Jean
Nicod
Lectures
2007
Moral Theory Meets Cognitive
Science
How the Cognitive Sciences Can
Transform Traditional Debates
Stephen Stich
Dept. of Philosophy
& Center for Cognitive Science
Rutgers University
sstich@ruccs.rutgers.edu
1
Jean
Nicod
Lectures
2007
Lecture 2
The Persistence of Moral
Disagreement
2
Philosophical Background
 Fundamental Moral Disagreement

No one doubts that moral views differ both within
cultural groups
3
Philosophical Background
 Fundamental Moral Disagreement

No one doubts that moral views differ both within
cultural groups and across cultural groups
4
Philosophical Background
 Fundamental Moral Disagreement

But whether that diversity of views would
persist under idealized circumstance is a hotly
debated question

How to characterize the relevant sort of
idealized circumstances is a difficult and
contentious question
5
Philosophical Background

It is widely agreed that in to be “ideally
situated” people must be
rational
 impartial
 agree on all relevant non-moral issues


There is much debate on how these notions
are to be understood

But I’ll assume we all have a rough understanding
which is good enough for present purposes
6
Philosophical Background

If a moral disagreement would persist under
idealized circumstances, I’ll say that the
disagreement is
Fundamental

If it would not persist under idealized
circumstances, I’ll say that the disagreement is
Superficial
7
Philosophical Background
 There are many reasons why it’s philosoph-
ically important to know whether moral
disagreement is fundamental or superficial

I’ll focus on two

Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude
Theories

Moral Realism
8
Philosophical Background
 Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude Theories

(arguably) defended by Adam Smith, Hume &
Hutcheson

and by Firth, Brandt, Lewis, Harman & other leading
moral theorists in the 20th century
9
Philosophical Background

Semantic Version:

‘x is morally right (wrong)’ means anyone who
is ideally situated (= rational, impartial, fully
informed, etc.) would have a (un)favorable
attitude toward x

If ideally situated people disagree about x, then x is
neither right nor wrong

Semantic version + fundamental disagreement 
Moral Skepticism
10
Philosophical Background

Justification Version:

a moral claim is justified iff the person making
the claim would have the appropriate attitude
toward the matter at hand, after going thru an
appropriate idealizing process (= a process that
corrects relevant false beliefs & removes
partiality, irrationality, etc).
11
Philosophical Background

If two ideally situated people have different attitudes
about x, then

‘x is wrong’
is justified for one while
‘x is not wrong’
is justified for the other


This version of the Ideal Observer Theory +
fundamental disagreement 
Moral Relativism
12
Philosophical Background
 Moral Realism

defended by Boyd, Brink, Railton, Michael Smith,
Sturgeon & many others

there are lots of important differences between these
theorists

but for most of them, the persistence of moral
disagreement that does not depend on non-moral
disagreement (or other distorting factors, like selfinterest or irrationality) would pose a significant
problem
13
Philosophical Background

Richard Boyd:
"careful philosophical examination will reveal …that
agreement on nonmoral issues
would eliminate almost all
disagreement about the sorts of
issues which arise in ordinary
moral practice.” "(1988)
14
Philosophical Background

David Brink:
“It is incumbent on the moral
realist . . . To claim that most
moral disputes are resolvable
at least in principle.” (1984)
15
Philosophical Background

Michael Smith:
The notion of objectivity “signifies
the possibility of a convergence
in moral views” (1994: 6)
16
Philosophical Background

Many Moral Realists and many Moral Anti-Realists
would agree that
Fundamental moral disagreement (i.e. persisting
diversity under idealized conditions) entails, or at
least strongly suggests, that
Moral Realism is False *
*“Non-Convergentists” disagree
17
Philosophical Background

For these reasons (and others) it is clearly
philosophically important
to determine whether (and to what extent)
moral disagreement is
fundamental
18
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
19
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
 Arguably the first “experimental philosopher”
of the modern period was
Richard Brandt
1910 - 1997
20
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

There is a large anthropological literature
(going back to Westermark 1906) documenting
radically divergent moral outlooks in
different cultures.

