $400
billion.
• According to the Congressional Budget
Office, the United States will face “severe
long-term budgetary challenges” as a result
of pressure from “ongoing increases in
health care costs, along with the aging of
the population.
• Moreover, if the proposed fiscal year 2009
sum of $515.4 billion is passed, the next
president will inherit a defense budget that
in inflation-adjusted dollars is the largest
since World War II.
• Since 2001, Congress has approved a total
of $691 billion for the so-called “global war
on terror,” and the cost of the wars could rise
to nearly $900 billion by next spring and
may reach $1 trillion by the end of 2009.
• The next president will have to deal
with real economic and budgetary
tensions that will force hard choices
about where to place emphasis and
how to manage risk.
• Third, America is suffering from
strategic distraction.
• The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the
global campaign against terrorism have so
transfixed America’s leadership and
dominated the exercise of statecraft that
areas of the world and key relationships vital
to our interests have been given scant
attention.
• The next president will have to contend with
several emerging challenges: the future of
Russia’s political evolution is in doubt; the
continued rise of China poses challenges to
America’s strategic alliances in the region;
stability in Pakistan could unravel quickly;
relations with Latin America have
deteriorated; North Korea has tested a
nuclear weapon; and Iran continues to
undermine our interests in the Middle East
• According to Francis Fukuyama,
“American preoccupation with Iraq
limits Washington’s options in other
parts of the world and has distracted
the attention of senior policy makers
from other regions such as Asia that in
the long run are likely to present
greater strategic challenges.
• Moreover, the continued rise of
transnational challenges such as
radical Islamist ideology, nonstate weapons proliferation, global
climate change, and energy
security will pose ever-increasing
problems for the United States and
its allies. (Shawn Brimley and Michèle
A. Flournoy)
• There are six features of the current international
environment most salient to devising an effective
grand strategy for the United States.
• They are: (1) the absence of a peer competitor to
the United States;
• (2) the lack of legitimacy for U.S. actions in the
eyes of other states;
• (3) the continuing advance of democracy;
• (4) the advance of globalization, together with the
backlash that is forming against it;
• (5) the rise of China and the coalescing of Europe;
and
• (6) the trilogy of ills of grand weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) terrorism, the global Islamic
jihadi threat, and climate change.
• The United States has six fundamental
national interests in the current era:
• first, to protect the homeland from
attack;
• second, to keep a deep peace among
the Eurasian great powers;
• third, to preserve assured access to
stable supplies of oil;
• fourth, to preserve an open
international economic order;
• fifth, to spread democracy and the rule
of law, protect human rights, and
prevent mass murders in civil wars;
• and sixth, to avert severe climate
change (Robert J. Art)
• Among all the possible challenges in
engaging the world—from a resurgent
Russia to our interests in Latin America
and Africa— such a liberal realist
strategy for your administration should
place priority on five major challenges.
• Probably the greatest danger to the
American way of life would be the
intersection of terrorism with nuclear
materials.
• Preventing this requires policies for
counterterrorism, nonproliferation,
better protection of foreign nuclear
materials, stability in the Middle East,
and attention to failed states.
• Political Islam and how it develops is the
second priority.
• The third major challenge would be the rise of
a hostile hegemon as Asia gradually regains the
three-fifths share of the world economy that
corresponds to its three-fifths of the world
population. Forestalling this outcome requires a
policy that embraces China as a responsible
stakeholder, but hedges against possible hostility by
maintaining close relations with Japan, India, and
other countries in the region.
• The fourth major threat would be an
economic depression that could be
triggered by financial mismanagement
or a crisis that disrupts global access to
the Persian Gulf (where twothirds of
world oil reserves are located). Meeting
this challenge will require policies that
gradually reduce dependence on oil while
realizing that we will not be able to isolate
the American economy from global energy
markets and must not succumb to costly and
counterproductive protectionism.
• The fifth major threat to our way of life
may be termed ecological breakdowns
such as pandemics or climate change.
• Again, part of the solution requires prudent
energy policies, combined with leadership on
climate change and greater cooperation
through international institutions such as the
World Health Organization. (Joseph S. Nye)
Rank
Country
Oil - consumption
(bbl/day)
Date of Information
1
World
80,290,000
2005 est.
