Running head: CIS 633 FAA PROJECT ANALYSIS
CIS 633 FAA Project Analysis
Edward Kuligowski
Bellevue University
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CIS 633 FAA PROJECT ANALYSIS
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Abstract
In 1981 the FAA was given the green light for a comprehensive plan to upgrade 12 major air
traffic control systems across the United States. The projects budget was approximately $12billion and was scheduled to last approximately 12 years (Post, 2012). By 1990 only one
milestone had been achieved and the project was $3-billion over budget, and running an
estimated 4 years behind schedule (Post, 2012). This paper will examine the mismanagement of
the FAA’s Advanced Automation System (AAS) and what possible lessons future program
management professionals can learn from the mistakes made during this costly system upgrade
blunder.
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CIS 633 FAA Project Analysis
The FAA air traffic control system was comprised of custom built IBM 9020 machines
assembled in the 60’s and installed in the 20 regional centers scattered around the United States.
As air travel steadily began to increase over the years these custom systems began to become
over taxed and strained by the inadequate processing power and inabilities to be upgraded.
Therefore, in 1981, the government decided to upgrade the system with new more efficient
machines in hopes to improve the flow of air traffic across the nation (Post, 2012). In 1982 the
White House Science Council established the scope of the project by ordering the agency to
procure a prime contractor that was to formulate performance goals, design specification and
system integrations, which include the design, implementation, and maintenance of hardware and
software need to direct and regulate air traffic (U.S. Archive, 1995).
What Went Wrong?
The FAA feared that turning over a crucial system to an outside contractor would be a
mistake. Therefore they deviated from the scope requirements and began to sub contract the
work out themselves by granting a $3.6-billion contract to IBM who in turn subcontracted work
out as well (Post, 2012). In addition, the FAA even went as far as subcontracting consultants
such as Martin Marietta, but did not grant them any control over other contractors such as IBM
(Post, 2012). According to the Standish Report, the number 3 requirement for a successful
project is a clear statement of requirements (The Standish Group, 2001). The requirement set
forth by the by the Senate Appropriations Committee was founded on the facts that the FAA had
no viable well define management system in place to handle the direction and evaluation of a
project of this scale and complexity (Post, 2012). This lack of proper management practices
instilled ambiguity into the project by not establishing a so called “pecking order” or
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management plan during the crucial planning stage of the project. Research suggest that 20% of
a projects time should be spent on the planning stage, and it is considered an industries best
practice, in addition Schwalbe also states “A dollar spent up front in planning is worth one
hundred dollars spent after the system is implemented.” this stage is the most crucial part of the
project (Schwalbe, 2010, p. 81).
The expectations set by the project requirements were by far unrealistic for the
technology of the time period. The FAA required the new system to experience only a 1%
“crash” rate with no longer than a 15sec window of down time (Cone, 2002). In addition, IBM
attempted to design propriety equipment and software for the FAA to use instead of utilizing
available off the self-equipment (Cone, 2002). These expectations coupled with lake of
accountability due to improper management allow IBM to turn the project into more of a R&D
project for themselves by experimenting and writing papers instead of focusing on meeting the
constraints set forth by the project sponsors (Post, 2012). Furthermore, as the project sponsors
themselves began to add to the delays in IBM’s progress in the project as well. For example,
according to testimony given by Gerald L. Dillingham Associate director of transportation, and
telecommunications issues, the contractors were over-optimistic in their assumptions on what the
necessary requirements would be in order to achieve the complex goals set forth by the project
itself, and they were greatly impacted by the continual changes to the requirements that were
created by poor contract oversight (U.S. Archive, 1995). Another example was the FAA’s
decision to consolidate their once 200 air traffic control centers into just 22 across the nation
putting more pressure on the capabilities of the limited technology at the time (Peltz, 1994). The
constant change in scope and direction of the project is a direct result of improper management
and planning by the project managers.
