Computational Theories of Consciousness
Computational Theories of Consciousness:
Bibliography for CSE 719, Fall 2009
Last Update: 10 November 2013
Note:
or
material is highlighted
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
I.
Many of the readings are only available via UB computers.
However, some of those are available on the Web in locations other than the given links.
o See Chalmers's bibliography or do a Google search on the author's last name + first
few words of article title in quotes (e.g.: chalmers "facing up").
A username and password may be required for some online readings. Please contact
Bill Rapaport.
Philosophical, Psychological, & CognitiveNeuroscientific Theories
A.
Historical Readings
1.
2.
3.
Descartes readings
Leibniz
a.
"17. Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which
depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to
say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a
machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it
might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same
proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being
so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which
work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a
perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound
or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. Further,
nothing but this (namely, perceptions and their changes) can be
found in a simple substance. It is also in this alone that all the
internal activities of simple substances can consist." —From The
Monadology (trans. Robert Latta)
b.
Kulstad, Mark; & Carlin, Laurence (2008), "Leibniz's Philosophy
of Mind", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
Tolman, Edward Chace (1927), "A Behaviorist's Definition of
Consciousness", Psychological Review 34(6) (November): 433–439.
 "Whenever an organism at a given moment of stimulation shifts
from being ready to respond in some relatively less differentiated
way to being ready to respond in some relatively more
differentiated way, there is consciousness."
B.
Literary Background Readings
1.
C.
General & Introductory Background Readings
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
D.
Lem, Stanislaw (1967), "The Seventh Sally, or How Trurl's Own Perfection
Led to No Good", from "The Seven Sallies of Trurl and Klapaucius", The
Cyberiad: Fables for the Cybernetic Age, trans. by Michael Kandel (New
York: Seabury): 161–171.
Baars, Bernard J. (1988), A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press); Preface & Ch. 1: What Is to Be
Explained? Some Preliminaries.
Blackmore, Susan (2005), Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (New
York: Oxford University Press)
 See also:
Blackmore, Susan (2004), Consciousness: An Introduction (New
York: Oxford University Press)
Flanagan, Owen; & Güzeldere, Güven (1997), "Consciousness: A
Philosophical Tour", in in Masao Ito, Yasushi Miyashita, & Edmund T.
Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997): 3–16.
O'Shea, Michael (2005), The Brain: A Very Short Introduction (New York:
Oxford University Press)
 Ch. 3: "Signalling in the Brain: Getting Connected", pp. 28-41.
Searle, John R. (1997), The Mystery of Consciousness (New York: New
York Review of Books)
 Most of this book is online; links to relevant sections are listed
below.
 For Searle's own view, see:
Searle, John R. (1995), "The Mystery of Consciousness: Part I",
New York Review of Books 42(17) (November 2), §1.
 For Searle's critique of Damasio's theory of consciousness, see:
Searle, John (2011), "The Mystery of Consciousness Continues",
New York Review of Books 58(10) (9 June): 50–52.
Van Gulick, Robert (2009), "Consciousness", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition)
Major Theories (in alphabetical order)
1.
Baars's Global-Workspace Theory:
. Baars, Bernard J. (1988), A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press); Ch. 2: "The Basic
Model: Conscious Representations Are ‘Internally Consistent’ and
‘Globally Distributed’"
See also:
i.
ii.
Baars, Bernard J. (1997), "In the Theatre of
Consciousness: Global Workspace Theory, A Rigorous
Scientific Theory of Consciousness", Journal of
Consciousness Studies 4(4): 292–309.
Baars, Bernard J.; & McGovern, Katherine (1997),
"Global Workspace: A Theory of Consciousness".
iii.
a.
b.
Baars, Bernard J. (2003), "The Global Brainweb: An
Update on Global Workspace Theory", Science and
Consciousness Review (October).
Dehaene, Stanislas; & Naccache, Lionel (2001), "Towards a
Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a
Workspace Framework", Cognition 79: 1–37.
 Reprint
Background reading:
.
McCarthy, John (1959), "Discussion on the Paper by
Dr. O.G. Selfridge", immediately following Selfridge,
Dr. O.G., "Pandemonium: A Paradigm for Learning", in
National Physical Laboratory, Mechanisation of Thought
Processes (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office):
511–531; see p.527

This is so good, I can't help but quote it here
(Dennett 2005 also cites it):
"I would like to speak briefly about
some of the advantages of the
pandemonium model as an actual model
of conscious behaviour. In observing a
brain, one should make a distinction
between that aspect of the behaviour
which is available consciously, and
those behaviours, no doubt equally
important, but which proceed
unconsciously. If one conceives of the
brain as a pandemonium—a collection
of demons—perhaps what is going on
within the demons can be regarded as
the unconscious part of thought, and
what the demons are publicly shouting
for each other to hear, as the conscious
part of thought."
i.
ii.
Fodor, Jerry A. (1983), The Modularity of Mind
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Fodor, Jerry A. (1985), "Précis of The Modularity of
Mind", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8(1) (March): 1–
42.