2
United States
20,800,000
2005 est.
3
European Union
14,550,000
2004
4
China
6,930,000
2007 est.
5
Japan
5,353,000
2005
6
Russia
2,916,000
2006
7
Germany
2,618,000
2005 est.
8
India
2,438,000
2005 est.
9
Canada
2,290,000
2005
10
South Koreauth
2,130,000
2006
11
Brazil
2,100,000
2006 est.
12
Mexico
2,078,000
2005 est.
13
Saudi Arabia
2,000,000
2005
14
France
1,999,000
2005 est.
15
United Kingdom
1,820,000
2005 est.
16
Italy
1,732,000
2005 est.
17
Iran
1,630,000
2006 est.
18
Spain
1,600,000
2005 est.
19
Indonesia
1,100,000
2006 est.
20
s
1,011,000
2006
Rank
Country
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold
Date of Information
1
China
$ 1,534,000,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
2
Japan
$ 954,100,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
3
Russia
$ 476,400,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
4
India
$ 275,000,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
5
Taiwan
$ 274,700,000,000
31 December 2007
6
Korea, South
$ 262,200,000,000
31 December 2007
7
Brazil
$ 180,300,000,000
31 December 2007
8
Singapore
$ 163,000,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
9
Hong Kong
$ 152,700,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
10
Germany
$ 136,200,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
11
Algeria
$ 110,600,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
12
Malaysia
$ 101,100,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
13
France
$ 98,240,000,000
2006 est.
14
Italy
$ 94,330,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
15
Thailand
$ 87,460,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
16
Mexico
$ 87,190,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
17
Libya
$ 79,600,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
18
mirates
$ 76,620,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
19
Turkey
$ 76,510,000,000
31 December 2007 est.
20
United States
$ 70,570,000,000
31 December 2007 est
Rank
Country
Debt - external
Date of Information
1
World
$ 53,970,000,000,000
2004 est.
2
United States
$ 12,250,000,000,000
30 June 2007
3
United Kingdom
$ 10,450,000,000,000
30 June 2007
4
Germany
$ 4,489,000,000,000
30 June 2007
5
France
$ 4,396,000,000,000
30 June 2007
6
Italy
$ 2,345,000,000,000
30 June 2007
7
Netherlands
$ 2,277,000,000,000
30 June 2007
8
Spain
$ 2,047,000,000,000
30 June 2007 est.
9
Ireland
$ 1,841,000,000,000
30 June 2007
10
Japan
$ 1,492,000,000,000
30 June 2007
11
Switzerland
$ 1,340,000,000,000
30 June 2007
12
Belgium
$ 1,313,000,000,000
30 June 2007
13
Australia
$ 824,900,000,000
30 June 2007
14
Canada
$ 758,600,000,000
30 June 2007
15
Austria
$ 752,500,000,000
30 June 2007
16
Sweden
$ 598,200,000,000
30 June 2006
17
Hong Kong
$ 588,000,000,000
2007 est.
18
Denmark
$ 492,600,000,000
30 June 2007
19
Norway
$ 469,100,000,000
30 June 2007
20
Portugal
$ 389,500,000,000
31 December 2007
II Изазивачи: Јапан; Кина; Русија;
Европска унија; Индија…
Power resources of the Major U. S.
contenders, 2007
Sources of
power
United
States
Japan
China
Russia
European
Union
India
Basic
resources
strong
medium
strong
strong
strong
Strong to
medium
Military
strong
weak
medium
strong
medium
medium
Economic
strong
strong
strong and
medium
medium
and strong
strong
medium to
strong
Science/
Technology
strong
strong
medium
medium
National
Cohesion
strong
strong
strong
medium
weak
weak and
medium
Universalist
ic Culture
strong
medium
medium
medium
strong
medium
Internation
al
Institutions
strong
strong
medium
medium
strong
medium
tangible
strong
Intangible
Ваш одговор?
Sources of
power
tangible
Basic
resources
Military
Economic
Science/
Technology
Intangible
National
Cohesion
Universalist
ic Culture
Internation
al
Institutions
United
States
Japan
China
Russia
European
Union
India
III Perspektive: čiji će biti 21.
vek??