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Furthermore, to compound the issue the project began to loss the support of the sponsors
when the lack of millstone achievements were being meet and the test system that were
implemented began to fail and cause major issues in vital hubs around the country. System
blackouts like in Chicago in 1995, and total system failure in Aurora began to shake the
confidence of the sponsors and the stakeholders began to question the management and
appropriations of the entire project itself (Post, 2012). According to the Standish group lack of
executive or sponsor support is the fourth leading cause of project failure (The Standish Group,
2001). These events occur because of improper management, lack of communication and failure
to meet goals and deadlines.
Lastly, the biggest contributor to not only the FAA’s project failure, but to the majority of
projects was the lack of user involvement (The Standish Group, 2001). Dr. Dopart testified
before congress that the focus of the FAA’s AAS system has primarily been on the software and
hardware needs to complete a task. However, the end user involvement has been completely
overlooked. Dr. Dopart refers to the methods in which controllers communicate, in which
information is shared, when and how, he refers to the basic culture and polices set by an existing
system that now has completely new sets of controls (U.S. Archive, 1995). With the
implementation of new equipment problems may arise, problems that were never defined or dealt
with in previous policies and management. These issues that occur then cause other issues
because they cannot be dealt with by the current system. The findings of the OTA report given
by Dr. Dopart outline some of these policy conflicts that were beginning to occur due to the lack
of project over sight to not only address the equipment issue but the equipment management
issue as well. These two issues although separate in nature should have been developed together,
and the best way to tackle that issue is end-user involvement. The Standish group report
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suggests this is the number one cause for project failure (The Standish Group, 2001). End-users
provide insight to why requirements are set by the sponsors. They provide necessary feed back
to pointing out issues and concerns that may arise due to functionality of the product. End-users
are ultimately the deciding factor on rather the entire projects cost and efforts were put to good
use.
In conclusion the several misshapes of the FAA’s AAS upgrade project could have been
substantially reduced if the FAA would have first, stuck to the clearly defined requirements of
the project. The FAA’s lack of internal management practices lead to their in ability to
coordinate and establish an effective management plan during the integration phase of the
project. In addition, the continual changes to the scope of the project due to ineffective planning
and management compounded the misappropriations of resources during this stage as well.
Furthermore, poor communications between contractors and sponsors coupled with poor
resource management practices and lack of risk consideration created an environment destine for
failure. Second, the FAA lack of planning limited their ability to manage time, cost, and quality
issue related to the entire project.
To reiterate research suggest that 20% of a projects time should be spent on the planning
stage, and it is considered an industries best practice, in addition Schwalbe also states “A dollar
spent up front in planning is worth one hundred dollars spent after the system is implemented.”
this stage is the most crucial part of the project (Schwalbe, 2010, p. 81). If more time would
have went into the project integration and planning stage a clear more realistic scope could have
perhaps been defined, better time constrains could have been established due to an effective
management system, cost could have been better controlled, quality could have been built into
the product, resources could have been better managed, communication would have vastly
CIS 633 FAA PROJECT ANALYSIS
improved, risk may have been monitored and more closely watched, and the procurement of off
the shelf components may have been a more viable option. Moreover, if the project managers
would have involved the end-user in its development process they could have created in tandem
not only a operational system that meet their needs but an established culture and polices to
effectively manage and operate the end product that was excepted by all involved parties.
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References
Cone, E. (2002, April 9). The Ugly History of Tool Development at the FAA. Baseline.
Retrieved from http://www.baselinemag.com/c/a/Projects-Processes/The-Ugly-Historyof-Tool-Development-at-the-FAA/
Peltz, J. F. (1994, April 24). Upgrade of Air Traffic Control System Stuck in Holding Pattern.
Los Angeles Times.
Post, G. V. (2012). Management Information Systems Cases [Case Study, PDF]. Retrieved from
www.jerrypost.com: https://www.jerrypost.com/MIS/MISCases2012.pdf
Schwalbe, K. (2010). Information Technology: Project Management (6th ed.). Boston, MA.:
Course Technology, Cengage Learning.
The Standish Group . (2001). CHAOS. CHAOS REPORT, 1-8.
us.archive.org [Hearing Minutes]. (1995, May 16). SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY OF
THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE
HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION : SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE , (),
http://www26.us.archive.org/stream/federalaviationa051695unit/federalaviationa051695u
nit_djvu.txt, .