For more on modularity, see Modularity of Mind
2.
Block, Ned (1995), "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness",
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18(2): 227–287.
 Block's Fig. 1
 Block's Fig. 2
 Block's Fig. 3
3.
Chalmers's Theory:
. Chalmers, David J. (1995), "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience",
Scientific American (December): 62–68.

Above PDF version is a 2002 "update" from the original.

HTML version of original

Both versions include commentary by Crick & Koch.
a.
b.
c.
4.
Chalmers, David J. (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press).

For an interesting take on both Chalmers and Block, see:
Clark, Andy (2000), "A Case Where Access Implies
Qualia?", Analysis 60(1) (January): 30–38.
Chalmers, David J. (1997), "Facing Up to the Problem of
Consciousness", in Jonathan Shear (ed.), Explaining
Consciousness—The ‘Hard Problem’ (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press).

Shear's book containing this précis of Chalmers 1996 is an
anthology of commentaries on Chalmers's book.
Searle, John R. (1997), "Consciousness and the Philosophers", New
York Review of Books 44(4) (March 6).

At the end, there is a link to a reply by Chalmers; if it is
not accessible, try this:
Chalmers, David J.; & Searle, John R. (1997),
"‘Consciousness and the Philosophers’: An Exchange",
New York Review of Books 44(8) (May 15).
Crick & Koch's Theory:
 Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis":
"...‘You’, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are i fact
no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and
their associated molecules."

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Crick, Francis (1994), The Astonishing Hypothesis: The
Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: Simon &
Schuster): 3.
Crick, Francis; & Koch, Christof (1990), "Towards a
Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness", Seminars in the
Neurosciences 2: 263–275.

For a critique, see:
Searle, John R. (1995), "The Mystery of Consciousness:
Part I", New York Review of Books 42(17) (November 2).

See §2.
Crick, Francis; & Koch, Christof (1998), "Consciousness and
Neuroscience", Cerebral Cortex 8(2): 97–107.
Koch, Christof; & Crick, Francis (2001), "The Zombie Within",
Nature 411 (June 21): 893.
Crick, Francis; & Koch, Christof (2003), "A Framework for
Consciousness", Nature Neuroscience 6(2) (February): 119–126.
Koch, Christof (2005), The Quest for Consciousness (Roberts &
Co.).
For a critique of Koch's latest theory, see:
Searle, John R. (2005), "Consciousness: What We Still
Don't Know", New York Review of Books 52(1) (January
13).

Stevan Harnad replied to Searle; if you can't
access their debate from the above link, try this
one:
Harnad, Stevan; & Searle, John R. (2005), "What
Is Consciousness?", New York Review of Books
52(11) (June 23).
f.
g.
5.
Koch, Christof; & Bhattacharjee, Yudhijit (ed.) (2012), "A Vision
of How Mouse Vision Can Reveal Consciousness' Secrets:
Newsmaker Interview", Science 335(6075) (23 March): 1426–
1427.

Koch's answer to the interviewer's first question suggests
that he really does understand the importance of "the hard
question"
Koch, Christof (2012), Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic
Reductionist (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)

Merges his views with those of Tononi.

Dehaene, Stanislas (2012), "The Eternal Silence of
Neuronal Spaces" (review of Koch 2012), Science
336(6088) (22 June): 1507–1508.

Searle, John R. (2013), "Can Information Theory Explain
Consciousness?" (review of Koch 2012), New York
Review of Books 60(1) (10 January): 54–55, 58.

See follow-up letters to the editor:
Koch, Christof; & Tonini, Giulio; reply by
John R. Searle (2013), "Can a Photodiode Be
Conscious?", New York Review of Books 60(4),
(7 March): 43–44.
Dennett's Theory:
. Dennett, Daniel C. (1978), "Two Approaches to Mental Images",
in Brainstorms (Montgomery, VT: Bradford): 174–189.

on "heterophenomenology"
a. Dennett, Daniel C. (1982), "How to Study Human Consciousness
Empirically or Nothing Comes to Mind", Synthese 53(2)
(November): 159–180.

More on "heterophenomenology".

This issue of Synthese is a special issue on "Matters of the
Mind", and contains a critique of Dennett by Richard
Rorty and an article by Douglas Hofstadter, critiqued by
Guy Steele.
b. Dennett, Daniel C. (1991), Consciousness Explained (Boston:
Little, Brown).
c. Dennett, Daniel C.; & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992), "Time and the
Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain",
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 183–247.

Note: The published version, unlike the online version,
contains numerous commentaries and Dennett's replies.

For a recent reply, see:
Todd, Steven J. (2009), "A Difference that Makes a
Difference: Passing through Dennett's
Stalinesque/Orwellian Impasse", British Journal of the
Philosophy of Science 60: 497–520.
d. Searle, John R. (1995), "The Mystery of Consciousness: Part II",
New York Review of Books 42(18) (November 16).