“The Age of Nonpolarity - What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”
By Richard N. Haass
Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008
• The principal characteristic of twentyfirst-century international relations is
turning out to be nonpolarity: a world
dominated not by one or two or even
several states but rather by dozens of
actors possessing and exercising
various kinds of power. This represents
a tectonic shift from the past.
• In contrast to multipolarity -which involves several distinct
poles or concentrations of power -a nonpolar international system is
characterized by numerous centers
with meaningful power.
• At first glance, the world today may
appear to be multipolar. The major
powers -- China, the European Union
(EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the
United States -- contain just over half
the world's people and account for 75
percent of global GDP and 80 percent
of global defense spending.
• Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's
world differs in a fundamental way from one of
classic multipolarity: there are many more power
centers, and quite a few of these poles are not
nation-states.
• Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the
contemporary international system is that nationstates have lost their monopoly on power and in
some domains their preeminence as well.
• States are being challenged from above, by regional
and global organizations; from below, by militias;
and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and corporations.
• Power is now found in many hands and in many
places.
•
•
•
•
•
•
In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional
powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin
America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi
Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and
South Korea in East Asia and Oceania.
A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including
those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations,
the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of
American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and
those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization).
So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar
Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and Shanghai.
Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the
worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing.
Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera,
the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban),
political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations
(al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace).
Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated,
power.
• In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest
single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion
annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval
forces that are the world's most capable.
• Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest.
The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and
television), information, and innovation.
• But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative
decline of the United States' position in the world -- and with this
relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and
independence.
• The U.S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent.
Although U.S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's total,
this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and
projected differential between the United States' growth rate and
those of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number
of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the
United States.
• Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no greatpower rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the
United States. In part, this is because the disparity
between the power of the United States and that of any
potential rivals is too great.
• The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to
pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a
result of the United States' behavior, which has not
stimulated such a response.
• A further constraint on the emergence of great-power
rivals is that many of the other major powers are
dependent on the international system for their economic
welfare and political stability. They do not, accordingly,
want to disrupt an order that serves their national
interests
•
But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, Unipolarity Has Ended.
Three explanations for its demise stand out.
•
The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and
piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to
productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other
organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is
an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally.
A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the postWorld War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both
what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has
accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has
weakened its own position relative to them…The war in Iraq has also
contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world.
Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of
other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S.
policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization.
Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of crossborder flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases,
manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses
(virtual and real), and weapons.
•
•
• Nonpolarity will be difficult and dangerous.
But encouraging a greater degree of global
integration will help promote stability.
Establishing a core group of governments
and others committed to cooperative
multilateralism would be a great step
forward. Call it "concerted nonpolarity." It
would not eliminate nonpolarity, but it would
help manage it and increase the odds that
the international system will not deteriorate
or disintegrate
PARAG KHANNA
Second World – Empires and influence in New
World Order, Random House, New York, 2008
• It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or
Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its
second term.
• America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000
troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well
as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force
presence in Qatar.
• Afghanistanis stable; Iran is nuclear. China has
absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval
presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the
Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.
• The European Union has expanded to well over 30
members and has secure oil and gas flows from North
Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as
substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the
world remains in steady decline.
• At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the
1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-coldwar “peace dividend” was never converted into a global
liberal order under American leadership.
• So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are
competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace
alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European
Union and China.
• This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big
Three.
• Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by
Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in
internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind
China in both development and strategic appetite.
• The Big Three make the rules — their own rules —
without any one of them dominating. And the others are
left to choose their suitors in this post-American world.
• The more we appreciate the differences
among the American, European and Chinese
worldviews, the more we will see the
planetary stakes of the new global game.
• Previous eras of balance of power have
been among European powers sharing a
common culture. The cold war, too, was not
truly an “East-West” struggle; it remained
essentially a contest over Europe.
• What we have today, for the first time in
history, is a global, multicivilizational,
multipolar battle.
• The Big Three are the ultimate “Frenemies.” Twenty-firstcentury geopolitics will resemble nothing more than Orwell’s
1984, but instead of three world powers (Oceania, Eurasia and
Eastasia), we have three hemispheric pan-regions, longitudinal
zones dominated by America, Europe and China.