But traditional ethnography gives little guidance
about what people’s moral attitudes would be
under idealized circumstances.

In the 1950s, Brandt’s began a study of the
Hopis aimed at providing the sort of ethnography that would be useful to philosophers
21
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Brandt found a number of examples of moral
differences between Hopis & white Americans that he
could not trace to non-moral disagreement

Hopi have no moral qualms about allowing children to
“play” with small animals in a way which causes them
great pain, breaks their bones and ultimately kills them

Brandt looked for evidence that the disagreement between
the Hopis’ moral view and the view of contemporary white
Americans was superficial

But he found none
22
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Hopi do not believe that these animals lack the
capacity to feel pain

nor do they believe (e.g.) that animals are rewarded
for martyrdom in the afterlife

nor could Brandt find any other nonmoral belief or
failure of imagination that could account for the
disagreement
23
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Brandt concluded that these moral disagreements
are fundamental

they reflect a “basic difference of attitude” which
would not disappear under idealized conditions
like those that his own “qualified attitude theory”
specified
24
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

He went on to argue that the “Qualified Attitude
Theory” (his own justification-based version of the
Ideal Observer Theory) led to relativism

and that some semantic versions of the Ideal
Observer Theory led to skepticism
25
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
 Richard Nisbett’s studies
of attitudes toward honor
& violence in “Cultures of
Honor” is a rich source of
evidence suggesting that
some very important
examples of moral
disagreement are
fundamental
26
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
 Richard Nisbett’s studies
of attitudes toward honor
& violence in “Cultures of
Honor” is a rich source of
evidence suggesting that
some very important
examples of moral
disagreement are
fundamental
27
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

“A key aspect of the culture of honor is the importance
placed on the insult and the necessity to respond to it.
An insult implies that the target is weak enough to be
bullied. Since a reputation for strength is of the
essence in the culture of honor, the individual who
insults someone must be forced to retract; if the
instigator refuses, he must be punished – with violence
or even death.” (Nisbett and Cohen 1996: 5)
28
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Cultures of honor tend to arise in situations where
resources are liable to theft and where the state’s
coercive apparatus cannot be relied on to prevent or
punish theft

These conditions often occur in relatively remote
areas where herding is the main viable form of
agriculture; the "portability" of herd animals makes
them prone to theft

They also occur in many urban, inner city areas
where police protection for minorities is unreliable
29
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Cultures of honor exhibit considerable cultural inertia,
persisting for many generations after the conditions that
gave rise to them disappeared

Parts of the American South were originally settled by
Scotch-Irish herders with a long culture of honor
tradition

Nisbett & Cohen argue that a culture of honor
persists among white southerners in the USA

They support this claim with data of various sorts,
including
30
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Demographic data indicating that
 among southern whites homicides are more
common in regions where herding once was
common
 white males in the South are much more likely
than white males in other regions to be
involved in homicides resulting from
arguments
 they are not more likely to be involved in
homicides that occur in the course of a robbery
or other felony
31
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Survey data indicating that white
southerners are more likely to believe


that violence is “extremely justified” in
response to a variety of affronts
that if a man fails to respond violently, he is “not
much of a man”
32
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Legal scholarship indicating that southern
states “give citizens more freedom to use
violence in defending themselves, their homes,
and their property"
33
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Particularly compelling were a field study of
moral responses to culture of honor violence
and a series of laboratory experiments

In the field study letters were sent to hundreds of
employers in the North & South.

The letters purported to be from a 27 year old
Michigan man who had one blemish on his
otherwise solid record.
34
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

One letter explained:
“I have been convicted of manslaughter… I got into
a fight with someone who was having an affair with
my fiancée…. He confronted me in front of my
friends at a bar,… told everyone that he and my
fiancée were sleeping together, …laughed at me to
my face, and asked me to step outside if I was man
enough.”