See §2.
e. Denett, Daniel C. (2001), "Are We Explaining Consciousness
Yet?", Cognition 79(1–2) (April): 221–237.

A discussion of other papers on consciousness in that
issue of Cognition, plus Dennett's new theory of
consciousness as "fame in the brai" or "cerebral celebrity".
f. Dennett, Daniel C. (2005), Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles
to a Science of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
g.
6.
Cohen, Michael A.; & Dennett, Daniel C. (2011), "Consciousness
Cannot Be Separated from Function", Trends in Cognitive Sciences
15(8) (August): 358–364.
Edelman, Gerald M. (2003), "Naturalizing Consciousness: A Theoretical
Framework", P[roceedings of the ]N[ational ]A[cademy of ]S[ciences]
100(9) (April 29): 5520–5524.
Related reading:
.
a.
b.
Searle, John R. (1995), "The Mystery of Consciousness: Part II",
New York Review of Books 42(18) (November 16).

See §1.
Reeke, George N., Jr.; & Edelman, Gerald M. (1995), "A Darwinist
View of the Prospects for Conscious Artifacts", in Giuseppe
Trautteur (ed.), Consciousness: Distinction and Reflection (Naples,
Italy: Bibliopolis): 106–130.
Tononi, Giulio; & Edelman, Gerald M. (1998), "Consciousness and
Complexity", Science 282 (December 4): 1846–1851.
See especially:

Tononi, Giulio (2008), "Consciousness as Integrated
Information: A Provisional Manifesto", Biological
Bulletin 215 (December): 216–242.
and also:


c.
d.

7.
Koch & Tononi 2008
Koch, Christof (2009), "A Theory of Consciousness",
Scientific American Mind 20(4) (July/August): 16–19.
Izhikevich, Eugene M.; & Edelman, Gerald M. (2008), "LargeScale Model of Mammalian Thalamocortical Systems", PNAS 105:
3593–3598.
Kruglinski, Susan (2009), "What Makes You Uniquely ‘You’?",
Discover (February).
For a list of all of Edelman's books on consciousness, search
amazon.com for "Gerald Edelman", link to Google Books by
Gerald Edelman, or link to Edelman's website.
Nagel, Thomas (1974), "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", Philosophical
Review 83(4) (October): 435–450.
 Reprint online here.
 See also his book:
Nagel, Thomas (1989), The View from Nowhere (New York:
Oxford University Press).
 Also see:
Nagel, Thomas (2013), "The Core of ‘Mind and Cosmos’", New
York Times "Opinionator" (18 August).

This is an abstract of his latest, and highly reviled (except
by creationists!), book.
Related items:
c.
What is it like…?
.
i.
video of a blind teenager who perceived by echolocation.
More:
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.

"Human Echolocation", Wikipedia

obituary
What is it like to be a rock?
Foss, Jeff (1989), "On the Logic of What It Is Like to Be a
Conscious Subject", Australasian Journal of Philosophy
67: 205–220.
Tye, Michael (1997), "The Problem of Simple Minds: Is
There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee?",
Philosophical Studies 88: 289–317.

See also Koch 2008-2009, below.
Lewis, Peter J. (2000), "What Is It Like to Be Schröinger's
Cat?", Analysis 60(1) (January): 22–29.
Weisberg, Josh (2008), "What's It Like to Be My Cat?", in
Hales, Steven D. (ed.), What Philosophy Can Tell You
about Your Cat (Chicago: Open Court): 135–145.
Gopnik, Alison (2009), "What Is It Like to Be a Baby?
Consciousness and Attention", in Alison Gopnik, The
Philosophical Baby: What Children's Minds Tell Us about
Truth, Love, and the Meaning of Life, Ch. 4, pp. 106–132.

Discussion continued in "Who Am I? Memory,
Self, and the Babbling Stream", Ch. 5, pp. 133–
163, see esp. §"Living in the Moment", pp. 152–
154.
What is it like to be a dog?

Schine, Cathleen (2009), "Grr, Sniff, Arf: A
Cognitive Scientist Leads a Tour of the
Sensations and Thought Processes of Dogs", New
York Times Book Review (September 13): 20–21.
What is it like to be yourself?
What is it like to be a dolphin?

"Dolphin Awareness, or, What is it like to be a
dolphin?"

White, Thomas (2011), "What Is It Like to Be a
Dolphin?", in Philippa Brakes & Mark Peter
Simmonds (eds.), Whales and Dolphins:
Cognition, Culture, Conservation and Human
Perceptions (Earthscan), isbn=9781849712255.
Koch, Christof (2008-2009), "What Is It Like to Be a
Bee?", Scientific American Mind 19(6) (DecemberJanuary): 18–19.

See also:
Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2008), "Insects and the
Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural
Zombies?", Journal of Philosophy 105(8)
(August): 389–415.