• As the early 20th-century European scholars of geopolitics
realized, because a vertically organized region contains all
climatic zones year-round, each pan-region can be selfsufficient and build a power base from which to intrude in
others’ terrain.
• But in a globalized and shrinking world, no geography is
sacrosanct. So in various ways, both overtly and under the
radar, China and Europe will meddle in America’s backyard,
America and China will compete for African resources in
Europe’s southern periphery and America and Europe will seek
to profit from the rapid economic growth of countries within
China’s growing sphere of influence.
• Globalization is the weapon of choice. The main battlefield is
what I call “the second world.”
The Swing States
• There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of
America’s global dominance: our military spending, our share of
the global economy and the like.
• But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand
how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I’ve
spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five
most strategic regions of the planet — the countries of the second
world.
• They are not in the first-world core of the global economy,
nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and
between the Big Three, second-world countries are the
swing states that will determine which of the superpowers
has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics.
• From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new
reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies
and influence countries but three: America’s coalition (as in
“coalition of the willing”), Europe’s consensus and China’s
consultative styles.
• The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the
21st century.
• Second-world countries are distinguished from
the third world by their potential: the likelihood
that they will capitalize on a valuable commodity, a
charismatic leader or a generous patron.
• Each and every second-world country matters in its
own right, for its economic, strategic or diplomatic
weight, and its decision to tilt toward the United
States, the E.U. or China has a strong influence on
what others in its region decide to do.
• Will an American nuclear deal with India push
Pakistan even deeper into military dependence on
China? Will the next set of Arab monarchs lean East
or West?
• The second world will shape the world’s
balance of power as much as the superpowers
themselves will.
Fareed Zakaria
The Post-American World, W. W. Norton,
New York, 2008
• This is not book about american decline but of rise
of the rest.
• The real test for the United States is the opposite of that
faced by Britain in 1900. Britain's economic power waned
even as it managed to maintain immense political
influence around the world. The U.S. economy and
American society, in contrast, are capable of responding
to the economic pressures and competition they face.
They can adjust, adapt, and persevere.
• The test for the United States is political -- and it rests
not just with the United States at large but with
Washington in particular. Can Washington adjust and
adapt to a world in which others have moved up? Can it
respond to shifts in economic requirements and political
power?
• The world has been one in which the United States was utterly
unrivaled for two decades. It has been, in a broader sense, a U.S.designed world since the end of World War II. But it is now in the
midst of one of history's greatest periods of change.
• There have been three tectonic power shifts over the last 500
years, fundamental changes in the distribution of power that have
reshaped international life -- its politics, economics, and culture.
• The first was the rise of the Western world, a process that began
in the fifteenth century and accelerated dramatically in the late
eighteenth century. It produced modernity as we know it: science and
technology, commerce and capitalism, the agricultural and industrial
revolutions. It also produced the prolonged political dominance of the
nations of the West.
• The second shift, which took place in
the closing years of the nineteenth
century, was the rise of the United
States. Soon after it industrialized, the
United States became the most powerful
nation since imperial Rome, and the only
one that was stronger than any likely
combination of other nations. For most of
the last century, the United States has
dominated global economics, politics,
science, culture, and ideas. For the last 20
years, that dominance has been unrivaled, a
phenomenon unprecedented in history.
• We are now living through the third
great power shift of the modern era -the rise of the rest. Over the past few
decades, countries all over the world have
been experiencing rates of economic growth
that were once unthinkable. Although they
have had booms and busts, the overall trend
has been vigorously forward. (This growth
has been most visible in Asia but is no
longer confined to it, which is why to call this
change "the rise of Asia" does not describe it
accurately.)
•
The emerging international system is likely to be quite different from those that have
preceded it.
•
A hundred years ago, there was a multipolar order run by a collection of European
governments, with constantly shifting alliances, rivalries, miscalculations, and wars.
•
Then came the duopoly of the Cold War, more stable in some ways, but with the
superpowers reacting and overreacting to each other's every move.
•
Since 1991, we have lived under a U.S. imperium, a unique, unipolar world in which the
open global economy has expanded and accelerated.