The other letter explained that the “applicant” had
“stolen a couple of expensive cars” at a time when
he needed money to support his family.
35
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Southern employers were more likely to be
sympathetic in response to the manslaughter
incident than the car theft.

There was no such difference in responses from
northern employers.
36
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

One southern employer wrote back:
“As for your problems of the past, anyone could
probably be in the situation you were in. It was just
an unfortunate incident that should not be held
against you. Your honesty shows that you are
sincere…. I wish you the best of luck for your future.
You have a positive attitude and a willingness to
work. These are qualities that businesses look for in
employees.”

No northern employers were comparably
sympathetic.
37
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

The laboratory experiments were conducted on
white, male (mostly upper middle class) University of
Michigan undergraduates from the North & the South

Subjects were told saliva samples would be collected to
measure blood sugar as they performed various tasks

After a sample was collected, Ss walked down a narrow
corridor where they were bumped by a confederate who
called the S an “asshole”

A 2nd saliva sample was collected & both samples tested
for cortisol (associated with stress) & testosterone
(associated with dominance behavior & aggression)
38
85
15
80
% Change in Testosterone Level
% Change in Cortisol Level
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
10
5
30
0
0
Control
Insult
Control
Culture of Honor Subjects
Non-Culture of Honor Subjects
Insult
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

These findings suggest that moral attitudes about the
appropriateness of violence in response to insults will
not converge even under idealized circumstances,
and thus that these disagreements are fundamental

To see why, consider the standard examples of
“defusing explanations” used by Moral Realists to
argue that disagreement is not fundamental
40
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

The disagreement is caused or sustained by
disagreement about relevant non-moral facts

It is hard to see what these non-moral facts might be

We know (for example) that there are no systematic
religious differences between the Northern & Southern
students in Nisbett’s experiment

Nor is there any reason to think that Northerners did
not believe that calling someone an “asshole” is an
insult
41
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Of course, it is always possible that there is an
unsuspected systematic difference in belief

But it seems clear that the burden of argument
falls squarely on those who deny that the moral
disagreements between culture of honor subjects
and non-culture of honor subjects are fundamental
42
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

The disagreement is caused by one group or the other
failing to be impartial

There is no “reason to think that southerners’ economic
interests are served by being quick on the draw, while
northerners’ economic interests are served by turning the
other cheek”. (Doris & Plakias, p. 30)
43
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

The disagreement is caused by one group or the other
being significantly more irrational

On thin interpretations of rationality, this is
singularly implausible

It is perhaps more plausible on “thick”
interpretations of rationality because …
44
45
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

So they are OBVIOUSLY IRRATIONAL

But, of course, thick interpretations of rationality
are typically normatively loaded, and thus
question begging
46
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

The Geography of Morals Project (Doris, Peng,
Uskul, Nichols & Stich)

Inspired by Nisbett’s findings

EAs are more collectivist; Ws are more individualist
 The EA conception of the person emphasizes
social roles (mother, teacher) and de-emphasizes
“context independent attributes”(honest,
gregarious)
 This suggests EAs would take a harsher view of
transgressions destructive of group ties & a
more lenient view of transgressions that benefit
the group
47
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Note that if these psychological differences have
a significant impact on moral judgment, it is
plausible that the resulting disagreement is
fundamental
48
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data


Experiment I

Subjects were Asian & non–Asian undergrads at U.C.
Berkeley

All experimental material was in English
Experiment 2

Subjects were Chinese students in Beijing & non-Asian
undergrads at U.C. Santa Cruz