See also Tye 1997, above.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.
xv.
xvi.
d.
Cummins, Robert (2010), "What Is It Like to Be a
Computer?", in The World in the Head (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), Ch.1, pp.1–10.
Birkhead, Tim (2012), Bird Sense: What It's Like to Be a
Bird (Walker & Co.)

"He acknowledges that in the end science cannot
actually say what it's like to be a bird. His
subtitle was drawn from the philosopher Thomas
Nagel, who wrote an essay about consciousness
called ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ The scientist
has no more luck than the philosopher in
answering the fundamental question, and for the
same reason. We have no way to know the
subjective experience of bat or bird, nor neighbor
or spouse, no matter how much information we
have on how their senses work or on the structure
of their brains. The only subjective experience
we have is our own. But the attempt to get at
what a bird sees, hears, feels and thinks is more
than worth the effort because there are so many
intriguing facts and stories that the reader learns
along the way."
— Gorman, James (2012), "The Games Crows
Play, and Other Winged Tales", New York Times
(12 June): D2.
What is it like to be a zombie in philosophy? (humor)
What is it like to be an octopus?

Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2013), "On Being an
Octopus", Boston Review (3 June).
The Knowledge Argument (a.k.a. "What is it like to be Mary?")
.
Jackson, Frank (1982), "Epiphenomenal Qualia",
Philosophical Quarterly 32(127) (April): 127–136
i.
Jackson, Frank (1986), "What Mary Didn't Know",
Journal of Philosophy 83(4) (April): 291–295.
ii.
Lewis, David (1990), "What Experience Teaches," in
William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader
(Oxford: Blackwell): 499–519.

Jackson's favorite reply, but see Jackson 2003
below.
iii.
Conee, Earl (1994), "Phenomenal Knowledge"
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72(2) (June): 136–
150.

The reply I currently favor.
iv.
Lodge, David (2001), Thinks... (Viking).

A novel about a professor of cognitive science
and a professor of English composition. The
latter learns about cognitive sci and has her
students write cog-sci-related stories, such as
what Mary might do once she sees red.
v.
Jackson, Frank (2003), "Mind and Illusion", in
Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press).

In which Jackson recants.
vi.
Ludlow, Peter; Nagasawa, Yujin; & Stoljar, Daniel (eds.)
(2004), There's Something about Mary: Essays on
vii.
e.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's
Knowledge Argument (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Chomsky, Noam (2009), "The Mysteries of Nature: How
Deeply Hidden?", Journal of Philosophy 106(4) (April):
167–200.

(local copy)

See pp. 181–183 for Chomsky's (and Bertrand
Russell's!) analysis of the knowledge argument.
Mysterianism:
.
McGinn, Colin (1989), "Can We Solve the Mind-Body
Problem?", Mind 98(391) (July): 349–366

His answer: No, because we are like Snoopy's
ant:


3.
f.
…or like Lucy's bug:
…or like Bliss's dogs:
For a discussion of mysterianism in a different
context, see:
Harnad, Stevan; & Searle, John R. (2005), "What
Is Consciousness?", New York Review of Books
52(11) (June 23).
Philosophical Zombies:
"Q. When referring to a zombie, should I use the relative
pronoun who (which would refer to a person) or that
(since, technically, the zombie is no longer living)?
Essentially, does a zombie cease to become a ‘person’ in
the grammatical sense?
"A. Let's assume this is a serious question, in which case
you, as the writer, get to decide just how much humanity
(if any) and grammatical sense you wish to invest in said
zombie. That will guide your choice of who or that."

i.
From February 2013 Questions and Answers,
The Chicago Manual of Style Online.
Kirk, Robert (1974), "Sentience and Behaviour" Mind
83(329) (January): 43–60.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Kirk, Robert; & Squires, J.E.R. (1974), "Zombies v.
Materialists", Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 48: 135–
163.
Harnad, Stevan (1995), "Why and How We Are Not
Zombies", Journal of Consciousness Studies 1: 164–167.
Kirk, Robert (2005), Zombies and Consciousness (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press).
Ch. 1: Introduction
g.
h.
8.
 p. 1
 p. 2
 p. 3
 p. 4
 p. 5
 p. 6
v.
On "blindsmell":
0. Sobel, Noam; Prabhakaran, Vivek; Hartley,
Catherine A.; Desmond, John E.; Glover,
Gary H.; Sullivan, Edith V.; & Gabrieli,
John D.E. (1999), "Blind Smell: Brain Activation
Induced by an Undetected Air-Borne Chemical",
Brain 122: 209–217.
1. Chen, Denise; & Haviland-Jones, Jeannette
(2000), "Human Olfactory Communication of
Emotion", Perceptual and Motor Skills 91: 771–
781.
Kihlstrom, John F. (1987), "The Cognitive Unconscious", Science
237(4821) (18 September): 1445–1452.

A good, general discussion of (un)consciousness.