•
•
This expansion is driving the next change in the nature of the international order.
At the politico-military level, we remain in a single-superpower world. But polarity is not a
binary phenomenon. The world will not stay unipolar for decades and then suddenly, one
afternoon, become multipolar.
•
On every dimension other than military power -- industrial, financial, social, cultural -- the
distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance. That does not mean
we are entering an anti-American world.
•
But we are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many
places and by many people.
• The United States has a window of
opportunity to shape and master the
changing global landscape, but only if
it first recognizes that the postAmerican world is a reality -- and
embraces and celebrates that fact.
Kishore Mahbubani
The New Asian Hemisphere – The Irresistible shift of the
Global power to the East, PublicAffairs, New York, 2008
• THERE IS a fundamental flaw in the West's
strategic thinking. In all its analyses of
global challenges, the West assumes that it
is the source of the solutions to the world's
key problems.
• In fact, however, the West is also a major
source of these problems. Unless key
Western policymakers learn to understand
and deal with this reality, the world is
headed for an even more troubled phase.
• The West is understandably reluctant to accept that
the era of its domination is ending and that the
Asian century has come.
• No civilization cedes power easily, and the West's
resistance to giving up control of key global
institutions and processes is natural.
• Yet the West is engaging in an extraordinary act of
self-deception by believing that it is open to change.
In fact, the West has become the most powerful
force preventing the emergence of a new wave of
history, clinging to its privileged position in key
global forums, such as the UN Security Council, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
the G-8 (the group of highly industrialized states),
and refusing to contemplate how the West will
have to adjust to the Asian century.
• Partly as a result of its growing insecurity,
the West has also become increasingly
incompetent in its handling of key global
problems.
• Many Western commentators can readily
identify specific failures, such as the Bush
administration's botched invasion and
occupation of Iraq.
• But few can see that this reflects a deeper
structural problem: the West's inability to
see that the world has entered a new era.
Stiven Majer, NDU, Washington, D. C.
• Међународна структура и односи у
периоду после Хладног рата одумиру
и на њихово место долазе нови који
ублажавају улогу Запада. Утицај
ових промена у Европи одржаваће
Косово и целокупан регион
југозападне Европе неколико година
у нестабилном стању.
• За ово постоји пет разлога.
• Прво, током претходних пет година
Сједињене Државе стално су губиле
моћ, ауторитет и утицај на светској
позорници. Такозвани „униполарни
тренутак”, који је требало да опише
америчку моћ после слома Совјетског
Савеза и комунизма, у стварности није био
ништа више од тренутка. Свакако да
амерички дебакл у Ираку има много везе
са слабљењем снажне америчке позиције
у свету, али на моћ Сједињених Држава
такође су у великој мери утицале и
промене у Европи које Вашингтон не може
у пуној мери да држи под контролом.
• Друго, Европска унија је у извесној мери
посустала и постала несигурна када је реч о
плановима за проширење и продубљење.
Лисабонски споразум, потписан крајем прошле
године, представља покушај да се ЕУ
преоријентише и опорави после пораза уставног
референдума у Француској и Холандији.
Међутим, велика површина, различити интереси
и мноштво „брзина” у данашњој ЕУ чине да
управљање, одлучивање и сличност намера буду
много компликованији – и с времена на време –
готово немогући за остваривање. Сходно томе,
све више се чини да ће ЕУ бити ограничена на
веома простран трговински и економски блок
• Треће, НАТО је постао застарео. Упркос завршетку
Хладног рата – када је НАТО био неопходан за
заштиту Запада, овај савез наставио је да постоји по
инерцији и због неспособности западних лидера да се
упусте у веома напоран посао стварања система
безбедности који одговарају стварности 21. века.
Разуме се да је НАТО наставио свој живот, али је у
суштини једна шупља организација с незнатном
безбедносном наменом у свету који настаје. Највећи
тест за НАТО данас јесте Авганистан. Али, чак и тамо
он је као савез неуспешан јер има знатне проблеме у
обезбеђивању одговарајућих снага за тамошњу борбу.
Код већине европских чланица НАТО просто постоји
мало интересовања за укључење у Авганистан на
били какав значајан начин.