Experimental material was translated into Chinese for
Chinese subjects
49
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Case I: The Magistrate & the Mob
An unidentified member of an ethnic group is known to be
responsible for a murder that occurred in a town. This
causes many of the townspeople to become extremely
hostile towards the ethnic group. Because the town has a
history of severe ethnic conflict and rioting, the town's Police
Chief and Judge know that if they do not immediately
identify and punish a culprit, the townspeople will start antiethnic rioting that will cause great damage to property
owned by members of the ethnic group, and a considerable
number of serious injuries and deaths in the ethnic
population. But nobody in the community knows who the
murderer is, or where to find him. 
50
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The Police Chief and Judge are faced with a dilemma. They
can falsely accuse, convict, and imprison Mr. Smith, an
innocent member of the ethnic group, in order to prevent the
riots. Or they can continue hunting for the guilty man,
thereby allowing the anti-ethnic riots to occur, and do the
best they can to combat the riots until the guilty man is
apprehended. After discussing and debating their options at
length, the Police Chief and Judge decide to falsely accuse,
convict, and imprison Mr. Smith, the innocent member of the
ethnic group, in order to prevent the riots. They do so,
thereby preventing the riots and preventing a considerable
number of ethnic group deaths and serious injuries.
51
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

The (Western!) philosophical consensus on cases
like this is clear.

“Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in order to
prevent riots in the street, period.” (Bloomfield 2001)

“Someone [who] really thinks, in advance, that it is open
to question whether such an action as procuring the
judicial execution of the innocent [is permissible] should
be quite excluded from consideration-- I do not want to
argue with him;
52
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

The (Western!) philosophical consensus on cases
like this is clear.

“Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in order to
prevent riots in the street, period.” (Bloomfield 2001)

“Someone [who] really thinks, in advance, that it is open
to question whether such an action as procuring the
judicial execution of the innocent [is permissible] should
be quite excluded from consideration-- I do not want to
argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.” (Anscombe 1958)

Compare (even!) Smart (1973)
53
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

However, in both Experiment I (with Asian-Americans)
& Experiment II (with Chinese students) the Asians
were less inclined to make these judgments
55
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Here are some of the moral questions subjects were
asked:
4. The Police Chief and Judge did the morally right thing
5. The Police Chief and Judge did the morally wrong thing
6. The Police Chief and Judge should be punished for what they did
8. The Police Chief and Judge should feel guilty for what they did
12. The Police Chief and Judge are responsible for Mr. Smith being
falsely accused, convicted and imprisoned
13. The townspeople are responsible for Mr. Smith being falsely
accused, convicted and imprisoned
56
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

… and here are some of the factual questions subjects
were asked:
1. Being falsely accused, convicted, and imprisoned caused Mr.
Smith to suffer
2. Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted, and imprisoned
caused Mr. Smith’s friends, family, and loved ones to suffer
3. If the riots occurred, they would have caused members of the
ethnic group to suffer
57
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Results

Chinese subjects were significantly less likely to think
that the Police Chief & the Judge did was morally wrong

They were significantly more likely to think that what
they did was morally right

They were significantly less likely to say that the Police
Chief & the Judge should be punished

Chinese subjects were significantly more likely to hold
the potential rioters responsible for the scapegoating

Suggesting that they attributed more responsibility at
the level of the collective than did their more
58
individualist counterparts
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Case II: Promiscuity
Jack and Debbie have been happily married for 15 years.
Jack’s best friend from childhood, Casey, is passing
through town on business, and Jack and Debbie invite
him to stay at their house for a few days. All three of
them have a great time, drinking, eating, laughing, and
talking over old times. On the morning before Casey is
scheduled to leave, Jack is called in to work to deal with
an emergency. “Casey, old friend,” Jack says, “I’m sorry I
won’t be here to see you off. But I want you to enjoy our
fullest hospitality.” 
59
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Looking meaningfully at Debbie, Jack says, “Debbie will be
pleased to see to your every need, won’t you, Debbie?” The
implication is clear: Jack is inviting Casey to have sex with
his wife. After Jack leaves, Debbie and Casey have sex.
60
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
2. What Jack did was morally wrong
3. What Jack did was morally right
4. Jack should be punished for what he did
5. Jack should have been prevented from doing what he did
6. If what Jack did was not customary in his culture, it would be
morally wrong
7. If what Jack did was customary in his culture, it would be morally
right
8. I would be bothered by what Jack did, even if it were customary
in his culture
61
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Results