On philosophical zombies and phenomenal-vs."psychological" consciousness:
 "One thing is now clear: consciousness is not to
be identified with any particular perceptualcognitive functions such as discriminative
response to stimulation, perception, memory, or
the higher mental processes involved in judgment
or problem-solving. All of these functions can
take place outside of phenomenal awareness.
Rather, consciousness is an experiential quality
that may accompany any of these functions. The
fact of conscious awareness may have particular
consequences for psychological function—it
seems necessary for voluntary control, for
example, as well as for communicating one's
mental states to others. But it is not necessary for
complex psychological fimctioning." (p. 1450,
col. 2.)
The following article has nothing whatsoever to do with
philosophical zombies, but has a great title and a great
illustration :-)

Drezner, Daniel W. (2011), "How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love Zombies", Chronicle [of Higher
Education] Review 57(24) (February 18): B13 B14.
Rosenthal, David M. (1986), "Two Concepts of Consciousness",
Philosophical Studies 49(3) (May): 329–359.

§1 is especially good.
See also:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
E.
Rosenthal, David M. (2009), "Higher-Order Theories of
Consciousness", in Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann
(eds.), Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford:
Clarendon): 239–252.
Rosenthal, David; & Weisberg, Josh (2008), "Higher-Order
Theories of Consciousness", Scholarpedia 3(5): 4407.
Lau, Hakwan; & Rosenthal, David (2011), "Empirical Support for
Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness", Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 15(8) (August): 365–373.
A debate on HOT:
0. Block, Ned (2011), "The Higher Order
Approach to Consciousness Is Defunct",
Analysis 71(3) (July): 419–431.
1. Rosenthal, David (2011), "Exaggerated
Reports: Reply to Block", Analysis 71(3)
(July): 431–437.
2. Weisberg, Josh (2011), "Abusing the
Notion of What-It's-Like-Ness: A
Response to Block", Analysis 71(3)
(July): 438–443.
3.
Block, Ned (2011), "Response to
Rosenthal and Weisberg", Analysis
71(3) (July): 443–448.
Graziano, Michael (2013), "How the Light Gets Out", Aeon
(21 August).

A neuroscientist's proposal for understanding
consciousness that seems related both to Rosenthal's HOT
and Dennett's theories, but that mentions neither. Based
on a (forthcoming?) book, Consciousness and the Social
Brain

Also see:
Graziano, Michael S.A.; & Kastner, Sabine (2011),
"Human Consciousness and Its Relationship to Social
Neuroscience: A Novel Hypothesis", Cognitive
Neuroscience 2(2) (1 January): 98–113; doi:
10.1080/17588928.2011.565121
Miscellaneous (in chronological order)
1.
2.
A critique of Roger Penrose's theory, along with a discussion of Gödel's
Proof, is in:
Searle, John R. (1995), "The Mystery of Consciousness: Part I", New York
Review of Books 42(17) (November 2).
 See §3.
Hesslow, Germund (2002), "Conscious Thought as Simulation of Behaviour
and Perception", Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6(6) (June): 242–247.
3.
Livingston, Paul M. (2004), Philosophical History and the Problem of
Consciousness (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
Metzinger, Thomas (2005), "Précis: Being No One", Psyche 11(5) (June).
Miller, Greg (2005), "What Is the Biological Basis of Consciousness?",
Science 309 (1 July): 79.
DeWall, C. Nathan; Baumeister, Roy F.; & Masicampo, E.J. (2008),
"Evidence that Logical Reasoning Depends on Conscious Processing",
Consciousness and Cognition 17(3) (September): 628–645.
Pollock, John L. (2008), "What Am I? Virtual Machines and the
Mind/Body Problem", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(2)
(March): 237–309.
Seth, Anil K.; Dienes, Zoltán; Cleeremans, Axel; Overgaard, Morten; &
Pessoa, Luiz (2008), "Measuring Consciousness: Relating Behavioural and
Neuro-physiological Approaches", Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12(8)
(July): 314–321.
Chomsky, Noam (2009), "The Mysteries of Nature: How Deeply Hidden?",
Journal of Philosophy The Saturday Review",
Communications of the ACM 27(11) (November):1114–1119.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
.
General
0.
Putnam, Hilary (1964), "Robots: Machines or Artificially Created
Life?", Journal of Philosophy 61(21): 668–691.
1.
Maudlin, Tim (1989), "Computation and Consciousness", Journal
of Philosophy 86(8): 407–432.
 Argues that consciousness is not computational.
2.
Dennett, Daniel C. (1994), "Consciousness in Human and Robot
Minds", in Masao Ito, Yasushi Miyashita, & Edmund T. Rolls
(eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997): 17–29.
3.
Steels, Luc (1995), "Is Artificial Consciousness Possible?", in
Giuseppe Trautteur (ed.), Consciousness: Distinction and
Reflection (Naples, Italy: Bibliopolis): 42–51.
4.
Weyhrauch, Richard (1995), "Building Conscious Artifacts", in
Giuseppe Trautteur (ed.), Consciousness: Distinction and
Reflection (Naples, Italy: Bibliopolis): 18–41.
 Also online in a slightly different format as "Ideas on
Building Conscious Artifacts"
 Fodor, Jerry A. (1980), "Methodological Solipsism
Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive
Psychology", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63–73.