• Четврто, Русија се с Владимиром Путином
поново појавила на светској позорници као
значајна сила. И поред тога што су односи
Москве са Европом и Сједињеним Државама често
неспретни, нема сумње да економски и политички
утицај савремене Русије расте. За разлику од
периода комунизма, Русија не представља
озбиљну војну претњу, већ је јасно постала
магнет за земље и процесе који не налазе
задовољење на Западу. На пример, подршка
Русије за српски став у односу на Косово има
изузетно важну улогу за Москву као начин на
који показује своје противљење Сједињеним
Државама, али, што је још важније, као средство
за представљање њене нове силе на
међународној позорници.
• Коначно, све бољи односи између Русије и
Турске обећавају преоријентисање
политичких, економских и војних односа не
само у приобалном подручју Црног мора, већ
потенцијално и у читавој југоисточној
Европи. Наравно, иза Русије и Турске стоји дуг
период сукоба, али оне знају и за периоде
сарадње – који потичу још од времена
Ататурковог отварања према новом Совјетском
Савезу током двадесетих година 20. века. Данас,
слични интереси између Анкаре и Москве воде ка
све тешњим везама у области трговине,
безбедности и цивилне заштите у региону Црног
мора.
Запад више нема монопол над
будућношћу
.
Koji su glavni problemi kad se procenjuje
moć u međunarodnim odnosima?
Power is an elusive concept. It is hard to define, measure or
describe exactly how it works. Former John Kennedy School of
Government Dean, Joseph Nye wrote: “Power is like weather.
Everyone talks about it, but few understand it.. Power is like love…
easier to experience than to define or measure”
Hard and Soft Power
• Power is the ability to influence the behavior of
others to get a desired outcome. Historically, power
has been measured by such criteria as population
size and territory, natural resources, economic
strength, military force, and social stability.
• Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and
sticks to get what they want. The Pentagon’s budget
for FY2008 is more than $750 billion and growing,
many times more than the nearest competitor. The
United States has the world’s largest economy, and
more than a third of the top 500 global companies
are American. There is no other global power, and
yet American hard power does not always translate
into influence.
• Trends such as these have made power less tangible and coercion
less effective. Machiavelli said it was safer to be feared than to be
loved. Today, in the global information age, it is better to be both.
• Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without
coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation
believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to
persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes.
• Legitimacy can also reduce opposition—and the costs—of using hard
power when the situation demands. Appealing to others’ values,
interests and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the
dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of
degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction.
• Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor
instruments to fight ideas. Today, victory depends on attracting
foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable,
democratic states. Soft power is essential to winning the peace. It is
easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be
democratic.
Smart Power
• Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the
skillful combination of both.
• Smart power means developing an integrated
strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve
American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft
power. It is an approach that underscores the
necessity of a strong military, but also invests
heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at
all levels to expand American influence and
establish the legitimacy of American action.
• Providing for the global good is central to this effort
because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming
power with the rest of the world’s interests and
values.
Moć je uvek moć u odnosu na neke
druge
• “То да ли је држава данас моћна и
богата или није, не зависи од обиља
или сигурности њене моћи и
богатства, већ првенствено од
чињенице да ли њени суседи
поседују више или мање тога од ње.”
(фон Хорник, немачки
меркантилистички писац)
• Stalna promenjivost
• Subjektivnost
• “Percepcija moći”
• Nepostojanje instrumenata za merenje
moći – rat kao najbolji instrument za
merenje moći?
• Uspon i opadanje u moći je pre proces
nego nešto što se dešava brzo.
• Power is not a simple and stable
phenomenon. Indeed, it is very much a
political chameleon, constantly
changing even while it remains the
same (John T. Rourk)
• Power Dynamics
• Absolute and relative power
• Objective and subjective power
• Situational power
WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH
The Rules of Power Analysis
• Rule No. 1: Be Clear About
Definitions of Power
• Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts
• Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single
Indicator
• Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power
Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of Power
• What have shifted are peoples' views of the real
utility of these resources and capabilities. Current
discussions of the limits of US power are really
focused on the limited usefulness of large amounts
of military and economic capabilities.
• Political scientists generally use the term "power" to
refer to a relationship of influence. As Robert Dahl
put it, power is "ability to get B to do something it
would not otherwise have done" or, of course, to
prevent B from doing something it otherwise would
have done).