Chinese subjects were more likely to agree that this
behavior is morally wrong

They were less likely to agree that it was morally right

They were more likely to think that Jack should be
punished for doing what he did

They were more likely to think that Jack should have
been prevented from doing what he did
62
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

These results indicate that Chinese subjects were more
likely to think this kind of sexual behavior is
appropriately morally condemned, subject to punitive
responses, and legitimately interfered with

These findings are predicted by the hypothesis that
Chinese culture is more collectivist

since this kind of sexual behavior is, intuitively, a threat to
the family, among the most important forms of
association in a collectivist culture
63
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Case III: Honor
Jack and Debbie have been happily married for 15 years.
Jack’s best friend from childhood, Casey, is passing
through town on business, and Jack and Debbie invite
him to stay at their house for a few days. All three of
them have a great time, drinking, eating, laughing, and
talking over old times. On the morning before Casey is
scheduled to leave, Jack is called in to work to deal with
an emergency. 
64
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data
When he returns a few hours later, he finds Debbie and
Casey lying on the couch, naked in each other’s arms.
They have obviously been having sex. Jack is enraged;
his best friend and wife have betrayed him. “Bastard,” he
shouts at Casey. “How can you insult a man like this,
when you are a guest in his home?” Casey tries to
respond, but before he can do anything, Jack pulls a
knife, stabbing and killing him.
65
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Subjects were asked many of the same questions they
were asked about the promiscuity case. They were
also asked some additional questions, including:
1. What Casey and Debbie did caused Jack to suffer
2. What Jack did caused Casey and Debbie to suffer
66
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Results

Chinese subjects were less likely to think the homicide
committed by Jack was morally wrong

They were more likely to think it was morally right

They were less likely to think Jack should be punished

They were more likely to assent to the statement, “If
what Jack did was customary in his culture, it would be
morally right.”
67
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Again, most of these results can be explained by the
hypothesis that Chinese morality is more collectivist

The Chinese subjects are more tolerant of violence in
response to an anti-collective behavior – the
individual pursuit of sexual gratification at the expense
of a collective – the family

If that is right, then it is plausible that the disagreement
is fundamental
68
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

None of the standard “defusing explanations” look
plausible

There were no differences between Chinese &
Westerners on any of the non-moral questions, like:
What Casey and Debbie did caused Jack to suffer.
What Jack did caused Casey and Debbie to suffer.

It is hard to see how either group might be considered
less impartial

And it is hard to take seriously the suggestion that one
group or the other suffers from irrationality
69
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement
Fundamental? A Look at the Data

or that 1.3 billion Chinese have …
corrupt
minds!
Elizabeth Anscombe
70
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
74
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 We are under no illusions that this study (and
others that point in the same direction) will
convince those who think there is little or no
fundamental moral disagreement

