Philosophy 220
The Moral Significance of the More than Human World:
Virtues, the Environment and Consumerism
Hill, Jr., “Ideals of Human
Excellence”
 Hill begins with the interesting example of the ‘wealthy
eccentric.’
 The question the example prompts is, “What sort of person
would do a thing like that?” (624c1)
 This question points in the direction that Hill’s essay takes
us.
 Though, as he argues, there is no suitably convincing way to
prove that the destruction of nature is morally wrong, that’s not
the end of the story.
 The focus on the rightness and wrongness of acts misses the
morally significant analysis of the virtues indicated or
highlighted by destructive actions.
 Our question about the eccentric points to a different sort of
moral concern.
Wrongness?
 Typical analyses of actions like those of the eccentric isolate
relevant features of the action for scrutiny.
 We could contest certain sorts of conclusions about overall
utility.
 We could consider the welfare and interests of non-animal life
(plant rights?).
 We could argue from religious convictions about what God
requires of us.
 All of these approaches, more or less plausible, ignore a
question relevant to the virtuousness of the agents involved;
namely, what the willingness to engage in the acts reveals
about the character of the individuals involved.
An Answer
 Hill’s response is not to insist that such a person lacks virtue
(is not a virtuous person) but rather that, “…indifference to
non-sentient nature…often signals the absence of certain
traits which we want to encourage because they are, in most
cases, a natural basis for the development of certain virtues”
(626c1).
 Thus, though he is not willing to affirm that our eccentric
necessarily lacks humility (the proper appreciation for one’s
place in the natural order), the eccentric’s actions do
indicate a certain kind of ignorance or narrowness of
appreciation which is a likely precursor to humility.
Some Responses
 Hill imagines a critic of his claim who would reject the idea
that the eccentric's disdain for non-sentient nature is rooted
in a kind of ignorance or failure of appreciation.
 A first response: knowledge of nature does not necessarily
require moral concern (naturalistic fallacy).
 Hill: logical point is granted, but it is the case that familiarity
typically increases concern.
 A second response: it is not knowledge that the destroyer is
lacking, it is the proper perspective and this cosmic perspective
doesn’t guarantee concern either
 Hill: true, but indifference is still usually a sign that one fails to
see oneself as a part of the natural order. Furthermore, an
appreciation of one's place in nature is not just an intellectual
understanding, it requires humility.
Humility
 For Hill, humility is an ability to measure importance without
relation to oneself or something one identifies with (628c1).
 In this context, the critic has one more objection: to assert that an
ideal humility requires us to view non-sentient nature as important
for its own sake begs the question.
 Hill’s response is to specify the nature of this requirement: it is not
conceptual but developmental.
 A positive expression of this sense of humility is self-acceptance
as part of the natural order, subject to the same natural forces and
limits of all other elements of the whole (629c2).
 Hill insists that experiencing nature promotes such a selfacceptance. The eccentric's failure may be one of refusing to see
himself in this way.
In Summary
 If Hill is right, though acts of natural destruction cannot be argued
to be morally wrong, they can be criticized as resulting from
defects in agents like the eccentric.
 These defects (ignorance, self-importance, and lack of selfacceptance, the latter two entailing a lack of the humility crucial to
understanding one's place in the world) while not necessarily
vicious in themselves do raise morally relevant questions about
the character of these agents.
 Thus, Hill's environmental ethics focus not so much on the state of
the environment itself, or on the rightness or wrongness of acts
with environmental significance, but on human beings and their
proper attitudes and dispositions to their environment.
Wenz, “Environmental Virtues”
 Wenz begins by noting that from a virtue ethical standpoint, there
doesn’t appear to be any conflict between anthropocentric and
non-anthropocentric moral standpoints.
 For both, the traditional virtues produce agents whose actions are
consistent with human and non-human flourishing.
 However, our economic system’s reliance on consumerism is
inconsistent with these virtues, inasmuch as it presumes a range
of dispositions inconsistent with virtue (vices).
 Thus, virtue ethics of either anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric
varieties support the conclusion that consumerism is immoral.
 The fact that these perspectives support and enhance each other
is the ‘synergy’ of the title.
What is Consumerism?
 Consumerism is not the same as consumption.
Consumption is an ineliminable part of life, as all living
things need to consume energy to sustain themselves.
 Consumerism: “the ideology that society should
maximize consumption, pursue consumption without
limit” (632).
 This is the ideology that dominates much of global
economic policy. It is also an ideology that pervades
much of our thinking about ourselves and the world.
Consumerism and the More than
Human World
 A non-anthropocentric moral standpoint is committed to
the DMS of the more than human world.
 As Wenz demonstrates (631c1-2), consumerism
causes significant degradation of the more than human
world.
 Global warming
 Pollution, resource use, species extinction
 Thus, from a non-anthropocentric moral standpoint,
consumerism is immoral.
Consumerism and
Anthropocentrism
 For the anthropocentric moral view, human beings are the
primary bearers of moral value.
 Wenz demonstrates that consumerism harms human beings
apart from any collateral damage that might be done to the
natural world.
 His argument here proceeds in two stages: he first discusses
how consumerism harms poor people in the third world (63235),
 He then considers how consumerism harms “industrial people”
in the developed world as well (635-37).
 The harm done to both these groups by a consumptiondriven lifestyle, leads to the conclusion that from the
anthropocentric standpoint, consumerism is wrong.
What about Virtue?
 Up to this point, much of the focus has been on the
consequences for nature and for humans of the
rampant consumerism which dominates our form of life.
 However, Wenz’s claim to a synergy between
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric moral views is
ultimately tied to a common virtue ethical perspective.
 To close the loop, Wenz focuses our attention on the
vices that consumerism encourages and the virtues
that are common to both A and non-A views.
The Vices
 Consumerism is rooted in what for ancient Greek virtue
ethicists was a unifying vice: outdoing.
 Consumerism, in its call for endless progress,
encourages us all to grab a much of the good stuff as
possible, to see ourselves as competing against each
other, “The Person with the Most Toys Wins”
 More specific vices that this ‘master vice’ encourage
include: greed, avarice, gluttony, envy, pride,
intemperance, selfishness and indifference.
The Virtues
 By contrast, both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric
virtue ethical perspectives typically articulate a set of virtues
(habits or dispositions to act), that are at odds with the goals
and practices of consumerism.
 These virtues include: frugality, appreciation, temperance,
self-development, dedication, generosity, benevolence.
 Though these virtues may be essentially human capacities,
to the extent that they are consistent with the good of the
more than human world, they receive non-anthropocentric
support.
A Philosophical Conclusion
 Though much of the energy of Wenz’s analysis is
dedicated to the critique of consumerism, the primary
philosophical accomplishment of the essay is to bridge
the gap between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric moral views.
 Though in the context of the question of the moral
status of the more than human world, this gap looms
large, Wenz argues that in particular cases (like the
critique of consumerism) they overlap significantly and
can be mutually reinforcing.