• In international relations, the same term of "power"
is often equated with resources: measurable
elements that states possess and use to influence
others. In popular commentary-, these two
meanings of power are often conflated, with
unfortunate results.
Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts
• The larger problem with conflating
power-as-resources with power-asinfluences that it leads to a constant
shifting of the goalposts. The better die
United States becomes at acquiring
resources, the greater the array of
global problems it is expected to be
able to resolve, and the greater the
apparent gap between its material
capabilities and die ends it can
achieve.
Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single Indicator
• Current projections of China's economic rise may well be
overstated. Iraq aside, what is most responsible for the virtual
shift to multipolarity is not a word but an acronym: PPP.
• PPP stands for the "purchasing power parity" estimate of
countries' exchange rates—the size of their economies in dollar
terms.
• Although the prices oi many manufactured products tend to be
equalized by international trade, the price of labor is not, and
therefore labor-intensive products and services tend to be
relatively cheap in poor counties. PPP corrects for this
discontinuity by using prices for a locally selected basket of
goods to adjust the exchange rate for converting local currency
into dollars.
• As University of Pennsylvania professor Avery Goldstein notes,
"the World Bank's decision in 1994 to shift to a PPP estimate
for China's economy was crucial in propelling perceptions of
that country's imminent rise to great power status."
Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power
• US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits arc
high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by
borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These
developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United
States suffers from "imperial overstretch."
• And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity
can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is
that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must
he careful to take Into account both the level of resources that can he
mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to
mobilize them.
• And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of
the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never
know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously
challenged.
• "self-inflicted overstretch"— in which a state lacks the sufficient
resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short
term, but has untapped latent power ;and readily available policy
choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the
situation that the United States is in today.
• Да ли ће САД бити једина и последња
глобална суперсила? (Збигњев
Бжежински)
• Амерички и антиамерички век?
• Да ли је успон и пад великих сила стање
или процес?
• Има ли Империја наследника?
• The 21st Century World as a World Without
Power? (Niall Ferguson)
• Ваш одговор?
• “As we work our way through this seemingly
intractable problem in Iraq, we must
constantly remember that this is not just a
troublesome issue form which we can walk
away if it seems too costly to continue. What
is at stake is not only Iraq and the stability
of the Middle East, but the global perception
of the reliability of the United States as a
partner in a deeply troubled world. We
cannot afford to fail this test… And this is
why America can’t just walk away. (Brent
Scowcroft, The International herald Tribune,
Thursday, January 4, 2007, p. 6)
• “Here’s my theory: Prosperity and Security
are boring. Nobody wants to read about
them. The same phenomenon occurred in
Ancient Rome, the last state to acquire such
a firm hegemony… of course America could
be falling, but I have my doubts. For one
thing, the book market is too strong. So, on
this Fourth of July, I am going to watch the
fireworks and be grateful for the place and
time in which I live. When Polibius, Sallust
and Livy, wrote their books the Roman state
still had more than millenium of life in it.
Perhaps ours does too.” (Thomas F. Madden)
• “So the question is not whether America is in
relative decline as a result of global
productive power shift. Of course it is. The
question is whether it can carry out policies
that mitigate the impact of those broad
secular trends, play to its own massive and
undoubted strengths and avoid actions that
are, essentially self-weakening. There
actually may be such a thing as “smart
relative decline”, however contradictory
that idea sounds.” (Paul Kennedy, 2007)
However, if the United States was not an Empire, then what was it?
(Niall Ferguson)
What to do with Power, the question is now… end,
ever…and, forever…
IV Литература
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Pol Kenedi, Uspon i pad velikih sila, CID Podgorica, Službeni List SRJ, Beograd, 1999
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1, Summer 2003, pp. 5 – 46.
Niall Ferguson, Colossus – The Price of America’s Empire, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004
David Held, Mathias Koenig – Archibugi, Eds., American Power in the 21st Century, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003
Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power – The Global Response to American Primacy, W. W. Norton, New York, 2005;
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Мајкл Манделбаум, Треба ли свету голијат, Филип Вишњић, Београд, 2006
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