Those skeptical about fundamental moral
disagreement might raise a variety of
objections focusing on the details of these
studies
 including possible sources of superficial
disagreement that have not been ruled
out
75
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 To address these “Yes, but …” objections and move
the debate forward, I believe that we need an
empirically supported theory of the psychological
mechanisms underlying the acquisition & utilization of
moral norms and of how those mechanisms might
have evolved.
 Chandra Sripada & I have recently published a theory
aimed at doing that
76
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
Sripada & Stich, “A
Frame-work for the
Psychology of Norms,”
in The Innate Mind:
Culture & Cognition, ed.
by Carruthers, Laurence
& Stich, Oxford Univ.
Press, 2006
77
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
other emotion
triggers
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
post-hoc
justification
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
The Model Claims
that Moral Judgments
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
other emotion
triggers
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
post-hoc
justification
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
The Model Claims
that Moral Judgments
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
other emotion
triggers
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
are
largely determined by the
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
rules in the norm data base
post-hoc
justification
The Model Claims
that Moral Judgments
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
other emotion
triggers
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
that are well supported by empirical findings
whichcausal
arelinks
largely
determined by the
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
acquisition mechanism
post-hoc
justification
The Model Claims
that Moral Judgments
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
other emotion
triggers
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
links that are well supported by empirical findings
which iscausal
heavily
influenced by the norms
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
that prevail in the social environment
post-hoc
justification
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
other emotion
triggers
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
So people who grow up in social environments in
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
which different norms
prevail will often make different
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
moral judgments… even in ideal conditions
post-hoc
justification
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
other emotion
triggers
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
So people who grow up in social environments in
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
which different norms
prevail will often make different
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
moral judgments… even in ideal conditions
post-hoc
justification
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 Sripada & I survey a substantial body of evidence
which, we maintain, is consistent with this model
 But rather than review that evidence, I want to close
by considering a prima facie disquieting feature of
the S&S model, viz.
it suggests that reason can play only a
peripheral role in our moral lives
85
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 In a recent paper, Leland Saunders has argued that
this is mistaken
 and that the S&S model actually supports an
influential account of the use of reason in ethics,
viz, a psychologized version of Rawlsian
Reflective Equilibrium
86
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 In the 1st step in Saunders’ account, a deliberative
moral agent generates lots of judgments about
actual and hypothetical cases in a given moral
domain
87
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating
behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
other emotion
triggers
J1 J2
beliefs
J5 J6
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
J3 J4
post-hoc
justification
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 Next, the deliberative agent attempts to articulate a
moral principle (or set of principles) that will capture
those cases
 That, as Rawls notes, will often require ignoring one
or more of the judgments
 The process is one that requires explicit, often
painstaking, reasoning
89
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating
behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
other emotion
triggers
J1 J2
beliefs
J5 J6
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
J3 J4
post-hoc
justification
Pr
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 The deliberative agent then forms a commitment to
adhere to the principle – which may be thought of as
a belief that one ought to do what the principle
requires
91
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating
behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
other emotion
triggers
beliefs
judgment
DO
punitive
motivation
Pr
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
post-hoc
justification
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 Acting on that belief will often require that the
principle be explicitly rehearsed

One says to oneself, “I ought (or ought not) to do A”
 This repeated, linguistically explicit, rehearsal
mimics one of the principle environmental cues for
norm acquisition
 And that (sometimes) will lead to the principle being
internalized by the norm system
93
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating
behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn----------
P
r
Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
other emotion
triggers
DO
beliefs
P
r
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Explicit verbal
rehearsal of Pr
post-hoc
justification
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 Subsequent spontaneous judgments & behaviors will
be the product of rationally generated norms
95
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating
behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
Pr
rn---------Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
other emotion
triggers
beliefs
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
post-hoc
justification
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 As Saunders notes, this process is probably
relatively rare, since it is both complicated and
arduous
97
infer contents of
normative rules
identify norm
implicating
behavior
Acquisition
Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
norm data base
r1---------r2---------r3---------……
rn----------
Pr
Rule-related
reasoning
capacity
compliance
motivation
emotion
system
other emotion
triggers
J1 J2
beliefs
J5 J6
judgment
punitive
motivation
explicit
reasoning
Proximal
Cues in
Environment
Explicit verbal
rehearsal of Pr
J3 J4
post-hoc
justification
Pr
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
 Also, as Saunders does not explicitly note,
deliberative agents who start with quite different,
socially acquired norms are likely to end up with
different judgment-capturing principles and thus
with different rationally generated norms
99
“Yes, but…”
Some Support From a Theory
They will be Rawlsian Rational Agents
with
Fundamental Moral
Disagreements
100
The End