As reprinted in:
Haugeland, John (ed.), (1981), Mind Design:
Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): Ch. 11, pp. 307–
338.
5.
6.
7.
Perlis, Donald (1997), "Consciousness as Self-Function", Journal
of Consciousness Studies 4(5–6) (1997): 509–525.
 Reprinted in Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.),
Models of the Self (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2000).
 §2.2 seems to suggest that possibly there could be nearzombies with only 1 ur-quale
 2 other theories make points related to Perlis's focus on
the self:
a. Kriegel, Uriah (2009), "The SelfRepresentational Theory of Consciousness"
b. Hofstadter, Douglas (2007), I Am a Strange Loop
(New York: Basic Books).
McDermott, Drew V. (2001), Mind and Mechanism (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press).
See also:
.
a.
b.
c.
8.
Akman, Varol (2003), "Reading McDermott", Artificial
Intelligence 151(1–2) (December): 227–235.
Carruthers, Peter (2003), Review of McDermott 2001,
Artificial Intelligence 151(1–2) (December): 237–240
McDermott, Drew (2003), "Reply to Carruthers and
Akman", Artificial Intelligence 151(1–2) (December):
241–245.
McDermott, Drew (2007), "Artificial Intelligence and
Consciousness", in Zelazo, Philip David; Moscovitch,
Morris; & Thompson, Evan (eds.), The Cambridge
Handbook of Consciousness (New York: Cambridge
University Press), Ch.6 (pp. 117–150).
The Baars/Franklin Global-Workspace Theory:
. Cognitive Computing Research Group
 How Minds Work: A Cognitive Theory of
Everything (IDA tutorial)
a. Franklin, Stan (2003), "IDA, a Conscious Artifact?,
Journal of Consciousness Studies 10: 47–66.
b. Baars, Bernard J.; & Franklin, Stan (2007), "An
Architectural Model of Conscious and Unconscious Brain
Functions: Global Workspace Theory and IDA", Neural
Networks 20: 955–961.
 From: Taylor, J.G.; Freeman, W.; & Cleeremans,
A. (guest eds.) (2007), Special Issue on Brain
and Consciousness, Neural Networks 20(9)
(November): 929–1060, containing online
articles by:

Aleksander

Rolls

Sanz et al. (see below)

Sun

Taylor

et alia
c. Baars, Bernard J.; & Franklin, Stan (2009),
"Consciousness Is Computational: The LIDA Model of
d.
Global Workspace Theory", International Journal of
Machine Consciousness 1(1) (June): 23–32.
 A more legible version of Fig. 1 is online as part
of their tutorial (see above).
Franklin, Stan; D'Mello, Sidney; Baars, Bernard J.; &
Ramamurthy, Uma (2009), "Evolutionary Pressures for
Perceptual Stability and Self as Guides to Machine
Consciousness", International Journal of Machine
Consciousness 1(1) (June): 99–110.
 Franklin et al. occasionally refer to Douglas
Hofstader's notion of a "slipnet". Hofstadter &
Melanie Mitchell's description of slipnets can be
found here (Google books site) or here (PDF)
Related reading:

A.
Surveys
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
B.
Shanahan, Murray (2005), "Global Access, Embodiment,
and the Conscious Subject", Journal of Consciousness
Studies 12(12): 46–66.
Sun, Ron (1999), "Computational Models of Consciousness: An
Evaluation", Journal of Intelligent Systems 9: 507–562.
Morbini, Fabrizio; & Schubert, Lenhart K. (2005), "Conscious
Agents", Technical Report 879 (Rochester, NY: University of
Rochester Department of Computer Science).
Sun, Ron; & Franklin, Stan (2007), "Computational Models of
Consciousness: A Taxonomy and Some Examples", in Zelazo,
Philip David; Moscovitch, Morris; & Thompson, Evan (eds.), The
Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (New York: Cambridge
University Press), Ch.7 (pp. 151–174).
Gamez, David (2008), "Progress in Machine Consciousness",
Consciousness and Cognition 17(3) (September): 887–910.
Clowes, Robert W.; & Seth, Anil K. (2008), "Axioms, Properties
and Criteria: Roles for Synthesis in the Science of Consciousness",
Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 44(2) (October): 91–104.
Anthologies
0.
Aleksander, Igor; & Lahnstein, Mercedes (organizers) (2003),
"Machine Consciousness: Complexity Aspects"
 Contains or cites papers or slides by:
 Aleksander
 Baars
 Chrisley
 Cotterill
 Franklin
 Haikonen
 Holland
 Kirilyuk
 Sanz
 Taylor
 Torrance
 Trautteur
1.
Holland, Owen (ed.) (2003), Machine Consciousness (Exeter, UK:
Imprint Academic).
 Based on Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(4–5) (May
2003)
 …which, in turn, was based on 2001 Banbury
Workshop on Can a Machine Be Conscious
See also:



Dietrich, Eric (2001), "Banbury Bound, or Can a
Machine Be Conscious?", Journal of
Experimental and Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence 13(2): 177–180.
Table of contents, abstracts, & some full texts at above
links.
Contains articles by:
 Aleksander
 Blackmore
 Cotterill
 Franklin (.ppt)
 Harnad
 Holland
 Prinz
 Sloman & Chrisley
 Steels
 Thompson
2.
Dautenhahn, Kerstin (ed.) (2005), Proceedings of the Symposium
on Next Generation Approaches to Machine Consciousness:
Imagination, Development, Intersubjectivity and Embodiment, held
at AISB'05, 12–15 April, University of Hertfordshire.
 Contains papers by:
 Aleksander
 Bosse, Jonker, & Treur
 Calverley
 Chella, Frixione, & Gaglio
 Chrisley, Clowes, & Torrance
 Dautenhahn
 Gamez
 Haikonen
 Ikegami
 Nomura, Takaishi, & Hashido
 Shanahan
 Stuart
 Ziemke
3.
Torrance, Steve; Clowes, Robert; & Chrisley, Ron (guest eds.)
(2007), Machine Consciousness: Embodiment and Imagination,
Journal of Consciousness Studies 14(7) (July).
 Table of contents, abstracts, & some full texts at above
link.
 Contains articles by:
 Aleksander











4.
Bringsjord
Chrisley
Clowes
Haikonen
Hesslow
Holland
Ikegami
Kiverstein
Stuart
Torrance
Ziemke
Chella, Antonio; & Manzotti, Riccardo (eds.) (2007a), Artificial
Consciousness (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic).
 Contains articles by:
 Aleksander
 Cardaci, D'Amico, & Caci
 Chella
 Farleigh
 Faro & Giordano
 Gaglio
 Holland
 Lavazza
 Manzotti
 Morasso
 Parisi
 Sanz, López, & Bermejo-Alonso
 Tagliasco
 Taylor
 Ziemke
For a critical review, see:

5.
Aleksander, Igor; Awret, Uziel; Bringsjord, Selmer;
Chrisley, Ron; Clowes, Roert; Parthemore, Joel; Stuart,
Susan; Torrance, Steve; & Ziemke, Tom (2008),
"Assessing Artificial Consciousness: A Collective Review
Article", Journal of Consciousness Studies 15(7): 95–110.
Chella, Antonio; & Manzotti, Riccardo (eds.) (2007b), AI and
Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches;
Papers from the AAAI Fall Symposium, Technical Report FS-07-01
(Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press).
 Contains papers (many online) by:
 Aleksander
 Boltuc
 Chella
 Chrisley
 Dubois, Poirier, & Nkambou
 Franklin
 Haikonen
 Harnad
 Hesslow
 Kuipers
 Manzotti













Marcarelli & McKinsry
McCauley
Menant
Parisi
Pirri
Rzepka & Araki
Samsonovich
Sanz, López, & Hernández
Shanahan
Sloman
Stuart
Tagliasco
Tononi
6.
Boltuc, Peter (ed.) (2008), Papers on Robot Consciousness,
A[merican ]P[hilosophical ]A[ssociation] Newsletter on
Philosophy and Computers 8(2) (Fall).
 Containing papers by:
 Baars
 Chella
 Franklin
 Harman
 Wheeler
7.
Buttazzo, Giorgio; & Manzotti, Riccardo (guest eds.) (2008),
Special Issue on Artificial Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence in
Medicine 44(2) (October): 77–170.
 Contains online articles by:
 Buttazzo
 Chella, Frixione, & Gaglio
 Clowes & Seth
 Chrisley
 Harnad
 Kuipers
 Manzotti
 Tagliasco
8.
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
 Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 2009) contains online articles by:
 Aleksander
 Baars
 Boltuc
 Chella & Manzotti
 Chrisley
 Franklin
 Hernández, López, & Sanz
 Hudlicka
 Samsonovich
 Seth
 Taylor
C.
Tests of Consciousness (Artificial or Otherwise)
0.
1.
2.
3.
D.
Moor, James H. (1988), "Testing Robots for Qualia", in Herbert R.
Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: D. Reidel): 107–116.
 Editorial comments on pp. 116–118.
 Replies (each with editorial comments):
. Van Gulick, Robert (1988), "Qualia, Functional
Equivalence, and Computation", in Herbert R.
Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on
Mind (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel): 119–
126.
a. Johnstone, Henry W., Jr. (1988), "Animals,
Qualia, and Robots", in Herbert R. Otto &
James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel): 127–136.
 local copy of most of the above
Anderson, John R.; & Lebiere, Christian (2003), "The Newell Test
for a Theory of Cognition", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:
587–637.
 See also:
Anderson, John R. (2007), How Can the Human Mind
Occur in the Physical Universe? (New York: Oxford
University Press).
 See especially "The Question of Consciousness",
pp. 243–247, where Anderson concludes: "I am
willing to declare ACT-R conscious" (p. 247).
Floridi, Luciano (2005), "Consciousness, Agents and the
Knowledge Game", Minds and Machines 15(3–4) (November):
415–444.
. Bringsjord, Selmer (2010), "Meeting Floridi's Challenge
to Artificial Intelligence from the Knowledge-Game Test
for Self-Consciousness", Metaphilosophy 41(3) (April):
292–312.
a. Floridi, Luciano (2010), "The Philosophy of Information:
Ten Years Later", Metaphilosophy 41(3) (April): 402–
491; response to Bringsjord on pp. 404–406.
Koch, Christof; & Tononi, Giulio (2008), "Can Machines Be
Conscious?", IEEE Spectrum (June 2008): 55–59.
 See also: Tononi & Edelman 1998
 Koch, Christof; & Tononi, Giulio (2011), "A Test for
Consciousness", Scientific American 304(6) (June): 44–
47.
 "How will we know when we've built a sentient
computer? By making it solve a simple puzzle."
Miscellaneous (in chronological order)
0.
Marcel, A.J.; & Bisiach, E. (eds.) (1988), Consciousness in
Contemporary Science (Oxford: Clarendon)
Includes:
.
a.
Shallice, Tim, "Information-Processing Models of
Consciousness"
Johnson-Laird, Philip N., "A Computational Analysis of
Consciousness"
1.
2.
3.
Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1999), "The Interpreter Within: The Glue
of Conscious Experience", Cerebrum: The Dana Forum on Brain
Science 1(1) (Spring):68–78.
 A theory about the nature of consciousness as an
"interpreter" of the brain's modular activities, by one of
the pioneers of split-brain research.
Buttazzo, Giorgio (2001), "Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or
Real Possibility?" IEEE Computer 34(7) (July): 24–30.
Haikonen, Pentti O. (2003), The Cognitive Approach to Conscious
Machines (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic).
See also:

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Haikonen, Pentti O. (2007), Robot Brains: Circuits and
Systems for Conscious Machines (Wiley-Interscience).
Harnad Stevan (2003), "Can a Machine Be Conscious? How?".
Adami, Christoph (2006), "What Do Robots Dream Of?", Science
314 (17 November): 1093–1094.
Granger, Richard (2006), "Essential Circuits of Cognition: The
Brain's Basic Operations, Architecture, and Representations"
Granger, Richard (2006), "Engines of the Brain: The
Computational Instruction Set of Human Cognition", AI Magazine
27(2) (Summer):15–32.
Kiverstein, Julian (2007), "Could a Robot Have a Subjective Point
of View?", Journal of Consciousness Studies 14(7): 127–139.
Aleksander, Igor (2008), "Machine Consciousness", Scholarpedia
3(2): 4162
Horgan, John (2008), "The Consciousess Conundrum", IEEE
Spectrum 45(6) (June):36–41.
 "The wetware that gives rise to consciousness is far too
complex to be replicated in a computer anytime soon."
 From Special Report: The Singularity
Shapiro, Stuart C.; & Bona, Jonathan P. (2009), "The GLAIR
Cognitive Architecture", in Alexei Samsonovich (ed.), Biologically
Inspired Cognitive Architectures: Papers from the AAAI Fall
Symposium, Technical Report FS-09-01 (Menlo Park, CA: AAAI
Press).
O'Regan, J. Kevin (2011), Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell:
Understanding the Feel of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
 Wonderful title, computationally sympathetic, but
ultimately disappointing. Has a terrific chapter (Ch. 8) on
the "hard" problem of qualia, which is well worth reading
and pinpoints exactly why the problem is hard. But his
solution, though offered as a counterpoint to Dennett's
view, is ultimately not much better than Dennett's, though
offering more detail. One problem is that he analyzes
qualia in terms of interaction, but how would he explain
mental imagery or memories of qualia, which don't
involve interaction? And one of his principal claims…
If we take experiencing a raw feel to be an
activity of interacting with the world, then by this
very definition, there must be something it's like
for this interaction to be happening: Interactions
always have some quality or other. (Ch. 14,
p. 165.)
…simply begs the question. (After all, what is it that
explains why and how the interactions have quality?)

E.
For a shorter version of his book, see:
O'Regan, J. Kevin (2012), "How to Build a Robot that Is
Conscious and Feels", Minds and Machines 22(2)
(Summer): 117–136.
0. video
1. transcript
Websites
0.
1.
2.
Conscious Robots
Machine Consciousness
"DARPA Workshop on Self-Aware Computer Systems 2004"
 Includes position statements by Baars, Franklin, Holland,
McCarthy, McDermott, Perlis, Schubert, Shapiro,
Sloman, inter alia.

 <="" a="">
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